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      The Importance of the US-South Korea Relationship

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      There are many things we look for in a president. We look for leadership and the ability to manage grave challenges like a pandemic. While most people are focused on avoiding COVID-19 and keeping their jobs, we would be wise to remember that one of the most important roles for any president is to build a set of global allies who will stand with us when inevitable conflicts occur.

      Today, America faces unprecedented challenges from foreign powers, especially China and North Korea. To meet the challenges, we must build a coherent foreign policy that the world — especially our allies — can understand and support. We are witnessing China increasingly flexing its muscles on the Indian border, in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea and with Taiwan. America puts itself at risk to not realize that China is investing much of its resources into a growing, multifaceted military.

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      The US needs to build alliances throughout Asia to ensure our stability for the next century. We need to be doubling down on our relationships with India, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and especially South Korea. South Korea is the world’s 12th-largest economic power and one of America’s strongest allies for the last 60 years. It has been a bastion of democracy housing one of the largest US military bases in Asia. It also houses an essential element of the West’s global supply chain for technology, transportation and telecommunications. This supply chain is more important than ever if relations with China continue to deteriorate.

      While the importance of a strong South Korea policy is at an all-time high, US President Donald Trump managed to stick his finger in the eye of our Korean allies. In 2019, Trump demanded “out of thin air” that the Koreans pay $4.7 billion per year to station US military forces on the Korean Peninsula, according to CNN.

      There is no question that our allies have to pay their fair share for defense. However, cost-sharing negotiations must be based on rationale and data. At precisely the time we need strong allies in Asia, President Trump is burning bridges. This is a major political gaffe that America needs to correct before our relationship suffers long-term damage. If the South Koreans cannot count on reasonable and predictable US foreign policy, they will have little choice but to abandon Washington and to seek out other alliances.

      The South Koreans weren’t the only ones taken by surprise. Even Republican Senators Cory Gardner and Marco Rubio were unprepared to discuss the president’s comments. Senator Ed Markey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, said, “If South Korea decides that it is better off without the United States, President Trump will have undermined an over 60-year shared commitment to peace, stability, and rule of law.”

      The United States can do better. We need to deepen our relationship with South Korea as an essential partner for dealing with North Korea and China. We should be doing the same with other Asian countries and continue to promote the policies that Democratic and Republican secretaries of state have built over decades. A president needs to communicate a consistent game plan that the American people — and our allies — can understand and count on.

      Presidential leadership needs to be even-handed and sensitive to the concerns of our allies. Demands should be replaced by reasonable requests and ample explanations. Insisting that allies vastly increase payments to the United States might make good domestic election-year politics at the cost of American safety in the world.

      If we do not rethink the importance of our allies soon, we may be left to fight the next war alone.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Why Is the US Losing Against China in an Espionage War?

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      Chinese espionage cases in the US have assumed alarming proportions. On July 7, Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, declared: “We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost half are all related to China.”

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      Since the mid-1990s, evidence of Chinese espionage in the US had been mounting. However, it is only recently that the US began taking this issue seriously. Washington’s inability to recognize the threat from Beijing early on is due to its failure to understand Chinese espionage culture. This, in turn, is because the US lacks a strategic counterintelligence culture and focuses excessively on operations.

      Historical Roots of Chinese Espionage Culture

      Americans see the worsening of Sino-US relations from the prism of “betrayal” and “surprise.” This is because the US considers the 1972 US-China rapprochement as a watershed moment. Many in Washington believe the US was singularly responsible for the dramatic economic rise of China. Consequently, they had assumed that the Middle Kingdom would be grateful for American help and adopt Western norms over time. To their surprise, this did not happen. Beijing never really displayed gratitude and it has become increasingly defiant as it has become more powerful. The rising threat of espionage, both security and commercial, is just one of the many manifestations of this defiance.

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      A simple question arises: Why did the US fail to foresee the threat of espionage by China? The answer lies in the chronic inability of American intelligence and intelligentsia to pay adequate attention to the intelligence cultures of other countries. As early as the 1980s, this lacuna had been pointed out by some academics who understood the perils of neglecting foreign cultures. Their advice went unheeded, though.

      To understand Chinese intelligence culture, the operative date is not 1972 but the first recorded interaction between the Chinese and Western civilizations. In the 16th century, Italian-born Father Matteo Ricci led a team of Jesuit missionaries to the village of Shanghai. In a way, these missionaries were the first Western intelligence operatives in China. They came with the mission of converting the Chinese to Christianity. The Jesuits assumed that the lure of superior Western science and technology would convince the Chinese to embrace Christianity. This didn’t happen. By the end of the 19th century, the Jesuits concluded that their mission had been a “total failure.”

      The reason behind this failure is fairly straightforward. Hostility toward foreigners was deeply entrenched in the Chinese psyche. Any foreigner was categorized as “inferior” and “barbaric.” The missionaries were only welcome as long as they imparted knowledge in the scientific and technological realms. Beyond that, when they tried to propagate religion and philosophy, they were punished and sometimes executed. In essence, the Chinese saw the missionaries akin to a fat cow that was to be milked and then slaughtered. This episode offers important insights for understanding modern Chinese espionage culture.

      Today, China is again milking the West for advanced scientific and technical knowledge. This time, it has sent Chinese spies to infiltrate citadels of Western knowledge, especially in the US.

      Reassessing Chinese Espionage Operations

      Studies on Chinese intelligence have mostly focused on operational level analysis. Analysts have largely failed to place individual espionage operations within the cultural context. Few Americans understand that the principles guiding Chinese espionage operations are fundamentally at odds with western ones.  

      This difference could be spotted as early as the mid-20th century when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was building up its intelligence infrastructure with the help of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the CCP intelligence apparatus cooperated closely with Soviet intelligence. Yet, despite tutelage and operational cooperation, the influence of Soviet intelligence practices on the Chinese remained minimal.

      Just as 16th century China had welcomed Western science and discarded Western philosophy, the CCP followed the same practice. Operationally, the CCP intelligence services were keen to learn the tricks of the trade from the Soviets. However, they stuck with their ancient philosophies on the subject. In particular, the Chinese stayed true to Sun Tzu, the famous military strategist of the 6thcentury BCE. There was “no imitation or even emulation” of Soviet intelligence practices, but only “customization and improvisation.”

      One such customization can be seen in how the Chinese have employed the Sun Tzuvian concept of “expendable spies,” which conflicts with the Western philosophy of “ethical spying.” Empirical studies on the British, American and Soviet experience in running human intelligence operations reveal a remarkable degree of concern for field agents. In particular, Western intelligence agencies have historically shown great regard for the lives and security of their informers. The Americans and the British treated Russian informers like Adolf Tolkachev and Oleg Gordievsky rather well. The Soviets also took good care of strategic informants like the Cambridge Five. Western handling officers often insist on “informant security.”

      The “expendable spies” doctrine, on the other hand, does not extend to the field agents the privileges that come with “ethical spying.” The arrest of Candace Claiborne, the State Department official, illustrates this point. Claiborne’s true identity was revealed when she unsuspectingly accepted a compliment from an undercover FBI operative that she was one of the “highest regarded” assets of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the intelligence, security and secret police agency of China. This incident reveals that Chinese intelligence seems to have offered zero security training to an agent who enjoyed top-secret clearance. The CCP treats agents as “disposable” because it still follows Sun Tzu’s theory of “expendable spies.”    

      The expendable and ethical schools of intelligence lead to a qualitative versus quantitative dichotomy when it comes to informer networks. Western agencies look for a few reliable informers who can be secured. The Chinese employ a vacuum cleaner approach and prefer using a large number of intelligence collectors instead of a few trained professionals. This qualitative-quantitative distinction is certainly well known, but few Americans appreciate its historical origins that date back to the formative years of the CCP intelligence apparatus.

      Beijing has used the quantitative approach relentlessly when it comes to commercial espionage. In 2015, John Lewis of the Obama administration insisted to his Chinese counterpart that they discuss this thorny issue. After a few failed attempts at dodging it, the Chinese official made a rather candid observation. According to the official, the Chinese intelligence culture did not distinguish between espionage for national security and for economics. Such a dichotomy was solely a Western one. For the Chinese, it did not exist. Despite this clear confession, it took another five years for the American establishment to completely wake up to the reality of the Chinese threat.

      Fixing the American Culture of Counterintelligence

      The US can contain the Chinese threat by effective counterintelligence. However, the current state of play does not inspire much confidence. American misreading of Chinese espionage culture has given birth to an inadequate counterintelligence response. The US focuses too much on individual cases and not enough on developing a strategic counterintelligence doctrine.

      In such a strategy, the US would employ offensive operations to disrupt enemy intelligence goals. Instead, the FBI currently deploys a defensive strategy that involves the prosecution and conviction of foreign agents. This has two obvious flaws.

      Embed from Getty Images

      First, prosecution takes up scarce time, energy and money. It has an opportunity cost. It fails to exploit a compromised spy who could be used as a double agent. Prosecution also alerts enemy intelligence agencies who can then cover up their tracks.

      Second, convictions are hard to obtain in intelligence matters. Evidence is often insufficient, critical details of operations cannot be revealed and the gray matters of espionage do not translate as easily to the cut and dried approach of the court of law. This makes convictions difficult to secure. In fact, the shrinking arrest-to-conviction ratio feeds into the Chinese intelligence offensive, which feeds on accusations of racism and witch-hunting by the Americans. Every person accused by the FBI who walks away free adds to China’s psychological operations (PSYOP).

      In theory, PSYOP is shaped and targeted at a particular set of audiences to achieve a well-defined set of objectives. By accusing Americans of racism, the CCP aims to appeal to the sentiments of the American people in order to turn them against the FBI. In this regard, Beijing seems successful as American academic and scientific institutions have repeatedly resisted the FBI’s requests to monitor Chinese students. These institutions fear accusations of racism and perhaps a drying up of Chinese money. China has cleverly created rifts between American security agencies and its intellectual institutions to further its own purposes.

      To extricate American counterintelligence from this imbroglio, the US will have to embrace a strategic counterintelligence doctrine. It will have to use PSYOP effectively too. In particular, it could focus on China’s violations of human rights such as the brutal “traitor weeding” program followed by its intelligence agencies. Already, educated Americans are turning against Chinese actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet.

      Therefore, the need of the hour is for Americans to embrace the famed Sun Tzuvian dictum: “[K]now thyself and know thy enemy; a thousand battles, a thousand victories.”

      *[Atul Singh provided guidance for this article.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is Realism in Foreign Policy Realistic?

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      The year 2020 has understandably been a time of deep confusion in the world of diplomacy, marked by the parallel phenomena of a Donald Trump presidency that may come to an end in January 2021 and the ongoing global curse of COVID-19. Those factors and other more local ones — such as yet another countdown for Brexit — have brought to a virtual standstill serious consideration of how the most powerful nations of the world will be conducting their foreign policy in the years to come. 

      With the increasing likelihood of a Joe Biden presidency and a hoped-for fadeout of COVID-19, it may be time to begin looking at the prospects some influential thinkers in the realm of international relations have been putting forward.

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      Last year, in those halcyon days when COVID-19 was still hiding in the recesses of a bat cave on the outskirts of human society and President Trump — who was headed for another four years in the White House — was gloating over unemployment levels in the US that had reached a record low, celebrated political scientist John Mearsheimer took a trip “down under” to teach Australians his doctrine of “offensive realism.”

      The University of Chicago professor informed them that the rise of China would lead to a military standoff with the reigning hegemon, the US. Though Australia may appear in geographic terms to be an appendage of Asia, with strong economic ties, Mearsheimer insisted that Australians should see their role as an outpost of the American continent, which he occasionally referred to as Godzilla.

      In a 2019 debate with Australian strategic thinker Hugh White, Mearsheimer reduced his lesson to the Aussies to its simplest terms: “If you go with China, you want to understand you are our enemy. You are then deciding to become an enemy of the United States. Because again, we’re talking about an intense security competition. You’re either with us or against us.”

      Does this sound like the language of war? Mearsheimer wants us to believe it’s something else. Not even a cold war. Even less, a global chess game. Those obsolete metaphors should be put to pasture. It has a new name: “intense security competition.”

      Here is today’s 3D definition:

      Security competition:

      A contest concerning political reputation and global power that requires little more than demonstrating the capacity and readiness to launch a nuclear war, now seen as the principal attribute of any nation claiming to assume the responsibility for writing a rulebook that the rest of humanity will be obliged to follow

      Contextual Note

      This definition sums up Mearsheimer’s ideology. Breaking with the idealistic tradition in US diplomacy that justifies aggression and imperial conquest by citing its commitment to establishing or defending liberal democratic values in other parts of the world, Mearsheimer prefers to recognize reality for what it is (or what he thinks it is). Some may be tempted to call this political Darwinism, inspired by Herbert Spencer’s 19th-century social Darwinism.

      Lecturing the Australians, Mearsheimer makes no bones about the brutally expansionist history of the growth of the US empire that began in 1783. He sees it as a consistent, continuous development. Referring to the culture of his childhood neighborhood in New York, he calls it the political equivalent of becoming “the biggest and baddest dude on the block.” As a social scientist, he gives it another more technical name: regional hegemon.

      Mearsheimer insists that Australia must ally with the US instead of China, not because it is less authoritarian, but mainly because the US is bigger and badder. China is too far behind to catch up in the near future. And for a realist, the name of the game is simply “follow the leader.” And though Australia’s economy is closely tied to China’s, Mearsheimer warns the Aussies that if they don’t ally with the US, they will likely receive the same treatment as Fidel Castro’s Cuba (embargos, blockades, sanctions and perhaps even assassination attempts on a future leader).

      Appearing to address the question of the choices Australians must make on their own, Mearsheimer nevertheless claims to know what Australia’s future will inevitably look like. “Security is more important than prosperity because if you don’t survive, you’re not going to prosper,” he says. “That’s why you’ll be with us.”

      His Aussie audience at the conference may or may not see a resemblance between this and the mafioso telling a local shopkeeper, who resists paying protection, to be careful because “things break.” But at least one Australian commentator, Caitlin Johnstone, has understood his message. She provocatively offered what may be the best and most logical translation of Mearsheimer’s point by turning it on its head. “Australia is not aligned with the U.S. to protect itself from China. Australia is aligned with the U.S. to protect itself from the U.S.,” she writes.

      Mearsheimer was even more blunt in his lecture on the same tour: “You understand that the United States is the ruthless great power.”

      Historical Note

      In a lengthy academic article, “Bound to Fail, The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” John Mearsheimer situates his theory within the perspective of post-World War II history. Contradicting the standard account of the Cold War, he offers this correction: “The Cold War order, which is sometimes mistakenly referred to as a ‘liberal international order,’ was neither liberal nor international.” He claims that its idealism was a sham. It was realistic. It was about hegemonic power.

      Instead, he asserts that what followed the collapse of the Soviet Union should be called the rise of the liberal international order. And he explains that “the post–Cold War liberal international order was doomed to collapse, because the key policies on which it rested are deeply flawed. Spreading liberal democracy around the globe … is extremely difficult” and it “often poisons relations with other countries and sometimes leads to disastrous wars.”

      Having given precise instruction to the Australians, Mearsheimer now addresses his compatriots with the question: “How should the United States act as it leaves behind the liberal international order that it worked so assiduously to build?” His answer is that the US must abandon the goal of forcefully spreading democracy and “engaging in social engineering abroad.” 

      He wants the US to consolidate its power through a conjoined focus on economic control and military might. He acknowledges that China is positioned to become a regional hegemon in Asia. But he reminds us that “the United States does not tolerate peer competitors. The idea that China is going to become a regional hegemon is unacceptable to the United States.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      Some may find this contradictory. Mearsheimer explains to the Australians that the only legitimate hegemony is regional and not global and then claims that the US — the dominant regional hegemon in the Americas — should not allow another regional hegemon to exist. That surely means that by default the US becomes the global hegemon. 

      Mearsheimer confirms this impression when he describes the merits of a “rules-based order,” which so many commentators believe Donald Trump has compromised. This is what Mearsheimer told the Australians: “The United States writes the rules. We obey them when it suits us and we disobey them when it doesn’t suit us.” 

      He then adds this remark: “Those rules are written to benefit the great powers so that they can wage security competition … and if they don’t like the rules they just disobey them.” His choice of the verb “wage” clearly demonstrates that his idea of “security competition” is nothing more than a euphemism for war. That apparently is how realists have been thinking ever since Thomas Hobbes.

      So, what about the coming US presidential election? Stephen Walt, who famously collaborated with Mearsheimer to expose the influence of the Israel lobby on US politics, has titled his recent article in Foreign Policy: “Biden Needs to Play the Nationalism Card Right Now.” Walt cites Mearsheimer’s insistence that “nationalism remains the most powerful political ideology on the planet and a critical source of identity for most human beings, including the vast majority of Americans.”

      In an interview, Mearsheimer recently articulated his expectations of a new Democratic administration: “I think that will all be for the good.” In other words, he sees Trump’s “America First” nationalism (which he appreciates) being replaced by Biden’s more realistic brand of hegemonic nationalism, which he also appreciates. Australians will simply have to learn to live with it.

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Does Beijing Prefer Biden or Trump?

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      Few major events occur in the world now occur without China having a stake, directly or indirectly, in their outcome. That is because Beijing has become a force to be reckoned with, and its influence has grown to rival or even surpass that of the US in many parts of the world. Just as elections throughout the world have historically implied some sort of impact on Washington, now the world is becoming accustomed to the same being true for Beijing.

      The US presidential election is certainly no exception. At least part of the reason that matters to Washington is because, for the first time since America became a global superpower, it now has a proper peer. The former Soviet Union may have been a military peer, but it was not a peer on any other level. That is not true with China, which now rivals the US in some arenas or is on its way to doing so. In some aspects of science, technology, the global economy, diplomacy and political influence, Beijing is already more consequential to much of the rest of the world than America is.

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      Given its single-minded focus on creating an alternative world order crafted in Beijing’s image, as well as the tremendous resources it is devoting to that task, there is little reason to believe that China’s trajectory will change in the coming decade and beyond. One could argue, in fact, that the outcome of the election matters almost as much to Beijing as it does to America, for it will define the type and scope of headwind Beijing faces for at least the next four years.

      A second Trump term of course implies more of the same: trade war, challenging Beijing at every opportunity, the war of words, and not giving an inch on anything. But it also implies four more years of discord and disarray between America and its many allies. Both America and China have paid a serious price for having Donald Trump in the White House, but Beijing has certainly benefitted while Washington has suffered from the fractious nature of America’s relationship with its allies.

      Under a Biden presidency, that is likely to be greatly reduced, which should concern Beijing a lot, for it has enabled the Communist Party of China (CPP) to act with virtual impunity on the global stage while America and its allies passively look on. That is what has enabled Beijing to expropriate and militarize the Spratly and Paracel Islands, bulldoze its way into more than 70 countries without opposition via the Belt and Road Initiative, and significantly increase its influence in the world’s multilateral organizations, among other things. That damage has already been done and, in truth, there is relatively little Joe Biden or any subsequent US administration may be able to do about it.

      What Biden can do in response is repair those alliances and lead an effort to coordinate and unify the West’s future responses to Beijing’s actions. It is by acting in unison that the West will not only get Beijing’s attention, but begin to reverse the tide. Beijing has few real allies, and some of its “allies” have dual allegiances between Beijing and Washington. When push comes to shove in a time of crisis, Saudi Arabia, for example, is not likely to pivot in Beijing’s direction, despite China’s growing economic ties with the kingdom. The same is true with a variety of other allies that China believes are in its camp but which Washington has cultivated over the decades. Beijing is a new arrival to the party.

      So, what is at stake for Beijing is an unfortunate choice: endure four more years of Trump’s tirades or (at least) four years of a US administration that values America’s alliances and intends to reinvigorate them. Biden is not likely to try to reverse the course Trump has embarked upon with Beijing. That ship has sailed. US Congress is on board with Trump’s contention that Xi Jinping and the CCP are bad actors and that the Chinese government is America’s greatest adversary. Biden’s foreign policy is unlikely to be substantively differently oriented.

      In that regard, while this is undoubtedly the most important election of most Americans’ lifetimes, it is also crucially important for Beijing. The gloves are off on both sides and they are not going to be put back on. The question is, does Beijing prefer Trump or Biden? While the answer is probably neither, knowing that bilateral relations are not going to revert to where they were under Barack Obama, Beijing may actually prefer Trump over Biden in the hope that the damage done to America’s alliances may become permanent. In the meantime, the CCP will continue to use Trump to whip up nationalism at home, which of course suits its ultimate objective of strengthening Xi’s and the CCP’s grip on power.

      *[Daniel Wagner is the author of “The Chinese Vortex: The Belt and Road Initiative and its Impact on the World.”]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Will Laos Become a Model for China’s Economic Colonialism?

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      The small Southeast Asian nation of Laos stands out as a success story in COVID-19 control. With only 23 confirmed cases, it has gradually lifted lockdown measures. Success on the medical front, however, will not be enough to carry the country through the economic whiplash that pandemic containment had on the informal economy. Laos’ reliance on remittances from abroad is not unique in the region, and while it has thus far averted a coronavirus-induced health crisis, its economy is expected to contract, according to World Bank estimates.

      Incomes from tourism, remittances and the informal gig economy are expected to be hit hardest by the pandemic. Director general of the Laotian Department of Labor Skill Development at the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, Anousone Khamsingsavath, has voiced concerns about exacerbated poverty under COVID-19. Migrant workers have been returning from abroad due to evaporated opportunities, and the sudden influx of job seekers, coupled with a precarious economy, makes countries like Laos particularly susceptible to economic — and thus political — influence from outside.

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      Against the backdrop of the pandemic, countries whose economies are large enough to weather the storm have a unique opportunity to extend their influence vis-à-vis their smaller neighbors. A case in point: China and Laos. Earlier this year, Beijing began to build diplomatic goodwill in Vientiane by sending supplies, health advisers and medical staff, as well as offering loans and development opportunities to help Laos recover from the crisis. Existing power imbalances between the two states will likely be exacerbated, and China is well positioned to further consolidate support for its ally.

      Golden City

      China was the first country to be hit by the pandemic, and its economy, the second largest in the world, is now showing signs of recovery. Beijing has already unveiled a 3.6-trillion yuan ($506-billion) stimulus package, suggesting that China intends to continue work on its existing projects, with the Belt and Road Initiative being the crown jewel among them. As part of this initiative unveiled in 2013, China has been working to extend its land and maritime transportation networks through infrastructure built with the agreement of partner countries.

      One of the initiative’s branches that has thus far received little attention is the China-Laos railway, which stretches from Mohan, in China’s Yunnan province, to the Laotian border town of Boten, before reaching the capital, Vientiane. Once adjoining railways are complete, the segment is projected to be part of a pan-Asian network that joins Yunnan’s capital Kunming with Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. The project has been underway since 2016. Laos is the only landlocked country in Southeast Asia, and due to the lack of ports that can offer counterbalancing sources of income and connectivity, it is particularly dependent on Chinese investment in towns like Boten. The town was designated a special economic zone (SEZ), its casinos drawing in massive numbers of tourists from mainland China, where gambling is illegal.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Touted by both governments as a partnership of mutual prosperity, local Laotians complained of the disrespect and one-sided decision-making from the new arrivals. This was the case when casinos in Boten were shut down in 2010 by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs over accusations of crime and prostitution. The town, whose economy centered around gambling, went into decline even as construction of the railroad continued. Two years later, however, Laotian officials decided to give the original sponsor of Boten’s failed project a second chance. The sponsor partnered with another industrial group and signed a new agreement to shift the town’s focus from gambling to commerce, rechristening “Golden Boten City” as “Beautiful Boten Specific Economic Zone.”

      It is unclear whether this new venture is a result of or is intended as an extension of the railway being constructed. What is clear is that China does not intend for the BRI to be an isolated transportation framework in Boten’s case. Railway construction naturally brings an influx of Chinese laborers who prefer Chinese goods and Chinese services, but an injection of Chinese cash into the local economy could also add to the local government’s incentive to cooperate with construction. The businesses and the railway can then form an economic feedback loop that justifies each other’s existence.

      Business Model

      This business model would not be so worrying if the local Laotian government retained significant regulatory power over the venture. However, the Chinese-funded Boten Economic Zone Development and Construction Group has been given the responsibility of charging taxes and building both utility and telecommunications infrastructure. This calls into question the sovereignty of the host nation’s government, and one of the group’s buyers stationed in Boten went so far as to say the company basically controlled the entire growing city.

      SEZs like Boten may become the next model of economic colonialism in Southeast Asia, where Chinese investors lease large tracts of land for a substantial period, import Chinese workers to build infrastructure around railway stations, and create economies that cater specifically to Chinese patrons and Chinese interests. This form of colonialism doesn’t have to be directly affiliated with the Communist Party, as China has more than enough corporations with deep pockets that can withstand the risk of investment and provide the much-needed capital to rural areas whose native government do not have the means for development.

      As COVID-19 ripples through Southeast Asia, countries in the region can be expected increasingly to look abroad for any kind of financial buffer that will help them survive the economic shockwaves. Even countries like Laos that have avoided a health crisis cannot avoid suffering indirectly from the economic contractions of their less proactive neighbors. Regional governments will be tempted to grant more concessions in the hopes of bringing more jobs to locals out of work, and capital from China will be alluring, even as it inevitably comes with economic dependence and the local influence of powerful Chinese corporations.

      Developments in little-known outposts with potential, such as Boten, rarely make the headlines. But make no mistake: China was already making its way steadily through Southeast Asia, and the ongoing pandemic is only likely to increase its pace.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More