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      Israel Will Continue Disregarding International Law

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      The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is now in its 72nd year. Israel has been given renewed impetus after agreeing to the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates on August 13, when the two states announced the normalization of diplomatic relations. Bahrain soon followed in Abu Dhabi’s footsteps.

      Now, along with Sudan, there are five Arab countries that recognize Israel, and there are rumors that others like Oman will join the bandwagon. This recent development could have implications for the Palestinians, including the bitter realization that Arab and Muslim countries are betraying them. A 2019 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that nearly 80% of Palestinians feel they are abandoned by Arab states.

      The task of bringing Israel into compliance with its obligations as the occupying power vis-à-vis the Palestinians has become ever more convoluted. UN Security Council resolutions addressing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are routinely disregarded by the Israelis. A case in point is the Security Council Resolution 2334, adopted in 2016, which terms Israel’s settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “a flagrant violation under international law.”

      Amid Normalization With Israel, Sudan’s Future Hangs in the Balance

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      Richard Seaford is a professor emeritus of classics and ancient history at the University of Exeter, United Kingdom. A distinguished scholar, he has been a fellow of the National Humanities Center in North Carolina and a member of the British Committee for the Universities of Palestine.

      In this edition of The Interview, Fair Observer talks to Seaford about the Israeli public’s perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Donald Trump’s “deal of the century,” and the global reception of the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement.

      The transcript has been edited for clarity. This interview took place in summer 2020.

      Kourosh Ziabari: How do Israel’s political, intelligence and military elites, particularly those on the right, perceive the status quo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The Israeli author Micah Goodman believes the dominant narrative is no longer about the “sanctity of the settlements, the fulfillment of biblical prophecies, and imminent redemption.” Rather, for him, the main concern is guaranteed security. Do you agree with this assumption? Can it be inferred that Israeli leaders are prepared for a compromise with the Palestinians, and possibly making territorial concessions, provided that their security concerns are addressed?

      Richard Seaford: The answer to both questions is no. The Israeli elite is no doubt concerned about security, and I recognize the problems that they face. But if security was their main motive, they would have established, and could still establish, an impregnable state on their own in pre-1967 borders, if necessary with a massive wall and all the sophisticated technology available to them.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Instead, they have illegally filled with settlements conquered land that belongs not to Israel but to more than 2 million Palestinian Arabs. In doing so, they have made a two-state solution impossible and created a further massive security problem that is used to justify unbearable suffering for the Palestinians and the further expansion of settlements. No doubt some of the elite are aware of the present and future nightmare created by this expansionism, but there is no sign of any political will to do anything substantial about it.

      The basic problem is that Israel is a military superpower up against a defenseless people — the Palestinians — with no genuine international pressure to prevent Israel from stealing as much land as it wants.

      Ziabari: In late June, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres told a meeting of the Security Council that Israel’s plans to annex swaths of the West Bank would threaten the vision of a two-state solution and represent a most serious violation of international law. Since the Trump administration has reversed the US position on the settlements and no longer considers them a breach of international law, do you expect the Security Council to take action to block further annexations? Is there any legal barrier dissuading Israel from annexing more West Bank lands?

      Seaford: No! Firstly, the past record of the Security Council does not encourage the belief that it will take action to require Israel to conform to international law and UN resolutions.

      Secondly, there is no reason to believe that Israel will reverse its decades-long disregard of international law, especially given the encouragement now given to its lawbreaking by Trump. A Biden government may not continue the policy of encouraging illegality, but it will probably do nothing substantial to prevent it.

      Western countries adopted sanctions against the Russian Federation after rightly regarding its annexation of Crimea in 2014 — after a referendum there — as a violation of international law. But when Israel illegally annexed East Jerusalem in 1980 and the Golan Heights in 1981, where were the sanctions? The double standards are so obvious as to be embarrassing, and they encourage Israel to further acts of illegal annexation.

      According to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, “the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territories it occupies.” The United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Court of Justice and the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, among others, have, unsurprisingly, all affirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the territories occupied by Israel. Trump has, in order to please his base, de facto withdrawn from the Geneva conventions.  

      Ziabari: In August 2018, the Trump administration suspended all US funding for UNRWA, the UN program supporting Palestinian refugees. UNRWA is now believed to face a major financial challenge, hindering its ability to provide education for 520,000 students, health care for 3 million patients and food assistance for 1.7 million refugees. On other occasions, the Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland and other countries have also cut or reduced their contributions. In what ways will these cuts affect the prosperity and wellbeing of the Palestinian people?

      Seaford: To cut off funding for those who live in some of the worst conditions in the world, while maintaining much more funding for the state that has dispossessed them, speaks for itself. A [recent] letter appeared in The Guardian signed by numerous European senior politicians stating that UNRWA needs funding desperately, not least to use its proven expertise in preventing the coronavirus from spreading through densely populated Palestinian refugee camps in the region.

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      Apart from the further intensification of the misery of the Palestinians, there are two less obvious consequences of the defunding. One is the potential for an increase in regional instability caused by the despair. The other is to diminish yet further the standing of the US in the region and in the world generally. One effect that the defunding will not have is the one desired by Trump: to force the Palestinians to give up their claim to their homeland.

      Ziabari: The United States has long worked to position itself as an intermediary in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. President Trump has renewed efforts to play this role by tabling his long-awaited “deal of the century.” Does this deal make any positive contribution to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Given the Palestinians’ lukewarm and uninterested response, does it have any chance of being successfully implemented?

      Seaford: No. The idea that the US is a neutral intermediary in the conflict is now absurd. The discussions that produced the “deal of the century” entirely excluded the Palestinians. It gives Israel virtually everything that it wants, and the Palestinians virtually nothing of what they want. It confirms the illegal expansionism of Israel, gives the Palestinians limited control of the fragments of a very small part of their historic homeland, and leaves by far the largest part of it to a state formed and controlled by 20th-century Jewish emigrants to Palestine and their descendants.

      I could go on and on detailing the one-sidedness of the plan. But people may be thinking: Why propose a plan that is so absurdly one-sided that it has no chance of being agreed by both sides?

      One answer might be the sheer ignorance of the people responsible for it — for example, Jared Kushner. But the more substantial reason is a kind of propaganda that has been used in the past. The plan helps to instill in the millions who do not bother to ascertain the details of the idea that Trump is trying to create peace, and that the Palestinians are being unreasonable in rejecting it.

      Ziabari: The UAE recently announced normalized relations with Israel. Negotiations are also underway between Israel and Oman. Why do you think a growing number of Muslim, Arab states are leaning toward forging closer relations with Israel? What are the implications for the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people?

      Seaford: The causes of the Gulf states’ rapprochement with Israel include their fear of Iran, the various consequences of the Arab Spring, and perhaps also the steep decline in the price of oil over the last few years, which will endanger states that are almost entirely dependent on it.

      However, the rapprochement should not be exaggerated on the basis of a few highly publicized statements or events. For the elites of the Gulf states, whose only concern is to remain in power, it retains its dangers. Surveys show that concern for the Palestinians amongst Arabs has generally risen, rather than fallen, over the past few years.

      The UAE has long had commercial and security links with Israel, and its claim to have averted annexation of parts of the West Bank in exchange for normalizing relations is bogus. The annexation was postponed earlier, for other reasons. Anyway, the fact is that the Arab states over the last decades have not succeeded in improving the political position of the Palestinians. What they have provided is financial support, which continues.

      Ziabari: Efforts are underway by independent scholars, public figures, artists and athletes as well as some businesses in Europe to boycott the Israeli government, institutions and universities in the framework of the BDS movement. What are the costs for Israel? Will it be induced into changing its policies?

      Seaford: The costs to Israel are so far not great in material terms, but there are some cultural and academic consequences. The reason why Israel and its apologists do so much to combat BDS by the anti-Semitism slur is what it calls its delegitimating effect. BDS does not, of course, seek to destroy the state of Israel. What it seeks to delegitimate is its defiance of international law and of UN resolutions.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Citizens, when their governments have abdicated all concern with international law, feel that they must act to enforce it. And the most immediate way of acting is to adopt the boycott personally, as well as urging companies to divest and governments to apply sanctions. Anybody can do it.

      Moreover, the call for BDS becomes a way of creating publicity and raising consciousness of the crimes of Israel. It is this change of opinion, especially among US students, that Israel fears, because it may eventually, though not any time soon, limit their expansionism. Israel will be induced to change its policies only by external pressure, a combination of the reduction in the massive amount of US aid, with diplomatic pressure, sanctions, boycott and divestment — the kind of combination that helped to end apartheid in South Africa.

      One imagined objection to BDS says: But what about the horrible things going on elsewhere? What is unique about Israel is the combination of illegal colonization, the inaction of governments and that the victims by a large majority are asking us to boycott. When someone who is being beaten up and robbed asks me to do something simple, safe and legal to help, I do it. Wouldn’t you? I boycotted apartheid South Africa, and so consistency requires me to boycott Israel, or anywhere else with the same combination of circumstances.

      Ziabari: Have international organizations and blocs, including the United Nations and European Union, lost their competence in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Israel is the subject of several dozen Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions, but it continues to defy them. How is it possible to be brought into compliance?

      Seaford: The answer to the first question is yes, and the answer to the second is that Israel will be brought into compliance only by external pressure. There are many good and brave Israelis who deserve our support, but any idea that the Israelis may elect a government that wants to dismantle the settlements, comply with international law and so on has been shown by the last few decades, especially recently, to be fantasy. A just peace will come only from citizens in other states, especially the US, raising consciousness and electing governments that will exercise the required pressure on Israel. It is our historic responsibility.

      In the UK, in the 1980s, there were only a few thousand of us in the anti-apartheid movement. But Western politicians who had done nothing to help the imprisoned Nelson Mandela or isolate apartheid attended his funeral [in 2013]. When we succeed in dissolving Israeli apartheid, there will be numerous Western politicians who will falsely take the credit. But it feels better to have changed history than to pretend to have done so. 

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Kuwait Succession: Keeping the Boat Steady in Troubled Waters

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      On September 29, Kuwaiti Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah passed away after ruling for 14 years. Messages of condolences flooded from all over the world to mourn a statesman who will be remembered as a respected mediator in a troubled region. After serving for 40 years as foreign minister, Emir Sabah had earned robust diplomatic credentials which he harnessed during his reign to mediate in various crises, from Iraq to the Gulf Cooperation Council standoff, from Yemen to the Iran-Arab Gulf confrontation.

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      The late Kuwaiti emir managed to uphold a balanced position and steady policy for his country throughout the 2010s, despite increasing regional polarization. With his passing, the Middle East has lost an important peacemaker. The newly appointed Emir Nawaf al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, the late emir’s half-brother, now faces the task of keeping Kuwait on track amid domestic and external challenges.

      Who is Who in the al-Sabah Family?

      Emir Nawaf, who is 83, stepped onto the throne immediately after the death of his predecessor, as is customary in royal law. The new emir built his career in the security sector, serving as interior and defense minister of Kuwait, as well as the deputy chief of the national guard. Emir Nawaf has never taken outright positions on key political matters and has stayed outside the spotlight throughout his career. His approach is unlikely to change during his reign, something that leads experts to foresee an overall continuity with the policies and positions of his predecessor.

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      The profile of the new crown prince who is next in the line of succession, Meshaal al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, reflects that of the emir in terms of both security background and low profile. Like Emir Nawaf, 80-year-old Meshaal al-Sabah also served at the interior ministry and has largely contributed to shaping the national guard since 2004. Notably, the crown prince was nominated by the emir and approved by the national assembly just one week after the succession. And although Emir Sabah’s illness had given enough time to the ruling family to make internal decisions, the swift transition has also been orchestrated to send a signal of stability inside and outside the country.

      There are two main takeaways from the choice of Meshaal al-Sabah as crown prince. First, the al-Ahmad branch of the royal family consolidates its position in the line of succession. The al-Sabah family is indeed made of two branches, al-Jaber and al-Salem, which have alternated as emirs of Kuwait. With Meshaal, the al-Jaber branch has set its third consecutive member in the line of succession, after Emir Sabah and Emir Nawaf.

      Compensation to the al-Salem branch will probably come in the form of senior government positions. Secondly, there has been no shift toward the next generation of the family as happened elsewhere in other Gulf monarchies. Several experts indeed expected a move similar to that taken by King Salman of Saudi Arabia, who moved on to the next generation of the family by appointing his son, Muhammad Bin Salman, as crown prince in 2015.

      Two members of the al-Sabah’s next generation are poised to race for leadership, if not now, then at least in the foreseeable future, given the age of the current and next incumbents. One is Emir Sabah’s son, Nasser al-Sabah. He is the mastermind of the national development plan, New Kuwait 2035, to boost private investment and reduce economic dependency from oil revenues. But Sheikh Nasser Sabah is also heralding the fight against corruption.

      This role rallied popular support around him and allowed him to target the former prime minister and the interior minister, two potential competitors, amid a corruption scandal in 2019. Another family member is often mentioned among competitors for power is Nasser al-Mohammad, a nephew of the late emir who was forced to step down after a public outcry against him in 2011.

      Challenges Ahead

      Portrayed as guarantors of stability, the new emir and crown prince will have to deal with domestic and external questions from the very beginning. The first challenge ahead is the parliamentary election scheduled for November. The Kuwaiti national assembly is by and large the region’s most powerful parliamentary body given its veto right on legislation and the right to take away confidence from individual ministers. In recent times, the assembly has often clashed with the government, causing deadlock and leading the emir to dissolve the parliament on multiple occasions. As a signal of appeasement with the assembly, Nawaf al-Sabah met with two opposition figures and received a list of demands back in September.

      Parliamentary support will be essential for his highness’ government to pass critical legislation on financial borrowing. The recent oil price crisis has severely depleted state coffers. This year, Kuwait’s debt has soared to $46 billion, around 33% of the GDP, due to a combination of extraordinary expenditures to fight COVID-19 and falling oil revenues. These factors motivated Moody’s decision to downgrade Kuwait from A1 to Aa2 for the first time at the end of September. Another reason the rating agency mentioned in its report was the inability of the wealthy Gulf monarchy to borrow money abroad.

      Embed from Getty Images

      But here, the parliament comes back into the picture. The Kuwaiti executive cannot issue sovereign bonds on international markets without previous approval from the national assembly. Back in August, the parliament turned down a bill allowing the government to issue external bonds. But once a new legislature comes into effect, and given Kuwait’s dangerous financial situation, the government will likely put forward a similar bill again.

      Besides immediate financial concerns, Kuwait wants to undergo structural reforms not dissimilar from those of its fellow monarchies across the Gulf. That is the idea behind the national development plan that should reduce the share of oil revenues in the economy from 90% to one-third, according to its designers. Kuwait’s “vision” centers around large-scale infrastructural projects, like the Mubarak al-Kabir port and Silk City, the $86-billion town under construction that is expected to become a pivot along China’s New Silk Road.

      Another key reform concerns subsidies, in particular on fuel, since it takes the lion share in the state budget. The first attempts at reform had been made at the time of the 2008 financial crisis, but they have repeatedly faced opposition from the national assembly. Such rejection of reforms was not the result of opportunistic behavior by MPs but reflected a widespread sentiment among Kuwaitis who fear that subsidy reforms and a structural transition would undermine their position within a post-rentier economy. These are but the main domestic challenges that the new emir and the crown prince will have to confront.

      Consequences for the Region

      For Kuwait, external challenges equal domestic ones. Kuwait has been the main broker of intra-Gulf dialogue to solve the standoff between Qatar on one side, and Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. While Kuwait’s mediating strategy is here to stay, the absence of an experienced negotiator such as Emir Sabah behind the process will likely hinder its impact. At the same time, Crown Prince Meshaal is allegedly close to Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a result of the years spent leading security cooperation against the Muslim Brotherhood along with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In support of this claim, the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman reportedly called Meshaal al-Sabah both before and after his appointment as crown prince.

      The prospects of a region-wide dialogue involving Iran and Saudi Arabia might be similarly affected. Along with Oman, Kuwait has repeatedly called on the two shores of the Persian Gulf to come to the negotiation table. The European Union and other international actors saw Kuwait as the best-positioned country to host and drive any mediation initiative. Nevertheless, a combination of domestic concerns and the lack of a recognized mediator in the monarchy’s leadership might undermine such efforts. On 27 September, the Kuwaiti prime minister proposed a regional dialogue to defuse regional tensions but, unsurprisingly, only Tehran responded positively to the call.

      The passing of Emir Sabah has deprived Kuwait of a shrewd statesman. The new incumbents will try to maintain the Gulf monarchy on its track. Yet domestic challenges abound, and external pressures to abandon neutrality will likely be reinforced. Withing the al-Sabah family, the next generation is waiting to enter into the line of succession, positing major challenges for Emir Nawaf and Crown Prince Meshaal.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Amid Normalization With Israel, Sudan’s Future Hangs in the Balance

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      On October 23, the Trump administration announced the agreement between Israel and Sudan to normalize relations. Ordinarily, such an agreement would be good for both countries. But for Sudan, still struggling with imposing democratic norms after decades of brutal dictatorship, it could come at a price. The accord marks another step toward Israel’s long-sought acceptance in the Middle East. The agreement is especially noteworthy for Sudan’s role in the notorious Khartoum Resolution’s “Three Nos” — no negotiation, no recognition and no peace with Israel – declared at the Arab League summit in 1967 following the Arabs’ embarrassing defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War.

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      The agreement hardly portends the economic, trade and security benefits that will follow from Israel’s earlier agreements with the United Arab Emirates or even Bahrain. Sudan’s economy is on the ropes, suffering from a brittle political climate, rampant corruption, punishing sanctions imposed by the US since 1993 as a state sponsor of terrorism (SST) and the concomitant economic isolation, the sharp fall in oil revenues following South Sudan’s independence, and continuing internal instability. Israel stands little to gain other than one more embassy in an Arab nation.

      Normalization Amidst a Transition

      Sudan, on the other hand, could potentially benefit longer term from Israel’s vaunted economy and the resulting technology transfer and investment. But the latter depends on the very action that the accord could jeopardize. Sudan is engaged in an existential transition. Its former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown in April last year following five months of massive and violent popular demonstrations throughout the country, especially in the capital Khartoum. Among his many crimes, al-Bashir had allowed al-Qaida to set up operations in Sudan in the 1990s and had ordered a genocide in the Darfur region in the early 2000s.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Al-Bashir’s successor was also removed as Sudanese opposition groups united to assert their growing power and demands for democratic reforms in the country. But merely removing two autocrats wasn’t sufficient, and the opposition has been locked in negotiations with entrenched interests among the security and intelligence services and the armed forces over the country’s political future.

      A transitional government, led by technocratic Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, is now engaged in a herculean effort to shed Sudan’s international pariah status, reintegrate the country into the international community, activate a moribund economy and establish the foundations for a durable democracy. To complicate his task, Hamdok faces resistance from the recalcitrant, self-interested class of al-Bashir leftovers in the armed forces and security and intelligence services. In addition, he must also now contend with dissent within the democratic opposition. Key members of this fragile coalition of opposition groups backing democracy have already announced their opposition to normalization.

      So, Sudan’s future hangs in the balance. Mixing the Israel normalization agreement into this steaming political cauldron is hardly likely to quell things. For one, there has been no public dialog about normalization after more than a half-century of estrangement from and antipathy toward the Jewish state. With national elections still two years away, Hamdok rightly understood that as interim prime minister he had no mandate to proceed with normalization and told US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as much earlier this month. He likely recalled the similarly rushed Israel-Lebanon peace agreement in the midst of the Lebanese Civil War in 1983, subsequently revoked by the Lebanese parliament after less than a year. (The Israelis may also be thinking the same thing.)

      However, Trump and Pompeo had Hamdok and the interim government over a barrel. Sudan’s efforts to return to the international economic fold hinged on the US lifting its sanctions on Sudan. The government had already agreed to pay $335 million in reparations to the victims and families of the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi embassy bombings, which had been the principal condition for lifting the sanctions. Pompeo already had the authority to lift the onerous SST restrictions.

      Desperate Need of Votes

      Donald Trump’s flagging political fortunes intervened. He calculated that notching a third Arab country on his Israel normalization belt would burnish his foreign policy credentials in the election. He even tried to win Benjamin Netanyahu’s endorsement in a phone call, asking the Israeli prime minister if he thought “Sleepy Joe,” a disparaging reference to his Democratic opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden, could have negotiated such a deal. The supremely wily Israeli politician demurred, however, merely expressing Israel’s appreciation for all of America’s efforts on behalf of Israel. Israelis watch American polls, too.

      In an act of what only can be seen as desperation in the face of trailing numbers in US national presidential polls, Donald Trump bragged to Netanyahu of a diplomatic achievement in negotiating — let’s call it by its real name, strong-arming — a weak and struggling nation into accepting a normalization deal with Israel. In an even more obvious sign of Trump’s fear of becoming a one-term president, he pressured a country he likely had in mind in his infamous declaration on “shithole countries” in January 2018.

      Sudan isn’t good enough for Trump’s America, but it will do as Israel’s newest diplomatic partner. That Trump did not grasp this irony only underscores his gross ineptitude and neophyte status in foreign policy. The real tragedy, however, is that the Sudanese people’s heroic struggle for democracy, already pursued at great sacrifice, is further freighted. Regardless of how the Sudanese may feel about their nation’s new ties to Israel, the enemies of their freedom and democracy will surely use this as a political cudgel to thwart Prime Minister Hamdok and the allied groups. Normalization with Israel could have waited. Democracy cannot.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Does Saad Hariri Really Believe He Can Save Lebanon?

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      My parents used to say, “Eat with your mouth and not your eyes.” This may be good advice for newly-minted Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri. He is clearly unable to resist trying once again to raise Lebanon from its deathbed, and this time the consequences may be more disastrous than just a bit of heartburn. Yes, I’m sure his supporters see this as the ultimate act of patriotism, and hopefully, he will be successful, but the odds are against him.

      First of all, Hariri is a well-known figure who understands the political calculus of his supporters and opponents. Yet this is not similar to his deal that brought the presidency to Michel Aoun in 2016. The reforms called for, and that Hariri has said he supports, are literally aimed at dismantling the edifice of economic and political corruption that has led to the erosion of Lebanon’s well-being.

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      Secondly, there is the matter of the timeframe called for under the French plan for change that serves as Hariri’s point of reference. It calls for significant reforms underway in six months as well as capital controls, anti-corruption measures, a robust social safety net and radical changes to how the government and banking system operate. Hariri, a three-time prime minister, has said that he will accept a government with a shelf life of six months and focus on the political and economic reforms to refresh and reinvigorate the country.

      Will the oligarchy, of which he is a member, yield to his office the necessary executive authority to bypass parliament to enact laws and regulations? There is no brotherly bond or even public tolerance between Hariri and Gebran Bassil, leader of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement. So, will the prime minister’s reliance on Hezbollah’s support bring him into the cross-hairs of US sanctions?

      A major sticking point will be the composition of the Hariri cabinet, which he promised will be made up of “nonpolitically aligned experts with the mission of economic, financial, and administrative reforms contained in the French initiative road map.” The downfall of the most recent prime minister, Mustapha Adib, was over this exact point, and it is a road too far for many of the political elites.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Finally, how much longer will the Lebanese people put up with leaders who are more concerned with their patrimony and their constituents rather than the health, safety and well-being of the country? Hariri may have the best of intentions, but we know which way that road can lead. As Al Jazeera reports, “Hariri’s return marks the biggest challenge yet for activists involved in the nationwide uprising against the country’s corrupt political class that had led to the resignation of Hariri and his coalition government last year.”

      The economic realities are well known, ranging from extensive corruption to government mismanagement and a failed government model built on cronyism. Soon, more than 70% of the people could be below the poverty line as the Lebanese pound has lost 80% of its value, unemployment is around 35% and people struggle with restrictions limiting access to their funds in banks. According to journalist Souad Lazkani, as many as 1 million will be unemployed by 2021 unless, by some miracle, reforms are urgently implemented by the new government.

      Deja Vu

      Hariri’s restart as prime minister is dreaded by many in the street who feel a sense of deja vu from the last decade. “Hariri’s return is the peak of the counter-revolution,” Nizar Hassan, a political activist told Al Jazeera. “A pillar of the political establishment, a multi-millionaire who represents the banks and foreign interests, and a symbol of inefficient governance and widespread corruption: He represents everything we revolted against.”

      So, the demonstrators who have been protesting for several months have to decide whether to publicly oppose these latest steps to maintain the status quo or come up with an alternative that, hopefully, will be nonviolent. With the hyperinflation that has caused shortages of basic goods like medicine and foods, the growing instability and dwindling prospects for change, Lebanon faces a very difficult winter.

      This is Hariri’s multilayered and multifaceted challenge. As he assembles his cabinet and prepares his ministerial statement of his government’s vision, he will be watched closely by people hoping that he can rise above the sectarian politics of the past, as well as by those who are most threatened by reforms. It is a difficult road ahead indeed.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      When It Comes to Israel, Saudi Arabia Is Playing an Astute Game

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      The lengthy interview that Prince Bandar bin Sultan gave to Al Arabiya English has been the subject of much commentary. On October 9, the BBC weighed in with an article headlined “Signs Saudis Edging Toward Historic Peace Deal.” Analysis by security correspondent Frank Gardner drew heavily on the Bandar interview to argue that “a Saudi-Israeli peace deal, while not necessarily imminent, is now a real possibility.” Gardner suggested that the changes initiated by the “maverick” Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman augured well for such a deal: “Women can now drive, there is public entertainment, and the country is slowly opening up to tourism.” A very conservative society was being readied for a potentially dramatic move — the recognition of the state of Israel.

      Had Prince Bandar’s been the only recent voice of a senior ruling family member on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, then it could be said that such a move was well and truly underway. However, like Bandar, another former Saudi ambassador and intelligence head had given interviews in English to both Arabian Business and to CNBC. His comments, however, have received little analysis.

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      Whereas Prince Bandar had castigated the Palestinian leadership for failing to grasp numerous opportunities — “they always bet on the losing side” was one of his more pungent denunciations — Prince Turki bin Faisal did not follow the same path. He chose to reiterate Saudi government support for the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative that called for recognition of the state of Israel by all Arab countries in return for the withdrawal of occupation forces and settler communities from the West Bank, recognition of a border on the 1967 Green Line and East Jerusalem as the capital of an independent Palestine.

      Where the Kingdom Stands

      Speaking to Arabian Business on September 26, Prince Turki was unequivocal: “Government officials have expressed the view that the kingdom is committed to the Arab Peace Initiative and will not change that position until there is a sovereign Palestinian state with its capital as East Jerusalem. We have not moved from that position in spite of what Mr. Netanyahu is throwing in, either through innuendo or smirk, smirk, winks at, particularly, Western media. … This is where the kingdom stands on this issue.”

      He made no mention of Jared Kushner’s Peace to Prosperity plan that would see much of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, annexed by Israel with Palestinians left with non-contiguous pockets of land, without East Jerusalem as a capital and a very constrained and encumbered semi-state beholden to the Israelis for its survival. In other words, the Swiss-cheese effect that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long privately presented as his ultimate solution to the Palestinian question is realized with the Kushner deal.

      Turki did, however, comment favorably on a Joe Biden presidency, saying that the former vice president “is not ignorant of the value of the relationship, he knows the kingdom and recognizes the importance of this relationship.” In endorsing Biden, the prince took a sly, though unstated, dig at the ignorance of President Donald Trump and his attitude that the Saudis are a cash cow, useful for weapons sales and little else unless that be to normalize relations with Israel.

      He had been less diplomatic in the interview with CNBC’s Hadley Gamble on September 23. Gamble had asked him if his father, King Faisal, would have been disappointed with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain’s recognition of Israel without a two-state solution for the Palestinians being first arrived at. “Most definitely,” he replied, “that’s my personal view knowing his commitment to getting a quid pro quo between Israel and Arab countries.” He noted the oil sanctions that Faisal had invoked in 1973 during the Ramadan War was to “force the United States to be an honest broker between Israel and the Arab world. I must say that President Trump is not such an honest broker, so yes, I think the late king would have been disappointed.” Prince Turki carefully sidestepped a question about splits in the ruling family over Palestine while noting that the Arab Peace Initiative has been “reaffirmed by King Salman many times, most recently in cabinet meetings last week and the week before.”

      Astute Game

      Gardner, in his piece about Bandar’s attack on the Palestinian leadership, writes: “Such words, said a Saudi official close to the ruling family, would not have been aired on Saudi-owned television without the prior approval of both King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.” He is entirely correct in that statement, and the same is true for Prince Turki. He, too, could only have spoken so frankly with the knowledge that his comments had prior approval. So what is going on here with these very different takes on the Israel-Palestine conflict from two royal greybeards who have, thus far, survived the several purges Mohammed bin Salman has inflicted on the ruling family?

      A clear indication that Turki al Faisal was on secure ground were the comments by the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, as part of a lengthy interview he gave to the Washington Institute on October 15. Prince Faisal averred that the kingdom was committed to the process of finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and part of the process was “an eventual normalization with Israel as envisioned by the Arab Peace Plan.” Regarding Bandar’s attack on the leadership he said: “That’s Prince Bandar’s opinion. I believe that the Palestinian leaders genuinely want what’s best for their people.”

      Take it all as a sign that in this, at least, the often headstrong Saudi crown prince is playing a more astute game: on the one hand supporting the Trump line on Palestine and normalization while on the other implacably rejecting it. Maybe, Mohammed bin Salman seems to be saying, we are for it but then maybe we are not. If so, it is an eerie echo of what President Trump said when asked if the crown prince had ordered the killing of the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi: “It could very well be that the crown prince had knowledge of this tragic event — maybe he did and maybe he didn’t!”

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      What Would a Biden Victory Spell for US-Turkish Relations?

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      In an interview for a new book from Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward, US President Donald Trump says: “I get along very well with Erdogan, even though you’re not supposed to because everyone says, ‘What a horrible guy.’” A lot is revealed in that statement. The key lies in the phrase “you’re not supposed to.” It implies there is a moral authority vetting such preferences and that he is dismissive of that moral authority.

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      Of course, it says more about the moral fault lines at the heart of US politics than it does about US-Turkish relations. These fault lines are being given the scorched earth treatment once more as the election season draws to a close. But what does the future hold for US-Turkish relations, once so unshakable and now so fractious, despite President Trump’s personal warmth toward Recep Tayyip Erdogan? Will it make any difference if the old man at the helm is Joe Biden instead?

      Let the Old Men Talk

      As the above quote reveals, much about US-Turkish relations today is being driven by personalities. Individuals always matter in international relations, but their importance is accentuated by the rise of figures who command strong populist appeal, who are firmly embedded in positions of power and who espouse an essentially patriarchal and conservative vision of the exercise of that power. It means relations are not the smooth ride they were during the Cold War era. Today, these populist figures thrive on being bullish and awkward leaders.

      In Donald Trump, Turkey’s leader, like many others, has found a man with whom they can engage. Indeed, President Erdogan is said to have a regular hotline to the White House. The US president is openly admiring of strong and often autocratic leadership. It’s a style he clearly feels he epitomized in the business world and which he has brought to his presidency. That his tenure as the president of the United States may be briefer than that of many of the populist and autocratic leaders he admires is the one spoiler.

      It may also be a spoiler for the US more broadly. In the past few years, such world leaders have grown self-confident in the global order lead by Donald Trump. A Biden administration that chastises them for their faults on human rights, conflict resolution or democratic norms might well receive a hostile response. This poses a conundrum for the United States. A president who set out specifically to put America first may have made it far harder for a successor who wants to begin collaborating again.

      What Would Biden Do?

      The signs are that as president, Joe Biden would not have as easy a relationship with Erdogan as Trump has had. Given that getting on with Turkey has increasingly come to mean getting on with its president, this matters a great deal. Almost a year ago, Biden said in an interview with The New York Times that he regarded Erdogan as an “autocrat.” He also expressed misgivings about Turkey’s actions in Syria, confrontations in the eastern Mediterranean about energy resources, and the stationing of NATO nuclear weapons on Turkish soil.

      Though these comments went unacknowledged at the time, the Turkish government has since raised heated objections as Biden’s presidential bid has gathered steam. There will also be real concerns in Ankara about Biden’s longstanding support for Kurdish rights, including his belief that President Trump has dealt shoddily with his nation’s Kurdish allies in Syria after they helped to subdue the Islamic State group. Such a position would bring back some of the tensions of the Obama presidency.

      Clearly, upon gaining the presidency, one would expect a measure of realignment from the Biden White House. The former vice president’s strong stance against Erdogan would have to become more nuanced as occurs for all those who gain actual power. President Erdogan is not an autocrat. He may have authoritarian instincts, but autocrats do not allow elections with credible results, nor do they allow their opponents to win the mayoralty in their largest cities. 

      The complex and competing tensions of the region in which Turkey lies will necessitate the US working with Turkey to a large degree. That requires finding common ground and mutual interest. But necessity can only get you so far. To generate any real warmth to his relationship with President Erdogan, Joe Biden will have to reveal some dissatisfaction with the global status quo or at least some sympathy with those, such as the Turkish president, who are driven by this belief.  That such concern genuinely motivates Biden might be a hard sell.  

      No Smooth Rides

      Nothing about the past few years of US-Turkish relations has been smooth, from the furor over the jailing of American pastor Andrew Brunson to the simmering Turkish anger at US refusal to extradite Fethullah Gulen, the head of the movement held responsible in Turkey for the failed 2016 coup attempt. That incident, which has defined the trajectory of the country over the past five years, was a pivotal one not only internally but also externally.

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      Russian President Vladimir Putin was quick and decisive in backing Erdogan at a point when the success of the coup was still unclear. The US, on the other hand, was less wholehearted, and there was the sense that it hesitated and that US personnel might even have been complicit at the Incirlik airbase in southeastern Turkey. In moments of crisis, you learn whom you can really trust. In the personality politics of today, President Erdogan learned much from that episode. It fed into his already established worldview in which the West was inherently predatory and untrustworthy.

      None of this means that Turkey or its president are wedded to deep friendships with US opponents such as Russia, Iran or China. Indeed, Turkey’s relations with Russia over the past five years have been exceptionally turbulent. But it does mean that Turkey has, in President Erdogan, a pugnaciously nationalist leader who is unafraid of picking fights. It means he has picked several with the US itself, and yet, with President Trump at the helm, you always feel that, however unsavory things get, the Turkish president is always half-admired for his obstinate aggression.

      If there is a new president in the Oval Office come 2021, it will pose many more challenges for both sides. The relationship will not be easy, and without the bromance that occasionally surfaces between the current leaders, it could be a more dangerous one. US-Turkish strategic goals have been diverging for years. This causes systemic strain to the relationship. The Trump presidency may, inadvertently, have eased some of that strain, but it will not go away. A president less in tune with the current administration in Ankara could tear it further apart. For bilateral relations, for NATO and for the whole Middle East and Mediterranean region that could be a very destabilizing prospect.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Will Idlib Be the Final Move on Syria’s Chessboard?

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      Recent rumblings portend a grim new episode for Syria’s Idlib province. Stretching along the northwestern border with Turkey, Idlib became the last redoubt of forces that oppose President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, namely Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the National Liberation Front,  when Moscow and Ankara announced the creation of a de-escalation zone in the area two years ago. The 2018 agreement halted a Syrian government offensive that would have brought devastation to Idlib. An uneasy calm hangs over the province, but the delicate diplomatic balance that brought respite now looks close to collapse. Notably, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Syria in September prompting speculation that Moscow and Damascus are set to make a northward push against rebel forces.

      Around the same time, reports emerged of Syrian regime forces shelling opposition frontlines, while Turkey has brought military hardware across the border to bolster anti-Assad forces in the Idlib countryside. Local observers relate that both Russian and Turkish reconnaissance drones have been active over the city of Idlib and the surrounding areas. Syrian forces, backed by Russian airpower, now appear to be hitting HTS positions with more intensity.

      Entangled International Interests

      Idlib may prove to be the final chapter of the Syrian Civil War. But here, Turkey and Russia are the main players. Turkey has long propped up anti-Assad factions and has maintained a military presence in Syria’s north for several years. Meanwhile, it was the assertive intervention of Russia in 2015 that turned the war in Assad’s favor. Russian airpower has been a key factor in Syrian government forces’ advance toward Idlib and the regime’s ability to reclaim rebel-held territory.

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      In our research into the impacts of proxy actors in Middle Eastern conflicts, we interviewed a range of Syrian activists. All of them noted a tangle of relationships and alliances between a plethora of Syrian organizations and international sponsors. In particular, they highlighted the roles of Turkey and Russia, both in the conflict and in the humanitarian crisis Syria faces. One opposition figure expressed his gratitude to Turkey for accommodating Syrian refugees. Yet at the same time, he felt that Turkey’s military involvement had made a complex conflict environment more difficult to resolve. Another activist who had participated in ceasefire negotiations in 2015 noted the dominant role that Russia played in securing agreements.

      In general, Syrian figures we spoke with expressed concern at the intentions foreign powers may harbor for Syria. The prevalent feeling among our interviewees was that the challenges that Syria faces are ultimately for Syrians to solve and that foreign interventions made solutions even harder to find. Major powers jockeying for an advantage over regional rivals have clear geopolitical goals, the pursuit of which generally overrides the interests of local people.

      Local Impacts

      Even after the Russia-Turkey accord reached in 2018, Idlib has not been spared hostilities. As elsewhere in the Syrian conflict, civilians have borne the brunt of the violence. A UN report recorded “rampant human rights violations” in Idlib and western Aleppo in late 2019 and early 2020 as Assad’s forces pushed to retake the province despite the de-escalation agreement. Up to a million civilians were uprooted, the largest single displacement of people during the entire war. UN investigators detailed numerous instances where pro-regime forces bombarded schools, markets and hospitals. Investigators also accused HTS of indiscriminately targeting civilian areas.

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      In February, 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in a Syrian airstrike spurring Turkey to undertake a spate of retaliatory attacks. In the wake of this flare-up, Ankara and Moscow reached another deal to curtail hostilities. This latest agreement demonstrates once more that the fates of Syria and its hapless people are largely in the hands of external powers. It seems that the conflict is only in abeyance while powerful actors maneuver for advantage across the chessboard that Syria has become.

      In Idlib, the interests of the key players are clear. Ankara wants to maintain a foothold in Syria. Long calling for the removal of Assad and championing anti-regime forces, it plays the role of protector to Idlib’s militias and civilians fleeing the regime’s advance. Should Idlib fall, a new wave of refugees would surge toward Turkey, something that Ankara can ill afford. Russia, meanwhile, retains access to its only Mediterranean naval base thanks to its relationship with Assad, and thus Moscow wants to ensure the Syrian president’s longevity.

      Linking Damascus and the northern city of Aleppo, Idlib is a central piece of the strategic jigsaw for Assad. Retaking the province, which has been an opposition stronghold since 2015, would be highly symbolic, drastically weakening rebel groups and being another step toward the regime’s final victory.

      Machinations in Moscow and Ankara

      Domestic concerns in Turkey and Russia also come into play in what happens on the ground in Syria. Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin have both used international adventures to further their own agenda. Erdogan’s approval surged after authorizing forays into Syria against Kurdish-led forces in Afrin in early 2018 and in the northeast in late 2019. More recently he has intervened in Libya in support of the Government of National Accord. For his part, Putin rose to prominence at the turn of the millennium fighting Chechen insurgents and underlined his tough-guy credentials by strutting into Georgia in 2008 in a conflict over the breakaway region of South Ossetia.

      Both leaders are currently under pressure, Erdogan as Turkey’s economy falters, and Putin facing criticism after the poisoning of Russia’s prominent opposition figure, Alexei Navalny. Creating a distraction by upping the ante in Idlib would be a convenient way of rallying domestic support. Heightened tensions between Russia and Turkey, each of which backs different sides both in Libya and in the escalating conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, further complicate matters.

      Significantly, other international interventions by Russia and Turkey have been against considerably weaker opponents. Do Eurasia’s two military heavyweights really want to directly face off in Idlib? Turkey and Russia maintain outwardly amicable relations, but they have different goals in Syria. Decisions made in Moscow and Ankara will determine whether the tenuous peace in Idlib endures. Should it fracture, it will be the long-suffering people of Syria, yet again, who will bear the greatest cost.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

      [*Dr William Gourlay and Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh are based in the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University, Australia. This research was facilitated by Carnegie Corporation of New York (Grant number: G-18-55949): “Assessing the impact of external actors in the Syrian and Afghan proxy wars.”] More

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      The Abraham Accords: A Chance to Rethink the Arab-Israeli Conflict

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      German facilitation of the first meeting between the Israeli and Emirati foreign ministers on October 6 is a welcome change in the European attitude toward the Abraham Accords, which are viewed very differently in Europe than in the Middle East. In the region, supporters and antagonists alike view the accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates as a meaningful development that revises the rules of engagement for Arabs and Israelis.

      However, in Europe, the agreement is often downplayed as being yet another PR stunt designed for the mutual electoral interests of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump. Others dismiss this step as symbolic — a mere formalization of the relations that have existed below the surface between the parties for years now.  

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      Improving Netanyahu’s declining approval ratings and boosting Trump’s image as a statesman before the US election on November 3 are among the main motivations behind this initiative. Nevertheless, they do not reduce the potential impact of the accords as a challenge to the status quo.

      The Abraham Accords set in motion new regional dynamics at a time of new regional needs. The lesson learned from previous rounds of conflict and peace in the Middle East — from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 — is that when the timing is right, symbolic steps can become the catalyst for major political developments.

      The accords break a long-standing taboo in the Arab world. The prevailing formula — as outlined by the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 — was that normalization would be granted to Israel in return for making meaningful political compromises vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The accords have shattered this formula, as they replace the equation of “peace for land” with the Netanyahu-coined “peace for peace” approach, in which normalization is given almost unconditionally. Moreover, the accords reframe the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the framework of Arab-Israeli relations.

      The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been downgraded to yet another topic alongside other standing issues. The need to counter Iran’s regional ambitions or utilize economic opportunities have all become alternative frames of reference to Israeli-Arab relations. Prevention of annexation notwithstanding, Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian Territories have hardly served as main motives for the UAE and Bahrain to normalize relations with Israel. This process of disassociating Arab-Israeli relations from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may create a domino effect, in which other Arab nations that are not involved in direct confrontation with Israel will follow suit.

      Shifting Regional Priorities

      The potential of the Abraham Accords to change regional realities relies on its extraordinary timing. As the COVID-19 crisis takes its toll, national priorities — from Khartoum to Kuwait City — are partially shifting from traditional political considerations to urgent economic needs. The decline in oil prices and the expected decline in growth of more than 7% in Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2020 have turned general goals such as diversifying the Gulf economies and utilizing new global business opportunities into immediate necessities.

      In this nexus, normalization with Israel provides an undeniable opportunity. Israel’s status as a leading hi-tech hub presents a viable platform for joint cooperation in multiple fields, from agriculture to health. For other regional actors, such as Sudan, US endorsement of the normalization process offers the opportunity to mend relations in the hope of lifting sanctions and receiving financial aid.

      From an international perspective, the potential of the accords to influence the Israeli–Palestinian political stalemate remains a key question. On the one hand, the accords serve as yet another disincentive for Israel to reengage with the Palestinian issue. They demonstrate that Israel’s acceptance in the region does not necessitate paying the price of tough compromises on the Palestinian front.

      The Israeli public’s sense of urgency for dealing with topics such as the Israeli occupation or Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian Territories will decrease even further, as the accords enhance the comfortable illusion that the events shaping Israel’s future in the Middle East are taking place in Abu Dhabi and Muscat instead of in Gaza and Kalandia.

      Nevertheless, the accords reintroduced the terms “peace” and “normalization” into Israeli public discourse after a decade of absence. The violence affiliated with the Arab Spring in 2011 enhanced the Israelis’ self-perception of their country as a “villa in the jungle.” These events had turned their perception of normalization with the Arab world from a token concern into an outdated distraction. Now, and for the first time in decades, public polls indicate a change in the Israeli public mindset regarding normalization, both on the political and economic levels, reinstating it as a matter of value.

      Reengage With the Palestinian Issue

      The Abraham Accords invite European leaders to rethink their policy approach regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the last two decades, the European Union’s approach has been to compartmentalize the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians from the regional context and focus on bilateral relations. The accords offer new opportunities to leverage the broader regional context as a basis to reengage with the core Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

      Europe’s involvement in enhancing Israel’s regional normalization is not a withdrawal from the two-state solution. On the contrary, it should become a factor in reconnecting the normalization process with efforts to influence Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian Territories and Gaza. The converging interests between the moderate regional forces and Europe have already been demonstrated in the campaign against annexation.

      At present, leveraging the accords to constructively influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict sounds highly unlikely, as the actors involved either aim to cement the separation between the topics (Netanyahu) or under-prioritize the need to engage with it (Trump). Nevertheless, possible changes to the political leadership in the near future in Israel, the United States and the Palestinian Authority — combined with growing Arab public pressure on the normalizing countries to address the Palestinian issue — might present an opportunity to harness regional influence to impact Israeli policies.

      Instead of observing from afar, Europe should be at the forefront of the effort to promote this regional dynamic as a conciliatory vector. After all, who can speak better for regionalism as a basis for peace than the EU?

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More