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      US Must Call Out Egypt Over Human Rights Record

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      In 2013, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown in a military coup. At the same time, the 2012 Egyptian Constitution was suspended. Shortly after, in 2014, the former defense minister and commander of the armed forces, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a central figure in the coup, was elected president in a landslide victory. Since then, Sisi has instituted what is arguably one of the most oppressive regimes in Egypt’s history.

      According to data collected from the Arab Network for Human Rights, there has been a threefold rise in the number of death sentences handed down by Egyptian courts, increasing from 800 over the six years prior to 2014 to more than 3,000 since Sisi came to power. Moreover, Reuters reports that “At least 33 civilians were executed following trials in military courts from 2015” compared to none between 2008 and 2014. President Sisi has thrown countless journalists in jail and intensely limited freedom of speech as almost all websites that are believed to be critical of the government have been blocked since 2017.

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      In addition, one of Sisi’s first actions as president in 2014 was to dramatically slash subsidies for fuel and food. According to the Atlantic Council, this led to a 78% price increase on gasoline and a 175% price increase on natural gas — a big hit for a country where 33% of the population was classified as poor in 2018, up from 28% in 2015.

      The Protests

      Over the course of Sisi’s rule, the government has effectively quelled all protest through rough detention practices, inhumane prison conditions and harsh military crackdowns. However, in September last year, Egypt saw its first major protests since 2013. The demonstrations began when Mohamed Ali, a 45-year-old Egyptian actor and former building contractor living in self-imposed exile in Spain, posted videos on social media criticizing corruption in government. In his videos, Ali encouraged Egyptians to protest in the streets and called for Sisi’s removal. Though these videos were blocked within hours of posting, Ali’s message spread like wildfire throughout Egypt. 

      As a result of Ali’s call for action, protests broke out in at least eight cities. Citizens from all walks of life, but mainly young people, took to the streets and chanted “rise up, fear not, Sisi must go” and “the people demand the regime’s fall.” Hundreds of residents, mainly from working-class backgrounds, also stormed a popular football match. The government responded with rubber bullets and tear gas in an attempt to quell the protests, establishing a heavy presence around Tahrir Square in the center of Cairo, the site of the 2011 uprising that brought down Egypt’s long-serving dictator, Hosni Mubarak. By establishing a military presence in Tahrir Square, the government sent a strong message to the people of Egypt: There will be no repetition of the January 25 Revolution. 

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      Following the protests, more than 3,120 people were arrested, according to the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms. Based on data from Amnesty International, over 2,300 were arrested, including at least 111 children, “some as young as 11, with several detained on their way home from school.” Government officials also searched protesters’ phones and social media for anything it could use as evidence against them. These actions taken by the government have been heavily criticized by rights groups as unconstitutional. 

      The COVID-19 pandemic has only furthered Sisi’s authoritarian grasp as the regime ratified 18 new amendments to Egypt’s emergency laws. Some of these new amendments make sense given the current context of the situation as they give President Sisi the right to close schools and universities, to mandate hospitals to work together with the government to resolve the crisis and also to control scientific laboratory work. In addition, these new developments allow the president to ban public gatherings and processions given that the transmission of COVID-19 at large public events is extremely dangerous. 

      However, while these laws may be beneficial in the short term, they also pose extremely concerning questions for Egypt’s future. As Human Rights Watch points out, just five of the 18 amendments “are clearly tied to public health developments.” For example, Article 13 allows the president to “restrict public and private meetings, processions, and any other forms of gatherings” regardless of whether there is any actual health crisis. Furthermore, these changes give Sisi greater leverage over the economy as he can regulate prices of various goods and “determine methods of collecting monetary and in-kind donation.” By ratifying these amendments as part of emergency legislation, authorities will be able to strictly enforce these measures whenever they wish. 

      Egypt’s Relationship With the United States

      Given the ever-increasing power of the Sisi regime and the government’s disregard for freedom of speech and basic human rights, the seemingly most honorable option for Washington would be to sever its relationship with Cairo and withdraw economic and political support. However, the relationship between Egypt and the United States is becoming more important for both nations, who have historic ties dating back to the Cold War. Egypt’s geographical positioning gives a unique influence in the region, inviting more than $40 billion in military and $30 billion in economic assistance from the US since 1980.  

      The United States and Egypt have common interests in limiting Iran’s influence in the Middle East as well as curtailing the spread of radical movements in volatile states like Iraq and Syria. Both the US and Egypt have a strong relationship with Israel. In addition, though Egypt has been struggling economically, it is still the most populous Arab country, and its control of the Suez Canal is vital for international commerce with an average of 300 million tons of goods passing through its shipping lanes each year. Moreover, Egypt’s transportation routes are beneficial for the US, with two-way trade between the two countries totaling $7.5 billion in 2018.

      And yet while the connection between these two nations is undoubtedly one that must be preserved, the US could slowly begin to withdraw some of its support and show less outward “affection” that has become more apparent during President Donald Trump’s tenure. His support for Sisi stems from an attempt to emphasize US foreign policy objectives of counteracting terrorism, as well as to seem more statesmanlike. This comes in stark contrast to the Obama administration’s freezing of military aid after the 2013 protests against Morsi and the general cooling of relations between the two nations.

      In recent years, Cairo has begun to have a more independent role in regional affairs and is working with the US to reach a deal for Arab-Israeli peace. At last year’s G7 Summit, President Trump has even referred to Egypt’s leader as his “favorite dictator” who is a “great leader” that is “highly respected.” While both nations are benefiting from the relationship, the Egyptian military is heavily dependent on weapons and contractors from the United States. Washington could use this to leverage pressure against Cairo on its human rights record.

      If the US continues to permit a cruel dictator to tyrannize his citizens under an oppressive regime, it is sending a strong message to other nations both in the region and the world that attempts to undermine and subvert democratic principles may be ignored for economic and political control.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      How the US Can Win Back Clout in Syria

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      The humanitarian crisis in northeastern Syria is well documented. Nonetheless, despite the devastation that has occurred and the likely peril that is soon to come, pleas from aid groups, journalists and refugees have not been enough to move policymakers to take action. One reason for this is that because the underlying causes of this crisis are political, the solution must be too. Washington could seize considerable political influence in Syria by throwing a lifeline to its strategic allies in the northeast. Unilateral action by US policymakers to open the Yarubiya border crossing between Iraq and Syria could increase American and Kurdish influence at the expense of Iran, Russia, Turkey, the Islamic State (IS) and the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

      A decade of civil war against the Syrian regime, a regional war against IS and a recent Turkish military incursion have turned half of Syria’s prewar population into refugees. More than 6 million Syrians are displaced internally, and 5.6 million are in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria governs the seven cantons of the northeast. Its alliance of paramilitary groups, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is led by the Kurdish majority People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Ankara considers a terrorist organization. Of the 3 million residents of this region, 700,000 are refugees living in numerous refugee and displaced persons camps, with 65,000 in the Al-Hol refugee camp alone. 

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      Humanitarian aid shipments were all but cut off to northeastern Syria in January 2020, when the United Nations ordered the closure of the Yarubiya border crossing between Syria and Iraq. As the only port of entry with sufficient capacity to handle the requisite shipments of aid and equipment, Yarubiya was the carotid artery bringing humanitarian aid into northeastern Syria. The border between Turkey and northeastern Syria is effectively closed. The Syrian regime allows minimal, if any, aid to cross from its territory into this part of the country, and it controls the Qamishli airport. The remaining border crossing at Samalka, between northeastern Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, is a river crossing over pontoon boats, which heavy rains regularly wash away; it is shut on most days.

      By closing the Yarubiya crossing, the UN was acceding to concerted pressure from Russia, officially to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State, but in reality to choke off aid to anti-Assad regime forces, primarily the SDF. To make matters worse, in August, Turkey cut off the flow of water through the Alouk pumping station, thereby weaponizing water by severing northeastern Syria’s main freshwater source. Aside from leaving hundreds of thousands without water for drinking, cooking and bathing, not to mention hampering the generation of electricity by hydroelectric plants dependent on it, this manmade political crisis has made the medical response to the region’s escalating COVID-19 crisis all the more helpless. 

      Lack of Interest and Resolve

      The squeezing of the ethnically diverse residents of northeastern Syria is the result of political jostling by Turkey, Iran and Russia to increase their respective regional influence at American and Kurdish expense. For Iran and Russia, who are working to rearm their pro-Assad proxy forces, the SDF stands in the way of the Assad regime reasserting control over the country. Although Turkey does not support Assad, it considers the YPG to be a mortal enemy and has even been supporting the Islamic State against it. 

      The Trump administration’s imposition of the Caesar Act — US sanctions targeting Bashar al-Assad’s government and its backers — may create obstacles for regime officials to transfer assets, but their benefactors will find a way to put their money where they want. Regardless, this policy will have no effect on the ongoing loss of American regional influence to Iran, Russia and Turkey. 

      Despite the recurring crises related to Syria over the last four years, it has not received consistent attention from the Trump administration, whose characteristic lack of interest and resolve to carry out complex foreign policy goals has allowed the crisis to escalate. This can be exemplified by the administration’s inconsistent messaging. For example, the official US position to justify the presence of American forces in Syria is to defeat IS, push out Iranian influence and resolve the civil conflict between the Assad regime and domestic opposition groups. However, President Donald Trump recently minimized the American presence to keeping the oil out of the hands of Iran, the IS and Russia, and to allow American companies and allies to benefit from its sale. 

      Aside from statements of support for opening the Yarubiya crossing, congressional committees have not expressed more than a nominal interest in the significant loss of American regional influence. This is despite the trillions of dollars the US has invested to build up the American position in Iraq and Syria over the past two decades. As a result, the harsh reality must be accepted that one cannot expect the US government to do anything to protect American interests or regain its squandered strategic regional influence without the executive and legislative branches being willing and able to design and implement policy to that effect.

      Unilateral Action

      Fortunately, the opening of the Yarubiya crossing is a relatively simple policy that will require minimum resolve to carry out. Nonetheless, it will bolster American regional influence at the expense of its most bitter regional rivals. Pleas to the UN by humanitarian groups and NGOs seeking to reopen the Yarubiya crossing to aid will never overcome Russian opposition. However, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Khadimi has separate authority over Yarubiya. Having spent close to $2 trillion in Iraq on military operations, hardware and training of local military, police and emergency medical staff, as well as operating the largest embassy in the world in Baghdad, the US government has more than enough leverage to instruct Khadimi to open the border crossing.

      There are other added benefits to unilateral action. For instance, sidestepping the UN will itself add leverage to both the US position and that of its ally, the SDF. Brokering a deal with its rivals for the UN to open the crossing would require the US to make considerable concessions. By design, all anticipated requests, such as allowing Turkey to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense systems, would likely be ones the US could never accept, as the status quo benefits all parties involved except the US and the population of northeastern Syria.

      Acting unilaterally would bypass such futile negotiations. Instead, the US would gain considerable leverage that it can save for a final status agreement in the long term or, at the very least, demand concessions from other parties in exchange for limiting what would be allowed through the crossing, thereby ensuring continued and adequate aid shipments. Aside from humanitarian considerations, from an economic standpoint, the move would provide an avenue for oil in northeastern Syria to be brought to market. The windfall profits would lead to a boom of economic development in northeastern Syria as well as Iraq, through which all materials would have to be shipped, and would save the United States millions of dollars in humanitarian aid. 

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      This must be done soon. The Assad regime is being continually strengthened by Iran and Russia in order to reassert control over northeastern Syria, the Deir Az Zour oil fields and the profits they hold. Northeastern Syria contains 90% of the country’s oil and natural gas, but it does not have an efficient route to export these energy resources. As a result, what does get exported goes through markets controlled by Iran, and profits are also siphoned off by the Islamic State as it rebuilds its infrastructure.

      The US finally allowed the export of oil from Deir Az Zour recently, which increased the political leverage of the SDF against Assad in future settlement negotiations. Opening the Yarubiya crossing will further extend that leverage to the United States. The more oil that is exported in the meantime, and the more involved the US is in protecting it, the more leverage the US will have and the stronger its regional ally, the SDF, will become. By fortifying itself, the SDF, which controls northeastern Syria, will be better equipped to cut off Iranian land access to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In effect, the stronger northeastern Syria becomes, the more influence the US will have to counter Iranian and Russian influence in Syria. 

      To reiterate, as America’s frontline ally in the fight against the IS, the SDF has led the fight against the armed group and continues to prevent its resurgence. However, as IS is now receiving aid from Turkey as part of Ankara’s effort to wipe out the Kurds, if the SDF were to lose its fight, American soldiers may be expected to take their place protecting considerable US strategic interests. Otherwise, the oil would fall into the hands of Russia, Iran and the IS. It is therefore imperative to act quickly so as to bolster the SDF as well as to mitigate the disaster of the COVID-19 pandemic that has increased humanitarian suffering in the region.

      Challenging Russia, Turkey and Iran

      Turkey and Russia have outmaneuvered the US in Syria over the last several years. As Seth Franztman writes in The Jerusalem Post, “Moscow has become friends with all sides in Syria — except with the Americans.” As a result, all of these actors have benefitted to different extents in Syria with the exception of the United States. Russian and Turkish efforts to divide up Syria include allowing Turkey to shore up its control in Idlib province in exchange for letting Russia fortify the Assad regime and act against US regional interests. Crucially, the opportunity created by sidelining Washington has allowed and will continue to allow the Assad regime and Iran to fortify their positions.

      Russia punches far above its weight in terms of international influence. As Anna Borshchevskaya reports for The Hill, Moscow’s efforts to defend its imperiled interests around the world by sowing unrest requires considerable personnel and resources. These resources are not unlimited and are effective because of the perceived threat of retaliation by Russian President Vladimir Putin against those who act contrary to his interests.

      Moscow’s interests in Syria are among its most heavily challenged. Russia cannot afford to lose its gambit in Syria and will remain invested no matter what the foreseeable cost. Thus, there is no better way to undermine Russian influence globally than to spread it thin and weaken it by acting against its various global interests concertedly. Russia worked very hard to get the UN to close the Yarubiya crossing, thereby freeing up its resources to fight battles on other fronts. Those resources cannot simply be reassigned back to Syria without being removed from other fights.

      As Turkey asserts itself as a regional political and military power, Ankara’s and Washington’s interests do not always align vis-à-vis Syria. For example, as analysis by the RAND corporation shows, Turkish attacks against YPG forces in northeastern Syria have led to the reappropriating of SDF personnel from fighting the IS in Deir Az Zour region to address Turkish incursions along the northern border. The State Department’s inspector general has accused Turkey of working in concert with the Islamic State to undermine US-supported YPG efforts in Syria. 

      Turkey has been threatening war with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, and its cutting off of water to northeastern Syria has considerably exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis in the region. Opening the Yarubiya crossing to allow in aid, supplies and water would challenge Ankara’s clout in northeastern Syria. It may cause Turkey to rethink its confrontation with Greece, making it more likely that Ankara will err on the side of diplomacy to resolve that conflict before it escalates into a military clash. It will also show Turkey that, despite its influence as a NATO ally, Ankara does not have carte blanche to act against US interests without facing consequences.

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      The involvement of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria has drained its coffers and its personnel. This has considerably frustrated the Iranian population as its resources are sent abroad rather than used to rebuild the struggling economy at home. Applying pressure by opening up the Yarubiya crossing will further drain Iranian resources as it will require even more money, personnel and influence to fight Iran’s battles in Syria and Iraq, which will in turn further inflame domestic opposition to the IRGC. 

      Opening the Yarubiya crossing will aid the Kurds in northeastern Syria to fortify their positions and take a big step toward economic stability in the territory. Historically, the Kurds have been reliable US allies in the region and will undoubtedly continue to be strategic allies in the near future. Leaving them in the lurch by allowing Turkey to attack them in October 2019 shattered American credibility with the YPG, and left them with little recourse other than to put their hope in Russia for protection from Turkey. However, opening the Yarubiya crossing will considerably improve American credibility with the Kurds and work toward improving relations with a critical strategic ally, which will be imperative for American regional influence in the future.

      Opening the Yarubiya crossing between Iraq and northeastern Syria is a singular action that will simultaneously put pressure on Putin, Iran, the Islamic State and the Assad regime. It will also reassert American leadership in NATO, rebuild credibility with regional strategic allies and safeguard US energy interests. Finally, and perhaps most critically, will improve humanitarian conditions on the ground, which will go a long way to win hearts and minds by saving lives.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.] More

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      Mauritania’s Fading Promise and Uncertain Future

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      Mauritania is rarely in the news. A member of the Arab League, it shares with its southern neighbor Senegal a large offshore gas field that promises to bring a potentially huge windfall to the impoverished northwest African nation. The Greater Tortue Ahmeyim field sits in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of the two countries at a depth of 2,850 meters. According to BP, which is invested heavily in the field, it has an estimated 15 trillion cubic feet of gas and a 30-year life span.

      The company signed a partnership deal in late 2016 with Kosmos Energy to acquire what it described as “a significant working interest, including operatorship, of Kosmos’ exploration blocks in Mauritania and Senegal.” BP’s working interest in Mauritania amounts to 62%, with Kosmos holding 28% and the Mauritanian Society of Hydrocarbons and Mining Heritage the remaining 10%.

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      BP says it is committed to sustainable development and promised a variety of programs to train Mauritanians, create jobs, contract local companies and build third-party spending with those companies. It has made further commitments to health and education projects, social development, capability building and livelihood and economic development.

      Basket of Worries

      But with the gas market depressed by a combination of COVID-19 and unusually warm winters in Europe, the bright hopes for Tortue Ahmeyim are already starting to fade. The initial goal of a staggered launch in three phases in 2020 to bring the field to full capacity by 2025 has been shelved. Phase one is now pushed back to the first half of 2023, with the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) quoting Kosmos CEO Andy Inglis in May as saying that a final investment decision on phases two and three will not now be considered “until post-2023 when we’ve got Phase 1 onstream.” The goal of reaching full capacity is pushed back toward the end of the decade.

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      What may be more unsettling for the government of President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani was BP’s announcement in the summer that it will slash oil and gas output by 40% over the next decade. That was followed by the 14 September release of the company’s Energy Outlook 2020 that presented scenarios where peak oil demand had already passed or would pass by the middle of the decade. It is important to note that, presenting the Outlook, BP’s chief economist, Spencer Dale, underlined that “The role of the Energy Outlook is not to predict or forecast how the ‎energy system is likely to change over time. We can’t predict the future; all the scenarios ‎discussed in this year’s Outlook will be wrong.” That may be cold comfort to President Ould Ghazouani.

      The hard fact is that early ebullience about the potential of the Tortue Ahmeyim project by its consortium backers has now been replaced with an abundance of caution and with brakes strongly applied. So much so that James Cockayne, of MEES, opined: “The likelihood of these developments ever seeing the light of day, at least under BP’s stewardship, needs to be considered anew in the light of the latest far-reaching strategy shift from the UK major.” His gloomy conclusion was that “Mauritania’s hopes of gas riches appear to be hanging by a thread.”

      The president has another issue weighing heavy in his basket of worries, and that is the question of normalization with Israel. Commentators have anticipated that Mauritania would join the UAE and Bahrain in recognizing Israel, especially as Tel Aviv and Nouakchott had diplomatic relations from 1999 to 2009. In 2009, Mauritania froze relations in protest at Israeli attacks on Gaza.

      The UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed, the Abu Dhabi crown prince and de facto ruler, has been the driving force in Arab normalization with Israel. With Ould Ghazouani in attendance in Abu Dhabi, in February bin Zayed announced $2 billion in aid. For a country with a GDP that the World Bank estimated in 2018 stood at just over $5 billion, that sort of largesse buys a lot of influence.

      Normalization Bandwagon

      But the president is well aware of the strong sentiment within the country for the Palestinian cause. Tewassoul, the opposition Islamist party, was instrumental in 2009 in bringing protesters onto the streets of the capital demanding an end to diplomatic links with the Israelis. The party also backed the candidacy of Sidi Mohamed Ould Boubacar in last year’s presidential election. Ould Boubacar took 18 % of the vote, while another candidate and leader of the anti-slavery movement, Biran Dah Abeid, scored a similar percentage. Ould Ghazouani won with 52%, with the opposition denouncing the election as rigged.

      Although Mauritania officially outlawed slavery in 1981, the practice continues, with approximately 90,000 out of a population of 4.6 million enslaved. That situation caused US President Donald Trump’s administration to revoke Mauritania’s preferred trade status under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Justifying his decision, Trump cited the fact that “Mauritania has made insufficient progress toward combating forced labor, specifically, the scourge of hereditary slavery.”

      It may be that if he wins reelection, Trump will revisit that decision and offer to drop the revocation as a carrot to bring Mauritania onto the normalization bandwagon. That would, of course, do nothing to hasten the end of slavery. As Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes in its World Report 2020, the Mauritanian government is doing precious little itself: “According to the 2019 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, Mauritania investigated four cases, prosecuted one alleged trafficker, but did not convict any.” HRW also detailed numerous human rights abuses, the stifling of free speech and the harassment and arrest of opposition politicians and activists, including the anti-slavery movement leader and presidential candidate Biran Dah Abeid.

      There is no doubt that the promise of economic gain that Tortue Ahmeyim represents could go some way toward steering Mauritania onto a modernizing path. Though the 2019 presidential election was challenged by the opposition, it did represent the first peaceful transition in the country’s long history of military coups after gaining independence from France in 1960. That, coupled with the windfall the gas field could bring, is a step in the right direction. But if the Tortue Ahmeyim project falters, so too will Mauritania’s chances for a better future.

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The US Must Support Sudan’s Path to Democracy

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      In the aftermath of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain formalizing diplomatic relations with Israel on August 13 and September 11, respectively, many experts predict that Sudan will be the next Arab state to follow suit. The main reason for this pertains to the fact that the Trump administration has been putting pressure on Khartoum to abandon the Arab Peace Initiative (API) and open up full-fledged ties with Tel Aviv. Undoubtedly the White House would desperately like to see Sudan take this step prior to America’s presidential election in November.

      In a characteristically transnational manner, President Donald Trump and those around him, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and adviser Jared Kushner, are reportedly making a quid pro quo deal with Khartoum. The US State Department will remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list in exchange for Khartoum normalizing relations with the Jewish state. Nonetheless, this is a cynical and misguided way for the Trump administration to approach Sudan as it disregards the significant ways in which Sudan has changed its policies, both domestically and internationally. Ultimately, it would serve US national interests to immediately remove Sudan from this list regardless of Khartoum’s stances on Israel and the API.

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      Since Sudan’s former president Omar Hassan al-Bashir fell from power in the spring of 2019, the country’s democratic experiment has faced myriad challenges. From COVID-19 to human rights abuses committed by the Sudanese military and major economic problems, Sudan has been dealing with many difficult issues amid the post-Bashir period. Today, there is no denying that the popular and non-violent revolution which ended Sudan’s three-decades-long dictatorship is fragile. International support for Khartoum is necessary for Sudan’s democratic struggle to succeed.

      Yet this is not forthcoming, due to a lack of focus in US foreign policy that has resulted in insufficient attention being paid to the specific policy drivers that must be implemented if Washington can hope to engage constructively with Sudan’s democratic process. It would behoove officials in Washington to adopt policies that result in the US helping, rather than hindering, Sudan’s difficult transition to democracy and civilian rule.

      Struggle for Democracy

      After Bashir’s ouster in a palace coup in April 2019, Sudan’s revolutionaries, millions of whom spent months on the streets pressuring the dictator to step down, continued protesting in favor of civilian leadership. In contrast to the many Egyptians who supported the military-backed coup in Egypt that toppled their country’s president, Mohammed Morsi, in July 2013, Sudan’s wider public knew not to blindly trust the country’s military to defend a democratic revolution. By June 3, 2019, hardline elements tied to the Bashir regime, including militants from the notorious Janjaweed militia, massacred Sudanese protesters in the capital, resulting in roughly 120 deaths and hundreds of injuries.

      Yet about two months after that atrocity, Sudan’s military and civilian revolutionaries agreed to a political compromise that came up with a government that is led by civilians but also maintains significant military representation.

      Since August 2019, a sovereign council consisting of six civilian and five military officials has been governing Sudan. Additionally, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok heads a technocratic cabinet comprised of civilians. Sudan plans to run free and democratic elections in 2022, with the interim period of time supposed to give Sudanese civil society an opportunity to regrow after being harshly oppressed under Bashir’s rule. During the present period, there has been a restoration of the freedoms of assembly, press and speech. But the democratic transition was agreed upon in the pre-COVID-19 era and at a time when impacts of the pandemic on public health, the economy and society could not possibly have been foreseen.

      For Sudan’s government, the gravest risk is that it will lose its legitimacy among more Sudanese citizens if the country’s economic situation remains bleak. Youth unemployment stands around 40% and could widen societal divisions if left unaddressed or if tackled in ways that exacerbate and widen existing fault-lines and inequalities. Long lines for petrol as well as staple foods are common in Sudan, where the country’s annual inflation rate reached 167% in September. The global coronavirus pandemic and the lockdown have only exacerbated the country’s economic problems and made it more urgent that actions be taken as soon as possible to support the political transition underway in Sudan rather than wait until 2022, by which time the impact of economic and social dislocation generated by the current crisis might be too late to effect a positive democratic outcome.

      Harm of US Sanctions

      “The single biggest obstacle to Sudan’s economic recovery is the continued U.S. economic sanctions, which … not only impacts trade with and investment from the United States, but from other countries and multilateral entities as well,” explained renowned American Middle East scholar, Dr. Stephen Zunes. Other experts such as the Atlantic Council’s Cameron Hudson agree that Sudan’s long-term economic progress depends on Washington removing its sanctions on Khartoum. Imposed by the US in 1993 when Washington labeled Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism, these sanctions were aimed at punishing Bashir’s government for its links to Osama bin Laden and other global terrorists, plus the regime’s sponsorship of armed Palestinian and Arab groups like Hamas, the Abu Nidal Organization, the Fatah-Revolutionary Council, Hezbollah, Jamaat al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

      Yet today, Sudan’s post-Bashir government is not sponsoring any Salafi-jihadi terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS). In fact, even Bashir’s government was not doing so during its final years in power. In its 2015 country report on terrorism, the US State Department stated that Washington and Khartoum “worked cooperatively in countering the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and ISIL.”

      Thus, Washington’s current policy vis-à-vis Sudan suffers from being stuck in a previous era in which leaders, institutions and both regional and global circumstances were fundamentally different and in no way reflect the considerable changes in Sudanese politics over the past year and more. Hudson described the continued designation of Sudan as a state sponsor terrorism as representing to many “an anachronism and a symbol of Washington’s own lethargy in updating its policy toward Khartoum.” In sum, problems which the US had with Bashir’s regime decades ago should not be “effectively punishing [the Sudanese] further for having overthrown [the Bashir] dictatorship,” as Zunes argues.

      Last year, Prime Minister Hamdok spoke before the UN General Assembly and addressed Washington’s outdated policies in relation to Sudan: “The Sudanese people have never sponsored, nor were supportive of terrorism. On the contrary, those were the acts of the former regime which has been continuously resisted by the Sudanese people until its final ouster. These sanctions have played havoc on our people, causing them untold misery of all types and forms.” There is a risk that the longer these sanctions remain in place, the more the US becomes vulnerable to narratives that portray bureaucratic inertia in responding to changing circumstances as something more sinister, ascribing to Washington malign policy motivations that damage America’s standing and public diplomacy interests.

      A major concern is that Sudan’s economic situation and COVID-19 crisis could jeopardize the country’s transition to democracy. If the period of time between now and the planned 2022 elections is defined by economic crises and resultant social and political unrest, other actors including the military or conservative Islamists tied to the Muslim Brotherhood may find themselves best positioned to take power. The Sudanese public, so energized by the revolutionary success of 2019, may quickly become disillusioned if it perceives its struggle to have been in vain or to have been betrayed. The experience of disillusioned activists in Tunisia and Egypt has shown how some may be drawn toward radicalization if they feel there is no realistic alternative to an authoritarian status quo.

      Policy Recommendations

      In order to best secure the hopes for a future Sudan led by inclusive, secular, moderate and democratic civilians, the US government should end all its sanctions on Khartoum and establish fully normalized diplomatic relations with Sudan. Thus, given the urgency of helping Sudan preserve its hard-fought-for democratic gains since 2019 and US interests in seeing a smooth transition occur in the country, below are four key policy recommendations.

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      First, Washington should remove Sudan’s designation on the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Sudan’s inclusion on the SST list not only bars the US from economically assisting Sudan but mandates that Washington prevent the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other global financial institutions from giving Sudan loans or other forms of assistance. As coronavirus spreads across Sudan, the authorities have had a more difficult time coping with the pandemic because the World Bank came under US pressure in April 2020 to exclude Sudan from a list of developing countries that received help from a $1.9-million emergency fund. Furthermore, the designation requires US citizens to obtain the Treasury Department’s approval prior to engaging in any financial transaction with these Sudanese government. So long as Sudan is on the SST list, it will be difficult to imagine the impoverished country receiving sufficient levels of investment and trade in order to develop and prosper in the future.

      Second, the US should lift all other remaining sanctions on Khartoum and encourage multinational institutions to help Sudan, especially amid the global COVID-19 crisis. Because Omar al-Bashir ascended to power in an Islamist-driven military coup in 1989, and the military that took power in the 2019 palace coup did not come to power as a result of a democratic election, there remain prohibitions under Section 7008 of the State Department Foreign Operations funding. In practice, this prevents the US from providing much assistance to any country where the “military has overthrown, or played a decisive role in overthrowing, the government.”

      Yet the US should not wait to pull these prohibitions until after the 2022 elections, which is what Washington currently plans to do. Darfur-related sanctions are also still enforced, which as Hudson argues “will continue to have a dampening effect on outside investment until durable peace and credible accountability mechanisms have been implemented.” These sanctions deter banks and other financial institutions around the world from taking the risks that currently come with Sudan-related opportunities. Thus, lifting these sanctions could help boost Sudan’s foreign investment climate.

      Third, Washington should reverse its decision, made in February 2020, to end migrant visas from Sudan. This move basically brings all immigration from Sudan to a complete halt, and it will continue to do so even in the post-COVID-19 period if not addressed. As experts such as the Chatham House’s Matthew T. Page have explained, Trump’s domestic political agenda of taking hard stances on immigration issues amid his reelection campaign was largely behind this policy decision, which targeted Sudan and three other African countries. In the process, however, the US loses influence in these developing nations that see the American door slamming on them as only further reason to invest in even deeper ties with China and Russia.

      Finally, the US should stand with Sudan’s government in solidarity against COVID-19. While the US should first end sanctions on Sudan, which would help combat the spread of coronavirus in the country and among its neighbors, Washington should also give Khartoum aid to help the Sudanese authorities deal with the pandemic within their own borders. As other states worldwide have practiced “coronavirus diplomacy” to boost their humanitarian credentials, this demonstration of American soft power could secure some goodwill from the Sudanese public following decades of negative relations between Washington and Khartoum.

      Key Interests

      Ultimately, there is no good reason for the US to be working to undermine Sudan’s democratic experiment, even if that is not the intent but rather the unfortunate byproduct of a bureaucracy that is slow to respond, giving the impression of stasis. Perceptions often play a key role in shaping emerging realities, and for the Sudanese, who feel that their actions in ousting a dictator are deserving of American support, there may not be an open-ended window before expectation turns to disillusionment.

      Moreover, there are key American interests that can be advanced through a US-Sudan rapprochement that follows an unwinding of Washington’s sanctions on Khartoum. In terms of competition among global powers, Washington has long-term foreign policy interests in establishing a positive relationship with post-Bashir Sudan. Washington’s sanctions on Sudan, as well as outright American hostility against the country — most exemplified by the Clinton administration’s decision to bomb a factory in Khartoum in 1998 — have only pushed the country closer to China, Russia, and at previous junctures Iran too.

      Although Sudan is not a high-ranking issue of interest to the diplomatic establishment in Washington nor to the US public, the American and Sudanese people alike could stand to gain in many ways if their governments reconcile and work toward a more cooperative relationship following a rapprochement. As a farmland-rich country situated along the Red Sea at the intersection of the Arab and African worlds, Sudan represents an important part of the conflict-prone Horn of Africa. In this volatile part of Africa, many powers — China, Israel, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Russia, United Arab Emirates, etc. — are scrambling to consolidate their clout, and the US certainly has its own interests in the immediate and broader neighborhood.

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      While the focus on countering terrorism and violent extremism has, to an extent, taken center stage in the US, measures taken now that support the political transition to democracy and strengthen Sudan’s economy can have a significant impact in bolstering Sudanese resilience to potential shocks such as COVID-19 that, if mishandled, could undermine much of the progress made on the security and stability fronts.

      Yet beyond such strategic interests shaped by Sudan’s geopolitical position in the wider African, Arab and Islamic regions, the US would in an ideational sense be living up to its professed values if Washington adopted new policies that are aimed at supporting the Sudanese people in their struggle for democracy following 30 years of brutal dictatorial rule. Ultimately, the US is sending the wrong message when it emphasizes the importance of human rights but turns its back on Sudan’s non-violent, democratic revolutionaries while engaging openly with highly authoritarian states around Sudan such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

      From a soft power and public diplomacy perspective, too, greater support for Sudan would be a significant tool for the US to project as the world retreats into a great power rivalry synonymous with the Cold War in the 20th century, not least because the African continent has emerged as one of the frontlines for such perceived geopolitical competition with China.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is Assad Gearing Up for a Final Push in Syria?

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      Ceasefires in Syria come and go, and so do the meetings between the outside players who hold it in their hands to determine if an end to the country’s 9-year civil war is in sight. The most recent meeting in Ankara between Turkish and Russian military officers was intended to discuss issues at a “technical level” in both the Syrian and Libyan theaters of war. Not much was achieved, with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reportedly calling the session “unproductive.” The minister called for the ceasefire to continue and insisted that “there must be more focus on political negotiations,” a sentiment few can disagree with but one that seems most unlikely to be realized in the near to middle future.

      Russia’s state-controlled Sputnik news agency reported that what it called a “source” had said that the Turks had declined to evacuate five observation posts in Syria’s Idlib province. According to the source, “After the Turkish side refused to withdraw the Turkish observation points and insisted on keeping them, it was decided to reduce the number of Turkish forces present in Idlib and to withdraw heavy weapons from the area.”

      A Coming Catastrophe

      Whether that is the case has yet to be confirmed. However, it was enough for the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) to issue a somber warning: “Turkey may have agreed to cede control of Southern Idlib to pro-Assad forces in a meeting with Russia September 16. If the reports of a deal are true, a pro-Assad offensive is likely imminent.”

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      The ISW buttresses its argument by noting that Turkey had already withdrawn hundreds of its forces from southern Idlib on September 8. Turkey’s claim that the withdrawal is the result of rising tensions with Greece over hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean were treated with skepticism by the ISW: “Turkey may have used its dispute with Greece as cover for action consistent with an impending deal with Russia in Idlib.”

      This may, indeed, be the “political negotiations” that Cavusoglu was speaking of. If so, and if an assault on what remains of Idlib in rebel hands is imminent, then it signals likely catastrophe for civilians trapped between advancing Assad forces and jihadist militias. Were the US not in the middle of a presidential race and were the incumbent in the White House not so inclined to call for the complete withdrawal of US forces from Syria (only to change his mind when presented with the outcomes of such a move), then there would be grounds for more hope for the civilian population of Idlib.

      But such is not the case. And beyond President Donald Trump’s view that, as he expressed it, “People said to me, ‘Why are you staying in Syria?’ Because I kept the oil, which frankly we should have done in Iraq,” uncertainty about just what America’s intentions in Syria are remains very much in play. It is a factor that other external players, that is the Russians, the Turks and Iran, can all exploit as they seek to advance their strategic efforts at the expense of the Syrian people.

      Old Enemies

      It is a situation that has left the 500 or so US troops still in Syria and their allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in a vulnerable and exposed place, a point the Pentagon clearly gets, even if the commander-in-chief doesn’t. Announcing a deployment of Bradley fighting vehicles to Eastern Syria on September 19, a Pentagon spokesperson stated: “These actions are a clear demonstration of US resolve to defend Coalition forces in the [Eastern Syria Security Area], and to ensure that they are able to continue their Defeat-ISIS mission without interference. The Defense Department has previously deployed Bradleys to northeast Syria pursuant to these goals.”

      That deployment reflects a growing concern that, as documented by ISW and others, the Islamic State (IS) is resurging in Syria. Its recent attacks have been aimed at tribal elders who support the SDF and at efforts to develop governance capabilities that benefit civilians by removing festering grievances that the jihadists seek to exploit.

      For their part, the Russians, playing on fears that the SDF Kurdish leadership has concerning an abrupt American withdrawal, may strive to build on pushing the Kurds to seek some sort of rapprochement with Damascus, thus hastening a US departure. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Russians were crucial to a deal in October last year that saw the Kurds cede territory to Assad forces and withdraw rather than face a Turkish offensive in northern Syria.

      Meanwhile, the ISW’s Jennifer Cafarella argues that a sudden withdrawal without a strategic endgame plays straight into the hands of not just Russia and Iran; it emboldens a rising IS and empowers the jihadist ideology it shares with America’s oldest enemy in its war on terror, al- Qaeda.

      Al-Qaeda has played a long game, happy for IS to take the brunt of the West’s military response. Cafarella says that while a global coalition led by America came together to defeat the caliphate (and force ISI into a guerrilla insurgency), the same cannot be said for al-Qaeda. “We have not been able to reach the same level of understanding with our allies and partners and that is in part because Al Qaeda is playing this much more sophisticated political game that in the long run, I do very much worry, could outflank us.”

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Taking American Carnage to the Next Level

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      It is a recent tradition among occupants of the White House, as they head out of office, to play a few practical jokes on their successors. The Clinton administration jesters, for instance, removed all the Ws from White House keyboards before handing over the keys to George W. Bush’s transition team. The Obama administration left behind books authored by Barack Obama for Trump’s incoming press team.

      Donald Trump has no sense of humor. His “gift” to the next administration is dead serious. With his recent foreign policy moves, the president is trying to change the facts on the ground so that whoever follows in his footsteps will have a more difficult time restoring the previous status quo. Forget about pranks. This is a big middle-finger salute to the foreign policy establishment and the world at large.

      The Next President Needs to Learn From Past Mistakes

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      Of course, Trump is not preparing to leave office, regardless of the results of the November election. But in his policies in the Middle East and East Asia, the president is attempting to change the very rules of the game just in case he’s not around next year to personally make more mischief. The man is not going to win a Nobel Prize for his efforts — despite the recent nominations coming from a pair of right-wing Scandinavians — but he’ll do whatever he can to achieve the next best thing: putting the Trump brand on geopolitics.

      It cost about $5,000 to replace all those W-less typewriters. The bill for all the damage Trump is doing to international affairs in his attempt to make his Israel, Iran and China policies irreversible will be much, much higher.

      Israel Up, Palestine Down

      For several years, the Trump administration promised a grand plan that would resolve the Israel-Palestine stand-off. According to this “deal of the century,” Palestinians would accept some economic development funds, mostly from Gulf states, in exchange for giving up their aspirations for an authentic state.

      The hoops Palestinians would have to jump through to get even such a shrunken and impotent state — effectively giving up Jerusalem, relinquishing the right to join international organizations without Israel’s permission — are such obvious deal-breakers that Jared Kushner and company must have known from the start that their grand plan was not politically viable.

      But finding a workable solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict was not the purpose of the plan. It was all an elaborate shell game. While the administration dangled its proposal in front of world leaders and international media, it was working with Israel to create “new realities.” Trump withdrew the United States from the UN Human Rights Council for its “chronic bias against Israel.” The administration closed the PLO’s office in Washington, DC, and eliminated US funding for the UN agency that supports Palestinian refugees. And in perhaps the most consequent move, Trump broke a global convention by moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Until recently, only one country, Guatemala, had followed suit.

      But then came a flurry of diplomatic activity this fall as both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain extended diplomatic recognition to Israel. The Trump administration also pushed Serbia and Kosovo, as part of a new economic deal, to include clauses about Israel: Serbia will move its embassy to Jerusalem and Kosovo will establish one there after establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.

      Astonishingly, the Trump administration has promoted this diplomatic activity as restraining Israel. In May, Netanyahu announced that he was moving forward with absorbing sections of the West Bank that already featured large Israeli settlements. He subsequently stepped back from that announcement to conclude the new diplomatic deals with the Gulf states. But it was only reculer pour mieux sauter, as the French say — stepping back to better leap forward. Netanyahu had no intention of taking annexation off the table.

      “There is no change to my plan to extend sovereignty, our sovereignty in Judea and Samaria, in full coordination with the United States,” Netanyahu said in mid-August. Some further to the right of Netanyahu — alas, they do exist — want to annex the entire West Bank. But that’s de jure. As writer Peter Beinart points out, Israel has been annexing the West Bank settlement by settlement for some time.

      Where does this leave Palestinians? Up a creek without a state. The Trump administration has used its much-vaunted “deal of the century” to make any future deal well-nigh impossible. In collaboration with Netanyahu, Trump has strangled the two-state solution in favor of a single Israeli state with a permanent Palestinian underclass. The cost to Palestinians: incalculable.

      Permanent War With Iran

      Strengthening Israel was a major part of Trump’s maneuverings in the Middle East. A second goal was to boost arms sales to Gulf countries, which will only accelerate the arms race in the region. The third ambition has been to weaken Iran. Toward that end, Israel, Bahrain and the UAE now form — along with Saudi Arabia — a more unified anti-Iran bloc.

      But the Trump crowd has never been content to contain Iran. It wants nothing less than regime change. From the get-go, the Trump administration nixed the Iran nuclear deal, tightened sanctions against Tehran and put pressure on all other countries not to engage Iran economically. In January, it assassinated a leading Iranian figure, Major General Qassem Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. And this summer it tried, unsuccessfully, to trigger “snap-back” sanctions against Iran that would kill the nuclear deal once and for all.

      Even as the Trump administration was celebrating the diplomatic deal between the UAE and Israel, it was going after several UAE firms for brokering deals with Iran. Trump recently castigated the Iranian government for going through with the execution of wrestler Navid Afkari for allegedly killing a security guard during a 2018 demonstration.

      And US intelligence agencies have just leaked a rather outlandish suggestion that Iran has been thinking about assassinating the US ambassador to South Africa. According to Politico, “News of the plot comes as Iran continues to seek ways to retaliate for President Donald Trump’s decision to kill a powerful Iranian general earlier this year, the officials said. If carried out, it could dramatically ratchet up already serious tensions between the U.S. and Iran and create enormous pressure on Trump to strike back — possibly in the middle of a tense election season.”

      Hmm, sounds mighty suspicious. Sure, Iran might be itching for revenge. But why risk war with a president who might just be voted out of office in a couple of months and replaced with someone who favors returning to some level of cooperation? And why would the unnamed US government officials leak the information right now? Is it a way to discourage Iran from making such a move? Or perhaps it’s to provoke one side or the other to take the fight to the next level — and take off the table any future effort to repair the breach between the two countries?

      Cutting Ties With China

      At a press conference earlier this month, Trump laid out his vision of US relations with China. Gone were the confident predictions of beautiful new trade deals with Beijing. After all, Trump had canceled trade negotiations last month, largely because the Phase 1 agreement hasn’t produced the kind of results the president had predicted (in terms of Chinese purchases of US goods). Nor did Trump talk about what a good idea it was for China to build “reeducation camps” for Uighurs in Xinjiang (he reserves such frank conversation for tête-à-têtes with Xi Jinping, according to John Bolton).

      Rather, Trump talked about severing the economic relationship between the two countries. “Under my administration, we will make America into the manufacturing superpower of the world, and we’ll end our reliance on China once and for all,” he said. “Whether it’s decoupling or putting in massive tariffs like I’ve been doing already, we’re going to end our reliance on China because we can’t rely on China.”

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      As with virtually all things, Trump doesn’t know what he’s talking about. China has been largely unaffected by all of Trump’s threats and posturing. As economist Nicholas Lardy explains, “for all the fireworks over tariffs and investment restrictions, China’s integration into global financial markets continues apace. Indeed, that integration appears on most metrics to have accelerated over the past year. And U.S.-based financial institutions are actively participating in this process, making financial decoupling between the United States and China increasingly unlikely.”

      In fact, decoupling is just another way of saying “self-inflicted wound.” On the non-financial side of the ledger, the United States has already paid a steep price for its trade war with China, which is only a small part of what decoupling would ultimately cost. Before the pandemic hit, the United States was already losing 300,000 jobs and $40 billion in lost exports annually. That’s like a Category 3 hurricane. A full decoupling would tear through the US economy like a Category 6 storm.

      Geopolitical Carnage

      American presidents want to leave behind a geopolitical legacy. Bill Clinton was proud of both the Dayton agreement and the Oslo Accords. George W. Bush touted his response to the September 11 attacks. Barack Obama could point to the Iran nuclear deal and the détente with Cuba. Donald Trump, like the aforementioned twisters, has left destruction in his path. He tore up agreements, initiated trade wars, pulled out of international organizations and escalated America’s air wars.

      But perhaps his most pernicious legacy is his scorched-earth policy. Like armies in retreat that destroy the fields and the livestock to rob their advancing adversaries of food sources, Trump is doing whatever he can to make it impossible for his successor to resolve some of the world’s most intractable problems.

      His diplomatic “achievements” in the Middle East are designed to disempower and further disenfranchise Palestinians. His aggressive policy toward China is designed to disrupt an economic relationship that sustains millions of US farmers and manufacturers. His bellicose approach to Iran is designed not only to destroy the current nuclear accord but make future ones impossible as well.

      If he wins a second term, Trump will bring his scorched-earth doctrine to every corner of the globe. What he is doing to Iran, China and the Palestinians, he will do to the whole planet. The nearly 200,000 pandemic deaths and the wildfires destroying the West Coast are just the beginning. Donald Trump can’t wait to take his brand of American carnage to the next level.

      *[This article was originally published by Foreign Policy in Focus.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Kushner’s Triumph: The Writing Is on the Wall for Palestine

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      In a recent phone interview with reporters, Jared Kushner made the claim that his Peace to Prosperity deal represents salvation for the two-state solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict. He couched the claim in the transactional language that is the mark of the Manhattan real estate wheeler and dealer that he ultimately is: “What we did with our plan …
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      Finding a Cure for Lebanon’s Imperialist Hangover

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      Lebanon, as a nation, was destined for conflict since its creation in November 1943 by the French colonial power. To this day, it remains a client state with several competing foreign powers trying to exploit the country’s social, political and economic systems for their benefit. The current socio-economic crisis has clearly exposed the inadequacies of …
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