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      Was the First Gulf War the Last Triumph of Multilateralism?

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      This week marks the 30th anniversary of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Desperate to pay off his nation’s seemingly insurmountable debt, acquired as a result of his invasion of and the futile 8-year war with Iran that had just ended, Saddam Hussein saw oil-rich Kuwait as the solution. Iraq had never recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty, claiming it had been hived off by the British during its occupation of Iraq in the early 20th century. Moreover, as he and many Iraqis asserted, it really was Iraq’s “19th province.”

      The World Without American Leadership

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      Saddam deployed Iraqi troops to the border in July of 1990, prompting concern among neighboring Arab countries and the United States. In a much-reported meeting with then-US Ambassador April Glaspie late in July, he was asked about his intentions. Glaspie took pains to explain that the US had “no opinion” on Arab-Arab disputes, further expressing the US hope that the Iraqi-Kuwait border question might be resolved soon and without the use of force. (Egypt has been trying to mediate the dispute.) Saddam interpreted her response as an American green light to invade, as egregious a misinterpretation of a diplomatic communication as there ever was.

      A Multilateral Approach

      Within hours of the August 2 invasion, the UN Security Council convened and ordered Iraq’s immediate withdrawal. It was ignored by Saddam, as were multiple subsequent UNSC resolutions. Saddam did not believe that the US or any other nation would take action to defend the small patch of desert at the end of the Persian Gulf, despite its outsize oil wealth and massive reserves.

      He was wrong. Under the leadership of President George H. W. Bush and his able secretary of state, James Baker, the US organized a 34-nation coalition, including many Arab states and NATO allies. Armed with a UNSC resolution authorizing “all necessary means” if Saddam did not withdraw his forces by the January 15 deadline, the US and other coalition forces began assembling in Saudi Arabia, which many feared would be the next target of Saddam’s ambitions. Facing more than 650,000 troops and a massive US, British and French air assault, Iraqi forces were driven out of Kuwait. The three-day campaign cost coalition forces some 300 deaths, including 146 Americans. Iraqi casualties were never officially ascertained, but estimates range from 20,000 to 26,000 killed and 75,000 injured. Over 1,000 Kuwaitis also died, mostly civilians.

      The Kuwait incursion proved even more humiliating and costly than Iraq’s ill-fated invasion of Iran. Numerous and increasingly costly sanctions (including on critical oil exports), intrusive UN weapons inspectors and expansive no-fly zones in the country’s north and south decisively placed Iraq in pariah-nation status in the world. Ultimately, it set the stage for the American invasion and occupation of Iraq and Saddam’s removal in 2003.

      Leadership When It Counted

      The First Gulf War marked a significant achievement for American diplomacy, one that would be difficult to replicate today. Though Saddam remained unmoved by American warnings and UNSC resolutions and sanctions, the international community proceeded deliberately but measuredly before employing force. The UNSC’s approval of Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force, obtained 12 affirmative votes, including from four of the five permanent members (China abstained) and only two negatives (Cuba and Yemen).

      Deft diplomacy on the part of Bush and Baker attracted 33 other nations to the coalition that expelled Saddam’s forces. Secretary of Baker met on several occasions with Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, to resolve the crisis. This was a marked contrast to George W. Bush’s approach to, and eventual invasion of, Iraq in 2003, which failed to secure UNSC approval and incurred considerable worldwide condemnation.

      Importantly, despite a virtually open road to Baghdad and against the urgings of some in the US at the time, in 1991 President Bush withdrew all US forces from Iraq and did not seek to remove Saddam. This proved to be critical in maintaining the unprecedented coalition he had organized to address a Middle East crisis. Bush Sr. was able to capitalize on that achievement by assembling world leaders in Spain later that fall for the Madrid Conference, which brought together many of the same Arab countries from the coalition, plus Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and co-sponsor the Soviet Union to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conference became a stepping stone for increased action on the part of many Arab countries, the Palestinians and Israel, and the progress that followed.

      The Era of Great Power Rivalry

      The First Gulf War itself and what followed demonstrated what principled, deft and concerted diplomacy on the part of the US can achieve. Clearly, the task remains significantly short of its ultimate goal. But the hope of that seems all the more distant as the US under President Donald Trump eschews the Bush/Baker approach to multilateral diplomacy in favor of narrow, one-sided bilateral diplomacy. The latter has proven to be a contributing factor in the region’s — and perhaps the world’s — decided move toward “great power” competition.

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      Nations as diverse as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others now vie for increased influence and even dominance in the Middle East and elsewhere. Never a partisan in great power competition, the US now stands strangely quiet on the sidelines as these nations attempt to carve out spheres of influence, from the Crimea and Ukraine, to South and Central Asia, the Far East and the Middle East. For some of the peoples of the Middle East — Syria, Yemen and Libya — this has meant misery and devastation, and for the rest of the region, instability, uncertainty and fear. US-led multilateralism at a time when it stood unparalleled in military, political and economic power in the world helped address a genuine Middle East crisis 30 years ago. In that sense, America’s and the world’s actions in Iraq may very well have been the mythical “good” war in the Middle East, as much an oxymoron as that may sound.

      In an era of great-power maneuvering, it would be inconceivable to imagine now a similar response in the event of another crisis between nations of the region, say Iran and Saudi Arabia. With rival major powers choosing sides, one could more easily envision competing alliances being drawn up, culminating in the sort of conflict the world saw in Europe in World War I.

      Great-power competition seldom, if ever, leads to stability or peace. World War I amply proved that. The example of the First Gulf War, however, proved that multilateralism, especially when led by a powerful but principled nation, can diffuse escalating tensions, avert greater disaster and provide at least the prospect and a framework for peace and stability.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      How Will the UAE Cope With Growing Environmental Insecurity?

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      Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the world is “living through an unrivalled drop in carbon output.” According to the International Energy Agency, global use of energy will drop 6% in 2020, an amount that equals India’s total energy demand. Worldwide demand for electricity has already fallen 5%, which is the largest amount since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The dramatic decline in pollution resulting from economic lockdowns was apparently visible and recorded by numerous satellites. However, it will take a decade of this kind of economic lockdown to make a significant impact on global warming and truly curb carbon emissions.

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      Environmental pollutants are indifferent to national boundaries. Addressing climate change requires long-term international cooperation. All countries must make serious and collective efforts to stop irreversible damage caused by climate change.

      The Environment-Security Nexus

      The United Arab Emirates is among the world’s biggest per capita emitters of greenhouse gases. In fact, the World Wide Fund for Nature has ranked the UAE as having the world’s highest per capita environmental footprint, which largely has to do with the unsustainable megaprojects that began in the Emirates amid the oil boom of the 1970s.

      Other factors such as the desert country’s climatic conditions are in the picture too. There are also the popular modes of transportation within the Emirates: According to a survey conducted by the Department of Transport in 2014, “60 per cent of Abu Dhabi and Dubai residents who owned a car said they never used public transport. Only two to three percent use public transport frequently.” This is in part due to the long-standing car culture in the Emirates and relatively cheap fuel as well as car prices, but also because of connectivity problems to certain destinations.

      As outlined by Jon Barnett in his 2013 essay “Environmental Security,” environmental problems pose threats to the national well-being as well as the quality of life of the inhabitants of any state. Analysts and scholars refer to environmental security when discussing the threats and dangers emanating from the environment. The principal source that threatens ecological security is human activity. The environment is one of the seven sectors outlined in the United Nations Development Program’s early definition of human security, and environmental change has long been identified as a human security issue.

      The Emiratis have been struggling with a number of environmental threats for decades. Today, numerous environmental issues — including pollution, waste, land degradation, desertification, biodiversity loss, etc. — all impact the UAE. Waste and air pollution constitute major challenges, in particular outdoor air pollution. The UAE ranks in the bottom fourth globally in exposure to particulate matter — tiny particles of sand, dust or chemicals registered at elevated levels that are highly dangerous and associated with risks of numerous diseases such as cancer, as well as respiratory and heart diseases. In 2017, the Environment Agency of Abu Dhabi considered poor air quality to be a “primary environmental threat to public health.”

      In terms of water, the UAE continues to have highly unsustainable groundwater extraction rates. Being largely a desert country, the contamination of its fresh groundwater reserves and seawater endangers the UAE’s future. Some experts have warned of the imminent depletion of groundwater sources by 2030.

      In the area of biodiversity conservation, the UAE boasts a number of protected areas both on land and in the sea. But its fish stocks are in a critical state. Overfishing and heavy commercial maritime shipping across the Persian Gulf have also contributed to a potentially irreversible decline in the health of fragile coral reefs off the coast. Silt from shoreline construction has had a negative impact on coral.

      “Greening” the Emirati Economy

      The UAE has long acknowledged climate change as a serious threat multiplier to the country and is ahead of the curve when compared to other countries that are still debating the seriousness of the issue or even outright denying its reality. Recognizing these environmental threats, the UAE has been in the process of “greening” its economy by developing a solar energy sector along with a nuclear energy sector and managing its scarce water resources with an emphasis on conservation and efficiency. It has been at the forefront of the renewables revolution with its solar farms while very slowly transforming its thermal desalination plants into reverse osmosis desalination facilities that produce far fewer greenhouse gas emissions.

      The UAE Vision 2021 document contains as one of its wide-reaching goals a “well-preserved natural environment” and seeks to address various environmental threats to the country. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi has put in place its Environment Vision 2030 strategy, which lists five priority areas, namely climate change impacts, air and noise pollution, water resources, biodiversity and waste. The UAE government has set up various institutions and initiatives to address environmental issues in the previous decades such as the Environment Agency — Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi Global Environmental Data Initiative and the Arab Water Academy, and has signed and ratified numerous international and regional environmental conventions. The government has launched a variety of awareness campaigns pertaining to environmental issues in order to educate different sectors of society.  

      According to Dr. Taoufik Ksiksi, a plant biologist and climate change researcher at the United Arab Emirates University at Al Ain, these awareness campaigns were not quite sufficient: “More needs to be done to raise the awareness levels, especially at the lower levels, in schools with young people, and there have to be substantial changes to the curriculum to incorporate courses on environmental sciences, native ecology and conservation in general,” he said in a phone interview. In addition, Ksiksi suggests that “more robust climate modeling approaches that focus primarily on the region need to be developed with increased processing power that take into account regional circumstances and are not geared towards climate conditions prevalent in Europe.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      Dr. Ksiksi thinks that UAE’s advantage is that it enjoys “the benefit of resources than can fund technology and new initiatives.” Yet the lack of synergy in terms of regional cooperation in the area of green economy building in the Arabian Peninsula somewhat hampers such efforts.    

      The UAE has for some time now incorporated narratives of sustainable development into the country’s national policy aims. Masdar City, described as a city of the future, is perhaps the best known and most ambitious example of an avowedly green megaproject. Other projects such as Sustainable City and Desert Rose City are additional examples of green cities that emphasize technological innovation in Masdar City’s manner.

      The greening of the Emirates takes on a central aspect of the modernization narrative. The main gist is that the existing ecological challenges can be measured, and existing institutions and policies find solutions to the problems. According to Dr. Gökçe Günel, the UAE is making a serious effort to maintain its status quo while offering up “technical adjustments” to environmental challenges. Sustainable development juxtaposes intense economic development along with high consumerism coexisting with an environmentally friendly and responsible society. This reveals a paradox in the greening process currently in place.

      These projects are small in scale and only take on a tiny space in the overall urbanity of the country. They take place in a bounded environment and constitute living laboratories that pioneer green technology. But they cannot be replicated on a larger scale or implemented and applied across the whole territory.

      Inevitably, rapid urban growth and transnational migration flows have massively enlarged the ecological footprints of countries such as the UAE. It will be very difficult to achieve sustainable development while Arab Gulf states subsidize massive energy consumption, continue to expand urban sprawl and expansion, and allow for traffic congestion while remaining careless about water and electricity consumption.

      *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Bologna Attack of 1980: Italy’s Unhealed Wound

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      The clock struck 10:25 am on August 2, 1980, when a bomb exploded at Bologna’s Central Train Station. The attack plunged the city, known at the time for its left-wing politics and home to one of the oldest universities on the continent, into chaos. One of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Europe, the explosion had a devastating effect, killing 85 people and injuring over 200. After years of investigations, trials and false leads, Francesca Mambro and Giuseppe Fioravanti, members of the right-wing terrorist organization Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), were sentenced to life imprisonment in November 1995. Both, however, have always maintained their innocence.

      Many others were also put on trial, some of whom eventually received prison sentences for supporting the terrorists or for obstruction of justice. Among them were Licio Gelli, head of the infamous Propaganda Due lodge, and Pietro Musumeci, an officer in the Italian military secret service.

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      Despite these convictions, the Strage di Bologna, or the Bologna massacre, as the attack is now known, continues to be a source of heated debate in Italy, and serious doubts remain as to whether the masterminds behind the attack have really been caught. Every now and then, for example, the Italian judiciary issues new sentences in connection with the attack. Moreover, as recently as January this year, nearly 40 years after the incident, Gilberto Cavalli was found guilty of aiding and abetting Mambro and Fioravanti.

      The ongoing sentencing seems to confirm the widespread belief that we still do not know the whole story and that Italy has struggled to come to terms with this horrible act of terrorism. This state of seeming paralysis is symbolized by the fact that the main station’s clock has not been replaced and, as a reminder for future generations, still shows the exact time of the attack.

      A New Lead? The Palestinian Theory

      Former politicians, judges and magistrates, as well as investigative journalists and academics, have often added to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the attack. Manifold theories about the true masterminds exist, alternately accusing left-wing terrorists, the Mafia or Gladio of having orchestrated the attack. In 2008, Francesco Cossiga, member of the former Christian Democratic Party (DC) who served as minister of interior between 1976-78 and held the title of prime minister between 1979-80 and president of Italy from 1985 to 1992, cast doubt on the culpability of the neo-fascists.

      In an interview with an Israeli newspaper, he argued that the Bologna attack was an act of retaliation by Palestinian terrorists because the government in Rome had violated the so-called Lodo Moro — a decades-old secret agreement between Rome and the Palestinian Liberation Organizations (PLO), in which the Palestinians offered to spare Italy from PLO orchestrated terrorist attacks in return for Rome’s diplomatic support and for allowing the PLO to roam freely in Italy. In July 2016, Rosario Priore, who has investigated right-wing terrorism in Italy for years, propagated Cossiga’s thesis in his book, “I segreti di Bologna: La verità sull’atto terroristico più grave della storia italiana” (“The Secrets of Bologna: The Truth About the Most Serious Attack in Italy’s History”).

      According to Priore, everything started in November 1979 when the Carabinieri arrested three left-wing extremists — Daniele Pifano, Giuseppe Nieri and Giorgio Baumgartner — and a Palestinian man, Abu Anzeh Saleh, for arms smuggling. When the Italian government declined to release Saleh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under George Habash contacted Libyan leaders Muammar Gaddafi, who in turn asked the Venezuelan militant Ilich Ramirez Sanchez — better known as Carlos the Jackal — to retaliate against the Italians. The German Thomas Kram, a member of Carlos’ group, was duly dispatched to Bologna to carry out the bombing. However, Kram and Carlos denied any involvement, arguing that Kram was under constant surveillance by the Italian police as soon as he entered Italy and therefore could not have carried out the attack undetected.

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      Nevertheless, the question remains: Were the Palestinians really responsible, in one form or another, for the terrorist attack in Bologna? As time goes by and more and more archives declassify their documents and make them available for researchers, we may be able to get closer to the truth. In the meantime, however, as historians, we can try to sort myth from reality by contextualizing the events and critically examining the arguments presented. This approach reveals that the Palestinian theory is not as cut and dried as Priore and others claim.

      We do not currently have any evidence that the PFLP and its main leaders, Habash and Bassam Abu Sharif, or any other Palestinian group actually demanded the release of Saleh. Furthermore, bombings were not typically the first weapon of choice for Palestinian terrorists, who preferred kidnappings and taking hostages at the time. In addition, the Palestinians usually claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks they committed. Even Carlos, who worked for the PFLP until 1975, usually claimed responsibility for his actions.

      Moreover, neither the Palestinians nor the Italian government would have gained anything from a stand-off caused by the arrest of one person and the confiscation of weapons. Given the vulnerability of the Italian economy and its dependence on Arab oil, Rome continued to negotiate with rather than confront the PLO. In June 1980, for example, the European Council under Italian leadership issued a statement in favor of the PLO. In addition, in 1980, the various factions within the PLO — including Habash’s PFLP — supported Yasser Arafat’s more cautious and diplomatic approach toward the European countries.

      Why would the PFLP, whose leadership had been weakened when Habash suffered a stroke in 1980, go through all this trouble when there was really nothing to gain? Only when Arafat’s leadership role was challenged in 1982 did Palestinian attacks in Europe resume, with the Achille Lauro affair of 1985 serving as a prime example.

      Going back to Francesco Cossiga’s testimony, it seems that he used the 2008 interview primarily to present himself in a favorable light for the newspaper’s Israeli readership by rejecting any involvement in the pact between Rome and the PLO. He claimed that the secret service did not tell him any details about the agreement between Rome and the Palestinians, which, considering his positions at the highest level of government, is hardly convincing. In addition, by blaming foreign terrorists for the deadliest attack in Italy’s history, he avoided taking responsibility for neglecting and underestimating homegrown terrorism.

      Moreover, we should not forget the tensions between the leadership of what was formerly known as the Christian Democratic Party and the Italian judiciary. Cossiga’s interview shows his distrust toward the judiciary and might have also been an attempt to undermine their authority, by implying that they were unable to find and prosecute the real perpetrators of the attack despite all these years that have passed since.

      A Familiar Pattern: Right-Wing Terrorism

      Considering these points, it seems unlikely that the Bologna attack was an act of retaliation against Italy orchestrated by the PFLP. The extent of Gaddafi’s involvement might tell a different story, but only further investigation and declassification of documents will clarify that case. As it stands, all the concrete evidence and indications we do have point to Italy’s extreme radical right.

      The Bologna attack mirrored how right-wing terrorists have previously operated in Italy, particularly during the strategy of tension period between 1969 and 1974. Though skeptics may claim that the attack was designed to mimic the tactics of the extreme radical right and thus shift blame, it was not just the attack itself — the indiscriminate bombing without anyone claiming responsibility — but also the target that reminded many contemporaries of the chaos right-wing terrorists inflicted on Italy a decade earlier: placing bombs in or close to trains in the summertime, thus causing maximum civilian casualties.

      On August 4, 1974, for instance, right-wing terrorists of the group Black Order carried out an attack on the Italicus express, killing 12 people and injuring 48. The Italian singer and songwriter Claudio Lolli commemorated the attack in his famous song “Agosto”— August — which experienced a revival after the Bologna attack.

      One important aspect of the strategy of tension, however, was missing in 1980, thus implying that it was not just a copycat attack. In contrast to the early 1970s, the attempts to blame the Italian left for the attack were marginal and had not been picked up by Italy’s major newspapers. It shows that the perpetrators were able to adapt to a new socio-political situation. Blaming the Italian left, which had established itself as an integral part of the Italian political landscape in 1980, for the Bologna attack would have been a lost cause.

      That does not mean, however, that the right-wing terrorists did not attempt to influence Italian politics. Bombings, bloodshed and chaos on the streets usually favor conservative groups who claim to be the protectors of law and order. Why right-wing terrorists thought 1980 would be a good year to launch another campaign to push Italy further to the right can only be fully understood when we contextualize Bologna within Italian and European history of the time.

      Given the rising tensions between the West and the Eastern Bloc since 1979, anti-communism became a powerful recruitment tool for the radical right in Europe and again offered an opportunity to form alliances with the conservative milieu, including elements of the state secret services. Thus, it comes as no surprise that everywhere in Europe, extreme parts of the radical right started a new campaign of terror to influence the politics of their respective countries and push them further to the right. The campaign started in February 1980 and lasted, with pauses, at least until 1984-85, when the regime in Moscow began to noticeably decline.

      France and Spain experienced a series of right-wing attacks, and after Bologna, a bomb exploded at the Oktoberfest in Munich on September 26, 1980, killing 13 people. Given the latter’s proximity to the Bologna attack, rumors quickly circulated that some kind of connection must have existed between the Italian terrorists and the German perpetrator, Gundolf Köhler. In 2014, the German federal prosecutor general decided to reopen the case due to inconsistencies and omissions in the original investigations. Until July 2020, when the case was closed again, over 300,000 pages of evidence were examined and over 1,000 witnesses interviewed. In the end, however, the prosecutor could not find additional co-conspirators or backers as possible evidence was carelessly — some would argue deliberately — destroyed early on.

      He did, however, establish that Köhler indeed committed a right-wing terrorist attack to shape West Germany’s politics and was more than just a disgruntled youth. Köhler wanted to influence the political landscape in his country in favor of conservative change — after all, parliamentary elections in West Germany occurred only a couple of days after the bombing, and Franz-Josef Strauß, the candidate of the conservative CDU, was known for his anti-communist stance.

      Fluid Politics

      In Italy, the political situation in 1980 was also fluid, even though no general election was on the horizon. Francesco Cossiga formed a fragile coalition government in April 1980 between his Christian Democratic Party, the Republican Party and the Socialist Party under Bettino Craxi. In the regional election in June 1980, the Christian Democrats gained new seats, and right-wing terrorists might have thought that by destabilizing public order this trend could be pushed even further, maybe resulting in an end to the Socialist’s government involvement.

      Also, the city of Bologna as a target can be taken as a clear sign that it was the extreme radical-right milieu that sought to benefit from public turmoil: Bologna was a, if not the symbol in Italy for a successful, leftist local government: Since 1970, Renato Zangheri, a member of the communist party, has served as the mayor of the city.

      Last but not least, we should also consider the Italian extreme right-wing terrorist scene at the time. Internal rivalry between different factions within a terrorist milieu is often an important factor to explain a process of radicalization. While the strategy of tension of the early 1970s was dominated by a form of reactionary right-wing terrorism, the second half of the decade saw the emergence of a heterogenous right-wing “armed spontaneity” that showed similarities to the American idea of leaderless resistance of the 1970s and 1980s.

      Embed from Getty Images

      During the second half of the 1970s, former heroes of the strategy of tension like Stefano Delle Chiaie were sidelined. When the security apparatus was able to arrest exponents of the armed spontaneity faction, and when the Cold War tensions once again increased, the old guard of Italian right-wing terrorism might have seen an opportunity to regain control over the country’s radical-right extremist milieu.

      One last question remains, however: Why do the arrested right-wing terrorists deny all the charges? Should we believe them? Despite the fact that nearly everyone who was accused of having committed the terrorist bombing in Bologna has denied their involvement, the right-wing terrorists have another motif: Spreading terror and fear is a core aspect of every terrorist group. So, when they deny their involvement in the attack, which remained shrouded in mystery for decades, they increase a sense of unease, fear and terror — a feeling that something similar can happen anywhere and at any time because the true puppet masters are still out there, giving even those who have been accused of or arrested for a crime the opportunity to advance the group’s agenda.

      On this 40th anniversary of the Bologna attack, the citizens of Bologna will observe a minute of silence as they have done every year since 1980, commemorating the 85 victims whose names are enshrined on a plaque with the title “Victims of Fascist Terrorism.” Like each year before, the anniversary will be accompanied by newspaper articles and commentaries, continuing the controversial debates surrounding the attack. These discussions, however, should not distract from the fact that currently the judicial and the historical evidence point only to one group of perpetrators: right-wing terrorists.

      However, as long as theories and rumors circulate and documents remain classified, the victims and their families still await closure. Even if the terrorists might have not succeeded in their ultimate goal, the fear and terror they unleashed on August 2, 1980, still haunts Italy’s public memory — and Bologna’s main station, with its stricken clock — to this day.

      *[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Morocco Looks to a Future After COVID-19

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      Many countries are facing declining growth rates due to the coronavirus pandemic, and Morocco is no exception. Given lockdowns and flight restrictions implemented worldwide from March, the tourism and hospitality sectors — usually the third-largest component of GDP — have suffered enormous losses and almost collapsed during the first 90 days of the global response to COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus.

      In the latest World Bank report, “Morocco Economic Monitor,” it is projected that the Moroccan economy will contract in the next year, which would be the first severe recession since 1995. “Over the past two decades, Morocco has achieved significant social and economic progress due to the large public investments, structural reforms, along with measures to ensure macroeconomic stability,” the report notes.

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      The World Bank’s forecast indicates that Morocco’s real GDP is projected to contract by 4% in 2020, which is a sharp swing from the 3.6% positive growth rate that was predicted before the pandemic. Consequently, the bank expects Morocco’s fiscal deficit to widen to 7.5% of GDP in 2020, around 4% more than expected before the COVID-19 outbreak.

      Meanwhile, the country’s public and external debt is to set rise but still remains manageable. In assessing the government’s well-regarded response to the crisis, the World Bank puts an emphasis on moving from mitigation to adaptation, which is key “to ensuring a resilient, inclusive, and growing Moroccan economy.” It also points out that despite this year’s setbacks, Morocco can still “build a more sustainable and resilient economy by developing a strategy to adapt,” similar to what it has done to address issues of climate change and environmental challenges.

      A Strong Position

      When viewed in comparison to the rest of North Africa and the Middle East, let alone its sub-Saharan neighbors, Morocco is in a strong position to capitalize on global changes as companies rethink supply chains and vulnerabilities in logistics. Globally, and especially in Europe and the US, corporations are rethinking their reliance on China as a key supplier, and Morocco is poised to benefit, as I mentioned in a previous article on Fair Observer.

      The European Union, in particular, is already calling for “strategic autonomy” in sectors such as pharmaceuticals by focusing on more reliable and diversified supply chains. The new strategy is expected to entail tighter rules on human rights and environmental protection on imported goods, a move that experts say would boost local manufacturers, and Morocco is near the top of the list.

      Guillaume Van Der Loo, a researcher at the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels, spoke to DW about the opportunities for Morocco. “If you look at Morocco, there are more favorable conditions there for specific areas in particular, in relation to renewable energy and environmental related sectors, [and] Morocco is quite a frontrunner and the EU tries to chip in on that,” he said. “The idea that the European Commission has already expressed about diversifying supply chains could be beneficial for Morocco and that could accelerate negotiations on the new trade agreement.”

      Morocco is one of few countries that have free-trade deals with both the United States and the European Union, and it is seen as an entry point for Western investment in Africa. As Alessandro Nicita, an economist at UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), says, “Morocco is very well positioned because of its proximity [and] because it’s part of [the] EU’s regional trade agreements, its rules of origin are kind of integrated with those of the EU.”

      The Challenges

      Yet Morocco faces challenges in grabbing these economic opportunities, including restrictive capital controls and a paucity of high-skilled workers. Having been overhauled in the 1980s, the country’s education system “has failed to raise skill levels among the country’s youth, making them especially unsuitable for middle management roles,” DW reports.

      Another concern has been raised by the National Competitive Council in Morocco, which said that if the country was to move forward efficiently, it had to end monopolies in key sectors. These include fuel distribution, telecoms, banks, insurance companies and cement producers, which have created an oligopolistic situation in the country.

      The Oxford Business Group (OBG) has also released a study focusing on the success that Morocco is achieving in terms of combating the effects of COVID-19. “Morocco boasts a robust and diversified industrial base, developed through years of heavy investment, which enabled the country to take actions to control the pandemic and mitigate supply chain disruptions,” the OBG notes. The investment-friendly climate and robust infrastructure, with Africa’s fastest train network, will enhance the country’s attraction for manufacturers looking to relocate Asia-based production, as supply-chain disruptions due to distant and vulnerable suppliers have resulted in many companies pursuing a strategy of near-shoring, the report adds.

      So, Morocco’s future in manufacturing, agro-business and technology may well determine the country’s capacity to recover its positive GDP growth rate as it overcomes the COVID-19-induced recession. To do so, it will need a robust marketing campaign as a country for reliable and relatively inexpensive supply chains and a skilled workforce.

      *[An earlier version of this article was published by Morocco on the Move.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Annexation or No Annexation, Little Will Change in Israel-GCC Relations

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      It is important to question how the proposed Israeli annexation of 30% to 40% of the West Bank could impact Tel Aviv’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Although it is impossible to safely predict how regional dynamics would change if the annexation goes ahead, there are three main reasons why the move would probably neither elicit a discernible reaction from most Arab Gulf sheikdoms nor irreparably damage Israel’s existing partnerships with GCC members.

      First, most regimes in the Arabian Peninsula do not perceive Israel as a grave strategic threat, nor do most in the GCC view standing up for the Palestinian cause as a high-ranking priority, especially compared to dealing with the perceived Turkish and Iranian threats. Second, throughout the 20th century, Israel has developed extensive relations with some states in the GCC. Such engagement and cooperation spread across numerous domains such as intelligence, security and economic cooperation. Third, the question of Palestinian statehood is generally linked to either pan-Arabism or Islamism, and most Arab Gulf regimes seek to limit the power of such ideologies in their own countries.

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      Furthermore, while officials in the GCC have issued public statements warning Israel to not to go ahead with the planned annexation of the West Bank, such rhetoric is mainly intended for domestic and regional consumption and does not directly reflect the warming relations between Israel and the Gulf capitals. 

      Strategic Relations

      Foreign ministers and Gulf officials have publicly condemned the move, arguing that “annexation will certainly and immediately upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and with UAE.” Moreover, Bahraini minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, expressed that the “Israeli plan threatens international peace and security and endangers the region,” while both Kuwait’s ambassador to the United Nations and Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued similar statements condemning annexation. 

      Doha would likely react negatively to annexation based on the close relationships developed with Hamas and a litany of Islamist movements across the region since the 1990s. However, Qatar has had to go to pains to cement its close relations with the Trump administration amid the past three years of being subjected to a blockade by its neighbors. Thus, officials in Doha would likely have to be cautious about taking any steps vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine that could trigger a negative response from the most pro-Israel leader who has ever occupied the Oval Office.

      Embed from Getty Images

      At the same time, examining the strategic relations between Israel and the GCC member states allows one to understand the potential repercussions of annexation. Accordingly, Israel’s economic, security and intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE are likely to withstand annexation. This is mainly due to most Arab Gulf states’ tactical acceptance of Israel’s military and technological predominance in the region, especially when viewed in terms of the perceived Iranian threat, Turkish “neo-Ottomanism” and Washington’s waning military commitment to the region. Notwithstanding Qatar and Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman all formed durable ties in the realms of security, intelligence, and economics. In the domains of security and intelligence, the common enemy — Turkey — and the threat of Iranian hegemony cohere Israel with the UAE, Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

      Israel and Arab Gulf states’ clandestine diplomatic engagement began decades ago and surfaced into overtly public relations. Consequently, the move toward normalization of ties has shuttered away the long-standing Arab demand that Israel withdraw from lands captured in 1967 as a precondition for acceptance of Israel.

      Omani-Israeli relations are largely predicated on clandestine diplomacy and are historically orchestrated by the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency. To be sure, Mossad officers have routinely traveled to Muscat to consult with Omani officials regarding Iran and other shared regional concerns. Oman’s willingness to work with Tel Aviv is based on a historic pattern of bilateral economic and political ties. It follows that Oman will not disrupt ties with the Jewish state but rather continue its historical role as a diplomatic mediator — a position Muscat is likely to attempt to embrace in the short term in the event of annexation.

      Durable Ties

      Moreover, Israel established durable intelligence and security ties with other GCC members. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) caused a bit of a surprise in the regional when he declared that “there are a lot of interests we [Saudi Arabia] share with Israel and if there is peace, there would be a lot of interest between Israel and the GCC.” Further, GCC support for Israel was expressed during the 2019 Warsaw Mideast Summit, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE’s chief diplomats all defending Israel’s right to exist and alluding that the perceived Iranian threat overshadowed the question of Palestinian statehood. That same year, MBS declared that “the Palestinians need to accept [Trump’s] proposal or stop complaining.”

      Although, as noted, Tel Aviv’s intelligence and security relations with GCC member states are predicated on sharing information regarding Tehran and terrorism, many Arab Gulf monarchies are acquiring signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities from the Israeli defense sector. As an anonymous European intelligence official told The Washington Post, “The tools you need to combat terrorism are the same ones you need to suppress dissent.”

      To be sure, the Israeli defense sector has sold GCC member-states SIGINT collection methods and eavesdropping capabilities to monitor internal dissent and entrench the power of the central authority. For example, Israel sold Saudi Arabia over $250 million worth of electronic and signals intelligence eavesdropping equipment in 2018, while Tel Aviv sold the Iron Dome advance air defense system to the kingdom a short time earlier. In 2016, Israel sold more than $1 billion to Arabian Peninsula sheikdoms, with most of the weapons directed to the Emiratis and Saudis, although the majority of such deals are kept secret.

      The defense and intelligence relationships are again important given the convergence of interests around the Iranian threat, Ankara’s ambitious and Muslim Brotherhood-friendly foreign policy, along with the relative decline of Washington’s regional influence. For many Gulf monarchies, Israel represents a strategic partner that can effectively contribute to regional and global efforts to counter Iranian conduct in the wider Arab/Islamic world, provide intelligence information and collection capabilities to counterterrorism operations, and eavesdrop on domestic detractors while also gradually embracing the regional security role previously commanded by Washington.

      Domestic perceptions triggered by annexation among the GCC population are likely to dilute the strength of public diplomacy between the Gulf monarchies and Tel Aviv in the short term, despite Riyadh and Abu Dhabi often viewing Hamas with trepidation given the group’s Islamist ideology and its relations with Turkey, Qatar and Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are worried about Islamist movements and affiliated political power as a challenge to authority, yet they are equally concerned about domestic perceptions of annexation given the overtly public relations between the two monarchies and Tel Aviv.

      In sum, the annexation process is unlikely to rupture Tel Aviv’s relations with GCC members. Israel is united with the Arabian monarchies by the common perception of the Iranian threat, while the Israeli defense and intelligence establishment provides an abundance of weaponry, intelligence information and collection capabilities to Gulf partners. Moreover, while annexation will stir internal opposition in the region, the GCC member states are only likely to publicly condemn the policy while continuing with diplomatic engagement, trade, intelligence sharing and defense acquisitions.*[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Opposing Repressive Regimes in the Middle East Is a Death Sentence

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      The ruling by Bahrain’s top judicial body, the court of cassation, on July 13 to uphold the death sentences of Mohammed Ramadhan and Husain Moosa has been decried by human rights organizations, condemned in the UK House of Lords and questioned in the British Parliament. Whether any of that will save the men from execution is debatable.

      The men were convicted and sentenced to death in 2014 for the killing of a policeman. That conviction was overturned when evidence emerged that they had been tortured into giving false confessions. Despite that decision, the death penalty was reinstated and subsequently confirmed by the court of cassation. An official in the public prosecutor’s office defended the court’s latest ruling while denying the accusations of torture, claiming that medical reports showed that the confessions were obtained “in full consciousness and voluntarily, without any physical or verbal coercion.”

      In Bahrain, Justice Is Still a Far-Off Goal

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      That confounds the earlier court decision to throw out the convictions, which was based on an investigation undertaken by the Bahraini government’s own Special Investigation Unit that showed the men had been tortured. However, in the contorted reality of the kingdom’s politicized judicial system, the court of cassation decided that the convictions were not based on evidence extracted under torture but rather on other evidence.

      “Close and Important Relationship”

      Amnesty International denounced the latest verdict, saying: “The two men were taken to the Criminal Investigations Department where they were tortured during interrogation. Mohamed Ramadhan refused to sign a ‘confession’, though he was subjected to beating and electrocution. Hussain Ali Moosa said he was coerced to ‘confess’ and incriminate Mohamed Ramadhan after being suspended by the limbs and beaten for several days.”

      Moosa has said that, after his genitalia were repeatedly beaten, he was told that if he signed a confession implicating Ramadhan his sentence would be commuted to life: “They were kicking me on my reproductive organs, and would hit me repeatedly in the same place until I couldn’t speak from the pain. I decided to tell them what they wanted.” His repudiation of the confession was ignored by the courts.

      In UK Parliament, four days prior to the court of cassation ruling, the Conservative MP Sir Peter Bottomley had asked Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab for a statement on whether he would use what he called “the UK’s constructive dialogue” with Bahrain to publicly raise the cases of the men. In reply, the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa James Cleverly spoke of a “close and important relationship” with an “ongoing, open and genuine dialogue” with Bahrain. The minister averred that “this dynamic” enabled the UK to raise human rights concerns, adding “the cases of Mr Moosa and Mr Ramadhan had been, and would continue to be, raised in conversations with officials in Bahrain.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      Earlier this month, it was revealed that another heavily politicized judiciary, this time in Iran, had upheld the death sentences of three young Iranian protesters who had been arrested in November of last year during countrywide protests that saw hundreds killed by security forces. Though moving swiftly to convict the men and sentence them to death, the authorities have done virtually nothing about investigating the killings carried out by the state in suppressing the protests. Amongst media highlighting their case is the Saudi news site Al Arabiya. It noted that a hashtag trending in Iran, “#do not execute,” has had over 2 million tweets. On July 19, Iran halted the executions, according to one of the lawyers for the accused.

      In 2019, Saudi Arabia executed a record 184 people, including six women, many for drug-related offenses. Some were crucified after being beheaded. At least one was a minor. In April, the kingdom announced it would no longer execute juveniles; rather it would sentence them to a maximum of 10 years in a juvenile detention center. It is unclear if the decree will save the life of Ali al-Nimr, who was 17 when arrested and 19 when sentenced to death. His uncle Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Shia Muslim cleric and critic of the ruling family, was beheaded in 2016.

      State-Sanctioned Arbitrary Killing

      In Egypt, more than 2,000 people have been sentenced to death since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in 2013, with nearly 200 executed. At least 10 children have been sentenced to hang. In the country’s prison system, there is another kind of death — by deliberate medical neglect, as was the case with the country’s first democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi. He was repeatedly denied medication for his diabetes and collapsed and died in a Cairo court on June 17, 2019.

      On November 8 last year, a panel of UN experts led by Agnes Callamard, the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, concluded that Morsi’s death “after enduring those conditions could amount to a State-sanctioned arbitrary killing”. The case shed light on the horrific conditions in Egypt’s overcrowded and brutal prison system, a situation that has been severely exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

      On July 13, prominent Egyptian journalist Mohamed Monir died from COVID-19. He had been arrested and held in pre-trial detention for criticizing, on the Al Jazeera news network, the government’s handling of the coronavirus crisis. The charge against him was broadcasting false news. The 65-year-old suffered from heart disease and diabetes, and was therefore at high risk of contracting the disease. After falling ill Monir was released to hospital a week before he died. An influential critical voice was silenced. Surely that was the intention — death, be it by medical malfeasance or by execution, is a powerful weapon in the hands of authoritarian regimes.

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The West’s Middle Eastern Playbook

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      Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan, the wise ones say. I would add that failure suddenly gets you dumped like a hot potato in the hands of your benefactors. You don’t believe me? Just ask the Libyan has-been, Khalifa Haftar, at one time considered the best game in town by his foreign backers. The general knows a thing or two about hot potatoes.

      French President Emmanuel Macron has no qualms about claiming that France never supported Haftar. In the era of television and coronavirus social distancing, Macron was saved the embarrassment of looking us in the eye as he insulted our intelligence. Or perhaps he wasn’t. Unlike many of us, but still with a good memory, he was just too young to remember the French military helicopter shot down near Benghazi, killing three French soldiers in July 2016. Clearly, they were not there paying a social visit to Haftar, and not in a war chopper.

      Deeper Fragmentation Looms for Libya

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      Nor would he remember the Javelin missiles discovered in the possession of Haftar’s forces that France procured from the Americans, probably using cash it withdrew from one of the two petrodollar ATMs. But to be fair to France, it did confess ownership of those missiles, explaining, “Those missiles were damaged! Awaiting destruction!” In Haftar’s possession, we may ask? Seriously?

      Granted, torpedoing a political process intended to bring an accountable transparent rule of law is anathema to Haftar’s regional supporters and for Russian President Vladimir Putin too, who, like his colleagues in Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has fixed himself with job security until 2036 or eternity, whichever lasts longer. Installing another North African military junta makes sense — for them at least.  

      Ultimate Objective

      But what could possibly drive France to be involved in a destructive war with the ultimate objective to restore a brutal military dictatorship, which goes against everything the French people stand for? Moreover, France’s role in Libya has split the NATO alliance dangerously. French and Turkish warships recently faced each other as adversaries rather than allies in the Mediterranean Sea. Rather than work with a NATO partner who knows the dangers of, and has freed itself from, military rule, Turkey, Macron, in order to help bring a civilian-led political process in Libya, has taken the side of the region’s most ruthless dictatorships, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and also Russia, who must be applauding the NATO split.  

      By what measure of expression and democratic representation of the people does Macron’s policy reflect the will of the French majority? Probably the answer to that and other debacles of the Macron administration might come soon. The next election is in 2022, and the French do not suffer fools.

      Still insulting our intelligence, France insists it is engaged in fighting terrorism — everybody’s cause célèbre for rampage, plunder, death and destruction. From Afghanistan to Iraq and Yemen, to Libya and Syria, one wonders who has become more dangerous, more destructive, more criminal — the terrorists or those claiming to be fighting and saving us from them? 

      Embed from Getty Images

      The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan saw the creation of al-Qaeda by the CIA, which funded, trained and armed the group — complete with stinger missiles. Immediately after the Soviets left Afghanistan and America won that Cold War battlefield, the Afghans were dumped, only to be remembered when America itself decided to invade the country. Only this time, it is the Russians who are hitting back at the US there, if the reports on bounty money for dead Americans are to be believed.

      Even before the blood of Afghans and Americans dried up, Washington decided to launch another invasion, this time against weapons of mass destruction, or maybe to bring democracy, or maybe leading an anti-terrorism alliance. It took the maestro himself, Alan Greenspan, to admit what we already knew. In his book, “The Age of Turbulence,” Greenspan writes that “The Iraq war was largely about oil.” He goes on to say, “I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to admit what everybody knows.” There, so much for WMDs and fighting terrorism and bringing democracy on the backs of war tanks.

      Western Playbook

      There is a playbook in the West, used in every modern-day invasion of the Middle East. In it, loud noises are never the not-so-hidden agendas. Pardon me for stating the obvious. The problem with that short-sighted destructive playbook is its unnecessary cost in blood and treasure.  

      In 2012, at the height of the Arab Spring and our optimism, I attended a conference in Istanbul discussing “rebalancing.” Advocating for the idea of rebalancing Arab-Western relations, I said that  “while we Arabs must refuse to be held hostage by the past, and we will continue to advocate a forward looking new page in our relations. The West must also free itself from its past.” The West tragically was unable to live with the prospects of new realities emerging in the Arab world and went ahead to help cut the knees of the democratic forces.

      Our argument for creating governments that do not rely on foreign powers for protection but on their own electorates to whom they will also be answerable was exactly what was feared. When I said, “The West must realize that the incoming governments of Arabia, unlike the outgoing dictatorships, will be answerable to their people, and therefore have less wiggle room to make decisions that only serve short term external interests over their people’s long-term interests,” a Western friend came to me and said, “That’s exactly why your revolution will not be allowed to succeed.” 

      That kind of shift in the West toward the Middle East would require accepting representative governments created through a transparent, accountable political process and accepting economic exchange based on fair value. An exchange we have always been happy to engage in, no bloody and expensive invasions needed. After all, the Arab world can neither drink its oil nor live in economic isolation.

      But the West has never been used to that type of relationship with us. Not when it was the colonial power nor later, as the protector of proxy regimes it helped create at the end of its colonial presence. That inability to accept a change in the region lies at the center of its policies — supporting the survival of military and other undemocratic regimes in the region whose existence is not protected by the mandate of the people they govern but by foreign powers. The price for that quid pro quo is paid economically and politically and is never at fair value for the people who matter — the growing populations.

      The vicious cycle is perpetuated. The more such arrangements are created at the top, the more unrest is created at the base against the ruling tyrants, which in turn leads to more dependence on foreign protection. Imagining the violent outcome is a no brainer, and it is clear before our very eyes.   

      Whether it is America and Britain in Afghanistan and Iraq, or France in Libya and elsewhere in Africa, that playbook has become more costly not just for the people in whose territories it is played out, but also in the streets of the nations that employ it. Tyranny comes in different shapes and forms. It is also dressed differently, and not just in turbans and military uniforms. Perhaps the worst is the one that comes deceptively in a suit and necktie, controlling the levers that drive the others.  

      *[This article was originally published by the Daily Sabah.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Lucrative Art of Sportswashing

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      When it was announced on July 9 that the great British road racing cyclist Chris Froome was departing Team Ineos for Israel Start-up Nation, there was some surprise amongst the racing fraternity — not about his leaving Ineos, where relations were said to be fraying, but about where he was headed. As the BBC’s Matt Warwick put it: “Froome has gone to a team who, up until … last October, were in pro cycling’s second division … Think Lionel Messi leaving Barcelona to play in the English Championship, and you’ll get the idea.”

      The man bringing Froome to Israel is 61-year-old Israeli-Canadian billionaire businessman Sylvan Adams. Adams has unabashedly appointed himself Israel’s ambassador at large, whose remit is to use his wealth and the vehicle of sport to improve the image of the country he now calls home. That sounds suspiciously like sportswashing, but Adams says that is not the case: “We’re not trying to cover up our sins and wash them away with something. Actually we’re just being ourselves and it’s not washing, it’s sport. It’s not called sportwashing, it’s called sport.”

      A New Narrative

      Adams likes to boast about bringing in celebrities like Lionel Messi for a football friendly, or Madonna when Israel hosted the Eurovision song contest. He doesn’t talk about the fees he paid to bring them in — it is all about telling positive stories, creating a new narrative. And he insists that what he is doing is not political. Adams is prepared to acknowledge that the Israelis “live in a bit of a rough neighbourhood, and we have issues with our neighbours, but that’s not the whole story.” And in his relentlessly sunny version of reality he sees but one dark cloud: “By just focusing on one aspect of life here, you are necessarily distorting the true picture and necessarily creating, and I hate to say it, fake news.”

      One of his biggest coups and one he is building on with the acquisition of Froome was to secure the first leg of the famed Giro d’Italia for Israel in 2018. Adams is himself an amateur racing fanatic: He built the Middle East’s first velodrome in Tel Aviv and named it after himself. He says that, though it took a little convincing, the Giro organizers were eventually won over and the deal was done. Again, no mention of fees. “When I brought the Giro here and we had helicopter footage from the north to the south over three beautiful days, people saw it and it looked like the Giro. Really, it was fantastic,” Adams proudly recalls.

      Embed from Getty Images

      One doubts, however, that the footage caught the concrete wall that slashes through the land and divides Palestinian families, the illegal settlements implanted in the West Bank, the olive groves uprooted and destroyed, the nearly 2 million Palestinians crammed into the 365 square kilometers of the Gaza Strip. With a mantra of good news and pleasing views, Adams hopes that what many others see as sportswashing and what he insists is just “sports” will further facilitate the process of Israel’s normalization with the Gulf states.

      He points to the presence of teams from Bahrain and the UAE in the 2018 Giro race held in Jerusalem as evidence of building friendly relations and the race itself as a “bridge of peace.” And he talks of meeting Prince Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, son of the king of Bahrain, a fellow racing enthusiast and head of the Bahrain Cycling Team. Adams was part of the Israeli delegation that went to the Bahraini capital Manama last year to discuss financing Donald Trump’s so-called “deal of the century,” which is where he met Prince Nasser. The prince has been credibly accused of torturing protesters in 2011.

      Though the allegations against Nasser are widely known and the subject of conversation and controversy within the racing community, this news seemed either to have escaped Adams or he knew and wasn’t troubled: “I went to the palace. We had a private meeting. I told him about the velodrome and sent him an invitation.” Good news then.

      More Good News

      Continuing on the good news front, Manchester City, owned by a senior member of the Abu Dhabi ruling family, had its two-year ban from Champions League football lifted on July 13. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) overturned UEFA’s February ruling that punished the club for being in breach of Financial Fair Play regulations. Although Manchester City had “obstructed” UEFA in its investigation and shown “disregard” for the principle of cooperating with the authorities, CAS determined that as concerned the central finding — that the team’s Abu Dhabi ownership had played a shell game, disguising what was its own funding as independent sponsorship — “most of the alleged breaches were either not established or time-barred.” That does suggest rather strongly that at least some of the breaches were established and others disallowed on a technicality.

      It is widely accepted that, in building Man City into a football behemoth, club executives played fast and loose with the financial rules. Now with this decision, it is accepted that Abu Dhabi, with the payment of a €10-million fine ($11.4 million), knocked down from the €30 million UEFA had levied, can get away with it.

      For those in the business of sportswashing, that’s very good news. That and the fact that fans will look away from the unsavory, will see sport as an escape with no political intersections. As Sylvan Adams, the sportswashing denier, puts it: “I’m reaching sports fans who don’t dislike us. I’m not talking to the haters; haters gonna hate, and you know we live in a happier world. We don’t hate, we’re open, we’re free-thinking people. I’d rather live in our world. The world’s a little sunnier and nicer in our world rather than spewing hate all the time.”

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More