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    Macron’s Campaign to Reveal France’s Historical Sins

    One of the worst humanitarian disasters of the past 30 years took place in 1994 in Rwanda. Approximately 800,000 people died in a genocidal campaign led by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority. The rampage began after Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. The Hutus immediately blamed the Tutsis and initiated a “well-organized campaign of slaughter” that lasted several months. A new French report on the Rwandan genocide has revealed some uglier truths about the role played by Western powers — particularly France.

    Since his election, French President Emmanuel Macron has demonstrated what some French patriots feel is a morbid curiosity about the history of France’s relations with the African continent. In the first three months of 2021, two reports by French historians tasked by Macron to tell the truth have been released. The first concerns France’s role in the Algerian War of Independence between 1954 and 1962, and the second, the Rwandan genocide.

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    Le Monde describes the 1,200-page Rwandan report as “solid, established by independent researchers and founded on newly opened archives.” Shortly after taking office in 2017, Macron asked historian Vincent Duclert to elucidate France’s role in the Rwandan genocide. Al Jazeera describes the report as criticizing “the French authorities under [Francois] Mitterrand for adopting a ‘binary view’ that set Habyarimana as a ‘Hutu ally’ against an ‘enemy’ of Tutsi forces backed by Uganda, and then offering military intervention only ‘belatedly’ when it was too late to halt the genocide.”

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Binary view:

    A prevalent mindset among leaders responsible for foreign policy in powerful nations, whose tendency to reduce every problem to a contest between two diametrically opposed points of view permits them to justify the most cynical and cruelly destructive policies

    Contextual Note

    In the aftermath of the genocide, analysts speculated about whom to blame, not only concerning the genocide itself but also the failure to prevent it from spinning out of control. As the leader of the nation whose role as “policeman of the world” became consolidated after the fall of the Soviet Union, US President Bill Clinton exhibited an apparent “indifference” to tribal slaughter in Africa. It included deliberate “efforts to constrain U.N. peacekeeping.” Canadian General Romeo Dallaire accused Clinton of establishing “a policy that he did not want to know,” even though since 1992, US intelligence had been aware of a serious Hutu plan to carry out genocide.

    French President Francois Mitterand’s guilt, it now turns out, was far more patent and direct than Clinton’s. The historians who authored the French report call it “a defeat of thinking” on the part of an administration never held accountable for its “continual blindness of its support for a racist, corrupt and violent regime.” Astonishingly, the report reveals that “French intelligence knew it was Hutu extremists that shot President Habyarimana’s plane down, which was seen as the trigger for the genocide.” Le Monde attributes Mitterand’s blindness to his “personal relationship” with the slain Hutu president.

    Historical Note

    By sneaking through the gaping cracks in the traditional parties on the right and left to be elected president, Emmanuel Macron became the leader of a new party created for the purpose of providing him with a majority in the 2017 parliamentary election that followed his historic victory. As a political maverick, Macron felt himself liberated from at least some of the shackles of history.

    He first dared to do what Fifth Republic presidents of the past had carefully avoided when, as a candidate, he attacked the very idea of colonization, which not only played an essential role in France’s past, but continued to produce its effects through the concept of Francafrique. In an interview in Algiers, the Algerian capital, early in the 2017 presidential campaign, Macron described colonization as a “genuinely barbaric” practice, adding that it “constitutes a part of our past that we have to confront by also apologising to those against whom we committed these acts.”

    Politicians on the right predictably denounced what they qualified as Macron’s “hatred of our history, this perpetual repentance that is unworthy of a candidate for the presidency of the republic.” This is the usual complaint of the nationalist right in every Western nation. Recently, columnist Ben Weingarten complained that Nikole Hannah-Jones’ 1619 Project for The New York Times Magazine was motivated by “hatred for America.” Patriots in every country tend to believe that exposing any embarrassing historical truth is tantamount to hate and intolerance of their own noble traditions. Telling the truth is treasonous.

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    In January 2021, the historian Benjamin Stora presented the report Macron commissioned him to produce on France’s historical relationship with Algeria. Stora proposed the “creation of a joint ‘Memory and Truth’ commission.” The report also recommended “restitution, recognition of certain crimes, publication of lists of the disappeared, access to archives” and “creation of places of memory.” Suddenly, Macron realized that he had received more than he bargained for. As the website JusticeInfo.net reported, “The French presidency said there was ‘no question of showing repentance’ or of ‘presenting an apology’ for the occupation of Algeria or the bloody eight-year war that ended 132 years of French rule.”

    These two examples demonstrate France’s curious relationship with history. They also tell us about how powerful nations elaborate and execute their foreign policy. France is not alone. Every nation’s policy starts from a sense of national interest. The ensuing analysis begins by assessing threats to it. These may be military, economic or even cultural. In the case of military threat, the nation in question will be branded either an enemy or, if diplomatic politeness prevails, an adversary. When the discord is purely economic, the other nation will most likely be called a competitor or a rival. When the threat is cultural — as when Lebanon and Israel square off against each other about who makes the most authentic hummus — foreign policy experts will simply shut up and enjoy the show.

    On the other hand, three forms of cultural competition — linguistic, tribal and religious rivalries — have real implications for the exercise of power and may seriously influence the perception of whether what is at stake is enmity, rivalry or friendly competition. The danger in such cases lies in confusing cultural frictions with political ambitions.

    The two French reports reveal that the very idea of “national interest” may not be as innocent as it sounds. It can also mean “extranational indifference,” or worse. Indifference turns out to be not just a harmless alternative to the aggressive pursuit of national interest. In some cases, it translates as a convenient pretext for the toleration or even encouragement of brutally inhuman practices. That is why Rwanda may be a stain on both Francois Mitterand’s and Bill Clinton’s legacies.

    Another feature of modern policy may appear less extreme than the tolerance of genocide while being just as deadly. As Noam Chomsky, Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J.S. Davies and others have repeatedly asserted, the imposition of drastic sanctions has become a major weapon in the US foreign policy arsenal. Sanctions essentially and often sadistically target civilian populations with little effect on the targeted leaders. Sanctions have become an automatic reflex mobilized not just against enemies or rivals, but also against the economically disobedient, nations that purchase goods from the wrong designated supplier.

    In 2012, Saeed Kamali Dehghan, writing for The Guardian, noted that the Obama administration’s sanctions on Iran were “pushing ordinary Iranians to the edge of poverty, destroying the quality of their lives, isolating them from the outside world and most importantly, blocking their path to democracy.” Nine years later, those sanctions were made more extreme under Donald Trump and continue unabated under President Joe Biden. All the consequences Dehghan listed have continued, with no effect on the hard-line Iranian regime’s hold on power. Can anyone pretend that such policies are consistent with a commitment to human rights? Do they reveal the existence of even an ounce of empathy for human beings other than one’s own voters?

    The French at least have solicited truthful historical research about their past. But politicians like Macron, who have encouraged the research, inevitably turn out to be too embarrassed by the truth to seek any form of reparation. After commissioning it, they prefer to deny the need for it.

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Will Multilateralism Be Great Again?

    A few weeks ago, six eminent world leaders — including UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German Chancellor Angela Merkel — called for the revitalization of multilateral cooperation. They reminded us of the UN Millennium Declaration, which was signed by 189 countries in 2000. The declaration expressed the confidence of the international community that multilateral policies could defeat global challenges such as “hunger and extreme poverty, environmental degradation, diseases, economic shocks, and the prevention of conflicts.”

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    The declaration marked the heyday of multilateral optimism. But contrary to the millennial vision of global governance, international affairs today are dominated by entrenched mistrust between governments.

    Sadly, the above-mentioned article by the six world leaders does not explain what went wrong in the 21st century. Without such an analysis, however, appeals for changing course risk being little more than aspirational talk. To really make multilateralism great again, we have to ask: Why did things go astray?

    The Adverse Effects of Nasty Surprises

    Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister between 1957 and 1963, is frequently quoted as having said that what he feared most in politics were “Events, dear boy, events.” This catchy phrase points to the proverbial overlooked elephant that has rampaged through international affairs in the last two decades. Apparently, unexpected events, escalating into major crises and global disruptions, have driven the international community apart and contributed decisively to the demise of multilateralism.

    To their credit, the world leaders are aware of this. They accurately state that major crises remind us of how interdependent we are, referencing the global financial crisis of 2008 and the current COVID-19 pandemic. However, there have been far more important disruptions in the past two decades: the 9/11 attacks in 2001; the popular revolts in the Middle East in 2011, which escalated into civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen; the eurozone crisis; Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014; the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom; and the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States. More could easily be added to the list.

    These disruptions shattered international cooperation. Economic crises intensified cleavages within as well as between societies. Austerity and social inequality championed populist and anti-liberal sentiments that were expressed through battle cries of “take back control” and “America First.” Following 9/11, the 2003 war in Iraq split the West, whereas the military confrontations in Libya and Syria continue to divide the international community. Russia was suspended from the G8 after its territorial aggression against Ukraine, closing an important channel of communication with the Kremlin.

    The cumulative effect of these disruptions has been a significant decline in the willingness of governments to collaborate. International organizations and multilateral agreements have become political battlegrounds. Many administrations, including those in the United States, China, Russia, India, the United Kingdom and the European Union, prioritize policies such as decoupling, self-sufficiency and strategic autonomy. Consequently, the COVID-19 pandemic is unfolding as a dual crisis of global connectivity and global governance.

    Credible Foresight Creates Trust in Multilateral Cooperation

    In their article, the world leaders shied away from the conclusion that global disruptions are not only a result of, but also an important catalyst for many governments retreating from multilateralism. That is why they are missing the low-hanging fruit for policy innovation: Avoiding nasty surprises by cultivating anticipatory governance — for instance, by investing in multilateral foresight and forecasting capabilities.

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    Hardly any of the major disruptions in international affairs have come as a surprise. Genuine “black swans” are very rare: The 9/11 Commission Report pointed out that several American agencies had been collecting evidence that al-Qaeda was planning attacks; there were plenty of reports from the Middle East and North Africa region analyzing the widespread dissatisfaction with repressive governments and bad governance; experts had frequently warned about the global financial crisis, the eurozone and the pandemic; and the referendum in the United Kingdom and the elections in the United States could only have had one of two outcomes. So, the lack of preparations for the unexpected results had more to do with wishful thinking than surprise.

    The exception to the rule is the annexation of Crimea. That the Kremlin would drastically change course instead of waiting out the developments in Kiev, which had proved a winning strategy for Moscow after 2004, came as a real surprise. But in all other cases, plenty of unheeded warnings lined the road to the tragedy of multilateralism.

    Of course, governments’ reluctance to trust forewarnings is understandable. The track record of expert predictions is not that impressive. Quite often, they turn out to be wrong. And crying wolf has consequences: Policymakers might be criticized by their opponents, the media, courts of auditors or the public when they order, for example, vaccines but a pandemic does not materialize as expected. This happened in 2009 with the swine flu scare, when policymakers in Europe and the United States learned a lesson that partly explains the inadequate preparations for COVID-19.

    But some predictions are better than others. Research has shown that the best forecasters achieve up to 30% higher prediction accuracy than analysts with access to classified material. Diversity and multi-perspectivity are important criteria for the success of forecasting teams that consistently outperform their competitors. Policymakers should harvest this knowledge. Investing in multilateral foresight and forecasting capabilities promises not only to increase timely awareness of future events. Collectively anticipating risks and opportunities could also stimulate international cooperation and joint policymaking.

    *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Germany’s Handling of the Pandemic: A Model of Incompetence?

    There is an unwritten rule in politics: If you are incompetent, at least you should not be corrupt. It seems nobody ever informed the German Christian Democrats that this was the way of things. How else to explain why Christian Democratic MPs thought it was perfectly fine to take advantage of Germany’s COVID-19 crisis to line their own pockets? In German, we have a word, “Raffzahn,” to refer to somebody who cannot get enough, never satisfied with what they have. In the concrete case, a member of the German Bundestag from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) pocketed €250,000 ($298,000) in commissions for brokering a deal involving the procurement of FFP2 face masks by the federal and the state governments.

    Another member, who so happened to serve as deputy leader of the Christian Democratic parliamentary group, this time from the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, appears to have made similar deals. Both were exposed and were ultimately forced to resign from the parliamentary group and leave their parties. End of the story, or so the Christian Democrats hoped. But this Maskenaffäre (masks affair) continued to provoke strong emotions. In the process, it not only severely damaged the CDU/CSU’s image, but also caused a significant loss of trust in the party.  

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    The mask affair is not the only scandal that has haunted the party. Another controversy has been smoldering for some time now, involving dubious business relations between CDU MPs and the quasi-dictatorial regime of Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s strongman. A few days ago, one of the MPs involved in the affair relinquished his mandate. Two other MPs are being investigated by the public prosecutor’s office in Munich on charges of corruption. Apparently, payments were made to the MPs in exchange for their keeping quiet about the dismal human rights record of the regime in Baku. Pecunia non olet, as they used to say in ancient Rome — money does not stink — not even in the offices of the Christian Democrats.

    A Super Election Year

    Unfortunately, this year is what in German is known as a Superwahljahr — a super election year. In September, Germans are called upon to elect a new federal parliament. In the meantime, a number of Germany’s Länder, the regional administrative units that constitute the federation, will elect their regional governments. The process started with elections in two southwestern regions, Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz, over the weekend. With a population of more than 11 million, Baden-Württemberg is the more important state; Rheinland-Pfalz’s population amounts to a mere 4 million.

    In addition, Baden-Württemberg used to be a CDU stronghold. In the 1970s, the party routinely scored more than 50% of the vote, with a high point in the 1976 state election which saw the CDU gain over 56%. From then on, things started to go downhill. In the first election in the new century, the CDU still commanded roughly 45% of the vote; by 2016, it reached rock bottom, at 27%. It could not get any worse, or so it seemed. It did. The latest pre-election polls had the CDU at 24% of the vote. On Sunday, the party lost roughly 3% compared to the previous election, which left it with roughly what the polls had anticipated.

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    The situation in Rheinland-Pfalz was similar. In the 1970s, the CDU gained on average around 50% of the vote. By the new century, its support stood at 35%; 15 years later, at 32%. Pre-election polls had the party at around 29%, with a downward tendency. And fall it did: With a loss of around 4% of the vote, it scored a historic low. At the same time, in both Länder, the radical populist-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) returned to parliament, even if significantly decimated. It should also be noted that a large number of people in both states voted by mail, in many cases weeks before the election and before the disastrous masks scandal. Otherwise, the CDU losses would probably have been even greater. Hardly surprising, the dominant issue in these elections was COVID-19 or, more precisely, the government’s handling of the pandemic, particularly after the second wave hit the country in late fall.

    By now, the judgment is in, and it is devastating on many accounts. You know that something has gone terribly wrong when those who used to admire you, such as the British, now express either derision or, worse, pity; or when Germany’s leading news magazine Der Spiegel feels the need to ask why the United States — once jeered for its lack of preparedness during the Trump administration — “is so much better when it comes to vaccinating.”

    A recent account of vaccination data collected and put online by Germany’s leading public television channel, ARD, proves the point. Germany is far, far behind countries such as Israel, Great Britain, the United States, Chile, Hungary and even Greece — the country Germans love to denigrate as mismanaged and corrupt. At the beginning of March, merely 3% of the population had received the vaccine in Germany, and this despite the fact that the first vaccine to be certified was a German co-production.

    Appearance vs. Reality

    The pandemic has brutally exposed the fundamental difference between appearance and reality. For long, Germany has promoted itself as a model to follow — the famed “Modell Deutschland” — or at least was promoted by outsiders as such. The perhaps most prominent promoter was Michel Albert, the former head of the French General Commission for the Modernization and Equipment Plan. In his 1991 book, “Capitalisme contre capitalisme” (“Capitalism Against Capitalism”), he postulated the superiority of “Rhenish capitalism” over the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. The book was translated into several languages and proved highly influential. One wonders whether Albert’s analysis would be the same today. I somehow doubt it.

    Central to progress in any kind of capitalist system is innovation, what the prophet of innovation, Joseph Schumpeter, famously characterized as “creative destruction.” New technologies and particularly digitalization have advanced with dramatic speed over the past two decades, making innovation absolutely crucial for a country’s competitiveness. This is a painful lesson Germany has been forced to learn as the pandemic progressed. As an article in the country’s leading business newspaper, Handelsblatt, warned last year, Germany was falling farther and farther behind with respect to innovation. Among the reasons are, most prominently, a dearth of top research, high-tech investments and, last but not least, openness to the world. For Germany to regain its competitive edge, the author charged, politics had to wake up from its Dornröschenschlaf (Sleeping Beauty’s slumber) and provide necessary measures.

    A year later, politics has still not completely woken up; or, perhaps, it has woken up but is fundamentally incapable of addressing the myriad of problems and challenges it confronts. Examples abound, some tragic, others bordering on the ridiculous and the grotesque. Take the case of inoculations. The program started a couple of weeks ago. It progressed at a snail’s pace. In the face of massive public attempts to secure an appointment, the server crashed and phone hotlines were overwhelmed for hours on end. In the meantime, letters designed to inform the over 80-year-olds could not be sent, among other things because authorities lacked the necessary information regarding age. As a result, in some cases, authorities guessed the age of potential recipients on the basis of their first names. Adolf and Adolfine — a sure bet the person is eligible for priority vaccination.

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    Take the case of COVID-19 tests as another example. Bavaria introduced them in the late summer of 2020, with suboptimal results, to put it kindly. Test results were supposed to be delivered within 48 hours. In reality, it took up to a week, the result of a technical glitch at the private server provider in charge of the tests. The experiment turned out to be a major debacle, with doctors having to cancel appointments and health authorities going incommunicado. In the new year, German authorities once again took up the question of testing in a lengthy debate that took several weeks. Finally, in early March, Germany’s health minister from the CDU, Jens Spahn, announced that the government had ordered hundreds of millions of test kits. Critics were quick to point out that Germany lacked the capacity to carry out the tests.

    In an earlier article on Angela Merkel’s legacy (she leaves office in September), I have suggested that her place in history will be judged by the way she handles the pandemic. By now, it is apparent that the chancellor’s COVID-19 crisis management has been nothing short of disastrous. In early February, Merkel conceded mistakes but insisted that on the whole, the government’s cautious and hesitant approach had been justified. The fact is — and German media have pointed it out on numerous occasions — that many of the problems linked to the pandemic are the result of years of neglect during Merkel’s mandate, particularly when it comes to Germany’s digital infrastructure. Compared to other countries in the European Union, Germany is a “digital developing country,” an assessment recently made by the Boston Consulting Group and widely commented on in the media. In fact, it seems that over the past decade or so, Germany has fallen even more behind other countries, such as Estonia.

    The pandemic has brutally exposed to what degree Germany was lagging behind its main competitors — at least five to 10 years, as one observer asserted last year. The impact is felt every day in offices, labs and particularly schools. Last year, an EU education report noted that in 2017-18, only 9% of Germany’s elementary students had access to a digitally well-equipped school. Once the pandemic forced schools to shut down and go online, the consequences of Germany’s digital divide became glaringly obvious, to the detriment of the youngest generation.

    Don’t Expect Too Much

    It is becoming increasingly clear that Angela Merkel’s time in office has been characterized by a degree of Panglossian complacency combined with a cautious and hesitant don’t-rock-the-boat mentality that left the country largely unprepared to deal with this pandemic in an efficient, effective and competent way. The most recent example is who gets to be part of the vaccination program. While family doctors and general practitioners have strongly expressed their desire to be part of the roll-out, the government continued to prefer public vaccination centers, thus ignoring viable options to accelerate the pace of immunization.

    It was only after protracted negotiations between the federal government and the Länder that an agreement was reached to open the vaccination campaign to private practices starting in mid-April. At the same time, Spahn, himself heavily criticized for the test kit disaster, dampened expectations given the bottlenecks in the procurement of vaccines. As the health minister put it, “One has to be a bit cautious with regard to the management of expectations.” In other words, don’t expect too much — a perfect characterization of the government’s dealing with the pandemic over the past several months.

    The result has been growing popular discontent. In early March, a large majority of respondents in a representative poll expressed dissatisfaction with the organization of the vaccination campaign, the supply of testing kits and the way the vaccines were procured. At the same time, in a second poll, almost half of respondents said they were dissatisfied with the work the Christian Democrats did in government (a bit more than 40% said they were satisfied). And as a result of the Maskenaffäre, trust in the Christian Democrats has plunged to record lows.

    In German, we have the word, “richtungsweisend” — pointing to a direction or setting the trend. Ulli Hoeness, the iconic former president of Germany’s most successful soccer club, Bayern München, once proclaimed that “the trend is your friend.” This might be true for Germany’s premier soccer club, but it is certainly not true of the Christian Democrats. The results of the two elections last weekend portend ills for the federal vote later this year.

    They also do not bode well for the reputation of Angela Merkel, who is likely to be remembered primarily for her (mis)handling of the coronavirus crisis, for failing to halt or reverse the Christian Democrats’ downward spiral at the polls and, last but not least, for being incapable of preventing the AfD from establishing itself in Germany’s party system. As the good book says, “You have been weighed on the scales and found wanting” (Daniel 5:27).

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Guillaume Faye, the “Golden One” and the Metapolitical Legion

    March 7 marked two years since the death of Guillaume Faye, the former number two of the French nouvelle droite (new right). His death wasn’t big news in the media. In academic research, Faye exists mostly in the shadows of the so-called number one of the new right, Alain de Benoist.

    This lack of attention to his work contrasts with sharp uptake of his writings in contemporary far-right groups around the world. Faye’s critique of the metapolitics of the nouvelle droite has proved to be very influential.

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    In the first of a three-part series, I will zoom in on Faye’s conceptualization of metapolitics and the birth of what I call metapolitics 2.0. In the second part, I will show how “The Golden One,” a Swedish bodybuilder, YouTuber and new-right metapolitical influencer, is emblematic of this new metapolitical battle. In the final article, I will further reflect on the role of algorithmic knowledge in contemporary metapolitics.

    Guillaume Faye and Metapolitics 2.0

    In his book, “Archeofuturism,” Faye argued that the nouvelle droite “had simply overlooked the fact that the cultural battle [Antonio] Gramsci promoted was associated with the political and economic battle.” Metapolitics, according to Faye in his metapolitical dictionary, is not only about “the social diffusion of ideas and cultural values for the sake of provoking a long-term, political transformation.” Metapolitics, he argued, is an “indispensable complement to every direct form of political action, though in no case can it or should it replace such action.”

    Even more, in contemporary societies, Faye stressed, politics is a crucial scene for the metapolitical battle as politicians have privileged access to the media. Faye regretted, for instance, that the nouvelle droite never connected with the far-right National Front from Jean-Marie Le Pen onward. (Note that Faye explicitly stresses the importance of media and media attention in the context of metapolitics.)

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    Faye’s conception of metapolitics as necessarily connected to politics, activism and media was taken up by many key figures in the contemporary far right. For example, the white nationalist intellectual, publisher and editor-in-chief of Counter-Currents, Greg Johnson, reproduced Faye’s critique extensively in his 2012 reader devoted to the establishment of the “North American New Right,” as well as in his 2013 book, “New Right vs. Old Right” and in several blogs and essays on Counter-Currents.

    Johnson reentextualizes Faye’s work in a different, US context addressing American readers and making an abstraction of Faye’s anti-Americanism. He argues that the North American new right should take Faye’s lessons on board. He even made that explicit in his definition of the new right: “The North American New Right is an intellectual movement with a political agenda’ that because of its ‘aims to change the political landscape’ does not ‘enjoy the luxury of ignoring party and electoral politics.” Johnson thus fully subscribes and reproduces Faye’s assessment of the nouvelle droite and sees in it as a foundation to establish a North American new right.

    Faye’s understanding of metapolitics as more than just production of theory (and Johnson’s reentextualization of it) has been taken up by different websites and activists within the alt-right and the global new right. From the start, metapolitics had an important role within the alt-right. In the context of the liberal society, several key figures argue that metapolitics is at the heart of the new-right cultural construction of that future society.

    “Any political struggle must be preceded, legitimised, and supported by a metapolitical struggle,” says Arktos publisher Daniel Friberg. This metapolitical strategy is also visible in the classical metapolitical structures influenced by the nouvelle droite — think-tanks like Richard Spencer’s National Policy Institute, congresses, books, papers and essays. But particularly in the US, it was also embedded in vlogs, memes and offline practices influenced by digital culture and in activism for former President Donald Trump.

    In the American uptake of metapolitics, not only did the goal change (a vitalistic reconstructing of American society), but the conceptualization of metapolitics did too. The “prosumer,” and thus not only the intellectual or politician, became a metapolitical actor. “[O]ne individual on an American college campus who tapes a sign reading ‘It’s OK to be White’ to a lamppost,” says the Arktos editor-in-chief, John Bruce Leonard, acts metapolitically because his action seeks “to shift or shatter” the political conventions. The intellectual, the politician, the activist and the prosumer are now all imagined as part of the new right metapolitical battle, all helping “to prepare the way for the regime which will supplant democracy. The deepest work of the metapolitician of the Right is therefore necessarily anti-democratic: he seeks to produce a society in which metapolitics, save in its conservative aspect.”

    Not Limited

    Contemporary new right metapolitics is not limited to a purely intellectual strategy. It encompasses every ideological intervention toward the construction of that future reborn society. It is this broad conception of metapolitics as embodied in meme warfare, offline activism, “influencer culture” and politics that is dominant in the alt-right and the global new right.

    Even more, just because the new right denounces parliamentary democracy, politicians are only understood within the logic of metapolitics. “Parliamentary efforts,” says Friberg, “can never be more than complements to broader cultural and political work. The results of elections are but products of how public opinion has been formed and how, what and in what manner information has been spread between these elections.”

    In the 21st century, it is Guillaume Faye’s broad conceptualization of metapolitics that was taken up and stretched to include digital activism.

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Is Dutch Exceptionalism Equipped to Cope With the Pandemic?

    In late January, protests and riots against COVID-19 lockdown measures in the Netherlands drew attention from international audiences, taking many by surprise. Described by the Dutch police as the “worst rioting in 40 years,” it was a response to the first curfew the country has seen since the Second World War. Now, more violence and what appears to be a deliberate attack on a coronavirus testing center have caused further shock. The Netherlands is well established at the heart of orderly Northern Europe, bound by welfare-state solidarity and reserved, measured behavior. However, its populist subculture is news to no one. Radical and conservative elements, as well as a culture of Dutch exceptionalism, existed well before the COVID-19 pandemic, which has undoubtedly stirred social tensions in an unprecedented fashion.

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    As the curfew remains in place, most activities are restricted, including the shuttering of non-essential businesses and shops (closed since December), restaurants (closed since November) and gyms. Schools are only recently back in session after being closed in December, and only as of Wednesday, March 3, have contact professions been allowed to open on a limited basis, with stores also taking appointments for shopping trips.

    After suffering some of the worst rates of COVID-19 infections in the second European wave at the end of 2020, the Netherlands is watching numbers rise again. However, a poll in the third week of February indicated that 45% of Dutch citizens believe lockdown measures would be relaxed. How the government responds to this pandemic is most likely being swayed by the fact that national elections are coming up in less than two weeks.

    Intelligent Lockdown

    The unique social dynamics of the Netherlands are important for understanding the social sentiment surrounding the COVID-19 crisis. Firstly, it should be noted that the Netherlands took a different approach to many European counterparts at the start of the pandemic. Referred to as laissez-faire by some, there was never a total lockdown experienced by Spain or Italy. Of course, when the first round of lockdown measures hit Europe, schools, restaurants and businesses were closed. However, while citizens were encouraged to respect social distancing and limit gatherings, as well as to stay home as much as possible, there were neither explicit measures, such as how many times a day one could go outdoors, nor any regulation of them. Prime Minister Mark Rutte called this “an intelligent lockdown.” The Netherlands was one of the last countries in Europe to make masks obligatory, as late as December last year. 

    Embed from Getty Images

    This is perhaps due to the culture of Dutch exceptionalism or tolerance: no need to enforce or dictate rules to independent citizens so long as everyone peacefully goes about their business. As Sarah Bracke explains, Dutch exceptionalism can be understood as pertaining to “a notion of toleration, which is historically linked to its particular arrangement of secularization and later on, throughout the second half of the twentieth century, gained a strong resonance in relation to sexual politics.”

    The Netherlands has been known for its “coffee shop” culture where recreational use of soft drugs is openly tolerated, and it has legalized prostitution, euthanasia and gay marriage far in advance of many other countries. Such a culture, which is often criticized as being overly idealized, can prove resistant to what could be viewed as over-regulation of the private sphere through constrictive measures necessitated by the global pandemic.

    Systemic Tensions

    What is perhaps less directly related to but is more illustrative of the social tensions exacerbated by the pandemic is the history of radical-right and conservative presence in the country. Throughout the world, it seems that populist movements against COVID-19 measures and conspiracy theories relating to the pandemic are often led by right-wing factions or adherents. Populist anti-Islam or immigrant politicians or parties have proliferated in the Netherlands in the past decades. Geert Wilders, who founded the nationalist, far-right populist Freedom Party in 2006, is one of the best-known faces in Dutch politics.

    In fact, Dutch politicians often reference immigrants and minority ethnic groups in their rhetoric. While Dutch culture and identity are purportedly tolerant, there has been a constant and evidenced critique from academia and civil society that institutions and society remain exclusionary toward those who fall within the category of “allochtoon” (not from here) versus “autochtoon” (from here). Neoliberal and nationalist-populist parties reflect and mutually reinforce these alleged biases.

    A peek into the perspective of those who attest to discrimination on a daily basis is interesting and illuminative, even if it may not be statistically representative of Dutch culture or even an entirely objective account. The Amsterdam Confessions of a Shallow Man website, for instance, is authored by an expat living in Amsterdam who presents a bemused apparisal of Dutch life and moderates a large Facebook group where members joke, critique or celebrate Dutch culture. With over 8,000 members, it often serves as an outlet for those who feel discriminated against.

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    For example, members share when they have been told to “go back to their country” alongside news and experiences of racists attacks or rental ads that are exclusive to Dutch nationals. In particular, when someone experiences racism or discrimination, other members of the group offer support and advice on how to file a complaint. A common topic of discussion includes a Dutch Christmas character, Zwarte Piet — Black Pete — who takes his name from traditional blackface.

    There seems to be a frustration with proclaimed liberal Dutch tolerance vis-à-vis the experience of everyday life, especially among people of color. This explains the possibility of polarization and right-wing extremism or populism taking firmer root in Dutch society. However, simmering unrest intertwined with racial inequality is not exclusive to the Netherlands: The United States and its Black Lives Matter mobilization provides an example of a nation coming to terms with these same issues that have been exacerbated by the pandemic.

    Typical Problems

    Problematizing extreme reactions to government-imposed COVID-19 response measures can be conducted from several angles. One could cite the culture of Dutch exceptionalism and resistance to intrusive regulation, or point to an increasing trajectory of populism. There are, however, many more factors at play, and the social implications of the pandemic will probably continue to be revealed in varying stages for years to come.

    For example, when explosives and fireworks were set off during riots, which were made up of mostly young people in their teens and twenties, earlier this year, it caused understandable alarm. However, these fireworks could be seen as an extension of Dutch youth culture and a popular, even if a dangerous, tradition. Each season, New Year’s fireworks result in injuries and property damage in otherwise peaceful Dutch towns and cities. These explosives seem to be a traditional manner of expression — both for festive and restive moods.

    By contrast, the recent, uncharacteristically intense February storm Darcy brought sub-zero temperatures, snow and iced-over canals that drew many happy faces. Locals enjoyed another cherished tradition: skating on nature’s ice rinks (at a respectable distance). The Dutch rank favorably on many indexes thanks to a comparatively rich, educated and open society, rooted in a specific set of customs, traditions and culture that requires a unique approach to a global emergency.

    The number of those who participated in the violence is low in comparison to the wider population, although it does suggest that there is understandable dissatisfaction with current COVID-19 response policies and management. Indeed, much like the rest of the world, the Dutch government and society face challenges in addressing the multilayered issues inherent in this unprecedented crisis.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Macron Enriches French Vocabulary and Impoverishes Political Thought

    France appears to be living through a strange transitional period that could be described as the waning of the Fifth Republic. It contains no sense of what a sixth republic might look like or why it might even be necessary. But today’s republic, with its unique electoral system, has achieved a summit of incoherence. The current president, Emmanuel Macron, has only one thing in mind: getting reelected in 2022 and maintaining the shaky status quo. 

    The Fifth Republic had a few moments of glory marked by at least three somewhat illustrious personalities who became president. The actions of these three men left a mark on the memory of the French. Their names? Charles de Gaulle, Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac. The only recent president to make a valiant but ultimately futile attempt to achieve their stature, Nicolas Sarkozy, was just this week convicted of corruption and sentenced to three years in prison.

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    Macron hoped to surpass them all but has clearly failed. Instead of playing by the consecrated rules of the Fifth Republic dominated by powerful parties, he profited from a sudden and unexpected vacuum within both the traditional right and the traditional left to sneak through the cracks and create the illusion that a system permanently dominated by the “alternance” of right and left could be run from the center. 

    It was quite an achievement, but Macron failed to understand that modern French political thinking is not about vague ideas or even attractive personalities. It remains based on the notion of “engagement” (commitment) in favor of one or another strong position. The center Macron so proudly claimed to represent has always been seen as spineless and fundamentally unexciting. At best it reflects a commitment to bureaucracy, which the French have no respect for but cannot live without.

    In 2017, it looked like a free ride for Macron that would last five years thanks to a guaranteed majority in parliament, no viable opposition and a public initially willing to entertain the centrist experiment. But it has become a living hell. Macron never managed to build his own party into something that could represent a political force, despite his massive majority elected to parliament on the coattails of his 2017 electoral victory.

    Embed from Getty Images

    Now, Macron finds himself embroiled in a controversy of his own creation. Its focus has been defining Islam as the enemy and intellectuals sympathizing with Muslims as the enemy within. In November 2020, The Atlantic reported that “Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer has bemoaned the influence of American critical race theory on the French social sciences, blaming them for undermining France’s race- and ethnicity-blind universalism, and for giving comfort to ‘islamo-gauchisme,’ or ‘Islamo-leftism.’” Then, just two weeks ago, France’s higher education minister, Frederique Vidal, set off an uproar in the media and in academe itself when she demanded an “investigation” be carried out into “Islamo-leftist” influence within the universities and research community.

    This spectacular initiative has ended up having a closer resemblance to QAnon than to traditional French intellectual creativity and freedom. Vidal now wants the French to believe that universities and research institutes are harboring a cabal that englobes the French left (irresponsible intellectuals with ideas no sane Frenchmen would endorse) and Islamist extremists (murderous jihadist activists) in an unholy alliance that is threatening the security of the Republic.

    Why? Because a number of serious thinkers have dared to detect a link between the history of European colonialism, including the extension of some its practices into the present, and the rise of violent revolt by Islamic extremists against a system they believe to be oppressive of their people and their people’s well-being. Detecting historical links — or at least certain specific links — has become a crime that can no longer be tolerated.

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Islamo-gauchiste:

    A faux portmanteau word invented by Emmanuel Macron’s government to create the belief that two segments of French society, each with its own tradition of respectability — leftist thinkers and the Muslims who were part of the booty of the former French empire — are plotting to overthrow the modern mainstream, neoliberal, corporatist and implicitly racist consensus that Macron’s party believes to be the main voting bloc in French society today

    Contextual Note

    Macron’s desire to profit from the fear of Muslims that has attracted voters to his main rival, Marine Le Pen, is understandable, though risky since its anti-intellectual belligerence alienates many to the left of center. More surprising is one of its oddest features, that its promoters have coupled it with an appeal to a long-standing trend among the French of anti-Americanism. It claims to be anti-Islamic, anti-intellectual and anti-American, all at the same time.

    It isn’t enough to attack French researchers who propose readings of history that make French colonial incursions into Muslim lands look inglorious. The Macronists are now affirming that this acknowledgment of France’s historical injustice toward its minorities is an example of slavish emulation of American “critical race theory” that has now infected the minds of a generation of French academics. It’s all the fault of American “wokism,” which has no place in French culture.

    Le Monde has long been the serious newspaper of the intellectual rather than the activist left. Since the end of the Second World War, it has stood as the alternative to the other “serious” newspaper, Le Figaro, which reflected the positions of the establishment right and more specifically the Gaullists. De Gaulle, after all, was the founder of the Fifth Republic.

    Macron claims to be neither right nor left, but his electoral strategy has clearly pushed him to commit to policies agreeable to the right. Responding to the proposal of an investigation into academic Islamo-gauchisme, Le Monde immediately published the appeal launched by 600 academics condemning Vidal’s obscurantist effort. The signatories included the immensely successful Thomas Piketty, highly respected on the left. No one would think of branding Piketty as an Islamo-gauchiste.

    Historical Note

    For nearly a century, the French have complained about the attack on the noble purity of the language of Racine and Voltaire by the importation of English words. In the past, governments have legislated to prevent modern French vocabulary from being overwhelmed by trendy American coinages. That hasn’t prevented French people, and especially professionals, from using the very “anglicisms” they are expected to patriotically deplore. “Low-cost” could simply be called “pas cher” but not by people in business, who prefer the English term. Buzz, open space, leader, flop, play-list, best-of and the verb “booster” (to boost) are commonly spoken. Many deem these words illegal occupiers, on a par with the postcolonial invasion of North African immigrants. Neither of them has any business being here and sapping French culture.

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    Interviewed by the magazine L’Obs, political analyst Olivier Roy provides an acute analysis of the French president’s absurd and futile attempt to strategize his reelection: “Emmanuel Macron believes he is playing a grand strategic game by aiming to reach the second round of the next presidential elections in a face-off against Marine Le Pen.” Macron’s ministers are no longer working for the French republic. They are working for Macron’s reelection in 2022. 

    Recent polls show Le Pen within two points of Macron. For Jean-Michel Blanquer and Frederique Vidal, to steal votes from Le Pen’s white working-class constituency, intellectuals on the left must be branded as traitors to the white European republic. They may be unhappy, but just as US President Joe Biden did with progressive Democrats, the Macronists count on the vast majority on the left to vote against Le Pen.

    What Macron fails to realize is that his quandary is closer to the Democratic Party’s failure in the 2016 US presidential election than its success in 2020. Like Hillary Clinton in 2016, people now see him as a shabby, ineffective pillar of a discredited establishment. Nobody likes Macron enough to want to see him hanging around for another five years. As Roy points out, the strategy he has devised is absurd. He cannot win over Le Pen voters. His commitment to Europe has made him their enemy. And now polls show that many on the left will no longer be intimidated to vote for someone so committed to betraying them and their intellectual culture.

    After two years of the COVID-19 pandemic, 2022 promises to be the year of political pandemonium.

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Can the British Army Modernize Under Pressure?

    Over the past three decades, the British Army has faced numerous challenges. British soldiers have been putting their lives on the line in several intense multilateral deployments, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations have enhanced the mechanical wear and tear, necessitating an early replacement of vehicles that were already due to be replaced by newer generations.

    As bad luck would have it, the need for expensive new equipment comes at a time when budgets are scarce. In the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, UK defense budget allocations were systematically slashed by governments that considered the expense no longer indispensable. This has led many observers to describe the modern British Army as a shadow of its former self. The entire British Armed Forces shrank by more than 50% percent over the past three decades, dropping from 311,000 to 145,000 personnel.

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    While the overall budget has increased from £38 billion ($53 billion) to £48 billion, the figure is misleading as it does not take into account rising costs of development or inflation. A more telling indicator is the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense, which dropped from 3.5% to 1.7% between 1990 and 2020. The rhythm of deployments, however, has not slowed, with the UK taking an active part in virtually every NATO operation in the past decades.

    But things may be changing. As defense expert Andrew Chuter writes: “The British government has approved the largest rise in its defense budget since the end of the Cold War, with £16.5 billion (U.S. $21.9 billion) in additional funding made available for spending on shipbuilding, space, cyber, research and other sectors over a four-year period.” This is welcome news for an institution that can no longer count on European military assistance as it could before Brexit.

    Retiring the Heavy Cavalry

    In the coming decade, Britain will be waving its Challenger 2 tanks goodbye. Put in service at the end of the 20th century, the Challenger has served proudly in Iraq, Kosovo and Bosnia. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was simultaneously its finest hour and the beginning of the end for the heavy tank. During combat, Challengers were repeatedly struck with rocket-propelled grenades and proved exceptionally robust. Throughout the invasion, the tank remained operational despite extreme conditions and performed admirably.

    Embed from Getty Images

    However, it became apparent that the Challenger could only be deployed in certain environments. Challengers were never used in Afghanistan because they could hardly have operated in the mountainous terrain and because this battlefield was landlocked — two factors that threaten the tanks’ very existence. Heavy armor can be moved easily by sea, with difficulty over land and never by air.

    The heavy tanks are, therefore, proving increasingly irrelevant as Britain strives to maintain its global presence and capacity. From a strategic setting that pitched two massive conventional military blocs against each other in the plains of Central Europe, the West discovered a post-Cold-War era in which it needed to be able to deploy rapidly to every corner of the world. Heavy weaponry is considerably less relevant today. This type of firepower is not needed in skirmishes and territory control, and its low deployability presents a problem for many operations.

    As the UK Ministry of Defense struggles to reorganize budgets, it surprises no one that heavy armor would be the first on the list for the difficult cuts ahead. After several drops in numbers, Harry Lye reports that “The British Army’s fleet of Challenger 2 main battle tanks (MBTs) and Warrior Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) could be cut under plans reportedly being drawn up by military chiefs.” What will replace British armor if it is effectively mothballed is anyone’s guess.

    The Artillery

    Britain’s AS-90s are also getting close to retirement and, for once, this may be good news. The AS-90 is the UK’s standard self-propelled artillery — effectively a tank, mounted with an artillery howitzer instead of a direct-fire barrel. Artillery regiments have also seen their fleets diminished, for the same budget reasons, and they are also plagued with the same logistical difficulties as their colleagues in the heavy-armor divisions. While not quite as heavy, AS-90 howitzers are immensely cumbersome due to their armor coating, are nearly impossible to move quickly and will easily be evaded by today’s nimble insurgencies.

    But Britain is in luck: There is a new type of howitzer on the market that may fix all of the army’s problems at once. New truck-mounted howitzers, such as the French Caesar cannon, swap armor for mobility. Their simpler design makes them easily transportable by air and considerably less expensive than their predecessors. The Caesar howitzer is the first of its kind to have successfully passed the test by fire in operational deployments. Magzter reports that “Using the truck’s ability to move offers the benefit of being able to have a much lower total system weight particularly if armour protection is either limited to the driver/crew cab area or even eliminated altogether.”

    China, France, Japan, Sweden and many others all have turned to this design, which has demonstrated good operational results. The Caesar cannon is also one of the few artillery types that are air-transportable. Should Britain acquire such howitzers, it could simultaneously maintain its current stock numbers and reduce its military expenditure — a rare opportunity in military affairs.

    The Caesar artillery unit also represents a diplomatic opportunity. The UK was hoping that Brexit would naturally lead to closer ties with the US. This has not transpired — and seems unlikely in the future. Plans for an integrated EU army and low financial contributions from Western European countries have led to American exasperation with its Eastern allies, meaning that US strategies have become, in reaction, increasingly self-sustained and self-centered over the years. Building reinforced interoperability with the French and enhancing the capacity among European nations for rapid deployment is a practical and achievable way to rebuild international ties.

    The Boxer Gamble

    And then, of course, there was the Boxer, the now-infamous infantry fighting vehicle which, despite its critical role on the battlefield, was purchased under the worst possible conditions. While the protection of infantry soldiers receives priority, now that new threats are about, it is unclear why London would allow fair competition for the tender to be scrapped.

    Soldiers commonly need to take the threat of improvised explosive devices or drones into account — something that hardly existed in the 20th century. But, given how drastically the battlefield has changed in the past few decades, defense analysts were astounded that the British Army would throw as fundamental a quality prerequisite as a tender out of the window. By a simple decision, the UK bought the Boxer off the shelf, hoping that it would somehow be adapted to modern threats. Andrew Chuter covered the matter, indicating that 500 Boxers would be ordered — without competition — from the defense contractor Artec at a cost of £4.4 billion, to be delivered in 2023.

    The price tag includes 10 years of technical support. This entails that in case the Boxer reveals itself ill-suited to current-day operations, the UK troops will be stuck with it for at least a decade. Hasty and unverified spending is certainly unwelcome in times of financial strain. But what is done is done. The British Army will presumably not be overturning this decision, and we can hope the Boxer performs well.

    Some of the choices facing the British Army will not make commanders’ hair turn gray beyond reason. If new cannons come at a lower cost, the army can stay within its budgetary envelope and maintain, or even increase, its fleet. Other choices, such as deciding whether to shelve the cavalry, will be more of a strategic gamble. Indeed, Britain may have little need for heavy tanks now, but who knows if it will need them again? One thing is sure, however: Buying the Boxer blindfolded was a huge, almost irresponsible risk in a time of budgetary constraints. Let’s hope future choices will be made with more discernment.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The Italian Far Right’s Long-Term Investment

    When the government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte was unable to find eleven lawmakers willing to join its ranks in the house of representatives in order to keep his ruling majority, President Sergio Mattarella decided to offer the former president of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, the possibility to try to form a new governo tecnico. Italy’s last technical government was led by Mario Monti between 2011 and 2012. A third Conte cabinet did not materialize because of the opposition by Matteo Renzi, the leader of Italia Viva, a party currently polling at 2%.

    The Italian Job: Can Mario Draghi Master It?

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    All political parties in the Italian parliament supported Draghi’s appointment except one: Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy). Even the Euroskeptic and anti-immigration populist-radical Lega (League) agreed to support Draghi, with its leader Matteo Salvini affirming, “I rather prefer to play the game and manage 209 billions of euros than not,” referring to the Italian share of the Next Generation EU plan agreed in July last year.

    Next Generation EU

    Next Generation EU, a €750-billion ($904-billlion) stimulus package designed to boost post-pandemic recovery, will be the largest ever financed by the European Union. Taken together with the EU’s long-term budget, overall recovery funding stands at a total of €1.8 trillion, aimed at rebuilding, “a greener, more digital and more resilient Europe.”

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    The complex intergovernmental dynamics that have led to the agreement behind Next Generation EU are well known. What began with the initial opposition by the so-called “Frugal Four”  — Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden — to the French-German initiative in May 2020 ended in an impasse provoked in late November by Hungary and Poland’s veto of the EU budget. Warsaw and Budapest were concerned about the Rule of Law Mechanism attached to the stimulus that would make it easier for Brussels to sanction violations of democratic principles by withdrawing aid.

    Of the €750 billion, about two-thirds would be non-repayable grants financed by joint borrowing, and one-third will consist in loans. With the aim to help less wealthy countries, Italy and Spain will get the biggest chunk, €209 billion and €140 billion respectively, with France “only” allocated €40 billion. Next Generation EU has been hailed by many as the “new Marshall Plan” that helped lift Europe out of the ruin of the Second World War. However, its practical implementation is revealing to be more complicated than earlier expected.

    For instance, the Spanish government led by Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has already officially declared it will not seek €70 billion in loans, in a move similar to the one announced by Portugal’s Prime Minister Antonio Costa. In Italy, the recent political crisis erupted when Matteo Renzi quit the government over an objection to Conte’s plans for how to spend EU recovery money. In particular, Renzi, once an enfant prodige of Italian and European politics, was critical of the highly technocratic governance that the Conte cabinet was originally seeking to adopt vis-à-vis the stimulus package, including a task force composed of more than 300 experts. Conte, whose popularity has increased over the course of the pandemic, in order to avoid possible vetoes, had previously defended the move by highlighting that it was required by the EU.

    Grand Strategy

    With the Italian government desperately trying to avoid a return to the ballot box during a pandemic, which has already killed nearly 100,000 Italians so far, and an executive struggling to produce a consistent dossier on how to allocate the money from the EU recovery plan, the move by Giorgia Meloni to not lend support to the new government might appear pointless. In fact, Meloni was the only Italian political leader who called for new elections. According to polls, an election now would give to the Italian populist radical-right parties a landslide victory, with Salvini’s League and Meloni’s Brothers of Italy potentially garnering 40% of the votes.

    However, the Brothers of Italy, which in the last year has moved from 10,7% to the current 17%-18%, could vastly benefit from this “isolating abstention.” By simply waiting for the end of the honeymoon between Draghi’s technocratic executive and Italian political parties, the Brothers of Italy could easily build narratives based around blaming the incapacity of the current executive to efficiently utilize the EU funds; denouncing a technocratic agenda dictated by the European “bureaucrats” in Brussels or by “foreign” policymakers in Berlin and Paris; and by criticizing the opportunistic and inconsistent attitudes of other Italian parties, including the League.

    What is certain is that a highly deteriorated and inflamed post-pandemic landscape could provide a perfect context for the Brothers of Italy to gain support by reverting to social policies that à la Orban or à la Kaczyński, focusing on the pillar of “traditional” family. The Brothers of Italy was formed in late 2012 following the open disagreement with the center-right People of Freedom party launched by Silvio Berlusconi, and since then, Miloni has been clearly outlining social and family policies she wants to adopt in Italy. Those policies are based on the principles of conservativism and nationalism, and on intelligent, soft Euroskepticism in the name of sovereignty.

    The policies are the focus of a grand strategy to increase birth rates and protect the traditional family, with generous incentives for both parents and children alongside investment in social housing. It is important to note here that, differently from the League’s economic policies, based on a syncretic and opportunistic mix of both neoliberal and autarchic worldviews protecting small and medium enterprises, the Brothers of Italy has a clear and organic economic vision. As Mitchell Orenstein, among others, has brilliantly demonstrated in the case of Hungary and Poland, these types of policies can be particularly effective in buying many voters into the nationalist right’s vision of a social state. Could this be the case in post-pandemic Italy?

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More