Philippa Kaur

While Australia was busy defending the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme against threats from the United States in recent weeks, another issue related to the supply and trade of medicines was flying under the radar.

Buried on page 19 of the Trump’s administration’s allegations of barriers to trade was a single paragraph related to Australia’s access to generic medicines. These are cheaper alternatives to branded medicines that are no longer under patent.

The US is concerned about how much notice their drug companies have that Australia will introduce a generic version of their product. Once a single generic version of a medicine is listed on the PBS, the price drops. The US argues that lack of advance notice is a barrier to trade.

There is pressure for Australia to emulate aspects of the US system, where drug companies can delay generic copies of their medicines by 30 months.

If the US plays hardball on this issue, perhaps in return for other concessions, this could delay Australia’s access to cheaper generic drugs.

It would also mean significant pressure on Australia’s drug budget, as the government could be forced to pay for the more expensive branded versions to ensure supply.

What’s the current process?

Drug companies use patents to protect their intellectual property and prohibit other manufacturers from copying the drug. The standard patent term in Australia is 20 years, but the time a product is protected by patents can be extended in a number of ways. When patents expire, other companies are able to bring generic versions to market.

A generic manufacturer wanting to market its drug in Australia must apply to the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) for regulatory approval. Before approval is granted, the generic company must provide a certificate to the TGA that states either:

a) that the product will not infringe a valid patent, or

b) that it has notified the patent-holder of its intention to market the product.

The certificate can be provided after the TGA has evaluated the generic – before it grants approval.

If the generic company chooses option “a”, the manufacturer of the patented product may not find out the competing product is going to be launched until after the TGA has approved it.

The patent-holder can then apply for a court order to temporarily stop the generic from coming to market, while legal battles are fought over patent-related issues.

However, if the first generic has already launched and been added to the PBS, it triggers an automatic 25% price drop. This affects all versions of the drug, including the patented product.

In Australia, patented drug companies that try to delay generics by taking legal action without good reason can face penalties and be required to pay compensation.

Patented drug companies don’t like this system. They want to know as early as possible that a generic is planning to launch so they can initiate legal action and prevent or delay generic entry and the associated price reductions.

Is Australia’s system consistent with our trade obligations?

Australia introduced its patent notification system at the request of the US, to comply with the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). The World Trade Organization doesn’t require patent notification.

Australia’s system is different to that of the United States. But it’s consistent with the rules negotiated between the two countries.

US drug companies have long argued Australia’s system is a barrier to trade. They want Australia to change it to be more like the US system.

Why is the US arguing this is a barrier to trade?

The Trump Administration’s 2025 report on foreign trade barriers states “US and Australian pharmaceutical companies have expressed concerns about delays” in the patent notification process.

The report also mentions US concerns about the potential for penalties and compensation when a patent owner takes legal action against a generic company.

This report reflects long-standing concerns of the US pharmaceutical industry. In March, its drug makers trade association wrote to the US trade representative complaining that “lack of adequate notification” is an unfair trade practice. It argued this creates uncertainty for patent-holders, prevents resolution of patent challenges before generics enter the market, and penalises patented-drug companies for trying to protect their rights.

Medicines Australia, which represents the Australian subsidiaries of many big patented drug makers, echoes these concerns.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says he won’t use the PBS as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with the US.
Lukas Coch/AAP

What does the US want instead?

The US patent notification system is much more favourable to the patented drug companies than Australia’s.

In the US, the generic company must notify the patented drug company within 20 days of filing an application for approval.

Then, within 45 days of receiving the notification, the patent-holder can ask the regulator to impose a 30-month delay on approval for the generic.

This means there is an automatic 30-month delay on the launch of the generic, unless patents expire in the meantime or the court decides earlier that valid patents aren’t being infringed.

What could happen if Australia bowed to pressure from the US?

Changing Australia’s system to be more like the US would delay generics entering the market in Australia and keep the price of drugs higher for longer.

The quicker generics can be added to the PBS, the less the government pays. When the first generic is listed on the PBS, a 25% price cut is applied to all versions of the product, including the patented version.

Over time, as more generics get added, prices continue to fall. Having plenty of generic competition can eventually result in prices lower than the PBS co-payment, resulting in savings for consumers.

In the longer term, lost savings from timely listing of generics on the PBS would reduce value for money and add cost pressure.

In time, it could also delay savings for consumers from drugs priced below the PBS co-payment.

Both major parties are saying they won’t use the PBS as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the US over tariffs. They also need to resist pressure to slow down access to generic drugs. More

When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sweeping new tariffs on imported goods on April 2, 2025 – upending global trade and sending markets into a tailspin – he presented the move as a response to a crisis. In an executive order released the same day, the White House said the move was necessary to address “the national emergency posed by the large and persistent trade deficit.”

A trade deficit – when a country imports more than it exports – is often viewed as a problem. And yes, the U.S. trade deficit is both large and persistent. Yet, as an economist who has taught international finance at Boston University, the University of Chicago and Harvard, I maintain that far from a national emergency, this persistent deficit is actually a sign of America’s financial and technological dominance.

The trade deficit is the flip side of an investment magnet

A trade deficit sounds bad, but it is neither good nor bad.

It doesn’t mean the U.S. is losing money. It simply means foreigners are sending the U.S. more goods than the U.S. is sending them. America is getting more cheap goods, and in return it is giving foreigners financial assets: dollars issued by the Federal Reserve, bonds from the U.S. government and American corporations, and stocks in newly created firms.

That is, a trade deficit can only arise if foreigners invest more in the U.S. than Americans invest abroad. In other words, a country can only have a trade deficit if it also has an equally sized investment surplus. The U.S. is able to sustain a large trade deficit because so many foreigners are eager to invest here.

Why? One major reason is the safety of the U.S. dollar. Around the world, from large corporations to ordinary households, the dollar is used for saving, trading and settling debts. As the world economy grows, so does foreigners’ demand for dollars and dollar-denominated assets, from cash to Treasury bills and corporate bonds.

Because the dollar is so attractive, the Federal Reserve gets to mint extra cash for use abroad, and the U.S. government and American employers and families can borrow money at lower interest rates. Foreigners eagerly buy these U.S. financial assets, which enables Americans to consume and invest more than they ordinarily could. In return for our financial assets, we buy more German machines, Scotch whiskey, Chinese smartphones, Mexican steel and so on.

Blaming foreigners for the trade deficit, therefore, is like blaming the bank for charging a low interest rate. We have a trade deficit because foreigners willingly charge us low interest rates – and we choose to spend that credit.

US entrepreneurship attracts global capital – and fuels the deficit

Another reason for foreigners’ steady demand for U.S. assets is American technological dominance: When aspiring entrepreneurs from around the world start new companies, they often decide to do so in Silicon Valley. Foreigners want to buy stocks and bonds in these new companies, again adding to the U.S. investment surplus.

This strong demand for U.S. assets also explains why Trump’s last trade war in 2018 did little to close the trade deficit: Tariffs, by themselves, do nothing to reduce foreigners’ demand for U.S. dollars, stocks and bonds. If the investment surplus doesn’t change, the trade deficit cannot change. Instead, the U.S. dollar just appreciates, so that imports get cheaper, undoing the effect of the tariff on the size of the trade deficit. This is basic economics: You can’t have an investment surplus and a trade surplus at the same time, which is why it’s silly to call for both.

It’s worth noting that no other country in the world enjoys a similarly sized investment surplus. If a normal country with a normal currency tries to print more money or issues more debt, its currency depreciates until its investment account – and its trade balance – goes back to something close to zero. America’s financial and technological dominance allows it to escape this dynamic.

That doesn’t mean all tariffs are bad or all trade is automatically good. But it does mean that the U.S. trade deficit, poorly named though it is, does not signify failure. It is, instead, the consequence – and the privilege – of outsized American global influence.

The president’s frenzied attacks on the nation’s trade deficit show he’s misreading a sign of American economic strength as a weakness. If the president really wants to eliminate the trade deficit, his best option is to rein in the federal budget deficit, which would naturally reduce capital inflows by raising domestic savings.

Rather than reviving U.S. manufacturing, Trump’s extreme tariffs and erratic foreign policy are likely to instead scare off foreign investors altogether and undercut the dollar’s global role. That would indeed shrink the trade deficit – but only by eroding the very pillars of the country’s economic dominance, at a steep cost to American firms and families. More

The Trump administration’s foreign policy has raised alarms. It seems to have shifted America away from its traditional Nato allies, favouring instead a closer relationship with Russia. There has also been talk of plans to control Greenland, the Panama Canal – possibly even Canada. This has caused sleepless nights for political leaders, especially in Europe.

However, in the developing world, the biggest concern is the US government’s suspension of development aid. For people in these regions, access to clean water, seeds for crops and vaccines is a matter of life or death.

The suspension is presently the subject of a battle in the US Supreme Court, but at the end of February, the administration said it planned to cut 90% of all overseas aid contracts. With a single stroke of President Trump’s Sharpie pen, this has struck out US$60 billion (£39 billion) of US aid assistance, globally. Internal projections by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), published by the New York Times at the beginning of March, forecast dire consequences, including a massive increase in diseases such as malaria and polio as well as a rise in cases of malnutrition of up to a million children.

USAID was founded in 1961 under John F. Kennedy’s administration. It operated with an annual budget of about US$58 billion – orders of magnitude larger than any other country’s development portfolio. It maintains a staff of diplomats, subject experts, and also employs local nationals around the world. It is a critical component of US soft power and works in close proximity to the country’s national security interests.

USAID’s absence will be felt around the world. Perhaps the most consequential effect lies with the freezing of American food aid. Experts have already predicted that without this lifeline, Sudan could face a famine to compound the effects of the civil war that has raged there. The consequences of this will be very public, producing heartbreaking headlines and images.

But there is another side to this that the Trump administration seems to be overlooking. USAID is one of the largest single customers of American farm products that constitute the country’s food aid packages – 1 million metric tonnes in 2024 alone.

One of the most misunderstood concepts of foreign aid is the fact that large portions of its budget are spent domestically. A report may say that billions of dollars of food aid were given by the US to Sudan – but much of that represents payments to American farmers who are growing the food that is then donated to starving people – not just in Sudan, either.

America’s farmers already exist on very tight margins, so an unexpected loss in revenue such as this, is likely to be a serious blow to them as well. It’s just one example of the effect this decision will have both at home and abroad.

Pulling away the safety net

Without USAID the world is less safe. There is a large body of research on how development assistance is a critical component of an effective national security strategy. In 2018, the then secretary of defense, Jim Mattis, who was appointed by Trump, said in an interview that his message to the world is: “Work with our diplomats because you do not want to fight the Department of Defense.”

To illustrate Mattis’s point, consider the academic work done on the emergence of climate-driven conflicts driven by water and food shortages. One crisis simulation I use in my classrooms puts students in the role of solving a kinetic (shooting) war over water rights in the Horn of Africa. This particular crisis, while used as a game to teach national security, could very easily become a reality. It’s the sort of thing USAID helps to prevent.

I have had the fortune to serve my country in several capacities. Before I started my doctorate in intelligence and national security, I spent four years working for the US government, both as a development worker and in the diplomatic and defence sectors. While diplomacy, defence and development work might look very different on the surface, I can attest that they are quite similar – and very closely linked.

Street vendors selling bread in Kabul, Afghanistan where cutting of USAid assistance will make people’s lives harder than they already are.
EPA-EFE/Samiullah Popal

They operate in very different spheres – but the goal is ultimately the same: to help partner nations enhance their own safety and prosperity. Without this help they may turn to adversaries such as Russia and China to provide assistance and security. These adversaries then have an opportunity to expand their influence around the world, which can include supporting dictatorships and predatory lending, such as seen in the Chinese belt and road initiative.

Peacekeeping through soft power

As a US peace corps volunteer, I called on USAID funding to help the community I was assigned to. In Akhaltsikhe, Georgia I taught English and coordinated youth development programmes.

The Akhaltsikhe region is one of the poorest in the country – and the school was in a sorry state of affairs. With a USAID grant, we were able to renovate part of the school and create an English language learning centre, which still thrives today, 12 years later. I can say first-hand that this project had a big impact on the image of the US among the Georgian people in my community.

It should go without saying that the US has a chequered past when it comes to some of its foreign policy interventions. But the country’s wealth and resources offer it the unique position to help grow and enhance western values in parts of the world that deserve the same freedom that developed countries in the west take for granted. In my opinion, that is money well spent.

Whatever value one might place on the US global footprint does not erase the truth of its existence. America is called upon to uphold democracy, to lift people out of poverty, and to respond to crises no matter where they are. Donald Trump, Elon Musk and his Doge staffers should have paid greater heed to USAID’s motto: “For the American people.” More

Democratic U.S. Sen. Cory Booker of New Jersey made history on April 1, 2025, when he stood on the Senate floor and spoke for 25 hours and five minutes, delivering the longest floor speech in the history of the U.S. Senate.

Booker’s speech detailed his concerns about President Donald Trump’s new executive orders, other policies and approach to government in his second term.

“I rise tonight because silence at this moment of national crisis would be a betrayal of some of the greatest heroes of our nation. Because at stake in this moment is nothing less than everything that we brag about, that we talk about, that makes us special,” Booker said.

Although Booker’s speech was not technically a filibuster, meaning a prolonged action at the Senate in order to delay or stop a vote on a legislative action, it was clearly a monumental physical achievement. Booker stood, wearing a black suit, for the entirety of his speech and did not pause to take bathroom or meal breaks.

What does the subject matter of Booker’s speech, as well as his style of giving it, say about its potential effectiveness? Could it succeed where filibusters have failed?

Many other long Senate speeches in history offer a variety of useful historical hints about the political significance of Booker’s record-breaking speech.

U.S. Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina is kissed by his wife after talking for 24 hours and 18 minutes in opposition to the Civil Rights Act in August 1957.
Bettmann/Contributor/Getty Images

Booker’s speech was a wide-ranging protest

One unusual element of Booker’s oration is that it was not focused on just one narrow issue.

Most of the lengthiest filibusters from across Senate history are focused on bills that cover important but specific issues. In 1953, Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon, for example, set a record for the longest filibuster when he spoke for 22 hours and 26 minutes. Morse protested a bill involving the transfer of land and oil rights between coastal states and the federal government. The bill passed, despite Morse’s filibuster.

Sen. Strom Thurmond, the South Carolina politician who broke Morse’s record just four years later, infamously – and unsuccessfully – protested the Civil Rights Act of 1957 with a 24-hour, 18-minute speech.

Booker’s speech came in the midst of a vote to confirm Matthew Whitaker as the U.S. ambassador to NATO. Whitaker was confirmed shortly after Booker’s speech concluded.

Booker and the procession of Senate colleagues who asked him questions referenced this and other appointments in their remarks. But Booker largely used the speech to build a much bigger case against the Trump administration, most notably that the administration had wrested from Congress much of its constitutionally mandated budgetary authority by extensively cutting federal staff, grants and spending without congressional approval.

“These are not normal times in America,” Booker said toward the beginning of his address, “and they should not be treated as such in the United States Senate.”

The rules and culture of the Senate have always been more lax when it comes to what congressional experts call “germaneness” – in other words, how relevant a Senator’s action is to whatever is being debated.

For example, the Senate often allows nongermane amendments, meaning those that have little or nothing to do with the bill being debated. Booker leveraged that Senate tradition to make a larger point about what he called an ongoing “crisis” in American democracy.

Booker stuck to the issues

Booker may have covered a wide variety of areas in his speech, ranging from proposed Republican cuts to Medicaid to mass firings of federal workers, but there’s no question that he stayed focused on his critique of the Trump administration – a difficult task to stick to for 25 straight hours.

Booker’s predecessors in the pursuit of Thurmond’s record have demonstrated this difficulty in keeping a marathon speech focused.

For example, Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas diverted from his argument when he gave a 21-hour, 19-minute speech protesting President Obama’s signature piece of legislation, the Affordable Care Act, in 2013.

Cruz, who still serves with Booker in the Senate, took the opportunity to tell his young daughters a bedtime story on the Senate floor, reading aloud from Dr. Seuss’ children’s book “Green Eggs and Ham.”

Louisiana Sen. Huey Long, meanwhile, shared recipes for southern fried oysters during his 1937 protest of the federal appointments process.

Booker, on the other hand, almost uniformly kept his focus on his grievances against the Trump administration and used only notes designed to reinforce his central argument that Trump is not leading in the best interest of the country.

According to an April 1 press release from Booker’s office, the senator drew from over 1,000 pages of prepared material assembled by his Senate aides, including stories from more than 200 Americans who had written to Booker protesting Trump’s actions.

In many instances, Booker also spoke extemporaneously about the administration’s actions. At other times, his fellow senators broke in for a lengthy question, but even these kept the conversation, and Booker’s attention, focused on taking Trump — and occasionally Elon Musk – to task.

In all instances, Booker used his speech to rally the public.

“My voice is inadequate. My efforts today are inadequate to stop what they are trying to do,” he said at one point. “But we the people are powerful, and we are strong.”

Sen. Cory Booker speaks on the Senate floor on April 1, 2025.
Senate Television/Associated Press

Lasting effects

Of course, with few tangible results to show for lengthy Senate speeches, people might be tempted to view these long orations as little more than trivia or political theater.

On some occasions, filibusters have made a legislative impact. Sen. Alfonse D’Amato of New York, for example, filibustered a budget bill in 1986 for nearly 23½ hours to protest an amendment that would have killed funding for a jet trainer plane manufactured in his state. His filibuster didn’t stop the bill entirely, but he did secure a concession that prolonged the project’s life.

For the most part, however, lengthy filibusters throughout history have been largely fruitless efforts legislatively. Even so, the symbolism of these speeches, including Booker’s, can have effects on politics and representation that last beyond the legislation the senator is protesting.

It’s difficult to know yet just how effective Booker’s efforts will be in motivating an anti-Trump coalition to stand up to the administration, either in Congress or among voters.

But politically speaking, Booker’s timing was fortuitous – on April 2, the same evening Booker wrapped up his address, liberals secured a crucial Wisconsin Supreme Court seat in a high-turnout election, when Judge Susan Crawford beat Judge Brad Schimel. Schimel is a Trump supporter and received nearly US$20 million in donations from organizations supported by Musk.

Democratic politicians also outperformed expectations in two special elections to the U.S. House in Florida, though they lost the races.

Taken together with Booker’s herculean effort, these events could serve as a catalyst for Trump’s opponents to strike back in the coming months.

The symbolic significance of Booker’s achievement has also not gone unnoticed. Booker, who is Black and reflected on ancestors who were both enslaved or enslavers in his speech, was himself mindful of the historical relevance.

“To be candid, Strom Thurmond’s record always just really irked me,” Booker said after his speech in an interview with MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow.

“The longest speech on our great Senate floor was someone who was trying to stop people like me from being in the Senate.”

If nothing else, Booker took that record from Thurmond and made it his own. More

The federal election will be held in four weeks. A national YouGov poll, conducted March 28 to April 3 from a sample of 1,622, gave Labor a 51–49 lead, a one-point gain for Labor since the previous non-MRP YouGov poll taken March 14–19.

Primary votes were 35% Coalition (down two), 30% Labor (down one), 13% Greens (steady), 7% One Nation (steady), 2% Trumpet of Patriots (up one), 10% independents (up two) and 3% others (steady). YouGov is using respondent preferences from its last MRP poll. By 2022 election preference flows, Labor would lead by about 52–48.

Anthony Albanese’s net approval rose three points to -6, with 50% dissatisfied and 44% satisfied. Peter Dutton’s net approval slumped ten points to -15, his worst in YouGov’s polls and the first time he’s had a worse net approval than Albanese since June 2024. Albanese led as better PM by 45–38 (45–40 previously).

Since Sunday, we have had leaders’ ratings polls from Newspoll, Resolve, Freshwater, Essential and YouGov. A simple average of the net approval from these five polls has Albanese at net 7.8 and Dutton at net -12.

Here is the poll graph. Labor has led in four of the six polls taken since the budget, with the exceptions a 50–50 tie in Resolve and a Coalition lead by 51–49 in Freshwater. However, Labor’s lead is narrow, except in Morgan.

Labor Two Party Preferred Vote in national polls.

While the Coalition could regain the lead before the election, Donald Trump’s tariff announcement on Thursday may make it more difficult for the Coalition.

Essential poll: Labor takes slight lead

A national Essential poll, conducted March 26–30 from a sample of 1,144, gave Labor a 48–47 lead by respondent preferences including undecided (a 47–47 tie in mid-March). This was the first Labor lead in Essential since November, with the Coalition either leading narrowly or a tie since.

Primary votes were 34% Coalition (down one), 30% Labor (up one), 12% Greens (steady), 9% One Nation (up one), 2% Trumpet of Patriots (up one), 8% for all Others (down one) and 5% undecided (down one). By 2022 election flows, Labor would lead by about 51–49.

Albanese’s net approval was down three points to -2, with 46% disapproving and 44% approving. Dutton’s was down one point to -6. It’s Dutton’s worst net approval in Essential since October 2023.

Peter Dutton’s personal approval rating has slumped.
Mick Tsikas/AAP

By 52–32, voters thought Australia was on the wrong track (48–35 previously). Essential and Morgan have a big lead for wrong track, but Labor is ahead. Voters may be blaming Trump more than Labor.

By 61–29, voters did not think the federal budget would make a meaningful difference on cost of living (64–27 after the May 2024 budget). By 69–31, voters thought the government should prioritise the delivery of services, even if it means running a deficit, over prioritise running a surplus.

Voters were told the Trump administration wanted to pressure Australia into removing some policies using tariffs. By 65–15, voters supported the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and by 64–13 they supported making US companies pay tax on income generated in Australia.

Morgan poll: Labor retains solid lead

A national Morgan poll, conducted March 24–30 from a sample of 1,377, gave Labor a 53–47 lead by headline respondent preferences, unchanged from the March 17–23 poll.

Primary votes were 35% Coalition (down 0.5), 32% Labor (down 1.5), 13% Greens (up 0.5), 5.5% One Nation (up 1.5), 10.5% independents (up 0.5) and 4% others (down 0.5). By 2022 election flows, Labor led by 53.5–46.5, a 0.5-point gain for the Coalition.

By 51.5–32, voters thought Australia was going in the wrong direction (52.5–32.5 previously). Morgan’s consumer confidence index was up 1.1 points to 85.3.

This term, Morgan’s results in general haven’t skewed to Labor relative to other polls, and Labor was behind in Morgan’s polls from November until late February. But Trump’s initial imposition of steel and aluminium tariffs on Australia on March 12 has seen Morgan move much more to Labor than other polls.

Additional Resolve and Newspoll questions and a NSW federal poll

I covered the national Resolve poll for Nine newspapers on March 30. In additional questions, by 60–15 voters thought Trump’s election was bad for Australia (40% bad in November). On threats to Australia in the next few years, 31% thought China the greatest threat, 17% the US, 4% Russia and 38% all equally.

The Trump tariff announcement may have an effect on domestic politics.
Lukas Coch/AAP

Newspoll has been asking the same questions on the budget since 1988. The Poll Bludger said on Wednesday the March 25 budget was the fourth worst perceived on economic impact (at net -10), but about the middle on personal impact (net -19). The nine-point lead for “no” on would the opposition have delivered a better budget was about par for a Labor government.

A federal DomosAU poll of New South Wales, conducted March 24–26 from a sample of 1,013, gave the Coalition a 51–49 lead (51.4–48.6 to Labor in NSW at the 2022 federal election). Primary votes were 38% Coalition, 30% Labor, 12% Greens, 9% One Nation and 11% for all Others.

Albanese led Dutton as preferred PM by 39–38. By 52–31, respondents did not think Australia was headed in the right direction.

Canadian election and US special elections

The Canadian federal election is on April 28. Polls continue to show the governing centre-left Liberals gaining ground, and they now lead the Conservatives by 43.4–37.6 in the CBC Poll Tracker.

US federal special elections occurred on Tuesday in two safe Republican seats. While Republicans easily retained, there were big swings to the Democrats from the 2024 presidential election results in those districts. A left-wing judge won an election to the Wisconsin state supreme court by 55–45. I covered the Canadian and US developments for The Poll Bludger.

WA election final lower house results

I previously covered Labor winning 46 of the 59 lower house seats at the March 8 Western Australian election. The ABC’s final two-party estimate was a Labor win by 57.2–42.8. While that’s way down from the record 69.7–30.3 in 2021, it’s up from 55.5–44.5 in 2017.

Final primary votes were 41.4% Labor (down 18.5% since 2021), 28.0% Liberals (up 6.7%), 5.2% Nationals (up 1.2%), 11.1% Greens (up 4.1%), 4.0% One Nation (up 2.8%), 3.2% Australian Christians (up 1.7%), 2.5% Legalise Cannabis (up 2.1%) and 3.3% independents (up 2.5%).

The upper house will be finalised next week. All above the line votes have been included, with only below the line votes to be added. Labor will win 15 of the 37 seats, the Liberals ten, the Nationals two, the Greens four and One Nation, Legalise Cannabis and the Christians one each. That leaves three unclear seats.

ABC election analyst Antony Green’s modelling of the effect of below the line votes suggests Labor’s 16th seat is in doubt and the Liberals won’t win an 11th seat. If this is correct, an independent group and Animal Justice will probably win two seats, with the final seat to be determined by preferences. More

Donald Trump has always talked about how much he likes tariffs. And on April 2 2025, he showed that he meant it. For the president it was “liberation day”, but for his fellow world leaders it was a tense wait to see what percentage figure would be attached to their country’s vital exports.

Those tariff rates ranged from 10% for the UK to 49% for Cambodia, charges which Trump says will raise trillions of dollars for the US economy and “make America wealthy again”.

“Our country has been looted, pillaged, raped and plundered,” he said, before unveiling the tariffs which will cause headaches for business leaders and politicians across the world. We asked Linda Yueh, an economist at the University of Oxford, to answer some of the most pressing questions the tariffs pose.

What is Trump thinking?

Economically speaking, the president of the US says he wants to make international trade fairer – by equalising tariffs. He said that if countries want these “reciprocal tariffs” removed (on top of the 10% baseline tariff on all US imports), then they also need to remove non-tariff barriers, such as opening more of their markets to US companies.

As with his first administration, he also wants companies to bring production and manufacturing jobs back to the US. Basically, he views current international trade as unfair and is using tariffs in a way that’s unprecedented in modern times to try to level the playing field.

Why such a broad range of tariffs?

The formula used by the White House to calculate the various tariff rates is apparently based on the trade balance – what each country sells and buys from the US. The Trump administration views a trade surplus (where the US buys more than it sells) as a proxy for unfair trade, so is imposing “reciprocal tariffs” to retaliate.

And some countries do indeed levy higher tariffs than the US. For instance, some developing countries do so in accordance with their level of development. But tariffs are generally governed by the World Trade Organisation, so that’s where countries would normally go to resolve trade disputes.

But because no tariff is set below 10%, there will be tariffs levied even on countries with whom the US runs a trade surplus (those which do more buying from the US than selling). These include the Netherlands, Australia and Brazil.

A complex relationship.
Tomas Ragina/Shutterstock

Over 100 countries will have tariffs imposed, including small countries like Fiji (32%) and poor economies like Haiti (10%). Those are also likely to be the ones which will find it most challenging to get into the queue to negotiate a lower tariff any time soon.

What options do countries have in terms of their response?

The EU (20%) has said it will retaliate, while the UK (10%) says it will keep talking though all the options on the table. Trump has said he is open to negotiations before the baseline tariffs are imposed on April 5, and the extra reciprocal tariffs land on April 9.

Engaging in a tit-for-tat trade war is economically damaging – as the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) set out in its latest assessment of the UK economy. Each government will take its own view on the appropriate approach, but with the knowledge that it’s highly unlikely that everyone will be able to negotiate a better deal conclusively within a week.

Will there be a recession?

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that Trump’s tariffs could reduce global economic growth by 0.5% through next year, which is significant. But, it also believes that a global recession is not on the horizon.

That said, the economic impact of these tariffs is highly uncertain and unpredictable. The effects will vary from country to country, and a lot will depends upon how long the tariffs are levied for, how other countries respond and how companies manage the tariffs and the uncertainty of trade policy.

Read more:
How the UK and Europe could respond to Trump’s ‘liberation day’ tariffs

And it remains a big gamble for Trump too. For a president who considers himself to be the master of deals, there are risks of rising inflation, falling stock markets and potentially denting the US economy. More

It had the hallmarks of a reality TV cliffhanger. Until recently, many people had never even heard of tariffs. Now, there’s been rolling live international coverage of so-called “Liberation Day”, as US President Donald Trump laid out tariffs to be imposed on countries around the world.

Just hours ago, Trump announced all imports to the United States will be subject to a new “baseline” 10% tariff. This is an additional tax charged by US Customs and Border Protection when products cross the border.

The baseline tariff is expected to take effect from April 5, and then higher reciprocal tariffs on individual countries from April 9. That leaves no time for businesses to adjust their supply chains.

What might the next “episode” hold for the rest of the world? We can expect many countries to retaliate, bringing in tariffs and trade penalties of their own. That comes with risks.

Tariffs on the whole world

Vietnam will be among the hardest hit by reciprocal measures, with a 46% tariff. China, South Korea and Japan will also feel the brunt of the newest announcement – all subject to new tariffs of between 24% and 34%. The European Union is subject to 20%.

Many countries had already vowed to retaliate.

In a recent speech, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said “all instruments are on the table”. She also stressed that the single market is the “safe harbour” for EU members.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has vowed to retaliate against US tariffs.
Ronald Wittek/EPA

Canada was apparently spared from the baseline 10% tariff. But it still has to contend with previously announced 25% tariffs on the automotive and other sectors.

Canada’s new prime minister, Mark Carney, has said “nothing is off the table” in terms of retaliation.

Major tariffs on Asia

The 34% new tariff on China will be on top of the 20% tariff previously imposed, bringing the total to 54%.

That’s a further aggravation to already fractious relations between the world’s two largest economies.

Vietnam is especially reliant on the US market, and has been trying to negotiate its way through tariff threats. This has included unprecedented agreements to accept deported Vietnamese citizens from the US.

Until this point, Vietnam had benefited from tensions between the US and China. These new enormous tariffs will have large ripple effects through not only Vietnam, but also less economically developed Cambodia (49% tariff) and Myanmar (44% tariff).

Vietnam has been hit with a tariff of 46%.
Luong Thai Linh/EPA

Is it worth fighting back?

Vulnerable countries may not have the leverage to fight back. It is hard to imagine what leverage Cambodia or Myanmar could have against the US, given the disparity in resources.

Other countries consider it is not worth the fight. For example, Australia is rightly questioning whether a tit-for-tat strategy is effective, or will just ramp up the problem further.

One country that has flown under the radar is Russia. Two-way trade with Russia is small, and subject to sanctions. But US media have reported Trump would like to expand the trading relationship in the future.

A nightmare for the US Postal Service

Some of the interesting impacts of Trump’s announcements relate to what trade experts call the “de minimis” rule: usually, if you make a small purchase online, you don’t pay import taxes when the item arrives in your country.

Trump closed this loophole for goods from China in February, but then paused it days later. On April 2, Trump signed an executive order to again close the loophole, which will be effective May 2.

Duties will apply to goods from China that were previously exempt, below the “de minimis” amount of US$800. Those sent through the international postal network will face a rate of either 30% of their value or a charge of $25 per item (increasing to $50 in June).

This won’t just be a nightmare for online shoppers. Some 100,000 small parcels arrive in the US every hour, many from China.

These charges will now have to be collected on many more packages, in coordination with US Customs and Border Protection.

Trump has signed an executive order ending de minimis exemptions on goods from China.
Nati Harnik/AP

Boycotts and retaliation

We can also expect consumer backlash to increase worldwide, too. Canada’s “elbows up” movement is one template.

Consumers around the world are already choosing to redirect their spending away from US products, expressing their anger at the Trump administration’s stance on trade, diversity equity and inclusion (DEI) policies, environmental protection, gender rights and more.

Consumers should be careful about jumping on the bandwagon without doing their homework, though. Boycotting a US fast food outlet might make you feel better (and frankly may be better for your health), but that’s also going to impact the local franchise owner.

Hating Americans en masse is also not productive – many US citizens are themselves deeply upset at what is happening.

Claiming victory while consumers pay more

Watch out for the impending claim of victory – one of Trump’s mantras popularised in the recent movie, The Apprentice.

The US trade deficit rocketed after Trump’s previous tariff announcements this year, as importers scrambled to stockpile supplies before price increases.

This cannot happen this time, because the tariffs come into effect in just three days.

In the short term, the monthly trade deficit will decline if imports return to normal, which will give Trump a chance to claim the policies are working – even if it’s just a rebound effect.

But these tariffs will harm rather than help ordinary Americans. Everyday purchases like clothes (made in places like Vietnam, Cambodia and China) could soon cost a lot more than they used to – with a $20 t-shirt going up to nearly $30, not including US sales taxes.

As this reality TV-style trade drama continues to unfold, the world should prepare for more episodes, more cliffhangers, and more uncertainty.

This article has been updated to clarify specific details about US tariff announcements, and details on changes to the de minimis exemption. More

During Donald Trump’s first term as president, the United States lurched from the absurdity of his lies to the use of his office for personal financial gain, his schoolyard insults and his utter contempt for critics. His term ended with his irresponsible and dangerous incitement of the assault on the Capitol building on Jan. 6, 2021.

This time around, Trump is replying on outdated tools — tariffs, small government, territorial expansion and nationalism — to solve modern problems of globalization, wealth disparities, the decline of manufacturing jobs and exploitative capitalism.

On April 2, he announced a baseline tariff of 10 per cent on all countries that import goods to the U.S., including Canada. Canada has also been hit with a 25 per cent levy on Canadian-made automobiles.

The Trump administration’s current use of 19th-century tools to solve 20th-century problems that are wholly inappropriate for the 21st century threatens to take America back to the 19th century. This is an incredibly dangerous road for the U.S to take.

The rise of the nation state

The 19th century was marked by the rise of the nation-state — a single political entity united by geography, culture and language.

This was, in many respects, the result of the rapidly industrializing world shifting away from monarchical rule and mercantile economics toward limited democratic rule and free-market capitalism.

It was a time of tariffs, small government, territorial expansion and nationalism. It was also a time of mass migration from Europe to North America, where rampant nativism, colonialism and unchecked and exploitative capitalism shaped the landscape.

The 19th century was a time of mass migration to the North America. A Ukrainian immigrant family harvesting in 1918.
(National Archives of Canada/Wlidus)

The prevailing belief at the time was that nation-states should use tariffs, adopt isolationist policies to cut off the outside world and seize territory where possible. These measures, it was thought, would foster national unity and allow capitalism to thrive by letting the “invisible hand” of the marketplace work its magic.

Protective tariffs promised to grow domestic industries, but the economic benefits were not evenly distributed. Wealth disparities grew wider as millions of immigrants arrived on North American shores, only to find deplorable living conditions in the cities and hardscrabble farmland out in the country.

Some newcomers prospered, of course, but they tended to be those who arrived with money already in their pockets. And they fast learned how to exploit the lack of state-directed regulation, patches of corruption amid rapid western expansion and growing nativism and poverty to their own benefit.

Many of the 20th century’s problems flowed from these 19th-century trends.

The economic fallout of tariffs

Following the financial Panic of 1873 and its ensuing economic depression in both Europe and North America, nation-states unleashed tariffs to protect their domestic economies. It was the wrong strategy to pursue, as it slowed trade even more by limiting the free flow of goods and capital. Money, as is now well-known, needs to move to grow.

Working families chafed at the lack of labour protections like bargaining rights, health and safety measures, unemployment insurance and sick benefits. In response, they formed unions and initiated waves of strikes throughout the western industrialized world.

Western North American farmers were furious that tariffs forced them to buy on protected markets while selling on unprotected ones subject to international market prices. They organized, too, by forming farmer co-operatives and backing movements like the Granger movement, populism and progressivism to protect their interests.

Nation-states, warmed by rising nationalist fires, formed military-defence alliances across Europe and its colonial and former colonial holdings, including Canada. In 1914, these alliances led to the First World War, a global and industrial war the likes of which the world had never seen.

The Great Depression

By the 1930s, unrestricted and largely unregulated capitalism, together with astonishing wealth disparities and monopolistic tendencies, plunged the world into the decade-long Great Depression.

Many governments’ initial response was to impose tariffs once again, and just as in 1873, they only made the problem worse. The simultaneous rise of fascism, which was largely nationalism run amok, brought the world to war again at the end of the decade, to devastating consequence.

People stand in line for their portions of a federal surplus of potatoes and cabbages in Cleveland in 1938.
(AP Photo)

The post-war years saw a concerted international effort at using the nation-state to regulate domestic economies by investing in social services and programs and to rein in runaway capital when its excesses threatened stability.

International bodies like the World Bank, the United Nations and the International Court of Justice were created to promote peace and stability. This new approach wasn’t always successful in its goals, but so far the world hasn’t seen any global hot wars or massive economic depressions.

The end of history

In 1992, historian Frances Fukuyama infamously declared that the world had reached “the end of history.”

He didn’t mean that time stopped, of course. Instead, he was arguing that the liberal nation-state represented “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

In his view, the western industrialized world had reached the pinnacle of successful governance and unlimited prosperity.

Yet, even as western liberal democracy was congratulating itself on its own success, these same nation-states, in conjunction with large corporations, were seeking out lower labour costs and greater profit in the developing world.

The result was a hollowing-out of North America’s industrial heartlands, along with rampant exploitation of vulnerable labour in places like Asia, South Asia and South Central America. Once mighty American cities declined. Wages failed to keep up with inflation. Farm debt soared.

This is where the Trump administration re-enters the story — tapping into the frustration and disillusionment of frustrated Americans by promising to restore a “golden age” that never was.

Trump’s 19th-century playbook

Despite his promises, Trump’s tariffs are unlikely to bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. As history has shown, tariffs do not revive industries that are already gone; instead, they will only make Americans pay more for the things they need.

A return to small government won’t “make America great again,” either. Instead, it risks repeating the 19th-century pattern of making the rich richer and gutting the very social programs millions of people rely on. The Trump administration’s massive and ongoing cuts to the Social Security Administration are already well under way.

Trump’s rhetoric about territorial expansion, including threats to annex Greenland and Canada, won’t make the U.S. more secure. It will just exacerbate the sort of international tensions the world saw in 1914 and 1939.

And with limited resources left to exploit, it’s becoming harder for capital to sustain itself, even as it seeks to wrest whatever is left from our planet, the realities of environmental catastrophe be damned.

Nationalism, meanwhile, won’t foster a sense of national unity. It will only deepen existing divisions based on race and class. And if history is any guide, the consequences could be even more dire this time around, even pushing the world toward a global conflict unlike anything seen before. More