The Disrupter in Chief Can’t End a War Like This

Can a nation be truly free and independent if it doesn’t possess a nuclear arsenal?

That question is being answered right now, on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine. If a nation’s conventional military can stop an aggressive, nuclear-armed nation in a defensive struggle, then there is hope for the viability of conventional deterrence.

If, however, a conventionally armed nation is doomed to fail — because it lacks the resources (including the allies) to defend itself — then look for more countries to pursue nuclear weapons. They will choose self-defense over subservience.

So far, most of the discussion of the risk of nuclear war in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been focused on a perceived immediate danger — that Russia will use nuclear weapons to achieve victory on the battlefield or to retaliate for Ukraine’s use of Western weapons on Russian soil.

The hovering threat of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is one explanation for the Trump administration’s shocking weakness in its dealings with Russia. It will stand tall when confronting allies like Denmark, Canada, Mexico and Panama. It will threaten war crimes when dealing with a puny, diminished military force like Hamas.

But regarding Russia? Consider the following news items from the past few days alone.

Donald Trump initially refused to promise that he would even include Ukraine in his negotiations with Russia, as if Ukraine were a mere pawn on the chessboard. (He reversed himself and said later that “of course” Ukraine would have a place at the table.)

He spoke to Vladimir Putin on Wednesday, an event Russians celebrated. The Russian stock market soared, and a Russian lawmaker said the call “broke the West’s blockade.”