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    Why Donald Trump’s plan to weaken the dollar is flawed | Kenneth Rogoff

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    Now that US President Donald Trump’s tariff war is in full swing, investors around the world are asking: what’s next on his agenda for upending the global economic order? Many are turning their attention to the “Mar-a-Lago Accord” – a plan proposed by Stephen Miran, chair of Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers, to coordinate with America’s trading partners to weaken the dollar.At the heart of the plan is the notion that the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency is not a privilege but a costly burden that has played a major role in the deindustrialisation of the American economy. The global demand for dollars, the argument goes, drives up its value, making US-made goods more expensive than imports. That, in turn, leads to persistent trade deficits and incentivises US manufacturers to move production overseas, taking jobs with them.Is there any truth to this narrative? The answer is yes and no. It’s certainly plausible that foreign investors eager to hold US stocks, bonds, and real estate could generate a steady flow of capital into the United States, fuelling domestic consumption and boosting demand for tradable goods such as cars and non-tradables such as real estate and restaurants. Higher demand for non-tradable goods, in particular, tends to push up the dollar’s value, making imports more attractive to American consumers, just as Miran suggests.But this logic also overlooks crucial details. While the dollar’s reserve-currency status drives up demand for Treasuries (Treasury bills, Treasury bonds, and Treasury notes), it does not necessarily increase demand for all US assets. Asian central banks, for example, hold trillions of dollars in Treasury bills, to help stabilise their exchange rates and maintain a financial buffer in the event of a crisis. They generally avoid other types of US assets, such as equities and real estate, since these do not serve the same policy objectives.This means that if foreign countries simply need to accumulate Treasury bills, they don’t have to run trade surpluses to obtain them. The necessary funds can also be raised by selling existing foreign assets such as stocks, real estate, and factories.That is precisely what happened in the 1960s through the mid-1970s. By then, the dollar had firmly established itself as the global reserve currency, yet the US was almost always running a current account surplus – not a deficit. Foreign investors were accumulating US Treasuries, while American firms expanded abroad by acquiring foreign production facilities, either through direct purchases or “greenfield” investments, in which they built factories from the ground up.The postwar era was hardly the only time when the country issuing the world’s reserve currency ran a current account surplus. The British pound was the undisputed global reserve currency from the end of the Napoleonic wars in the early 1800s until the outbreak of the first world war in 1914. Throughout that period, the UK generally ran external surpluses, bolstered by high returns on investments across its colonial empire.There is another way to interpret the US current account deficit that helps explain why the relationship between the exchange rate and trade imbalances is more complicated than Miran’s theory suggests. In accounting terms, a country’s current account surplus equals the difference between national savings and investment by the government and the private sector. Importantly, “investment” here refers to physical assets such as factories, housing, infrastructure, and equipment – not financial instruments.When viewed through this lens, it is clear that the current account deficit is influenced not just by the exchange rate but by anything that affects the balance between national saving and investment. In 2024, the US fiscal deficit was 6.4% of GDP, significantly larger than the current account deficit, which was under 4% of GDP.While closing the fiscal deficit would not automatically eliminate the current account deficit – that would depend on how the gap is closed and how the private sector responds – it is a far more straightforward fix than launching a trade war. Reducing the fiscal deficit would, however, involve the difficult political task of convincing Congress to pass more responsible tax and spending bills. And unlike a high-profile trade confrontation, it wouldn’t cause foreign leaders to curry favour with Trump; instead, it would shift media attention back to domestic politics and congressional negotiations.Another key factor behind the current account deficit is the strength of the American economy, which has been by far the most dynamic among the world’s major players in recent years. This has made US businesses particularly attractive to investors. Even manufacturing has grown as a share of GDP. The reason employment has not kept pace is that modern factories are highly automated.skip past newsletter promotionafter newsletter promotionMiran’s plan, clever as it might be, is based on a flawed diagnosis. While the dollar’s role as the world’s leading reserve currency plays a part, it is just one of many factors contributing to America’s persistent trade deficits. And if the trade deficit has many causes, the idea that tariffs can be a cure-all is dubious at best. Kenneth Rogoff is professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University. He was the IMF’s chief economist from 2001-03.© Project Syndicate More

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      Forget Trump’s tariffs, the president’s bond market threat is worse | Heather Stewart

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      When Donald Trump gave an in-flight press conference en route to the Super Bowl last week, it generated a flurry of news, from the fresh threat of steel tariffs to the declaration of “Gulf of America Day”.Much less remarked upon was a throwaway comment about the US’s financial obligations, which underlined the fact that tariffs are far from the only way in which Trump is jeopardising economic stability.“We’re even looking at Treasuries,” the president told reporters. “There could be a problem … It could be that a lot of those things don’t count. In other words, that some of that stuff that we’re finding is very fraudulent, therefore maybe we have less debt than we thought.”The suggestion was that opening up the US Treasury’s data to Elon Musk’s “department of government efficiency” team had identified a money-saving wheeze: why not walk away from some of America’s debt obligations – a “selective default”, as economists call it.Like so many of the serially erratic president’s pronouncements, this one had to be “walked back”, as the Americans call it. Kevin Hassett, his economic adviser, stressed the next day that Trump was referring to other payments that the US Treasury had been making, not its $36tn (£28.6tn) in debt obligations. Hassett suggested the Treasury “had been “sending money out without flagging what it was for”.Yet just entertain for a moment the idea that a US administration might decide it could unilaterally default on even a small portion of its debts. The result would be catastrophic. Because of the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency, the yield on US Treasuries – US government bonds – is perhaps the most important benchmark in global financial markets.If investors suddenly began demanding a higher yield – in effect the interest rate – as insurance against the risk they would not get their money back, the effects would ripple through the trillions of dollars of other assets worldwide priced with reference to supposedly super-safe Treasuries.Hassett made clear this is absolutely not an outcome the saner elements of Trump’s administration were aiming for. Indeed, the treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, has said the president wants to bring down the yield on 10-year US government borrowing costs.Yet as a result of Musk’s crazed takeover of the financial plumbing of the state, the US is already welching on its obligations – moral and financial – all over the world.Every day seems to bring fresh examples: health clinics in the developing world being closed because of the dismantling of USAid; researchers whose projects funded by the National Institutes of Health have been put on hold.Officials from the city administration in New York have even claimed the government in effect dipped into the city’s bank account to claw back $80m in federal grants that had already been made.This fast-track austerity is ostensibly aimed at improving the government’s balance sheet – putting the US through “the private equity wringer”, as Wired’s Brian Barrett put it last week.But the Musk/Trump takeover simultaneously risks shattering confidence in US institutions, in a way that is liable to have long-lasting and unpredictable consequences.Five former treasury secretaries warned in an extraordinary New York Times editorial last week of the risks of letting Musk loose on the nation’s financial system.“Any hint of the selective suspension of congressionally authorised payments will be a breach of trust and ultimately, a form of default. And our credibility, once lost, will prove difficult to regain,” they said.Musk has faced legal action and is targeting arms of government with which he has a particular beef, meaning the chances of anything that looks like a formal default remain low.View image in fullscreenBut the whole performance – as exemplified by a rambling Oval Office briefing involving Trump, Musk and his son X (who has the same name as the social media platform formerly known as Twitter) – screams “political risk”, as analysts would call it if it was happening elsewhere in the world.It would not be surprising if efforts to spur the development of alternative global reserve currencies and payments structures – such as those proposed by nations in the global south – are given added impetus by the shenanigans in Washington.The sheer insularity of the Trump administration’s approach was illustrated on Friday when Bessent – supposedly one of the more sensible figures in the administration – said: “The US has a strong dollar policy, but because we have a strong dollar policy it doesn’t mean that other countries get to have a weak currency policy.”In the short term, the most immediate impact of Trump’s plans on the global economy is likely to be via his long-trailed tariffs plan, which will throw sand in the wheels of the international trading system.All of this is likely to dampen growth, and if trade analysts are right that Trump’s latest idea of “reciprocity”, based on each country’s existing tariff and VAT rates, is the opening bid in a negotiation, it may be weeks or even months before any clarity emerges.Given this corrosive uncertainty, markets have so far been remarkably quiescent in the face of Trump’s wayward trade policy, and appear to be relatively unconcerned about Musk’s slash-and-burn mission, for now.They have been putting their faith in the mighty US consumer, and the economy’s powerful and innovative tech sector, to feed the narrative of US “exceptionalism”.But every week of the Trump/Musk show in Washington surely increases the threat of a structural shift in how investors view the US economy – which would ultimately be felt around the world. 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      in US Politics

      What the weakening dollar means for the global economy

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      A near 10% drop in the value of the US dollar since its March high has given rise to two distinct narratives. The first takes a short-term perspective, focusing on how a depreciation could benefit the US economy and markets; the second takes the long view, fretting over the dollar’s fragile status as the world’s reserve currency. Both narratives contain some truth, but not enough to justify the emerging consensus around them.Several factors have combined to put downward pressure on the greenback (as measured by the DXY index of trade-weighted currencies) in recent weeks, resulting in a depreciation that has reversed almost half of the appreciation of the last 10 years within the space of months.As the US Federal Reserve has loosened monetary policy (actually and prospectively) in response to a worsening economic outlook, the income accruing to dollar-denominated safe havens, such as US government bonds, has declined. And with US-based investments having lost some of their attractiveness, there has been a shift in holdings in favour of emerging markets and Europe (where the European Union last month agreed to pursue deeper fiscal integration).There also are indicators of lower capital inflows into the United States. House purchases by foreigners appear to have decreased again, owing in part to the US government’s embrace of inward-looking policies and the weaponisation of trade and sanction measures.With the exception of Lebanon, Turkey and a few other countries that have experienced even sharper exchange-rate depreciations than the US, most currencies have strengthened against the dollar. But among those with appreciating currencies, the reactions to this generalised phenomenon have been far from uniform.Some countries, particularly in the developing world, have welcomed the reversal, because their previous currency weakness had been contributing to higher import prices, including for foodstuffs. Moreover, a weaker dollar provides them with greater scope to support domestic economic activities through more stimulative fiscal and monetary measures.But the reaction has been less welcoming in the other advanced economies. Japan and eurozone member states, in particular, fear that currency appreciation could threaten their own economic recovery from the Covid-19 shock. Also, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank now have to worry that they are not only reaching the limits of their policy effectiveness, but could also be putting their economies at greater risk of collateral damage and unintended consequences.In the US, meanwhile, the dollar’s depreciation has been welcomed as an overwhelmingly positive development for the economy, at least in the short term. After all, economic textbooks tell us that a weakening dollar boosts US producers’ international and domestic competitiveness relative to foreign competitors, makes the country more attractive for foreign investors and tourism (in price terms), and increases the dollar value of revenue earned overseas by home-based companies. That is also all good for US stock and corporate bond markets, which benefit further from the greater attractiveness of dollar-denominated securities when they are priced in a foreign currency.The longer-term consensus view is less positive for the US. The worry is that dollar depreciation will further erode the currency’s global status, which has already been weakened by the US policies of the past three years – from protectionism and weaponised sanctions to bypassing global standards and the rule of law.The more the dollar’s credibility is eroded, the more the US risks losing the “exorbitant privilege” that comes with issuing the world’s main reserve currency. A country in this position can exchange bits of printed paper or digital entries – currency creation – for the goods and services that other countries produce. It enjoys disproportionate influence over important multilateral decisions and appointments. And it benefits from others’ willingness to outsource to its own institutions the management of their financial wealth.Both of these (partly true) consensus narratives imply further significant dollar depreciation. While the immediate effects are theoretically positive, the practical situation is likely to be different, because so much economic activity is currently impaired by government restrictions and the reluctance of individuals and companies to return to previous consumption and production patterns. Around half of US states have now reversed or halted the process of economic reopening.Moreover, today’s positive market effects demand further qualification beyond the health crisis. Owing to the reliable and ample provision of liquidity, particularly by central banks, most valuations have already decoupled from economic and corporate fundamentals. Under these financial conditions, it is hard to imagine that a dollar depreciation will have any more than a marginal effect on real economic performance.As for the dollar’s role as a reserve currency, I am reminded of a simple principle I learned at university: it is hard to replace something with nothing. At this time, there simply is no other currency that can or will fill the dollar’s shoes. Instead, we will continue to see small pipes being built around the dollar. And, because none of these will be large enough to replace it, the eventual result will be a more fragmented international monetary system.As has happened before, the current consensus views on the dollar will probably end up overstating the long-term implications of short-term movements. Today’s dollar weakness is neither a boon to markets and the US economy nor an augury of the currency’s global downfall. But it is part of a larger, gradual fragmentation of the international economic order. The main factor in that process is the shocking lack of international policy coordination at a time of rising global challenges.• Mohamed El-Erian is chief economic adviser at Allianz. He served as chair of President Barack Obama’s Global Development Council and is a former deputy director at the IMF© Project Syndicate More