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      How Alexei Navalny Created Russia’s Main Opposition Platform

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      On September 2, German authorities stated that Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a nerve agent from the Novichok group. Since August 22, Navalny has been treated at the Charité university hospital in Berlin, where he was transported from Russia in an induced coma.

      Navalny is best-known for his anti-corruption initiatives, particularly the Anti-Corruption Foundation, which is commonly known under its Russian abbreviation FBK. Since its inception in 2011, FBK has evolved into an important independent investigative media outlet funded by over 15,000 recurring donations from Russian citizens. Although Navalny is not allowed on Russian state-run television, FBK’s video investigations have been watched hundreds of million times on Navalny’s YouTube channel.

      In July, Navalny was forced to dissolve FBK after a libel lawsuit filed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a US-sanctioned Russian billionaire accused of interference in the 2016 US presidential elections. Prigozhin is seeking 88 million rubles ($1.4 million) from FBK, Navalny and Lyubov Sobol, FBK’s lawyer and a prominent opposition activist. Despite FBK’s liquidation, its team continued to work as usual, and on August 18-20 was filming a new investigation in Tomsk, where Navalny is believed to have been poisoned.

      Breaking Through the Information Blockade

      Navalny’s anti-corruption crusade began in 2008, when he purchased a small number of shares in Russian publicly-traded oil and gas companies, including the majority state-owned Gazprom and Rosneft, and became an activist shareholder. He started publishing investigations into the opaque operations of these companies on LiveJournal, formerly a popular blogging platform in Russia.

      Launched in 2011, FBK initially published its reports on Navalny’s LiveJournal page. In 2015, it published its first investigative documentary on Navalny’s YouTube channel, previously used for promoting his Moscow mayoral candidacy in 2013. In the ground-breaking documentary, FBK accused Russia’s then-Prosecutor General Yury Chaika and his two sons of large-scale corruption, money laundering and links to organized crime figures.

      Russia’s Denials of Navalny’s Poisoning Fall on Deaf Ears

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      Since then, FBK has regularly published its investigations on YouTube, pointing out the lavish lifestyles of Russian officials and visualizing complex ownership schemes of their businesses and properties. FBK’s videos were particularly appreciated for their humorous presentation, impressive drone footage of luxury properties and high-quality animations. By keeping the content entertaining and accessible while describing complex fraudulent schemes, Navalny managed to expand his follower base to include people from across the country and its social classes.

      In 2017, FBK published its best-known documentary, exposing the alleged corrupt activities of Russia’s then prime minister and former president, Dmitry Medvedev. The video was viewed over 36 million times as of September 2020. Shortly after the release of this investigation, Navalny’s YouTube channel gained one million subscribers, and Navalny announced the launch of a second YouTube channel, Navalny Live, intended for live streaming.

      In June 2017, TIME magazine included Navalny in its list of the 25 most influential people on the internet for “breaking through the Kremlin’s information blockade.” Navalny’s two YouTube channels became an influential alternative to state-run television and a vital source of information for many Russians. By September 2020, the two channels accumulated 4 million and 2 million subscribers, respectively.

      Transparency and Accountability

      FBK is widely credited for its scrupulous work with public records, which is the main source of information for its investigative documentaries. FBK has been actively challenging the common misconception that Russia is an opaque jurisdiction with poor record-keeping. Indeed, Russian authorities collect and publish a wealth of regularly updated data that is readily available free of charge or for a relatively small fee.

      FBK’s investigations are often based on information from Russia’s official land registry and corporate records as well as wealth declarations published by government officials. Based on open source information, in April 2019, FBK concluded that Russia’s longstanding minister of finance, Anton Siluanov, owned a plot of land in the elite Rublevka district outside Moscow and that, taking into account his declared income over the past 10 years, he could not possibly afford it.

      Similarly, FBK discovered that a neighboring plot of land is owned by an anonymous “natural person,” according to the official land registry. FBK claimed that the land is owned by the Russian Deputy Minister of Defence Ruslan Tsalikov; the size of the plot was exactly the same as the plot of land Tsalikov mentioned in his wealth declaration. Once again, FBK concluded that Tsalikov would not have been able to buy land in Rublevka considering his declared earnings. Both the finance and defense ministries confirmed ownership of the land but denied FBK’s allegations of illicit enrichment.

      Despite the overall transparency of the official Russian registries, names of senior public officials from Russia’s military and space sectors, and even their relatives, have been increasingly removed from the land registry filings on unclear legal grounds. For example, in November 2019, FBK stated that the 81-year-old father-in-law of Dmitry Rogozin, the head of Roscosmos (Russia’s space agency), disappeared from the land registry. His name was substituted by the “natural person” entry. FBK claims that he owns expensive properties on behalf of Rogozin. Rogozin has not responded to FBK’s allegations.

      Various global NGOs and think tanks, including Transparency International, have continuously classified Russia as a country with a high level of corruption. Russian government officials are often involved in illicit enrichment schemes, such as kickbacks, or conceal ownership of businesses and properties through their close associates or offshore shell companies. As demonstrated by FBK’s investigations into Tsalikov and Rogozin’s properties, officials tend to try to hide ownership by erasing their names from the official registries.

      Even though FBK can identify individual cases of illicit enrichment, Russia currently lacks the necessary mechanisms to investigate such allegations. Article 20 of the UN Convention Against Corruption defines illicit enrichment as a “significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.” While Russia ratified the convention in 2006, it refused to include Article 20. Due to this omission, FBK’s anti-corruption investigations have little to no legal consequences within Russia. Against this backdrop, Navalny has repeatedly claimed that political changes are necessary to end endemic corruption in Russia.

      Smart Voting Against United Russia

      As Russia’s leading opposition figure, Navalny has never concealed that FBK’s investigations are intended as a call for political action. His most recent investigations, including the one filmed in Tomsk, support his political campaign against candidates from the ruling United Russia party on the eve of the regional elections on September 13.

      This campaign is part of the so-called smart voting initiative, which is Navalny’s wider strategy to challenge the protracted rule of President Vladimir Putin and United Russia. The central election commission has refused to register Navalny or any other FBK employee as a candidate in elections since 2013, when Navalny came second in Moscow’s mayoral election with 27% of the vote. To challenge the situation, Navalny’s team used its reach to coordinate opposition voters to strategically and effectively beat United Russia candidates in hundreds of local and regional elections. In practice, this means voting collectively for the strongest non-United Russia candidate in any given district, regardless of his or her political affiliation or personal qualities.

      Embed from Getty Images

      In September last year, smart voting generated impressive results: Nearly half of the elected members of the Moscow city council — 20 of 45 members — had been recommended by the platform. During the campaign, FBK’s investigations into the source of wealth of prominent United Russia members in Moscow proved to be a vital agitation tool, given that Navalny or FBK have no access to popular state-run media outlets. According to a research paper published in March this year by Russian political analysts Ivan Bolshakov and Vladimir Perevalov, Navalny’s smart voting, on average, improved the results of opposition candidates by 5.6% in last September’s Moscow city council elections. For instance, FBK accused Andrey Metelsky, United Russia’s branch head in Moscow, of concealing his multimillion-dollar business empire by controlling it through his 75-year-old mother. Following the 2019 campaign, Metelsky lost his district to a candidate suggested by Navalny’s smart voting. Prior to that, Metelsky had continuously held office since 2001.

      According to the Charité hospital, on September 8, Navalny has been taken out of an induced coma and is reported to be responding to speech. His recovery will probably take a long time, and long-term after-effects cannot be ruled out. But it is worth noting that Navalny’s projects seem to be working smoothly even in his absence: The latest investigation, released on September 9, has already garnered nearly 3 million views. Acting under constant pressure from Russian authorities, Navalny and FBK focused on establishing autonomous operations that do not overly rely on any single person.

      On the eve of the 2019 elections, Navalny spent a month in jail for violating Russia’s strict protest laws, while his allies continued to shoot FBK documentaries and campaigned for smart voting. The smart voting platform has already provided its recommendations for the upcoming local and regional elections scheduled for September 13 and intends to do so for the 2021 state Duma elections.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      What Can the Gulf States Learn from the Belarus Crisis?

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      It might come as a surprise that the Gulf states have more than a passing interest in events in Belarus. Beyond growing economic ties, the political drama provides valuable lessons for the region’s monarchies and their efforts to maintain standards of living for their citizens without compromising power and influence. The Belarus crisis also offers useful pointers for Gulf states in their dealings with Russia.

      Over the past three decades, Belarusian domestic politics has been defined by its predictability. Despite the emergence of opposition candidates around election time, President Alexander Lukashenko’s grip on power was such that there was only one outcome. Yet, as with so much of 2020, life as Belarusians know it has been turned on its head.

      Big Blow for a Stable Dictatorship: Major Protests Hit Belarus

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      While the veracity of past elections has been called into question, a mixture of political complacency and COVID-19-related turmoil has breathed new life into Belarus’ opposition movement. Beyond disputing Lukashenko’s winning margin in July’s poll, hundreds of thousands of ordinary Belarusians have taken to the streets calling for change. Mostly born after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this generation does not regard the stability offered by Lukashenko as an asset. As they see it, state control of Belarus’ economy and society is incompatible with their aspirations.

      Lukashenko’s response to what has effectively become a matter of life and death for his regime has fluctuated between incoherency and heavy-handedness. The president’s disappearance from the public gaze at the start of the unrest, coupled with the disproportionate use of force against demonstrators, suggests that he did not seriously consider the possibility of mass protests. Continued police brutality and opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s flight into exile make it difficult to use “external forces” as justification for the crackdown.

      “Family” Comes First

      Much like Belarus, the Gulf states have relatively young populations, particularly Saudi Arabia, where over two-thirds of citizens are under the age of 35. Many have benefited from access to higher education systems that have grown exponentially since the early 2000s, both in terms of state and private universities. With this in mind, the region’s political elites can use the lack of meaningful opportunities for so many Belarusians to underscore the importance of their development plans and national visions.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Designed to meet the specific needs of Gulf countries, these strategies nevertheless have several objectives in common. In an effort to counter faltering prices and technological obsolescence, the region is attempting to diversify its dependence on oil and gas revenues by facilitating high-knowledge-content jobs in different industrial sectors. Doing so also requires the greater incorporation of indigenous populations into national workforces at the expense of expatriate workers. In this respect, Kuwait’s plans to drastically reduce its migrant population offers a glimpse into the future shape of the Gulf’s workplaces. While never explicitly mentioned in strategic documents, the Gulf states anticipate that encouraging their own populations’ development will offset opportunities for the type of political dissent that’s currently gripping Belarus and which rocked Bahrain almost a decade ago.

      The Gulf’s rulers have no appetite for an Arab Spring 2.0, a scenario that some warn is a distinct possibility thanks to COVID-19. Accordingly, local development opportunities will continue to be encouraged during these chastened times. When it comes to wider political participation, Kuwait will remain something of an outlier for the foreseeable future.

      The Gulf states’ responses to COVID-19 also merit consideration. Once dismissed by Lukashenko as an ailment that can be treated with saunas and vodka, Belarus was among the last in Europe to enact lockdown measures. While it remains to be seen what impact ongoing protests will have on infection rates, a spike in cases could be used by Gulf states to justify their no-nonsense approaches to tackling the virus. Qatar, for example, was one of the first to completely lock down all but the most essential public services. The country’s return to normal rests on the public’s strict compliance with a four-phase reopening plan.

      Don’t Annoy Next Door

      International reaction to the political crisis in Belarus has so far been muted, with presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and China’s Xi Jinping leading the congratulations for Lukashenko’s re-election. For its part, the European Union’s response has been cautiously led by the likes of Lithuania and Poland. Their approach reflects two important points. First, the protests are highly internalized and not about pivoting Belarus further East or West. Second, direct support for the opposition risks a Ukraine-type scenario whereby Moscow directly intervenes to safeguard its interests.

      Point two is of particular relevance to the Gulf states, whose economic ties with one of Russia’s closest allies continue to grow. Cooperation between Belarus and the United Arab Emirates is a case in point. According to government statistics, the volume of trade between both countries amounted to $121 million in 2019, up from $89.6 million the previous year. Minsk has also made overtures to Oman regarding joint manufacturing opportunities and the re-export of products to neighboring markets.

      Saudi Arabia undoubtedly has the most to lose from antagonizing Russia in its own backyard. Last April, the kingdom sold 80,000 tons of crude oil to Belarus. This purchase, first of its kind, not only reflects Minsk’s determination to lessen its reliance on Russian supplies, but also happened against the backdrop of faltering demand and an oil price war between Moscow and Riyadh. Since then, both sides have brokered a fragile peace designed in part to ensure that OPEC+ members respect industry-saving production cuts.

      Accordingly, the “softly, softly” approach currently being employed by the EU’s eastern flank provides a blueprint for how the Gulf states should continue to manage their responses to the Belarus crisis. Not only does it offer the best chance of maintaining economic relations irrespective of the final outcome, but it also keeps regional oil supplies in still uncharted waters at a time of great uncertainty in global markets. Antagonizing Russia with even the most tacit support for Belarus is, put simply, too risky a proposition.

      Belarus’ unfolding crisis is ultimately about replacing an unmovable political leader and system that have dominated the country for decades. In a region defined by its own version of long-term political stability, a similar scenario among Gulf states is unpalatable. Fortunately, the region still has resources at its disposal to prevent this from happening and protect much-needed economic victories in new markets. While always important, the Gulf’s indigenous populations are increasingly being reconfigured as the most essential features of the region’s future prosperity and stability.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Russia’s Denials of Navalny’s Poisoning Fall on Deaf Ears

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      The Russian government has said it will not investigate the poisoning of the opposition politician and anti-corruption investigator Alexei Navalny until there is evidence of a crime. Navalny, who is 44, collapsed during a flight to Moscow after drinking a cup of tea at Tomsk airport on August 20. After much wrangling with the Russian authorities, he was flown to Germany on August 22 and remains in a medically-induced coma at Berlin’s Charité hospital.

      On 24 August, German doctors announced that they had detected the presence of a cholinesterase inhibitor in Navalny’s blood. Cholinesterase is a component of nerve agents. The Russian doctors who treated Navalny after his plane made an emergency landing at Omsk have contested this conclusion, insisting that their tests for cholinesterase inhibitors were negative.

      Yet Another Poisoning

      Depressingly, yet another poisoning of an enemy of Vladimir Putin is no surprise. Navalny has been a vigorous anti-corruption campaigner and prominent critic of the Russian president and his circle, for the last decade. In return, Putin’s security services have harassed, arrested, prosecuted, imprisoned, threatened and now poisoned Navalny —apparently a second time. He joins a list of dozens of opposition politicians, investigative journalists and critics of Putin’s regime who have been forcefully silenced.

      These include Boris Nemtsov, a political high flyer who turned against Putin, assassinated in 2015 right outside the Kremlin. Boris Berezovsky, a billionaire former ally of Putin’s, was found dead in his home in the UK in 2013. Sergei Magnitsky, a tax-law investigator who exposed widespread government fraud spanning some 23 companies and $230 million, who died in police custody in 2009 after being brutally beaten and denied medical treatment. Vladimir Kara-Murza, a journalist and politician who played an instrumental role in the passing of the Magnitsky Act by US Congress, was poisoned twice, in 2015 and 2017.

      Anna Politkovskaya, a renowned investigative journalist, was shot to death in the elevator of her Moscow apartment block in 2006 following a failed poisoning attempt two years earlier — also involving a cup of tea on a flight. Alexander Litvinenko, an FSB defector, was poisoned with polonium 210-laced tea in London in 2006. Sergei Skripal, a former military intelligence officer and double agent, was poisoned alongside his daughter with the Novichok nerve agent in Salisbury in 2018. The list goes on and on. Russia has denied any involvement in any of these cases, despite mountains of forensic, surveillance and other evidence to the contrary.

      Of course, no rational person believes the Russian denials, although the followers of the Putin cult seem willing to swallow it. But Vladimir Putin clearly does not care whether he is believed or not. The purpose of these assassinations or poisonings is to cow the opposition, bludgeon it into silence, to prevent the investigation of the government’s crimes and to establish Putin as the autocrat, accountable to nobody. Vladimir Putin wants to ensure that no one in Russia dares to oppose him.

      A Good Moment

      The West is in disarray about how to respond to Navalny’s poisoning and particularly desperately misses the leadership of the United States. President Donald Trump has yet to comment on the Navalny case. But Trump, the Russian president’s self-proclaimed “fan,” generally refuses to criticize Putin, so we should fully expect him either to say the Navalny case “never reached his desk” or that he was prepared to believe Putin’s sincere denials, as he did over the conclusions that Russia interfered in the 2016 US election. Russia is once again heavily engaged in the campaign to reelect Trump, so we should not expect him to take effective action. Putin thrives on Trump’s weakness.

      President Putin is not as secure as he would like to believe. The economy is doing badly, oil prices are down, the number of COVID-19 infections is the fourth-highest in the world, and in Khabarovsk, in Russia’s far east, tens of thousands of demonstrators have been taking to the streets since July, protesting the arrest of the popular governor on Moscow’s orders. In neighboring Belarus, where the dictator Alexander Lukashenko is fighting to hold on to power, the popular uprising against the rigged election may foreshadow Russia’s future. 

      Putin has regional elections of his own to rig in September, and a national election next year. Alexei Navalny, with his well-organized political movement, is the most prominent, effective and popular figure opposing Putin. Rather than take any chances of the Belarusian uprising being contagious, Putin may well have thought this would be a good moment to eliminate his chief opponent and to terrorize Navalny’s supporters. Now would also be a good time for the West to show some spine and oppose Putin’s murderous dictatorship.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      How Russia Views the Election Aftermath in Belarus

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      In Moscow, all eyes are on Belarus. Russia and Belarus are intimately connected, so political actors in Russia feel an immediate connection with developments there.

      In formal terms, the two countries form a “union state” and an economic and defense community. Belarus is Moscow’s closest ally and a linchpin for Russian neighborhood policy. For two decades, Russia has funded and subsidized Belarus’ state and economy. This has become a high price for a complicated relationship, as Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko consistently — and successfully — spurns Russian attempts to deepen integration.

      Belarus Election Unleashes Unprecedented Anti-Government Protests

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      Heading a joint state in Moscow had been raised as an option for keeping Russian President Vladimir Putin in power after 2024. Lukashenko was less than enthusiastic and turned, as always in moments of tension with Moscow, to the European Union. That variant is off the table, now that the amended Russian Constitution permits Putin two more terms in the Kremlin.

      A Lack of Distance

      Despite growing political differences, Moscow continues to support Lukashenko through his latest domestic political travails. Official figures put his share of the presidential vote at 80%. The candidate of the united opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, had just 10%, according to the Central Election Commission. Opposition exit polls paint a very different picture, with some showing the proportions exactly inverted.

      Since the announcement of the results on August 9, the country has seen ongoing mass demonstrations, to which the security forces have responded with brutality. Nevertheless, President Putin congratulated Lukashenko on his “victory” as expected.

      The Russian political discourse pays very close attention to developments in Belarus, reflecting a persistent post-imperial lack of distance to its sovereign neighbors. Looking at the Russian discussion, one might forget that there actually is a border between Russia and Belarus, much as was the case following the Ukrainian presidential election in 2019.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Another reason for this closeness lies in the similarity of the political systems. Both are aging autocracies that are out of touch with the societies they rule and suffer rapidly evaporating legitimacy. The economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic is tangibly accelerating these processes in both states.

      The Russian state media tend to play down the significance of the events and push a geopolitical interpretation in which the protesters are a minority controlled by hostile Western actors. They would not exist without Western support, it is asserted. The objective of Western policy is said to be reducing Russian influence in the region and, ultimately, “regime change” in Moscow. In other words, the issue is not liberty but geopolitical rivalry.

      In this understanding, the trouble in Minsk is just the latest in a long series of Western plots against Russia — following the 2014 Euromaidan in Ukraine and the “color revolutions” of the early 2000s. The needs of Belarusian society are completely ignored.

      Russia’s independent media, on the other hand, seek to present a realistic picture, concentrating on developments within Belarus and Lukashenko’s loss of public legitimacy. Belarus is also treated as a template for Russia’s own political future. Comparisons are frequently drawn with the ongoing protests in Khabarovsk, with speculation whether Minsk 2020 might be Moscow 2024.

      Russian Intervention?

      Foreign policy analysts in Moscow do not believe that Tsikhanouskaya can expect Western support. The European Union is divided, they note, weakened by COVID-19 and preoccupied with internal matters, while the United States is generally incapable of coherent foreign policy action. The regime will weather the storm, they believe, but emerge from it weakened.

      This, in turn, will increase Lukashenko’s dependency on Moscow. Regime-loyal and more critical foreign policy experts alike concur that Russia will ultimately profit from the situation in Minsk without itself having to intervene politically or militarily.

      The coming days will tell whether that assumption is correct. The regime in Minsk may have lost touch with the realities of Belarusian society, but it has good prospects of survival as long as the state apparatus backs Lukashenko and Russia maintains its support.

      But if the unrest grows to paralyze the country, a Russian intervention cannot be excluded. The costs would be enormous, in view of the pandemic and the economic crisis. And an intervention could also harm the Kremlin domestically, where it has its own legitimacy problems. On the other hand, it would not be the first time Moscow chose geopolitics and great power bravado over economic and political reason. And Russia’s rulers are still happy to ride roughshod over society, both at home and in Belarus.

      The EU cannot overlook the massive election fraud and the brutality of the security forces against unarmed demonstrators. It should back the demand for new elections, offer mediation and impose additional sanctions if the regime refuses to alter its current stance. But in the process, it should do everything it can to preserve contacts within Belarusian society. Clear communication with Moscow is vital, both to float possible solutions and to lay out the costs of intervention. There is no need to fear a quarrel — the EU has been in a conflict with Russia for a long time already.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Belarus Is Not a Unique Case

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      The rigged election of President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus has provoked massive protests among the citizenry. The uprising appears to have radically destabilized the authority of Lukashenko’s government. The New York Times offers this assessment: “Mr. Lukashenko’s security apparatus showing no sign of wavering in its support for his government, the president may survive the current storm. But he has lost the aura of an invincible popular leader.”

      Here is today’s 3D definition:

      Invincible:

      A quality that includes the idea of untouchable, invulnerable, immune and applied for long periods of time to despots, powerful oligarchs, blackmailers and more generally the very rich, who while theoretically accountable before the law can afford legal teams capable of parrying all threats

      Contextual Note

      The case of Belarus stands out in an international landscape at a moment of history in which the populations of many nations are now prone to protest every government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Times describes Lukashenko as “fighting for his political life, besieged by protests across his country and a tsunami of international criticism.” 

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      No leader is truly invincible. But no recognized means exist for wresting power from a leader who controls the military, especially in a nation such as Belarus whose population has never had any serious expectations of democratic elections being anything more than a public ritual to confirm the existing power structure.

      Anna Romandash, writing for Fair Observer, described the depth of a crisis that goes far deeper than protests over election results or the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. “However, the events leading up to the election demonstrated that some big changes were taking place in Belarus,” Romandash writes. The Ukrainian journalist adds that “the level of popular dissatisfaction has reached its all-time high, with people becoming increasingly disillusioned with the regime and its handling of the many crises facing Belarus.” 

      The author’s pessimistic conclusion that “with the resources at his disposal, Lukashenko can remain in power unless both domestic and external pressure are applied equally strongly and consistently” is sadly but undoubtedly true. In particular, it is difficult to imagine what kind of external pressure — from the West, Russia or both combined — might unseat Lukashenko.

      In more ways than one, this illustrates the dilemma facing almost all nations across the globe, one brought into focus by the pandemic. The presence of an unprecedented, uncontrollable threat to public health has highlighted other often more local contradictions the populations of many nations are faced with. The frustration with increasing levels of economic and sanitary uncertainty has provoked multiple reactions among those who feel themselves the victims of forces that appear devoid of accountability. This inevitably leads to the discrediting and destabilizing of all forms of existing authority.

      Embed from Getty Images

      In some places — the US, France, the UK, for example — the deeper issue may be racial inequality and police brutality. In many nations across the globe, the growing inequality of wealth and income associated with the manifest arrogance of the ruling classes on every continent may be close to reaching a breaking point. In other places, it may be the visibly growing threat to the climate itself provoking ever-increasing numbers of natural disasters in many regions. 

      This year has proved special. With all the other trends augmenting the tensions within national borders, the local mishandling of a global pandemic by so many different governments represents the straw that is breaking multiple camels’ backs.

      The reasons not just for contesting authority but for professing a deep lack of belief in its pretension to govern have been present for some time. The yellow vest movement in France, whose effects have not been erased though circumstances have halted its dynamics, represents one obvious indicator. Four years of deep political uncertainty in the UK over Brexit is another. And Donald Trump’s imposed cultural chaos is yet another. 

      The global crisis is real and profound because it entails a growing disaffection with the ideals associated with democracy and representation. Disorder will only grow, which means that the response to disorder will become more and more violent, as we are seeing today. Thanks to technology and massive investment in military equipment, governments have the means to repress practically any amount of uprising. But at some point, they run the risk of discovering the populations they supposedly govern are themselves ungovernable. What that tipping point will look like nobody knows.

      In Belarus, the BBC reports that “the level of brutality is shocking and new. Protesters and often passers-by have been targeted by people clad in black, wearing balaclavas and with no insignia or uniform.” These are the same tactics President Trump deployed in Portland to control peaceful demonstrations. Short of the utter collapse of the global economy, this may indicate what much of urban life will be like in the next few years.

      Historical Note

      The Guardian points to the historical specificity of Belarus among the nations of Eastern Europe formerly controlled by the Soviet Union. The British journal describes Belarus’ system of government as an “idiosyncratic form of autocracy” and alludes to the very real “vulnerability of Lukashenko’s hold over a country seen by neighbouring Russia as a strategic buffer against Nato and the European Union.” 

      Predictably, Russia supported Alexander Lukashenko’s claim that the protests are due to foreign meddling. But Russia’s support of an ally in the resistance to European incursion may be far from absolute. According to The Moscow Times, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed his commitment to “retaining a stable domestic political situation in Belarus.” 

      Russian readers will have to decide whether “stable” means defending the existing regime or seeking an original political solution to a problem that has become seriously unstable. Russian news outlets have reported on the clashes but mostly avoided showing sympathy for one side or the other.

      This contrasts with the attitude expressed by Komsomolskaya Pravda. The pro-Kremlin tabloid recognized that the official election results reflected probable fraud. It went further, accusing Lukashenko of insulting the people. And far from comforting the president’s right to hold onto power, it acknowledged his vulnerability. “The president of Belarus, guarding his ‘80%’ with bayonets, will face difficulties. He has to find a way to explain what happened on Aug. 9,” the Russian newspaper reports.

      The Wall Street Journal wasted no time by directly accusing Putin of seizing “an opportunity to reestablish [Russia’s] influence in Belarus by shoring up Mr. Lukashenko after an unprecedented wave of protests following Sunday’s vote.” This is undoubtedly true, but the historical context is far from simple. In the very recent past, as Mitch Prothero explains in an article for Business Insider, Lukashenko has demonstrated an attitude of defiance with regard to Russia. He accused Putin of interfering in the elections and even of sending 33 mercenaries to Minsk, who were arrested only days before the vote.

      Prothero explains that “Lukashenko’s long-standing ability to play the European Union to its west and Russia to its east off one another to bring in international assistance has increasingly irritated Putin.” Contradicting The Wall Street Journal, which wants its readers to believe it has a hotline to Putin’s mind, Porthero quotes these thoughts of a NATO official: “It’s not a great situation in general but doubly dangerous because nobody can say for sure what Putin will do.” The official added this pertinent remark: “This is a normal crisis for a dictator like him. What’s unusual is Russia’s confused position.”

      In many ways, this typifies the problem the West has with Eastern Europe, whether the bone of contention is Ukraine, Crimea, Belarus or even the nations such as Hungary and Slovakia that are now part of the European Union. Westerners simply lack the psychological insight required to understand the complex experience and worldview of the people who formerly lived under governments that were part of the Soviet bloc. 

      Even in the absence of the political and ideological conditions that defined the Cold War, the West insists on maintaining what amounts to a cold war reading of history. It wants everything to be reduced to a simple choice between good and evil, freedom and authoritarian control, the supposed ideals of the capitalist West and the cynicism of the authoritarian (even if no longer communist) East. But even the authority of that hitherto comfortable and well-defended ideological position has now become destabilized.

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Big Blow for a Stable Dictatorship: Major Protests Hit Belarus

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      It’s not that Belarus hasn’t had any protests recently. It’s just they have never been this big and this bloody. The capital, Minsk, has seen the use of military machinery, grenade explosions and special forces attacking both protesters and innocent bystanders. Smaller cities are experiencing major rallies, too. At least two people have died. Hundreds have been injured and nearly 7,000 arrested.

      Journalists were attacked. Not that they were not attacked before, but again, it was never on a scale this massive and brutal. The regime blocked some of the popular media platforms which published independent content. I learned about some of my colleagues being detained. They were missing for days — no one knew what happened to them. Then, suddenly, the law enforcers decided to reveal that the journalists were, in fact, detained and that charges were being pressed against them.

      Belarus Election Unleashes Unprecedented Anti-Government Protests

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      When asked about the protests, Lukashenko rather unoriginally responded that they were being directed and funded from abroad. He also claimed that it was the foreign interference that blocked the internet in the country. Despite a lack of information and increasing violence, people managed to communicate via VPN and some encrypted channels. They keep protesting.

      Neither Free nor Fair

      Belarusians took to the streets on the evening of August 9, as voting stations were shutting down. This was hours before the incumbent president, Alexander Lukashenko, was announced to have won 80% of the vote in an election widely claimed to be fraudulent that the EU called “neither free nor fair.” Lukashenko’s victory means a sixth term — and at least five more years — in office. He has ruled the country for 26 years already and is the only president independent Belarus has ever had.

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      Throughout his rule, Lukashenko had a low track record on human rights and managed to extend a nearly total control over the media, the military and the courts. He nearly succeeded in crushing all dissent and opposition. Previous protests where either brutally dispersed or died down on their own. However, the events leading to Sundays’ election demonstrated that some big changes were taking place in Belarus.

      First of all, the opposition has managed to unite around an unlikely leader, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, whose husband, a popular vlogger-turned-candidate Sergei Tikhanovsky, was arrested and blocked from standing in the election. Second of all, the level of popular dissatisfaction has reached its all-time high, with people becoming increasingly disillusioned with the regime and its handling of the many crises facing Belarus. The pre-election protests, combined with post-election rallies, in Minsk as well as other major cities, have attracted the biggest crowds in the country’s modern history.

      On election day, people could not vote properly. There were long lines at voting stations, and many were unable to enter at all. The regime spoke about an unusually high rate of early voting. Some foreign journalists were detained and deported, and the internet worked only intermittently. Independent observers were detained across the country following reports of violations, and the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has withdrawn its mission, leaving “no credible observers overseeing the election.”

      No Surprises

      Consequently, the announcement of Lukashenko’s sweeping victory surprised no one. It was also not surprising that people took to the streets to contest the result. What was surprising was the scale of the protests, their continuation despite a vicious crackdown and the level of fear that the regime has shown when attacking the demonstrators. Many people are missing, presumably detained, with widespread reports of inhumane treatment and beatings. The pictures of bloodied marchers on the streets of Minsk show the dangers of fighting for a right as basic as free elections.

      Tikhanovskaya fled the country to neighboring Lithuania, following a brief disappearance after a visit to the election commission to file an appeal. She later recorded a video where she asked people not to protest. Many speculate she’s being blackmailed by the regime.

      The protests have continued for four days, with a little dialogue between the opposing sides. Women have come out wearing white, with people forming human support chains, while doctors and workers at a number of factories across the country have walked out in protest. On August 12, more than 500 CEOs, investors and employees in the IT sector — the pride of Belarusian economy — have signed a letter calling for an end to violence and a new election, threatening to move their businesses elsewhere. There will potentially be an escalation or an attempt to quash the protest movement by the increasing use of force.

      It is perhaps logical to be hopeful and to expect that change will come so that Belarus can transform into a more transparent country where human rights are respected and where citizens can vote, express themselves, enjoy peace and stability, and elect representatives who will follow democratic principles. However, even now, it’s hard to predict what happens next.

      The protests have made a big crack in what is often referred to as Europe’s last dictatorship, but the regime remains strong. During his rule, Lukashenko had managed to maneuver Belarus between an assertive Russia while still maintaining limited contact with European leaders. So far, Germany has called for a reintroduction of sanctions that were lifted in 2016 to bolster cooperation, and Poland wants an emergency summit to discuss what the EU has condemned as “disproportionate and unacceptable state violence against peaceful protesters.” But with the resources at his disposal, Lukashenko can remain in power unless both domestic and external pressure are applied equally strongly and consistently. The following days will show how the domestic situation evolves, and whether an external response will follow.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Belarus Election Unleashes Unprecedented Anti-Government Protests

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      The victory of Alexander Lukashenko in Sunday’s presidential election in Belarus was expected. It would take a certain level of naiveté to believe that any opposition candidate could unseat the strongman who has ruled over the post-Soviet state for over a quarter of a century. The institutional system of Belarus — the security services, the constitution, the courts and election officials — are firmly under the president’s control. After all, he is nicknamed “bat’ka,” a familiarly affectionate term for “dad” — the father of modern Belarus. However, the incumbent’s dire approval ratings in unofficial polling earned him another nickname, “Sasha 3%,” which has been appearing as graffiti across cities, on homemade signs and t-shirts (as a portmanteau with the Russian word for “psychosis,” ПСИХ03%.)

      Those in Belarus who were visibly ready for change took to the streets already in the run-up to the election. Complaints over economic stagnation have been perennial, but these are more apparent in this period of a global financial crisis. The people of Belarus look to neighboring Poland and its vast social services programs with some envy, even though the government of Andrzej Duda has just faced its own headline-grabbing election.

      What’s Going On in Belarus?

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      Belarusians are also frustrated with Lukashenko’s approach to COVID-19. He did not mandate a national lockdown, allowed the continuation of sporting events with crowds in the stands, stating that vodka, banya (sauna) and tractor work in the fresh air acted as protection, and called proactive measures “a frenzy and psychosis.” Still, the virus found its victims, with over 69,000 infections and 592 deaths to date. Lukashenko himself claimed he survived the virus.

      Public Anger

      The protest movement that brought massive crowds onto the streets before the election is unique in many ways. Its leader, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, a teacher and interpreter, is not a politician by trade. She registered as an independent candidate after her husband Sergey, a presidential candidate running against the incumbent, was arrested and jailed by the authorities. The mother of two said her decision to continue her husband’s campaign was done “out of love” for him.

      The rise of a female politician — in fact, all three challengers to Lukashenko’s presidency were women — exposed issues rooted in misogyny. While stating his overall respect for women, Lukashenko expressed the opinion that a woman was not prepared to lead a country like Belarus because its “society is not mature enough to vote for a woman,” only to add that any theoretical female president would “collapse, poor thing.” These sentiments were echoed by reports that female political challengers typically face threats of sexual violence, assault and state intervention into their families.

      Tikhanovskaya stated that she indeed was on the receiving end of such intimidations and sent her children abroad in fear they would be taken from her and placed in an orphanage. (In a video released following her disappearance the night after the election, Tikhanovskaya, visibly distressed, mentions children again, saying she hopes no one ever faces the choice she had to make, suggesting pressure.) But even despite these threats, Maria Kolesnikova, a member of the campaign team for another detained opposition figure, Viktor Babariko, and Veronika Tsepkalo, the wife of former Belarusian ambassador to the United States, Valery Tsepkalo (another barred candidate), joined forces with Tikhanovskaya and led the rallies.

      These eruptions of public anger were the largest and most prolonged since the demonstrations over the so-called law against social parasites, which mandated that those who work less than six months a year compensate the government $250 for lost taxes, forced a U-turn. Tens of thousands took to the streets of Minsk at the end of July, with momentum spreading to other major cities like Brest, Gomel, Grodno and Vitebsk. In the capital, some 63,000 people attended a pro-Tikhanovskaya rally in what some suggested could have been “the most massive political rally in Belarus history” not seen since the 1990s. However, Belarusian law enforcement and security services wasted no time in making numerous arrests.

      A recent event demonstrated just how unprepared the Lukashenko administration is to counter such a vast protest moment. Days prior to the election, the government planned a music fest in central Minsk to bolster support ahead of the election. Some 7,000 protesters organized on social media and showed up to the event with the intention to disrupt it. In a show of solidarity, sound engineers Kiryl Halanau and Uladzislau Sakalouski played the song “Changes!” by the Soviet rock band Kino, one of the anthems of the final years of the USSR, followed by chants of “Long live Belarus!” from the crowd. Halanau and Sakalouski were consequently arrested and convicted to 10 days in jail, but the incident showed that the police struggled to cover all protest locations at all times.

      No Peaceful Exit

      Once the electoral commission announced that Lukashenko had been reelected with 80.23% of the vote compared to 9.9% accrued by Tikhanovskaya, the streets of Belarus filled with voices of discontent yet again. No one accepted these results as legitimate, and Tikhanovskaya even points out there were cases in which she led by 70%-90% at certain polling stations. In fact, Tikhanovskaya considers herself the winner, though she does not seek power. Rather, her ideal situation includes talks between a unified opposition and the government so that Lukashenko can have a peaceful exit from power.

      Even before the polls closed, military and police vehicles were on display throughout Minsk, with law enforcement and security services cracking down as protests began to spark across the capital and beyond. While the use of rubber bullets and flash grenades is in line with Western policing measures, as seen in the protests that have rocked the United States recently, but the limits of acceptability in one jurisdiction do not necessarily apply in another.

      Over 3,000 protesters were arrested, with the Belarusian authorities reporting 39 police and over 50 civilian casualties, including one death, which the Belarusian Ministry of Health slammed as “fake news.” The Belarusian Association of Journalists reports over 50 instances of detention and beating of journalists since August 4, and an internet blackout has been imposed as the clashes began on Sunday night. In the meantime, Belarusian state TV streams footage of badgers and other forest-related activities.

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      So, where does the Belarusian protest movement go from here? The organizers have stated that they are committed to long-term protests. It will be interesting to see how all these plans unfold, given the severity of the government response. Tikhanovskaya has already fled to Lithuania, issuing what appears to be a forced statement calling for an end to violence, following her detention at the central electoral commission office on Sunday. Lukashenko has vowed to quash any and all opposition protesters. As usual, the president claimed the protesters were “sheep” manipulated by foreign powers and entities who did not know what they are doing, claiming many of them were high on drugs and drunk. The 65-year-old authoritarian went on to assert that “We will not allow them to tear the country apart.” This sentiment should be juxtaposed with a protester who told a member of law enforcement in the midst of protest: “You are humans! You are also Belarusian!”

      It is difficult to determine exactly who wants to tear the country apart when the opposition movement states its intended purpose is to produce a viable future for Belarus. Lukashenko shows no intention of resigning or even lending an ear to complaints espoused by the people. If the protest movement is to continue, one should expect more arrests and detentions. 

      Belarus finds itself in a political crisis that must be managed with the utmost care. Neither side seems willing to budge on its demands, and so it comes down to who has the most endurance in terms of power and energy. Lukashenko has the power of government and its vast repressive apparatus at his disposal. The protest movement is energized and full of voices that have united in the sole goal of a change of leadership. Alexander Lukashenko cannot afford to make concessions as it would mean his hold on the presidential office is shaky. As it currently stands, even if this round of opposition is quashed, it will undoubtedly emerge again, perhaps at a time when the authorities may be ill-prepared.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Has Putin Won the Vote on Constitutional Amendments?

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      On July 3, the Russian central election commission announced the results of the nationwide vote on constitutional reforms, the biggest shake-up of the constitution since it was adopted in 1993. According to official data, 77.92% of voters, or 57.7 million people, cast their ballots in favor of the reforms, with a 67.97% turnout. The vote […] More