Throughout the 2024 cycle, polling has suggested that Republicans are poised to do extraordinarily well with African Americans.
Even with Kamala Harris at the top of the ticket, nearly one out of five black voters say they support Donald Trump. Younger Black voters seem especially open to casting ballots for the Republican party.
On its face, this seems like a sea change in Americans’ electoral affinities. The last time Republicans put up numbers anywhere near that level with Black voters was in 1976. And given that Black voters currently make up nearly one-quarter of the Democratic base, a scenario where almost 20% of these constituents defected to the other side would be absolutely devastating for the vice-president’s electoral prospects.
The good news for Democrats is that, even if the polls have been genuinely capturing overall Black sentiment in the US, they are unlikely to be accurately predicting the final vote distribution in November.
To clarify why polls are unlikely to reflect the eventual vote margins for this particular subset of voters, it might be helpful to look at how things typically shake out for third-party candidates.
Elections are decided by voters, not poll respondents
During the 2016 electoral cycle, Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson consistently hovered around 9% of the vote in polling. As the race tightened in the weeks before the election, voters began defecting to one of the top ticket candidates. However, in the week before ballots were cast, he was still polling at more than 6%. Ultimately, he ended up with just over 3%.
In the 2020 cycle, Green party candidate Howie Hawkins polled at 2% of the national vote six weeks before the election. He ultimately secured roughly one-quarter of 1% of ballots.
In the current cycle, Robert F Kennedy Jr polled above 10% for most of the race and, at his high point, was more than double that. However, as the race has tightened (we’re less than 90 days out), and after Joe Biden dropped out, Kennedy is now polling around 4%. In the end, he’d probably be lucky to get half that many votes in November.
In short: despite most Americans consistently expressing support for alternatives to the Democratic and Republican nominees, third-party candidates consistently underperform at the ballot box relative to their polling – even in cycles (like 2016) where unusually high numbers of voters dislike both major party candidates.
One of the primary causes of this gap between polling and outcomes is that contests are ultimately decided by who shows up to vote on election day. And Americans who are disgusted with both major-party nominees often find other things to do on a Tuesday afternoon than standing in line at a polling place to cast a ballot for someone who has little prospect of actually winning. And when these voters do show up at the ballot box, it’s often to hold their nose and vote for whomever they perceive to be the lesser of the two major party evils, in order to deny victory to the candidate they least prefer. And so, in the end, few Americans who express support for third-party candidates in polls actually show up to vote for them. The polls may accurately capture Americans’ preferences for third-party candidates, but they don’t predict well voting behavior with respect to those candidates.
A similar tale holds for Black support of Republicans.
Although polls this cycle have consistently found that nearly one in five Black Americans are open to voting for Trump, they also show that most Black voters could be easily swayed to vote for someone other than who they’re leaning towards at the moment, most Black voters have much weaker commitments to their current candidate of choice than other Americans, and roughly a third say they will probably not vote at all. This pattern in responses is also reflected in historical voting behavior: Black voters are more likely than most other Americans to sit elections out.
Across the board, the Americans who are most likely to show up on election day – highly-educated, relatively affluent, urban and suburban voters – now tend to favor Democrats, even as lower-propensity voters (younger, working class and low-income, and/or less educated Americans, especially those who live in small towns and rural areas) have been shifting to the right.
Historically, the dynamic has gone the other way. Democrats benefitted from high turnout and sought to expand access and participation while Republicans aggressively sought to suppress turnout by increasing voting restrictions, purging voter rolls, gerrymandering districts and otherwise undermining the Voting Rights Act. However, as the Democratic party was reoriented around knowledge economy professionals, many other constituencies swung in the other direction. And because there are far more “normie” voters than there are symbolic capitalists, high turnout increasingly came to favor Republicans instead.
This matters because Republicans’ polling gains among African Americans are concentrated most heavily among lower-propensity voting blocs (such as younger and less affluent or educated constituents) and, as a consequence, the lower overall electoral turnout is, the more we should expect to see Republicans underperform among black voters relative to the polls.
In 2020, the GOP got a bigger share of the black vote than in previous cycles, but this was in part because of record turnout among non-white voters (whereas Democrats overperformed in subsequent special elections that had much lower overall turnout). Unfortunately for Trump, there are signs that African American turnout this cycle may be significantly lower among lower-propensity voters. Consequently, the vote share Republicans ultimately receive in 2024 among black voters may end up being significantly lower than the polling suggests.
The bad news for Democrats is that Trump doesn’t necessarily need to get around 20% of the black vote to freeze Kamala out of the White House. If he’s to even marginally exceed his numbers from last cycle, Democrats would be left with a highly precarious path to victory unless they can make up the losses with other constituents in swing states.
Both parties have been alienating core constituencies
Since 2010, Democrats had been consistently losing vote share among African Americans in every midterm and general election.
And it wasn’t just African American voters who were leaving, but also Hispanic Americans, religious minorities, and less affluent or educated voters. The very populations that Democrats often fancy themselves as representatives of and advocates for. The very constituents that were supposed to ensure Democrats an indefinite electoral majority.
These defections were highly consequential: they contributed to enormous congressional wipeouts from 2010 to 2014 and cost Democrats the White House in 2016 (as Black voter attrition helped flip states including Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Ohio, even as Hispanic alienation helped tilt Arizona, Texas and Florida toward the Republicans).
Many assumed that with Trump in the White House, minority voters would come flocking back to the Democratic party. Instead, the GOP held their margins with non-white voters in the 2018 midterms. Democratic gains in that election were near-exclusively due to shifts among highly-educated, relatively affluent, urban and suburban white people.
In 2020, Black voters in states such as South Carolina helped save Biden’s floundering primary election campaign. In response, the president vowed to appoint a Black woman as his running mate should he win the Democratic nomination. Upon securing the vote, he ultimately settled on Harris.
This choice was striking because Harris was not popular with Black voters during the primary. She typically trailed behind not just Biden, but also Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and sometimes other competitors as well – consistently polling about 5% with African Americans.
That general sentiment seems to have continued through to the general election. Although Harris’s nomination was historic in virtue of her being potentially the first Black, female and/or Asian vice-president, her appearance on the ticket generated little enthusiasm among any of these voter blocs. Democrats ultimately got a smaller share of the black vote and the Asian vote in 2020 as compared with 2016 (across gender lines). Democrats were able to nonetheless carve out a narrow electoral college win primarily because white men (especially self-identified “moderates” and “independents”) shifted away from Donald Trump in 2020.
These patterns continued through the 2022 midterm elections: non-white people, including non-white women, shifted much further towards the GOP than white people (especially white men). And it seems likely that Democrats will see further attrition in 2024, even if it’s less than current polling suggests.
Contrary to optimistic narratives that circulated as Obama was ushered into office, it’s actually quite difficult to hold together a coalition that is centered around knowledge economy professionals but attractive to less advantaged Americans as well.
With respect to the Democratic party’s current core constituency, although knowledge economy professionals have been straying from the Democrats since the election of Biden, they seem poised to turn out in force for Harris. The record-breaking “White Women: Answer the Call” and “White Dudes for Harris” online events seem like a strong indicator – as does the huge outpouring of support from Wall Street, Silicon Valley and big law. The symbolic professions seem to be 100% coconut-pilled.
Black people, on the other hand, seem much less enthusiastic. And should Harris lean heavily into her race or gender in an attempt to rally support – although this might be appealing to (disproportionately white) knowledge economy professionals – it would likely alienate non-white “normie” voters even more (who tend to prefer messages that are less identitarian and more focused on bread and butter issues).
The big question for 2024 is whether or not Trump will continue to alienate white people at an equal or greater clip as Democrats are driving away voters of color. The answer will likely determine control of the White House.
Musa al-Gharbi is a sociologist in the School of Communication and Journalism at Stony Brook University. His book, We Have Never Been Woke: The Cultural Contradictions of a New Elite, is forthcoming with Princeton University Press. He is a Guardian US columnist.
Source: US Politics - theguardian.com
