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    The hidden power of marathon Senate speeches: What history tells us about Cory Booker’s 25-hour oration

    Democratic U.S. Sen. Cory Booker of New Jersey made history on April 1, 2025, when he stood on the Senate floor and spoke for 25 hours and five minutes, delivering the longest floor speech in the history of the U.S. Senate.

    Booker’s speech detailed his concerns about President Donald Trump’s new executive orders, other policies and approach to government in his second term.

    “I rise tonight because silence at this moment of national crisis would be a betrayal of some of the greatest heroes of our nation. Because at stake in this moment is nothing less than everything that we brag about, that we talk about, that makes us special,” Booker said.

    Although Booker’s speech was not technically a filibuster, meaning a prolonged action at the Senate in order to delay or stop a vote on a legislative action, it was clearly a monumental physical achievement. Booker stood, wearing a black suit, for the entirety of his speech and did not pause to take bathroom or meal breaks.

    What does the subject matter of Booker’s speech, as well as his style of giving it, say about its potential effectiveness? Could it succeed where filibusters have failed?

    Many other long Senate speeches in history offer a variety of useful historical hints about the political significance of Booker’s record-breaking speech.

    U.S. Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina is kissed by his wife after talking for 24 hours and 18 minutes in opposition to the Civil Rights Act in August 1957.
    Bettmann/Contributor/Getty Images

    Booker’s speech was a wide-ranging protest

    One unusual element of Booker’s oration is that it was not focused on just one narrow issue.

    Most of the lengthiest filibusters from across Senate history are focused on bills that cover important but specific issues. In 1953, Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon, for example, set a record for the longest filibuster when he spoke for 22 hours and 26 minutes. Morse protested a bill involving the transfer of land and oil rights between coastal states and the federal government. The bill passed, despite Morse’s filibuster.

    Sen. Strom Thurmond, the South Carolina politician who broke Morse’s record just four years later, infamously – and unsuccessfully – protested the Civil Rights Act of 1957 with a 24-hour, 18-minute speech.

    Booker’s speech came in the midst of a vote to confirm Matthew Whitaker as the U.S. ambassador to NATO. Whitaker was confirmed shortly after Booker’s speech concluded.

    Booker and the procession of Senate colleagues who asked him questions referenced this and other appointments in their remarks. But Booker largely used the speech to build a much bigger case against the Trump administration, most notably that the administration had wrested from Congress much of its constitutionally mandated budgetary authority by extensively cutting federal staff, grants and spending without congressional approval.

    “These are not normal times in America,” Booker said toward the beginning of his address, “and they should not be treated as such in the United States Senate.”

    The rules and culture of the Senate have always been more lax when it comes to what congressional experts call “germaneness” – in other words, how relevant a Senator’s action is to whatever is being debated.

    For example, the Senate often allows nongermane amendments, meaning those that have little or nothing to do with the bill being debated. Booker leveraged that Senate tradition to make a larger point about what he called an ongoing “crisis” in American democracy.

    Booker stuck to the issues

    Booker may have covered a wide variety of areas in his speech, ranging from proposed Republican cuts to Medicaid to mass firings of federal workers, but there’s no question that he stayed focused on his critique of the Trump administration – a difficult task to stick to for 25 straight hours.

    Booker’s predecessors in the pursuit of Thurmond’s record have demonstrated this difficulty in keeping a marathon speech focused.

    For example, Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas diverted from his argument when he gave a 21-hour, 19-minute speech protesting President Obama’s signature piece of legislation, the Affordable Care Act, in 2013.

    Cruz, who still serves with Booker in the Senate, took the opportunity to tell his young daughters a bedtime story on the Senate floor, reading aloud from Dr. Seuss’ children’s book “Green Eggs and Ham.”

    Louisiana Sen. Huey Long, meanwhile, shared recipes for southern fried oysters during his 1937 protest of the federal appointments process.

    Booker, on the other hand, almost uniformly kept his focus on his grievances against the Trump administration and used only notes designed to reinforce his central argument that Trump is not leading in the best interest of the country.

    According to an April 1 press release from Booker’s office, the senator drew from over 1,000 pages of prepared material assembled by his Senate aides, including stories from more than 200 Americans who had written to Booker protesting Trump’s actions.

    In many instances, Booker also spoke extemporaneously about the administration’s actions. At other times, his fellow senators broke in for a lengthy question, but even these kept the conversation, and Booker’s attention, focused on taking Trump — and occasionally Elon Musk – to task.

    In all instances, Booker used his speech to rally the public.

    “My voice is inadequate. My efforts today are inadequate to stop what they are trying to do,” he said at one point. “But we the people are powerful, and we are strong.”

    Sen. Cory Booker speaks on the Senate floor on April 1, 2025.
    Senate Television/Associated Press

    Lasting effects

    Of course, with few tangible results to show for lengthy Senate speeches, people might be tempted to view these long orations as little more than trivia or political theater.

    On some occasions, filibusters have made a legislative impact. Sen. Alfonse D’Amato of New York, for example, filibustered a budget bill in 1986 for nearly 23½ hours to protest an amendment that would have killed funding for a jet trainer plane manufactured in his state. His filibuster didn’t stop the bill entirely, but he did secure a concession that prolonged the project’s life.

    For the most part, however, lengthy filibusters throughout history have been largely fruitless efforts legislatively. Even so, the symbolism of these speeches, including Booker’s, can have effects on politics and representation that last beyond the legislation the senator is protesting.

    It’s difficult to know yet just how effective Booker’s efforts will be in motivating an anti-Trump coalition to stand up to the administration, either in Congress or among voters.

    But politically speaking, Booker’s timing was fortuitous – on April 2, the same evening Booker wrapped up his address, liberals secured a crucial Wisconsin Supreme Court seat in a high-turnout election, when Judge Susan Crawford beat Judge Brad Schimel. Schimel is a Trump supporter and received nearly US$20 million in donations from organizations supported by Musk.

    Democratic politicians also outperformed expectations in two special elections to the U.S. House in Florida, though they lost the races.

    Taken together with Booker’s herculean effort, these events could serve as a catalyst for Trump’s opponents to strike back in the coming months.

    The symbolic significance of Booker’s achievement has also not gone unnoticed. Booker, who is Black and reflected on ancestors who were both enslaved or enslavers in his speech, was himself mindful of the historical relevance.

    “To be candid, Strom Thurmond’s record always just really irked me,” Booker said after his speech in an interview with MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow.

    “The longest speech on our great Senate floor was someone who was trying to stop people like me from being in the Senate.”

    If nothing else, Booker took that record from Thurmond and made it his own. More

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    Labor leads in three recent national polls, four weeks from the election

    The federal election will be held in four weeks. A national YouGov poll, conducted March 28 to April 3 from a sample of 1,622, gave Labor a 51–49 lead, a one-point gain for Labor since the previous non-MRP YouGov poll taken March 14–19.

    Primary votes were 35% Coalition (down two), 30% Labor (down one), 13% Greens (steady), 7% One Nation (steady), 2% Trumpet of Patriots (up one), 10% independents (up two) and 3% others (steady). YouGov is using respondent preferences from its last MRP poll. By 2022 election preference flows, Labor would lead by about 52–48.

    Anthony Albanese’s net approval rose three points to -6, with 50% dissatisfied and 44% satisfied. Peter Dutton’s net approval slumped ten points to -15, his worst in YouGov’s polls and the first time he’s had a worse net approval than Albanese since June 2024. Albanese led as better PM by 45–38 (45–40 previously).

    Since Sunday, we have had leaders’ ratings polls from Newspoll, Resolve, Freshwater, Essential and YouGov. A simple average of the net approval from these five polls has Albanese at net 7.8 and Dutton at net -12.

    Here is the poll graph. Labor has led in four of the six polls taken since the budget, with the exceptions a 50–50 tie in Resolve and a Coalition lead by 51–49 in Freshwater. However, Labor’s lead is narrow, except in Morgan.

    Labor Two Party Preferred Vote in national polls.

    While the Coalition could regain the lead before the election, Donald Trump’s tariff announcement on Thursday may make it more difficult for the Coalition.

    Essential poll: Labor takes slight lead

    A national Essential poll, conducted March 26–30 from a sample of 1,144, gave Labor a 48–47 lead by respondent preferences including undecided (a 47–47 tie in mid-March). This was the first Labor lead in Essential since November, with the Coalition either leading narrowly or a tie since.

    Primary votes were 34% Coalition (down one), 30% Labor (up one), 12% Greens (steady), 9% One Nation (up one), 2% Trumpet of Patriots (up one), 8% for all Others (down one) and 5% undecided (down one). By 2022 election flows, Labor would lead by about 51–49.

    Albanese’s net approval was down three points to -2, with 46% disapproving and 44% approving. Dutton’s was down one point to -6. It’s Dutton’s worst net approval in Essential since October 2023.

    Peter Dutton’s personal approval rating has slumped.
    Mick Tsikas/AAP

    By 52–32, voters thought Australia was on the wrong track (48–35 previously). Essential and Morgan have a big lead for wrong track, but Labor is ahead. Voters may be blaming Trump more than Labor.

    By 61–29, voters did not think the federal budget would make a meaningful difference on cost of living (64–27 after the May 2024 budget). By 69–31, voters thought the government should prioritise the delivery of services, even if it means running a deficit, over prioritise running a surplus.

    Voters were told the Trump administration wanted to pressure Australia into removing some policies using tariffs. By 65–15, voters supported the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and by 64–13 they supported making US companies pay tax on income generated in Australia.

    Morgan poll: Labor retains solid lead

    A national Morgan poll, conducted March 24–30 from a sample of 1,377, gave Labor a 53–47 lead by headline respondent preferences, unchanged from the March 17–23 poll.

    Primary votes were 35% Coalition (down 0.5), 32% Labor (down 1.5), 13% Greens (up 0.5), 5.5% One Nation (up 1.5), 10.5% independents (up 0.5) and 4% others (down 0.5). By 2022 election flows, Labor led by 53.5–46.5, a 0.5-point gain for the Coalition.

    By 51.5–32, voters thought Australia was going in the wrong direction (52.5–32.5 previously). Morgan’s consumer confidence index was up 1.1 points to 85.3.

    This term, Morgan’s results in general haven’t skewed to Labor relative to other polls, and Labor was behind in Morgan’s polls from November until late February. But Trump’s initial imposition of steel and aluminium tariffs on Australia on March 12 has seen Morgan move much more to Labor than other polls.

    Additional Resolve and Newspoll questions and a NSW federal poll

    I covered the national Resolve poll for Nine newspapers on March 30. In additional questions, by 60–15 voters thought Trump’s election was bad for Australia (40% bad in November). On threats to Australia in the next few years, 31% thought China the greatest threat, 17% the US, 4% Russia and 38% all equally.

    The Trump tariff announcement may have an effect on domestic politics.
    Lukas Coch/AAP

    Newspoll has been asking the same questions on the budget since 1988. The Poll Bludger said on Wednesday the March 25 budget was the fourth worst perceived on economic impact (at net -10), but about the middle on personal impact (net -19). The nine-point lead for “no” on would the opposition have delivered a better budget was about par for a Labor government.

    A federal DomosAU poll of New South Wales, conducted March 24–26 from a sample of 1,013, gave the Coalition a 51–49 lead (51.4–48.6 to Labor in NSW at the 2022 federal election). Primary votes were 38% Coalition, 30% Labor, 12% Greens, 9% One Nation and 11% for all Others.

    Albanese led Dutton as preferred PM by 39–38. By 52–31, respondents did not think Australia was headed in the right direction.

    Canadian election and US special elections

    The Canadian federal election is on April 28. Polls continue to show the governing centre-left Liberals gaining ground, and they now lead the Conservatives by 43.4–37.6 in the CBC Poll Tracker.

    US federal special elections occurred on Tuesday in two safe Republican seats. While Republicans easily retained, there were big swings to the Democrats from the 2024 presidential election results in those districts. A left-wing judge won an election to the Wisconsin state supreme court by 55–45. I covered the Canadian and US developments for The Poll Bludger.

    WA election final lower house results

    I previously covered Labor winning 46 of the 59 lower house seats at the March 8 Western Australian election. The ABC’s final two-party estimate was a Labor win by 57.2–42.8. While that’s way down from the record 69.7–30.3 in 2021, it’s up from 55.5–44.5 in 2017.

    Final primary votes were 41.4% Labor (down 18.5% since 2021), 28.0% Liberals (up 6.7%), 5.2% Nationals (up 1.2%), 11.1% Greens (up 4.1%), 4.0% One Nation (up 2.8%), 3.2% Australian Christians (up 1.7%), 2.5% Legalise Cannabis (up 2.1%) and 3.3% independents (up 2.5%).

    The upper house will be finalised next week. All above the line votes have been included, with only below the line votes to be added. Labor will win 15 of the 37 seats, the Liberals ten, the Nationals two, the Greens four and One Nation, Legalise Cannabis and the Christians one each. That leaves three unclear seats.

    ABC election analyst Antony Green’s modelling of the effect of below the line votes suggests Labor’s 16th seat is in doubt and the Liberals won’t win an 11th seat. If this is correct, an independent group and Animal Justice will probably win two seats, with the final seat to be determined by preferences. More

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    Why has Trump launched so many tariffs and will it cause a recession? Expert Q&A

    Donald Trump has always talked about how much he likes tariffs. And on April 2 2025, he showed that he meant it. For the president it was “liberation day”, but for his fellow world leaders it was a tense wait to see what percentage figure would be attached to their country’s vital exports.

    Those tariff rates ranged from 10% for the UK to 49% for Cambodia, charges which Trump says will raise trillions of dollars for the US economy and “make America wealthy again”.

    “Our country has been looted, pillaged, raped and plundered,” he said, before unveiling the tariffs which will cause headaches for business leaders and politicians across the world. We asked Linda Yueh, an economist at the University of Oxford, to answer some of the most pressing questions the tariffs pose.

    What is Trump thinking?

    Economically speaking, the president of the US says he wants to make international trade fairer – by equalising tariffs. He said that if countries want these “reciprocal tariffs” removed (on top of the 10% baseline tariff on all US imports), then they also need to remove non-tariff barriers, such as opening more of their markets to US companies.

    As with his first administration, he also wants companies to bring production and manufacturing jobs back to the US. Basically, he views current international trade as unfair and is using tariffs in a way that’s unprecedented in modern times to try to level the playing field.

    Why such a broad range of tariffs?

    The formula used by the White House to calculate the various tariff rates is apparently based on the trade balance – what each country sells and buys from the US. The Trump administration views a trade surplus (where the US buys more than it sells) as a proxy for unfair trade, so is imposing “reciprocal tariffs” to retaliate.

    And some countries do indeed levy higher tariffs than the US. For instance, some developing countries do so in accordance with their level of development. But tariffs are generally governed by the World Trade Organisation, so that’s where countries would normally go to resolve trade disputes.

    But because no tariff is set below 10%, there will be tariffs levied even on countries with whom the US runs a trade surplus (those which do more buying from the US than selling). These include the Netherlands, Australia and Brazil.

    A complex relationship.
    Tomas Ragina/Shutterstock

    Over 100 countries will have tariffs imposed, including small countries like Fiji (32%) and poor economies like Haiti (10%). Those are also likely to be the ones which will find it most challenging to get into the queue to negotiate a lower tariff any time soon.

    What options do countries have in terms of their response?

    The EU (20%) has said it will retaliate, while the UK (10%) says it will keep talking though all the options on the table. Trump has said he is open to negotiations before the baseline tariffs are imposed on April 5, and the extra reciprocal tariffs land on April 9.

    Engaging in a tit-for-tat trade war is economically damaging – as the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) set out in its latest assessment of the UK economy. Each government will take its own view on the appropriate approach, but with the knowledge that it’s highly unlikely that everyone will be able to negotiate a better deal conclusively within a week.

    Will there be a recession?

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that Trump’s tariffs could reduce global economic growth by 0.5% through next year, which is significant. But, it also believes that a global recession is not on the horizon.

    That said, the economic impact of these tariffs is highly uncertain and unpredictable. The effects will vary from country to country, and a lot will depends upon how long the tariffs are levied for, how other countries respond and how companies manage the tariffs and the uncertainty of trade policy.

    Read more:
    How the UK and Europe could respond to Trump’s ‘liberation day’ tariffs

    And it remains a big gamble for Trump too. For a president who considers himself to be the master of deals, there are risks of rising inflation, falling stock markets and potentially denting the US economy. More

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    Trump’s trade war will hurt everyone – from Cambodian factories to US online shoppers

    It had the hallmarks of a reality TV cliffhanger. Until recently, many people had never even heard of tariffs. Now, there’s been rolling live international coverage of so-called “Liberation Day”, as US President Donald Trump laid out tariffs to be imposed on countries around the world.

    Just hours ago, Trump announced all imports to the United States will be subject to a new “baseline” 10% tariff. This is an additional tax charged by US Customs and Border Protection when products cross the border.

    The baseline tariff is expected to take effect from April 5, and then higher reciprocal tariffs on individual countries from April 9. That leaves no time for businesses to adjust their supply chains.

    What might the next “episode” hold for the rest of the world? We can expect many countries to retaliate, bringing in tariffs and trade penalties of their own. That comes with risks.

    Tariffs on the whole world

    Vietnam will be among the hardest hit by reciprocal measures, with a 46% tariff. China, South Korea and Japan will also feel the brunt of the newest announcement – all subject to new tariffs of between 24% and 34%. The European Union is subject to 20%.

    Many countries had already vowed to retaliate.

    In a recent speech, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said “all instruments are on the table”. She also stressed that the single market is the “safe harbour” for EU members.

    European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has vowed to retaliate against US tariffs.
    Ronald Wittek/EPA

    Canada was apparently spared from the baseline 10% tariff. But it still has to contend with previously announced 25% tariffs on the automotive and other sectors.

    Canada’s new prime minister, Mark Carney, has said “nothing is off the table” in terms of retaliation.

    Major tariffs on Asia

    The 34% new tariff on China will be on top of the 20% tariff previously imposed, bringing the total to 54%.

    That’s a further aggravation to already fractious relations between the world’s two largest economies.

    Vietnam is especially reliant on the US market, and has been trying to negotiate its way through tariff threats. This has included unprecedented agreements to accept deported Vietnamese citizens from the US.

    Until this point, Vietnam had benefited from tensions between the US and China. These new enormous tariffs will have large ripple effects through not only Vietnam, but also less economically developed Cambodia (49% tariff) and Myanmar (44% tariff).

    Vietnam has been hit with a tariff of 46%.
    Luong Thai Linh/EPA

    Is it worth fighting back?

    Vulnerable countries may not have the leverage to fight back. It is hard to imagine what leverage Cambodia or Myanmar could have against the US, given the disparity in resources.

    Other countries consider it is not worth the fight. For example, Australia is rightly questioning whether a tit-for-tat strategy is effective, or will just ramp up the problem further.

    One country that has flown under the radar is Russia. Two-way trade with Russia is small, and subject to sanctions. But US media have reported Trump would like to expand the trading relationship in the future.

    A nightmare for the US Postal Service

    Some of the interesting impacts of Trump’s announcements relate to what trade experts call the “de minimis” rule: usually, if you make a small purchase online, you don’t pay import taxes when the item arrives in your country.

    Trump closed this loophole for goods from China in February, but then paused it days later. On April 2, Trump signed an executive order to again close the loophole, which will be effective May 2.

    Duties will apply to goods from China that were previously exempt, below the “de minimis” amount of US$800. Those sent through the international postal network will face a rate of either 30% of their value or a charge of $25 per item (increasing to $50 in June).

    This won’t just be a nightmare for online shoppers. Some 100,000 small parcels arrive in the US every hour, many from China.

    These charges will now have to be collected on many more packages, in coordination with US Customs and Border Protection.

    Trump has signed an executive order ending de minimis exemptions on goods from China.
    Nati Harnik/AP

    Boycotts and retaliation

    We can also expect consumer backlash to increase worldwide, too. Canada’s “elbows up” movement is one template.

    Consumers around the world are already choosing to redirect their spending away from US products, expressing their anger at the Trump administration’s stance on trade, diversity equity and inclusion (DEI) policies, environmental protection, gender rights and more.

    Consumers should be careful about jumping on the bandwagon without doing their homework, though. Boycotting a US fast food outlet might make you feel better (and frankly may be better for your health), but that’s also going to impact the local franchise owner.

    Hating Americans en masse is also not productive – many US citizens are themselves deeply upset at what is happening.

    Claiming victory while consumers pay more

    Watch out for the impending claim of victory – one of Trump’s mantras popularised in the recent movie, The Apprentice.

    The US trade deficit rocketed after Trump’s previous tariff announcements this year, as importers scrambled to stockpile supplies before price increases.

    This cannot happen this time, because the tariffs come into effect in just three days.

    In the short term, the monthly trade deficit will decline if imports return to normal, which will give Trump a chance to claim the policies are working – even if it’s just a rebound effect.

    But these tariffs will harm rather than help ordinary Americans. Everyday purchases like clothes (made in places like Vietnam, Cambodia and China) could soon cost a lot more than they used to – with a $20 t-shirt going up to nearly $30, not including US sales taxes.

    As this reality TV-style trade drama continues to unfold, the world should prepare for more episodes, more cliffhangers, and more uncertainty.

    This article has been updated to clarify specific details about US tariff announcements, and details on changes to the de minimis exemption. More

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    Stuck in the past: Trump tariffs and other policies are dragging the U.S. back to the 19th century

    During Donald Trump’s first term as president, the United States lurched from the absurdity of his lies to the use of his office for personal financial gain, his schoolyard insults and his utter contempt for critics. His term ended with his irresponsible and dangerous incitement of the assault on the Capitol building on Jan. 6, 2021.

    This time around, Trump is replying on outdated tools — tariffs, small government, territorial expansion and nationalism — to solve modern problems of globalization, wealth disparities, the decline of manufacturing jobs and exploitative capitalism.

    On April 2, he announced a baseline tariff of 10 per cent on all countries that import goods to the U.S., including Canada. Canada has also been hit with a 25 per cent levy on Canadian-made automobiles.

    The Trump administration’s current use of 19th-century tools to solve 20th-century problems that are wholly inappropriate for the 21st century threatens to take America back to the 19th century. This is an incredibly dangerous road for the U.S to take.

    The rise of the nation state

    The 19th century was marked by the rise of the nation-state — a single political entity united by geography, culture and language.

    This was, in many respects, the result of the rapidly industrializing world shifting away from monarchical rule and mercantile economics toward limited democratic rule and free-market capitalism.

    It was a time of tariffs, small government, territorial expansion and nationalism. It was also a time of mass migration from Europe to North America, where rampant nativism, colonialism and unchecked and exploitative capitalism shaped the landscape.

    The 19th century was a time of mass migration to the North America. A Ukrainian immigrant family harvesting in 1918.
    (National Archives of Canada/Wlidus)

    The prevailing belief at the time was that nation-states should use tariffs, adopt isolationist policies to cut off the outside world and seize territory where possible. These measures, it was thought, would foster national unity and allow capitalism to thrive by letting the “invisible hand” of the marketplace work its magic.

    Protective tariffs promised to grow domestic industries, but the economic benefits were not evenly distributed. Wealth disparities grew wider as millions of immigrants arrived on North American shores, only to find deplorable living conditions in the cities and hardscrabble farmland out in the country.

    Some newcomers prospered, of course, but they tended to be those who arrived with money already in their pockets. And they fast learned how to exploit the lack of state-directed regulation, patches of corruption amid rapid western expansion and growing nativism and poverty to their own benefit.

    Many of the 20th century’s problems flowed from these 19th-century trends.

    The economic fallout of tariffs

    Following the financial Panic of 1873 and its ensuing economic depression in both Europe and North America, nation-states unleashed tariffs to protect their domestic economies. It was the wrong strategy to pursue, as it slowed trade even more by limiting the free flow of goods and capital. Money, as is now well-known, needs to move to grow.

    Working families chafed at the lack of labour protections like bargaining rights, health and safety measures, unemployment insurance and sick benefits. In response, they formed unions and initiated waves of strikes throughout the western industrialized world.

    Western North American farmers were furious that tariffs forced them to buy on protected markets while selling on unprotected ones subject to international market prices. They organized, too, by forming farmer co-operatives and backing movements like the Granger movement, populism and progressivism to protect their interests.

    Nation-states, warmed by rising nationalist fires, formed military-defence alliances across Europe and its colonial and former colonial holdings, including Canada. In 1914, these alliances led to the First World War, a global and industrial war the likes of which the world had never seen.

    The Great Depression

    By the 1930s, unrestricted and largely unregulated capitalism, together with astonishing wealth disparities and monopolistic tendencies, plunged the world into the decade-long Great Depression.

    Many governments’ initial response was to impose tariffs once again, and just as in 1873, they only made the problem worse. The simultaneous rise of fascism, which was largely nationalism run amok, brought the world to war again at the end of the decade, to devastating consequence.

    People stand in line for their portions of a federal surplus of potatoes and cabbages in Cleveland in 1938.
    (AP Photo)

    The post-war years saw a concerted international effort at using the nation-state to regulate domestic economies by investing in social services and programs and to rein in runaway capital when its excesses threatened stability.

    International bodies like the World Bank, the United Nations and the International Court of Justice were created to promote peace and stability. This new approach wasn’t always successful in its goals, but so far the world hasn’t seen any global hot wars or massive economic depressions.

    The end of history

    In 1992, historian Frances Fukuyama infamously declared that the world had reached “the end of history.”

    He didn’t mean that time stopped, of course. Instead, he was arguing that the liberal nation-state represented “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

    In his view, the western industrialized world had reached the pinnacle of successful governance and unlimited prosperity.

    Yet, even as western liberal democracy was congratulating itself on its own success, these same nation-states, in conjunction with large corporations, were seeking out lower labour costs and greater profit in the developing world.

    The result was a hollowing-out of North America’s industrial heartlands, along with rampant exploitation of vulnerable labour in places like Asia, South Asia and South Central America. Once mighty American cities declined. Wages failed to keep up with inflation. Farm debt soared.

    This is where the Trump administration re-enters the story — tapping into the frustration and disillusionment of frustrated Americans by promising to restore a “golden age” that never was.

    Trump’s 19th-century playbook

    Despite his promises, Trump’s tariffs are unlikely to bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. As history has shown, tariffs do not revive industries that are already gone; instead, they will only make Americans pay more for the things they need.

    A return to small government won’t “make America great again,” either. Instead, it risks repeating the 19th-century pattern of making the rich richer and gutting the very social programs millions of people rely on. The Trump administration’s massive and ongoing cuts to the Social Security Administration are already well under way.

    Trump’s rhetoric about territorial expansion, including threats to annex Greenland and Canada, won’t make the U.S. more secure. It will just exacerbate the sort of international tensions the world saw in 1914 and 1939.

    And with limited resources left to exploit, it’s becoming harder for capital to sustain itself, even as it seeks to wrest whatever is left from our planet, the realities of environmental catastrophe be damned.

    Nationalism, meanwhile, won’t foster a sense of national unity. It will only deepen existing divisions based on race and class. And if history is any guide, the consequences could be even more dire this time around, even pushing the world toward a global conflict unlike anything seen before. More

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    ‘Putin’s brain’: Aleksandr Dugin, the Russian ultra-nationalist who has endorsed Donald Trump

    Aleksandr Dugin, sometimes referred to as “Putin’s brain” because of his ideological influence on Russian politics, endorsed the policies of Donald Trump in a CNN interview aired on March 30. Dugin said Trump’s America has a lot more in common with Putin’s Russia than most people think, adding: “Trumpists and the followers of Trump will understand much better what Russia is, who Putin is and the motivations of our politics.”

    Dugin made his name by espousing Russian nationalist and traditionalist – including antisemitic – themes, and publishing extensively on the centrality of Russia in world civilisation. So, this endorsement should be a warning of the disruptive nature of the Trump White House. It implies that Dugin believes Trump’s policies support Russian interests.

    Dugin began his career as an anti-communist activist in the 1980s. This was less because of an ideological antipathy for communism than his rejection of the internationalism that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union espoused. He also criticised the party for breaking from traditional – especially religious – values.

    Dugin proposes what he calls a “fourth political theory”. The first three, he claims, are Marxism, fascism and liberalism – all of which he thinks contain elements of error, especially their rejection of tradition and the subordination of culture to scientific thought.

    Dugin’s fourth political theory takes pieces from all three and discards the elements with which Dugin disagrees, especially the dwindling importance of traditional family and culture. The culmination is a melange of ideas that sometimes appear Marxist and sometimes fascist, but which always centre on the criticality of traditional Russian culture.

    His founding philosophy is traditionalism, which he views as a strength of Russia. Thus, he has become a strong supporter of the country’s president, Vladimir Putin, who emphasises traditional Russian values. Dugin and Putin align in their criticism of liberalist anti-religious individualism, which they claim destroys the values and culture on which society is based.

    Dugin has value for Putin because he advances the president’s objectives. Putin’s security goals are in part founded on the principle that political unity is strength and political division is weakness. If Russia can maintain political unity by whatever means necessary, it retains its perception of strength. And if a state opposed to Russia is divided internally, it can be portrayed as weak.

    The Russian government claims complete political unity inside Russia. Its spokespeople reinforce that claim by declaring, for example, the Russian electorate was so unified behind Putin that the 2024 Russian presidential election could have been skipped as an unnecessary expense. They also push a strained claim that the Russian population is unanimously behind the Ukraine war.

    Dugin energises voters behind Putin, basing his support on the philosophy of Russian greatness and cultural superiority, and the perception of Russian unity. His influence has been felt throughout the Russian government and society. He publishes prolifically, and lectures at universities and government agencies about the harms of western liberalism. He also served as an advisor to Sergey Naryshkin, currently director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) of the Russian Federation.

    Dugin’s views support an expansionist Russia, especially in the direction of Ukraine. He questions the existence of Ukraine and promotes Russia’s war there wholeheartedly. But his support for the war led to an attempt on his life. On August 20 2022, a bomb exploded in a car owned by Dugin, killing his daughter, Darya, who was driving it back from a festival of Russian traditional art.

    Dugin speaking at a memorial for his daughter Daria, who was killed by a car bomb in August 2022.
    AP Photo/Dmitry Serebryakov

    Divide and conquer

    Russia applies the same principle of “unity equals strength” to its adversaries, but in reverse. Many Russian political thinkers try to emphasise political divisions in unfriendly states. They work hard to broaden existing disagreements and support disruptive political parties and groups.

    Such operations give the Russian government the ability to denigrate the foreign powers that Russia considers adversaries by making them look weak in the eyes of their own people – and more importantly, in the eyes of the Russian population.

    Dugin lays a philosophical foundation for foreign parties that oppose the European Union and western liberalism, and that disrupt political unity. His views have been adopted by far-right political groups such as the German National Democratic Party, the British National Party, Golden Dawn in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, and the National Front in France.

    Dugin’s interview in which he endorsed Trump’s policies is likely to have been directly authorised by the Kremlin. He pushes a Kremlin-sponsored endorsement of Trump’s divisive – and thus weakening – effect on US politics.

    But Dugin’s extreme Russian nationalist rhetoric at times clashes with Putin’s attempts to include all peoples of Russia in a strong unified state, rather than only ethnic Russians. As it is a multi-ethnic state, Russian ethnic nationalism can obstruct Putin’s attempts at portraying strength through unity. The label “Putin’s brain” is only accurate sometimes.

    The Russian government uses Dugin when he is useful and separates itself from him when his extremism is inconvenient. Dugin is a tool who says many of the right things and facilitates Kremlin goals. His endorsement of Trump should be seen in its context: Russia attempting to strengthen itself at the expense of the US. More

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    How is classified information typically shared and can officials declassify secrets whenever they want? A national security expert explains

    U.S. District Judge James Boasberg on March 27, 2025, ordered top Trump administration officials to preserve records of their messages sent on the messaging app Signal from March 11 to March 15 following a transparency watchdog group’s lawsuit alleging that the officials have violated the Federal Records Act.

    This marked the latest development since The Atlantic on March 24 published a Signal chat among Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and other national security officials discussing specific plans to attack Houthi militants in Yemen. Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor in chief at The Atlantic, was mistakenly included in the chat and wrote about what he saw.

    Trump administration officials have shared contrasting accounts about whether they were discussing sensitive war information on Signal – but maintain that they did not share classified information.

    Senator Roger Wicker, the Republican chair of the Senate Arms Services committee, and Senator Jack Reed, the top Democrat chairing the committee, on March 27 requested an investigation into how the Trump officials used Signal to discuss military strikes.

    Amy Lieberman, a politics and society editor, spoke with national security scholar Dakota Rudesill to better understand what constitutes classified information and how the government typically handles its most closely kept secrets.

    Democratic representatives share text messages on March 26, 2025, sent by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to other top Trump administration officials.
    Kayla Bartowski/Getty Images

    How are government officials supposed to communicate about classified information?

    The first way someone with the proper clearance can communicate about classified information is in person. They can talk about secret things in what is called a sensitive compartmented information facility, or SCIF. This means a secure place, often with a big, heavy door and a lock on it, where security officials have swept the area for bugs and no one can easily eavesdrop. People who are in SCIFs usually have to leave their cell phones outside of the room, and then they can talk freely about secret information. A SCIF can be a particular room, or a floor of a building, or even an entire building.

    Second, there is print communication: written documents with classification markings, which have to be handled in really particular ways, like in a safe location, and can be transported between SCIFs in secure containers.

    Third, intelligence agencies, the White House and the Department of Defense also all have secure electronic systems. These include visual teleconferences, which are similar to a Zoom call and are secure for discussing highly classified information, as well as secure email systems and secure phones.

    Many people with clearances have what is called “high side” email, which is shorthand lingo for classified email and messaging. Many people with security clearance would have two work hard drives and two computers. One of them is “low side,” where there is access to unclassified official email, documents and the internet.

    All of these methods of secure communication can be clunky and take more time than people in our smartphone age are used to. That is the cost of protecting the nation’s secrets. My sense is the Trump administration officials wanted to move fast and turned to Signal, a commercial app that promises encryption. Signal is generally considered secure but is not perfect. There is abundant public evidence that Signal is not totally secure and indeed has been penetrated by Russian intelligence.

    Can something be declassified after the information has been shared?

    Yes. The president can classify and declassify at will via oral or written instruction.

    The president’s constitutional powers include removing classification controls after information has been released or leaked. Trump could at any point declassify the information shared on Signal. Several of the Cabinet-level officials on that Signal chat also have expansive delegated powers over classification.

    Even so, Trump’s national security Cabinet would have presumably still violated the law. For example, by putting national defense information inappropriately on an insecure app and not checking to verify the clearances of everyone on the chat and thereby allowing a reporter to be present, one could reasonably conclude that the team was showing “gross negligence,” running afoul of the Espionage Act.

    The Espionage Act, enacted in 1917, criminalizes unauthorized retention and dissemination of sensitive information that could undermine the national security of the U.S. or help a foreign country.

    Was the information shared on Signal likely classified?

    Looking at the Signal message transcript that The Atlantic shared, it seems like at least four things were all but surely classified.

    The most obvious was the details that Secretary of Defense Hegseth provided on the strike plans. These include the precise times that planes were taking off, what kind and when the bombs would fall. Recent reports have quoted defense officials confirming that this information at the time was classified.

    Second, the chat revealed that the president gave a green light for secret strikes at a Situation Room meeting.

    Third, there is the mere fact of these top officials deciding whether and when to execute attacks authorized by the president.

    And fourth, according to media reports, the chat included the name of an intelligence officer whose position may have been secret.

    The Trump administration says that there was no classified information in the chat. But several analysts have noted that defies belief. The exception would be a prior decision to declassify, but we have no evidence of that.

    FBI Director Kash Patel, left, Tulsi Gabbard, director of National Intelligence, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe testify during a House Select Intelligence Committee hearing in Washington, D.C., on March 26, 2025.
    Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images

    What other issues does this bring to mind?

    First, we don’t know whether the Trump officials carefully thought about it before they set up this chat on Signal, which the Pentagon has warned government officials against using because of hacking concerns.

    Second, even if the officials did make a focused decision to use Signal, what is the wisdom of that? I find it really, really hard to imagine that was a prudent decision when we think about how insecure this app is. There is also the fact that Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy to Ukraine and the Middle East, was party to the chat while he was in Russia. We do not know for sure if he had a device running Signal on him personally while he was in Russia, but in any event he would have been under intense Russian surveillance.

    A broader issue is how the Trump administration is enforcing the law is a giant question mark. Usually, the law both authorizes the U.S. government to do things, and also says it cannot do things. Law enables and limits everyone, including the president. However, Trump wrongly claims that he is the final authority on the law, and so far the Justice Department only seems to be enforcing the law against people outside of the administration.

    So does the law limit the Trump administration in any practical sense? Right now it is not clear – and there is abundant reason to be concerned about that from a rule of law standpoint. More

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    Trump is interested in joining the Commonwealth. It’s not up to him – or even the king

    It seems Britain has one key inducement to offer US President Donald Trump: a state visit hosted by King Charles.

    One can only imagine what the king thinks of this, but he will undoubtedly maintain a stiff upper lip and preside over several lavish dinners.

    Following reports of this offer, which would make Trump the only US president to be twice hosted by a British monarch, stories surfaced that the US might become an associate member of the Commonwealth.

    Read more:
    The king has a tricky diplomatic role to play in inviting Trump for a state visit

    There has been no official confirmation of this, but the story has been floated in several British newspapers.

    What is the Commonwealth?

    The Commonwealth came into existence as a means of retaining links with former British colonies, so there is a certain historical justification for the idea.

    Almost all of Britain’s former colonies are now members of the Commonwealth of Nations, with Ireland and the US notable exceptions.

    The Commonwealth is an organisation that ties together 56 countries, including a few in Africa that have been admitted despite not having been British colonies.

    Of the 56, only a minority recognise the British king as their head of state, a point local monarchists are reluctant to acknowledge.

    Indeed, some members of the Commonwealth, such as Malaysia, Brunei and Tonga, have their own hereditary monarchs.

    In theory, all members are democratic, and several, such as Fiji, have at times been suspended from membership for failing on this count.

    Whatever doubts we might have about the state of US democracy, it is hard to argue the US would fail to meet a bar that allows continued membership to states such as Pakistan and Zimbabwe.

    The Commonwealth is largely seen as less important than other international groupings, and its heads of government meetings are often skipped by leaders of the most significant members.

    Other than turning up to the Commonwealth Games, few recent Australian prime ministers have paid it much attention, compared to our membership of the G20 or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

    Nonetheless, the Commonwealth does include a remarkable range of countries ranging from significant states such as India, Canada and South Africa to the many island states of the Pacific and the Caribbean.

    While its work is largely unreported, it does provide a range of international assistance and linkages that otherwise would be out of reach for its smaller and poorer members.

    Why is Trump interested in joining?

    Trump, it can be assumed, has no interest in the Commonwealth as a means of better working with states such as Namibia and Belize.

    The attraction seems to be linked to his strange reverence for royalty and a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the British sovereign.

    King Charles is head of the Commonwealth through agreement of its members, probably in recognition of the extraordinary commitment his mother showed as the Commonwealth developed out of the old British Empire. Indeed, she clashed several times with her British ministers because of her loyalty to the Commonwealth.

    But unlike the king’s British – and Australian – crown, this is not a position that belongs automatically to the British monarch.

    So, while inviting Trump to Windsor Castle may be the gift of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, admission to the Commonwealth would require the agreement of all its members.

    Given Trump’s demands to acquire Canada and to punish South Africa for recent land expropriation law, it is hard to imagine unanimous enthusiasm.

    Read more:
    Donald Trump is picking fights with leaders around the world. What exactly is his foreign policy approach?

    Most member states are cautious about being too closely linked to either the US or China, although Australia might end up the last true believer in US alliances. Others, such as Ghana and Pakistan, depend considerably on Chinese aid.

    In a world dominated by increasingly autocratic leaders, a middle power like Australia needs as wide a range of friends as possible. Most of us have only a vague sense of what the Commonwealth entails.

    Like all international institutions, the Commonwealth often seems more concerned with grand statements than actual commitment.

    But there is value in a global organisation whose members claim to be committed to:

    democracy and democratic processes, including free and fair elections and representative legislatures; the rule of law and independence of the judiciary; good governance, including a well-trained public service and transparent public accounts; and protection of human rights, freedom of expression, and equality of opportunity.

    Would Trump’s America meet those demands? More