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    Athletes Shake Up Sports Governance

    Sports governance worldwide has had its legs knocked out from under it. Yet national and international sports administrators are slow in realizing the magnitude of what has hit them. Tectonic plates underlying the guiding principle that sports and politics are unrelated have shifted, driven by a struggle against racism and a quest for human rights and social justice.

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    The principle was repeatedly challenged over the last year by athletes and businesses forcing national and international sports federations to either support anti-racist protest or, at the very least, refrain from penalizing those who use their sport to oppose racism and promote human rights and social justice — acts that are political by definition. The assault on what is a convenient fiction that sports and politics do not mix started in the US. This was not only the result of Black Lives Matter protests on US streets, but also the fact that, in contrast to the fan-club relationship in most of the world, American sports clubs and associations see fans as clients — and the client is king.

    From Football to F1

    The assault moved to Europe in the last month with the national football teams of Norway, Germany and the Netherlands wearing T-shirts during qualifiers for the 2022 FIFA World Cup that supported human rights and change. The European sides added their voices to perennial criticism of migrant workers’ rights in Qatar, the host of next year’s World Cup. Gareth Southgate, the manager of the English national team, said the Football Association was discussing migrant rights in the Gulf state with Amnesty International.

    While Qatar is the focus in Europe, greater sensitivity to human rights appears to be moving beyond. Formula One driver Lewis Hamilton told a news conference in Bahrain ahead of this season’s opening Grand Prix that there “are issues all around the world, but I do not think we should be going to these countries and just ignoring what is happening in those places, arriving, having a great time and then leave.” Hamilton has been prominent in speaking out against racial injustice and social inequality since the National Football League in the US endorsed the Black Lives Matter movement and players taking the knee during the playing of the American national anthem in protest against racism.

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    In a dramatic break with its ban on “any political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images” on the pitch, FIFA, the governing body of world football, said it would not open disciplinary proceedings against the European players who wore the T-shirts. “FIFA believes in the freedom of speech and in the power of football as a force for good,” a spokesperson said.

    The statement constituted an implicit acknowledgment that standing up for human rights and social justice was inherently political. It raises the question of how FIFA will reconcile its stand on human rights with its statutory ban on political expression. It makes maintaining the fiction of a separation between politics and sports ever more difficult to defend. It also opens the door to a debate on how the inseparable relationship that joins sports and politics at the hip like Siamese twins should be regulated.

    Georgia’s Voting Law

    Signaling that a flood barrier may have collapsed, Major League Baseball this month said it would be moving its 2021 All-Star Game out of Atlanta in response to a new law in the US state of Georgia that threatens to potentially restrict voting access for people of color. In a shot across the bow to FIFA and other international sports associations, major companies headquartered in Georgia, including Coca-Cola, Delta Airlines and Home Depot, adopted political positions in their condemnation of the Georgia voting law.

    The greater assertiveness of athletes and corporations in speaking out for fundamental rights and against racism and discrimination will make it increasingly difficult for sports associations to uphold the fiction of a separation between politics and sports. The willingness of FIFA, the US Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC), and other national and international associations to look the other way when athletes take their support for rights and social justice to the sports arena has let the genie out of the bottle. It has sawed off the legs of the FIFA principle that players’ “equipment must not have any political, religious or personal slogans.”

    Already, the US committee has said it would not sanction American athletes who choose to raise their fists or kneel on the podium at this July’s Tokyo Olympic Games as well as future tournaments. The decision puts the USOPC at odds with the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) strict rule against political protest. The IOC suspended and banned US medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos after the sprinters raised their fists on the podium at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics to protest racial inequality in the United States.

    Regulation

    Acknowledging the incestuous relationship between sports and politics will ultimately require a charter or code of conduct that regulates it and introduces some form of independent oversight. This could be something akin to the supervision of banking systems or the regulation of the water sector in Britain, which, alongside the United States, holds privatized water as an asset.

    Human rights and social justice have emerged as monkey wrenches that could shatter the myth of a separation between sports and politics. If athletes take their protests to the Tokyo Olympics and the 2022 World Cup, the myth would sustain a significant body blow. In December 2020, a statement by US athletes seeking changes to the USOPC’s rule banning protest at sporting events said: “Prohibiting athletes to freely express their views during the Games, particularly those from historically underrepresented and minoritized groups, contributes to the dehumanization of athletes that is at odds with key Olympic and Paralympic values.”

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    How the End of the Gulf Crisis Affects Sudan

    Sudan has been at the center of the diverging interests of wealthy Gulf states for many years. Having been close allies of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar had longstanding business, military and political interests in the country prior to the Gulf crisis in 2017. In June of that year, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt — known as the Arab quartet — cut diplomatic and trade relations with Qatar.

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    After almost four years of severed ties, reconciliation in January led to the subsequent lifting of the blockade against Qatar and the formal restoration of relations. The resolution of the dispute is a positive regional development. However, it remains fragile because the issues that sparked the rift in the first place were never resolved.

    It is therefore unlikely that the Gulf reconciliation will usher in a new beginning or bring about a return to pre-crisis normalcy. Deep-rooted mistrust between the Gulf countries, ongoing rivalries between them, divergence in their policies and geostrategic competition in Africa could trigger the next diplomatic crisis among member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

    Sudan’s Attempt to Play All Sides

    Most Arab and sub-Saharan African states tried to resist pressure to join the anti-Qatar coalition and delicately maneuver their way into neutrality. These states were uneasy about their move because they feared that the Arab quartet would use their economic might against them. As a result, some African states cut or downgraded ties with Qatar.

    Financial influence in Africa has helped GCC states capitalize on their geostrategic location, increase their food security and advance their diplomatic and security goals. By offering substantial economic incentives, they have been able to bolster peace agreements between warring factions. Some GCC states have achieved notable success, growing influence and African allies that support their policies. Sudan is a case in point. In 2019, Saudi investments in Sudan were estimated at $12 billion, the UAE at $7 billion and Qatar at $4 billion, as per the Sudanese Bureau of Statistics. 

    Due to Saudi Arabia’s large investments, Sudan supported the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen in 2015 by deploying Rapid Support Forces and severing diplomatic ties with Iran. However, Bashir’s relationship with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi began stalling in the last few years of his rule. As part of the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s regional efforts to counter what they considered political Islam, Bashir was expected to root out Islamists in Sudan. However, since Islamists were deeply engrained in Sudan’s government, he could not risk alienating them and did not oblige.

    The Gulf dispute put Bashir in another uncomfortable position. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar were all key investors in Sudan and he could not afford to alienate any of them. Therefore, Bashir took the safest route of remaining neutral while offering to mediate between the opposing sides.

    The Sudanese leader’s reaction to the Gulf rift was not surprising. Historically, he cooperated with all regional powers, never fully aligning with any of them. His hands-off approach and ability to easily switch from the role of an army leader to an advocate of political Islam, enabled Sudan to simultaneously ally with rival GCC camps. It seems that Bashir’s key goal was to benefit economically from all Gulf states.

    Sudan Under the New Transitional Government

    Unfortunately for Bashir, Sudan’s economy collapsed, nationwide protests erupted in December 2018 and none of his Gulf allies came to his rescue. The GCC states were probably influenced by growing uncertainty regarding Bashir’s future. Their goal was to protect their investments, not Bashir. Without GCC financial support, the Sudanese president found his days in power numbered.

    In April 2019, Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed a military coup that ended three decades of Bashir’s rule and led to the creation of a Transitional Military Council (TMC). The GCC duo promptly promised a staggering $3 billion in aid to support the TMC. However, growing international pressure pushed the TMC to sign a power-sharing agreement with Sudan’s pro-democracy movement. The TMC transferred power to a sovereignty council for a transitional period. Elections to usher in a civilian-led government are planned in late 2023 or early 2024.

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    Saudi Arabia and the UAE have vested interests in backing the Sudanese military and ensuring it maintains control of the political transition. Consequently, they continue to offer economic and humanitarian support to Sudan. In return, the TMC has supported their war efforts in Yemen and, more recently, in Libya.

    After the 2019 revolution, Sudan temporarily cut ties with Qatar, accusing it of supporting Islamists. Qatar had a close relationship with Bashir’s former ruling National Congress Party that drew the ire of the TMC. However, Qatar has since rebuilt its influence by supporting Sudan’s removal from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST). In October 2020, Doha announced that a peace agreement had been brokered between the transitional government and rebel forces. Qatar has also provided much-needed humanitarian relief.

    Sudan remains a country of great economic and security importance to the world. It has an abundance of natural resources. The African Development Bank Group estimates that approximately 63% of Sudan’s land is agricultural but only 15-20% is under cultivation. This offers vast investment opportunities in agriculture. Sudan is also strategically located on the Red Sea just south of the Suez Canal, a key shipping passage for world trade.

    Major Challenges and Future Scenarios

    Sudan’s transitional government recently set its priorities for 2021, which include a focus on the economy, peace, security, foreign relations and the ongoing democratic transition. However, the challenges facing the transitional government are dire. Foreign debt has risen to over $60 billion and inflation has crossed 300%. The country faces massive unemployment and chronic shortages of bread, fuel and foreign currency. Sudan is in the throes of a complex power struggle between civilians and the military. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) threatens Sudan’s water security. Sudanese and Ethiopian troops have clashed at the border. If this was not daunting already, Sudan has registered nearly 32,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19, as of April 9.

    In response to some of these challenges, the transitional government has instituted seismic constitutional changes. After nearly three decades, the US removed Sudan from the SST list in January, eliminating a major hurdle to debt relief and bringing an end to the country’s isolation from global financial systems. However, the transitional government remains under pressure to deliver quick economic wins. If it fails, power may shift back toward the military. In these tough circumstances, the transitional government’s success and Sudan’s democratic future depend on outside financial support.

    For Sudan, the Gulf crisis served as a minor inconvenience. The revolution and Sudan’s removal from the SST list are more significant developments. GCC states are now encountering a growing number of new regional and international players who are looking at Sudan with increased interest. This could very well cause a shift in Gulf–Sudan relations.

    Although GCC states have a shared strategic interest in Sudan’s stability, this takes a back seat to alliances that promote the individual interests of these Gulf countries. They are all trying to increase their regional influence and are turning post-revolution Sudan into another theater of GCC rivalry. Given Sudan’s fragile economic and political situation, it needs financial support. Economic forces played a major role in the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime and will determine the survival of the transitional government.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Mohammed bin Salman’s Neom: A Case of Giga-Narcissism

    Despite rumors to the contrary due to the somewhat soiled reputation of a leader better known for, according to US intelligence, commanding the murder of a Washington Post journalist than his contribution to the future of humankind, Business Insider reassuringly reports that “work is pressing ahead at Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman‘s prized gigaprojects, a key pillar of his dream of modernizing Saudi Arabia.”

    The young man known as MBS has a confirmed habit of spending vast amounts of money on anything that may redound to his personal glory. And nothing redounds better than immensely costly, futuristic public projects that defy description. His discreetly managed construction of his own Chateau Louis XIV in Louveciennes, just a few kilometers from Versailles itself, got very little publicity, due undoubtedly to the fact that it was just an example of narcissistic indulgence.

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    The New York Times has referred to it as “the most expensive house in the world,” though there appear to be other candidates, such as Antilia in Mumbai, whose cost of construction estimated at between $1 and $2 billion dwarfs the $300 million that Mohammed bin Salman’s Chateau is worth. That nevertheless qualifies it for the title of the most elegant expensive house in the world and possibly the most respectful of its environment, nestled discreetly within the charming forest of Louveciennes.

    For all its splendor and expense, Chateau Louis XIV doesn’t is no gigaproject. The Times calls it a “bauble” for MBS. It has nothing to do with “modernizing Saudi Arabia” since it doesn’t even modernize France. The real future jewel in the crown prince’s crown is a delirious vision of the future called Neom.

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Gigaproject:

    Any absurd, unrealistic project planned by an individual with access to gigabillions of dollars and devoid of human values

    Contextual Note

    Business Insider gives its readers an idea of what MBS wants Neom to become. It is not just a hypermodern resort for billionaires, like Dubai, but a bold, forward-looking gigaproject that will generously advance the interests of science, the environment and especially human beings addicted to sci-fi literature and film and willing to pay to see and experience technoscientific fantasies materialized in front of their very eyes. “The city, named Neom, would be carbon neutral and have artificial rain, a fake moon, flying taxis, and robotic maids, according to early blueprints drawn up by consultants. It has since branded itself as a future hub for pioneering clean energy development,” Bill Bostock writes.

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    It sounds as if the consultants were asked to physically combine Las Vegas, Universal Studios, Disneyland and Dubai and shape them into a doughy ball that MBS could then roll out across a stretch of Arabian Desert. Business Insider explains that Mohammed bin Salman’s aim is to “inspire awe,” as if the daring murder and dismembering of journalist Jamal Khashoggi hadn’t already achieved that effect.

    But there is an even more serious objective. MBS wants Neom and two other gigaprojects to “substantiate his self-styled image as a reformer, while adding new strings to Saudi Arabia’s economic bow.” No other reformer of the past — from Martin Luther to Martin Luther King — has had the temerity and deep sense of empathy toward suffering humanity capable of guiding them toward the coveted goal of creating a society with artificial rain and a fake moon.

    In an earlier article, Business Insider describes Neom as “the world’s first ‘cognitive city.’ It is designed to “anticipate residents’ needs,” which it does by harvesting “an unprecedented amount of data from future residents.” It follows the Google model, offering something deemed valuable for free to gain control of all the forces underlying its consumers’ behavior. Both Google and MBS deploy a strategy that consists of confusing the random, artificially stimulated desires of their customers with needs.

    At least the Chinese model of social credits, denounced throughout the West as a totalitarian tool, derives from the value of “harmony” at the core of Chinese culture. Technology now enables every government in the world to encourage not just spying on its citizens, but monitoring every individual’s behavior. Democratic regimes do it one way. Despotic regimes do it another way. What varies is the type of hypocrisy used to justify it.

    Historical Note

    In recent history, the idea of reform, especially in the context of democracy, referred to measures that served to reduce injustice and promote equality. As a supremely autocratic monarchy, Saudi Arabia is the opposite of a democracy. When commentators such as Thomas Friedman detect the utilization of despotic powers to promote conformity with the global economic system imposed by the United States on the rest of the world, they call those who initiate such processes reformers. For Friedman, the world loses its asperities and becomes “flat” — in his reading, fair and just as well as economically dynamic — whenever money and monopoly-orientated technological innovation are brought together and stimulated by visionary political leadership. The symbiosis of Wall Street and Silicon Valley sums up Friedman’s ideal. Mohammed bin Salman encapsulated that ideal.

    The political stakes are undeniable. Business Insider cites the opinion of a former US diplomat who explained that the Saudi crown prince’s political future is “to a considerable extent tied to the success of” these gigaprojects. In today’s economy, commercial success, especially when technology is involved, is the key to pardoning crimes that can be henceforth reclassified as unfortunate episodes of history that deserve to be erased from our collective memory.

    The challenge nevertheless remains of ensuring such projects are successful. Money alone won’t do the trick. Overly ambitious projects, however well-funded, are risky, just as dismembering a journalist in an Istanbul consulate may prove risky. If the project doesn’t live up to its ambitions, danger lurks. The higher and more unrealistic the ambition, the greater the chances of humiliating failure. And the more enticing the promise — in this case, of accelerating scientific progress — the more disappointing even partial success will prove to be. With the right engineering and adequate investment, as a theoretical proposition, Neom may today seem technically feasible — just like Elon Musk’s idea of thriving colonies on Mars — but the willingness of humans to live in such artificial worlds and their ability to adapt to radically different living conditions may fail to meet the designers’ optimistic expectations.

    If Dubai has proved successful, it is because — despite its pretensions of grandeur — its hyperreality has never crossed the invisible line of credibility. It has simply taken and exaggerated every notable trend in the consumer society. Its unoriginal architecture imitates existing models. How many buildings in Dubai look like cheap imitations of New York’s Chrysler building or the British Parliament? Hyperreality is about imitation and illusion, not innovation. Neom appears to want to merge both and to be honored for advancing human science.

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    Andrew Hudson-Smith, a professor of digital urban systems at University College London, believes Neom’s success is possible. “People will buy into this as long as they’re given an incentive for it,” he told Business Insider. “That may be better healthcare, which is what Neom has said.” A Saudi analyst offered this optimistic take: “People will value the convenience and the associated elimination of bureaucracy … over sharing their digital data that many assume is already in the public domain given the technology that they use.” It’s the Google-Facebook principle.

    This thinking is consistent with the ingrained ideology of the consumer society. Offer people something new that seems to solve a problem or offer a new convenience and they will readily accept the associated constraints, so long as those constraints don’t become too visible. But there’s a significant flaw in the reasoning. Consumer society’s success in the 20th century rested on the idea that it was about limitless choice. Neom and Musk’s Mars colonies neglect the fact that choice implies the ability to change one’s choice once the consumer discovers the drawbacks. The worst thing that can happen to consumers is to feel they have become the prisoner of their choices.

    Business Insider claims the “experts are excited about Neom” before adding “the caveat that smart cities rarely resemble their original blueprints.” The experts have the luxury of simply drawing up new blueprints. Those who have committed to living there may feel locked in by circumstances or by their sense of shame at having made the wrong consumer choice.

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The Battle Lines of Yemen’s Endgame

    An endgame, traditionally, brings both bad and good news. An endgame is always tense because those involved know things are coming to a head. We can see this in the battle theaters in Yemen over the past weeks. What we don’t see is the reality of how those battles are actually progressing and who will be the last man standing: Ansar Allah, aka Houthis, or the Hadi faction, aka Yemen’s legitimate government. Although from the experience of past battles and the progressive loss of ground President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi had suffered, we can make a good guess. 

    The battlegrounds are the oil-rich Mareb, the 3,000-year-old capital city of the queen of Sheba, with its famous Mareb Dam, and the north-south large buffer city, Taiz, whose 2.5 million people suffered heavily over the past six years. These are the two regions where Hadi has some but not full control, and where tribal and political loyalties are as clear as the sun on a very foggy, snowy day. These two battlegrounds will not only determine the future of Hadi and his circle, who for the past six years served as the Saudi coalition’s pretext for its destructive military intervention, but also the future make-up of postwar Yemen and, most probably, the region’s new alliances. 

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    Ansar Allah’s efforts are centered around eliminating the Hadi faction permanently from the equation by driving its forces from its last two strategic positions. The meeting last month in Muscat, Oman, between the US and Ansar Allah might have a lot to do with wrapping up the fighting and discussing postwar scenarios. The battles cannot be allowed to continue for long, especially with other pressing regional issues demanding resolution. That is why, compared to all their battles so far, the Hadi faction is determined to continue fighting. Its survival depends on these two key positions, as does Ansar Allah’s ultimate prize — to retain its hard-won title as the driving force in Yemen’s political future, possibly as king, or at least as kingmaker.

    The Southern Transitional Council (STC), which had already dealt its own decisive blow to Hadi, now relishes its turn to watch the events unfold, clearly hoping for an Ansar Allah victory. This would help to terminate the president’s influence completely from the STC’s own stronghold, Aden, where the Hadi group exists ceremoniously as a government only with the STC’s permission.   

    First Scenario

    There are three possible scenarios for an endgame in this conflict. First is a total defeat and subsequent elimination of the Hadi faction from Yemen’s political future. That entails the elimination of the General People’s Congress (GPC), the ruling party founded by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Islah, Yemen’s brand of Muslim Brotherhood also created by Saleh as a religious party opposing the south’s Yemen Socialist Party (YSP). Ironically, Islah evolved into a strong opposition to Saleh’s own rule and allied with a weak YSP.

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    The GPC and Islah, once the stalwarts of Yemen’s post-union political landscape, have now become spent forces. The GPC managed in totalitarian fashion by its founder virtually died with him, as is always the case with one-man shows. Islah, defeated, then banished from Yemen by its ideological and political arch-rival Ansar Allah now exists largely in Saudi Arabia, where it is at once viewed as a terrorist organization and an ally by the Saudi regime. The UAE also rejects Islah, like it does the rest of the Muslim Brothers. These two spent forces are the bulwarks of the Hadi bloc.

    Eliminating the two political parties in every way but in name will not be unprecedented in Yemen. Following the two-month war in 1994 to defeat southern secessionist attempts led by the YSP, the GPC-Islah alliance completely destroyed the socialists, once a powerful dictatorship that ruled the pre-union People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. It then remained an insignificant player that managed to find a small voice on the bandwagon of Yemen’s Arab Spring revolution in 2011. Currently, in the midst of this war, the YSP is unheard of. Ironically, its fate now awaits its nemeses, the GPC and Islah, once ruling allies, then ruling opponents, now on the same side of a banished government led by Hadi, who, despite his international recognition as president, is unable to set foot in the country he claims to preside over.

    This scenario leaves Ansar Allah in control of the northern part of Yemen, with the STC controlling the south. This should be the logical platform for a north-south federation that can save the union. In the face of opposition to a preferred larger multistate federation, such a scenario was envisaged years back when the idea of a centralized state was completely rejected due to its absolute totalitarianism as well as political and financial corruption. But this scenario is now the most viable to bring a stable and peaceful solution.

    Second Scenario

    However, the danger for Yemen as a whole is the second scenario, in which the STC, without seeking a referendum, uses the fiat of its de facto power supported by the UAE to push for secession. Such a move will provoke others and become destructive in a postwar landscape. The move will also be dangerous for its proponents, the STC and the southerners who support it, and also the south’s backers in Abu Dhabi.

    Since independence in 1967, the south has not been politically cohesive. The fighting between the Hadi government — whose members, including Hadi himself, are largely southerners — and the STC, which is identifiably a southern secessionist movement is reminiscent of pre-union southern civil wars. Other secessionist voices in the south have become more prominent since the war of 1994. The large, oil-rich Hadhramout region has the economic and geographic viability to survive as a state on its own.

    Together with neighboring Shabwah, another large oil region, the two can be united as a nation. This is a prospect the Saudis have been seeking for many years, hoping to integrate the two regions into greater Saudi Arabia with a direct outlet to the Arabian Sea, away from the unstable Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. Neighboring Mahra, bordering Oman, with whom it has historical and ethnic ties, can find some accommodating formula with Muscat.

    Such a scenario will leave the STC with Aden and its surrounding regions of Lahaj, Abyan, Yafei and Dhalee, all of which can only be economically viable as part of a nation, never on their own. This is the dangerous scenario that the STC and the UAE must be very cautious about. It spells dangers for both by creating a total dependence of STC-ruled areas on Abu Dhabi. While this might look appealing for the UAE in the short term, enabling it to obtain geographical concessions from the STC — especially to Socotora, the Arab world’s biggest island coveted by Abu Dhabi — in the long term it will backfire because Yemenis have always reacted violently to attempts by external forces to dominate them territorially.

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    Besides, this scenario also enables the Saudis to become more powerful vis-à-vis the Gulf Cooperation Council, a prospect that others, especially the UAE and Oman, will find unnerving. There are much better ways of achieving regional partnerships that are peaceful, inexpensive and offer stable long-term benefits to all involved. On the other hand, there are intertwined economic and social bonds between north and south Yemen. Not only are these ties necessary and beneficial to maintain, but they are also difficult to break.

    The gas exported through the Balhaf terminal in the south originates from the fields in Mareb in the north of the country. The southern Yemeni oil that originates from fields in Masila and eastern Shabwah is piped across the northern Yemeni desert to Ras Essa in the Red Sea, part of north Yemen. This type of profitable integration exists in other economic lifelines of the nation. Families on both sides have strong social relations that are evident through intermarriage, food, dress, culture and social habits, forming a diverse nation of strong similarities.

    Why all this must be allowed to be lost at the risk of returning to the pre-union border wars is a serious question that anyone seeking to break the union will have to address. Secession demands have been largely led by emotions and a revolt against the excesses, mismanagement and corruption of the Saleh regime, which wreaked havoc on all Yemen and especially the south. But that regime is gone, never to return. Yemenis must now ask themselves if they still want to break up the country — with all the dangers, weaknesses and instability this fracture will bring to Yemen and the entire region — or whether they should mend Yemen in the broken places and build a viable nation that can be a strong regional and international partner?

    Such a Yemen will become a powerful lynchpin to the region’s security arrangement, especially as a southern security gate to the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen has the only regional coastline that connects both the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, extending for more than 2,500 kilometers. Going forward, regional political decisions affecting Yemen’s fate can either turn a very frustrated and angry Yemeni population, which has suffered six years of relentless airstrikes, blockade, starvation and military intervention, into a force for chaos or stability in this very important waterway. Clearly, seeing the support retaliatory strikes against Saudi Arabia are getting amongst Yemenis, those currently working toward peace have their work cut out for them. They better hurry. With time and patience running out, failure to meet peace expectations can become ever more dangerous.

    Ideal Scenario

    The ideal scenario given the current situation will be a new formula for a union that creates a federal government, with strong local governments to support it. That is the type of multistate federation envisaged before the military intervention brought Yemeni peace talks to a sudden halt on the eve of a breakthrough. It is still viable within a two-state federation.

    The third scenario is a stalemate in the current battles with no decisive victories. It is very doubtful that this would lead to a negotiated settlement. It has failed in the past six years because of external players funding and arming opposing sides. No solution in Yemen is possible without turning around the roles played by external forces. A stalemate at the present time is the worst possible scenario that must be avoided at all costs. Yemenis cannot afford it and should not be required to suffer it again.

    Strange as this might sound, it is, in fact, the UAE that can drive a solution, provided it is willing to terminate its destructive role in the Yemen war and follow the US example by announcing it is disengaging from the Saudi coalition. Despite saber-rattling, the UAE, among all Arab countries, has excellent relations with Iran, as demonstrated by substantial business ties, the large Iranian community in the UAE and the number of flights between the two countries. The UAE, despite the war, has good coordinating relations with Ansar Allah, and, of course, it is also the sponsor and benefactor of the STC without which the council would not survive. Despite the raging proxy battles between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the south of Yemen, Abu Dhabi still retains working relations with Riyadh. Unlike the Saudis, the UAE also has good relations with the Biden administration.

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    Working closely with Oman, which maintains unique relations with Yemenis across the divide, and Iran, which has excellent relations with Ansar Allah and is cordial with the STC, Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Tehran could together play a pivotal role in ending the war in Yemen, isolating those unwilling or unable to come to the table.

    However, the challenge in this approach is that, unlike some of its neighbors who might be of help, Yemen is a republic with a strong tradition of a free press and multiparty political process. The attempts to rule Yemen centrally through a totalitarian system failed because of these two characteristics. Its tribal tradition does not accept the full authority of a state. On the flip side, it is this strong tribal independence that strengthens Yemeni resolve to resist authoritarian rule. Should the process of bringing peace to Yemen threaten this rebellious characteristic, the dangers to the process can be insurmountable.

    Whether we will see this type of regional alliance brought to fruition depends on whether regional leaders are visionaries and strategists or are still confined to simple-minded tactical mentalities to achieve short-term gains. There is an opportunity in President Joe Biden announcing US disengagement from the conflict in Yemen and seeking its end. Others can do the same and ally themselves with this US direction. The blood and treasure that has been lost in Yemen, the social fabric that has been destroyed in the region, the hatred that replaced popular harmony due to bad decisions taken by regional leaders have all compounded the world’s worst man-made catastrophe.

    The heaviest price has been paid by Yemenis, once also known to ancient Romans and Greeks as Arabia Felix. As the Quran eloquently describes it, using Yemen’s ancient name, “There was among the people of Sheba, in their homes the proof (of God), two gardens on the right and the left. Eat from the bounties of your Lord and be thankful. A good land and forgiving God.” More than ever in the past, Yemen and the whole of the Middle East now have a unique opportunity to come together, bringing peace and stability to a region uniquely endowed with the potential for prosperity.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The Talented Mr. Bin Salman

    Mohammed bin Salman is a charming fellow. The tall, dark and handsome Saudi prince known as MBS has seduced world leaders and eager pundits left and right. To his supporters, MBS became first in line to the Saudi throne by championing reform in a deeply conservative Gulf kingdom, taking on corruption, confronting religious extremists and promising to modernize the economy. “Someone had to do this job — wrench Saudi Arabia into the 21st century — and MBS stepped up,” wrote Thomas Friedman in an oft-cited column from November 2017. “I, for one, am rooting for him to succeed in his reform efforts.”

    Not only impressionable opinion-makers have fallen for the prince’s charm. In 2017, MBS won the reader poll for Time’s person of the year with an astonishing 24% of the vote. Second place, at 6%, went to the magazine’s eventual pick for its cover, the #MeToo movement, while Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau garnered a mere 4%, Pope Francis 3% and then-US President Donald Trump 2%.

    Serious Politics Is Not About Recalibration

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    Of course, not everyone has been enthusiastic about the talented Mr. bin Salman. In 2015, three months into his new position as defense minister, MBS launched an air war in neighboring Yemen. Tens of thousands of Yemeni civilians have died, and the country has been plunged into a humanitarian nightmare. The war, which has become a quagmire for the Saudi-led coalition, has not exactly made a lot of friends for MBS.

    Two years later, shortly before he mesmerized Friedman in Riyadh, Mohammed bin Salman detained a number of his wealthiest rivals in a set of rooms at the Ritz-Carlton in the Saudi capital. There he subjected the sheikhs and businessmen to interrogations and torture that resulted in one death and the hospitalization of 17 others. The Saudi leadership called the extortion of billions of dollars from the rich prisoners an anti-corruption campaign, but it was really a way for MBS to consolidate his power through brute force.

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    “He is a psycho,” a relative of one of the detainees said of MBS. “He has spite. He wants to break people. He doesn’t want anyone to have an honorable name but him. He is a devil, and the devil is learning from him.”

    Shortly before the Ritz-Carlton “sheikhdown,” Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi fled the country for the United States. As a Washington Post columnist, he then took aim at the policies of the Saudi government and those of MBS in particular. While the Saudi prince “is right to free Saudi Arabia from ultra-conservative religious forces, he is wrong to advance a new radicalism that, while seemingly more liberal and appealing to the West, is just as intolerant of dissent,” Khashoggi wrote in a column from April 2018.

    That intolerance for dissent was on full and tragic display a few months later when Khashoggi walked into the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul to get papers to marry his Turkish fiancée and never came out. A government-dispatched death squad strangled the journalist and dismembered his body.

    The Saudi government initially denied that Khashoggi had been killed. Then it claimed that the killers were rogue elements. The kingdom eventually put 11 unnamed individuals on trial for the crime, charged eight of them and handed down five death sentences that it subsequently commuted to 20 years in prison.

    After Khashoggi’s murder, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on 17 Saudi officials. But even though a UN report implicated MBS in the assassination, he didn’t face any consequences. Indeed, Trump continued to praise the Saudi prince as if nothing had happened.

    “It’s an honor to be with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, a friend of mine, a man who has really done things in the last five years in terms of opening up Saudi Arabia,” Trump said at a June 2019 breakfast with MBS at the G20 meeting in Tokyo. “I want to just thank you on behalf of a lot of people, and I want to congratulate you. You’ve done, really, a spectacular job.”

    This week, the Biden administration released an earlier US intelligence report on the assassination of Khashoggi that concluded that Mohammed bin Salman approved the killing. The administration added some new sanctions against certain Saudi officials and instituted a “Khashoggi ban” against 76 unnamed individuals associated with the killing. That ban can also be applied to any foreign officials who harass or harm journalists or activists.

    Still, the Biden administration has declined to sanction MBS himself. Like Tom Ripley in the novels of Patricia Highsmith, Mohammed bin Salman is a confidence man, a possible serial killer and an all-around psychopath with a taste for the high life. Highsmith described the protagonist of “The Talented Mr. Ripley” and four other novels as “suave, agreeable, and utterly amoral.” Although he often comes close to getting caught, in the end, Tom Ripley gets away with murder every time. Will that be the fate of the talented Mr. bin Salman as well?

    The US-Saudi Relationship

    The alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia initially made sense, at least at a basic economic level. In February 1945, when Franklin D. Roosevelt met secretly with King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud on a Navy destroyer in the Suez Canal, the US president wanted to secure a homeland for Jewish refugees in Palestine. Although the Saudi king was not enthusiastic, he was willing to forge a partnership around oil. Saudi Arabia had recently discovered what promised to be very lucrative fields, and the US needed a reliable oil supply to finish off World War II and begin a post-war recovery.

    Saudi Arabia still has a lot of oil, but the US doesn’t need it anymore. From a high of two million barrels of crude a day in May 2003, US imports dropped to a mere 100,000 last December. For a period of time in January, for the first time in 35 years, the United States didn’t import any Saudi oil at all. Because of its own fossil fuel production, increased imports from countries like Canada, and greater reliance on renewables, the US is simply no longer dependent on the Saudis.

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    Take oil out of the equation and the alliance becomes untenable. Saudi Arabia is a dictatorship with fewer political and religious freedoms than, say, Iran, which the US routinely castigates for its human rights violations. The kingdom has been a destabilizing influence in the region, for instance through its war in Yemen and its earlier embargo of Qatar. Moreover, Saudi Arabia promotes a conservative version of Islam, Wahhabism, that has squeezed out more liberal variants of the religion all around the world. The country has also generated even more extremist ideologies, like the jihadism of Osama bin Laden and his followers.

    In an investigation of the links between the Saudi government and the 9/11 hijackers, the FBI found some evidence of collaboration, through the Saudi Embassy in Washington, but the agency has been divided on whether that evidence is conclusive. The name of the relevant embassy contact, Mussaed Ahmed al-Jarrah, was even inadvertently revealed last May, but it’s not likely that the Saudi government will allow him to be deposed as part of the lawsuit mounted by families of the 9/11 victims.

    It’s not the only case in which the Saudi government has been implicated. A lawsuit in Florida alleges that the kingdom could have prevented an attack by a Saudi air force officer in 2019 at a naval air station in Pensacola that left three US sailors dead.

    The US government has generally looked the other way when it comes to these obvious disqualifications for a strategic partnership. It’s not just oil. The Saudis have proved to be useful partners in various causes over the years. They provided financial support for the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan. They’ve been a bulwark behind conservative regimes in the Middle East, such as Egypt, which the United States has misinterpreted as a stabilizing influence.

    And then there’s Iran, with which Saudi Arabia has long battled for influence in the greater Middle East. Part of the rivalry is confessional — Iran is predominantly Shia, while Saudi Arabia is predominantly Sunni. The tensions are also political since the Saudis tend to prefer conservative, pro-Western regimes, while Iran favors governments and movements that are at least skeptical of the West if not outright hostile. But the competition often boils down to geopolitics, with the two countries trying to influence countries and leaders regardless of their religion or political leanings.

    Because the United States decided 40 years ago, with a big assist from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to do everything it could to constrain the new Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia became an essential partner. In 2015, the Obama administration challenged the cornerstone of this partnership with the Iran nuclear deal. Trump swung in the opposite direction to make the kingdom the fulcrum of a region-wide peace plan.

    President Joe Biden is now trying to “recalibrate” the relationship. It has ended “all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales,” but that leaves open the possibility of supporting defensive operations, whatever those might be. It has put a hold on half a billion dollars in military assistance but is now evaluating which deals can go through under the category of “defensive” weapons, like missile defense systems.

    In his initial discussions with the kingdom, Biden also raised issues of human rights and the assassination of Khashoggi. At the same time, however, the administration has tried to preserve the overall relationship by effectively pardoning MBS. King Salman is 85 years old, and he’s not in good health. With MBS set to take over, the United States doesn’t want to alienate a powerful future monarch. Mohammed bin Salman is aware of his leverage. He will act accordingly.

    Dealing with Ruling Assassins

    The Biden administration this week announced sanctions against senior Russian officials over the poisoning of dissident Alexei Navalny. In 2019, the European Union imposed sanctions on Iran for its involvement in the assassination of two Iranians in the Netherlands. After the 2017 assassination at the Kuala Lumpur airport of Kim Jong Nam, who was North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Malaysia closed its embassy in Pyongyang and imposed a travel ban on the country.

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    None of these moves has doomed bilateral relations. The US still engages with the Kremlin, most recently by extending New START. The EU is pushing hard for a resumption of the Iran nuclear deal. Malaysia reopened its embassy in Pyongyang last year.

    Part of the reason why such extrajudicial murders generate sanctions but not a full quarantine of the perpetrating countries is the widespread nature of these offenses. Among its many “targeted killings” by drones, the United States assassinated the head of Iran’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, outside the Baghdad airport at the beginning of 2020. Israel has routinely killed its opponents all over the world, including a Libyan embassy employee in Rome, an Egyptian nuclear scientist in Paris, a Brazilian colonel in Sao Paolo and a Canadian engineer in Brussels. Syria might or might not have been behind several assassinations in Lebanon, including leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. None of these countries has suffered geopolitically for these acts.

    The talented Mr. bin Salman, in other words, killed his most prominent critic because he knew he would get away with it. Even if the Biden administration decides for entirely pragmatic reasons not to sanction the Saudi prince, it should definitively stop all military support to Riyadh, even weapons considered “defensive.” After all, if Saudi Arabia feels more secure behind a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, it will be more likely to direct aerial attacks against its opponents.

    It’s the nature of geopolitics that a few psychopaths are going to become the leaders of their countries. But that’s no reason for the United States to give these “talented” men the weapons to consolidate their power.

    *[This article was originally published by FPIF.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The COVID-19 Crisis Has Catalyzed Vision 2030

    A look back at history shows that desperate times do indeed call for desperate measures. After all, it was not until Saudi officials watched in horror as oil prices plummeted by 70% that, in 2016, Vision 2030 was born. While other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members presented their own initiatives, true to form, Saudi Arabia’s economic reform agenda is the most ambitious yet. 2020 was set to mark the agenda’s first benchmark achievement. Instead, an oil price war, a disastrous bombing campaign against Yemen and a 5.4% contraction in GDP set a different tone than the kingdom may have intended.

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    The disruption ensued by the COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on economies and markets worldwide, but none saw the eye-watering lows experienced by the oil industry. This was exacerbated by Saudi Arabia and Russia going head-to-head in a price war that brought about further carnage. Despite production cuts being eventually agreed upon, the global downturn and persistent oversupply of oil reached its crescendo with US oil dropping spectacularly into negative for the first time in history.

    Progress Overview

    As the dust began to settle, a sense of urgency set in among leaders as they were faced with the aftermath of the crisis. Not only did COVID-19 highlight the risk of oil dependency, but it has further exposed oil-exporting economies to fiscal vulnerabilities. With growth contractions across the MENA region, the current price of oil is far below the break-even level required to balance the budgets. With the exception of the UAE, oil represents over 50% of GCC budgets, highlighting the urgency to diversify in order to pay off the fiscal bill. While the impact of COVID-19 on Vision 2030 is unclear, an analysis of existing achievements and overall aims can paint a clearer picture of how Saudi Arabia should reassess its grand plan in light of the pandemic.

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    Only a year after the announcement, it seemed that Vision 2030 was not enough to satiate the Saudi appetite for grandiose ideas. So, in 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced the construction of a $500-billion smart city of NEOM. Aside from talk of a fake moon and flying cars, the Saudis managed to hit a more palpable note with investors with the city’s $5-billion green hydrogen plant. By 2025, the facility will supposedly produce 650 tons of hydrogen daily and 1.2 million tons of green ammonia for export.

    Despite the challenges hydrogen fuel presents, this project offers Saudi Arabia an unparalleled opportunity to pioneer a market gaining “unprecedented political and business momentum,” according to the International Energy Agency. Beyond this, while there is little publicly available information on the kingdom’s key performance indictor achievements, visible progress has been made in the one thing it does best — state-managed tasks. Notable regulatory reforms in 2018-19 earned Saudi Arabia a spot in the World Bank’s top 10 global business-climate improvers.

    Strong development has also been observed in capital markets and the banking system, whereby the growth of Tadawul, the Saudi stock exchange, has been the standout achievement. Such praiseworthy steps have also been accompanied by progress in the realm of digitization and social reforms. Yet this is not enough.

    While the kingdom is certainly achieving its goal of being an ambitious nation, less can be said for its key pillar — a thriving economy. Job creation, foreign direct investment (FDI), entrepreneurship and private sector growth are all core areas where Saudi Arabia has fallen short. A recent string of PR disasters, like the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 and the 2017 high-profile purge that included the arrest of 11 senior princes, have further tainted the kingdom’s image, harming investor confidence. At mere 0.57% of GDP, current FDI levels are simply not enough to fund the diversification plan.

    Needless to say, the economic challenges spurred by the pandemic will require a tightening of the Saudi purse strings to rein in the growing budget deficit. Such fiscal prudence will inevitably impact the ever-more necessary reform agenda, indicating that a stringent revaluation of the Vision 2030 objectives will be needed to deliver on its promises.

    The To-Do List

    To lay the foundations of their revised plan, the kingdom must first reprioritize spending and maximize income from existing revenue streams while attracting and retaining investor funding. This will require boosting FDI through greater transparency, accountability and generally better self-conduct on the international stage. In the longer term, focusing on strategically sound, high-impact projects while delaying those with little real-time value will be an integral step in the agenda’s revaluation.

    Much to Saudi Arabia’s dismay, this will mean moving away from the likes of NEOM to the less glamourous task of actual economic reform. Yet if NEOM were not enough, within it there is now The Line — a linear, AI-run city free of carbon, cars and any sense of realism. Regardless of its supposed economic benefits, the fact of the matter remains that problems are not solved through procrastination, even if it costs billions.

    Arguably the hardest yet most important step for Saudi Arabia will be to cede state control to make room for a diverse, competitive and independent private sector. The kingdom’s strategy of spreading itself thin across all sectors is not only inefficient, but unattractive. A more market-based approach will stimulate entrepreneurship, competition and, most importantly, draw in foreign investment.

    This ties into the second key step: optimizing the business environment. This means pushing for greater access to capital, greater ease of doing business and greater stringency and transparency in the legal system, encouraging entrepreneurship both at home and from abroad. The third and most important step is human capital development. In a country where 67% of the population is below the age of 34, disregarding the youth would mean neglecting Saudi’s greatest asset.

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    Quality of education and upskilling the youth must be prioritized alongside creating jobs suited to the existing workforce. The importance of human capital cannot be overstated: In order to create a successful economy that best serves the people, investing in its citizens must be the crux of Vision 2030.

    Finally, to reinvent itself as the business hub of the Middle East, the kingdom must rein in its regional military interventions, a massive burden on both its budget and international image. In order to truly convince investors, Saudi must actively channel its efforts away from conflict and toward long-term economic reform.

    On the whole, despite some notable achievements, progress is slow, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a long journey ahead. However, COVID-19 has prompted a much-needed agenda revaluation, revealing some shortcuts and pushing Saudi leaders to move with a greater sense of urgency. The Word Bank itself warns that “higher than expected oil and gas revenues could reduce the pressure for [GCC] governments to reform,” exemplified in Vision 2030 itself being the result of such a price shock. However, with the eye-watering oil price drops of 2020, COVID-19 may have been the rude awakening Saudi leaders needed.

    The challenge now lies in both pioneering change while stimulating an economy in a world experiencing the greatest recession since the Second World War. This, of course, is no easy feat, but the key to success will lie in focusing on projects that truly add value. This will mean ceding control to facilitate private sector growth, optimizing the business environment and committing to its citizens by investing in the youth. Only then can Saudi Arabia unlock its potential and become, as it envisions, the “epicenter of trade and the gateway to the world.”

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Serious Politics Is Not About Recalibration

    Donald Trump’s brand of hyperreality over the past four years relied heavily on melodramatic plotting to keep the audience invested in the performance. To reestablish the more sober style of hyperreality the Democratic Party as an ideological force has come to represent, US President Joe Biden has cultivated the Democrats’ artificial style of neo-realism in its approach to political conflict. The Biden administration’s rhetorical creativity offers some insight into how this hyperreality is intended to play out.

    Trump, the former US president, typically chose an easy media strategy. He would disregard all existing standards, preferring to bully and shock. He relied on the public’s acceptance of the notion that — as he once said about himself — he could get away with murder in the middle of Fifth Avenue. (This paralleled his boast about women, whom he would grab in their private parts when he tired of shooting men in broad daylight.)

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    Biden has inherited a different, more “presidential” role. Independently of the policies he adopts, he finds himself having to exaggerate the contrast with Trump by at least seeming to reflect on complex issues, weighing the pros and cons and engaging in thoughtful deliberation on the same topics that Trump typically bulldozed his way through. After all that deliberation, the result tends to differ more in style than in substance.

    The Daily Devil’s Dictionary recently considered the case of Trump’s sanctions against Fatou Bensouda and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Biden has found himself in the awkward position of having to reaffirm the nation’s traditional refusal to be judged for war crimes while, at the same time, recognizing the legitimacy of the actions of the ICC so impudently denied by Trump. Now, Biden has a similar juggling act to carry out with Saudi Arabia after his director of national intelligence, Avril Haines, followed the prescribed democratic logic of obeying a command made by Congress that Trump had simply refused to acknowledge. It concerned the release of the CIA’s assessment of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) role in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist working for The Washington Post.

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    Trump chose to shield the perpetrators from any form of judgment. After all, Saudi Arabia spends hundreds of millions on American weapons. After showing such virtue, what crime could they possibly be accused of? Biden had to find a way of countering Trump while reaffirming America’s commitment to the ideal of even-handed justice. It is all in the name of preserving “American interests” (which everyone by now should know means simply money and geopolitical influence).

    The Washington Post explains how Biden has accomplished that mission: “The Biden administration will impose no direct punishment on Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, despite the conclusion of a long-awaited intelligence report released Friday that he ‘approved’ the operation, administration officials said.”

    When the press corps confronted Biden’s press secretary, Jen Psaki, questioning her over whether MBS could be “sanctioned personally,” she responded that something would be done, though without any indication of what that might be. She nevertheless offered this explanation, while insisting twice on the word “clear.” She said, “the president has been clear, and we’ve been clear by our actions that we’re going to recalibrate the relationship.” What could be clearer than the totally objective, scientific notion of recalibration?

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Recalibrate:

    Redefine a policy or relationship in such a way as to make the undermining of any existing moral principles appear justified in the pursuit of selfish interests

    Contextual Note

    Most Americans consider cold-blooded murder a moral fault as well as a criminal act. The idea of dealing with it by recalibrating a relationship might sound to some like a sick joke. How many people on death row in the US wouldn’t welcome the idea of recalibrating their relationship with the justice system? Considering that most of them — a majority of blacks, some of them later proven innocent — have not have benefited from the kind of rigorous investigation the Turkish government and the CIA carried out concerning the Khashoggi murder, the leniency of recalibration would certainly interest them.   

    The Guardian notes a slight contradiction with the moral stance Biden took concerning the Khashoggi murder during the campaign: “The decision to release the report and expected move to issue further actions represents the first major foreign policy decision of Joe Biden’s presidency, months after he vowed on the presidential campaign trail to make a ‘pariah’ out of the kingdom.” 

    This recalibration of attitude illustrates an interesting phenomenon in politics: the freedom opposition politicians have to invoke what resembles the truth followed by their tendency to equivocate as soon as they have their hands on the reins of power. “Recalibrate” deserves to be voted the Orwellian Newspeak word of the year.

    Historical Note

    To put things in perspective, Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained: “The relationship with Saudi Arabia is bigger than any one individual.” A lot of Americans, from Henry Ford to Joseph Kennedy and some of the most prominent US companies — IBM, Coca-Cola, Chase Manhattan, General Electric, Kodak, Standard Oil and Random House among others — felt exactly the same way about Nazi Germany. Why compromise a productive relationship simply because one man spouts heterodox ideas and has a tendency to kill people in the name of those ideas?

    The Washington Post quotes Blinken invoking Jen Psaki’s “recalibration” trope. In his press conference, he praised Joe Biden for moving “toward a promised ‘recalibration’ of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.” Oddly, the secretary of state seems to have forgotten that it wasn’t “one individual” who carried out the assassination, but a team of 15 who flew in and out of Istanbul for this specific effort.

    The Guardian realistically described how Mohammed bin Salman’s team culture works: “Prince Mohammed had ‘probably’ fostered an environment in which aides were afraid that they might be fired or arrested if they failed to complete assigned tasks, suggesting they were ‘unlikely to question’ the prince’s orders or undertake sensitive tasks without his approval.” As Hamlet once said of Denmark, “something is rotten in the state.” Like Biden and Blinken, Hamlet was reacting to a high-profile murder. Part of his quandary was that it wasn’t just about “one individual,” even though the Danish prince was focused on the man — his uncle — who had killed his father. 

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    As a political metaphor, the idea of recalibration may appear reassuring to some people thanks to its scientific ring, expressing an engineer’s objectivity in seeking to work with the most accurate measurements. But does it make any sense when what is at stake is a moral question, in this case literally of life and death? Or should we conclude that, for those who practice it, there are no moral questions in politics, only pragmatic ones, only questions that can be decided according to the unique criterion of “national interest?”

    The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the limits of purely “national” reasoning. The awareness of those limits will inevitably be challenged again over the next decade by the impending drama of climate change, possibly other pandemics and another global economic crash. The question of supply chains that the US encountered at the outbreak of the pandemic in 2020 and now concerning semiconductors demonstrates the absurdity of a world that has made sacrosanct the status of the nation-state. 

    Some kind of global system of cooperation — not just between nations and regions but between all manner of human groupings as well — must emerge if an economy now defined by the unique principle of technological exploitation of the earth’s resources is to persist. The ideal of growth that guides every national government is little more than a strategy of accelerated depletion of the world’s common patrimony. The very idea of national interest in a world of competitive nation-states has become a weapon of mass obliteration.

    The more technologically developed the world becomes, the more it needs to adopt some form of moral compass capable of constraining the decision-making of nations. Growth and job creation have become the only public values today’s nations are capable of putting forward. Their political imagination withers and dies as soon as they attempt to reason beyond these goals. These “public” goals are nothing more than the veneer on the surface of a powerful system dedicated to private gain.

    Such a system needs something more than simple recalibration if it is to survive.

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Will Iran Take Over the Ottoman Mantle in the Middle East?

    When the Ottoman Empire was dismantled in 1922, it created a vacuum which a series of powers have attempted to fill ever since. None has succeeded, and the result has been a century of wars, coups and instability. Iran ruled all these lands before the Arab and Ottoman conquests. It could do so again. President Joe Biden’s intention of restarting the dialogue with Tehran is an opportunity to build, at last, an enduring successor to the Ottomans and prevent Iranian dominance.

    How did we reach this point? The story begins on May 29, 1453, a Tuesday, with the moon in its final crescent quarter. Constantinople had been under siege for months, and tens of thousands of Turks were outside its massive impregnable walls. Inside were just 50,000 remaining Greeks, including the last Roman Emperor Constantine XI, or Constantine Paleologos. There were only 7,000 armed men, outnumbered at least 10 to one by the Turks. The Greeks had fresh water and could grow enough food within the walls to feed themselves. They could hold out. However, in the early hours of that morning, a Greek raiding party left the city to harry the sleeping Turks.

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    On the way back into the city through a narrow entrance, the Kerkoporta, the last Greek in forgot to lock the door. The Turks followed them, opened the main gates, and Mehmet II’s Janissaries poured in. The Byzantine empire was no more.

    Two days of looting, rape and blood-letting followed. According to custom, three days were allowed, but it was so awful that Mehmet stopped it after two. To commemorate the conquest, Mehmet added the crescent moon to the Ottoman flag, and since then, Tuesday remains the unluckiest day of the week for the Greeks. No Greek gets married on a Tuesday, and any Greek looking at the Turkish flag with the crescent moon is reminded of that calamity.

    Consent to Be Ruled

    The intervening 469 years were not of uninterrupted peace and stability, but the Ottomans did provide an overarching continuity of rule over the region. The legitimacy of the sultan and the caliph was accepted by all of the Sunni Muslim world. Ottoman rule over Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq and what is now Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states provided stability and a common rule of law. The Turks were not loved — they were authoritarian and brutal — but there was some consent to be ruled.

    On November 17, 1922, the last sultan, Mehmet VI, was loaded onto a British warship, HMS Malaya, and sent off to exile in Malta and later Italy, never to return. He was allowed to take his four official wives with him, all of them Turkish. However, there were still about 400 concubines from all over the world in the Topkapi hareem. A young British officer was dispatched to the palace with a sack of gold sovereigns to pay the women off. Each got one sovereign for every year of service. 

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    The Ottoman defeat and collapse of the empire after the First World War created a vacuum in the Middle East that the British and the French in particular wanted to exploit. The infamous Sazenov-Sykes-Picot Treaty negotiated in 1916 was the plan to carve up the carcass of the Ottoman lands between Britain, France and Russia. Russia, as party to the treaty, was to get Constantinople and surrounding lands, all of Armenia and parts of the Black Sea, but lost its place at the table after the 1917 revolution ended its participation in the war.   

    Vladimir Lenin’s new Soviet government found the Russian copy of the treaty and publicized it. A century before WikiLeaks, this was deeply embarrassing to the British who were telling the leaders of the Arab revolt that they were fighting the Turks for Arab independence. The Turks lost no time in giving as much publicity to the treaty as possible and telling the Arabs that they had been deceived into fighting with Christians against their own Muslim caliph. Although this had some effect, causing some Arab tribes to change sides, it was too late, and the Turks were expelled. The Arabs were indeed betrayed and, instead of the Arab kingdom they had been promised, they were divided into British and French protectorates. 

    The First War of Succession

    The Brits and the French may have carved up the Ottoman Empire, but they soon came to regret it. Although they installed their own or client regimes in all the Ottoman provinces, there was little peace and certainly no profit for the Europeans. Enver Pasha, an Ottoman general and hero of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the future first president of modern Turkey, led the nationalist war to expel the British and other allied powers from Turkey proper. The British and their allies had intended to carve up mainland Turkey itself as well as the Ottoman Arab possessions. When Enver Pasha prevailed, the Treaty of Sevres was torn up and the Treaty of Lausanne, negotiated in 1922-23, established present-day Turkey as the successor to the Ottoman state. It also forced Turkey to renounce all claims to former Ottoman lands. 

    The Arabs in all the new colonial possessions of the British and French were restless. This was particularly true in Palestine, where the British ruled. In 1917, the British government had issued the Balfour Declaration expressing support for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. That year, the British were losing the war because German U-boats were sinking a large number of ships bringing food and supplies from America. Britain was being strangled. The one area where the British — with Arab help — were winning was in Palestine. Former UK Prime Minister Arthur Balfour saw an opportunity to leverage the Jewish American vote to bring the United States into the war. It worked.

    But with the British now in control of Palestine, the Zionists insisted that the UK live up to its promise. Large numbers of Jews began to arrive in Palestine. This caused conflict between newly arrived Jews, the indigenous Arabs and the hapless British, who were supposed to keep the peace. Ethnic unrest and independence movements grew in the other provinces. The British and French rule did not last: Both powers gave up or were forced out by a series of nationalist uprisings in the 1940s and 1950s.

    In the period between 1920 and 1925, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud led a successful series of wars to establish the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 1945, the Saudi king held a fateful meeting with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt on board the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal that marked the beginning of the ambitions of the latest would-be successor to the Ottomans — the United States. At the same time, the Soviet Union was also eyeing the spoils, and while neither great power was able to take control of the Ottoman lands, their division between the two great rivals provided some stability, but not a permanent solution. 

    The Second War of Succession

    The Russians had missed an opportunity both before and after the Sykes-Picot affair but have not lost their interest. The leftist revolutions in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Algeria gave them an entrée, as did the sharpening Arab-Israeli conflict that put the US on the wrong side as far as the front-line Arab states were concerned. Russian arms sales, economic assistance, trade deals and leftist solidarity were all employed in what would become one of the theaters of the Cold War. At stake was control of the oil fields and trade routes through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. If the USSR gained total control, it would have given it a stranglehold on the West.

    While the Cold War rivalry lasted, there was some stability — or at least an absence of an all-out conflict, though the Yom Kippur War of 1973 tested this fragile equilibrium almost to destruction. The origins of the Yom Kippur War were not in great-power rivalry but local feuding — in this case, the struggle for land between Arabs and Israelis — but it was super-power hegemony that stopped the war. At one point, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger moved America’s military stance to DEFCON3 — ready for nuclear war.

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    The USSR backed down, and a truce was agreed. While the balance of power between the USSR and the West held, in the Middle East, as elsewhere, low-intensity cold conflicts ensued, with no one winning overall control. The continuing retreat of British and French interests accelerated, and the US and the USSR competed for successor rights.

    The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a shock. Iran had been America’s main proxy in the region. The Arabs opposed its ambitions, but Iran had been favored by the US as a bulwark against Soviet encroachment. The Sunni nations with sizable Shia populations saw the revolution as a major threat. They feared, rightly, that the Iranians would want to export not just the ideas of their revolution but also the facts. Iran agitated among the Shia in Iraq, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia, and sought to expel US influence from the region by launching terrorist attacks on US installations.

    Saddam Hussein particularly feared the Shia majority in Iraq and, with encouragement from the Sunni Arabs and the US, invaded Iran in 1980. But his war aims were thwarted. The revolutionary Iranian regime survived; in fact; the country unified behind it. The war lasted until 1988 and ended with Iraq’s defeat. The Iraqis had been supported financially by all the Arab states as well as provided with logistics and intelligence by the United States and its allies. The US was reluctant to become directly involved, and so were the Russians. It had been a local war, held within bounds.

    The Iran-Iraq War was an example of the instability resulting from the absence of an overall peace settlement in the region. It did have one remarkable result: All the petrodollar surpluses built up by the Arab and Iranian oil exports since the quintupling of oil prices in 1975 flowed back into the West. By the time the war was over, all of the Middle Eastern oil exporting nations’ foreign exchange reserves were exhausted while Western economies were booming.

    The Third War of Succession

    The fall of empires continued. The USSR collapsed in December 1991 after rotting from economic failure and internal rivalries for years. The Soviet contraction and internal focus also meant a retreat from its overseas interests and the Middle East in particular. In Europe, NATO and then the EU lost no time moving into what had been the Warsaw Pact, signing up a number of former Russian satellites and USSR republics to be part of the alliance, taking membership from 19 to 26 in its eastward expansion.

    In the Middle East, none of this happened — a missed opportunity. The partial order the Cold War had imposed on the region was gone, and, once again, local rivalries erupted without the moderating influence of either one of the two global superpowers to temper them. 

    In 1990, Saddam Hussein attempted to extort billions of dollars from Kuwait to replenish his reserves that had been exhausted by the war with Iran. When Kuwait refused, Iraq invaded, without the international community trying to restrain the aggression, and the First Gulf War began. Kuwait had allies that eventually came to its defense. But as soon as Iraqi forces had been expelled, they departed, leaving a regional vacuum still unfilled, with no general peace settlement.

    The defeat of Saddam Hussein gave the Iranians a golden opportunity to meddle in Iraqi Shia politics. The situation in Iraq festered, and the absence of any stabilizing force eventually led to the second US intervention in 2003. The chaos that this fateful invasion produced was again an enabler for the Iranians to fill the vacuum that emerged after Iraq’s dictator was overthrown. By now, Iran’s focus has shifted from its zeal to export the revolution toward more realist politics. The rise of Iranian nationalism since the Iran-Iraq War had replaced revolutionary idealism with national interests — an overriding policy that prevails to this day. Here, yet again, Washington failed to seize the initiative and establish a general peace settlement or a Pax Americana. 

    The Fourth War of Succession

    The Arab Spring, a series of revolutions and counterrevolutions that first ignited in Tunisia in 2010 before spreading throughout the region, set off a cycle of civil wars that are still with us. These conflicts flourished in the vacuum left by the collapse of regimes such as in Libya or Yemen, inviting intervention of regional players.

    The current situation is typical. We have civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen, and in each case, local powers are interfering in order to win a supposed tactical advantage. Russia is in the category of a local player; it no longer has the overall superpower or imperial advantage it had but, like Turkey, it wields enough military force to make a nuisance.

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    The civil war in Libya may worsen if Turkey and the UAE on one side, and Russia on the other, escalate their involvement. Syria, still engulfed in a decade-long civil war, has been carved up into Turkish, Russian, Syrian government and Iranian zones. Iraq appears to have slipped even more into the Iranian orbit. The slow US exit from Iraq and Afghanistan — the latter to the evident satisfaction of the undefeated Taliban — will further encourage struggles for a share of power. 

    The decline of US interest in the region is driven by the decreasing importance of oil and gas. In addition, the threat of regional domination by the USSR, or now Russia, has vanished. Public fatigue with the appalling loss of life, money and prestige the US has endured over the last 20 years has soured any appetite for further overseas wars. Arms deals and attractive opportunities for investment are declining, highlighted by the anxiety the Saudis are showing in trying to drum up disinterested foreign direct investment. The only motivators for continued US involvement are the security of Israel and the possibility that Iran, unchecked, may emerge as the local superpower.

    More War or Peace?

    Former US President Donald Trump’s policy was to try to force regime change in Iran. The campaign of maximum pressure to drive oil exports to zero, foment unrest and impose hardship was promoted as a way to push the Iranians back to the negotiating table and make more concessions in order to resuscitate the nuclear deal. The reality was that Trump sought the destruction of the regime. Despite enormous hardship, Iran did not buckle. It has a structural advantage: an educated and innovative population with well-balanced demographics, a diversified economy, fertile and productive agriculture, mineral resources and, of course, abundant hydrocarbons. It is a sleeping giant of an economy.

    Moreover, in almost every other sphere, from historical legacy, self-sufficient industry, military prowess, agriculture, architecture, food, to art, poetry and literature, Iran has been the dominant cultural influence in the region since the Seljuk empire — the same empire that brought the Ottomans, a Seljuk offshoot, to Turkey. History may again be moving in Tehran’s direction.

    The failed US, Israeli, Saudi and Emirati policy of pressure on Iran was tactical, not strategic. It had a short-term objective of regime change which, if reached, would actually accelerate the loss of US interest in the region and further underline the retreat of the most recent would-be successor to the Ottomans. Another vacuum is developing and, unchecked by binding treaties, Iran could regain its position as the major power in the region. Before Iran attempts to become the Ottoman successor, it is in the interest of all the other countries in the region to reach a general settlement. 

    Instead of examining short-term tactics based only on hatred or fear of the current Iranian regime, there is a need for a strategic view. Since the collapse of the Ottomans, the Middle East has seen continuous fighting, on and off, among international powers and regional players for the remnants of empire. The British and the French have come and gone, the US and Russia have come and are retreating — although they do intervene on a tactical basis here and there, usually leaving a worse situation than the one they found.

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    The Americans are clearly in the final stages of disengagement, driven, in part, by that declining need to keep the region and its oil in the Western camp. The power vacuum is growing, and if the sanctions are lifted, Iran will be back in business. The unity of Iraq and Syria is in question, Lebanon is a failed state and the future of the Saudi regime is not secure given the failure of the Vision 2030 initiative and the outlook for oil in a decarbonizing world economy. Turkey is eyeing the opportunities, as is Russia. Both have historical claims to Ottoman lands.

    But there is very little likelihood that any big power might be willing or able to assert sovereign rule over the Middle East. Even thinking about this is to court accusations of neo-colonialism. The solution lies in a different direction, not in more confrontation and threats of military conquest. A better vision is for an economic, political and security dialogue among all the parties in the region must be conceived. All parties are suffering in one way or another from the current disorder, whether it is the Iranians, Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis or Saudis. The current situation is unsustainable, and any idea that any sort of victory is possible is an illusion. On the other hand, all the countries around the Gulf, including Iran, have much to gain from a cessation of hostilities, economic cooperation and the settlement of disputes through negotiation.

    The model of what the Europeans were able to achieve after the Second World War is a good one, and this time no Marshall Plan will be needed as the wealth and resources of the regional players are already enormous. Every country has something to gain. But there will be losers. They will be the autocratic dictators who currently stand in the way of such a general settlement.

    A human rights and a democratic track will be essential parts of any such dialogue in order to ensure sustainability and continuity. This will require the Iranian regime and other authoritarian rulers to surrender power — perhaps not all of it right away — but over time, enough to give their citizens confidence in their own personal security and investment in the governance of their own countries and their neighbors. A good start would be a regional security dialogue and some confidence-building measures. This is where the Biden administration must begin its work.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More