More stories

  • in

    The CO2 Border Adjustment for the EU

    The heads of state and government of the European Union propose introducing a “carbon border adjustment mechanism” from 2023, to charge imported goods according to the CO2 emitted during their production. At their recent summit, they decided to use the ensuing revenues to boost the EU’s budget. This gives a fiscal twist to an instrument actually designed for climate policy.

    Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, had already announced in 2019 that she would like to introduce a “carbon border tax” as part of her European Green Deal. In spring 2020, the commission launched a roadmap process to prepare concrete legislative proposals by 2021. Its proposal also responds to fears that higher European CO2 costs caused by EU emissions trading (EU ETS) could cause companies to relocate activities outside the union, causing carbon leakage.

    Russia Has Planted Seeds of the EU’s Demise in the Balkans

    READ MORE

    Outsourcing would contribute to reducing European emissions, but not to tackling the global problem. To date, the European Union has addressed the risk of relocation by allocating free emission allowances to sectors at risk of carbon leakage. A CO2 border adjustment could create an alternative with a global impact.

    There is rising support for the idea, after years of resistance from many EU member states and business associations. And the pressure is set to grow, with an increase in the EU’s climate target for 2030 — and anticipated higher CO2 costs for EU businesses — expected this fall. Furthermore, a CO2 border adjustment for foreign products will be widely interpreted as a clear message, especially to Washington and Beijing, that the EU intends to implement the 2015 Paris Agreement. When designing the instrument, it will be important to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and to get important trading partners on board. 

    WTO-Compatible Design

    The European Commission proposes three ways in which a “carbon border adjustment mechanism” could be implemented: “a carbon tax on selected products, a new carbon customs duty or the extension of the EU ETS to imports.” From a trade law perspective, any of these options could be designed in accordance with WTO rules. The crucial aspect is the principle of non-discrimination: that a CO2 border adjustment must not differentiate among like products or between WTO members. If it were necessary to depart from the principle, for example, where a trading partner or individual company is able to demonstrate that it is already taking care of emissions reductions, the rules for exceptions would need to be observed.

    An EU-wide CO2 “product tax” and its implementation by the EU member states would be the most straightforward approach from a trade law perspective. To do this, the EU would first have to levy a CO2 tax on goods manufactured in the European Union. Then, it would be unproblematic to apply this tax to imports as well — the value-added tax, for example, follows this approach. Imported “like” products would be treated the same way as domestic products, which is WTO-compliant.

    Extending the EU ETS to industrial imports would be more complex. The task for the European. Commission would be to demonstrate that under trade law, the CO2 allowance price is ultimately equivalent to a “product tax.” Failing that, the commission could argue that it was acting to protect a global resource, i.e., that avoiding carbon leakage was the central aim of the EU legislation. The “conservation of exhaustible natural resources,” which includes the Earth’s atmosphere, is a valid ground for violating WTO principles, subject to certain conditions. Such an exemption would also have to be claimed for a new CO2 customs duty.

    However, the European Council decision has exacerbated the risk that WTO dispute settlement panels will regard the new instrument as a means of generating income, rather than a means to protect the climate. This would make a difference if trading partners challenged the new tool. The climate focus, which would be taken into account in WTO rulings, is currently slipping into the background.

    Don’t Underestimate the Diplomatic Effort

    A CO2 border adjustment mechanism will need extensive explanation given the many open details, and it can only promote international climate policy cooperation if trade partners are informed at an early stage and regularly consulted. For this, the European Union should use WTO forums and the climate regime as well as other international organizations. In 2012, the European Commission was made painfully aware of the difficulties involved in going it alone, after seeking to include international aviation in the EU ETS. Major partners put political pressure on the EU, even threatening sanctions, and the union decided to backtrack and reduce the coverage of the ETS to flights within the European Economic Area.

    Trust can only arise if the EU adheres to multilateral climate and trade agreements — i.e., supports the Paris Agreement and the troubled WTO and expresses this clearly and often. This task has probably become much more difficult after the European Council decision because a fiscally-motivated border adjustment cannot be convincingly attributed to these multilateral concerns — especially as the revenues would flow to the EU rather than to funds supporting climate protection, for example, in poorer countries. If a CO2 border adjustment specifically targeted cement, steel and other energy-intensive industries, as has already been discussed, producers from emerging and industrialized countries would be especially affected.

    The union should start discussions with these countries without delay. A good opportunity will arise at the meeting of G20 finance ministers in Saudi Arabia toward the end of the year. In addition, the EU should insist to the US that this initiative is not intended as a provocation in the smoldering customs dispute. Ultimately, the climate policy success of a CO2 border adjustment will depend on how the world’s major economies react to it.

    *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

  • in

    Another 1.18m Americans file for unemployment as benefits expire

    Another 1.18 million people filed for unemployment benefits last week as economists worry the expiration of enhanced unemployment benefits will lead to a sharp drop-off in household spending and set back the US economy’s near-term recovery.Claims dipped last week after two weeks of rises and were the lowest since March but the latest figure from the department of labor marked the 19th week in a row that claims have topped 1m. Before the coronavirus pandemic gripped the US, the record for weekly claims was 695,000 in October 1982.The figures come ahead of Friday’s monthly snapshot of the job market. Economists expect the unemployment rate to have dipped to 10.6% in July from 11.1% in June, a significant drop but still three times the pre-pandemic level.Americans have been receiving an extra $600 in emergency benefits since March as part of the government’s coronavirus stimulus package. But that agreement expired at the end of last month and Congress is split over a possible extension. About 30 million people have been receiving the extra cash and it has accounted for 15% of all weekly wages paid in the US.The expiration of the benefits without any replacement would likely cause a surge in evictions, hunger and poverty as well as having consequences for the wider economy.According to the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) the knock-on effect of removing that cash from the economy could be severe. The EPI estimated 5mn jobs could be lost by July 2021 if it is cut as consumers are forced to cut back on spending.“The $600 benefit is essential for millions of people to get food, to pay rent, to care for their children, to afford basic necessities. If it is cut off, it will mean a sharp decline in their living standards, an increase in poverty, and completely unnecessary suffering,” Heidi Shierholz, EPI senior economist and director of policy, wrote recently.“The spending generated by that $600 is supporting over 5m jobs. In other words, kill the $600 and you will kill 5m jobs – jobs in every single state,” she wrote.A recent paper from the JP Morgan and The University of Chicago argued that allowing the extra payment to expire could “meaningfully reduce” consumption. Eliminating the benefit “could result in large spending cuts and thus potential negative effects on macroeconomic activity”, the authors concluded.If the $600 payments expire and are nor replaced, the authors project that US consumption will 4.2% – a drop that exceeds the entire 2.9% fall in the Great Recession.🚨 new predictions of effects of alternative UI benefit supplements 🚨The UI supplements have expired. Congress is considering a range of options.What will happen to 1) *consumption*2) *UI replacement rates*Thread w/@JoeVavra @pascaljnoel pic.twitter.com/YdENQzgzBY— Peter Ganong (@p_ganong) July 31, 2020 More

  • in

    With the BRI, China Still Has a Long Road Ahead

    To determine whether China can deliver a better Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), we must first ask whether Beijing is first of all capable of delivering a better BRI? Accusations of practicing debt-trap diplomacy and new forms of colonialism have had some impact on Beijing’s thinking, resulting in its pivot in 2018 to commit to a new, greener BRI, but the foundation of its “grand plan” for implementing the BRI basically remains similar to when it started in 2013.

    Beijing’s BRI Hubris Comes at a Price

    READ MORE

    President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CCP) have put some good-looking window dressing on the basic package, but so far, many BRI host country governments would say not all that much has changed since 2018, when Xi announced a pivot. Beijing is very good at saying one thing and doing another, as numerous governments around the world have learned. As a result, BRI host nations will inevitably believe that Beijing has had a real change of heart when they see it.

    Deaf Ear

    Part of Beijing’s problem is that it does not appear to be attuned to what the world is thinking. Perhaps it does not care. Reading Chinese media reports on the subject leaves one with the impression that the world is in unison and harmony with Beijing, its vision for the world and its performance thus far with the BRI. For example, according to  the CCP’s primary media outlet, the China Daily, a 2018 survey of 8,500 people in 17 BRI countries determined that “more than 70% agreed with the concepts of the “Chinese Dream,” the Belt and Road and “a community with a shared future for mankind.” But even this Chinese government-sponsored survey admitted that 64% of respondents believed that the BRI will confront many difficulties and challenges in the future.

    That concern was echoed by a 2019 survey by Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, which polled more than 1,000 respondents in the government sector, the business community, civil society, academia and the media from across all 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It found that fewer than 10% of respondents viewed China as “a benign and benevolent power,” 64% had little or no confidence that Beijing’s revised approach to the BRI will result in a fairer deal for their respective countries, and nearly 50% responded that they believed that Beijing possessed an intent to turn Southeast Asia into its own sphere of influence. That does not sound like a particularly inspiring foundation from which to try to turn things around.

    Beijing knows it has a long road ahead. To its credit, it has issued regulations intended to better monitor the conduct of state-owned enterprises and private Chinese businesses, mandating that they should pay more attention to environmental, social, integrity, financial and other risk factors. If a particular host nation’s laws are weak, these entities have been advised to ensure compliance with Chinese law, international treaties and conventions, and industry best practices. Reporting requirements, capital controls, and the regulation of overseas finance and investment have been tightened, which has contributed to the notable decline in new Chinese overseas loans and investments since 2017.

    Outside the Norm

    That said, Beijing has generally been reluctant to apply its laws to the activities of its entities overseas. In fact, State Council guidance requiring extensive disclosure of contracts for major construction projects expressly exempts overseas investment and foreign aid projects. Laws criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials have never been enforced. Although Chinese courts have heard cases related specifically to the BRI, unless a project contract contains explicit obligations for which performance is sought, enforcement of Chinese laws for overseas actions almost never occurs. Beijing appears to be banking on the fact that a great many of the BRI’s host governments have worse transparency and corruption ratings than China, which presumably makes their willingness to pursue Chinese entities engaged in corruption less likely in the first place.

    As long as Beijing continues to insist that only Chinese entities will provide financing for BRI projects, there is no way for external organizations to monitor transparency, corruption or adherence to international standards. That will, by itself, ensure that tension remains between Beijing, BRI host nations and the West, and signals to the world that Beijing is not in fact serious about reforming fundamental aspects of the initiative. Greater emphasis can be placed on taking some care not to blatantly violate national laws and international norms, allowing Beijing to proclaim that progress is being made, but that will continue to be on a relative scale.

    If practices were previously wholly outside the norm of internationally acceptable behavior but they are improved, they can remain outside the norm of acceptable behavior even though they have improved. More than minor tweaks are required to demonstrate that a true pivot has occurred. Beijing certainly has the ability to implement meaningful wholesale change to the BRI if it chooses to, but it has yet to do so. Based on its prior history of performance regarding its flagship initiative, such changes stand little chance of being implemented.

    *[Daniel Wagner is the author of “The Chinese Vortex: The Belt and Road Initiative and its Impact on the World.”]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

  • in

    US government shelves survey that painted bleak picture of Covid-19 life

    The US Census Bureau has suspended a weekly survey that painted a bleak picture of American life during the Covid-19 pandemic, with no sign of when, or if, it will resume publishing the report.The “household pulse survey” tracked various quality-of-life measures, such as food sufficiency, internet access and mental health, and was first conducted by the Census Bureau on 23 April to “quickly and efficiently deploy data collected on how people’s lives have been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic”, according to the agency’s website.While data such as weekly unemployment claims released by the Department of Labor has shown how many people have lost their jobs, the survey provided a window into the effect the economic downturn is having on the lives of Americans.US households were asked whether they had enough food to eat and internet availability for education, if they had experienced depression or anxiety over the last seven days, and whether they felt they could afford next month’s rent or mortgage payments, among other questions.Over the past three months, the survey painted a desolate picture of what American households are experiencing during the pandemic – a picture that showed little sign of improvement.According to data collected between 16 and 21 July, more than 29 million Americans do not have enough food. Of the 7.2 million American households who did not have sufficient internet availability for educational purposes, 20% were black households and 30% were Hispanic. Over 44 million Americans said they have felt nervous, anxious or on edge nearly every day over the past seven days, while over 28 million experienced symptoms of depression.The Census Bureau described the survey as “experimental”. It was administered via a 20-minute series of online questions. The agency “scientifically selected” addresses to represent the whole US population. People from those addresses received emails with a link to the survey. Administering the survey cost the agency $1.2m, according to NPR.The survey was intended to last 90 days, with the last of the survey’s data from that period being released on 29 July. The Office of Management and Budget, the largest office in the White House, approved for the survey to be administered until the end of July. It is unclear whether the OMB will agree to let the survey continue.“The Census Bureau is working closely with the OMB to determine the possibility for a second phase of the household pulse survey. We will announce any details as soon as they are available,” a spokesperson for the agency wrote in an email to the Guardian.The bureau is currently hard at work trying to administer its once-in-a-decade census, trying to count everybody in the US amid the pandemic.The bureau has also been subject to political pressure, recently announcing it will be shortening the census deadline. Though the bureau had in April asked Congress to extend its deadline, it offered no explanation for the reversal.The move is expected to lead to an undercount of Americans, particularly communities of color and poorer Americans. More

  • in

    Think 'sanctions' will trouble China? Then you're stuck in the politics of the past | Ai Weiwei

    The Trump administration has floated the idea of sanctioning Chinese officials and members of the Communist party of China. Before we ask whether this is a good idea, let’s ask how Sino-US relations got to this stage.The US cold war with the Soviet Union was over ideology, but today’s standoff with China is different. The Chinese state has no ideology, no religion, no moral agenda. It continues wearing socialist garb but only as a face-saving pretence. It has, in fact, become a state-capitalist dictatorship. What the world sees today is a contest between the US system of free-market capitalism and Chinese state capitalism. How should we read this chessboard?The post-Mao dictatorship in China has lived by the principle of “repress at home and be open to the world”. It has imported knowhow from abroad. There are an estimated 360,000 Chinese students currently enrolled who have come through America’s open door. Over 40 years, at least a million have returned to China and fed their new technical knowledge into the existing authoritarian structures that have built the dictatorship. It might be the most momentous personnel transfer in history. When I applied to study in the US in the 1980s, I filled out a questionnaire that asked if I had ever been a member of the Communist party. The point of the question was presumably to avoid ideological risks. But it is beyond doubt that the Chinese students coming in with me included many party members who were headed to some of the US’s finest schools, often with scholarships. Americans generally assumed that these students would feel the appeal of liberal values, which they would then take back to China. What happened more often, though, was that Chinese students were quick to see the cultural differences between the two countries, and to draw the very logical conclusion that American values are fine for America but would never work in the Chinese system.If those US hopes for the exportation of values had panned out, much of China would have been won over by now. But what has actually happened? Returnees are now leaders in much of Chinese business and industry, but anti-American expression in China is as strong today as it has been since the Mao era.Washington bears much of the responsibility for what has happened. In the years after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, administrations of both parties touted the absurd theory that the best plan was to let China get rich and then watch as freedom and democracy evolved as byproducts of capitalist development.But did capitalist competition, that ravenous machine that can chew up anything, change China? The regime’s politics did not change a whit. What did change was the US, whose business leaders now approached the Chinese dictatorship with obsequious smiles. Here, after all, was an exciting new business partner: master of a realm in which there were virtually no labour rights or health and safety regulations, no frustrating delays because of squabbles between political parties, no criticism from free media, and no danger of judgment by independent courts. For European and US companies doing manufacture for export, it was a dream come true.Money rained down on parts of China, it is true. But the price was to mortgage the country’s future. Society fell into a moral swamp, devoid of humanity and difficult to escape. Meanwhile, the west made their adjustments. They stopped talking about liberal values and gave a pass to the dictatorship, in which Deng Xiaoping’s advice of “don’t confront” and Jiang Zemin’s of “lie low and make big bucks” made fast economic growth possible.European and American business thrived in the early stages of the China boom. They sat in a sedan chair carried up the mountain by their Chinese partners. And a fine journey it was – crisp air, bright sun – as they reached the mountain’s midpoint. But then the chair-carriers laid down their poles and began demanding a shift. They, too, sought the top position. The signal from the political centre in China changed from “don’t pick fights” to “go for it”. Now what could the western capitalists do? Walk back down the mountain? They hardly knew the way.Covid-19 has jolted the US into semi-awareness of the crisis it faces. The disease has become a political issue for its two major political parties to tussle over, but the real crisis is that the western system itself has been challenged. The US model appears to others as a bureaucratic jumble of competing interests that lacks long-term vision and historical aspiration, that omits ideals, that runs on short-term pragmatism, and that in the end is hostage to corporate capital.Are sanctions the way to go? A foreign ministry spokesperson in Beijing recently remarked words to the effect that the US and China are so economically interlocked that they would amount to self-sanctions. The US, moreover, would be no match for China in its ability to endure suffering. And there he was correct: in dictatorships, sacrifices are not borne by the rulers. In the 1960s Mao said: “Cut us off? Go ahead – eight years, 10 years, China has everything.” A few years later Mao had nuclear weapons and was not afraid of anyone.The west needs to reconsider its systems, its political and cultural prospects, and rediscover its humanitarianism. These challenges are not only political, they are intellectual. It is time to abandon the old thinking and the vocabulary that controls it. Without new vocabulary, new thinking cannot be born. In the current struggle in Hong Kong, for example, the theory is simple and the faith is pure. The new political generation in Hong Kong deserves careful respect from the west, and new vocabulary to talk about it.“Sanctions” is a cold war term that names an old policy. If the US can’t think beyond them, the primacy of its position in this changing world will disappear. More

  • in

    Is Europe More United Than the US?

    During the Trump era, America increasingly seems like a motley collection of states brought together for reasons of territorial contiguity and little else. The conservative South is ravaged by a pandemic. The liberal Northeast waits patiently for elections in November to oust a tyrant. A rebellious Pacific Northwest faces off against federal troops sent to “restore order.” The Farm Belt, the Rust Belt and the Sun Belt are like three nations divided by a common language.

    The European Union, on the other hand, really does consist of separate countries: 27 of them. The economic gap between Luxembourg and Latvia is huge, the difference in median household income even larger than that between America’s richest and poorest states (Maryland and West Virginia).

    Was the First Gulf War the Last Triumph of Multilateralism?

    READ MORE

    European countries have gone to war with each other more recently than the American states (a mere 25 years ago in the case of former Yugoslavia). All EU members are democracies, but the practice of politics varies wildly from perpetually fragmented Italy to stolid Germany to ever-more illiberal Hungary.

    Despite these economic and political differences, the EU recently managed to perform a miracle of consensus. After 90 hours of discussion, EU leaders hammered out a unified approach to rebuilding the region’s post-pandemic economy.

    The EU is looking at an 8.7% economic contraction for 2020. But the coronavirus pandemic clearly hit some parts of the EU worse than others, with Italy and Spain suffering disproportionately. Greece remains heavily indebted from the 2008-09 financial crisis. Most of Eastern Europe has yet to catch up to the rest of the EU. If left to themselves, EU members would recover from the current pandemic at very different rates and several might not recover at all.

    Embed from Getty Images

    That’s why the deal is so important. The EU could have helped out its struggling members by extending more loans, which was basically the approach after 2009. This time around, however, the EU is providing almost half of the money in the new recovery fund — $446 billion — in grants, not loans. The $1.3-trillion budget that European leaders negotiated for the next seven years will keep all critical EU programs afloat (like the European structural and investment funds that help bridge the gap between the wealthier and the less wealthy members).

    Sure, there were plenty of disagreements. The “frugal four” of the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Sweden argued down the amount of money allocated to the grant program and the budget numbers overall. Germany has often sided with the frugal faction in the past, but this time Chancellor Angela Merkel played a key role in negotiating the compromise. She also managed to bribe Hungary and Poland to support the deal by taking “rule-of-law” conditionality off the table. Both countries have run afoul of the EU by violating various rule-of-law norms with respect to media, judiciary and immigration. Yet both countries will still be able to access billions of dollars from the recovery fund and the overall budget.

    Until recently, the EU seemed to be on the brink of dissolution. The United Kingdom had bailed, Eastern Europe was increasingly authoritarian, the southern tier remained heavily in debt, and the pandemic was accelerating these centrifugal forces. But now it looks as the EU will spin together, not spin apart.

    The United States, on the other hand, looks ever more in disarray. As Lucrezia Reichlin, professor of economics at the London Business School, put it, “Despite being one country, the U.S. is coming out much more fragmented than Europe.”

    The Coming Storm

    The Trump administration has been all about restarting the US economy. President Donald Trump was reluctant to encourage states to lock down in the first place. He supported governors and even armed protesters demanding that states reopen prematurely.

    And now that the pandemic has returned even more dramatically than the first time around, the president is pretending as though the country isn’t registering over 60,000 new infections and over a thousand deaths every day. Trump was willing to cancel the Florida portion of the Republican Party convention for fear of infection, but he has no problem insisting that children hold the equivalent of thousands of mini-conventions when they return to school.

    Europe, which was much more stringent about prioritizing health over the economy, is now pretty much open for business.

    The challenge has been summer tourism. Vacationers hanging out on beaches and in bars are at heightened risk of catching the COVID-19 disease — which is caused by the novel coronavirus — and bringing it home with them. There have been some new outbreaks of the disease in Catalonia, an uptick in cases in Belgium and the Netherlands, and a significant increase in infections in Romania. Belgium is already re-instituting restrictions on social contacts. Sensibly, a number of European governments are setting up testing sites for returning tourists.

    The EU is determined not to repeat what’s going on in Florida, Texas and California. It is responding in a more deliberate and unified way to outbreaks leading to an average of 81 deaths a day than the United States is responding as a whole to a very nearly out-of-control situation producing more than 900 deaths a day.

    The US isn’t just facing a deadly resurgence of the pandemic. Various economic signals indicate that the so-called “V-shaped recovery” — much hyped by the Trump administration — is just not happening. More people are again filing for unemployment benefits. People are reluctant to go back to restaurants and hang out in hotels. The business sector in general is faring poorly.

    “The sugar rush from re-openings has now faded and a resurgence of domestic coronavirus cases, alongside very weak demand, supply chain disruptions, historically low oil prices, and high levels of uncertainty will weigh heavily on business investment,” according to Oren Klachkin, lead US economist at Oxford Economics in New York.

    The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released a report in July that offered two potential scenarios for the US economy through the end of the year. Neither looks good. The “optimistic scenario” puts the unemployment rate at the end of 2020 at 11.3% (more or less what it is right now) and an overall economic contraction of 7.3%. According to the pessimistic scenario, the unemployment rate would be nearer to 13% and the economic contraction at 8.5%.

    Much depends on what Congress does. The package that Senate Republicans unveiled last week is $2 trillion less than what the Democrats have proposed. It offers more individual stimulus checks, but nothing for states and municipalities and no hazard pay for essential workers.

    Unemployment benefits expired a few weeks ago, and Republicans would only extend them at a much-decreased level. Although Congress will likely renew the eviction moratorium, some landlords are already trying to kick out renters during the gap. The student loan moratorium affecting 40 million Americans runs out at the end of September.

    The only sign of economic resurgence is the stock market, which seems to be running entirely on hope (of a vaccine or a tech-led economic revival). At some point, this irrational exuberance will meet its evil twin, grim reality. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Europeans are preparing the foundation for precisely the V-shaped recovery that the United States, at the moment, can only dream about.

    The Transatlantic Future

    What does a world with a stronger Europe and a weaker America look like? A stronger Europe will no longer have to kowtow to America’s mercurial foreign policy. Take the example of the Iran nuclear deal, which the Obama administration took the lead in negotiating. Trump not only canceled US participation, but he also threatened to sanction any actors that continued to do business with Iran. Europe protested and even set up its own mechanisms to maintain economic ties with Tehran. But it wasn’t enough. Soon enough, however, the United States won’t have the economic muscle to blackmail its allies.

    Embed from Getty Images

    The EU has certainly taken a tougher stance toward China over the last couple years, particularly on economic issues. But in its negotiations with Beijing, the EU has also put far greater emphasis on cooperation around common interests. As such, expect the European Union to take full advantage of the US decline to solidify its position in an East Asian regional economy that recovers far more quickly from the pandemic than pretty much anywhere in the world.

    Europe is also well-positioned to take the lead on climate change issues, which the United States has forfeited in its four years of catastrophic backsliding under Trump. As part of its new climate pact, the EU has pledged to become carbon-neutral by 2050. The European Commission is also considering a radical new idea: a carbon tax on imports. In the future, if you want to be competitive in selling your products in the European market, you’ll have to consider the carbon footprint of your operation.

    Of course, the EU could do better. But compared to the US, Russia or China, it’s way out in front. The European Union is not a demilitarized space. It has a very mixed record on human rights conditionality. And its attitudes toward immigration range from half-welcoming to downright xenophobic.

    But let’s say that Europe emerges from this pandemic with greater global authority, much as the US did after World War II. A lot of Americans, and most American politicians, will bemoan this loss of status. But a world led by a unified Europe would be a significantly better place than one mismanaged by a fragmented United States.

    *[This article was originally published by FPIF.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

  • in

    Beijing’s BRI Hubris Comes at a Price

    Despite more than 3,000 years of Chinese history, many of the world’s countries had little to no direct experience with China or Chinese investment prior to the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). There was a presumption on the part of many governments that international best practices were well established and that China would be in compliance with those standards as it rolled out the initiative. As they now know, that often turned out not to be the case, but the fact that the Chinese business model is a mix of public and private sector participation, rules and regulations that are not necessarily logical or coherent and are often misunderstood has complicated matters.

    Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Strategic Genius, Arrogant Overreach or Something Else?

    READ MORE

    For all concerned, the BRI has in many ways been a leap in the dark, since such an ambitious undertaking had never before been attempted. The Chinese government, and many of the nation’s companies active in the initiative, were, and remain, on a learning curve. The enforceability of Chinese regulations on private sector Chinese companies operating overseas can be inconsistent, and Chinese-built infrastructure has, at times, been found to be substandard. Regulations governing the practices of Chinese firms are frequently revised, leaving many organizations scrambling to keep up in the public and private sectors. It then takes a while for new guidelines to translate into practice abroad.

    BRI Financing

    BRI financing is highly dependent on loans from the China Development Bank, China Export-Import Bank and other state-owned commercial banks. China’s foreign exchange reserves are important sources of capital for these institutions. Although Beijing maintains the world’s largest aggregation of foreign currency, its foreign reserves have declined in recent years, which, when combined with its dramatically slowing economy, raises questions about the sustainability of BRI financing in the medium term.

    Under the presumption that foreign capital and support from multilateral financial institutions will be required to sustain BRI projects in the future, China’s Ministry of Finance established the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Financing with eight multilateral development banks and financial institutions. The center is expected to enhance the project financing process through a combination of better information sharing, improved project preparation and capacity building. The ministry has also developed the Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries (DSF) of the BRI, collaborating with its counterparts from 28 partner countries. China’s DSF is virtually identical to the World Bank-International Monetary Fund DSF, which governs lending operations for the multilateral institutions and many bilateral lenders. That should increase its prospects for success.

    China’s effort is a significant step forward in guarding against the debt challenges associated with the BRI. Debt sustainability can only grow in importance for Beijing. As the BRI progresses, China will have no choice but to take steps to improve reporting transparency vis-à-vis financing, transaction structures and debt repayment. As for host governments that have become saddled with tens of billions of dollars of debt as a result of debt-trap diplomacy, their concerns have been widely shared with Beijing. Many of these nations have already become more discriminating BRI consumers. Although the trail of debt-related issues will certainly not diminish going forward, they will hopefully become less severe in time.

    The Chinese government has sought to integrate the BRI with its green growth agenda in an attempt to address criticism of its continued reliance on coal power and the lack of environmental oversight on Chinese infrastructure projects. Although Beijing has made great strides toward improving environmental and resource productivity, greater efficiency gains are vital to achieving a shift toward low-carbon, resource-efficient, competitive economies. Future progress will largely depend on the country’s capacity to integrate environmental aspects into the decision-making process for all its domestic and foreign policies to ensure that industrial and environmental policy objectives and measures are well aligned and mutually supportive.

    Reputational Risk

    At ongoing risk also is China’s reputation. The blowback it has experienced as a result of its rollout of the BRI from countries around the world has been unprecedented. The same may be said about its trade practices with the US and its response to COVID-19. Many of the world’s governments and people have simply lost confidence in Beijing, to the extent that they had confidence to begin with. The ball is squarely in Beijing’s court to raise the level of confidence the world may have in the future regarding what it says versus what it actually does. There is no better proving ground on that score than the BRI.

    A combination of hubris, a bulldozer approach to getting things done and a complete lack of sensitivity had worked well for the Communist Party of China at home for 70 years, and Beijing apparently believed that doing the same would work well overseas. While some aspects of Beijing’s original approach ended up yielding some positive results, President Xi Jinping’s move toward “BRI lite” in 2018 had to be taken with a grain of salt. He deserves credit for acknowledging some of the initiative’s pitfalls, but the Chinese government’s pivot must ultimately be considered too little and too late.

    If it wanted to more fully acknowledge the error of its ways, it would have offered to renegotiate every BRI contract that was clearly skewed in its favor rather than waiting to be asked to do so, award debt forgiveness on a broader basis and stop in its tracks any project under construction that is inconsistent with best environmental practices. That is clearly not going to happen.

    *[Daniel Wagner is the author of “The Chinese Vortex: The Belt and Road Initiative and its Impact on the World.”]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More