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    India Must Contain Afghanistan-Pakistan to Survive

    The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media. More

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    Lebanon Takes a Step Forward but Risks Still Remain

    The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media. More

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    Convergent Conversation – In fact VR is Possible, Bill!

    The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media. More

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    DC Deconstructed: The View from the Carriage House

    The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media. More

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    The Unholy Alliance Between the US Security Apparatus and Big Tech

    The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media. More

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    Macron Won But the Election Isn’t Over

    With 58.54% of the vote, Emmanuel Macron unambiguously bucked the recent trend thanks to which incumbent French presidents consistently failed to earn a second term due to their unpopularity. In their election night commentaries, the Macronists noted with glee that their man was the first to gain re-election outside of a period of cohabitation. That sounded like some kind of odd accomplishment invented for the Guinness Book of Records. But it served to distract the public’s attention from what became clear throughout the evening: that, though resoundingly reelected, Macron is just as resoundingly an unpopular president.

    Apart from Macron’s supporters, the commentators across the political chessboard saw the blowout more like a stalemate than a checkmate. The left had been divided during the first round. It now appears ready to at least consider uniting its disparate forces for June’s two rounds of legislative elections, which everyone on the left is now calling the “third round” of the presidential election. 

    The defeated Marine Le Pen put forth a similar message, hinting that her relative “success,” which marked a significant improvement on 2017 (over 41%, up from 34%) opened the possibility of leading a populist movement that she hopes will attract voters from the left as well. Éric Zemmour, the other far-right candidate, a dyed-in-the-wool xenophobe, who at one point appeared to challenge Le Pen’s hold on the rightwing fringe, evoked his ambition for a purely nationalist and basically racist coalition that would avoid the indignity of reaching out to the left.

    The buzzword of the evening was nevertheless the idea of a “third round,” in which an adversary might deliver Macron a knockout punch. The Macronists immediately mocked such talk as a denial of democracy, in the minutes following the president’s resounding majority. But as the various interested parties on all sides invited by the television channel France 2 developed their analysis, a consensus emerged that all was not well in the realm of Macronia.

    The demise of France’s traditional parties

    On the positive side for Macron’s faithful or at least for his political marketers, the traditional parties on the left and right had been humiliated once again. It was even more brutal this time around than in 2017, when Macron first swept through the miraculous gap in the political Red Sea to reach the promised land without even having to dawdle in the desert. The Républicains and Socialists, once the valiant wielders of the scepter of power, are clearly left with little to hope for other than possibly being invited, as individuals, into the new government Macron will be appointing this week to demonstrate his willingness to construct a new alliance. But looming beyond the now concluded five-year compromise Macron engineered and rather ineptly managed during his first term, is the vision of a France now divided into largely incoherent blocs defined less by political vision than by exasperation with all the traditional solutions, left, right and center.

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    Le Pen and Zemmour have demonstrated that there exists a substantial pool of voters not averse to xenophobic reasoning. But those same voters tend to hail from the working class or the rural lower middle classes. They voted for Le Pen less out of the conviction that she would be a good leader than to protest against the political and financial elite that Macron represents in their eyes. Half a century ago, most of Le Pen’s voters were faithful to the Communist Party.

    If the former communist bloc of voters gradually drifted away from a Mitterand-led governing Socialist coalition to align behind the far-right Front National, embodied by Marine Le Pen’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Socialists settled on their own rightward drift. They leaned increasingly towards the center, much as the Clinton Democrats had done in the US. That left a gaping hole on the left, which no political personality had the force or the name recognition to fill. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a former minister, finally stepped into the role, seeking to counter the trend towards the technocratic center, a political position that appeared to suit the culture and mood of the post-Mitterand generation of Socialists.

    Ever since declaring independence from the party in 2009, Mélenchon has been vilified by his Socialist brethren for the crime of contesting its visibly centrist and increasingly corporate elitist drift. This was the same party, led by then president François Hollande, that named the youthful former banker Macron minister of the economy. 

    Mélenchon’s persistence during Hollande’s presidency as a provocative progressive, contesting his former party’s orthodoxy, already positioned him in 2017 as the most distinctive, if not necessarily most attractive personality on the left.  Thanks to his more than respectable third-place showing in the first round two weeks ago, he has emerged as the eventual “spiritual” leader of a newly unified left that could bring together the now marginal Communist Party (with just 2.5% of the vote), the Ecologists and even the Socialists, though they remain reticent to acknowledge Mélenchon’s ascent.

    Can the left overcome its divisions?

    Unlike the famous programme commun that formally allied the Socialists, Communists and the center-left Radicaux de Gauche and brought François Mitterand to power in the 1981 presidential election, Mélenchon has nothing concrete to build on other than exasperation of all the other parties with Macron. Preceding the second round, the head of La France Insoumise (“France unbowed”) cleverly honed his rhetoric to aim at being “elected” prime minister in June, even though he knows full well that the prime minister is appointed by the president, not elected by the people. It is his way of both highlighting the incoherence of the Fifth Republic’s electoral system, while at the same time offering Macron the opportunity to run an experiment in government that would mirror the history of the past five years. During Macron’s first term, an officially centrist president consistently appointed prime ministers from the traditional right, betraying the hopes of some on the left for more balance. Mélenchon is proposing a similar solution, but this time pointing left.

    Embed from Getty Images

    The timing of this strategy couldn’t be better. According to an IPSOS poll of French voters, “57% want to see the main left-wing parties form an alliance and present common candidates in the constituencies.” Importantly, 56% of those polled have stated they do not wish to see Macron obtain a majority, which means they hope to see another “cohabitation” in which the president shares power with an opposition party in parliament. Only 35% of French voters, 6% fewer than voted for Le Pen, would support a coalition of the two extreme rightwing parties, Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and Zemmour’s Reconquête. Voters who support the traditional right are split between seeking an alliance with the extreme right (22%) or with Macron’s République En Marche (25%). An overwhelming 53% of Républicain voters eschew the idea of an alliance with either.

    Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

    What this means is that the next few weeks will be very interesting to watch. Can the man accused of being “the president of the rich” lead a government focused on the policies of the left? Or does he have the wherewithal and the political talent to confront what may become a populist uprising that draws energy from both the left and the right?

    Macron, the revolutionary?

    Two years ago when the COVID-19 outbreak forced the French government to take action, I noted in these columns that “French President Emmanuel Macron, of all people, seems to detect the beginning of a calling into question of the entire consumerist free market system, without giving much of a sense of what might replace it.” Perhaps he is ready to take seriously his own two-year old epiphany by appealing to the insights of a coalition on the left led by a prime minister named Mélenchon. After all, this time around, Macron has nothing to lose, since he cannot seek a third term. He might see this as his last chance to recover from the massive unpopularity that threatened his reelection and was saved only by his deft maneuvering aimed at ensuring that Marine Le Pen would be his hapless rival in the second round.

    The World This Week: Another French Revolution

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    More likely, Macron will try in the coming weeks to assemble a range of individuals from different sides, with variable symbolic value. He presumably hopes that this will persuade people of his capacity to assemble his own coherent majority. Macron’s attempt is highly unlikely to succeed and is likely to suffer a worse fate than his previous right-leaning, improvised coalitions.

    Macron’s real achievement is to have violated, not once but twice, the entire logic of the Fifth Republic that since its Gaullist beginnings always supposed the president would be the leader of a powerful governing party. In his first five-year stint he profited from the mental confusion in French electors’ heads, trying to understand the vacuum that had suddenly appeared, as he cobbled together what could only be seen as a temporary and to a large degree illusory solution. The confusion quickly provoked the Yellow Vest movement that called the entire montage into question. The unexpected arrival of a pandemic and a lockdown took the protesters off the street and put Macron back in the driver’s seat. A temporary situation was thus prolonged but its fragility has become even more evident than before.

    So now the French nation confronts a moment of truth, when the nature of its institutions must be given a makeover. Not because it would improve their look, but because they are on the verge of a permanent crisis. It seems unlikely that some simple solution will appear or that Macron can convince the people to continue to trust him to make, Jupiter-like, all the right decisions that might guide the nation through the troubles that lie ahead. 

    In his victory speech, Macron said absolutely nothing of substance. He congratulated and thanked his supporters for the victory and announced all the good things he is in favor of, promising, as expected, to respond to the needs and desires of “all” the people. On the same evening, violent protests broke out in Paris, Nantes, Lyon and Marseille, with spontaneous crowds contesting the election. The protesters from the right, upset by Le Pen’s failed bid, were joined by others from the left, who shouted slogans such as: “Macron, Le Pen, one solution: revolution.” Others shouted: “No fascists in our neighborhoods” and “Macron resign.”

    Embed from Getty Images

    Unlike the “Stop the steal” protests in the US following Donald Trump’s loss to Joe Biden, the French do not complain that the election was rigged, nor do they wish to see its results overturned. They are unhappy with a system that fails to represent their interests or needs. Having already effectively rejected the traditional parties and practically erased them from the electoral map, they are now focused on calling into question the curious political anomaly that Emmanuel Macron embodies in their eyes.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Making Sense of the Indian Position on the Russia-Ukraine War

    Fair Observer’s new feature FO° Insights makes sense of issues in the news. Last week, the former Agence France-Presse chief editor Florence Biedermann shared her views on the French presidential elections. The week before, former BBC Africa editor Martin Plaut explained the Tigray War in Ethiopia.

    This week, our founder, CEO and editor-in-chief explores why India is not lining up against Russia despite American pressure. He describes how historic ties, military equipment, geopolitical imperatives and a trust deficit between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Democrats lie behind India’s foreign policy decision.

    Watch or read Atul Singh make sense of it all.

    [embedded content]

    Atul Singh on India’s Position on the Russia-Ukraine War

    In this episode, we have our editor-in-chief explain the reasons behind India’s position in this conflict.

    Why won’t India denounce Russia? 

    Atul Singh: History, military equipment and the China factor explain India’s reticence on Russia. 

    History: Even before India became independent, it was inclined to socialism. Post-independence, India became a de facto Cold War ally. It was of course non-aligned but we know where India stood. 

    MIlitary Equipment: Most of India’s military equipment comes from Russia and Russian equipment is cheaper. It can be modified as India wishes unlike western equipment, which is more advanced and more reliable but also more expensive. 

    China Factor: India has a long  and disputed border with China. Given the fact that India relies on Russian kit, if Russia was to turn against India, then the country would face catastrophic defeat.

    How does India rely on Russia? 

    Atul Singh: India relies on Russia for defense, energy and geopolitical reasons.  

    On defense, given the fact that an estimated 70% of Indian military kit is Russian, India needs spare parts — critical particularly in times of war. When it comes to new kit, Russia allows India to modify it the way India wants and that is a big advantage. Also, Russia allows the transfer of technology, which the US, other countries in Europe, including France, are reluctant to allow. 

    For energy, the option of cheap or cut-price oil allows India greater leverage in its negotiations with its Middle Eastern energy suppliers. 

    And when it comes to geopolitical needs, Russia has backed India on Kashmir consistently over many decades and India is unsure about Western backing on Kashmir. 

    Why is India distrustful of the US? 

    Atul Singh: Well, part of it is a legacy of the Cold War. India was very much on the Soviet side, even if it was a soft Soviet ally.  

    Then in 1971, the US backed a military dictatorship in Pakistan whilst India was trying to liberate Bangladesh. Remember, Pakistan was running a genocidal regime in Bangladesh and using rape as a weapon of war. India has not forgotten that. 

    In the 1980s, the US funded a jihad in Afghanistan. Some of that money was used to fuel insurgency in India and, 1989 onwards, in Kashmir, many of these jihadis created mayhem. 

    Recently the withdrawal from Afghanistan has upset India. India spent an arm and a leg supporting the US-backed administration in Kabul and India feels betrayed.  

    There’s also that tiny little matter of political discord. India believes it is given no credit for sending 50,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan, even though the US pulled out of the country. Recently, the US raised issues of human rights in India, which did not go down well.

    This is where the left-leaning Democrat government lacks the trust of the right-leaning BJP. There’s a huge trust deficit with the BJP government, which believes that the Democrats are plotting an orange revolution to unseat them just as they did in Ukraine. 

    Embed from Getty Images

    What is the China Factor? 

    Atul Singh: India and China share over 3,000 kilometers of border. And this border is not defined. There was a war in 1962 and there was a clash in 2020. 

    Should China launch a full-scale invasion and should Russia back China even if covertly, India would face catastrophic defeat. So, India wants Russia to play the role of an honest broker. 

    And good ties with Russia are an insurance against defeat vis à vis China. 

    What is India’s best case scenario? 

    Atul Singh: India’s best case scenario is a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine and the end of sanctions. Remember, India imports military kit both from Ukraine and Russia, so this war is causing havoc with its supplies. 

    Also remember India gets its investment from the US. India exports to the US, especially IT services and India sends students by the thousands to the US. India is deeply integrated into the US economic system.

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    This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Ukraine: a divided America seeks moral clarity in a war against democracy

    Americans have been consumed by the war in Ukraine with intensive media coverage across news platforms. This is unusual. Foreign affairs do not usually consume the American public unless the US is directly involved and American lives are at risk.

    What explains this intense interest and what does it mean for a deeply polarised American political culture dealing with its own crisis of democracy? Some commentators read it as a symbolic moment of consensus in a divided nation. In the view of Fox News journalist Howard Kurtz,

    the country is pretty unified on the Ukraine crisis, and the space between Republicans and Democrats has visibly narrowed … vast majorities in each party favour the ban on Russian oil and gas, even with the knowledge that it will boost prices here at home. That’s about as close to consensus as we ever come in this country.

    This is an appealing analysis, given the deep divisions in the US. However, it is misleading. The broad public interest in the war is not producing a new consensus but mirroring the crisis in American democracy – albeit in a skewed fashion.

    A war against democracy

    The intensive coverage of the war in Ukraine has elevated particular frames reflecting American interests. By far the most prominent is that this is a war in defence of democracy – though this is often presented less as a geopolitical matter than as a dramatic spectacle of “a plucky country slaying a dictatorship”.

    But the popularity of this framing does not constitute a consensus, as politicians and pundits seek to spin the meaning of the war in their own interests.

    US president, Joe Biden, and his Democratic Party are keen to promote the war on democracy frame, hoping it will draw attention to what they view as threats to democratic institutions in the US. Undoubtedly, they further hope it will provide the president with a much-needed bounce in the polls at a time when his approval ratings hover at a dire 42% with challenging mid-term elections on the horizon.

    Many conservatives bluntly repudiate attempts to associate threats to democracy in the US with the war in Ukraine. Others, further right and mostly allied with the previous president, Donald Trump, claim that the war reflects back on America to reveal the weakness of Biden’s leadership. Trump himself has championed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as “genius” on Putin’s part.

    There is also a counter-narrative from the left that has had some airing, but little mainstream traction – to argue that the intense interest in the war by Americans reflects a Eurocentric (or racist) attitude. They point to the overt bias of anchors and correspondents and the hypocrisy in sidestepping previously vaulted standards of independent journalism. There are many examples.

    Solidarity: a pro-Ukraine protest in Washington DC in March 2022.
    EPA-EFE/Shawn Thew

    The war in Ukraine has become a Rorschach test of Americans’ perceptions of and anxieties about democracy. Neither liberal democracy at home, nor its global equivalent – a rules-based liberal world order – are as taken for granted as they once were.

    For the broader public, following the war across media platforms, their intense interest represents a desire for moral clarity amid the disruptions and confusion of ethnocentric nationalism, populist politics and conspiracy theory roiling the public sphere.

    Many Americans are seeing in this war a form of conflict that is much easier to grasp and engage with than the domestic civic fractures. It is a good war, a “David versus Goliath” conflict, with clear lines of good and evil. As such, it is also a distraction, for such moral clarity obscures as much as it reveals about domestic or international challenges to democracy.

    And so Fox’s national security correspondent Jennifer Griffin can say to her audience, “If you look in [Vladimir Putin’s] eyes, you see someone who has gone completely mad”. As journalism, this is ridiculous – but it mimics the collective avoidance of disquieting realities.

    End of the ‘end of history’

    In the same broadcast, Griffin goes on to claim that Russia’s invasion represents “a moment in history … something we have not seen for generations”. This claim chimes with a common narrative among American journalists and pundits commenting on the war on Ukraine – that it represents a return of history, understood as great power aggression.

    Such claims either directly or indirectly reference US political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s famous proclamation of “the end of history” – that the end of the cold war represented a globally defining triumph of free market liberal capitalism over communism.

    A similar claim is made by former defense secretary Robert Gates, who writes that: “Putin’s invasion … has ended America’s 30-year holiday from history.” For Gates, and many other foreign policy alumni and experts in the US, the war should serve as a wake-up call and an opportunity to reconstitute a global Pax Americana.

    Fukuyama himself has added to this chorus, seeing in the western surge of support for Ukraine a resurgent liberalism. “There’s a lot of pent-up idealism,” he writes. “The spirit of 1989 went to sleep, and now it’s being reawakened.”

    What is remarkable about all this talk about the return of history is the amnesia it represents, conveniently forgetting that America’s military never took a holiday from history over the last 30 years – as the people of Iraq and Afghanistan can attest – and that America’s efforts to bring democracy to other parts of the world have been deadly and disastrous.

    The apparent American consensus about the war in Ukraine is reducing that war to a spectacle of imperilled democracy that only further cements Americans collective amnesia about the failings of liberal democracy around the world. The reasons for America’s political decay at home and its relative decline abroad will not be found in the eyes of Vladimir Putin. More