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    The Prospects of Peace in Afghanistan

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    The Doha Agreement signed between the United States and the Taliban on February 29, 2020, not only set a date for the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, but it also included certain obligations for the Taliban.

    Under this agreement, the Taliban are obligated to take measures to prevent terrorist groups from threatening the security of the US and its allies and to engage in a comprehensive intra-Afghan dialogue that would produce a political settlement. The hasty US troop withdrawal in August 2021 emboldened the Taliban to disregard their obligations under the deal and encouraged them to prioritize political takeover instead of a sustainable peace mechanism for Afghanistan.

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    The Doha Agreement and its contents undermined the sovereign government of Afghanistan at the time and provided an upper hand to the Taliban in both war and peace. Certain assurances in the deal enabled the Taliban to become stronger in both battlefield action and narrative propagation.

    These include the agreement’s references to a “new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government”; clauses on the release of Taliban combatants referred to as “political prisoners”; indirect legitimization of the Taliban shadow government by virtue of stipulations such as “the Taliban will not provide visas, passports, travel permits, or other legal documents”; and a complete lack of any mention of human rights protections in Afghanistan.

    Another Case of Failed Peacemaking

    The agreement is not the only pact that was expected to bring a peaceful end to the conflict in the country. In 1988, the Geneva Accords concluded under the auspices of the UN between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the US and the Soviet Union serving as state guarantors, provided an overall framework for the settlement of the Afghan conflict and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Likewise, the Bonn Agreement in 2001 — irrespective of whether it is categorized as a peace deal —established a process to manage the political transition in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. It briefly outlined steps from the formation of an interim administration to the development of a new constitution and holding elections.

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    However, neither the Geneva Accords nor the Bonn Agreement were successful and ultimately failed to foster conditions necessary for enabling a comprehensive settlement to Afghanistan’s complicated problem. More recently, the Taliban’s abject disregard for their commitments under the Doha Agreement, combined with the United States’ rushed exit, sped up the Taliban’s reemergence, once again closing an already narrow window of opportunity for achieving a durable political solution to the protracted conflict in Afghanistan.

    There is indeed a qualitative difference between the Geneva Accords, the Bonn Agreement and the Doha Agreement. However, one of the key reasons for their failure, among other factors, is that they are silent on the main cause of the conflict in Afghanistan — i.e., ethnic conflict.

    Afghanistan is a multiethnic country where the various ethnic groups are also geographically fragmented. Historically, divisions over who should lead the country and how have been among the core contentious issues in Afghanistan. Disagreements on this matter have manifested in violent ways in the 1990s and non-violent ways in the outcome of four presidential elections held based on the 2004 constitution. Overlooking of the main cause of the conflict and an absence of a viable mechanism for power redistribution among ethnic groups is a common thread that connects each of the three agreements that failed and continued to fuel instability.

    The Current Situation

    Less than two years since the Doha Agreement was signed, in August 2021, Kabul, the Afghan capital, fell to the Taliban. In the aftermath of this development, residences of several former government officials, particularly those from the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), were raided and these personnel members were either killed or imprisoned. A UN report found that over 100 personnel from the Afghan security forces and others associated with the former Afghan government have been killed in the country, despite the Taliban announcing a general amnesty. 

    Moreover, despite the demands from the international community for the formation of an inclusive government, respect for human rights and counterterrorism assurances, the Taliban have refused to make any concessions. They have brazenly continued suppressing all dissenting voices, severely limiting women’s rights and persecuting civil society members and journalists.

    Peace in Afghanistan?

    It was apparent from day one that the prospects of the post-July 2018 efforts for a political settlement in Afghanistan were uncertain at best. The Doha Agreement simply laid out a possible schedule for the US withdrawal instead of guarantee or measures enabling a durable political settlement or peace process. The Taliban too negotiated the deal with the US with the aim of winning the war rather than seeking a peace deal or political settlement with their opponents.

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    The chaotic withdrawal of American forces and the mayhem at Kabul airport — which was reminiscent of the US pullout from Vietnam — has not only damaged the image of a powerful country like the US around the world, but has also established its reputation as an unreliable ally in times of difficulty. Given historical patterns and the Taliban’s track record, in the absence of any qualitative change of circumstances on the ground, the international community’s positive overtures to the Taliban might be yet another folly.

    As it stands, the prospects for peace in Afghanistan will remain distant for as long as the Taliban own the entire political apparatus rather than participate as a party in an inclusive and representative government and respect dissenting voices. In the meantime, the international community should use sanctions mechanisms and official recognition as the few remaining tools of leverage to hold the Taliban accountable to their commitments and to international legal standards.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      What the Taliban’s Constitution Means for Afghanistan

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      In a recent webinar titled, “Recognition of the Taliban as a Legitimate Government of Afghanistan,” a participant asked me which constitution is currently in place and the status of the Afghan Constitution from 2004? I couldn’t answer because the status of the constitution was still unclear.

      In August 2021, the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan through unconstitutional means. They initially did not establish a new government or issue a decree suspending or repealing the constitution. However, when prompted by the Chinese ambassador to Afghanistan, the minister of justice noted that the Taliban plan to temporarily enact the 1964 constitution, excluding parts that contradict the principles of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the formal name of the country under the new government. Thus far, the Taliban have not released a formal document or policy statement that would indicate how they plan to govern.

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      When the caretaker administration was introduced last September, the government was modeled on a different system than the one intended in the 2004 constitution, but it shared similarities with the 1964 version. The 2004 model provides for presidential rule, and a direct vote elects a president as the head of state to serve a five-year term.

      So far, it is clear that the 2004 constitution is no longer in force in Afghanistan and that the Taliban have, more or less, restored their constitution that was drafted in 1998. Under that version, the Taliban’s caretaker administration is a theocratic monarchial system with a supreme leader, known as the amir al-Mu’minin (leader of the faithful), as its king.

      The Taliban’s Constitution

      Under its rule between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban never introduced a written constitution for Afghanistan nor validated any previous version. But they made some efforts to draft a constitution. This process began in 1998 when the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar — formally known as amir al-Mu’minin — issued a legislative decree under which a so-called constituent assembly — or ulema committee (a religious body of scholars) — was established, led by Maulvi Noor Mohammad Saqib, the former chief justice of Afghanistan.

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      The decree placed the power to review laws with the committee, under the supervision of the supreme court of Afghanistan. The committee’s task was to look at existing laws, including under past constitutions, and to remove articles that did not conform to sharia. The committee began working on the constitution in July 1998 and decided that the review of the previous constitution should be in accordance with the Hanafi madhab (school of jurisprudence) of Sunni Islam. Articles inconsistent with sharia would be amended or repealed and, if necessary, a new article would be added.

      The constitution was drafted after a round of sessions, but it was not approved before the Taliban were toppled by US-led forces in 2001. The preamble of the constitution notes that it was adopted in 2005 by the supreme council of the Taliban, with 10 chapters and 110 articles. The constitution’s travaux préparatoires (preparatory works) are not publicly available to show which constitution of Afghanistan was chosen as the basis for the Taliban’s version. Yet based on preliminary examination of both versions, it appears that the 1964 constitution, which was adopted under King Mohammad Zahir Shah, has been chosen as a foundation for the Taliban’s model. The Taliban’s constituent assembly has reviewed the 1964 constitution and removed, amended or added articles to the constitution that it believes contradict Islamic law.

      Despite the considerable differences between the two constitutions, many articles of the Taliban’s version are verbatim to those of the 1964 model. While not explicitly mentioned, the Taliban’s constitution provides for a theocratic ruler under the title of amir al-Mu’minin, who would be similar to a king under the 1964 constitution in terms of political power.

      The Taliban’s constitution is focused on the religious dynamics of the country, without considering the social and economic implications, and it forms the basis of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The constitution recognizes Islam as the national religion and adheres to the Hanafi madhab of Sunni Islam. Due to its similarity with the 1964 model, in principle, the constitution commits to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Non-Aligned Movement, and other relevant laws and regulations within the limits of Islamic law and national interests. Power is divided between the amir al-Mu’minin, the prime minister or executive, the Islamic shura (parliament) and the supreme court. Ultimately, however, the amir al-Mu’minin has unlimited power to execute his will in all aspects of the government.

      To make sense of the Taliban’s constitution, it is important to examine the responsibilities of the head of state, the shura, the executive and the judiciary and the role of foreign policy.

      The De Facto King

      Under the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the amir al-Mu’minin is the head of state. He executes his authority in the executive, legislative, and judiciary fields according to the provisions of the constitution and other laws. Under the Taliban, the amir would be an Afghan national, born to Afghan Muslim parents and a follower of the Hanafi madhab. The amir al-Mu’minin has similar immensurable powers as the king had under the 1964 constitution. For example, under that version, the king was able, inter alia, to appoint and remove prime ministers and other government ministers, issue a state of emergency, approve the national budget, ratify laws, select and dismiss judges, promote and retire high-ranking officials and declare war. The Taliban’s constitution gives the same powers to the amir.

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      Unlike the 1964 and 2004 constitutions, the procedure for appointing the head of the state is not clearly laid out in the Taliban’s constitution. Yet one of the tasks of the shura, together with the supreme court and the prime minister, is to decide on what happens in the event of the amir al-Mu’minin stepping down. The amir would inform the speaker of the shura, chief justice of the supreme court and the prime minister about his resignation. After this, a meeting between the shura, the chief justice and the prime minister takes place. However, if the amir al-Mu’minin dies and does not choose a successor, then the chief justice takes over as acting leader. 

      The constitution does not explicitly state who appoints the amir al-Mu’minin. But it does imply that the authority to appoint him rests with the shura, the chief justice and the prime minister. The one significant difference between the amir and the king under the 1998 and 1964 constitutions, respectively, is that leader of the faithful is accountable and equal before the law like any other citizen. Under the 1964 constitution, the king was not accountable and was to be respected by all.  

      Islamic Shura

      Chapter three of the Taliban’s constitution deals with the nature of the shura, the appointment of its members and its powers. Under the constitution, Afghanistan would have a unicameral shura that has, inter alia, legislative power and the interpretation of the constitution. Members of the shura are appointed by the amir al-Mu’minin for an indefinite duration. The amir would appoint three members from the first grade I provinces, a maximum of two from the grade II provinces and one from grade III provinces. (Based on criteria determined by the Afghan government, all provinces are given different grades and, according to these grades, they receive particular privileges and allocation of the national budget.)

      The members of the shura would also have met the conditions set by the ahl al-hall wa’l ‘aqd, which refers to those qualified to elect or depose a caliph on behalf of the Muslim community under Sunni Islam. The constitution does not specify a method for the appointment of this group of people. Hence, this process remains open to arbitrariness and biased selection of pro-establishment individuals of dubious credibility and competence.

      The amir al-Mu’minin also appoints the speaker of the shura from amongst existing members, but the constitution does not address the appointment of the deputy and secretary of the shura. The shura has the power to ratify, modify or abrogate laws. However, the procedure of enacting laws and abrogation of laws and how the shura will engage with stakeholders is not specified. The shura also has the power, inter alia, to oversee the actions of the government, make decisions on contentious issues, approve the state budget, ratify international treaties and agreements (together with the supreme court and the council of ministers), approve loans and grants, adopt government policies, and elucidate and question the government.

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      The Taliban’s constitution does not give immunity to members of the shura in case they commit a crime. Article 51 states that if a member of the shura is accused of an offense, the official responsible shall communicate the matter to the speaker. The legal proceedings against the accused would be initiated only when the speaker allows it. In the case of a witnessed crime, the official responsible can start legal proceedings and arrest a member without seeking permission from the speaker.

      Executive

      The prime minister and other ministers who lead the government are the highest executive and administrative authority under the Taliban’s constitution. Appointees to the position of prime minister must meet specific criteria. This includes being a Muslim, a follower of the Hanafi madhab and born to Muslim parents. The prime minister represents the government (executive) and he chairs the council of ministers. The prime minister can delegate his powers to other ministers, sign contracts and agreements at the government level, organize and oversee the affairs of ministries, and appoint, promote, retire and dismiss government officials.

      The government under the Taliban’s model is in charge of the country’s domestic and foreign policies, regulates the performance of ministries and independent authorities, takes necessary measures in executive and administrative matters, drafts government-related laws and regulations, drafts and amends the annual budget, supervises banking affairs, ensures public security in the country and approves external expertise recruitment. The prime minister can also propose removing ministers to the amir al-Mu’minin, but they can only be removed if the head of state gives his approval.  

      Judiciary

      Articles 70 to 82 of the Taliban’s constitution contain detailed provisions on the courts and the status and independence of the judiciary. The constitution establishes the judiciary as an independent organ of the state. The only court established under the constitution is the supreme court, while the number of other courts and their jurisdiction is determined by law. The jurisdiction of the courts to hear cases brought before them is exclusive and, as per the constitution, “under no circumstances shall a law exclude from the jurisdiction of the judiciary, as defined in this title, a case or sphere, and assign it other authorities.”

      The amir al-Mu’minin appoints judges on the recommendation of the chief justice. The number and qualifications of the supreme court judges are not determined. But for the appointment of the chief justice, an ambiguous criterion of “full competence,” or Ahliat-e-Kamil, has been laid down. The deputies and justices of the Supreme Court are also appointed by the amir al-Mu’minin on the recommendation of the chief justice of the supreme court, taking into account the criteria of religion, piety, sufficient knowledge of jurisprudence, the judicial and legal system of the country.

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      Under the 1964 constitution, the king could appoint judges and review their position after 10 years, but he was not permitted to remove officials from their office through other means. The Taliban’s constitution, on the other hand, does not state the terms of tenure of supreme court judges, and the amir al-Mu’minin can remove judges from their offices.

      The power of the amir to remove judges and the appointment of judges for an undetermined period brings the judiciary’s independence into question. The supreme court under the Taliban’s constitution no longer has the power to interpret the constitution under judicial review. That power has been assigned to shura. Thus, the constitution does not recognize the separation of power and enforce checks and balances.

      Foreign Policy

      According to the Taliban’s constitution, the foreign policy of the Islamic Emirate is based on the teaching of Islam, human values, securing the public interest and political independence, territorial integrity, playing an effective and constructive role in international peace, and cooperating with the international community.

      In principle, the constitution supports the UN Charter, the charter of the OIC, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other internationally accepted principles and regulations, as long as they do not conflict with Islamic principles and national interests. The constitution condemns the use of force against any country and calls for dispute settlement through peaceful means. It also supports the program of disarmament and the elimination of the weapon of mass destruction.

      The Rights of Afghans

      So, with all this in mind, what does the constitution mean for the people of Afghanistan?

      First, it is clear that under the Taliban’s constitution, the public has no say in the decision-making process — neither in the form of voting, nor with holding government bodies to account. The constitution denies the people their right to elect members to the shura, choose a prime minister, pick members of provincial assemblies or select governors, mayors and members of district assemblies since, according to the Taliban, elections are considered un-Islamic.

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      Second, the selection of members of the shura by the amir al-Mu’minin opens the door for picking individuals who are close to the inner circle of the Taliban, particularly Taliban members themselves. By introducing the strict and ambiguous conditions of Ahl al-hall wa’l ‘aqd for shura appointees and a constitutional clause for the amir and prime minister to be followers of the Hanafi madhab of Sunni Islam, women and religious minorities such as Shia Muslims are excluded from positions of power and the decision-making process. Such provisions also contradict other clauses of the Taliban’s constitution, including the one that provides for equality before the law and prohibits all forms of discrimination.

      Third, the Taliban’s constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights with limitations. This, in principle, includes freedom of speech, the right to a free and fair trial, liberty, human dignity, right to property, right to assemble unarmed and inviolability of person’s residence. It also provides for certain social rights, including the chance to receive free education. Most importantly, however, it leaves the regulation of women’s education to a specific law, which limits their right to education.

      Prime Minister Mulla Hasan Akhund also confirmed such limitations in his first speech, where he indicated that only sharia education is compulsory and that women could seek knowledge in other fields if necessary. Thus, it can be inferred from his speech and the constitutional clause that the government will determine and specify faculties where women can take enroll and which the Taliban think are necessary for women. This provision itself contradicts other clauses of the constitution.

      Finally, regarding the rights of children, women and minorities, the Taliban’s constitution does not specifically guarantee their protection. However, all Afghan citizens are provided with general protection, which includes children, women and minorities.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Pashtun-led Taliban Could Break Apart Both Afghanistan and Pakistan

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      More than a century ago, the Russians and the British played the Great Game for the control of Afghanistan. Immortalized in Rudyard Kipling’s “Kim,” this game defined three generations of soldiers, spies and diplomats. As the remarkable Rory Stewart records, the Great Game never ended. The Soviets and the Americans carried on where the Russians and the British left. Now, a new great game is about to begin.

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      As is well chronicled, Afghanistan emerged as a buffer state between the Russian and British empires. Dominated by the Pashtuns, this state remained an inchoate entity of competing ethnic groups, feuding clans and autonomous villages. As Tabish Forugh and one of the authors noted in an earlier article on Fair Observer, this Pashtun-dominated order crumbled when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban brought back this order in the 1990s and are establishing Pashtun primacy yet again.

      New Life to Old Identities

      Modernity has not been kind to Afghanistan. Until the 1970s, this country was a land where hippies showed up to smoke pot and have a good time. Older Pakistani friends reminisce about driving from Peshawar to Kabul to buy videotapes of Bollywood movies and bask in the relatively liberal milieu of Afghanistan. When the Soviets intervened in 1979, this idyllic version of the country disintegrated. For all the efforts of Soviet troops, engineers and administrators, communism failed.

      By February 1989, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. Later that year, the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union itself imploded in 1991. The loosely allied mujahideen turned their guns on each other and a bloody civil war followed. The Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Pashtuns were at each other’s throats. Eventually, the Pakistani-trained, Islamabad-backed, Pashtun-led Taliban triumphed in 1996. Their rule was cut short by the 9/11 attacks in 2001, which brought American intervention and began a 20-year experiment with democracy.

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      Sadly, the democratic experiment has failed too. In June 2021, Forugh and one of the authors wrote that President Ashraf Ghani occupied “his fancy palace in Kabul thanks to the barrels of American guns,” and, once the Americans left, he would be toast. Americans established a presidential system based on their own model that was destined to fail in a famously diverse and fractious society. Note that the US leaders after World War II chose parliamentary democracy for Germany and Japan, two industrial societies with a far higher degree of homogeneity. If Washington blundered at the beginning, its decisions were catastrophic at the end. Today, democracy is dead and buried, the fanatical Taliban rule the roost and ethnic identity is replacing fragile multiethnic Afghan nationalism.

      The Rise of Ethnic Nationalism

      As stated earlier, Afghanistan is where two expanding empires met. The British had digested modern-day Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, then British India. The Russians had taken over an odd assortment of clans and khanates in Central Asia, many of whom were descendants of Genghis Khan and Timur. Just like the boundaries drawn by the British or the French, the Russian ones were arbitrary too. As ethnic nationalism rises in Afghanistan, it will spill over into Central Asia.

      As late as February 2020, the US State Department declared that “a secure and stable Afghanistan [was] a top priority for the Central Asian governments.” It encouraged these governments to boost economic and trade ties with their Kabul counterparts. American hopes for “stable governance of multi-ethnic, Muslim-majority countries” now lie in tatters. Kazakhstan demonstrates that Russian realpolitik of supporting strongmen has triumphed.

      Yet even the Kremlin cannot hold back the tide of ethnic nationalism that is unfolding in Afghanistan and spreading to Central Asia. The Tajiks led by Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud have the tacit, if not explicit, support of the Tajikistan government. The Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum fled to Uzbekistan when the Taliban took over. As the Pashtuns leave not even scraps at the table for others, it is only natural that minority ethnicities are looking across the border for a better future. Just as in former Yugoslavia, ethnic nationalism is now on the rise in Central Asia.

      Pakistan’s Frankenstein Monster’s Problem: Radical Islam

      To a large degree, Pakistan has fostered, if not created, the ethnic nationalism now rising in Afghanistan and spilling over into Central Asia. It is an open secret that Pakistan’s military elite created the Taliban. As Ishtiaq Ahmed explains, “the Garrison State” has always been paranoid about its lack of strategic depth. The loss of East Pakistan that won independence as Bangladesh in 1971 has scarred the Pakistani psyche and made the country’s political elites double down on political Islam. In the 1980s, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq moved Pakistan along a fundamentalist arc. Jihad became the order of the day not only against the Soviets in Afghanistan but also against India, which he sought to “bleed through a thousand cuts.”

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      Zia was not an exception to Pakistani hostility to India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the man Zia ousted through a military coup and hung on the gallows, vowed to wage a “thousand year war against India.” In 1974, Pakistani mobs massacred thousands of Ahmadis and, instead of delivering them protection or justice, Bhutto brought in a constitutional amendment declaring the Ahmadis non-Muslims. The same year, he declared Pakistan would go nuclear, claiming “We shall eat grass but have our bomb.” Islamic fundamentalism and Pavlovian anti-India ethos drive Pakistani state policy regardless of whether the country is under civil or military rule. 

      Backed by the US and Saudi Arabia, the Pakistan-backed mujahideen brought the Soviet Union to its knees. Against India, Pakistan has followed an asymmetric strategy of championing irregulars, insurgent and terrorists from its very inception. In the first of a three-part series analyzing the fallout of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, Rakesh Kaul points out how Pakistan supported a Pashtun jihad in Kashmir as early as 1947. The marauding tribesmen killed Kaul’s great-grandfather, “tied his dead body to a horse and dragged it through the streets to terrorize the local population into submission.”

      Starting from the 1980s, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) unleashed terror as an instrument of state policy against India. First, the ISI backed the violent Sikh insurgency for an independent state of Khalistan, a strategy that it continues with till today. Second, the ISI supported the insurgency in Kashmir that blew up in 1989 and persists till today. Third, the ISI created and supported militant jihadist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed to overwhelm India through multiple terrorist attacks. With a crisis-ridden economy and much smaller military, Pakistan has bet on asymmetric terror tactics and nuclear deterrence to tie India down.

      However, Pakistan is discovering that when you sow the wind, you reap the whirlwind. Like Victor Frankenstein, the Garrison State has created a monster: radical Islam. Since the 1980s, Pakistan has become intolerant, sectarian and violent. Minorities have faced persecution and suffered ethnic cleansing. The case of the animistic Kalash people in Chitral is a case in point. Many documentaries have recorded how they have faced persistent persecution and forced conversion. As a result, a mere 3,500 Kalash are left and they may not survive for too long.

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      Radical Islam was meant to be a tool the Pakistani state used against its neighbors. Now, it has spread like cancer throughout all aspects of the country’s life. Instead of Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient government, madrasas now provide education for refugees and lower-class Pakistanis. Many of them are hardline and churn out jihadis by the thousands. For instance, most of the Afghani Taliban leadership graduated from the madrasa Dur-ul-Uloom Haqqania.

      Religious figures can now bring the country over a standstill in an instant. Violent protests repeatedly erupted after French President Emmanuel Macron said that Islam was in crisis. Terror attacks within Pakistan have shot up. Roohafza, a sugary syrupy drink, has replaced whiskey in officer messes. Many officers now sport flowing beards and offer prayer five times a day. In the words of Javed Jabbar, Pakistan has experienced “a steady retreat into showy religiosity and visible piety in the public domain and in most media.” A new law makes it compulsory for every child to learn Arabic.

      Pakistan finds itself in a bind. It has to direct the thousands of jihadis graduating from madrasas against external enemies to avoid internecine strife. In fact, it is only a question of time before radical Islamists will infiltrate all organs of the Pakistani state. The Taliban’s victory has convinced them that Allah is on their side. The risks of a general like Zia or a cleric like Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini taking over and unleashing nuclear terror or nuclear war are getting higher by the day.

      Radical Islam and Pashtun Pride Make an Explosive Cocktail

      If radical Islam is dangerous, radical Islam combined with ethnic nationalism is terrifying. After 20 years, the Pashtun-led Taliban is back in power. They are surging with confidence after humbling the world’s superpower. This time, they are battle-hardened, better trained and savvier than their predecessors from the 1990s. The Taliban also have a strong sense of history and look back to the expansionist 18th-century Ahmed Shah Durrani as a model to follow. 

      Durrani was a historic figure who sent troops to Central Asia, defeated the Marathas in the historic 1761 Third Battle of Panipat with assistance of local Muslim rulers and created the modern nation of Afghanistan. Durrani’s young nation soon fell victim to the Great Game and lost much territory to the British. Led by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, the British delineated the modern-day border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Till date, many Pashtuns have not accepted this border.

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      The Taliban are expansionists. In the north, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks will fight a guerilla war, ensuring their eventual retreat. To the west lie Turkmenistan and Iran, two ethnically distinct entities where the Taliban cannot expand. To the south and east lies Pakistan where the Taliban trained and where their Pashtun kin reside. Furthermore, the Pashtuns have a deep memory of raiding and ruling the plains of Indus and the Ganges. When Babur swept down from modern-day Uzbekistan to modern-day Pakistan and India through the Khyber Pass, he defeated a Pashtun sultan who was ruling Delhi.

      When Pakistan won independence, Pashtun opinion was divided. Some like Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar wanted a homeland for Muslim Indians in the shape of Pakistan. Others like Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a friend of Mahatma Gandhi, fought for a unified India and then for an autonomous Pashtunistan. Still others wanted reunification with Afghanistan. Worryingly for Pakistan, Pashtun refugees have streamed into the country from Afghanistan since 1979. Encyclopedia Britannica tells us that there were “about 11 million Pashtun in Afghanistan and 25 million in Pakistan in the early 21st century.” Multiple estimates indicate Pashtuns to be over 15% of Pakistan’s population. In Afghanistan, they comprise about 42% of the population. Once all-out ethnic conflict erupts in Afghanistan, Pashtun identity is only likely to strengthen.

      So far, the Punjabi elite running Pakistan has co-opted the Pashtun elite by giving it plum positions in the state apparatus, especially the military. The ruling elite has also used Pashtuns to fight wars and proxy wars in Kashmir since 1947 when both India and Pakistan emerged as two independent entities after the partition of British India. During the 20 years of US presence in Afghanistan, cross-border incursions into and violent incidents in Kashmir declined because Pashtuns were too busy fighting a jihad at home. Now, these jihadis will turn their attention to Kashmir.

      Not all jihadis are fixated with Kashmir. Some of them are sworn enemies of the Pakistani state such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. With the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan may have achieved its long-cherished strategic depth against India, but it now has the tail of the Pashtun tiger in its hands. Pakistan’s ISI has no option but to deploy Pashtun jihadis against India in Kashmir. Failure on the Kashmir front could trigger Pashtun dissatisfaction against Punjabi leadership.

      A tiny wrinkle many forget is that Pashtuns see themselves as a warrior people and the natural leaders of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent. They have successfully beaten back the British, the Soviets and the Americans. Pashtuns see the Punjabis as soft, loud and showy. Like the Balochs, the Sindhis, the Muhajirs and others, Pashtuns resent the Punjabi domination of Pakistan. Furthermore, many Pashtuns regard the banks of the Indus, not the Durand Line, as their natural border.

      Blood Borders

      Pakistan’s Pashtun problem is a particular example of a more widespread phenomenon. Most of the current borders in Africa, the Middle East and Asia are colonial legacies that do not make sense. In 2006, Ralph Peters published a controversial article in Armed Forces Journal titled “Blood Borders” where he argued for redrawing “arbitrary and distorted borders.” Peters took the view that “significant ‘cheated’ population groups, such as the Kurds, Baluch and Arab Shia” deserved their own states. He blamed “awful-but-sacrosanct international boundaries,” not Islam, for much of the violence in the Middle East and South Asia.

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      Since 2006, many analysts have slammed Peters. The US has resolutely upheld the stability of the borders in former British and French colonies even as it has championed the independence of nations once under the Soviet yoke. That policy might be nearing the end of its shelf life. In its moment of triumph in Afghanistan, Pakistan might have set wheels into motion that will lead to its own disintegration.

      Today, Pakistan is held together by an anti-India Islamic identity. The different linguistic ethnic groups that comprise Pakistan have long been pulling in different directions. Therefore, Pakistan has fostered a siege mentality among its people and created an identity that looks to Arab, Turkish and Pashtun conquerors of India for inspiration. Pashtun identity is far more cohesive, time-tested and real. After humbling the US, Pashtuns are unlikely to play second fiddle to the Punjabis for much longer. Inevitably, they are bound to take charge of their own destiny as they have done many times in the past.

      To add fuel to the fire, Pakistan’s economy is in dire straits. Last year, the International Monetary Fund instituted yet another bailout and released $6 billion to Islamabad in November. Over the last three years, the Pakistani rupee has fallen by 30.5% against the US dollar. Inflation and unemployment are running high. In such circumstances, anti-India rhetoric is useful, desirable and essential to keep the country together. 

      Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has repeatedly condemned India’s “descent into fascism” and claimed that the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the BJP’s parent organization, of being Nazi-inspired entities. This puts pressure on Khan’s government and his military backers to act against such a toxic neighbor and evil enemy. The trouble for Khan and his delusional friends in Islamabad is that state coffers have little money to fund conflict with a far more prosperous and numerous India. Khan and co are riling up a mob that they are bound to disappoint. The last-ditch effort to keep Pakistan together would be war with India and, if Islamic radicals were to seize power in Islamabad, the risk of nuclear war would only turn too real.

      Whether conflict with India is conventional or nuclear will be determined by circumstances in the future. It is clear that the Taliban have unleashed ethnic nationalism not only in Afghanistan but also in neighboring Central Asian states. Inevitably, the Pashtuns in Pakistan will be infected by that sentiment as well, especially as Islamabad leads the country to economic and military disaster. The scenario Peters conjured of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier tribes reuniting with their Afghan brethren and creating Pashtunistan would then come true. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan would no longer be the same again.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is Afghanistan Going to Break Apart?

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      After the shambolic US withdrawal, Afghanistan faces an existential problem: Its very existence as a state is now in question. Most people forget that Afghanistan is a patchwork of disparate ethnic groups and remote villages. Unlike Germany or Japan, it is not and has never been a nation-state. Since the 1880s, Afghanistan has been a state based on a loose coalition of poorly governed provinces, forgotten villages and marginalized ethnic groups. 

      A Chequered Past

      For more than a century, different power centers in Afghanistan have had some sort of representation in the central government, even if they often got leftovers from the dominant Pashtun ruling class. This class was repressive and often bloody. Abdur Rahman Khan, the Iron Amir, conducted genocide against the Hazaras in the 1890s, erased a substantial part of the cultural heritage of Nuristanis by forcing them to convert to Islam, and confiscated fertile lands of Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north only to redistribute them to Pashtun tribes. Even a modernist king like Amanulla pursued the Iron Amir’s policies. Yet, at the helm of power, there was generally a servant’s seat at the table for other ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and even the Hazaras. This seat at the table along with the backing of superpowers, first the British and then the Soviets, kept the state and the political order intact.

      Afghanistan Is On the Verge of Disaster

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      When the Soviets invaded in 1979, the Pashtun-dominated order of Afghanistan gradually crumbled. Ideology trumped ethnicity, and groups like the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Hazaras rose in prominence. Much credit for this goes to Babrak Karmal, the president of Afghanistan from December 1979 to November 1986. When the Soviets withdrew in February 1989, this order collapsed. The battle-hardened mujahideen groups fought a brutal civil war in which Tajik leaders Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat Party, and Ahmad Shah Massoud, known as the “Lion of Panjshir,” held the upper hand.

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      The Pashtuns struck back through the Taliban and took over Kabul in 1996. They exercised power over most of the country while Massoud was leading the resistance to the Taliban government from the Panjshir Valley. He was killed in Afghanistan two days before the 9/11 attacks in 2001 by an al-Qaeda suicide squad masquerading as journalists on the pretext of filming an interview. Even after his death, the resistance to the Taliban continued and Massoud’s fighters contributed heavily to the ground fighting that drove out the Taliban from much of the country, including Kabul.

      In the five years of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, the Pashtuns returned as the dominant military and political group. They ran an autocratic regime, marginalizing other ethnic groups and suppressing opponents. Hence, resistance to the Taliban was persistent and ferocious in many parts of the country.

      The Post 9/11 Experience

      The 9/11 attacks led to the American intervention and the creation of a new democratic state. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmens and other marginalized communities became active participants in the political process. Despite its fragility and flaws, the post-2001 political order and its democratic components offered a unique opportunity for Afghanistan to transform into a functioning polity and society.

      The governing Pashtun ethnonationalist elites, their non-Pashtun partners, including conservative warlords, and the reemergence of a Pashtun-led insurgency squandered the resources and opportunities that otherwise might have consolidated a civil and democratic political order.  

      The Taliban’s forceful return to Kabul last August ended the post-2001 American-backed constitutional order. Today, chaos prevails and a fanatical Pashtun clergy has a vice-like grip on every aspect of Afghanistan’s social, political and economic life. Furthermore, the Taliban are fanatical Muslims with ethnofascist tendencies and a profound apathy for Afghanistan’s ethnic, cultural and political diversity.

      In recent months, many analysts have been very charitable to the Taliban. In an interview with Fair Observer, political analyst Anas Altikriti said, “The reality is the Taliban have won and in today’s world, they have the right, the absolute right to govern.” If the right to govern comes from conquest, then Altikriti is right. Lest we forget, the Taliban have yet to win an election or demonstrate that they are actually capable of governing. Moreover, they are rigid, dictatorial and revanchist. An inclusive political formula that represents Afghanistan’s mosaic-like diversity is impossible so long as the Taliban remain exclusively in charge.

      The legitimate aspirations of non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, the Uzbeks, the Hazaras, the Turkmens and others are now dissolving in the acid of Sunni fundamentalism. The Taliban have marginalized them completely. These groups have no seat at the table, no representation in the decision-making process and have to live under the barrel of the Taliban gun.

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      In 2022, this situation is untenable. Non-Pashtun ethnic groups are fed up and want control over their destiny. Many Pashtun technocrats, including the former president, Hamid Karzai, have switched sides and are part of the ruling dispensation. They claim the Taliban are the source of stability and have formed the only organization capable of ruling the country. However, they forget an important point. Marginalized groups in Afghanistan are chafing under Pashtun hegemony. If the Taliban-led Pashtuns cling to their unilateral rule and convert Afghanistan into a centralized state, the country will indubitably and inevitably break apart.

      Federalism Is the Way Forward

      To avoid a bloody partition along ethnic lines or a 1990s style civil war, Afghanistan needs a federal political system. Afghanistan is not France or the United Kingdom. It cannot be run out of a grand capital no matter how powerful the ruling class is. Like Switzerland and the United States, Afghanistan is an extremely diverse country with a history of local autonomy and a glorious tradition of bloody rebellion as the British, the Soviets and the Americans discovered at their cost.

      Therefore, the balance of power in any political system that can work must lie with local, not national government. Such a system could turn Afghanistan’s disparate ethnic groups into building blocks of a new federal state and avoid the looming bloodbath due to the Taliban’s autocratic rule.

      With China and Russia taking center stage, Afghanistan is increasingly forgotten. That is as risky as it is unfortunate. Conflict in Afghanistan could spill over into South and Central Asia, threatening global peace and security. Afghanistan needs dialogue between different groups ready to hammer out a territorial, judicial, and administrative settlement that leads to a functional union. Only then can we expect the fragile state of Afghanistan to survive.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Biden Must Call Off the Bombing of Afghan Cities

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      Ten provincial capitals in Afghanistan have fallen to the Taliban in just a week, while fighting continues in four more. US military officials now believe that Kabul, the Afghan capital, could fall in one to three months. 

      It is horrific to watch the death, destruction and mass displacement of thousands of terrified Afghans and the triumph of the misogynist Taliban that ruled the nation 20 years ago. But the fall of the centralized, corrupt Afghan government propped up by the West was inevitable, whether this year, next year or 10 years from now.     

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      US President Joe Biden has reacted to America’s snowballing humiliation in the graveyard of empires by once again dispatching US Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad to Doha, Qatar, to urge the government and the Taliban to seek a political solution. At the same time, the US has dispatched B-52 bombers to attack at least two of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals.

      In LashkarGah, the capital of Helmand province, the bombing has already reportedly destroyed a high school and a health clinic. Another B-52 bombed Sheberghan, the capital of Jowzjan province and the home of the infamous warlord and accused war criminal Abdul Rashid Dostum, who is now the military commander of the US-backed government’s armed forces. Meanwhile, the New York Times reports that US Reaper drones and AC-130 gunships are also still operating in Afghanistan. 

      The Fall of the Afghan Army

      The rapid disintegration of the Afghan forces that the US and its Western allies have recruited, armed and trained for 20 years at a cost of nearly $89 billion should come as no surprise. On paper, the Afghan national army has 180,000 troops. In reality, most of them are unemployed Afghans desperate to earn some money to support their families but not eager to fight their fellow citizens. The army is also notorious for its corruption and mismanagement. 

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      The army and the beleaguered and vulnerable police forces that man isolated outposts and checkpoints around the country are plagued by high casualties, rapid turnover and desertion. Most troops feel no loyalty to the corrupt US-backed government and routinely abandon their posts, either to join the Taliban or just to go home. When the BBC asked General Khoshal Sadat, the national police chief, about the impact of high casualties on police recruitment in February 2020, he cynically replied: “When you look at recruitment, I always think about the Afghan families and how many children they have. The good thing is there is never a shortage of fighting-age males who will be able to join the force.” 

      But a police recruit at a checkpoint questioned the very purpose of the war, telling the BBC’s Nanna Muus Steffensen: “We Muslims are all brothers. We don’t have a problem with each other.” In that case, she asked him, why were they fighting? He hesitated, laughed nervously and shook his head in resignation. “You know why. I know why,” he said. “It’s not really our fight.”

      Since 2007, the jewel of US and Western military training missions in Afghanistan has been the Afghan commando corps or special operations forces, who comprise only 7% of Afghan national army troops but reportedly do 70% to 80% of the fighting. But the commandos have struggled to reach their target of recruiting, arming and training 30,000 troops. Poor recruitment from Pashtuns, the largest and traditionally dominant ethnic group, has been a critical weakness, especially from the Pashtun heartland in the south. 

      The commandos and the professional officer corps of the Afghan army are dominated by ethnic Tajiks. This community consists of the successors to the Northern Alliance, which the US supported against the Taliban 20 years ago. As of 2017, the commandos are estimated at only 21,000. It is not clear how many of these Western-trained troops now serve as the last line of defense between the US-backed puppet government and total defeat. 

      The Taliban’s speedy and simultaneous occupation of large amounts of territory all over the country appears to be a deliberate strategy to overwhelm and outflank the government’s small number of well-trained, well-armed troops. The Taliban have had more success winning the loyalty of minorities in the north and west than government forces have had to recruit Pashtuns from the south, and the government’s small number of well-trained troops cannot be everywhere at once.

      US Fighter Jets

      But what of the United States? Its deployment of B-52 bombers, Reaper drones and AC-130 gunships is a brutal response by a failing, flailing imperial power to a historic, humiliating defeat. 

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      The US does not flinch from committing mass murder against its enemies. Just look at the US-led destruction of Fallujah and Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. How many Americans even know about the massacre of civilians that Iraqi forces committed when the US-led coalition finally took control of Mosul in 2017? This came after Donald Trump, while campaigning in 2015, said that the US should “take out the families” of Islamic State fighters.

      Twenty years after George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld committed a full range of war crimes — from torture and the deliberate killing of civilians to the “supreme international crime” of aggression — Biden is clearly no more concerned than they were with criminal accountability or the judgment of history. But even from the most pragmatic and callous point of view, what can continued aerial bombardment of Afghan cities accomplish, besides a final but futile climax to the 20-year-long slaughter of Afghans by tens of thousands of American bombs and missiles?

      The intellectually and strategically bankrupt US military and CIA bureaucracy has a history of congratulating itself for fleeting, superficial victories. The US quickly declared victory in Afghanistan in 2001 and set out to duplicate its imagined conquest in Iraq two years later. Then, the short-lived success of the 2011 regime change operation in Libya encouraged the US and its allies to let al-Qaeda affiliates loose in Syria, spawning a decade of intractable violence and chaos and the rise of the Islamic State (IS). 

      In the same manner, Biden’s unaccountable and corrupt national security advisers seem to be urging him to use the same weapons that obliterated the Islamic State group’s urban bases in Iraq and Syria to attack Taliban-held cities in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is not Iraq or Syria.  First, fewer Afghans live in cities. Second, the Taliban’s base is not in major cities, but in the rural areas where the other three-quarters of Afghans live. Despite support from Pakistan over the years, the Taliban are not an invading force like IS, but an Afghan nationalist movement that has fought for two decades to expel foreign invasion and occupation forces from their country. 

      In many areas, Afghan forces have not fled from the Taliban, as the Iraqi army did from IS in 2014, but joined them. On August 9, the Taliban occupied Aybak, the sixth provincial capital to fall, after a local warlord and his fighters reportedly agreed to join forces with the Taliban.

      That very same day, the government’s chief negotiator, Abdullah Abdullah, returned to Doha for further peace talks with the Taliban. His American allies must make it clear to him, his government and the Taliban that the US will support every effort to achieve a peaceful political transition. 

      The New Syndrome

      But the United States must not keep bombing and killing civilians to provide cover for the Afghan government to avoid difficult but necessary compromises at the negotiating table to bring peace to the long-suffering, war-weary people of Afghanistan. Bombing Taliban-occupied cities and the people who live in them is a savage and criminal policy that President Biden must renounce.           

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      The defeat of the US and its allies in Afghanistan now seems to be unfolding even faster than the collapse of South Vietnam between 1973 and 1975. The public takeaway from the US defeat in Southeast Asia was the “Vietnam syndrome,” an aversion to overseas military interventions that lasted for decades.

      As we approach the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we should reflect on how the Bush administration exploited the US public’s thirst for revenge to unleash this bloody, tragic and utterly futile war in Afghanistan. The lesson of America’s experience in that country should be a new “Afghanistan syndrome,” a public aversion to war that prevents future US military attacks and invasions, rejects attempts to socially engineer the governments of other nations, and leads to a new and active American commitment to peace, diplomacy and disarmament.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More