On December 24, 2019, The New York Times reported that Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper is weighing proposals for a major reduction — or even a complete pullout — of US forces from West Africa. This is the first phase of reviewing deployments that could reshuffle thousands of troops worldwide in an effort to prioritize confronting global powers like Russia and China, as chartered by the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Esper has given Africa Command until later this month to draft a withdrawal plan, as well as a plan for redeploying troops.
In December 2018, then-National
Security Adviser John Bolton unveiled the Trump administration’s Africa policy,
built on three pillars: advancing American and African prosperity through
increased US commercial ties in Africa, enhancing security through
counterterrorism efforts, and promoting American interests and African
“self-reliance” through a more targeted and selective use of US foreign aid.
The strategy called out the threat of Chinese and Russian economic and
political influence expanding across the continent, and acknowledged that both
countries are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments to gain
a competitive advantage over the United States.
The strategy’s
acknowledgment of Chinese and Russian tactics is crucial, but it lacks one key
component: explaining the relationship between the three pillars and US
military presence.
Chain Reaction
While the intent is for
West Africa to be the starting point of a worldwide review of troop
deployments, pulling US troops out of West Africa would set off a chain
reaction, relinquishing hard-fought relationships and influence across the
continent. A US pullout would leave a vacuum in West Africa, opening the door
for Russia, at a time when the G5 Sahel countries — Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania and Niger — are already asking for additional counterterrorism
support to help stem the rapid expansion of ethnic and jihadist militancy in
the region. Russia holds existing military cooperation agreements with all of
the G5 Sahel countries except Mauritania.
As we enter a new decade, a number of country specific threats will complicate the chessboard for governments and US businesses alike. Global leadership is in retreat, as heads of state from North America to Asia are mired in domestic crises. The number of stalled revolutions around the world is on the rise. China grows bolder in its quest to solidify its position as an international superpower through any means necessary, while Russia is busy expanding its influence through the familiar model of arms first, business concessions later. All of this, taken together, is driving a massive shift in the global order, and making it more important than ever for the United States to preserve its influence in places where it has already established roots.
In October 2017, when four American soldiers were killed in Niger, criticism from both the public and Congress was swift, raising questions about the relevance of the mission and shining a light on the Washington establishment’s inability to justify it beyond the predictable argument of fighting global terror. In fact, analysts have long struggled to clearly articulate Africa’s strategic importance and the reasons why what takes place on the continent could become a threat to US national security.
With global competition for
African partners escalating, however, this lack of a clear argument is not the
same as a lack of threats, which are as insidious as they are nuanced. A
drawdown of US troops from West Africa may not pose a short-term threat to the
ideals of democracy or national security, but most certainly poses a long-term
threat to the sovereignty and economic prosperity of African nations. That
reality ultimately degrades American influence and market access.
Terrorism
is a Small Fish
The standard argument for maintaining a US military presence in Africa is primarily one of counterterrorism, reasoning that factors ranging from water stress and food insecurity to displacement and internal conflict will foster conditions ideal for the rise of terrorist groups, which will in turn create security concerns for the United States. This line of reasoning further elaborates that, while one of these factors alone may not lead directly to conflict, such risk factors exacerbate existing tensions that can create conflict and instability.
While this explanation is
both rational and valid on a local or regional level, it never quite manages to
convincingly connect all of the dots to reach the threshold of a US national
security threat. A thorough study of the African terror groups often cited
as concerns — Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, Islamic State (IS) in the greater Sahara,
among others — reveals that they possess neither a demonstrated ability nor a
stated desire to attack the United States on its own soil, which has long been
the standard for such assessment. Despite loose associations with global
terrorist brands like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the struggles of these
groups inherently remain local.
There are many compelling reasons why it would be a disastrous miscalculation to withdraw US troops from West Africa. In 2020, a strong military presence is just one of a number of factors that contribute to a country’s global level of influence, but its importance is out-sized.In the game of geopolitical chess, perception is often 90% of reality.The presence of US troops around the world signifies the strength of American hegemony, which has an enormous impact on everything from regional stability to economic prosperity.
Having US troops placed
strategically the world over acts as a deterrent against future conflict, as
well as a balancing force. It is a reminder that the United States takes a
measure of interest in the well-being of the host country, is there to help and
support during times of tension and has a toehold established in the event that
a much larger military force is needed in a time of crisis. In many of the
locations where the United States has a military footprint, that footprint is
physically small, but psychologically large.
But perhaps most
importantly, a US troop presence, and all that it implies, helps form the
backbone of stable relationships that foster trade and economic growth. In the
21st century, Africa is poised to become a battleground for both
established and emerging economies, whether it’s the explosion of newly
accessible consumers or the race to lock down oil and mineral rights. Nowhere
is this more evident right now than in Djibouti, where global competition is
heating up alongside intra-Gulf competition for control of the Red Sea.
On the other side of the
continent, withdrawing US troops from West Africa would be the first domino to
fall on a path toward shutting out US influence on the continent, bringing
about severe market implications for generations to come. US businesses would
essentially begin to be blocked from competing in Africa, while Russia and
China continue to lock down meaningful partnerships that span the gamut from
economic to military. These relationships are often more appealing, in many
ways, than a partnership with the United States or other Western nations
because they come with few or no moral strings attached.
Economic
Strategy and Warfare
China, despite its best efforts externally to present its ambitions as modest and peaceful, is quite transparent internally about its desire for global dominance. One need only look at Beijing’s recent track record on human rights — including the treatment of the Uighurs and phenomena like forced organ transplants, the exponential growth of the surveillance state, and implementation of the social credit system, among other issues — to understand that it’s focused on bringing its vision of a China-centered future to fruition at any cost.
By 2050, China intends to
have the strongest military force in the world, to be the center of global
technology, and to be the anchor of a global trade and infrastructure network —
all to the deliberate detriment of the existing Western-focused system.
Africa as a continent is an
important stepping stone on Beijing’s journey to world domination, and while
the United States has been busy fighting terrorism there, China has been
cashing in and buying influence across the continent, securing the production
of minerals vital to modern electronics, among other things. In fact,
Sino-African economic engagement has grown exponentially since the first Forum
on Chinese-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000.
China is now Africa’s
largest trading partner. Just 18 years later, 53 out of 54 African countries
attended the annual FOCAC summit in Beijing. In 2018, China-Africa trade topped
$204 billion. Forty African states have signed memoranda of understanding with
Beijing to finance and build modern infrastructure like highways, airports and
railways since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China’s growing influence
in Africa is not confined to the realm of commerce, however. China is also
increasing its engagement with African nations through military support, arms
deals, foreign direct investment, media, education and travel. In August 2017,
China opened its first foreign military base in Djibouti. It sits on prime real
estate next to one of Djibouti’s main ports, and is just six miles from Camp
Lemonnier, the US military’s only permanent base on the continent.
China is the second largest
financial donor to United Nations peacekeeping missions, and the 11th
largest contributor of troops. Beijing has roughly 2000 soldiers serving as
peacekeepers across Africa. China is also a regular supplier of arms to African
nations and, of particular note, has provided (or offered) arms to Zimbabwe’s
former dictator Robert Mugabe, to Libya’s former strongman Muammar Qaddafi and
to the recently removed leader of Sudan, war criminal Omar al-Bashir, during
the genocide in Darfur.
More than 10,000 Chinese-owned firms are currently operating across the African continent, and the value of Chinese business there since 2005 amounts to more than $2 trillion, with potential for $300 billion in investments. Estimates suggest that these Chinese firms employ several million Africans. In the last decade, China has also significantly expanded its media presence in Africa, urging African media to “tell China’s story well,” while also influencing telecommunications, data and information industries and standards across the continent.
Direct airline flights between Africa and China have increased by more than 600% in the past decade. These flights are undertaken not only by workers and traders, but also by tourists and students. Beijing is cultivating the next generation of African leaders through education, often sponsoring the graduate and post-graduate studies of African students. As of 2017, more Anglophone African students studied in China than in the United States or the United Kingdom — their previous destinations of choice.
The
Russian Threat
In recent years, the global
community has finally begun to express concern over China’s multi-pronged
incursion into the African continent. This suits former KGB-era intelligence
officer and current Russian president, Vladimir Putin, just fine, offering
something of a smokescreen for Russia’s quieter, stealthier invasion. Unlike
China, which uses commercial projects like the BRI to pave the way for
realizing hegemonic ambitions, Russia is relying on its standard model of
providing arms and military support to pave the way for its commercial
ambitions. This is as much a result of Russia’s lesser buying power as it is a
deliberate tactic to gain access to strategic economic sectors like energy and
mining.
In late October 2019, Putin
hosted the first-ever Russia-Africa economic summit in Sochi, culminating in
over 92 commercial agreements valued at roughly $12 billion, though few have
yet to materialize just over two months later. Around four dozen African
leaders and high-level government officials attended the summit. On offer from
Russia was everything from nuclear power plants to fighter jets and missile
defense systems, designed to win influence across the continent.
Specific deals to come out of the summit include a signed a memorandum giving Russian oil company Lukoil drilling rights in Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria; a range of signed memoranda and agreements for Rosatom to develop nuclear energy in at least 18 African countries, including Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda and Ethiopia; and a contract for Russia to deliver 12 Russian Mi-35 attack helicopters to Nigeria. A number of other countries like Central African Republic, Namibia, Madagascar and Uganda asked for more tanks, planes, helicopters, missiles, rifles and military advisers.
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According to Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state-run arms export agency, Russia has defense orders for more than $14 billion from African countries, now accounting for around a third of Moscow’s military exports. Just as it has recently done in Syria, Moscow’s aim is to use military and trade ties to reassert itself as a geopolitical powerbroker on the African continent. Although Moscow’s actual presence on the ground is still relatively marginal in comparison to France or the United States, Russia holds “military technical cooperation agreements” with more than 30 African states.
Russia doesn’t bother to masquerade as a benevolent actor, though its tactics tend to be far more subtle and under the radar when compared to those of China. Much of Moscow’s African diplomacy is being conducted by the Wagner Group, a self-described private military company. Wagner is believed to be owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a restaurateur and businessman with close ties to Putin. Something of a public-private partnership between financiers like Prigozhin exists with Russia’s military intelligence. In this way, using the Wagner Group as a proxy gives Putin an asymmetrical capability with broad reach that allows him to enjoy strategic gains while also maintaining plausible deniability if things do not go well.
In the Central African Republic, Wagner receives compensation for training the presidential guard, but also receives a percentage of profits from the gold and diamond mines it guards. Wagner is believed to be operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Libya, Madagascar, Angola, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
Russia’s soft power approach in Africa includes boosting media cooperation and sponsoring educational opportunities, just like China. But another recognizable Russian tactic features just as prominently: social media influence campaigns. If Prigozhin’s name is familiar, it is likely because he also funds and directs the Internet Research Agency, known in the Western media as the “troll farm.” Prigozhin has been sanctioned multiple times by the US Treasury Department, including for aiding Russia’s involvement in the war in Ukraine in 2016 and, more recently, for meddling in the 2016 US presidential election.
That Prigozhin commands both real-world and online private armies on behalf of Moscow makes him an invaluable tool to the Kremlin. His reach epitomizes Russia’s approach to currying influence. At the end of October 2019, Facebook announced that it had removed three networks of fake accounts targeting eight African countries — unlikely a coincidence, but nearly the same list of countries where Wagner is currently operating — with messages intended to boost support for Russia’s political and commercial efforts. Facebook linked the coordinated influence operations to Prigozhin.
Pragmatic
Steps Forward
It is not clear that
American and other Western leaders fully appreciate the scope of economic and
defensive changes that are necessary to prevent the further deterioration of or
to potentially reestablish preeminent influence and market access on the
African continent.
Though China and Russia are
using very different strategies in their approach to African engagement, the
end goal is the same: They are investing throughout the continent to secure
political influence. Russia has a rich history of engagement in Africa, one
that is not tainted by colonialism. China has deep pockets, and a willingness
to spend. With autocratic governments of their own, neither country attaches
moral conditions to friendship. For the United States, with its historically
values-based approach, that makes competition tough. But history has
demonstrated that when the United States leaves and creates a vacuum, it almost
always invites further autocracy to develop. Egypt after the Arab Spring is a
prime example.
Western governments and
businesses must be prepared to meet African nations where they’re at,
especially with regard to competition from China and Russia. African leaders,
for their part, are unlikely to choose a side in the way that Western nations
will want them to. Many have been waiting for years for their countries to be
considered of high strategic value, and many African heads of state welcome the
competition, viewing it as an opportunity to increase both resources and
influence.
One key to accomplishing
the requisite shift in strategy is not scaling back troops in West Africa or
beyond — it is changing the lens through which troop deployments are viewed.
The United States must make a greater effort to understand why the so-called
Great Powers have been successful and accept that, within any legal
constraints, it may need to use similar tactics to compete, particularly in BRI
nations.
The realities of soft power
in the 21st century demand a cohesive strategy to combat the
asymmetric hybrid warfare methods — the future combination of modern warfare
and business strategy the world over — used by Beijing and Moscow. The strong
military partnerships we have already formed and nurtured are key foundational
building blocks for all other forms of engagement to take place. The answer in
this next decade is not less engagement, but more.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
