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    Far-right activist Laura Loomer cements her influence after White House firings

    The US president, Donald Trump, met with far-right activist Laura Loomer in the Oval Office last week. Loomer is a figure so extreme that she is shunned by many, even in Trump’s “make America great again” (Maga) movement.

    Hours after their meeting, Trump fired a string of national security officials, including General Timothy D. Haugh, the head of the National Security Agency and US Cyber Command, apparently at Loomer’s request. Trump has said Loomer was not involved in the firings, but also praised her judgment.

    Even for a president who has always listened to – and, indeed, echoed – fringe voices, the incident stood out. It served as a reminder that Trump is less constrained than ever before, and that his White House is responsive to his personal whims rather than any deliberative policy-making process.

    Gone are the days of Trump’s first administration, when aides would at least try to block the most extreme conspiracy theorists from having access to the president. Now, apparently, even a four-star general (the highest officer rank) like Haugh serves only at the pleasure of figures such as Loomer.

    So, who exactly is Loomer? She is, first and foremost, a media influencer – someone who made her name in far-right circles by spreading hate and conspiracy theories.

    She calls herself a “proud Islamophobe” and “pro-white nationalism”. She has endorsed claims that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an “inside job”, alleged that the “deep state” manipulates the weather to influence elections, and spread conspiracy theories implying that the FBI let school shootings happen in election years to help the Democrats push gun control.

    Loomer’s claims, and her open racism, have sometimes proven too much even for other prominent Maga figures, who prefer to be slightly more subtle in their messaging.

    When Loomer said in 2024 that if Kamala Harris won the election, the White House “will smell like curry” and speeches will be “facilitated via a call centre,” she drew push-back from the now vice-president, J.D. Vance, and far-right congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene.

    Republican congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene has previously called Loomer ‘mentally unstable’ and a ‘documented liar’.
    Michael Reynolds / EPA

    But Trump seems to have appreciated Loomer’s commentary all the same. The president has repeatedly praised her in public and backed her unsuccessful run as a Republican candidate for a US House of Representatives seat in Florida in 2020.

    Like many other Maga media figures, Loomer has realised that her antics give her direct exposure to a television-obsessed president, and that this exposure can be transformed into access and, ultimately, political power.

    Loomer, who is only 31, is entirely a product of the Trump era. As an adult, practically the only conservatism she has known is the conservatism of Maga – openly prejudiced, vindictive, and more a stew of grievance and hatred than a coherent political platform.

    Insofar as Loomer advocates for particular policies, they are a crude channeling of these impulses. She has campaigned for a ten-year immigration moratorium and has called for the death penalty for Democrats who oppose Trump.

    On a podcast in June 2024 about whether Democrats should be prosecuted and jailed if Trump wins the election over alleged “unscrupulous behaviour,” Loomer said: “Not just jailed, they should get the death penalty. You know, we actually used to have the punishment for treason in this country.”

    But the chief way in which Loomer personifies modern American conservatism is her single-minded loyalty to the president. Loyalty to Trump, and fury at the disloyalty of others, is the central component of her identity.

    Deep loyalty

    This loyalty seems to be both a deeply felt emotion and also a shrewd way of recommending herself to the president. And, more than anything else, it was what landed her in the Oval Office last week.

    Loomer’s apparent recommendation that Trump fire a slew of national security officials had its roots in this obsession with loyalty. Many people serving in national security positions in the Trump administration are not card-carrying members of the Maga movement.

    This reflects the fact that such positions require deep expertise developed over long apolitical careers in the civil service or military. As the product of a movement that disdains expertise and rationality, few Maga die-hards have the requisite knowledge to do these jobs.

    For Loomer, such figures pose a threat. It ought to be emphasised that this is not because people like General Haugh have ever shown open disloyalty to Trump. It is merely that they are not, like Loomer, his fanatical adherents. In her worldview, anything less is unacceptable.

    General Haugh was dismissed after Loomer had accused him and his deputy of disloyalty.
    Jim Lo Scalzo / EPA

    Trump seems to agree, which opens the way to more firings in the future. Sensing her opening, Loomer has declared that she will establish an organisation dedicated to investigating executive branch officials for suspected disloyalty to the president.

    Government officials will have to live in fear of being targeted, creating a chilling atmosphere in which pushing back against Trump’s whims becomes impossible.

    Loomer’s growing influence also suggests that the Trump White House is becoming more chaotic and unpredictable.

    The president’s aides have long claimed that the White House would be run in a controlled fashion this time around, with clear chains of command and questionable outsiders kept away. Loomer’s presence in the Oval Office – at Trump’s personal request – blows that story away.

    For her part, Loomer seems to have what she has always wanted: the president’s attention. Where might she direct it next? More

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    The left-behind men who crave pride, battle shame – and voted for Trump

    Arlie Russell Hochschild’s Strangers in their own Land, which explored the motivations and resentments of working-class conservatives in Louisiana, was named one of six books to help understand Donald Trump’s win by the New York Times when he was first elected president, in 2016. (Another was Hillbilly Elegy, by now vice president JD Vance, published just a few months earlier.)

    Since then, Californian progressive sociologist Hochschild has been struggling to understand the appeal of Donald Trump: particularly to white, working-class men, once a strong Democratic constituency. No writer has worked harder to grasp the gut-level appeal that saw Trump win two elections – and in the process, convert the Republican Party into his personal fiefdom.

    Review: Stolen Pride: Loss, Shame and the Rise of the Right – Arlie Russell Hochschild (The New Press)

    The puzzle is greatest when one contrasts the current billionaire cabinet with the fact much of Trump’s support comes from people who are objectively worse off under his policies – including tariffs. Last week, Oxfam America called them “an attack on the global working class” that will harm working-class families in the United States and “inflame inequality”.

    Much of Trump’s support comes from working-class people objectively worse off under his policies – including tariffs.
    Michael Arellano/AAP

    In Strangers in their own Land, Hochschild called this “the Great Paradox”. Stolen Pride returns to many of that book’s questions, but in a different era – and a US that seems more fragmented, and far angrier than it was in 2016.

    Hochschild explores the world of Pikeville, Kentucky, a poor, overwhelmingly white, Trump-supporting city in the heart of Appalachia: in the “whitest and second-poorest congressional district in the country, a region that had rapidly shifted from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party”.

    The American dream’s broken promise

    One of Hochschild’s subjects is James Browning, a recovering drug user whose hands are tattooed and covered in rings. “There you have it” he says, “I have a shame hand and a pride hand.” This sums up the basic argument of Stolen Pride.

    Arlie Russell Hochschild.
    Mark Leong/New Press

    “Pride and shame,” she writes, “signal the juncture between the identity we hold out to the world, and how the world responds to our identity.” The men she speaks to desperately need a sense of pride, but too often find their failures are the cause of deep shame. The American Dream, after all, teaches them every individual can make it, inherently implying failure is due to individual weakness.

    Many of the men she speaks to have experienced unemployment, domestic breakups, jail, alcoholism and drug abuse. (She even manages to speak to one current jail inmate.) Kentucky has one of the highest rates of opioid addiction in the United States – and despite Trump’s attacks on Mexico and Canada, the doctor-prescribed drugs some were addicted to appear to be domestically manufactured.

    So many of the men Hochschild interviewed talk of the balance between shame and pride, I began to wonder if they were prompted. On reflection, I suspect this represents Hochschild’s careful selection from a series of very extensive interviews, conducted over roughly six years.

    Her emphasis is almost entirely on the men in Pikeville, though a majority of white women also voted for Trump. I would love to see Hochschild explore this further. That so many women can support a convicted sexual predator in a country obsessed with sexual behaviour is one of the mysteries of contemporary American politics.

    Hochschild interviewed residents of Pikeville, Kentucky, a poor, overwhelmingly white, Trump-supporting city in the heart of Appalachia.
    Howder Family/Flickr, CC BY-NC

    By 2021, many Americans – and most Republicans – believed Trump’s claims that he had really won the 2020 election. They saw the rioters at the Capitol on January 6 as heroes defending American democracy. In Trump’s claim the election was stolen, many of those Hochschild interviews saw parallels to what they believed had been stolen from them, by economic and cultural upheavals.

    Importantly, many of her respondents saw Trump as a bully — but a bully who stood up for them, against what they perceived as urban liberal elites. When Hillary Clinton spoke of his supporters as “a basket of deplorables”, she reinforced the grievances of people consistently looked down on as “hillbillies” and “rednecks” by people they identified as Democratic elites.

    Many saw themselves in Trump’s stolen election, which mirrored what they felt had been stolen from them.
    Ross D Franklin/AAP

    How ‘deep stories’ inform politics

    For Hochschild, there are underlying emotional narratives, which she calls “deep stories”, that inform our political positions.

    In Strangers in their Own Land, these were identified as a sense of being overtaken by groups, usually educated women and Black people, who benefited from programs of affirmative action. The second Trump administration’s crusade against “DEI” is playing directly to these grievances. In Stolen Pride, this feeling is strengthened by the sense liberal elites are undermining both traditional values and the ability for individuals to succeed.

    Eastern Kentucky is coal country, and Clinton’s ill-worded election-trail claim she would “put a lot of coal miners and coal companies out of business” was a major factor in swinging voters towards Trump. For men who took pride in their work, the collapse of the coal industry produced a sense of shame: strengthened by a strong belief individuals are to blame for their own misfortunes.

    Pikeville was also the site of a neo-Nazi march in April 2017, the forerunner of the tragic Unite the Right march in Charlottesville later that year, which resulted in one death and multiple injuries.

    Much of the book skilfully explores the preparations for and reactions to the Pikeville march, which seemingly passed without incident. Some 100 white nationalists turned up and were outnumbered by counter protesters, As Hochschild writes, “Very few Pikeville locals were involved on either side”.

    Much of the book explores the 2017 Pikeville forereunner to the tragic Unite the Right march in Charlottesville, later that year.
    Tasos Katopodis/AAP

    Perhaps the most fascinating figure in Hochschild’s book, and evidence of her skill in persuading the most unlikely people to open up in interviews, is Matthew Heimbach, who led the 2017 Pikesville march, identified as a proud Nazi and co-founded the now-defunct neo-Nazi party, Traditionalist Worker Party.

    He also co-planned the Charlottesville march, where he railed against “white genocide” and was sued (with other members of the TWP) for his role in it on behalf of Charlottesville victims. He was found guilty on charges of civil conspiracy in 2021.

    “Some years later”, he reveals some of his core beliefs are shaken, especially his attitude toward Black Americans, whom he recognises as often sharing the same sense of dispossession that had fuelled his own anger. “I love Russia and I love Putin,” he told Hochschild, “so I looked into moving there.” As Hochschild remarks: “It seemed that Adolf Hitler was to be replaced in his pantheon by Vladimir Putin.”

    Transcending the gulf?

    Pikesville is also the home of America’s most famous family feud, between the Hatfields and the McCoys. The feud, which lasted many decades from the late 19th century, “began as a dispute over a stolen pig” and “ended as the longest and fiercest clan fight in the nation”. It has been the basis for a dozen movies, virtually all unmemorable. In 2017, a member of the reconciled clans said if they could settle their differences, “there has to be a way for Americans to get back together as one”.

    In the last section of the book, Hochschild looks for ways to transcend the apparent gulf that separates blue and red America. Reading the book after Trump’s return to power, this felt sadly inadequate. Yes, as she points out, most voters are more moderate than the politicians on either side. Sadly, this is not sufficient protection against the rise of the authoritarian plutocracy that now seems to have a firm grip on Washington.

    Hochschild wrote this book during the Biden administration and the lead-up to the 2024 elections. I assume she finished it before Trump named Vance as his vice president: a man who first came to prominence with his own account of Appalachian pride and shame. Hochschild doesn’t discuss his Hillbilly Elegy, though it is listed in her references.

    Hochschild brilliantly captures the pain of men who feel left behind and conveys something of life in rural Kentucky that goes beyond easy stereotypes. I could feel empathy for many of the people she comes across. But I was unpersuaded there is much room for optimism that the appeal of Trump, and those who follow him, will easily be defeated. More

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    Trump has Australia’s generic medicines in his sights. And no-one’s talking about it

    While Australia was busy defending the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme against threats from the United States in recent weeks, another issue related to the supply and trade of medicines was flying under the radar.

    Buried on page 19 of the Trump’s administration’s allegations of barriers to trade was a single paragraph related to Australia’s access to generic medicines. These are cheaper alternatives to branded medicines that are no longer under patent.

    The US is concerned about how much notice their drug companies have that Australia will introduce a generic version of their product. Once a single generic version of a medicine is listed on the PBS, the price drops. The US argues that lack of advance notice is a barrier to trade.

    There is pressure for Australia to emulate aspects of the US system, where drug companies can delay generic copies of their medicines by 30 months.

    If the US plays hardball on this issue, perhaps in return for other concessions, this could delay Australia’s access to cheaper generic drugs.

    It would also mean significant pressure on Australia’s drug budget, as the government could be forced to pay for the more expensive branded versions to ensure supply.

    What’s the current process?

    Drug companies use patents to protect their intellectual property and prohibit other manufacturers from copying the drug. The standard patent term in Australia is 20 years, but the time a product is protected by patents can be extended in a number of ways. When patents expire, other companies are able to bring generic versions to market.

    A generic manufacturer wanting to market its drug in Australia must apply to the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) for regulatory approval. Before approval is granted, the generic company must provide a certificate to the TGA that states either:

    a) that the product will not infringe a valid patent, or

    b) that it has notified the patent-holder of its intention to market the product.

    The certificate can be provided after the TGA has evaluated the generic – before it grants approval.

    If the generic company chooses option “a”, the manufacturer of the patented product may not find out the competing product is going to be launched until after the TGA has approved it.

    The patent-holder can then apply for a court order to temporarily stop the generic from coming to market, while legal battles are fought over patent-related issues.

    However, if the first generic has already launched and been added to the PBS, it triggers an automatic 25% price drop. This affects all versions of the drug, including the patented product.

    In Australia, patented drug companies that try to delay generics by taking legal action without good reason can face penalties and be required to pay compensation.

    Patented drug companies don’t like this system. They want to know as early as possible that a generic is planning to launch so they can initiate legal action and prevent or delay generic entry and the associated price reductions.

    Is Australia’s system consistent with our trade obligations?

    Australia introduced its patent notification system at the request of the US, to comply with the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). The World Trade Organization doesn’t require patent notification.

    Australia’s system is different to that of the United States. But it’s consistent with the rules negotiated between the two countries.

    US drug companies have long argued Australia’s system is a barrier to trade. They want Australia to change it to be more like the US system.

    Why is the US arguing this is a barrier to trade?

    The Trump Administration’s 2025 report on foreign trade barriers states “US and Australian pharmaceutical companies have expressed concerns about delays” in the patent notification process.

    The report also mentions US concerns about the potential for penalties and compensation when a patent owner takes legal action against a generic company.

    This report reflects long-standing concerns of the US pharmaceutical industry. In March, its drug makers trade association wrote to the US trade representative complaining that “lack of adequate notification” is an unfair trade practice. It argued this creates uncertainty for patent-holders, prevents resolution of patent challenges before generics enter the market, and penalises patented-drug companies for trying to protect their rights.

    Medicines Australia, which represents the Australian subsidiaries of many big patented drug makers, echoes these concerns.

    Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says he won’t use the PBS as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with the US.
    Lukas Coch/AAP

    What does the US want instead?

    The US patent notification system is much more favourable to the patented drug companies than Australia’s.

    In the US, the generic company must notify the patented drug company within 20 days of filing an application for approval.

    Then, within 45 days of receiving the notification, the patent-holder can ask the regulator to impose a 30-month delay on approval for the generic.

    This means there is an automatic 30-month delay on the launch of the generic, unless patents expire in the meantime or the court decides earlier that valid patents aren’t being infringed.

    What could happen if Australia bowed to pressure from the US?

    Changing Australia’s system to be more like the US would delay generics entering the market in Australia and keep the price of drugs higher for longer.

    The quicker generics can be added to the PBS, the less the government pays. When the first generic is listed on the PBS, a 25% price cut is applied to all versions of the product, including the patented version.

    Over time, as more generics get added, prices continue to fall. Having plenty of generic competition can eventually result in prices lower than the PBS co-payment, resulting in savings for consumers.

    In the longer term, lost savings from timely listing of generics on the PBS would reduce value for money and add cost pressure.

    In time, it could also delay savings for consumers from drugs priced below the PBS co-payment.

    Both major parties are saying they won’t use the PBS as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the US over tariffs. They also need to resist pressure to slow down access to generic drugs. More

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    The trade deficit isn’t an emergency – it’s a sign of America’s strength

    When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sweeping new tariffs on imported goods on April 2, 2025 – upending global trade and sending markets into a tailspin – he presented the move as a response to a crisis. In an executive order released the same day, the White House said the move was necessary to address “the national emergency posed by the large and persistent trade deficit.”

    A trade deficit – when a country imports more than it exports – is often viewed as a problem. And yes, the U.S. trade deficit is both large and persistent. Yet, as an economist who has taught international finance at Boston University, the University of Chicago and Harvard, I maintain that far from a national emergency, this persistent deficit is actually a sign of America’s financial and technological dominance.

    The trade deficit is the flip side of an investment magnet

    A trade deficit sounds bad, but it is neither good nor bad.

    It doesn’t mean the U.S. is losing money. It simply means foreigners are sending the U.S. more goods than the U.S. is sending them. America is getting more cheap goods, and in return it is giving foreigners financial assets: dollars issued by the Federal Reserve, bonds from the U.S. government and American corporations, and stocks in newly created firms.

    That is, a trade deficit can only arise if foreigners invest more in the U.S. than Americans invest abroad. In other words, a country can only have a trade deficit if it also has an equally sized investment surplus. The U.S. is able to sustain a large trade deficit because so many foreigners are eager to invest here.

    Why? One major reason is the safety of the U.S. dollar. Around the world, from large corporations to ordinary households, the dollar is used for saving, trading and settling debts. As the world economy grows, so does foreigners’ demand for dollars and dollar-denominated assets, from cash to Treasury bills and corporate bonds.

    Because the dollar is so attractive, the Federal Reserve gets to mint extra cash for use abroad, and the U.S. government and American employers and families can borrow money at lower interest rates. Foreigners eagerly buy these U.S. financial assets, which enables Americans to consume and invest more than they ordinarily could. In return for our financial assets, we buy more German machines, Scotch whiskey, Chinese smartphones, Mexican steel and so on.

    Blaming foreigners for the trade deficit, therefore, is like blaming the bank for charging a low interest rate. We have a trade deficit because foreigners willingly charge us low interest rates – and we choose to spend that credit.

    US entrepreneurship attracts global capital – and fuels the deficit

    Another reason for foreigners’ steady demand for U.S. assets is American technological dominance: When aspiring entrepreneurs from around the world start new companies, they often decide to do so in Silicon Valley. Foreigners want to buy stocks and bonds in these new companies, again adding to the U.S. investment surplus.

    This strong demand for U.S. assets also explains why Trump’s last trade war in 2018 did little to close the trade deficit: Tariffs, by themselves, do nothing to reduce foreigners’ demand for U.S. dollars, stocks and bonds. If the investment surplus doesn’t change, the trade deficit cannot change. Instead, the U.S. dollar just appreciates, so that imports get cheaper, undoing the effect of the tariff on the size of the trade deficit. This is basic economics: You can’t have an investment surplus and a trade surplus at the same time, which is why it’s silly to call for both.

    It’s worth noting that no other country in the world enjoys a similarly sized investment surplus. If a normal country with a normal currency tries to print more money or issues more debt, its currency depreciates until its investment account – and its trade balance – goes back to something close to zero. America’s financial and technological dominance allows it to escape this dynamic.

    That doesn’t mean all tariffs are bad or all trade is automatically good. But it does mean that the U.S. trade deficit, poorly named though it is, does not signify failure. It is, instead, the consequence – and the privilege – of outsized American global influence.

    The president’s frenzied attacks on the nation’s trade deficit show he’s misreading a sign of American economic strength as a weakness. If the president really wants to eliminate the trade deficit, his best option is to rein in the federal budget deficit, which would naturally reduce capital inflows by raising domestic savings.

    Rather than reviving U.S. manufacturing, Trump’s extreme tariffs and erratic foreign policy are likely to instead scare off foreign investors altogether and undercut the dollar’s global role. That would indeed shrink the trade deficit – but only by eroding the very pillars of the country’s economic dominance, at a steep cost to American firms and families. More

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    Why Donald Trump’s decision to slash USAID is hurting American soft power and making the world less safe

    The Trump administration’s foreign policy has raised alarms. It seems to have shifted America away from its traditional Nato allies, favouring instead a closer relationship with Russia. There has also been talk of plans to control Greenland, the Panama Canal – possibly even Canada. This has caused sleepless nights for political leaders, especially in Europe.

    However, in the developing world, the biggest concern is the US government’s suspension of development aid. For people in these regions, access to clean water, seeds for crops and vaccines is a matter of life or death.

    The suspension is presently the subject of a battle in the US Supreme Court, but at the end of February, the administration said it planned to cut 90% of all overseas aid contracts. With a single stroke of President Trump’s Sharpie pen, this has struck out US$60 billion (£39 billion) of US aid assistance, globally. Internal projections by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), published by the New York Times at the beginning of March, forecast dire consequences, including a massive increase in diseases such as malaria and polio as well as a rise in cases of malnutrition of up to a million children.

    USAID was founded in 1961 under John F. Kennedy’s administration. It operated with an annual budget of about US$58 billion – orders of magnitude larger than any other country’s development portfolio. It maintains a staff of diplomats, subject experts, and also employs local nationals around the world. It is a critical component of US soft power and works in close proximity to the country’s national security interests.

    USAID’s absence will be felt around the world. Perhaps the most consequential effect lies with the freezing of American food aid. Experts have already predicted that without this lifeline, Sudan could face a famine to compound the effects of the civil war that has raged there. The consequences of this will be very public, producing heartbreaking headlines and images.

    But there is another side to this that the Trump administration seems to be overlooking. USAID is one of the largest single customers of American farm products that constitute the country’s food aid packages – 1 million metric tonnes in 2024 alone.

    One of the most misunderstood concepts of foreign aid is the fact that large portions of its budget are spent domestically. A report may say that billions of dollars of food aid were given by the US to Sudan – but much of that represents payments to American farmers who are growing the food that is then donated to starving people – not just in Sudan, either.

    America’s farmers already exist on very tight margins, so an unexpected loss in revenue such as this, is likely to be a serious blow to them as well. It’s just one example of the effect this decision will have both at home and abroad.

    Pulling away the safety net

    Without USAID the world is less safe. There is a large body of research on how development assistance is a critical component of an effective national security strategy. In 2018, the then secretary of defense, Jim Mattis, who was appointed by Trump, said in an interview that his message to the world is: “Work with our diplomats because you do not want to fight the Department of Defense.”

    To illustrate Mattis’s point, consider the academic work done on the emergence of climate-driven conflicts driven by water and food shortages. One crisis simulation I use in my classrooms puts students in the role of solving a kinetic (shooting) war over water rights in the Horn of Africa. This particular crisis, while used as a game to teach national security, could very easily become a reality. It’s the sort of thing USAID helps to prevent.

    I have had the fortune to serve my country in several capacities. Before I started my doctorate in intelligence and national security, I spent four years working for the US government, both as a development worker and in the diplomatic and defence sectors. While diplomacy, defence and development work might look very different on the surface, I can attest that they are quite similar – and very closely linked.

    Street vendors selling bread in Kabul, Afghanistan where cutting of USAid assistance will make people’s lives harder than they already are.
    EPA-EFE/Samiullah Popal

    They operate in very different spheres – but the goal is ultimately the same: to help partner nations enhance their own safety and prosperity. Without this help they may turn to adversaries such as Russia and China to provide assistance and security. These adversaries then have an opportunity to expand their influence around the world, which can include supporting dictatorships and predatory lending, such as seen in the Chinese belt and road initiative.

    Peacekeeping through soft power

    As a US peace corps volunteer, I called on USAID funding to help the community I was assigned to. In Akhaltsikhe, Georgia I taught English and coordinated youth development programmes.

    The Akhaltsikhe region is one of the poorest in the country – and the school was in a sorry state of affairs. With a USAID grant, we were able to renovate part of the school and create an English language learning centre, which still thrives today, 12 years later. I can say first-hand that this project had a big impact on the image of the US among the Georgian people in my community.

    It should go without saying that the US has a chequered past when it comes to some of its foreign policy interventions. But the country’s wealth and resources offer it the unique position to help grow and enhance western values in parts of the world that deserve the same freedom that developed countries in the west take for granted. In my opinion, that is money well spent.

    Whatever value one might place on the US global footprint does not erase the truth of its existence. America is called upon to uphold democracy, to lift people out of poverty, and to respond to crises no matter where they are. Donald Trump, Elon Musk and his Doge staffers should have paid greater heed to USAID’s motto: “For the American people.” More

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    The hidden power of marathon Senate speeches: What history tells us about Cory Booker’s 25-hour oration

    Democratic U.S. Sen. Cory Booker of New Jersey made history on April 1, 2025, when he stood on the Senate floor and spoke for 25 hours and five minutes, delivering the longest floor speech in the history of the U.S. Senate.

    Booker’s speech detailed his concerns about President Donald Trump’s new executive orders, other policies and approach to government in his second term.

    “I rise tonight because silence at this moment of national crisis would be a betrayal of some of the greatest heroes of our nation. Because at stake in this moment is nothing less than everything that we brag about, that we talk about, that makes us special,” Booker said.

    Although Booker’s speech was not technically a filibuster, meaning a prolonged action at the Senate in order to delay or stop a vote on a legislative action, it was clearly a monumental physical achievement. Booker stood, wearing a black suit, for the entirety of his speech and did not pause to take bathroom or meal breaks.

    What does the subject matter of Booker’s speech, as well as his style of giving it, say about its potential effectiveness? Could it succeed where filibusters have failed?

    Many other long Senate speeches in history offer a variety of useful historical hints about the political significance of Booker’s record-breaking speech.

    U.S. Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina is kissed by his wife after talking for 24 hours and 18 minutes in opposition to the Civil Rights Act in August 1957.
    Bettmann/Contributor/Getty Images

    Booker’s speech was a wide-ranging protest

    One unusual element of Booker’s oration is that it was not focused on just one narrow issue.

    Most of the lengthiest filibusters from across Senate history are focused on bills that cover important but specific issues. In 1953, Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon, for example, set a record for the longest filibuster when he spoke for 22 hours and 26 minutes. Morse protested a bill involving the transfer of land and oil rights between coastal states and the federal government. The bill passed, despite Morse’s filibuster.

    Sen. Strom Thurmond, the South Carolina politician who broke Morse’s record just four years later, infamously – and unsuccessfully – protested the Civil Rights Act of 1957 with a 24-hour, 18-minute speech.

    Booker’s speech came in the midst of a vote to confirm Matthew Whitaker as the U.S. ambassador to NATO. Whitaker was confirmed shortly after Booker’s speech concluded.

    Booker and the procession of Senate colleagues who asked him questions referenced this and other appointments in their remarks. But Booker largely used the speech to build a much bigger case against the Trump administration, most notably that the administration had wrested from Congress much of its constitutionally mandated budgetary authority by extensively cutting federal staff, grants and spending without congressional approval.

    “These are not normal times in America,” Booker said toward the beginning of his address, “and they should not be treated as such in the United States Senate.”

    The rules and culture of the Senate have always been more lax when it comes to what congressional experts call “germaneness” – in other words, how relevant a Senator’s action is to whatever is being debated.

    For example, the Senate often allows nongermane amendments, meaning those that have little or nothing to do with the bill being debated. Booker leveraged that Senate tradition to make a larger point about what he called an ongoing “crisis” in American democracy.

    Booker stuck to the issues

    Booker may have covered a wide variety of areas in his speech, ranging from proposed Republican cuts to Medicaid to mass firings of federal workers, but there’s no question that he stayed focused on his critique of the Trump administration – a difficult task to stick to for 25 straight hours.

    Booker’s predecessors in the pursuit of Thurmond’s record have demonstrated this difficulty in keeping a marathon speech focused.

    For example, Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas diverted from his argument when he gave a 21-hour, 19-minute speech protesting President Obama’s signature piece of legislation, the Affordable Care Act, in 2013.

    Cruz, who still serves with Booker in the Senate, took the opportunity to tell his young daughters a bedtime story on the Senate floor, reading aloud from Dr. Seuss’ children’s book “Green Eggs and Ham.”

    Louisiana Sen. Huey Long, meanwhile, shared recipes for southern fried oysters during his 1937 protest of the federal appointments process.

    Booker, on the other hand, almost uniformly kept his focus on his grievances against the Trump administration and used only notes designed to reinforce his central argument that Trump is not leading in the best interest of the country.

    According to an April 1 press release from Booker’s office, the senator drew from over 1,000 pages of prepared material assembled by his Senate aides, including stories from more than 200 Americans who had written to Booker protesting Trump’s actions.

    In many instances, Booker also spoke extemporaneously about the administration’s actions. At other times, his fellow senators broke in for a lengthy question, but even these kept the conversation, and Booker’s attention, focused on taking Trump — and occasionally Elon Musk – to task.

    In all instances, Booker used his speech to rally the public.

    “My voice is inadequate. My efforts today are inadequate to stop what they are trying to do,” he said at one point. “But we the people are powerful, and we are strong.”

    Sen. Cory Booker speaks on the Senate floor on April 1, 2025.
    Senate Television/Associated Press

    Lasting effects

    Of course, with few tangible results to show for lengthy Senate speeches, people might be tempted to view these long orations as little more than trivia or political theater.

    On some occasions, filibusters have made a legislative impact. Sen. Alfonse D’Amato of New York, for example, filibustered a budget bill in 1986 for nearly 23½ hours to protest an amendment that would have killed funding for a jet trainer plane manufactured in his state. His filibuster didn’t stop the bill entirely, but he did secure a concession that prolonged the project’s life.

    For the most part, however, lengthy filibusters throughout history have been largely fruitless efforts legislatively. Even so, the symbolism of these speeches, including Booker’s, can have effects on politics and representation that last beyond the legislation the senator is protesting.

    It’s difficult to know yet just how effective Booker’s efforts will be in motivating an anti-Trump coalition to stand up to the administration, either in Congress or among voters.

    But politically speaking, Booker’s timing was fortuitous – on April 2, the same evening Booker wrapped up his address, liberals secured a crucial Wisconsin Supreme Court seat in a high-turnout election, when Judge Susan Crawford beat Judge Brad Schimel. Schimel is a Trump supporter and received nearly US$20 million in donations from organizations supported by Musk.

    Democratic politicians also outperformed expectations in two special elections to the U.S. House in Florida, though they lost the races.

    Taken together with Booker’s herculean effort, these events could serve as a catalyst for Trump’s opponents to strike back in the coming months.

    The symbolic significance of Booker’s achievement has also not gone unnoticed. Booker, who is Black and reflected on ancestors who were both enslaved or enslavers in his speech, was himself mindful of the historical relevance.

    “To be candid, Strom Thurmond’s record always just really irked me,” Booker said after his speech in an interview with MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow.

    “The longest speech on our great Senate floor was someone who was trying to stop people like me from being in the Senate.”

    If nothing else, Booker took that record from Thurmond and made it his own. More

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    Labor leads in three recent national polls, four weeks from the election

    The federal election will be held in four weeks. A national YouGov poll, conducted March 28 to April 3 from a sample of 1,622, gave Labor a 51–49 lead, a one-point gain for Labor since the previous non-MRP YouGov poll taken March 14–19.

    Primary votes were 35% Coalition (down two), 30% Labor (down one), 13% Greens (steady), 7% One Nation (steady), 2% Trumpet of Patriots (up one), 10% independents (up two) and 3% others (steady). YouGov is using respondent preferences from its last MRP poll. By 2022 election preference flows, Labor would lead by about 52–48.

    Anthony Albanese’s net approval rose three points to -6, with 50% dissatisfied and 44% satisfied. Peter Dutton’s net approval slumped ten points to -15, his worst in YouGov’s polls and the first time he’s had a worse net approval than Albanese since June 2024. Albanese led as better PM by 45–38 (45–40 previously).

    Since Sunday, we have had leaders’ ratings polls from Newspoll, Resolve, Freshwater, Essential and YouGov. A simple average of the net approval from these five polls has Albanese at net 7.8 and Dutton at net -12.

    Here is the poll graph. Labor has led in four of the six polls taken since the budget, with the exceptions a 50–50 tie in Resolve and a Coalition lead by 51–49 in Freshwater. However, Labor’s lead is narrow, except in Morgan.

    Labor Two Party Preferred Vote in national polls.

    While the Coalition could regain the lead before the election, Donald Trump’s tariff announcement on Thursday may make it more difficult for the Coalition.

    Essential poll: Labor takes slight lead

    A national Essential poll, conducted March 26–30 from a sample of 1,144, gave Labor a 48–47 lead by respondent preferences including undecided (a 47–47 tie in mid-March). This was the first Labor lead in Essential since November, with the Coalition either leading narrowly or a tie since.

    Primary votes were 34% Coalition (down one), 30% Labor (up one), 12% Greens (steady), 9% One Nation (up one), 2% Trumpet of Patriots (up one), 8% for all Others (down one) and 5% undecided (down one). By 2022 election flows, Labor would lead by about 51–49.

    Albanese’s net approval was down three points to -2, with 46% disapproving and 44% approving. Dutton’s was down one point to -6. It’s Dutton’s worst net approval in Essential since October 2023.

    Peter Dutton’s personal approval rating has slumped.
    Mick Tsikas/AAP

    By 52–32, voters thought Australia was on the wrong track (48–35 previously). Essential and Morgan have a big lead for wrong track, but Labor is ahead. Voters may be blaming Trump more than Labor.

    By 61–29, voters did not think the federal budget would make a meaningful difference on cost of living (64–27 after the May 2024 budget). By 69–31, voters thought the government should prioritise the delivery of services, even if it means running a deficit, over prioritise running a surplus.

    Voters were told the Trump administration wanted to pressure Australia into removing some policies using tariffs. By 65–15, voters supported the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and by 64–13 they supported making US companies pay tax on income generated in Australia.

    Morgan poll: Labor retains solid lead

    A national Morgan poll, conducted March 24–30 from a sample of 1,377, gave Labor a 53–47 lead by headline respondent preferences, unchanged from the March 17–23 poll.

    Primary votes were 35% Coalition (down 0.5), 32% Labor (down 1.5), 13% Greens (up 0.5), 5.5% One Nation (up 1.5), 10.5% independents (up 0.5) and 4% others (down 0.5). By 2022 election flows, Labor led by 53.5–46.5, a 0.5-point gain for the Coalition.

    By 51.5–32, voters thought Australia was going in the wrong direction (52.5–32.5 previously). Morgan’s consumer confidence index was up 1.1 points to 85.3.

    This term, Morgan’s results in general haven’t skewed to Labor relative to other polls, and Labor was behind in Morgan’s polls from November until late February. But Trump’s initial imposition of steel and aluminium tariffs on Australia on March 12 has seen Morgan move much more to Labor than other polls.

    Additional Resolve and Newspoll questions and a NSW federal poll

    I covered the national Resolve poll for Nine newspapers on March 30. In additional questions, by 60–15 voters thought Trump’s election was bad for Australia (40% bad in November). On threats to Australia in the next few years, 31% thought China the greatest threat, 17% the US, 4% Russia and 38% all equally.

    The Trump tariff announcement may have an effect on domestic politics.
    Lukas Coch/AAP

    Newspoll has been asking the same questions on the budget since 1988. The Poll Bludger said on Wednesday the March 25 budget was the fourth worst perceived on economic impact (at net -10), but about the middle on personal impact (net -19). The nine-point lead for “no” on would the opposition have delivered a better budget was about par for a Labor government.

    A federal DomosAU poll of New South Wales, conducted March 24–26 from a sample of 1,013, gave the Coalition a 51–49 lead (51.4–48.6 to Labor in NSW at the 2022 federal election). Primary votes were 38% Coalition, 30% Labor, 12% Greens, 9% One Nation and 11% for all Others.

    Albanese led Dutton as preferred PM by 39–38. By 52–31, respondents did not think Australia was headed in the right direction.

    Canadian election and US special elections

    The Canadian federal election is on April 28. Polls continue to show the governing centre-left Liberals gaining ground, and they now lead the Conservatives by 43.4–37.6 in the CBC Poll Tracker.

    US federal special elections occurred on Tuesday in two safe Republican seats. While Republicans easily retained, there were big swings to the Democrats from the 2024 presidential election results in those districts. A left-wing judge won an election to the Wisconsin state supreme court by 55–45. I covered the Canadian and US developments for The Poll Bludger.

    WA election final lower house results

    I previously covered Labor winning 46 of the 59 lower house seats at the March 8 Western Australian election. The ABC’s final two-party estimate was a Labor win by 57.2–42.8. While that’s way down from the record 69.7–30.3 in 2021, it’s up from 55.5–44.5 in 2017.

    Final primary votes were 41.4% Labor (down 18.5% since 2021), 28.0% Liberals (up 6.7%), 5.2% Nationals (up 1.2%), 11.1% Greens (up 4.1%), 4.0% One Nation (up 2.8%), 3.2% Australian Christians (up 1.7%), 2.5% Legalise Cannabis (up 2.1%) and 3.3% independents (up 2.5%).

    The upper house will be finalised next week. All above the line votes have been included, with only below the line votes to be added. Labor will win 15 of the 37 seats, the Liberals ten, the Nationals two, the Greens four and One Nation, Legalise Cannabis and the Christians one each. That leaves three unclear seats.

    ABC election analyst Antony Green’s modelling of the effect of below the line votes suggests Labor’s 16th seat is in doubt and the Liberals won’t win an 11th seat. If this is correct, an independent group and Animal Justice will probably win two seats, with the final seat to be determined by preferences. More

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    Why has Trump launched so many tariffs and will it cause a recession? Expert Q&A

    Donald Trump has always talked about how much he likes tariffs. And on April 2 2025, he showed that he meant it. For the president it was “liberation day”, but for his fellow world leaders it was a tense wait to see what percentage figure would be attached to their country’s vital exports.

    Those tariff rates ranged from 10% for the UK to 49% for Cambodia, charges which Trump says will raise trillions of dollars for the US economy and “make America wealthy again”.

    “Our country has been looted, pillaged, raped and plundered,” he said, before unveiling the tariffs which will cause headaches for business leaders and politicians across the world. We asked Linda Yueh, an economist at the University of Oxford, to answer some of the most pressing questions the tariffs pose.

    What is Trump thinking?

    Economically speaking, the president of the US says he wants to make international trade fairer – by equalising tariffs. He said that if countries want these “reciprocal tariffs” removed (on top of the 10% baseline tariff on all US imports), then they also need to remove non-tariff barriers, such as opening more of their markets to US companies.

    As with his first administration, he also wants companies to bring production and manufacturing jobs back to the US. Basically, he views current international trade as unfair and is using tariffs in a way that’s unprecedented in modern times to try to level the playing field.

    Why such a broad range of tariffs?

    The formula used by the White House to calculate the various tariff rates is apparently based on the trade balance – what each country sells and buys from the US. The Trump administration views a trade surplus (where the US buys more than it sells) as a proxy for unfair trade, so is imposing “reciprocal tariffs” to retaliate.

    And some countries do indeed levy higher tariffs than the US. For instance, some developing countries do so in accordance with their level of development. But tariffs are generally governed by the World Trade Organisation, so that’s where countries would normally go to resolve trade disputes.

    But because no tariff is set below 10%, there will be tariffs levied even on countries with whom the US runs a trade surplus (those which do more buying from the US than selling). These include the Netherlands, Australia and Brazil.

    A complex relationship.
    Tomas Ragina/Shutterstock

    Over 100 countries will have tariffs imposed, including small countries like Fiji (32%) and poor economies like Haiti (10%). Those are also likely to be the ones which will find it most challenging to get into the queue to negotiate a lower tariff any time soon.

    What options do countries have in terms of their response?

    The EU (20%) has said it will retaliate, while the UK (10%) says it will keep talking though all the options on the table. Trump has said he is open to negotiations before the baseline tariffs are imposed on April 5, and the extra reciprocal tariffs land on April 9.

    Engaging in a tit-for-tat trade war is economically damaging – as the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) set out in its latest assessment of the UK economy. Each government will take its own view on the appropriate approach, but with the knowledge that it’s highly unlikely that everyone will be able to negotiate a better deal conclusively within a week.

    Will there be a recession?

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that Trump’s tariffs could reduce global economic growth by 0.5% through next year, which is significant. But, it also believes that a global recession is not on the horizon.

    That said, the economic impact of these tariffs is highly uncertain and unpredictable. The effects will vary from country to country, and a lot will depends upon how long the tariffs are levied for, how other countries respond and how companies manage the tariffs and the uncertainty of trade policy.

    Read more:
    How the UK and Europe could respond to Trump’s ‘liberation day’ tariffs

    And it remains a big gamble for Trump too. For a president who considers himself to be the master of deals, there are risks of rising inflation, falling stock markets and potentially denting the US economy. More