As the civil war in Syria moves toward an
end, it becomes ever more difficult to postpone resolution of the toughest
issues. Each actor has different priorities, which are not easy to reconcile.
The Syrian regime wants to regain full control of its territory, while Russia
and Iran are particularly keen on eliminating the jihadi elements. Turkey has
been forced to relinquish its aim of regime change and is now on the defensive.
Ankara has limited its priorities to blocking any autonomous Kurdish governance
structures and preventing large-scale inward movements of refugees.
While Turkey’s desire to prevent Kurdish
political autonomy is plausibly reconcilable with the Syrian/Russian wish to
preserve Syria’s territorial integrity, this cannot be said for the refugee
issue. The regime’s northward advance inevitably creates a flow of Syrian refugees
toward Turkey, which is amplified by the brutality and vengefulness of the
regime forces against the opposition.
The Unabated Bombardment of Idlib in Syria
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Turkey’s use of jihadi factions as proxies
throughout the Syrian civil war has further complicated the picture. As the
United States and Pakistan experienced in the past, employing jihadi groups as
military proxies is like taking the genie out of the bottle and can have
long-term disruptive effects.
In Syria, these jihadi groups have become
concentrated in Idlib province as they successively lost control of other parts
of the country. Although the opposition have proved unable to topple the
regime, Turkey both chooses not to give up its patronage of them and cannot do
so. It chooses not to abandon these groups because they have been useful in
other conflicts, specifically against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)
and more recently in Libya. But more significantly, Turkey cannot easily
renounce its patronage for fear that they might turn against their former
benefactor if they feel betrayed.
Caught between a rock and a hard place, Turkey tries to diffuse and postpone the crisis as much as possible. Idlib has been a ticking time bomb for several months already. Numerous Turkish attempts to solve the mounting crisis — such as the Sochi agreement signed by Turkey and Russia in September 2018, as well as the recent ceasefire brokered last month — only postponed the inevitable. Now that the Syrian regime has retaken control of most of the country, Idlib is the only opposition-held enclave left and it is no longer possible to postpone the conflict.
While there is no easy long-term solution to the current situation, it is still possible to contain the crisis. At this stage, both sides appear to be applying increasing military pressure. Syrian forces made recent advances and encircled Turkish military outposts in and around Idlib. Turkey responded by deploying additional forces. These escalations can be understood as each side strengthening its hand to gain a better long-term deal.
In one possible compromise, Turkey would
accept the regime’s advances but try to preserve a diminished buffer zone
further to the north, both to contain the flow of refugees and to again
postpone its problem with its proxies. This solution would also receive support
from European countries which, like Turkey, consider preventing new refugee
movements their top priority.
Once again, any solution would be temporary
and Turkey will continue to face the consequences of its Syrian policy in the
near future. Whatever compromise is reached, tensions must be eased as the situation
can easily run out of control. This could happen simply through human error
among the military forces or, more likely, as a result of the jihadi groups’
desire to drag Turkey further into the conflict.
Limitations
of Russian-Turkish Cooperation
In a broader perspective, the recent
escalation in Idlib highlights the limitations of Turkish-Russian cooperation.
In fact, Ankara’s turn to Moscow was dictated more by domestic considerations
than geopolitical realities. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seeking to
tighten his grip on power, found anti-Western sentiment to be a useful tool to
mobilize support for his ambitious political projects.
Despite being on opposite sides in Syria
and later Libya, as well as in other regions such as the Balkans and the Black
Sea, both Turkey and Russia — and, more significantly, their two leaders —
manage to sustain their cooperation. Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air
defense system expanded the cooperation to the military realm. The two
countries also deepened their ties in the energy sector: Russia is Turkey’s
primary energy supplier, while the TurkStream pipeline enables Russia to bypass
Ukraine when supplying European markets. However, as has become clear, despite
appearances of increased cooperation, strategic rivalries continue to run deep.
This does not mean that the relationship is
on the brink of collapse. President Erdogan and his Russian counterpart,
Vladimir Putin, have both committed too much to it and have already signaled a
wish for reconciliation after brokering a ceasefire on March 5. However, the
revelation of deep strategic conflicts will have a long-term impact.
Particularly for Western countries, the recent escalation should remind them
once again that Turkey has little to benefit from its drift toward Russia.
Contrary to the gloomy picture presented in most Western capitals, the
possibilities of a long-term Turkish-Russian alliance are still quite limited.
So, although under duress, Turkey might be now more open to influence from the
West.
Recent statements of support from
Washington can be considered a sign that the United States is already aware of
this possibility. German financial support for Turkish housing projects in
“safe zones” in northern Syria is another case. However, the expectations need
to remain realistic. Turkey’s pro-Russian foreign policy will not be reversed
overnight, as the two leaders will find some kind of compromise amidst mounting
pressures. But the general realization that the Turkish-Russian rapprochement
will remain limited will increase the room of maneuver for Western countries
and for pro-Western factions within Turkey.
*[The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy. An earlier version of this article was first published on the SWP website in February 2020.]
The
views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily
reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
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