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    It’s Back to Square One in Libya

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    Six years ago, Libya’s political process fell apart almost as soon as it started. The country was forcibly divided as politicians got buyers’ remorse over their agreement and realized that competition was considerably more profitable than cooperation. Libya’s revolutionary transition stalled while rifts deepened, the state degraded and quality of life collapsed.

    Worse still, the moribund process was the perfect environment for a renegade military officer, Khalifa Haftar, to transform a counterterror operation into a Libyan forever war that saw him promoted to general — then field marshal — in a five-year journey of over 2,000 kilometers from eastern Libya to the gates of Tripoli.

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    It was an internationally-driven campaign that ended with Libya’s domestic bifurcation replicating itself internationally. By June 2020, with Haftar’s campaign and army in tatters, Turkey dominated western Libya, whilst Russia adeptly controlled the east and all that the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and France had once hopefully built for their marshal. Yet this war, and the international dynamics around it, had supercharged Libya’s drivers of destabilization and the largely clandestine proxy war threatened to explode into direct regional conflict.

    The Political Process in Libya

    So, when the United Nations returned to pick up Libya’s much-abused political process once more, there was relief from many. However, the UN failed to learn from its mistakes of just five years ago and so built a process that may not be an exact repeat of what came before but which certainly rhymed with it.

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    It was a process that promised elections in December 2021 and relied upon the same politicians who had divided the country in 2015 to first reunify it and then prepare the elections that would remove themselves from office. In an extension of that same wisdom, the process also re-empowered Haftar — the defeated megalomaniac who had attacked Libya’s capital in 2019 — and gave him a driver’s seat for building a unified national military. Overseeing it all was a man, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, who had gamed the UN process by paying millions of euros in bribes to those Libyans taking part in it to become the prime minister of Libya’s new government of national unity (GNU).

    Given the framing of this process, it is perhaps not such a surprise that, eight months later, there is little substantive progress toward elections, while each of the main actors are more firmly rooted in their positions.

    Aguila Saleh, the speaker of Libya’s parliament and perhaps the most influential of the remaining political class, has given everything to block progress toward elections, whilst working to reverse what little unification took place after the formation of Dbeibah’s unity government. He has used his role as speaker to continuously postpone what were necessary and urgent discussions on the constitutional basis for elections — i.e., what the Libyan people would exactly be voting for at the end of the year.

    This forced the discussion out from parliament to the UN convened body, which had first authorized this new process. However, with all political players having significant influence over that body and the newest UN special envoy, Jan Kubis, being notable only for his anonymity in the role, these discussions were quickly sidetracked to irrelevance.

    Instead, Saleh worked on extorting the GNU to guarantee a swollen budget for him to build out a patronage network across eastern Libya and develop bilateral relations with countries like Greece and Egypt, providing them access to public tenders in the east. As such, despite the presence of a unity government, Libya is perhaps more divided today than it was 12 months ago when parallel governments existed — as Saleh acts as a de-facto prime minister of the east.

    However, during a recent interview with Reuters, Saleh shirked all responsibility for the failure to make progress on elections. Instead, he publicly blamed the GNU, claiming that Prime Minister Dbeibah had betrayed the UN process and, as a result, he would be forced to reappoint an eastern government. This is a convenient outcome for Saleh, who has used the process to grab further power and funding for himself, which he will now lock-in by refreezing the political transition and any political process with western Libya and its actual government.

    The Field Marshall

    Haftar has supported him toward that end. The UN process brought the warlord time and space to reconstitute what he could of his forces, while Russia and the UAE provided him with mercenaries to buttress his position and allow him to repair his branding. His new-look army still claims to be Libya’s national military and claims parliamentary support for that distinction. However, the groups responsible for local security across east and south Libya no longer follow his orders and unilaterally pursue their own interests, rendering his control nominal.

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    Instead, Haftar has focused on maintaining political credentials and growing his economic activity. His “military investment authority” has started their own construction projects using Emirati companies to allegedly break ground on three new cities in eastern Libya with a promised capacity of 12 million people — a real boon to the tired and impoverished country of 6 million. His sons continue to dominate smuggling operations throughout Libya even as their father postures as he prepares to run for president.

    Haftar and the media machines provided by his foreign backers have focused on a narrative that Libya’s UN-promised elections are only to be presidential elections, and any attempts to create a more complex electoral process or constitutional framing than that would be to violate the people’s freedom of choice. Saleh has supported this, posturing as a democrat, knowing that a president would not affect his parliament.

    Moreover, both men know that this gambit is a sure winner. Elections will either be forced, with Haftar using armed groups to fix the vote to become an all-powerful president or, more likely, a majority of the country will refute the notion of allowing someone who bears significant command responsibility for war crimes and the killings of thousands of Libyans over the past five years. Then he can leverage his position supporting elections to regain international legitimacy, put the blame on western Libya and work with Saleh toward an eastern government he controls.

    Such is the disingenuity of Saleh and Haftar that Dbeibah never even had to try to postpone elections, although most of Libya knew his intention is to be there for the long haul. He has played off the stalling tactics of the other two and their direct hostility to try to build a policy around gathering international support to help his government settle, rebuild and return essential services, plan a proper constitutional basis, unify the military and only then — sometime in the future — allow for elections. The financial promise of this rebuilding enterprise has brought him the support of key players in addition to just Turkey, with whom he remains close.

    Libya’s Future

    As Libya’s process hurtles toward its expected collapse, the shape of its future will look familiar to anyone watching the country: re-division, disingenuous political bickering between those who never had an interest in governing, quiet cooperation between those bickering when it comes to corruption, and the ever-worrying threat of renewed conflict as Haftar awaits a new opportunity to seize power and other armed groups contest the depleted legitimacy of those in charge and look for a route of their own into the government coffers.

    Meanwhile, it is the Libyan people, as always, who suffer as their essential services continue to collapse, their wealth disappears and the soaring temperatures of a warming world begin to make everything that bit more volatile.

    *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Beirut Explosion One Year On: Are Israel and Hezbollah Responsible?

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      August 4 marks the one-year anniversary of the explosion that rocked the port of Beirut. Today, thousands of Beirutis are marching to the site in memory of the victims and in peaceful protest at continued government inaction. As Lebanon wrestles with political paralysis, a rampant pandemic and a wrecked economy, the authorities have provided no answers. To date, no one in a senior position has been held accountable for the blast that killed 218 people, injured more than 7,000 and displaced over 300,000 as large parts of the capital were laid to waste.

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      An FBI report from October last year (seen by Reuters at the end of July) concluded that the amount of ammonium nitrate left in the port warehouse by the time of the explosion constituted just one-fifth of the 2,754 tons seized by the authorities in 2013. The question the FBI did not ask was where the bulk of that shipment had gone. Arab Digest’s own account from July 20 suggests the likely destination: the regime forces of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. Sources claim that Assad’s ally Hezbollah moved the ammonium nitrate into Syria over the years.

      Buttressing our analysis is the fact that no insurance claim has ever emerged from the supposed destination, Mozambique, for the undelivered fertilizer. The Israelis, we postulate, in hitting a Hezbollah weapons cache in the harbor, unintentionally triggered the blast.

      No Concrete Evidence

      A new investigation published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) links to over 100 documents related to the Rhosus and its cargo, some of which have not been previously published. Once again, more questions than answers are forthcoming, including over such key issues as whether the ammonium nitrate was really ever, as has been asserted, intended for Mozambique:

      “The widely reported narrative regarding the arrival of the Rhosus, a Moldovan-flagged ship, in the port of Beirut in November 2013 carrying 2,750 tonnes of high-density ammonium nitrate is as follows: the ship’s cargo was ultimately bound for Mozambique; it entered Beirut’s port to load seismic equipment it was then meant to deliver to Jordan before traveling onward to Mozambique; the ship’s owner was a Russian national, Igor Grechushkin; and the owner of the ammonium nitrate on board, Savaro Limited, was a chemical trading company in the United Kingdom. Upon examination, however, it is not clear that any of these assertions are true.”

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      The HRW report goes on to mention three possible reasons for the blast: that the explosion was caused when welding sparks caused a fire in hangar 12, igniting the ammonium nitrate; that the explosion was caused by an Israeli airstrike; or that the explosion was an intentional act by Hezbollah. The hypothesis that the explosion might have been caused by an Israeli attack that was not an airstrike is not one that is under official consideration, although in June, investigative judge Tarek Bitar told journalists that he was “80 percent certain” that the blast was not caused by an Israeli missile.

      In July, we described how an Arab Digest member recalled the events of that day:

      “Shortly after 6 pm, we heard a jet flying at low level from the west and an explosion from the direction of the port. A couple of minutes later came the deeper sound of a surface-to-surface missile followed by another explosion. The ground then shook violently — this turned out later to be the ammonium nitrate detonating — and we watched in disbelief the plume of smoke and debris soaring into the sky. The blast reached us a few seconds later, throwing us off our feet from the terrace into the flat and blowing in all the glass.”

      For our member, it was a fortunate escape: bruised and cut, and astonished to find that, in the midst of the badly damaged flat, the internet was still working.

      Inconclusive Conclusion

      Now, a year on, there are still pressing questions about what caused the blast and who is responsible, questions that the suffering people of Lebanon deserve to have answers to. The second, and by far the most destructive explosion, occurred when a warehouse containing ammonium nitrate caught fire. A common explanation put about at the time was that the explosion had been caused by careless workers. But no concrete evidence has been brought forward to support that claim.

      France had declared that it would conduct a major investigation. However, a  French judge could not determine conclusively “whether the explosion was the result of an intentional security operation or whether it was the result of negligence in storing the ammonium nitrate and shortcomings that led to the devastating explosion.” According to Reuters, the FBI had arrived at the same inconclusive conclusion.

      The French report raised the possibility of an attack — “an intentional security operation” — together with the claim that the explosion was an accident caused by negligence. The equivocation and failure to find answers didn’t prevent the French from patronizingly scolding the Lebanese. As the French ambassador in Beirut put it, “To all this country’s leaders, I want to say that your individual and collective responsibility is considerable, be brave enough to take action, and France will help you.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      The first Lebanese judge investigating the blast was forced out in mid-February after he had attempted to charge cabinet ministers and the prime minister in office at the time of the explosion. A second judge has made virtually no headway against entrenched political elites whose central goal is to protect themselves and their fiefdoms while evading responsibility and the truth.

      On July 14, Amnesty International called for the removal of immunity for senior politicians as well as government and military personnel: “The protesters’ demand is simple: let justice take its course. We stand with these families in calling on Lebanese authorities to immediately lift all immunities granted to officials, regardless of their role or position. Any failure to do so is an obstruction of justice, and violates the rights of victims and families to truth, justice and reparations.”

      Despite pleas and protests by the families of the victims, justice is unlikely to be allowed to take its course. The judiciary itself is deeply compromised and beholden to numerous sectarian, business and political factions, a malignant legacy of Lebanon’s 1975-1990 civil war. As an article on Just Security forensically elucidates, “the corruptibility of the judicial system is no accident. Instead, the convoluted structure of the judiciary complements the structure of the rest of the political system — in that it facilitates impunity at the highest levels and protects those who have retained power in the aftermath of Lebanon’s civil war.”

      Speculations Abound

      In the absence of an independent investigation, with all the foot-dragging and obfuscation it entails, speculation abounds about what caused the explosion. There are those, including our member, who believe that what happened on August 4, 2020, was the unintended consequence of an Israeli attack on a Hezbollah weapons dump in the port. The cache was located adjacent to the warehouse holding the ammonium nitrate. The first blast, with its eerie resemblance to fireworks going off, set off the fire that caused the major blast which leveled the port and damaged much of Beirut.

      The Arab Digest member, who is familiar with both the Israeli air force tactics and their consequences, is convinced it was a missile strike: “We compared notes with a friend who had observed the jet banking away from the attack and another friend who actually saw the surface-to-surface missile flash past her office window.” The member says that, according to detailed work done by Lebanese citizen activists in the wake of the attack, the ammonium nitrate aboard the Rhosus had landed in Beirut under a cover story in 2013. 

      The shipment was subsequently seized by port authorities. The supposition put forward by the activists is that it was then trucked to Syria by Hezbollah to provide the regime forces of Bashar al-Assad with the raw material for the improvised barrel bombs they began dropping on opposition-held cities having run short of conventional ammunition. The member quoted expert sources who estimated that over several years, the original 2,750 tons had been reduced to about 400 tons at the time of the blast, which is in line with the FBI’s findings.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Richard Silverstein, who describes himself as a writer who “focusses on the excesses of the Israeli national security state,” wrote in his blog, Tikun Olam, just after the blast:

      “A confidential highly-informed Israeli source has told me that Israel caused the massive explosion at the Beirut port earlier today which killed over 100 and injured thousands. … The source received this information from an Israeli official having special knowledge concerning the matter.

      Israel targeted a Hezbollah weapons depot at the port and planned to destroy it with an explosive device. Tragically, Israeli intelligence did not perform due diligence on its target. Thus they did not know (or if they did know, they didn’t care) that there were 2,700 tons of ammonium nitrate stored in a next-door warehouse.”

      Tikun Olam referred to comments of then-President Donald Trump who, in a hastily arranged press conference, said he had met with some of his “great generals” and “they seem to think it was an attack. It was a bomb of some kind.” His comments caused consternation at the Pentagon, with Silverstein arguing that Trump had let slip “highly classified information,” i.e., that the Israelis had informed Washington that they were going to carry out an attack on a Hezbollah weapons cache.

      Silverstein, though a controversial figure, is viewed by some experts as a useful source on Israeli defense information that would otherwise be censored by the authorities. When contacted by Arab Digest, Silverstein thought it “not likely” that the Israelis would have used a fighter jet to carry out the alleged strike. He thought it too obvious and reckless. He pointed to the modus operandi used against Iranian targets where explosives were placed and then detonated remotely as a more likely approach. He said his source had not mentioned anything about using a fighter jet. “It might have been triggered by a drone,” Silverstein suggested.

      But Silverstein was certain of the attack itself: It was carried out by the Israelis. His source, he said, had been contacted by a cabinet minister in the Netanyahu government (the “Israeli official having special knowledge”) shortly after the explosion. Silverstein told Arab Digest that he was “totally confident about the source.”

      True Narrative

      Should this version, or variations on it, be the true narrative, it is understandable why Hezbollah and Israel would not want it to see the light of day. Less understandable and puzzling is why major news outlets have not touched the story when it was presented to them by reputable sources. Part of the answer may lie in the fact that the sources, either for professional or personal security concerns, have not wanted to go on the record.

      A truly independent investigation might answer the questions and uncover the truth. But for the Lebanese people, battered by an economic crisis and stalked by the COVID-19 pandemic, finding out what happened that terrible day in Beirut must join a disheartening queue. In a country that has for too long been abused by its political elites and used by foreign powers for their own purposes, seeking answers is a long and arduous task with little hope at its end that justice will be served.

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      How Dubai and Abu Dhabi See the World Cup

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      With the Euros over, attention outside the UK is turning to the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. The focus in Britain, quite rightly, remains on the racist abuse directed at black members of the English football team and the extent to which the prime minister and the home secretary contribute to enabling a culture in which such abuse can flourish.

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      In the Gulf, the lucrative rights to World Cup packages are now being awarded. In Kuwait, ITL World has been appointed the sales agent. The company’s CEO, Siddeek Ahmed, could hardly contain his delight at being able to offer “fans a unique opportunity to purchase ticket-inclusive hospitality packages” for the World Cup. In addition to game tickets, the packages include flights, accommodation, transport and “leisure” programs. According to Arabian Business, the deals for the main venue, the 80,000-seat Lusail Stadium, will run from $14,350 to $74,200. That buys you all 10 matches hosted there, including the quarter-final, semi-final and final. If you are not short on cash, you can pick up a 40-seat suite at the stadium for just $2.6 million.

      In Dubai, Expat Sport Tourism DMCC won the rights, with its website urging football fans to be a part of history to see the first World Cup held in the Arab world. “From the pinnacle in high end corporate experiences to individual hospitality solutions for football fans, we can cater for all those wishing to be part of FIFA World Cup 2022” is how the firm put it.

      Not Everyone Is Happy

      With an estimated 1.5 million fans heading to Qatar next year, Dubai, with its well-established tourism and entertainment sectors, sees itself as ideally placed to cash in on the World Cup bonanza. Yet others in the United Arab Emirates are less welcoming.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Mohammed al-Hammadi is the president of the Emirates Journalists Association and editor-in-chief of the newspaper Alroeya, based in Abu Dhabi. Among the core values listed on the paper’s website are “apply best practice in line with the journalism codes” and “be an objective and trustworthy information tool.”

      Hammadi is a strong proponent of normalization. He spoke at a webinar in October 2020, after the UAE and Bahrain had announced their plan to normalize relations with Israel. The event was organized by a pro-Israeli think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). Hammadi said he believed in both peace and advancing the rights of Palestinians, but people like him who “speak in favor of peace are stigmatized … and find themselves falling under attack.” He added that the word normalizing “has a very negative connotation in our region.”

      In June, he drew the ire of African journalists with a ham-fisted attempt to have them join a coordinated media attack on the World Cup in Qatar. They adopted a resolution denouncing efforts to “use Africa and its institutions as political football in order to settle scores in a political dispute.” The statement said:

      “While journalists in the East African region struggle to preserve their independence and freedom from rogue government and commercial interests that threaten the integrity of journalists, an outside actor is behind attempts to manipulate, divert and involve journalists in an issue completely outside the scope and powers of journalists and their unions.
      In the same way that journalists and their unions in East Africa are calling, confronting and protesting against governments for their interference in the work of journalists and the curtailment of their freedoms, all foreign powers that have a negative and false agenda must be condemned and publicly challenged as a matter of principle and consistency.”

      Twelve days later, the website Emirates Leaks, citing what it called “reliable sources,” alleged that Hammadi had attempted to pressure the heads of the journalism unions of Norway and Finland. According to the site, he wanted them to influence journalism unions in Asia and Africa to “coordinate attacks against Qatar and tarnish its image before hosting the World Cup.”

      His efforts occasioned a written question on June 23 in the European Parliament from Fulvio Martusciello. The Italian MEP accused the head of the Emirates Journalists Association of leading a smear campaign against Qatar: “Al Hammadi asked the Finnish and Norwegian Journalists Federations to exercise influence on journalists unions that he supports financially to engage in the Abu Dhabi campaign and offend Qatar. He also tried to offer them financial bribes and expensive gifts in return for achieving Abu Dhabi’s inflammatory goals.”

      So, while Dubai can barely contain its World Cup excitement, Abu Dhabi appears set to continue its anti-Qatar campaign. Imagine for a moment that the UAE was a football side and its two big stars had separate agendas and were playing only for themselves. That is not a winning formula and it’s something a good manager, like England’s Gareth Southgate, would quickly sort out.

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      UAE Diplomats Accused in International Gold Smuggling Syndicate

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      The United Arab Emirates is one of the world’s major gold trading hubs. In 2019, it was the fifth-biggest importer and fourth-biggest exporter globally. During the COVID-19 pandemic, international demand has surged. But as Reuters reported in 2019, much of this gold is smuggled from West Africa and produced by artisanal and small-scale gold mining, a trade that funds armed conflict, costs producing countries in lost tax revenue and has significant consequences on public health and the environment.

      This is a story that has long been in the public domain: In 2020, the Financial Action Task Force published a report that stated: “The UAE’s understanding of the risks it faces from money laundering, terrorist financing and funding of weapons of mass destruction is still emerging … The risks are significant, and result from the UAE’s extensive financial, economic, corporate and trade activities, including as a global leader in oil, diamond and gold exports.”

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      In 2018, a UN report stated, “In every state [in the Economic Community of West African States region], it was reported that most of the gold exported from the region is destined for Dubai. Most of this gold is thought to be exported by plane; gold is thought to be smuggled, for the most part, out of the region through airports.”

      The UAE authorities have been facing increasingly strenuous calls to clean up their bullion trade. In 2019, an International Crisis Group report called on them to ensure income from the gold trade is not used to finance terrorism. In December 2020, the UK Home Office national risk assessment stated: “These deficiencies expose the UAE, and other countries, to abuse by international controller networks which continue to launder the proceeds of crime to and from countries including the UK. These criminal networks exploit features of the UAE’s laws and systems, in order to move cash and gold easily into and out of the country, as well as engage in money laundering through the UAE property market, international trade, and newer areas such as crypto assets.”

      Last year, the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), the world’s most influential gold market authority, threatened to stop UAE bullion from entering the mainstream market if it failed to meet regulatory standards. Since gold was the UAE’s largest export after oil in 2019, a trend that in a post-oil age looks only set to grow, the authorities responded by quickly pledging support for an LBMA initiative in December 2020 to crack down on illegal gold trading and improve regulation around issues like money laundering and unethical sourcing.

      Gold Discovered in India

      But recent developments in a court case in India are once again calling into question the UAE’s commitment to clean up its bullion trade. In June 2020, Indian customs discovered over 30 kilograms of gold worth — at the official market rate — more than $2.1 million. The gold was found in diplomatic baggage addressed to the UAE Consulate-General Office in Thiruvananthapuram, the capital of the southern Indian state of Kerala; it had been listed as bathroom fittings, noodles, biscuits and dates. The subsequent investigation has opened a Pandora’s Box of organized crime that has already led to around 30 arrests, including a host of alleged facilitators, financiers, gold traders, former employees of the UAE Consulate and a principal secretary to the Kerala chief minister.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The National Investigation Agency (NIA), which is India’s counterterrorism task force, and at least four other central government agencies are now conducting separate but related investigations into a US dollar smuggling operation from Thiruvananthapuram airport to Cairo via Muscat. The operation was allegedly run by the former UAE Consulate Finance Department head, Khaled Ali Shoukry, an Egyptian national. The other investigations involve corrupt schemes related to various local government projects in Kerala, including the Wadakanchery LIFE Mission housing project, which is funded by the UAE Red Crescent, and the Kerala Infrastructure Investment Fund Board.

      This is the first time UAE diplomats have ever been publicly implicated in gold smuggling. Emirati authorities have promised to cooperate, claiming they were duped by their Indian and Egyptian staff. But the former UAE consul general, Jamal Hussain al-Zaab, and Admin Attaché Rashed Khamis Ali Musaiqri both fled home last year before they could be questioned and are now claiming diplomatic immunity.

      However, a steady stream of information has been coming to light through disclosures in Kerala High Court. The NIA said 150 kilograms of gold was smuggled through Thiruvananthapuram airport in the last six months in a similar fashion, and most of the money was used for funding terrorism. According to sources quoted in Indian media, over 20 such consignments allegedly came to India from Dubai since September 2019, around 19 of which were addressed to the UAE consul general and one was in the name of the admin attaché. At the same time, senior Indian politicians linked to the case were enjoying five-star trips to the UAE.

      The Claims

      In March, the political temperature rose significantly when two of the key accused, Indian nationals employed in the consular office, testified that the UAE consul general was personally involved in the criminal enterprise. Swapna Suresh, formerly the consul general’s Arabic-language translator, and another employee, Sarith P.S., stated in an affidavit that the consul general, as well as several senior Indian politicians, were aware of the gold and dollar smuggling activities and were coordinating illegal financial dealings under the cover of various projects run by the state government.

      “Swapna and Sarith [the accused] stated that it was a common practice among foreign nationals, including diplomats working at UAE Consulate, to carry currency notes above permitted limits. We suspect that they were engaged in hawala activities to fund smuggling of gold from Dubai to Kerala. Similarly, they also smuggled goods from abroad using diplomatic privileges and sold them in the Kerala market. Many Indian employees of the consulate were aware of such activities and they will be questioned soon” an Indian customs official reportedly said.

      The UAE consul general, Swapna alleged, split a 3-million UAE dirham ($817,000) commission for the Wadakkanchery project three ways between himself, Shoukry and her. Another accused claimed the consul general and Shoukry were carrying out illegal gold smuggling activities while working in the UAE Mission in Vietnam before coming to Thiruvananthapuram.

      The Indian Ministry of External Affairs recently issued permission to arraign the former consul general and admin attaché who served at the UAE Consulate in Thiruvananthapuram. “Both of them assisted Swapna Suresh and Sarith PS to clear the baggage containing gold that arrived from the UAE. They also were receiving remuneration as per the quantity of gold smuggling on 21 occasions. They are equally involved as other accused persons,” an Indian customs official reportedly said.

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Arrest of Migrant Activist Puts Qatar in the Spotlight

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      Amnesty International recently called for the authorities to reveal the whereabouts of Malcolm Bidali, a Kenyan national who worked as a security guard in Qatar. According to Amnesty, he was “forcibly disappeared since 4 May, when he was taken from his labour accommodation for questioning by the state security service.”

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      Bidali, who blogs under the name Noah, has been a critic of the treatment of migrant workers in Qatar, a small Gulf state that is hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup. “A week before his arrest, Bidali gave a presentation to a large group of civil society organizations and trade unions about his experience of working in Qatar,” Amnesty noted.

      Migrant Workers in Qatar

      For Qatar, his story draws unwelcome attention to the treatment of migrant workers in the run-up to the World Cup. The Qataris had won praise for scrapping the notorious kafala sponsor system, which ties workers to their employers with terms similar to those of indentured laborers or, as some critics say, to slavery.

      In August 2020, the government announced reforms that included a minimum wage. The changes to labor law were hailed as a landmark in a region with an appalling record of mistreatment of migrant workers. Had the amendments been fully implemented, the conditions for migrant workers would have improved significantly. But more than a year and a half after the reforms were introduced, it is clear that little has changed for many migrants in Qatar.

      An Al Jazeera investigation in March 2021 revealed that “the majority of those interviewed experienced delays in the process as well as threats, harassment and exploitation by the sponsor, with some of the workers ending up in prison and eventually deported.” The report cited the case of a migrant from the Philippines who worked at a food stall. When she told her boss she wanted to leave and get a new job, she faced threats and harassment. Her ID was canceled and she had a court case brought against her, none of which should have happened with the new laws in place. “I thought the new laws were there to help us. All I did was try and seek a better job. I don’t think I’ve committed a crime to be facing these problems,” she said.

      Writing About Rights

      Bidali’s problems arose as a result of his blogs, which challenge the rosy narrative projected by the government. In a post titled, “Minimum Wage, Maximum Adjustment,” he writes:

      “‘Peanuts.’ That’s the first thing that comes to Simon’s mind when I ask him about the changes to the minimum wage. A security guard from Kenya, toiling in Msheireb Downtown Doha, a slave to the elements for the better part of 12 hours a day. He earns [in a month] QR1250 (USD340). Paid a recruitment agent QR4400 (USD1200) to get the job, and spent a further QR1100 on related expenses. ‘There’s no difference for us (security guards). What they should have done is stipulate the specifics, like working hours, working conditions… things like that. When you take away the food and housing allowance, compensation for the work we do isn’t considered at all. We work so hard. Long commutes, long hours on-site, sweating like crazy with this heat, stress, fatigue… we don’t even eat properly.’”

      Bidali writes the following in a blog titled, “The Privilege of a Normal Life”:

      “Qatar, like all [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries, makes it virtually impossible for the spouses and partners of low-income migrant workers to accompany them for the duration of their contract. Over an extended period of time devoid of affection and intimacy, desire manifests, ever so intense. The situation isn’t made any easier when you look around and all you see are other couples of privileged nationalities, strolling side by side, holding hands, or having a meal together, enjoying each other’s company. After a magical day or night out, they retreat to their homes, where they enjoy the luxury of privacy.”

      In other blogs, he writes of the crowded and unsanitary dormitories that workers, despite some improvements, are still forced to endure.

      Amnesty told Arab Digest that since his arrest, the migrant rights activist has been allowed one short phone call to his mother. He said to her he is being held in solitary confinement, which Amnesty described as “incredibly worrying.” He is being held in an unknown place, and there are fears that he may be subjected to torture.

      Claims by Qatari Authorities

      The treatment of Bidali by Qatari authorities stands in stark contrast to their claims of change in the Gulf state. In 2020, Yousuf Mohamed Al Othman Fakhroo, the labor minister, said Qatar is “committed to creating a modern and dynamic labour market.” He added that the reforms “mark a major milestone in this journey and will benefit workers, employers and the nation alike.” That thought was echoed at the time by the general secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Sharan Burrow, who described the changes as “a new dawn for migrant workers.” Both the ITUC and FIFA, world football’s governing body, had pushed hard for the reforms, using the World Cup as leverage.

      Last week, Amnesty provided Arab Digest with the following statement:

      “Three weeks after his arrest, we still have very little information on Malcolm Bidali’s fate. Despite our appeals and those of Malcolm’s mother, the government has continued to refuse to disclose his whereabouts or to explain the real reason for the ongoing detention of this courageous activist who risked his own safety to try to improve life for all migrant workers in the country. … If he is detained solely on the basis of his legitimate human rights work he must be released immediately and unconditionally, and at an absolute minimum he should be granted access to a lawyer. Such practice by the Qatar authorities sends a clear signal that it will not tolerate migrant workers speaking out and claiming their rights, and can spread fear amongst activists and other workers.”

      The ITUC and FIFA have not commented publicly on the detention and disappearance of Malcolm Bidali. For weeks, the government had only confirmed his arrest and that he was being investigated for “violating Qatar’s security laws and regulations.” He has since been “charged with receiving payment to spread disinformation in the country,” Al Jazeera reports.

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Is Assad Gearing Up for a Final Push in Syria?

      by

      Ceasefires in Syria come and go, and so do the meetings between the outside players who hold it in their hands to determine if an end to the country’s 9-year civil war is in sight. The most recent meeting in Ankara between Turkish and Russian military officers was intended to discuss issues at a “technical level” in both the Syrian and Libyan theaters of war. Not much was achieved, with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reportedly calling the session “unproductive.” The minister called for the ceasefire to continue and insisted that “there must be more focus on political negotiations,” a sentiment few can disagree with but one that seems most unlikely to be realized in the near to middle future.

      Russia’s state-controlled Sputnik news agency reported that what it called a “source” had said that the Turks had declined to evacuate five observation posts in Syria’s Idlib province. According to the source, “After the Turkish side refused to withdraw the Turkish observation points and insisted on keeping them, it was decided to reduce the number of Turkish forces present in Idlib and to withdraw heavy weapons from the area.”

      A Coming Catastrophe

      Whether that is the case has yet to be confirmed. However, it was enough for the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) to issue a somber warning: “Turkey may have agreed to cede control of Southern Idlib to pro-Assad forces in a meeting with Russia September 16. If the reports of a deal are true, a pro-Assad offensive is likely imminent.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      The ISW buttresses its argument by noting that Turkey had already withdrawn hundreds of its forces from southern Idlib on September 8. Turkey’s claim that the withdrawal is the result of rising tensions with Greece over hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean were treated with skepticism by the ISW: “Turkey may have used its dispute with Greece as cover for action consistent with an impending deal with Russia in Idlib.”

      This may, indeed, be the “political negotiations” that Cavusoglu was speaking of. If so, and if an assault on what remains of Idlib in rebel hands is imminent, then it signals likely catastrophe for civilians trapped between advancing Assad forces and jihadist militias. Were the US not in the middle of a presidential race and were the incumbent in the White House not so inclined to call for the complete withdrawal of US forces from Syria (only to change his mind when presented with the outcomes of such a move), then there would be grounds for more hope for the civilian population of Idlib.

      But such is not the case. And beyond President Donald Trump’s view that, as he expressed it, “People said to me, ‘Why are you staying in Syria?’ Because I kept the oil, which frankly we should have done in Iraq,” uncertainty about just what America’s intentions in Syria are remains very much in play. It is a factor that other external players, that is the Russians, the Turks and Iran, can all exploit as they seek to advance their strategic efforts at the expense of the Syrian people.

      Old Enemies

      It is a situation that has left the 500 or so US troops still in Syria and their allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in a vulnerable and exposed place, a point the Pentagon clearly gets, even if the commander-in-chief doesn’t. Announcing a deployment of Bradley fighting vehicles to Eastern Syria on September 19, a Pentagon spokesperson stated: “These actions are a clear demonstration of US resolve to defend Coalition forces in the [Eastern Syria Security Area], and to ensure that they are able to continue their Defeat-ISIS mission without interference. The Defense Department has previously deployed Bradleys to northeast Syria pursuant to these goals.”

      That deployment reflects a growing concern that, as documented by ISW and others, the Islamic State (IS) is resurging in Syria. Its recent attacks have been aimed at tribal elders who support the SDF and at efforts to develop governance capabilities that benefit civilians by removing festering grievances that the jihadists seek to exploit.

      For their part, the Russians, playing on fears that the SDF Kurdish leadership has concerning an abrupt American withdrawal, may strive to build on pushing the Kurds to seek some sort of rapprochement with Damascus, thus hastening a US departure. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Russians were crucial to a deal in October last year that saw the Kurds cede territory to Assad forces and withdraw rather than face a Turkish offensive in northern Syria.

      Meanwhile, the ISW’s Jennifer Cafarella argues that a sudden withdrawal without a strategic endgame plays straight into the hands of not just Russia and Iran; it emboldens a rising IS and empowers the jihadist ideology it shares with America’s oldest enemy in its war on terror, al- Qaeda.

      Al-Qaeda has played a long game, happy for IS to take the brunt of the West’s military response. Cafarella says that while a global coalition led by America came together to defeat the caliphate (and force ISI into a guerrilla insurgency), the same cannot be said for al-Qaeda. “We have not been able to reach the same level of understanding with our allies and partners and that is in part because Al Qaeda is playing this much more sophisticated political game that in the long run, I do very much worry, could outflank us.”

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More