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‘Liberal’ has become a term of derision in US politics – the historical reasons are complicated

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Kevin M. Schultz is Chair of the Department of History at the University of Illinois Chicago, where he specialises in 20th- and 21st-century American history. In Why Everyone Hates White Liberals (Including White Liberals), he explores how the word liberal – and particularly its variant white liberal – became a term of derision across the American political spectrum.

Why, he asks, are so many Americans unwilling to identify as liberals, white or otherwise, even while supporting government programs that fall squarely within the American liberal tradition?

Review: Why Everyone Hates White Liberals (Including White Liberals): A History – Kevin M. Schultz (University of Chicago Press)

Why Everyone Hates White Liberals is written by an American academic for an American audience. It tries to assess the current political situation in the United States in the light of history. It asks how American liberals should respond to a situation where they are often viewed with disdain.

The book’s relevance is less obvious for those of us who live outside the US, but it promises to shed light on America’s political volatility and culture warring, which eventually affect us all in one way or another.

This thing called liberalism

Unfortunately, liberalism defies definition. Its roots can be traced to early European modernity, and especially to debates over religious toleration in the 16th and 17th centuries. Its more immediate background was the 18th-century Age of Enlightenment, culminating in great revolutions in America and France.

From the beginning of the 19th century, liberalism evolved into something distinct, with its own name, founding figures and institutions. It responded to a changed world marked by population growth, revolutionary turmoil, an expanding sphere of public discussion in Europe and North America, and the beginnings of industrialisation and corporate capitalism.

Schultz skates over this quickly, but he correctly refers to Madame de Staël and Benjamin Constant as originating figures in 19th-century France, and to Spain and Sweden as pioneers in the rise of liberal political parties.

Portrait of Madame de Staël – Marie-Éléonore Godefroid.
After François Gérard, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

It’s worth adding that, as liberalism took its early forms, it had input from numerous groups. These included religious non-conformists, free-market economists inspired by Adam Smith, utilitarian philosophers, and European thinkers (such as de Staël and Constant) who admired the French Revolution in its early years before the Reign of Terror.

Given its mix of influences, liberalism never became a unified ideology or political theory. It was more a tradition or tendency in politics. It took many directions, frequently questioned itself, discarded old ideas and embraced new ones, and changed emphases in response to emerging circumstances.

Comprehensive histories of liberalism give the impression of a chameleon-like quality. At different times, liberals have accommodated economic policies from unfettered free-market capitalism to a degree of socialism. Confronted with such a rich – or even contradictory – tradition, we might feel at a loss in giving liberalism any recognisable content.

Still, we can find some common themes. At a certain level of abstraction, liberalism favours toleration, individual freedom, acceptance of social pluralism, and cautious optimism about the possibilities for intellectual and social progress. With these core ideas go more specific political principles, including free speech, secular government, and the rule of law. To this we can add values such as individuality, creativity and suspicion of hierarchies of birth.

With that in mind, it’s usually clear enough what is being alleged if someone is accused, in a political context, of being “illiberal”. The accusation suggests intolerance, especially of opposed viewpoints or unusual ways of life, and hostility to individual freedom.

People who advertise themselves as liberals can sometimes be revealed as illiberal in this broad sense. If that sounds paradoxical, the paradox is easily resolved as long as we’re clear about what concepts are in play.

American liberals

After a sketchy introduction to liberalism, Schultz zooms in on the 1930s in the US, when the depression-era presidential rivals Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt each claimed to be a true liberal. As Schultz observes, few Americans before this had thought of themselves as liberals.

In the 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt defined the word liberal for the purposes of US electoral politics.
Vincenzo Laviosa, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

Roosevelt succeeded in redefining the words liberal and liberalism for the purposes of American electoral politics. In Roosevelt’s usage, they meant openness to new kinds of government intervention to address social problems. Thereafter, American liberalism can trace its history from the 1930s New Deal. It came to mean, in large part, policies of wealth redistribution and economic intervention.

Roosevelt’s success as a national leader lent prestige to his redefined conception of liberalism. For several decades, it attracted allegiance across social and political divides.

For Schultz, therefore, American liberalism in the New Deal tradition means “generosity of spirit and expansion of individual freedom” or using the power of the state “to ensure individual freedom for the maximum number of people”.

These definitions fall within the general tradition of liberalism, but they have a more specific suggestion of government interventions for the common good.

That might seem attractive as a political vision – so what went wrong?

Liberalism unravels

As Schultz tells the story, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, some figures on America’s left were losing patience with what they saw as a stultifying, bureaucratic, politically timid liberal establishment.

Schultz pinpoints 1964 as a key year when American liberalism began to lose its prestige. As he describes in detail, there was a marked change in political tone between 1963 and 1964, when Black radicals started to criticise white liberal allies, whom they had come to regard as spineless and hypocritical. From this point, white liberal crystallised as a term of abuse on the political Left.

Schultz appears sympathetic to the Black civil rights leaders of the time, whose impatience with the pace of change was understandable. But he also reminds us of the considerable effort, self-sacrifice and achievements of white liberals during the 1950s and early 1960s, culminating in dramatic initiatives such as the landmark Civil Rights Act.

Part of the problem was a mismatch, not only of priorities, but perceptions of what was realistically achievable. As radical left-wing movements emerged during the 1960s, their leaders distanced themselves from liberals and liberalism.

American liberals endured much worse from the conservative side of politics. During the “long” 1960s – the decade and a half from the late 1950s to the early 1970s – there was a right-wing backlash. Key conservative figures, such as William F. Buckley, ceded the term liberal to their opponents, which Herbert Hoover had refused to do in the 1930s. Then they attacked it and everything that it stood for within their understanding.

Conservatives like William F. Buckley associated ‘liberals’ with radical politics.
Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Political conservatives associated liberals with radical politics, atheism, communism, and what Schultz refers to as “cultural effeteness”. Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew weaponised this narrative in the the 1972 presidential election and inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the Democratic Party’s candidate, George McGovern.

Schultz sees the term liberal as having been abandoned during the 1970s, in the sense that almost nobody in politics or public debate wanted to identify with it. Instead, it was used to label others. More recently, liberalism has been blamed for the harshest outcomes of what is known as neoliberalism, although the latter has little to do with traditional liberal ideas such as individual freedom, social toleration, or the rule of law.

The term neoliberal has a history dating back to at least the 1930s, but has been applied to regimes and administrations not otherwise regarded as liberal. As Schultz reminds us, it was first applied pejoratively to the economic policies of the brutal Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.

Schultz emphasises an “owning the libs” strategy that has recently prevailed on the American right. Anybody with even slightly left-wing, liberal or progressive tendencies is now painted by conservatives as an unhinged radical deserving of mockery and political, if not personal, destruction. The “libs” have thus become an imaginary enemy against which disparate groups on the right can unify and rally.

Ironically, historic liberal reforms in areas such as health care and social security remain widely popular with the American electorate, but the actual words liberal and liberalism seem to have become toxic.

Some deeper issues

In explaining the challenges to American liberalism during the long 1960s, Schultz adds to our understanding. Yet Why Everyone Hates White Liberals is seriously incomplete: it glosses over important issues and entire decades.

I can only go so far in exploring what it omits, but for a start, Schultz ignores important developments in the late 1970s and the 1980s. This was a time marked by fraught debates over censorship, pornography, abortion and numerous other hot-button issues. These debates severely tested what liberalism stood for in the US.

As the legal scholar Owen M. Fiss has argued, the debates of that era revealed “liberalism divided”. On the left side of politics, identity-based demands, (mild) socialist influences, and activist approaches to legal interpretation increasingly clashed with the liberal instinct to restrain government power and support individual freedom. This rupture within American liberalism, or perhaps within America’s broader political left, has never healed.

At one point, Schultz drops a clue to some of the deeper issues. Following the historian David L. Chappell, he identifies a fundamental disconnect between white liberal reformers in the 1960s and the Black activists who came to despise them. Despite some common goals, they had different temperaments and worldviews, grounded in different experiences and cultural histories.

The white liberals’ optimism about human nature and the possibilities for incremental progress clashed with the Black activists’ prophetic sensibility, their more pessimistic view of human nature, and their demands for national repentance and total transformation of American society.

This points to a larger problem that only became more difficult in the decades that followed. It’s one thing to defend the rights and freedoms of one or another oppressed group, viewing the issues from a traditional liberal perspective. It’s a different thing to defend a group’s rights and freedoms by adopting whatever ideology or rationalisation the group itself (or its leaders) might develop.

Moreover, as oppressed groups recognise each other’s struggles and form pragmatic political coalitions, they tend to see analogies between each other’s causes and attempt an ideological synthesis. As they do so, they are likely to seek insights from whatever sources they can find. Importantly, they needn’t confine themselves to ideas and thinkers from the liberal political tradition.

A demonstration by members of the Black Panther Party on the steps of the Washington State Capitol building in Olympia, Washington, February 28, 1969.
CIR Online, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

Thus, liberals can find themselves supporting demographic groups whose representatives are, in turn, nourished by various kinds of religious fervour – or else by Marxism, feminism, postmodernism and other -isms that are not especially concerned with liberalism’s traditional ideas, such as freedom and toleration. Goals might be shared at a high conceptual level, but with starkly different perceptions of legitimate methods and acceptable costs.

In this setting, liberals face a conundrum. How far should they maintain traditional liberal ideals, and how far should they move towards non-liberal, and potentially illiberal, ideologies if these seem more promising for the purposes of social change?

When rapid and comprehensive change seems imperative, might this justify illiberal methods, such as attempts to control what people say and think? In the past, revolutionaries have often believed so, but the conflict with traditional liberalism is obvious.

Yet Schultz appears dismissive of any idea that American liberals sometimes veer in illiberal directions, or that this might undermine their credentials if they still claim to be part of the broader liberal tradition springing from the Enlightenment.

Useful, but frustrating

Why Everyone Hates White Liberals offers a useful, if limited, defence of America’s (white) liberals and their achievements, particularly in the face of unfair criticism and derision since the 1960s.

As far it goes, the book’s history is accurate. But it is incomplete, and hand-in-hand with this there’s a frustrating analytical shallowness.

For Schultz, the actual words liberal and liberalism are irredeemable in the US. For all I know, this might be correct (though it might also be slightly hyperbolic). Be that as it may, Schultz backs off examining how the problems for American liberals go deeper than slogans and words. These problems deserve a bolder reckoning. More

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    in US Politics

    ‘Liberal’ has become a term of derision in US politics – the historical reasons are complicated

    Kevin M. Schultz is Chair of the Department of History at the University of Illinois Chicago, where he specialises in 20th- and 21st-century American history. In Why Everyone Hates White Liberals (Including White Liberals), he explores how the word liberal – and particularly its variant white liberal – became a term of derision across the American political spectrum.

    Why, he asks, are so many Americans unwilling to identify as liberals, white or otherwise, even while supporting government programs that fall squarely within the American liberal tradition?

    Review: Why Everyone Hates White Liberals (Including White Liberals): A History – Kevin M. Schultz (University of Chicago Press)

    Why Everyone Hates White Liberals is written by an American academic for an American audience. It tries to assess the current political situation in the United States in the light of history. It asks how American liberals should respond to a situation where they are often viewed with disdain.

    The book’s relevance is less obvious for those of us who live outside the US, but it promises to shed light on America’s political volatility and culture warring, which eventually affect us all in one way or another.

    This thing called liberalism

    Unfortunately, liberalism defies definition. Its roots can be traced to early European modernity, and especially to debates over religious toleration in the 16th and 17th centuries. Its more immediate background was the 18th-century Age of Enlightenment, culminating in great revolutions in America and France.

    From the beginning of the 19th century, liberalism evolved into something distinct, with its own name, founding figures and institutions. It responded to a changed world marked by population growth, revolutionary turmoil, an expanding sphere of public discussion in Europe and North America, and the beginnings of industrialisation and corporate capitalism.

    Schultz skates over this quickly, but he correctly refers to Madame de Staël and Benjamin Constant as originating figures in 19th-century France, and to Spain and Sweden as pioneers in the rise of liberal political parties.

    Portrait of Madame de Staël – Marie-Éléonore Godefroid.
    After François Gérard, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

    It’s worth adding that, as liberalism took its early forms, it had input from numerous groups. These included religious non-conformists, free-market economists inspired by Adam Smith, utilitarian philosophers, and European thinkers (such as de Staël and Constant) who admired the French Revolution in its early years before the Reign of Terror.

    Given its mix of influences, liberalism never became a unified ideology or political theory. It was more a tradition or tendency in politics. It took many directions, frequently questioned itself, discarded old ideas and embraced new ones, and changed emphases in response to emerging circumstances.

    Comprehensive histories of liberalism give the impression of a chameleon-like quality. At different times, liberals have accommodated economic policies from unfettered free-market capitalism to a degree of socialism. Confronted with such a rich – or even contradictory – tradition, we might feel at a loss in giving liberalism any recognisable content.

    Still, we can find some common themes. At a certain level of abstraction, liberalism favours toleration, individual freedom, acceptance of social pluralism, and cautious optimism about the possibilities for intellectual and social progress. With these core ideas go more specific political principles, including free speech, secular government, and the rule of law. To this we can add values such as individuality, creativity and suspicion of hierarchies of birth.

    With that in mind, it’s usually clear enough what is being alleged if someone is accused, in a political context, of being “illiberal”. The accusation suggests intolerance, especially of opposed viewpoints or unusual ways of life, and hostility to individual freedom.

    People who advertise themselves as liberals can sometimes be revealed as illiberal in this broad sense. If that sounds paradoxical, the paradox is easily resolved as long as we’re clear about what concepts are in play.

    American liberals

    After a sketchy introduction to liberalism, Schultz zooms in on the 1930s in the US, when the depression-era presidential rivals Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt each claimed to be a true liberal. As Schultz observes, few Americans before this had thought of themselves as liberals.

    In the 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt defined the word liberal for the purposes of US electoral politics.
    Vincenzo Laviosa, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

    Roosevelt succeeded in redefining the words liberal and liberalism for the purposes of American electoral politics. In Roosevelt’s usage, they meant openness to new kinds of government intervention to address social problems. Thereafter, American liberalism can trace its history from the 1930s New Deal. It came to mean, in large part, policies of wealth redistribution and economic intervention.

    Roosevelt’s success as a national leader lent prestige to his redefined conception of liberalism. For several decades, it attracted allegiance across social and political divides.

    For Schultz, therefore, American liberalism in the New Deal tradition means “generosity of spirit and expansion of individual freedom” or using the power of the state “to ensure individual freedom for the maximum number of people”.

    These definitions fall within the general tradition of liberalism, but they have a more specific suggestion of government interventions for the common good.

    That might seem attractive as a political vision – so what went wrong?

    Liberalism unravels

    As Schultz tells the story, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, some figures on America’s left were losing patience with what they saw as a stultifying, bureaucratic, politically timid liberal establishment.

    Schultz pinpoints 1964 as a key year when American liberalism began to lose its prestige. As he describes in detail, there was a marked change in political tone between 1963 and 1964, when Black radicals started to criticise white liberal allies, whom they had come to regard as spineless and hypocritical. From this point, white liberal crystallised as a term of abuse on the political Left.

    Schultz appears sympathetic to the Black civil rights leaders of the time, whose impatience with the pace of change was understandable. But he also reminds us of the considerable effort, self-sacrifice and achievements of white liberals during the 1950s and early 1960s, culminating in dramatic initiatives such as the landmark Civil Rights Act.

    Part of the problem was a mismatch, not only of priorities, but perceptions of what was realistically achievable. As radical left-wing movements emerged during the 1960s, their leaders distanced themselves from liberals and liberalism.

    American liberals endured much worse from the conservative side of politics. During the “long” 1960s – the decade and a half from the late 1950s to the early 1970s – there was a right-wing backlash. Key conservative figures, such as William F. Buckley, ceded the term liberal to their opponents, which Herbert Hoover had refused to do in the 1930s. Then they attacked it and everything that it stood for within their understanding.

    Conservatives like William F. Buckley associated ‘liberals’ with radical politics.
    Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

    Political conservatives associated liberals with radical politics, atheism, communism, and what Schultz refers to as “cultural effeteness”. Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew weaponised this narrative in the the 1972 presidential election and inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the Democratic Party’s candidate, George McGovern.

    Schultz sees the term liberal as having been abandoned during the 1970s, in the sense that almost nobody in politics or public debate wanted to identify with it. Instead, it was used to label others. More recently, liberalism has been blamed for the harshest outcomes of what is known as neoliberalism, although the latter has little to do with traditional liberal ideas such as individual freedom, social toleration, or the rule of law.

    The term neoliberal has a history dating back to at least the 1930s, but has been applied to regimes and administrations not otherwise regarded as liberal. As Schultz reminds us, it was first applied pejoratively to the economic policies of the brutal Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.

    Schultz emphasises an “owning the libs” strategy that has recently prevailed on the American right. Anybody with even slightly left-wing, liberal or progressive tendencies is now painted by conservatives as an unhinged radical deserving of mockery and political, if not personal, destruction. The “libs” have thus become an imaginary enemy against which disparate groups on the right can unify and rally.

    Ironically, historic liberal reforms in areas such as health care and social security remain widely popular with the American electorate, but the actual words liberal and liberalism seem to have become toxic.

    Some deeper issues

    In explaining the challenges to American liberalism during the long 1960s, Schultz adds to our understanding. Yet Why Everyone Hates White Liberals is seriously incomplete: it glosses over important issues and entire decades.

    I can only go so far in exploring what it omits, but for a start, Schultz ignores important developments in the late 1970s and the 1980s. This was a time marked by fraught debates over censorship, pornography, abortion and numerous other hot-button issues. These debates severely tested what liberalism stood for in the US.

    As the legal scholar Owen M. Fiss has argued, the debates of that era revealed “liberalism divided”. On the left side of politics, identity-based demands, (mild) socialist influences, and activist approaches to legal interpretation increasingly clashed with the liberal instinct to restrain government power and support individual freedom. This rupture within American liberalism, or perhaps within America’s broader political left, has never healed.

    At one point, Schultz drops a clue to some of the deeper issues. Following the historian David L. Chappell, he identifies a fundamental disconnect between white liberal reformers in the 1960s and the Black activists who came to despise them. Despite some common goals, they had different temperaments and worldviews, grounded in different experiences and cultural histories.

    The white liberals’ optimism about human nature and the possibilities for incremental progress clashed with the Black activists’ prophetic sensibility, their more pessimistic view of human nature, and their demands for national repentance and total transformation of American society.

    This points to a larger problem that only became more difficult in the decades that followed. It’s one thing to defend the rights and freedoms of one or another oppressed group, viewing the issues from a traditional liberal perspective. It’s a different thing to defend a group’s rights and freedoms by adopting whatever ideology or rationalisation the group itself (or its leaders) might develop.

    Moreover, as oppressed groups recognise each other’s struggles and form pragmatic political coalitions, they tend to see analogies between each other’s causes and attempt an ideological synthesis. As they do so, they are likely to seek insights from whatever sources they can find. Importantly, they needn’t confine themselves to ideas and thinkers from the liberal political tradition.

    A demonstration by members of the Black Panther Party on the steps of the Washington State Capitol building in Olympia, Washington, February 28, 1969.
    CIR Online, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    Thus, liberals can find themselves supporting demographic groups whose representatives are, in turn, nourished by various kinds of religious fervour – or else by Marxism, feminism, postmodernism and other -isms that are not especially concerned with liberalism’s traditional ideas, such as freedom and toleration. Goals might be shared at a high conceptual level, but with starkly different perceptions of legitimate methods and acceptable costs.

    In this setting, liberals face a conundrum. How far should they maintain traditional liberal ideals, and how far should they move towards non-liberal, and potentially illiberal, ideologies if these seem more promising for the purposes of social change?

    When rapid and comprehensive change seems imperative, might this justify illiberal methods, such as attempts to control what people say and think? In the past, revolutionaries have often believed so, but the conflict with traditional liberalism is obvious.

    Yet Schultz appears dismissive of any idea that American liberals sometimes veer in illiberal directions, or that this might undermine their credentials if they still claim to be part of the broader liberal tradition springing from the Enlightenment.

    Useful, but frustrating

    Why Everyone Hates White Liberals offers a useful, if limited, defence of America’s (white) liberals and their achievements, particularly in the face of unfair criticism and derision since the 1960s.

    As far it goes, the book’s history is accurate. But it is incomplete, and hand-in-hand with this there’s a frustrating analytical shallowness.

    For Schultz, the actual words liberal and liberalism are irredeemable in the US. For all I know, this might be correct (though it might also be slightly hyperbolic). Be that as it may, Schultz backs off examining how the problems for American liberals go deeper than slogans and words. These problems deserve a bolder reckoning. More

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    in US Politics

    Charlie Kirk shooting: another grim milestone in America’s long and increasingly dangerous story of political violence

    Charlie Kirk, figurehead of the American far right, took a question at a 2023 event in Salt Lake City about the second amendment to the US constitution and gun-related deaths. He answered: “I think it’s worth to have a cost of, unfortunately, some gun deaths every single year, so that we can have the second amendment to protect our other God-given rights.”

    Two years later, once again in Utah, Kirk was killed with a gun. His death comes against a backdrop of increased political violence in the US, driven by a new set of political, societal and technological factors, and its future trajectory will determine the health of American democracy.

    Political violence is differentiated from other crimes and it is helpful to have clarity about its particular meaning. It is defined specifically as acts intended to achieve political goals or intimidate opponents through the use of physical force or threats to influence a political outcome or silence dissent. While most of these incidents come from the far right, violence is used by extremists on both sides.

    Over the past decade there has been a dangerous escalation in political violence driven by rage and resentment without clearly defined goals by self-radicalised individuals rather than organised extremist groups. High profile incidents have dominated headlines. These include the insurrection of January 6 2021, the shooting at a baseball practice session of Republican members of Congress in 2018, the plot to kidnap Michigan governor, Gretchen Whitmer in 2020, the vicious attack on Paul Pelosi – the husband of the speaker of the House of Representatives – in 2022, the torching of Pennsylvania governor Josh Shapiro’s family home in April this year. And, of course, the assassination attempts on Donald Trump on the campaign trail in 2024.

    Spiral of violence: polarisation has driven people to extreme acts, such as the January 6 2021 Capitol riots.
    AP Photo/John Minchillo, File

    But the threat has spread beyond the very visible faces of US democracy to targets such as judges, election officials, journalists and even private citizens based upon their perceived political affiliation.

    It is shocking yet unsurprising, given the new factors fuelling rage in an already deeply divided society. These can be broadly summarised by three characteristics.

    Hyper-partisanship at boiling point

    The way politics is discussed today shows that division can’t be seen in merely partisan terms. Opponents have become enemies and those with different worldviews have become traitors. In many examples, pundits, politicians and their mouthpieces indulge in dehumanising rhetoric. Research has consistently found that dehumanisation contributes to a more ready justification of violence.

    Indeed, Trump and other high-profile figures have incited violence, even when not actually issuing direct calls to action. This was most notably evident on January 6 2021, when Trump goaded supporters in Washington to march on the Capitol, telling them: “And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore.”

    Fight like hell: Donald Trump’s ‘Save America’ rally.

    Digital echo chambers

    These pressure cooker arguments play out on social media and online forums that help spread conspiracy theories, disinformation and violent content. Highly influential creators are able to conjure up “bespoke realities” for their followers, generating huge personal wealth from the fomenting of rage and hate. Citizens are consuming deeply flawed, incendiary political content in isolation. This fuels self-radicalisation when people become detached from reality of the world outside their bubble.

    Indeed, immediately following the Kirk shooting, social media was already awash with disinformation about liberals celebrating his death and the motivations of the killer before the shooter had been found.

    Erosion of trust in democracy

    When faith in government, the justice system, and the electoral process erodes, citizens may come to believe that the established systems are rigged, unresponsive, or illegitimate. This makes traditional avenues for change seem futile. In this environment, violence can be rationalised as the only effective means to “correct” the broken system. The American right has long railed against a corrupt and malevolent “deep state” convincing some citizens that democratic norms no longer apply.

    What next? There are three possible scenarios. The worst case is an escalation of violence in both its frequency and its organisation.

    The far right has been pushing for strict limits on civil liberties, and the most extreme members may use Kirk’s assassination as an excuse for violent retaliation. Widespread civil unrest is a persistent threat, particularly approaching the 2026 midterm elections. Many fear that if Trump’s allies sense they can use escalating disorder to declare an emergency suspension of democratic processes, they will push him to do so.

    More likely, but no less unsettling, is a stagnation in which political violence becomes a normalised feature of American political life without escalating to an existential crisis. This has potentially far-reaching consequences as more moderate politicians on both sides perceive the risks of being in public life to be too high and vacate their offices. This paves the way for more extreme candidates to fill the gaps. With the more moderate voices gone, it’s less likely the conversation will cool down.

    But things could improve. It will require bipartisan condemnation of political violence and a reconnecting of politicians to their constituents. Both sides need to work together to drag a bigger portion of the political debate back into the real world. Meanwhile social media platforms and the legacy media alike must be held accountable for the tenor and veracity of the content they feed to the public.

    And efforts must be made by political elites, the media and the public to rebuild civic trust. As the foundation stone of a healthy democracy, citizens’ trust in their government and in each other must be carefully pieced back together.

    America does not need to accept violence as the norm, in fact, it must collectively and consistently reject it. The future of its democracy may depend on it. More

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    Polling shows Donald Trump’s ratings are poor – but they could be worse

    It’s nearly eight months since Trump’s second term as United States president began. In analyst Nate Silver’s aggregate of US national polls, Trump’s net approval is currently -7.4, with 51.6% disapproving and 44.2% approving.

    Trump’s net approval was initially positive, but fell to -9.7 in late April, soon after the “liberation day” tariffs were announced. His net approval recovered to -3.6 in early June, but slid to a low of -10.3 in late July. Since a slight recovery from that position, his ratings have changed little.

    Silver has ratings for presidents since Harry Truman (president from 1945–53), so Trump’s ratings can be compared against other presidents at this point in their terms. Trump’s ratings are only better than his own at this point in his first term, and he’s roughly even with Gerald Ford (president from 1974–77).

    On issues, Trump is at net -3.8 on immigration, -14.4 on the economy, -15.9 on trade and -27.0 on inflation. There was a second successive weak US jobs report last Friday, but the benchmark US S&P 500 stock index rose to a new record high last night.

    Until and unless something goes badly wrong with either the real US economy or the stock market, Trump’s ratings are likely to be sustained at about their current level.

    Midterm elections for all of the US House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate will occur in November 2026. In analyst G. Elliott Morris’ aggregate of the national generic congressional ballot, Democrats lead Republicans by 44.3–41.4. Democrats have led Republicans narrowly since April.

    I covered a special election in a safe Democratic federal seat that Democrats retained with a swing in their favour today for The Poll Bludger. I also wrote about Republican gerrymandering in Texas and retaliatory Democratic gerrymandering in California, and electoral events in Norway and France.

    Australian Morgan poll and further Resolve and DemosAU questions

    A national Australian Morgan poll, conducted July 28 to August 24 from a sample of 5,001, gave Labor a 56.5–43.5 lead by headline respondent preferences, a 0.5-point gain for the Coalition since the July Morgan poll.

    Primary votes were 34% Labor (down 2.5), 30% Coalition (down one), 12% Greens (steady), 9% One Nation (up two) and 15% for all Others (up 1.5). By 2025 election preference flows, Labor led by 55.5–44.5, a 1.5-point gain for the Coalition since July.

    Labor’s two-party vote gender gap widened to 8.5 points from five points in July, with women giving Labor a 60.5–39.5 lead, while men gave them just a 52–48 lead.

    The age gap also widened, with people aged under 50 swinging to Labor from July, while those aged over 50 swung to the Coalition. The Coalition gained a 50.5–49.5 lead with those aged 50–64 and extended its lead to 56.5–43.5 with those aged 65 and over.

    In further questions from the August 11–16 Resolve poll for Nine newspapers that gave federal Labor a 59–41 lead, 28% wanted to keep the current 43% emissions reduction target by 2030, 17% wanted a more ambitious target, 12% wanted the 2030 target rejected or reduced and to just concentrate on net zero by 2050, and 17% wanted to reject all current emissions targets.

    In a national DemosAU poll, conducted July 31 from a sample of 1,079, 56% supported the ban on YouTube for children under 16 while 29% were opposed. Among parents of children under 16, support was 59–34. By 55–32, parents said they wouldn’t help their children circumvent the ban.

    By 45–33, respondents supported the government’s proposal to increase the tax rate on superannuation earnings for balances over $3 million. By 57–22, they did not believe the changes would lead to them personally paying more tax.

    Essential poll

    In a national Essential poll, conducted August 20–24 from a sample of 1,034, Anthony Albanese’s net approval was down three points since July to +6, with 49% approving and 43% disapproving. Sussan Ley’s net approval was unchanged at -2.

    On the economy, 43% (down nine since January) thought it would stay the same in the next six months, 35% (up six) get worse and 22% (up three) improve. Labor was trusted to manage the economy overall by 41–28 over the Coalition. Economic management is normally a strength for the Coalition.

    On regulation, 29% thought there was too much, 21% not enough and 49% about the right amount. But 54% said there was not enough regulation of AI and 44–48% said the same of social media, big businesses and childcare.

    By 34–30, respondents supported Australia recognising Palestine. By 50–24, they supported the introduction of a four-day working week.

    In questions asked only of the Victorian sample of 518, Labor Premier Jacinta Allan had a net approval of -15, with 51% disapproving and 36% approving. Liberal leader Brad Battin had a net approval of +5.

    Bradfield court challenge update

    In July the Liberals challenged their 26-vote loss to Teal Nicolette Boele in Bradfield at the federal election to the High Court, acting as the Court of Disputed Returns. The High Court referred this case to the federal court.

    The Guardian said that on August 22 the court had given lawyers for the Liberals and Boele three days each to examine 792 disputed ballot papers. A final list of ballot papers that are disputed by the Liberals and Boele will need to be submitted by September 25. There will be a one-day hearing on October 2.

    Tasmanian EMRS poll gives Liberals big lead

    A Tasmanian EMRS poll, conducted August 25–28 from a sample of 1,000, gave the Liberals 38% of the vote (down two from the July 19 election), Labor 24% (down two), the Greens 13% (down one), independents 19% (up four) and others 6% (up one). Tasmania uses a proportional system, so a two-party estimate is not applicable.

    Liberal premier Jeremy Rockliff’s net favourable surged 12 points since May to +18, while new Labor leader Josh Willie recorded an initial net +4 favourable. Rockliff led Willie by 50–24 as preferred premier.

    NSW Kiama byelection

    A byelection for the New South Wales state seat of Kiama will occur on Saturday after the resignation of independent MP Gareth Ward, a convicted felon. ABC election analyst Antony Green said there are 13 candidates for the byelection, including Labor and Liberal candidates. Labor is the favourite to win. More

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    Project 2025 and Donald Trump’s Dangerous Dismantling of the US Federal Government

    Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh, or the Rajput, and retired CIA officer Glenn Carle, or the WASP, examine US President Donald Trump’s cuts to the US federal government. Their wide-ranging discussion blends sharp historical insight with ideological critique, seeking to make sense of today’s Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) world.

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    They emphasize that this topic has global resonance, since the world still depends on the stability and leadership of the United States. The discussion, therefore, becomes both an internal American debate and an international concern.

    Trump’s attack on federal agencies

    Atul and Glenn begin by cataloging specific Trump-era actions they view as evidence of a systematic weakening of the federal apparatus. These include the removal of officials such as Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook, Center for Disease Control and Prevention Director Susan Monarez and Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Billy Long. They argue that such moves, combined with a broader hollowing out of institutions like the Federal Reserve, the State Department, the CIA, US Agency for International Development and NASA, represent an intentional “gutting” of agencies crucial to governance and public welfare.

    Atul and Glenn insist that these institutions exist not only for technical governance but also for maintaining the credibility of the American democratic model. If the credibility of these institutions collapses, it erodes public trust and damages the US’s global standing.

    Norquist’s philosophy and Ronald Reagan’s agenda

    Glenn situates Trump’s efforts within a longer ideological arc. He traces them back to US President Ronald Reagan’s “revolution,” which reduced faith in government and elevated conservative economic philosophy. Reagan’s agenda, amplified by figures such as Americans for Tax Reform President Grover Norquist — who is famous for wanting to shrink government so small he could “drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub” — and bolstered by conservative think tanks, paved the way for what Glenn calls today’s “Trumpian revolution.”

    Atul adds that the Reagan years were not just an American turning point, but part of a broader global shift toward neoliberalism, deregulation and privatization. The ideological groundwork laid in that era, they contend, continues to shape political agendas today.

    Trump and Project 2025

    Central to the conversation is Project 2025, a Heritage Foundation initiative Atul and Glenn describe as a radical blueprint. Its goals include cutting the federal workforce by half and dramatically expanding presidential powers. They stress that these proposals would not only disrupt government efficiency and accountability but also tilt the balance of power sharply toward the executive branch.

    Atul and Glenn emphasize that the size of the workforce reflects the government’s ability to deliver services, regulate markets and provide stability in times of crisis. Reducing this by half would, in their view, leave the country dangerously exposed.

    Federal layoffs under Trump 2.0

    Atul and Glenn note that Trump’s current plans echo his first term, but with greater intensity. They state that proposals to eliminate 50% of the federal workforce are unprecedented in scope. They interpret these layoffs as more than cost-cutting; they are an ideological purge designed to weaken federal institutions and concentrate loyalty directly under presidential control. Such measures would ripple outward beyond Washington to ordinary citizens who depend on federal programs, grants and regulatory oversight for health, education and economic stability.

    Presidential control: a threat to US democracy?

    Glenn links Trump’s approach to the legal philosophy of Carl Schmitt, “[Adolf] Hitler’s legal theorist,” who defended the primacy of unchecked executive authority in Nazi Germany. Schmitt’s concept of the unitary executive resonates with Trump’s own political movement, Glenn argues, by undermining checks and balances and normalizing near-absolute presidential power. This strikes at the heart of democratic governance.

    Atul points out that the American system was designed around the separation of powers. If that foundation is eroded, the US risks losing what has long been its distinctive democratic safeguard.

    The Republican Party’s evolution

    The conversation also turns to the broader Republican Party. Atul and Glenn argue that decades of conservative activism, think tank influence and shifting party priorities have steered the Grand Old Party toward radical centralization of power. They suggest that what once seemed like outlandish ideas are now mainstream within the Republican platform, particularly under Trump’s leadership. This shift is both political and cultural, representing a redefinition of what conservatism means in the US.

    Fascism, strongmen and the future

    Atul and Glenn conclude with a sober warning: Left unchecked, the United States risks sliding from liberal democracy into what they call a “conservative autocracy.” They point to echoes of strongman politics and fascist ideology, stressing the long-term danger of normalizing authoritarian principles. At the same time, they note Trump’s diverse support base — including many immigrants who align with cultural conservatism and share a disdain for bureaucracy — as evidence that these dynamics are both complex and deeply embedded in American society.

    They highlight that this contradiction of immigrants supporting an anti-immigrant politician reveals how cultural and ideological affinities can often outweigh personal experience. The episode ends as a call to reflect on the fragility of democratic institutions and the vigilance required to protect them.

    [Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

    The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    FO° Podcasts: Why Has Trump Deployed Thousands of National Guard Troops in Washington, DC?

    Fair Observer Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Ankit Jain, a voting rights attorney and the shadow senator of Washington, DC. Together, they discuss the city’s unusual political status, US President Donald Trump’s interventions in the capital and broader questions about crime, governance, statehood and the future of American democracy.

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    What is a shadow senator?

    Jain begins by clarifying his unusual role as one of DC’s two elected shadow senators. Unlike other states, Washington, DC, has no voting representation in Congress. To push for statehood and defend its autonomy, the city created two non-voting senators and one non-voting representative. Jain, elected in November 2024 and sworn in this January, explains that his position is part-advocate, part-lobbyist and part-symbolic lawmaker. His chief responsibility is to fight for DC to become the 51st state and secure full representation for its 700,000 residents.

    Turmoil in Washington, DC?

    Singh turns the conversation to Trump’s controversial policy decisions in the capital. Jain describes how Trump took control of the Metropolitan Police Department for 30 days, placing it under a presidentially appointed official. Trump also sent in hundreds of federal agents and more than 2,000 National Guard troops. The stated aim was to reduce crime, but Jain argues the real goal was to reshape policing “in his own image,” encouraging brutality and overriding DC laws on cooperation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He points to raids that terrified the Latino community and recalls seeing federal troops idling around tourist sites like the National Mall rather than addressing real problems.

    DC’s governance structure

    Jain then explains how fragile DC’s self-government really is. While the city elects a mayor and council, the federal government controls the judiciary and prosecution of adult crimes. Judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and the US Attorney — also a presidential appointee — handles prosecutions. Right now, one in five local court seats sits vacant, slowing trials and fueling more crime. The US Attorney’s office, meanwhile, suffers from mass firings that gutted its capacity. Even when DC passes its own laws, Congress can block or repeal them within 30 to 60 days. To Jain, this makes self-rule an illusion, unlike London or other world capitals, where residents govern their own affairs.

    Crime in DC

    Trump has repeatedly claimed that crime in Washington is spiraling. Jain challenges this, citing objective data: Crime is down 25% year-on-year, violent crime is at a 30-year low and overall rates remain below pre-COVID-19 levels. He accuses Trump of spreading lies to justify costly deployments that burn “millions of [taxpayer] dollars a day” without solving problems.

    Jain acknowledges DC still faces crime and homelessness, but argues solutions require smarter police deployment, housing reform and more funding for mental health. It does not need troop surges and headline-grabbing raids. He also notes that federal restrictions like the Height Act prevent the city from building enough affordable housing, driving rents higher and fueling homelessness.

    Trump’s attacks on DC

    Jain sees Trump’s interventions as part of a larger pattern. By stripping money from DC’s budget, firing federal workers and blocking judicial nominations, Trump is deliberately weakening the city. These moves deepen DC’s “mini-recession” and leave essential services, from schools to emergency response, undermanned. In Jain’s view, Trump’s goal is not to fix urban challenges but to create crises, then claim sweeping authority to impose his preferred policies.

    Should Washington, DC, be a state?

    For Jain, it is clear that Washington, DC, should be a state. He argues that nearly every problem facing the capital — crime policy, housing shortages, budget manipulation — stems from the fact that DC is not a state. Its residents pay taxes, serve in the military and number more than Wyoming or Vermont, yet they lack voting representation. Jain calls it a modern case of “taxation without representation,” pointing out that no other democratic nation in the world denies its capital city’s residents the vote. Statehood, he insists, is the only path to justice.

    The National Guard in other cities?

    Singh raises Trump’s threats to send the National Guard into Los Angeles, California, and Chicago, Illinois. Jain warns this is no idle talk — DC is simply the test case. Because it is not a state, it was an easy target. If successful, Trump could expand the model to cities like Chicago, Detroit, Michigan, or Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, coercing them into repealing policies or cutting federal funds. Jain calls this a “dangerous precedent” and urges Senate Democrats to resist using every tool available, including the filibuster, to stop such power grabs.

    Democrats need an upgrade

    Finally, Singh raises a broader critique: Democrats have failed urban America. Jain concedes there is truth in this. Democrats, he says, often rely too much on the “old guard” and resist fresh ideas. Still, he pushes back against Republican attacks, noting that Grand Old Party-led cities often have higher crime rates, largely because of permissive gun laws. He argues that Democrats need to show a new vision while Republicans must stop blocking gun control measures and sabotaging agencies like the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

    To Jain, Trump’s actions in DC reveal a deeper threat: an authoritarian drift that undermines American democracy itself. If left unchecked, he warns, it could spread from Washington to the rest of the nation.

    [Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

    The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Active Clubs are white supremacy’s new, dangerous frontier

    Small local organizations called Active Clubs have spread widely across the U.S. and internationally, using fitness as a cover for a much more alarming mission. These groups are a new and harder-to-detect form of white supremacist organizing that merges extremist ideology with fitness and combat sports culture.

    Active Clubs frame themselves as innocuous workout groups on digital platforms and decentralized networks to recruit, radicalize and prepare members for racist violence. The clubs commonly use encrypted messaging apps such as Telegram, Wire and Matrix to coordinate internally.

    For broader propaganda and outreach they rely on alternative social media platforms such as Gab, Odysee, VK and sometimes BitChute. They also selectively use mainstream sites such as Instagram, Facebook, X and TikTok, until those sites ban the clubs.

    Active Club members have been implicated in orchestrating and distributing neo-Nazi recruitment videos and manifestos. In late 2023, for instance, two Ontario men, Kristoffer Nippak and Matthew Althorpe, were arrested and charged with distributing materials for the neo-Nazi group Atomwaffen Division and the transnational terrorist group Terrorgram.

    Following their arrests, Active Club Canada’s public network went dark, Telegram pages were deleted or rebranded, and the club went virtually silent. Nippak was granted bail under strict conditions, while Althorpe remains in custody.

    As a sociologist studying extremism and white supremacy since 1993, I have watched the movement shift from formal organizations to small, decentralized cells – a change embodied most clearly by Active Clubs.

    An investigation by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation tracks down two Ontario-based Active Clubs that recruit and train young men to fight.

    White nationalism 3.0

    According to private analysts who track far-right extremist activities, the Active Club network has a core membership of 400 to 1,200 white men globally, plus sympathizers, online supporters and passive members. The clubs mainly target young white men in their late teens and twenties.

    Since 2020, Active Clubs have expanded rapidly across the United States, Canada and Europe, including the U.K., France, Sweden and Finland. Precise numbers are hard to verify, but the clubs appear to be spreading, according to The Counter Extremism Project, the Anti-Defamation League, the Southern Poverty Law Center and my own research.

    The clubs reportedly operate in at least 25 U.S. states, and potentially as many as 34. Active U.S. chapters reportedly increased from 49 in 2023 to 78 in 2025.

    The clubs’ rise reflects a broader shift in white supremacist strategy, away from formal organizations and social movements. In 2020, American neo-Nazi Robert Rundo introduced the concept of “White Nationalism 3.0” – a decentralized, branded and fitness-based approach to extremist organizing.

    Rundo previously founded the Rise Above Movement, which was a violent, far-right extremist group in the U.S. known for promoting white nationalist ideology, organizing street fights and coordinating through social media. The organization carried out attacks at protests and rallies from 2016 through 2018.

    Active Clubs embed their ideology within apolitical activities such as martial arts and weightlifting. This model allows them to blend in with mainstream fitness communities. However, their deeper purpose is to prepare members for racial conflict.

    An actor reconstructs how British broadcaster ITV News infiltrated and secretly filmed inside Active Club England, documenting its recruiting process, activities and goals.

    ‘You need to learn how to fight’

    Active Club messaging glorifies discipline, masculinity and strength – a “warrior identity” designed to attract young men.

    “The active club is not so much a structural organization as it is a lifestyle for those willing to work, risk and sweat to embody our ideals for themselves and to promote them to others,” Rundo explained via his Telegram channel.

    “They never were like, ‘You need to learn how to fight so you can beat up people of color.’ It was like, ‘You need to learn how to fight because people want to kill you in the future,’” a former Active Club member told Vice News in 2023.

    These cells are deliberately small – often under a dozen members – and self-contained, which gives them greater operational security and flexibility. Each club operates semi-autonomously while remaining connected to the broader ideology and digital network.

    Expanding globally and deepening ties

    Active Clubs maintain strategic and ideological connections with formal white supremacist groups, including Patriot Front, a white nationalist and neofascist group founded in 2017 by Thomas Rousseau after the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.

    Active Clubs share extremist beliefs with these organizations, including racial hierarchy and the “Great Replacement” theory, which claims white populations are being deliberately replaced by nonwhite immigrants. While publicly presenting as fitness groups, they may collaborate with white supremacist groups on recruitment, training, propaganda or public events.

    Figures connected to accelerationist groups – organizations that seek to create social chaos and societal collapse that they believe will lead to a race war and the destruction of liberal democracy – played a role in founding the Active Club network. Along with the Rise Above Movement, they include Atomwaffen Division and another neo-Nazi group, The Base – organizations that repackage violent fascism to appeal to disaffected young white men in the U.S.

    Brotherhood as a cover

    By downplaying explicit hate symbols and emphasizing strength and preparedness, Active Clubs appeal to a new generation of recruits who may not initially identify with overt racism but are drawn to a culture of hypermasculinity and self-improvement.

    Anyone can start a local Active Club chapter with minimal oversight. This autonomy makes it hard for law enforcement agencies to monitor the groups and helps the network grow rapidly.

    Shared branding and digital propaganda maintain ideological consistency. Through this approach, Active Clubs have built a transnational network of echo chambers, recruitment pipelines and paramilitary-style training in parks and gyms.

    Club members engage in activities such as combat sports training, propaganda dissemination and ideological conditioning. Fight sessions are often recorded and shared online as recruitment tools.

    Members distribute flyers, stickers and online content to spread white supremacist messages. Active Clubs embed themselves in local communities by hosting events, promoting physical fitness, staging public actions and sharing propaganda.

    Potential members first see propaganda on encrypted apps such as Telegram or on social media. The clubs recruit in person at gyms, protests and local events, vetting new members to ensure they share the group’s beliefs and can be trusted to maintain secrecy.

    From fringe to functioning network

    Based on current information from the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, there are 187 active chapters within the Active Club Network across 27 countries – a 25% increase from late 2023. The Crowd Counting Consortium documented 27 protest events involving Active Clubs in 2022-2023.

    However, precise membership numbers remain difficult to ascertain. Some groups call themselves “youth clubs” but share similar ideas and aesthetics and engage in similar activities.

    Active Club members view themselves as defenders of Western civilization and masculine virtue. From their perspective, their activities represent noble resistance rather than hate. Members are encouraged to stay secretive, prepare for societal collapse and build a network of committed, fit men ready to act through infiltration, activism or violence.

    Hiding in plain sight

    Law enforcement agencies, researchers and civil society now face a new kind of domestic threat that wears workout clothes instead of uniforms.

    Active Clubs work across international borders, bound by shared ideas and tactics and a common purpose. This is the new white nationalism: decentralized, modernized, more agile and disguised as self-improvement. What appears to be a harmless workout group may be a gateway to violent extremism, one pushup at a time. More

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    The Trump administration wants to use the military against drug traffickers. History suggests this may backfire

    In early August, US President Donald Trump signed a not-so-secretive order to make plans for the use of US military force against specific Latin American criminal organisations.

    The plans were acted upon this week. The US deployed three guided-missile destroyers to the waters off Venezuela, with the authority to interdict drug shipments.

    This was not exactly a surprise move. During his inauguration in January, Trump signed an executive order designating some criminal groups as foreign terrorist organisations. At the time, he told a journalist this could lead to US special forces conducting operations in Mexico.

    Weeks later, six Mexican cartels were added to the foreign terrorist list, as were two other organisations: MS-13, an El Salvadoran gang and particular focus during Trump’s first presidency, and Tren De Aragua, a Venezuelan gang and frequent target during Trump’s presidential campaign in 2024.

    Read more:
    What is Tren de Aragua? How the Venezuelan gang started − and why US policies may only make it stronger

    In May, two Haitian groups were added to the list. Then, in July, another Venezuelan organisation known as the Cartel of the Suns was added to a similar list because of its support for other criminal groups.

    Fentanyl brings a new focus on organised crime

    Illicit substances have flown across the US-Mexican border for more than a century. But the emergence of the synthetic opioid fentanyl has shaken up US responses to the illicit drug trade.

    Highly addictive and potent, fentanyl has caused a sharp increase in overdose deaths in the US since 2013.

    Successive US governments have had little success at curbing fentanyl overdoses.

    Instead, an emerging political consensus portrays fentanyl as an external problem and therefore a border problem.

    When the Biden administration captured Ismael Zambada – one of Mexico’s most elusive drug barons who trafficked tonnes of cocaine into the US for 40 years – he was charged with conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. Even progressive independent Bernie Sanders has pivoted to claiming border security was the solution to the fentanyl crisis.

    But focusing on border security will do little to improve or save lives within the US.

    Tougher border measures have never effectively curtailed the supply of other illicit substances such as cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine.

    These measures do little to reduce harm or dependency within the US, where a largely unaccountable pharmaceutical industry first pushed synthetic opioids.

    The question remains just what can be achieved by US military operations.

    How to spot a cartel

    While the chemical emissions from fentanyl labs are easily spotted by drones, cartels and their operatives are decidedly more difficult to identify.

    Criminal organisations in Mexico tend to be loose networks of smaller factions. They don’t operate in strict hierarchies like corporations or armies.

    The decentralised nature of these networks makes them extremely resilient. If one part of the chain is disrupted, the network adapts, sourcing materials from different places or pushing goods along different trafficking routes.

    But US and Mexican security agencies often act as though cartels follow rigid hierarchies. The so-called “kingpin strategy” focuses on killing or arresting the leadership of criminal organisations, expecting it to render them unable to operate.

    However, this strategy often exacerbates violence, as rival factions compete to take over the turf of fallen kingpins.

    Combating criminal groups with the military has already been a spectacular failure in Mexico.

    Former President Felipe Calderón declared war on the cartels in 2006, but his government lost credibility for leading Mexico into a war it could not win or escape.

    Tens of thousands of people are now killed every year, a dramatic increase from the historically low homicide rates in the years leading up to 2006. More than 100,000 have disappeared since the beginning of the war.

    Outside interventions also run the risk of increasing support for criminal groups.

    In my research, I’ve found cartels sometimes market themselves as guardians of local people, successfully positioning themselves as more in touch with local people than the distant Mexican state.

    Cartels can also certainly make the most of deep antipathy towards US intervention in Mexico.

    All cartels are not equal

    Deploying warships off the coast of Venezuela will have minimal impact on the fentanyl trade.

    Fentanyl enters the US from Mexico and even from Canada – but Venezuela doesn’t feature in US threat assessments for fentanyl.

    Military action against the Cartel of the Suns will also be largely ineffectual, as this group exists in name only.

    Research has found this isn’t an actual cartel – rather, the name describes a loose network of competing drug-trafficking networks within the Venezuelan state. Figures in the government certainly have ties to the illicit drug trade, but they are not organised in a cartel.

    In Mexico, however, the cartels do exist – albeit not as imagined by the US government.

    Given the US has invaded and seized territory from Mexico in the past, US military intervention has minimal prospect of support from Mexican governments.

    Current President Claudia Sheinbaum has shown a willingness to accommodate the Trump government on matters of fentanyl trafficking. She has deployed thousands of members of the National Guard to police the border and major trafficking centres, such as the state of Sinaloa.

    The Mexican government has also made two mass extraditions of captured crime bosses to the US. As with the capture of Zambada by the Biden government, this is likely to be used as evidence the US is winning the battle against fentanyl.

    Then again, these crime bosses could be put to other uses.

    The US government recently returned an imprisoned leader of MS-13 to El Salvador, even though he was indicted for terrorism in the US.

    This move was part of the deal-making between the US government and President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador.

    The US government may be eager to take the fight to organised crime, but sometimes political expediency is a bigger priority. More

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    Tit-for-tat gerrymandering wars won’t end soon – what happens in Texas and California doesn’t stay there

    Congressional redistricting – the process of drawing electoral districts to account for population changes – was conceived by the Founding Fathers as a once-per-decade redrawing of district lines following the decennial U.S. census. Today it has devolved into a near-constant feature of American politics – often in response to litigation, and frequently with the intent of maintaining or gaining partisan advantage.

    Polls show widespread public disapproval of manipulating political boundaries to favor certain groups, a process known as gerrymandering. However, we currently see little hope of preventing a race to the bottom, where numerous states redraw their maps to benefit one party in response to other states drawing their maps to benefit another party.

    The most recent round of tit-for-tat gerrymandering began in Texas. After drawing their post-census congressional maps in 2021, Republicans in the Texas Legislature, at President Donald Trump’s behest, are advancing a new set of maps designed to increase the number of Republican congressional seats in their state. The goal is to help Republicans retain control of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 2026 midterm elections by converting five Democratic seats to ones that will likely result in a Republican victory.

    In response, California Democratic Gov. Gavin Newsom is pushing to redraw his state’s map. Under Newsom’s plan, Democrats could gain five House seats in California, offsetting Republican gains in Texas. The California Legislature approved the new maps on Aug. 21 and Gov. Newsom signed the bills that day. Next, the maps will be presented to California voters on the November 2025 ballot for approval.

    Newsom vows that he isn’t trying to disband the independent redistricting process that California enacted in 2021. Rather, he proposes to shift to these partisan gerrymandered maps temporarily, then return to independent, nonpartisan redistricting in 2031.

    Democrats in Illinois and New York, and Republicans in Indiana, Missouri and South Carolina, have signaled that they may follow Texas and California’s leads. Based on our research on politics and elections, we don’t expect that the wave will stop there.

    Gerrymandering dates back to struggles over U.S. foreign policy in the early 1800s and is named for a signer of the Declaration of Independence, Elbridge Gerry.

    Rules for mapmakers

    Redistricting has always been an inherently political process. But the advent of widespread, easily accessible computer technology, increasingly predictable voting patterns and tight partisan margins in Congress have turbocharged the process.

    There are ways to tweak this gerrymandering run amok and perhaps block a bad map or two. But none of these approaches are likely to stop partisan actors entirely from drawing maps to benefit themselves and their parties.

    The most obvious strategy would be to create guardrails for the legislators and commissions who draw the maps. Such guidelines often specify the types of data that could be used to draw the maps – for example, limiting partisan data.

    Anti-gerrymandering rules could also limit the number of political boundaries, such as city or county lines, that would be split by new districts. And they could prioritize compactness, rather than allowing bizarrely-shaped districts that link far-flung communities.

    These proposals certainly won’t do any harm, and might even move the process in a more positive direction, but they are unlikely to end gerrymandering.

    For example, North Carolina had an explicit limitation on using partisan data in its 2021 mapmaking process, as well as a requirement that lawmakers could only draw maps in the North Carolina State Legislative Building. It was later revealed that a legislator had used “concept maps” drawn by an aide outside of the normal mapmaking process.

    In a world where anyone with an internet connection can log onto free websites like Dave’s Redistricting to draw maps using partisan data, it’s hard to prevent states from incorporating nonofficial proposals into their maps.

    Courts and commissions

    A second way to police gerrymandering is to use the courts aggressively to combat unfair or discriminatory maps. Some courts, particularly at the state level, have reined in egregious gerrymanders like Pennsylvania’s 2011 map, which was overturned in 2018.

    At the national level, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Rucho v. Common Cause in 2019 that partisan gerrymandering claims presented “political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts” and ultimately were better suited to state courts. There are still likely to be claims in federal courts about racial dilution and other Voting Rights Act violations in gerrymanders, but the door to the federal courthouse for partisanship claims appears to be closed for the time being.

    A third option is for states to hand map-drawing power to an independent body. Recent studies show that independent redistricting commissions produce maps that are more competitive and fairer. For example, a nonpartisan scholarly review of the 2021-2022 congressional and state legislative maps found that commissions “generally produce less biased and more competitive plans than when one party controls the process.”

    Commissions are popular with the public. In a 2024 study with political scientists Seth McKee and Scott Huffmon, we found that both Democrats and Republicans in South Carolina preferred to assign redistricting to an independent commission rather than the state Legislature, which has been in Republican control since 2000.

    Studies using national polling data have also found evidence that redistricting commissions are popular, and that people who live in states that use commissions view the redistricting process more positively than residents of states where legislators draw congressional lines.

    A national solution or bust

    While redistricting commissions are popular and effective in states that have adopted them, current actions in California show that this strategy can fail if it is embraced by some states but not others.

    Unfortunately, there is no simple solution for tit-for-tat gerrymandering. Litigation can help at the margins, and independent redistricting can make a difference, but even the best intentions can fail under political pressure.

    The only wholesale solution is national reform. But even here, we are not optimistic.

    A proportional representation system, in which seats are divided by the portion of the vote that goes to each party, could solve the problem. However, removing single-member districts and successfully implementing proportional representation in the United States is about as likely as finding a hockey puck on Mars.

    A national ban on gerrymandering might be more politically palatable. Even here, though, the odds of success are fairly low. After all, the people who benefit from the current system would have to vote to change it, and the filibuster rule in the Senate requires not just majority but supermajority support.

    So, brace for what’s about to come. As James Madison famously observed, forming factions – groups of people united by a common interest that threatens the rights of others – is “sown in the nature of man.”

    Gerrymandering helps factions acquire and retain power. If U.S. leaders aren’t willing to consider a national solution, it won’t disappear anytime soon. More