Philippa Kaur

A national YouGov poll, conducted February 24 to March 5 from a sample of 1,539, gave Labor a 52–48 lead, unchanged since an early February YouGov poll. Primary votes were 37% Coalition (up one), 32% Labor (steady), 15% Greens (up two), 6% One Nation (down two) and 10% for all Others (down one).

Anthony Albanese’s net approval jumped ten points to -6, with 50% dissatisfied and 44% satisfied. Peter Dutton’s net approval was down two points to -10. For the first time since the Voice referendum, Albanese’s net approval is higher than Dutton’s. Albanese led Dutton by 48–34 as preferred PM (45–38 in February).

By 86–14, respondents supported Australians having a right to disconnect from work outside outside of hours. Dutton has said he would overturn Labor’s right to disconnect legislation if elected.

On this pledge, 35% said they were less likely to vote for the Coalition, 17% more likely and 48% no difference. These “more likely/less likely” to support a party given X questions usually exaggerate the issue’s salience.

In another encouraging national poll for Labor, the Morgan poll gave them a 53.5–46.5 lead, a 3.5-point gain for Labor since last week. Primary votes were 36.5% Coalition (down 1.5), 34% Labor (up 2.5), 13.5% Greens (up 1.5), 3.5% One Nation (down 1.5) and 12.5% for all Others (down one). This poll was conducted February 26 to March 3 from a sample of 1,679.

The large majority of both the YouGov and Morgan polls’ fieldwork was before the Dunkley byelection. If this byelection had an effect on voting intentions, it won’t be part of these polls.

Dunkley byelection near-final result

With almost all votes counted in the federal March 2 Dunkley byelection, Labor won by 52.7–47.3, a 3.6% swing to the Liberals since the 2022 election. Primary votes were 41.1% Labor (up 0.8%), 39.3% Liberals (up 6.8%), 6.3% Greens (down 4.0%), 4.7% for independent Darren Bergwerf (up 0.9%) and 3.1% Animal Justice (up 1.0%).

The primary votes of both major parties, but especially the Liberals, benefited from the absence of the UAP and One Nation, who had a combined 7.9% in 2022. The Greens’ result was poor.

The swing to the Liberals was below the 6.1% average swing against the government in a government-held seat at a byelection. Owing to the loss of the sitting MP’s personal vote, government-held seats swing much more than opposition-held seats.

An early February uComms poll for The Australia Institute had given Labor a 52–48 lead in Dunkley. A mid-February YouGov poll had given the Liberals a 51–49 lead.

Tasmanian Redbridge poll: difficult to form a government

The Tasmanian state election is on March 23. A Redbridge poll for The Financial Review, conducted February 16–28 from a sample of 753, gave the Liberals 33% of the vote, Labor 29%, the Greens 14%, the Jacqui Lambie Network 10% and independents 14%.

Tasmania uses the Hare Clark proportional representation system, with 35 total lower house seats elected in five seven-member electorates. A quota for election is one-eighth of the vote or 12.5%.

Analyst Kevin Bonham’s seat estimate from the Redbridge poll is 13–14 Liberals, 10–12 Labor, 4–5 Greens, 2–3 JLN and 2–6 independents. While the Liberals would be the largest party, it would be difficult for either major party to reach the 18 votes needed for a majority.

There were two polls taken in the first week of the election campaign that had the Liberals much better placed to form a minority government.

NSW Resolve poll: Coalition support surges

A NSW state Resolve poll for The Sydney Morning Herald, presumably conducted with the federal Resolve polls in December and February from a sample of 1,035, gave the Coalition 38% of the primary vote (up six since November), Labor 34% (down two), the Greens 12% (down one), independents 12% (steady) and others 5% (down two).

Resolve doesn’t give a two party estimate until close to elections. The SMH article says “Labor is trailing the Coalition”, but the likely effect of preferences would give Labor about a 51.5–48.5 lead according to The Poll Bludger. Resolve’s polls have usually been much better for Labor than other polls, but the February federal Resolve poll had a slump for Labor.

Labor Premier Chris Minns had a 35–16 lead over the Liberals’ Mark Speakman as preferred premier (35–13 in November).

NSW Secularists’ national YouGov poll

The Secular Association of New South Wales has sent me details of a national YouGov poll conducted for them. This poll was conducted February 15–21 from a sample of 1,087.

By 55–45, respondents said they were not aware that their state has its own constitution separate from the federal constitution. Those who said they were aware of their state’s constitution were asked if they had seen or read it. Just 13% said they had read their state’s constitution, which is 6% of the overall sample.

For the third and final question, voters were told that Australia has no formal recognition of separation of government and religion, then asked if they would approve or disapprove of a constitutional amendment to formally separate government and religion in their state.

Voters approved of this proposition nationally by 51–20. Smaller subsamples in the eastern seaboard states had approve leading by 48–21 in NSW, 48–22 in Victoria and 50–21 in Queensland. The history of referendums suggests caution, as often big poll leads for a proposal collapse before referendum day.

US Super Tuesday confirms it’s Trump vs Biden

I covered the March 5 United States Super Tuesday primaries for The Poll Bludger. Donald Trump had big wins, and will win the Republican nomination after Nikki Haley withdrew. Joe Biden also dominated the Democratic primaries. In national general election polls, Trump is usually ahead by low single-digit margins.

I also covered the February 29 United Kingdom Rochdale byelection for The Poll Bludger. George Galloway, who has attacked Labour from the left for a long time, won after Labour’s candidate was disendorsed but still appeared on the ballot paper as the disendorsement was after the close of nominations. More

Americans spend mind-blowing amounts of money on their elections. According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in the 2016 presidential election cycle the candidates spent a total of US$1.6 billion (£1.2 billion). This rose to US$4.1 billion in the 2020 cycle, and it is likely to be much higher in the current election campaign.

Donations to presidential campaign funds come from individuals, political parties and political action committees (Pacs). The latter pool contributions from supporters to promote or oppose candidates, as well as raising money in the first place. They are legally independent from the campaign funds raised by candidates and parties, but they act in concert with them, for example, by funding ads which support the policies and positions taken by their candidates.

Political campaigns in the US are very expensive because they run on for a long time and involve costly advertising. As soon as a new president is elected, preparations begin for the midterm congressional elections two years later, as well as the next round of presidential primaries.

The FEC updates the figures on money raised and spent on the 2024 presidential election campaign on a continuous basis. At the time of writing the 2024 presidential campaign has already raised a total of just over US$397 million by all the candidates, and spent just under US$294 million since January 2021. The Republicans have raised US$225 million and the Democrats $103 million.

As regards spending, the Republicans have spent US$191 million and the Democrats US$48 million on the 2024 election campaign so far. These sums do not include the money raised by congressional and state-level campaigns, but just relate to presidential hopefuls.

The big discrepancy between the two parties in spending is because Joe Biden has no significant rivals for the Democratic party nomination, but the Republicans started out with nine candidates certified by the Republican National Committee. Spending by these hopefuls adds to the total raised.

Around 18% of the population gave money to a candidate or a party in the presidential election contest of 2020, according to the American National Election Study. It is likely these small donations from individuals are largely motivated by their attachment to a party or a candidate.

Donations from corporations to Pacs supporting the candidates often reflect a strategy of “hedging”, or giving money to both sides in order not to upset the winner if they back the loser. For example, the OpenSecrets website which tracks money in US politics, shows that Exxon Mobile gave 58% of its political donations to the Republicans and 42% to the Democrats (in 2020).

Costly challenges to Trump

Donald Trump is facing a number of different challenges to his fundraising. By mid February he had raised less money than the president, and there are some signs that January’s fundraising was particularly strong.

The FEC data shows that Biden has raised around US$92 million so far in this year’s campaign, whereas Donald Trump’s total is just under US$85.3 million. This represents the Biden and Trump totals out of the money spent by all presidential candidates up to this point.

Biden has raised more than Trump in the presidential campaign 2024, so far.
Shutterstock

In the 2020 election, Trump’s voting support was unsurprisingly strongest in the Republican-supporting states, which tend to be poorer than Democratic-supporting states. This means that he is likely to get less money from individual donations than Biden.

The gap between incomes in “red” (Republican) and “blue” (Democrat) states has been growing over time, so this problem is likely to get worse as the election approaches.

Another problem for him is that so-called “dark money” donations from rich individuals in 2020 overwhelmingly favoured the Democrats rather than the Republicans. Dark money refers to anonymous donations from the very wealthy via organisations described as “super Pacs”. In 2020 these donations exceeded US$1 billion, so they are really important.

According to OpenSecrets, Biden received US$174 million of dark money compared with only US$25 million for Trump. This premium for Biden may be even larger than in 2020 if, as seems likely, Trump gets the Republican nomination.

One interesting development is that Haley has been receiving significant sums from rich donors in her challenge to Trump for the Republican nomination. Even though her bid is a long shot, these donors clearly prefer her to Trump.

Finally, Trump is facing US$83 million in fines following a guilty verdict from a New York jury in a sexual assault case against columnist E. Jean Carroll. In a second case relating to his business empire in New York, the judge has ruled that fraud was committed and fined him a total of US$355 million.

The FEC is keeping a close eye on campaign finance, so he will be well advised to resist the temptation to use campaign funds to pay off these fines, since this would be illegal.

Overall, this means that the ex-president is likely to be outspent by a large margin by Biden’s campaign. But does this make a difference to the election outcome?

Recent research confirms consistent findings that campaign spending in US elections has a significant impact on support for candidates, although it tends to mobilise people to vote rather than to switch support between candidates.

This means that the more the Democrats outspend the Republicans in the 2024 campaign the greater the chance that Joe Biden will beat Donald Trump, or vice versa. More

The verdicts keep coming.

On Friday US time, the three-month hearing focused on Donald Trump’s business dealings in New York came to an end. Trump was ordered to pay back more than $US350 million (A$537 million), plus interest. He and two of his associates are banned from directing any business in New York for three years. His two sons, Donald Jr and Eric Trump, have also been handed two-year bans, and ordered to pay US$4 million (A$6.1 million) each.

In his judgement, New York Judge Arthur Engoron gave his own insight into the Trump phenomenon, describing what he saw as a “complete lack of contrition and remorse” that “borders on pathological”.

While Engoron was referring specifically to business fraud in New York, the judge’s observation might also apply to Trumpism writ large.

Coverage of the case and its stunning end has consistently focused on Trump’s celebrity – after all, he built his national profile on the back of his supposed business acumen, trading on his long stint as host of the popular television show The Apprentice.

Read more:
Should Donald Trump be disqualified from state ballots in presidential election? Here’s how the US Supreme Court might rule

The results of this civil case certainly seem to poke holes in the image of Trump as a consummate businessman. Combined with the money he owes as the result of his loss of a second civil defamation trial brought by E. Jean Carroll, Trump is now in upwards of half a billion dollars of debt. It’s not clear where this money will come from, or what will happen to Trump’s existing New York businesses.

This has led some commentators to argue this most recent case represents a “stunning”, “devastating” and “shocking blow” to the image of Trump as a successful real estate mogul better placed than anyone to run the world’s largest and most important economy.

The pathology of Trumpism

It is certainly possible to argue Trump’s reputation as the embodiment of rugged American entrepreneurship played an important role in his successful bid for the presidency in 2016. At least some of his support was drawn from the sense that a political outsider and ruthless businessman would shatter the stale consensus of establishment politics.

But if it were possible to make that argument eight years ago, it is less convincing now.

Read more:
Does Trump actually have to pay $83.3 million to E. Jean Carroll? Not immediately, at least

Trump’s celebrity profile was, of course, critical to his campaign. His rise to political prominence, though, came not so much as a result of his reputation as a successful businessman, but on the back of his unabashed peddling of racist conspiracy theories about the first Black president.

Trump’s ability to tap into a particularly American form of racial revanchism – his political acumen in marrying conspiracy, racism, and political grievance in an increasingly unequal society – is what brought him to power. It is what sustains him still.

The pathology of Trumpism revolves around his politics, not his personal economics. It at least partly explains why this latest case, plus the 91 separate felony charges in four criminal cases, are unlikely to affect Trump’s political support, particularly with his base in the Republican Party.

That base is too far down the road Trump began mapping out when he staked his political reputation on the argument that a Black man could not possibly be qualified for the presidency of the United States. Even a half a billion-dollar hole punched through his business reputation will not change that.

Trump’s extensive Republican base will likely be unperturbed by the latest judgement against him.
EPA/Randall Hill

Nothing, or everything, might change

That does not mean, however, that continued support for Trump is inevitable.

In another New York courtroom this week, a judge ruled that Trump’s first criminal trial will begin in just over a month. On March 25, for the first time in American history, a former president will face criminal charges in court.

In what will likely become the first of four possibly consecutive criminal trials, Trump will face a potential six-week hearing on his efforts to cover up politically damaging information about his relationships with two women in advance of the 2016 presidential election. Dubbed the “hush money” case, this trial represents more than the sordid dealings of an alleged serial adulterer; it represents, arguably, the beginning of a pattern of deliberate election interference that began even before Trump took office.

If it goes ahead as planned, a late March trial date will likely mean these hearings will barely be over before the next set begins. The classified documents case, centering on Trump’s alleged illegal removal of highly classified documents from the White House, is scheduled to begin in Florida in late May. Scheduling for the other two cases, focused on on Trump’s role in the January 6 insurrection and election interference in the state of Georgia, remains unclear.

Read more:
Donald Trump’s stroll to victory in Iowa was a foregone conclusion. This doesn’t make it any less shocking

None of this has ever happened before. There is really no telling what it will mean for Trump, his campaign, or American democracy more broadly.

Polling suggests that a criminal conviction may dent Trump’s national support. It is certainly possible such a conviction (or convictions), combined with eye-watering levels of debt, and the sheer logistics of conducting a national campaign amid multiple criminal trials, will have an impact.

But the pathology of Trumpism has so far proven resistant to what should be crushing blows.

The verdicts will keep coming. Trump may well, too. More

After months of wrangling, the US Senate has finally passed Joe Biden’s US$95 billion (£75 billion) foreign aid package. Ukraine is the destination for almost two-thirds of the aid, with US$14 billion set aside to assist Israel’s war against Hamas, and US$10 billion destined for humanitarian aid in conflict areas, such as Gaza.

The bill passed the Senate by 70 votes to 29, with 22 Republicans joining the Democrat majority. But two Democrats and Bernie Sanders, the independent senator for Vermont, voted against the bill because of its support of Israel.

The split in the Senate illustrates the divisions among both parties on the subject.

Republican senators originally voted against a much larger bill (US$118 billion). They demanded that any foreign aid package must be dependent on increased funding for security on the US southern border with Mexico, and declared the proposed bill was insufficient to address concerns there.

But when former president Donald Trump came out against the bill, even with the financial support for border control measures, Republicans were divided. Trump called the bill a “horrible, open borders betrayal of America,” and vowed that he would “fight it all the way”.

Republican support for the bill was led by Senate minority leader, Mitch McConnell. McConnell has always been supportive of Ukraine, claiming it is in the US interest to support Ukraine. After passing the bill, McConnell argued: “We equip our friends to face our shared adversaries so we’re less likely to have to spend American lives to defeat them.”

McConnell’s advocacy was enough to get the bill through the Senate, although his position as leader has been severely weakened by the number of GOP senators who defied him on the aid package.

McConnell’s support for Ukraine puts him in direct opposition to Trump. Last year, Trump said he could end the war in Ukraine in just one day if he was reelected, indicating he would push the US towards a more isolationist position.

The former president doubled down on this with a statement at a rally in South Carolina on February 11, where he declared he would refuse to support Nato members who failed to pay their way, and that he would encourage invading nations “to do whatever the hell they want”.

This is not a new position for Trump, who has regularly talked about pulling US support for Nato. But, as with his position on the Ukraine aid package, not all Republicans support his views.

Senator Josh Hawley, a staunch supporter of the former president, said that Trump was right to criticise those nations that did not pay 2% of their GDP towards the upkeep of Nato. But he added that the US should live up to its commitments and that if Russia “invaded a Nato country, we’d have to defend them”.

Unsurprisingly, Utah’s Republican Senator Mitt Romney, a long-time Trump critic, said on the Senate floor: “If we fail to help Ukraine, we will abandon our word and our commitment, proving to our friends a view that America cannot be trusted.”

It is too early to know whether – and to what extent – Trump is losing the support of some of the Republican party. But there definitely appears to be a division along foreign policy between the former president and some Senate Republicans.

What is clear is that the majority of those opposed to abandoning Ukraine – and who supported the bill through the Senate – are made up primarily of national security hawks and former veterans.

Now for the House

Even though the bill has passed the Democrat-controlled Senate, it will have an extremely tough time in getting through the GOP-controlled House of Representatives. McConnell has already reached out to the House speaker, Mike Johnson, to ensure that it will get a fair hearing, but there are questions about whether the bill will even reach the floor.

In an interview with US politics website Politico, McConnell asked Johnson to “allow the House to work its will on the issue of Ukraine aid”.

At loggerheads: House speaker Mike Johnson (right) and Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell (centre) are at odds over sending aid to Ukraine.
AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein

House Republicans have called the bill a “waste of time” and “dead on arrival” in the lower chamber. House support for the war in the Ukraine has fallen, especially as Republicans have begun to scrutinise the details of US assistance to Kyiv.

Johnson has declared that the bill will not even get a reading without sufficient provisions for security on the US southern border. “National security begins with border security,” he said. “We have said that all along. That has been my comment since late October, it is my comment today.”

Johnson’s refusal to get the bill on the floor of the House is understandable. House Republicans that oppose the bill believe that if it does get a reading then there is enough of a majority among moderates in both parties for it to pass. Republican representative Andy Biggs, a member of the Trump-supporting Freedom Caucus, told one talk radio host: “If it were to get to the floor, it would pass.”

This is a not a sign that Trump’s influence on House Republicans is dwindling. But it shows there is still just enough bipartisan support for Ukraine for bills such as this to pass Congress.

Johnson is now at the centre of what will be a parliamentary issue. If he refuses to allow the bill to be read, then it may make it onto the floor through a “discharge petition” brought about by a bipartisan majority.

This is a mechanism by which matters can be brought before the House without the sponsorship of the majority leadership. It would undermine Johnson’s position as leader of the House and deeply divide the Republicans in an election year.

The Senate passing the bill is a small victory for the pro-Ukraine lobby – but there could be many twists and turns before it gets voted on in the House, if it does at all. More

In certain circles, the 2020 presidential election isn’t over – and that seems to be at least a little bit true. In recent weeks, official reviews of election records and processes from the 2020 presidential election have reported findings that might be used to spread rumors about voting integrity.

For instance, election officials in Virginia’s Prince William County announced on Jan. 11, 2024, that 4,000 votes from the 2020 presidential election had been miscounted. None of them changed the results. Those miscounts gave Donald Trump 2,327 more votes than he actually got, and Joe Biden 1,648 votes fewer. Errors in counting turned up in other races, too, with both parties’ candidates for U.S. Senate being given fewer votes than they actually received, and a Republican who won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives actually won by a slightly larger margin than previously reported.

An audit of South Carolina’s 2020 voting records released in mid-January found no fraud and no indication any election results could have been different with the errors that were identified. But the report did recommend election officials cross-check lists of registered voters with other state lists more frequently than they have done in the past. Death reports and prison inmate rolls can help them determine who should remain eligible to voter and who should be removed from voting lists, the report said.

The Conversation U.S. has published several articles about the systems protecting election integrity. Here are four examples from our archives.

A Trump campaign poll watcher films the counting of ballots at the Allegheny County, Penn., elections warehouse in 2020 in Pittsburgh.
Jeff Swensen/Getty Images

1. Changing numbers are evidence of transparency, not fraud

The news reports of election audits came, originally, from election officials themselves, who specified they were below the small margins that would have triggered recounts. The reports also offered explanations for what had happened and how to fix it in the future – and included statements that at least some of the problems had already been fixed for upcoming elections.

That’s an example of what Kristin Kanthak, a political scientist at the University of Pittsburgh, was talking about when she explained that election results that change over time aren’t inherently a problem:

“(T)his doesn’t mean the system is ‘rigged.’ Actually, it means the system is transparent to a fault,” she wrote.

Read more:
How votes are counted in Pennsylvania: Changing numbers are a sign of transparency, not fraud, during an ongoing process

2. Easier voting is not a threat to election integrity

Erecting obstacles to voting will not prevent the problems that do exist in the election system, for the simple reason that the flaws are not a result of easier voting methods, such as early voting and voting by mail.

Grinnell College political scientist Douglas R. Hess observed that the COVID-19 pandemic was a massive test of whether a secure election could be held with a lot of accommodations that made voting easier, and safer from the spread of disease.

As he wrote,

“(E)arly voting and voting by mail are targeted for restrictions in many states, even though both reforms are popular with the public, worked securely in 2020 and have been expanded in many states for years without increases in fraud. Likewise, the collection of absentee ballots – a necessity for some voters – can be implemented securely.”

Read more:
Making it easier to vote does not threaten election integrity

3. It’s possible for election workers to be both partisan and fair-minded

For many years, elections have been run by people who were members of one political party or the other but behaved in good faith to run fair elections, wrote Thom Reilly, a scholar at Arizona State University’s School of Public Affairs.

But both the facts and the rhetoric have changed, he explained, noting that a significant share of the electorate is not a member of either party – so the people who supervise elections, who are typically party members, are “an increasingly partisan set of officials.”

Even so, many of them work hard to conduct fair elections. Yet, he wrote,

“(W)idespread misinformation and disinformation on election administration is hobbling the ability of election officials to do their job and has created fertile ground for mistrust.”

Read more:
Good faith and the honor of partisan election officials used to be enough to ensure trust in voting results – but not anymore

A poll worker helps a voter cast a ballot in the Kansas primary election at Merriam Christian Church on Aug. 2, 2022, in Merriam, Kan.
Kyle Rivas/Getty Images

4. Beware those who aim to confuse or mislead

Political disinformation efforts are particularly intense around elections, warn scholars of information warfare Kate Starbird and
Jevin West at the University of Washington and Renee DiResta at Stanford University.

Situations to watch out for are those in which “lack of understanding and certainty can fuel doubt, fan misinformation and provide opportunities for those seeking to delegitimize the results,” they wrote.

Specifically, look out for:

“Politically motivated individuals (who) are likely to cherry-pick and assemble these pieces of digital “evidence” to fit narratives that seek to undermine trust in the results. Much of this evidence is likely to be derived from real events, though taken out of context and exaggerated.“

They provide a reminder to keep your wits about you and be sure to double-check any claims before believing or sharing them.

Read more:
5 types of misinformation to watch out for while ballots are being counted – and after

This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives. More

Conservative outrage over the presence of a female pop star at professional football games is a sign of how many parts of American life and culture have taken on a partisan political flavor.

Partisanship doesn’t just apply to opinions about the dating lives of Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce. Food, too, is another aspect of the latest set of not-quite-political conflicts – including beverage brands and main courses. What you serve at your Super Bowl party, or what the host serves at the event you attend, can now be interpreted, or twisted, through a partisan lens.

Our public-opinion research shows that almost nothing today is free of partisanship – whether the item in question has anything to do with government action, political ideology or public policy, or not. At times, the issues that erupt into political skirmishes are the result of fanciful conspiratorial thinking, blatant misinformation or just the personal preferences of political leaders.

We have found that these developments, in which polarization invades parts of Americans’ lives that really aren’t political, deepen existing divides in society. These conflicts also make it harder to have fun in mixed political company, and harder to steer clear of accidentally offending someone at your Super Bowl party.

It’s an official sponsor of the Super Bowl, but Bud Light has been part of political controversy.
Patrick T. Fallon/AFP via Getty Images

An eye on Bud Light

Bud Light has long been one of the nation’s most popular beers. Politics has changed that.

In April 2023, transgender influencer Dylan Mulvaney posted a video to Instagram promoting a Bud Light contest. The anti-trans backlash was swift, with calls for boycotts of the beer coming from Republicans, including former President Donald Trump, U.S. Sen. Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee and U.S. Rep. Dan Crenshaw of Texas.

By June 2023, Bud Light was no longer the nation’s best-selling beer, falling behind Modelo Especial. The company that makes Bud Light, Anheuser-Busch, saw a 10% drop in revenue in the second quarter of 2023, which it attributed primarily to the conservative objections to a trans person being associated with the brand.

Would you like this dish less if you knew Barack Obama liked it?
LauriPatterson/E+ via Getty Images

Making the nonpolitical political

In our book, “The Power of Partisanship,” we document that partisanship – psychological attachments to one of the two major political parties – in America has drastically increased since the 1950s.

We have found that more Americans identify as strong partisans than ever. We have also found that people’s political preferences are increasingly driven by negative emotions about the other party.

As a result of this increased partisanship, political leaders have more power than ever to introduce new issues and ideas into the public discussion, and use them divisively – even topics that have nothing to do with politics. And leaders’ views affect those of the public.

We found that this partisan phenomenon extends to food. For instance, Donald Trump likes meatloaf and Barack Obama likes chili. We surveyed people and asked them about their political views and their food preferences. Some of them we told of Trump’s and Obama’s preferences, and some we did not.

Democrats whom we told that Trump likes meatloaf rated that dish significantly lower than Democrats whom we had not told of his preference. Likewise, Republicans we told about Obama’s preference for chili rated it less favorably than Republicans from whom we kept that information.

Would you like this meal less if you knew Donald Trump liked it?
bhofack2/iStock/Getty Images Plus

Menu planning

So, when it comes to planning your menu, our research offers some advice.

For a party of Democrats, chili – possibly with an arugula salad on the side – is a safe bet. But meatloaf would be a better choice for a party of Republicans. You could reinforce those choices by accompanying the dishes with photos of the politicians with their favorite dishes.

Other foods also divide Americans. Consider steering clear of Coca-Cola if you are having Republicans over: The company criticized Georgia’s 2021 law that shortened early voting and made it more difficult to vote by mail.

If you order takeout, some Democrats might be reluctant to eat Chick-fil-A because of company leaders’ past opposition to LGBTQ rights and marriage equality. But more recently, it’s Republicans who have criticized the fast-food chain for hiring an executive focused on diversity, equity and inclusion – and for shifting the company’s donations to be less political.

In general, we recommend doing a quick online search to make sure you are up on your social network’s preferences of the day. That’s the best way, though not guaranteed, to avoid serving up something that has recently become politicized by partisan media or party elites.

You might not be up for that much work. Or perhaps you are one of the few Americans left with friends who identify with both political parties.

A safe bet: People of all partisan stripes like lasagna.
JoeGough/iStock/Getty Images Plus

In that case, based on the research in our book, we suggest serving salmon or lasagna. Both are foods that appear to be resistant to partisan cues and are well-liked by members of both parties. Or maybe just throw a potluck, hope for the best, and you may even learn something new about your guests’ political views. Perhaps your guests will rise above partisanship and just enjoy the event.

The old advice to avoid talking about politics and religion in mixed company is evolving. For Americans, almost anything can be political now – from what’s on the table to what’s in the dresser or closet, and even what music we’re listening to.

When elites take positions, partisans follow their leaders. That means every cultural gathering, from the Thanksgiving table to the Super Bowl couch, can be invaded by political conflict. We don’t know about you, but we just want to watch the game. More

Rightwing populists appear to be enjoying a surge across the western world. For those who don’t support these parties, their appeal can be baffling and unsettling. They appear to play on people’s fears and offer somewhat trivial answers to difficult issues.

But the mathematics of human inference and cognition can help us understand what makes this a winning formula.

Because politics largely boils down to communication, the mathematics of communication theory can help us understand why voters are drawn to parties that use simple, loud messaging in their campaigning – as well as how they get away with using highly questionable messaging. Traditionally, this is the theory that enables us to listen to radio broadcasts and make telephone calls. But American mathematician Norbert Wiener went so far as to argue that social phenomena can only be understood via the theory of communication.

Wiener tried to explain different aspects of society by evoking a concept in science known as the second law of thermodynamics. In essence, this law says that over time, order will turn into disorder, or, in the present context, reliable information will be overwhelmed by confusion, uncertainties and noise. In mathematics, the degree of disorder is often measured by a quantity called entropy, so the second law can be rephrased by saying that over time, and on average, entropy will increase.

One of Wiener’s arguments is that as technologies for communication advance, people will circulate more and more inessential “noisy” information (think Twitter, Instagram and so on), which will overshadow facts and important ideas. This is becoming more pronounced with AI-generated disinformation.

The effect of the second law is significant in predicting the future form of society over a period of decades. But another aspect of communication theory also comes into play in the more immediate term.

When we analyse information about a topic of interest, we will reach a conclusion that leaves us, on average, with the smallest uncertainty about that topic. In other words, our thought process attempts to minimise entropy. This means, for instance, when two people with opposing views on a topic are presented with an article on that subject, they will often take away different interpretations of the same article, with each confirming the validity of their own initial view. The reason is simple: interpreting the article as questioning one’s opinion will inevitably raise uncertainty.

In psychology, this effect is known as confirmation bias. It is often interpreted as an irrational or illogical trait of our behaviour, but we now understand the science behind it by borrowing concepts from communication theory. I call this a “tenacious Bayesian” behaviour because it follows from the Bayes theorem of probability theory, which tells us how we should update our perspectives of the world as we digest noisy or uncertain information.

A corollary of this is that if someone has a strong belief in one scenario which happens to represent a false reality, then even if factual information is in circulation, it will take a long time for that person to change their belief. This is because a conversion from one certainty to another typically (but not always) requires a path that traverses uncertainties we instinctively try to avoid.

Polarised society

When the tenacious Bayesian effect is combined with Wiener’s second law, we can understand how society becomes polarised. The second law says there will be a lot of diverging information and noise around us, creating confusion and uncertainty. We are drawn to information that offers greater certainty, even if it is flawed.

Farage and Trump have hit on a winning formula.
Alamy/AP

For a binary issue, the greatest uncertainty happens when the two alternatives seem equally likely – and are therefore difficult to choose between. But for an individual person who believes in one of the two alternatives, the path of least uncertainty is to hold steady on that belief. So in a world in which any information can easily be disseminated far and wide but in which people are also immovable, society can easily be polarised.

Where are the leftwing populists?

If a society is maximally polarised, then we should find populists surging on both the left and right of the political spectrum. And yet that is not the case at the moment. The right is more dominant. The reason for this is, in part, that the left is not well-positioned to offer certainty. Why? Historically, socialism has rarely been implemented in running a country – not even the Soviet Union or China managed to implement it.

At least for now, the left (or centrists, for that matter) also seem a lot more cautious about knowingly offering unrealistic answers to complex problems. In contrast, the right offers (often false) certainty with confidence. It is not difficult to see that in a noisy environment, the loudest are heard the most.

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Why have authoritarianism and libertarianism merged? A political psychologist on ‘the vulnerability of the modern self’

Today’s politics plays out against a backdrop of uncertainties that include wars in Ukraine and Gaza with little prospect of exit strategies in sight; the continued cost of living crisis; energy, food and water insecurity; migration; and so on. Above all, the impact of the climate crisis.

The answer to this uncertainty, according to rightwing populists, is to blame everything on outsiders. Remove migrants and all problems will be solved – and all uncertainties eradicated. True or false, the message is simple and clear.

In conveying this message, it is important to instil in the public an exaggerated fear of the impact of migration, so their message will give people a false sense of certainty. What if there are no outsiders? Then create one. Use the culture war to label the “experts” (judges, scholars, etc.) as the enemy of the people.

For populists to thrive, society needs to be divided so that people can feel certain about where they belong – and so that those on the opposing side of the argument can be ignored.

The problem, of course, is that there are rarely simple solutions to complex issues. Indeed, a political party campaigning for a tough migration policy but weak climate measures is arguably enabling mass migration on a scale unseen in modern history, because climate change will make many parts of the world uninhabitable.

Wiener was already arguing in 1950 that we will pay the price for our actions at a time when it is most inconvenient to do so. Whatever needs to be done to solve complex societal issues, those who wish to implement what they believe are the right measures need to be aware that they have to win an election to do that – and that voters respond to simple and positive messages that will reduce the uncertainties hanging over their thoughts. More

Former US president George W Bush’s concept of an “axis of evil”, introduced in his 2002 State of the Union address, came to define the flawed foreign policy decisions of his years in power.

He used it to legitimise both the invasion of Iraq and the ensuing “war on terror”. Bush’s axis of evil included Iraq, Iran and North Korea. They were bound together as long-standing US adversaries, rendered as actively seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and who, he argued, collectively posed a “grave and growing danger” as antagonist regimes capable of attacking the US and its allies.

Rolling into 2024, with a US presidential election on one side, and continuing geopolitical volatility from Ukraine to east Asia on the other, Republicans, in particular, have recently revived the term to explain concurrently the machinations of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

Clear and present danger?

The new “axis” however, operates on different principles, and its links to US policy are more tenuous.

First, the distinction between original axis countries, including long-standing US adversaries North Korea and Iran, and new additions China and Russia.

During the cold war, Russia and China were of great concern to the US. But during the Bush era, neither was regarded as constituting either the remote or proximate threat of that first axis. Grouping the four suggests that some in Washington feel that both China and Russia pose a significant enough challenge to both US and global systems to add them to a renewed axis of evil, rather than categorising them separately as individual belligerents.

Second, the perceived threat to the US arising from associations between each of the four members is uneven. Russia’s connections with Iran are long-standing and have been, mostly, tolerated by the US.

These links only become unpalatable, and worthy of including in an axis, when nations step over a particular line. Iran did so by helping Hamas plan the October 7 attack in Israel.

Russia and China are being included in the new definition of the axis of evil.
UPI/Alamy

Russia has been added to the axis list – after undertaking expansionist adventures so significant (by invading Ukraine) that it cannot be ignored. So for both Iran and Russia, magnitude of ambitions counts.

Neither Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 nor Crimea in 2014 saw it consigned to a newfound axis of evil. It merely consolidated its status as a potential Eurasian rogue state.

It appears to be the risk of concerted collaboration between two or more axis members, and the combined threat that they represent that worries Washington. For example, former governor of South Carolina and presidential candidate Nikki Haley argued that “a win for Russia is a win for China”.

Third, the complexities of what the four have in common with each other remain unclear. What currently binds China and Russia together is their expansionist intent. But this differs from the historic willingness to stir up regional volatility exhibited by Iran and North Korea.

China stands opposed to such sabre-rattling from North Korea, while simultaneously undertaking plenty of its own regional expansion.

More interesting perhaps are the immense natural resources wielded by Russia and China, and to a lesser extent Iran. Russia and China make up enormous sections of Eurasia in terms of landmass, population and trading links binding their economies.

Does this suggest that the size, finances and natural resources of the new axis and its friends may allow it to become a semi-insulated trade and economic block? Probably not, but only while Russia’s current expansionist efforts remain at a standstill.

A post-conflict situation in Europe (assuming an end to the Ukraine war) will ultimately reset the sanctions regime against Russia, and – depending on Beijing’s peace-maker intentions – could facilitate warmer east-west relations.

Why revive the axis?

There are both drawbacks and benefits to resurrecting the idea of an “axis”. For supporters of the approach, the new axis provides policymakers with a convenient who’s who of adversaries. Assuming all four present a similar danger to the US, it gives a likely challenger for the presidency the chance to point at President Joe Biden’s foreign policy shortcomings.

While, unlike in Bush’s era, military interventions are probably not on the agenda, a more regionally targeted protectionist approach to “not try to do business with them” is more probable.

There is little of real value for US foreign policy in taking this approach. This uneven grab basket of anti-American villainy is reductivist at best, and cartoonish at worst. It suggests equivalences of power whether there are none, imagined ideological symmetry, and coordination incapable of surviving the short-term twists of four separate foreign policies.

The revival of the “axis” appears to be largely coming from Republicans, currently in charge of Congress, rather than the White House. But much may change in 2024 if they take over the presidency.

Like the original axis, the new grouping conflates power and ambition across states, muddies domestic objectives with regional support between two or more of the members, and suggests the need for a new global fistfight to defend democracy.

Rather than superficial attempts at suggesting basic enmity across four disparate nations, more important for the US ought to be a concern about Russia, China, Iran and North Korea’s long-standing preference for authoritarianism, and the ominous implications for their neighbouring states and regions. Alignment and agreements come and go. Entrenched authoritarianism, however, is hell to shift. More