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    Is Russia’s War in Ukraine Creating a New European Security Architecture?

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    The State of Press Freedom in Finland

    A decision to prosecute three journalists at Finland’s largest newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, has called into question its status as one of the world’s leading countries for press freedom. Investigative journalists Laura Halminen and Tuomo Pietilainen, along with their supervisor, Kalle Silfverberg, are accused of disclosing and attempting to disclose state secrets. All three deny the charges.

    The case concerns a series of investigative articles about a military intelligence research center operated by the Finnish defense forces. If found guilty, the journalists face up to four years in prison, with a minimum sentence of four months.

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    Despite Finland’s status as a leading example for freedom of the press, it has not been problem-free, particularly with targeted harassment of journalists. However, the case against Helsingin Sanomat’s journalists has opened up an entirely new front for defenders of press freedom. It has also raised uncomfortable issues from Finland’s past, which the country is still grappling with.

    A Small Country With a Large Neighbor

    Finland, with a population of 5.5 million, shares a border of more than 800 miles with Russia and its population of more than 144 million. For Finnish leaders, this has meant taking a realist approach to foreign policy. In particular, the Winter War of 1939-40, when Finland resisted an attack by the Soviet Union, is one of the defining events in the country’s history.

    The decades that followed World War II were challenging for Finland, a small country ravaged by war. Maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was a necessity. Finland successfully avoided Soviet occupation and remained a democracy, but it paid the price in the form of “Finlandization,” which meant strict political neutrality and not challenging the influence of the Soviet Union.

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    Finland’s national security strategy is founded on conscription, a trained reserve, defense of the entire country and a willingness to defend it from attack. The aim is to make it an unappealing target for a would-be aggressor state.

    A recent decision to renew Finland’s aging fleet of Hornets with 64 Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighter jets, popular with NATO countries, forms part of the strategy. Maintaining good international relations and participating in international military crisis management are other key elements. Finland is not a member of NATO, but it joined the European Union in 1995. Polls indicate that support for NATO membership has grown significantly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

    Prosecution Before Publication

    The case against the three journalists was triggered by an article that Helsingin Sanomat published in 2017. Legislative changes that aimed to extend the information-gathering powers of the security services were underway at the time. The newspaper’s representatives have argued that there were strong public interest reasons for publishing the story.

    The police investigation included a raid on one journalist’s home and left them stuck in limbo for four years. The decision to prosecute, announced in late October 2021, concerns the article published five years ago and material for a series of unpublished articles. The prosecution based on unpublished material has understandably raised concerns.

    There are currently limited facts available about the basis for the prosecution or the details of the case, but more information is expected to become public at a later stage. Based on the available information, it appears likely that one of the central questions in the case will hinge on when an investigative journalist’s research potentially crosses the line into an attempt to disclose state secrets.

    The Finnish Union of Journalists has raised strong concerns about the case, pointing out that it could set a precedent and mean that a journalist’s unpublished notes might result in a conviction. The union and the Council for Mass Media, the independent media regulator, have called for openness in the legal proceedings.

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    While not taking a position on the case, the council has expressed concerns that it could result in restrictions on freedom of expression on grounds that may remain secret. The council has emphasized the need for clarity about the circumstances in which considering material for publication or finalizing material, without actually publishing it, could constitute a crime.

    The issues raised by the Council for Mass Media include concerns about the risk of self-censorship. This is a sensitive historical issue, as the era of “Finlandization” included heavy self-censorship in the media and in publishing. Writing about the case for Politiikasta, academic scholars Anu Koivunen and Johanna Vuorelma warn against the risk of a return to a Cold War-era media environment, where every decision to publish was assessed from a security perspective.

    Welcome to the Land of Free Press

    In 2018, hundreds of billboards commissioned by Helsingin Sanomat famously greeted Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on their visit to Helsinki with messages such as, “Mr. President, welcome to the land of free press.” The case against Helsingin Sanomat’s journalists may test whether Finland still is that land of a free press.

    Whatever the outcome of the case, it has given Finland, the world’s happiest country, cause for serious self-reflection.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    What Would Helsinki 2.0 Look Like Today?

    The European security order has broken down. You might think that’s an overstatement. NATO is alive and well. The Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe is still functioning at a high level.

    Of course, there’s the possibility of a major war breaking out between Russia and Ukraine. But would Russian President Vladimir Putin really take such an enormous risk? Moreover, periodic conflicts in that part of the world — in Ukraine since 2014, in Georgia in 2008, in Transnistria between 1990 and 1992 — have not escalated into Europe-wide wars. Even the horrific bloodletting of Yugoslavia in the 1990s was largely contained within the borders of that benighted former country, and many of the Yugoslav successor states have joined both the European Union and NATO.

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    So, you might argue, the European security order is in fine shape, and it’s only Putin who’s the problem. The United States and Europe will show their resolve in the face of the Russian troops that have massed at the border with Ukraine, Putin will accept some face-saving diplomatic compromise and the status quo will be restored.

    Even if that were to happen and war is averted this time, Europe is still in a fundamental state of insecurity. The Ukraine conflict is a symptom of this much deeper problem.

    The current European security order is an overlay of three different institutional arrangements. NATO is the surprisingly healthy dinosaur of the Cold War era with 30 members, a budget of $3 billion and collective military spending of over a trillion dollars.

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    Russia has pulled together a post-Cold War military alliance of former Soviet states, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), that is anemic by comparison with a membership that includes only Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Instead of expanding, the CSTO is shrinking, having lost Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan over the course of its existence.

    And then there’s the Helsinki framework that holds East and West together in the tenuous OSCE. Neither Russia nor its military alliance was able to prevent the march of NATO eastward to include former Soviet republics. Neither NATO nor the OSCE was able to stop Russia from seizing Crimea, supporting a separatist movement in eastern Ukraine or orchestrating “frozen conflicts” in Georgia and Moldova.

    Presently, there are no arms control negotiations between East and West. China became Russia’s leading trade partner about a decade ago, and the United States and European countries have only fallen further behind since. Human rights and civil liberties are under threat in both the former Soviet Union and parts of the European Union.

    So, now do you understand what I mean by the breakdown of the European security order? The Cold War is back, and it threatens once again to go hot, if not tomorrow then perhaps sometime soon.

    So, yes, Ukrainian sovereignty must be defended in the face of potential Russian aggression. But the problem is much bigger. If we don’t address this bigger problem, then we’ll never really safeguard Ukraine, deal with Russia’s underlying concerns of encirclement or tackle the worrying militarization of Europe. What we need is Helsinki 2.0.

    The Origins of Helsinki 1.0

    In the summer of 1985, I was in Helsinki after a stint in Moscow studying Russian. I was walking down one of the streets in the Finnish capital when I came across a number of protesters holding signs.

    “Betrayal!” said one of them. “Appeasement!” said another. Other signs depicted a Russian bear pressing its claws into the then-Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

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    I’d happened on this band of mostly elderly protesters outside a building where dignitaries from around the world had gathered to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords. At the time, I had only a vague understanding of the agreement, knowing only that it was a foundational text for East-West détente, an attempt to bridge the Iron Curtain.

    As I found out that day, not everyone was enthusiastic about the Helsinki Accords. The pact, signed in 1975 by the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all European countries except Albania, finally confirmed the post-war borders of Europe and the Soviet Union, which meant acknowledging that the Baltic states were not independent but instead under the Kremlin’s control. To legitimize its control over the Baltics in particular, a concession it had been trying to win for years, the Soviet Union was even willing to enter into an agreement mandating that it “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”

    At the time, many human rights advocates were skeptical that the Soviet Union or its Eastern European satellites would do anything of the sort. After 1975, “Helsinki” groups popped up throughout the region — the Moscow Helsinki Group, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia — and promptly discovered that the Communist governments had no intention of honoring their Helsinki commitments, at least as they pertained to human rights.

    Most analysts back then saw the recognition of borders as cold realpolitik and the human rights language as impossibly idealistic. History has proved otherwise. The borders of the Soviet Union had an expiration date of 15 years. And, ultimately, it would be human rights — rather than war or economic sanctions — that spelled the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Change came in the late 1980s from ordinary people who exercised the freedom of thought enshrined in the Helsinki Accords to protest in the streets of Vilnius, Warsaw, Prague and Tirana. The decisions made in 1975 ensured that the transitions of 1989-91 would be largely peaceful.

    After the end of the Cold War, the Helsinki Accords became institutionalized in the OSCE, and briefly, that promised to be the future of European security. After all, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that NATO no longer had a reason for existence.

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    But institutions do not die easily. NATO devised new missions for itself, becoming involved in out-of-area operations in the Middle East, intervening in the Yugoslav wars and beginning in 1999 expanding eastward. The first Eastern European countries to join were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which technically brought the alliance to Russia’s very doorstep (since Poland borders the Russian territory of Kaliningrad). NATO expansion was precisely the wrong answer to the question of European security — my first contribution to Foreign Policy in Focus back in 1996 was a critique of expansion — but logic took a backseat to appetite.

    The OSCE, meanwhile, labored in the shadows. With its emphasis on non-military conflict resolution, it was ideally suited to the necessities of post-Cold War Europe. But it was an unwieldy organization, and the United States preferred the hegemonic power it wielded through NATO.

    This brings us to the current impasse. The OSCE has been at the forefront of negotiating an end to the war in eastern Ukraine and maintains a special monitoring mission to assess the ceasefire there. But NATO is mobilizing for war with Russia over Ukraine, while Moscow and Washington remain as far apart today as they were during the Cold War.

    The Helsinki Accords were the way to bridge the unbridgeable in 1975. What would Helsinki 2.0 look like today?

    Toward Helsinki 2.0

    The Helsinki Accords were built around a difficult compromise involving a trade-off on borders and human rights. A new Helsinki agreement needs a similar compromise. That compromise must be around the most important existential security threat facing Europe and indeed the world: climate change.

    As I argue in a new article in Newsweek, “In exchange for the West acknowledging Russian security concerns around its borders, Moscow could agree to engage with its OSCE partners on a new program to reduce carbon emissions and transition from fossil fuels. Helsinki 2.0 must be about cooperation, not just managing disagreements.”

    The Russian position on climate change is “evolving,” as politicians like to say. After years of ignoring the climate crisis — or simply seeing it as a good opportunity to access resources in the melting Arctic — the Putin administration change its tune last year, pledging to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.

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    There’s obviously room for improvement in Russia’s climate policy — as there is in the United States and Europe. But that’s where Helsinki 2.0 can make a major contribution. The members of a newly energized OSCE can engage in technical cooperation on decarbonization, monitor country commitments to cut emissions, and apply new and stringent targets on a sector that has largely gotten a pass: the military. It can even push for the most effective decarbonization strategy around: demilitarization.

    What does Russia get out of the bargain? A version of what it got in 1975: reassurances around borders.

    Right now, everyone is focused on the question of NATO expansion as either an unnecessary irritant or a necessary provocation in American-Russian relations. That puts too much emphasis on NATO’s importance. In the long term, it’s necessary to reduce the centrality of NATO in European security calculations and to do so without bulking up all the militaries of European states and the EU. By all means, NATO should be going slow on admitting new members. More important, however, are negotiations as part of Helsinki 2.0 that reduce military exercises on both sides of Russia’s border, address both nuclear and conventional buildups, and accelerate efforts to resolve the “frozen conflicts” in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Neither NATO nor the CSTO is suited to these tasks.

    As in 1975, not everyone will be satisfied with Helsinki 2.0. But that’s what makes a good agreement: a balanced mix of mutual satisfaction and dissatisfaction. More importantly, like its predecessor, Helsinki 2.0 offers civil society an opportunity to engage — through human rights groups, arms control advocates, and scientific and educational organizations. This might be the hardest pill for the Kremlin to swallow, given its hostile attitude toward civil society. But the prospect of securing its borders and marginalizing NATO might prove simply too irresistible for Vladimir Putin.

    The current European security order is broken. It can be fixed by war. Or it can be fixed by a new institutional commitment by all sides to negotiations within an updated framework. That’s the stark choice when the status quo cannot hold.

    *[This article was originally published by FPIF.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Britain’s Still Got It

    Since Brexit in 2016, the United Kingdom’s growth rate has been poor. Inflation is at its highest rate in 30 years. In December 2021, it had risen to 5.4%. Wages have failed to keep up and, when we factor in housing or childcare costs, the cost of living has been rising relentlessly.

    COVID-19 has not been kind to the economy. Rising energy prices are putting further pressure on stretched household budgets. To stave off inflation, the Bank of England is finally raising interest rates, bringing an end to the era of cheap money. Payroll taxes are supposed to go up in April to repair public finances.

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    The Resolution Foundation is predicting that “spiralling energy prices will turn the UK’s cost-of-living crisis into a catastrophe” by spring. The UK’s 2022 budget deficit will be larger than all its G-7 peers except the US. The beleaguered Boris Johnson government finds itself in a bind. At a time of global inflation, it has to limit both public borrowing and taxes. Unsurprisingly, there is much doom and gloom in the air.

    We Have Seen This Movie Before

    Since the end of World War II, the UK has experienced many crises of confidence. One of the authors move to the country in 1977. Back then, the Labour Party was in power. James Callaghan was prime minister, having succeeded Harold Wilson a year earlier. The British economy was the fifth-largest in the world but was buffeted by crises. In 1976, the government had approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when, in the words of Richard Roberts, “Britain went bust.”

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    From 1964 to 1967, the United Kingdom experienced “a continuous sterling crisis.” In fact, the UK was “the heaviest user of IMF resources” from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s. The 1973 oil crisis spiked energy costs worldwide and pushed the UK into a balance of payments crisis. Ironically, it was not the Conservatives led by Margaret Thatcher but Labour led by Callaghan that declared an end to the postwar interpretation of Keynesian economics.

    In his first speech as prime minister and party leader at the Labour Party conference at Blackpool, Callaghan declared: “We used to think you could spend your way out of a recession and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour, that option no longer exists.” After this speech, the Callaghan government started imposing austerity measures.

    Workers and unions protested, demanding pay rises. From November 1978 to February 1979, strikes broke out across the UK even as the country experienced its coldest winter in 16 years. This period has come to be known as the Winter of Discontent, a time “when the dead lay unburied” as per popular myth because even gravediggers went on strike.

    In 1979, Thatcher won a historic election and soon instituted economic policies inspired by Friedrich von Hayek, the Austrian rival of the legendary John Maynard Keynes. Thatcher’s victory did not immediately bring a dramatic economic turnaround. One major industry after another continued to collapse. Coal mines closed despite a historic strike in 1984-85. Coal, which gave work to nearly 1.2 million miners in 1920 employed just 1,000 a century later.

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    Throughout the 1970s, the UK was dubbed “the sick man of Europe.” People forget now that a key reason the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 was to make the economy more competitive. Between 1939 and the early 1990s, London lost a quarter of its population. Yet London and indeed the UK recovered from a period of crisis to emerge as a dynamic economy. Some credit Thatcher but there were larger forces at play.

    There Is Life in the Old Dog Yet

    Last week, one of the authors met an upcoming politician of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). A strong nationalist, he spoke about the importance of Hindi, improving India’s defense and boosting industrial production. When the conversation turned to his daughter, he said that he was sending her to London to do her A-levels at a top British school.

    This BJP leader is not atypical. Thousands of students from around the world flock to the UK’s schools and universities. British universities are world-class and train their students for a wide variety of roles. Note that the University of Oxford and AstraZeneca were able to develop a COVID-19 vaccine with impressive speed. This vaccine has since been released to more than 170 countries. This is hardly surprising: Britain has four of the top 20 universities in the world — only the US has a better record.

    Not only students but also capital flocks to the UK. As a stable democracy with strong rule of law, the United Kingdom is a safe haven for those seeking stability. It is not just the likes of Indian billionaires, Middle Eastern sheikhs and Russian oligarchs who put their wealth into the country. Numerous middle-class professionals choose the UK as a place to live, work and do business in. Entrepreneurs with a good idea don’t have to look far to get funding. Despite residual racism and discrimination, Britain’s cities have become accustomed to and comfortable with their ethnic minorities.

    Alumni from top universities and skilled immigrants have skills that allow the UK to lead in many sectors. Despite Brexit, the City of London still rivals Wall Street as a financial center. Companies in aerospace, chemical and high-end cars still make the UK their home. British theater, comedy, television, news media and, above all, football continue to attract global attention.

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    Napoleon Bonaparte once purportedly called the UK “a nation of shopkeepers.” There is an element of truth to this stereotype. The British are a commercially savvy, entrepreneurial and business-friendly bunch. One author knows a dealer who trades exclusively in antique fans and a friend who specializes in drinks that you can have after a heavy night. The other has a friend who sells rare Scotch whiskey around the world and an acquaintance who is running a multibillion insurance company in India. Many such businesses in numerous niches give the British economy a dynamism and resilience that is often underrated. Everything from video gaming (a £7-billion-a-year industry) to something as esoteric as antique fan dealing continues to thrive.

    The UK also has the lingering advantage of both the Industrial Revolution and the British Empire. Infrastructure and assets from over 200 years ago limit the need for massive capital investment that countries like Vietnam or Poland need. Furthermore, the UK has built up managerial experience over multiple generations. Thanks to the empire, English is the global lingua franca and enables the University of Cambridge to make money through its International English Language Testing System. Barristers and solicitors continue to do well thanks to the empire’s export of common law. Even more significantly, British judges have a reputation for impartiality and independence: they cannot be bribed or coerced. As a result, the UK is the premier location for settling international commercial disputes.

    In 1977, the UK was the world’s fifth-largest economy. In 2022, 45 years later, it is still fifth, although India is projected to overtake it soon. The doom and gloom of the 1970s proved premature. The same may prove true in the 2020s. The economy faces a crisis, but it has the strength and track record to bounce back. The UK still remains a jolly good place to study, work, invest and live in.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Italy’s Presidential Race Puts a Strain on Political Balance

    Italy’s parliament gathered in a joint session of both houses on January 24 to elect the country’s next president who will succeed Sergio Mattarella, whose term will end on February 3.

    A total of 1,009 voters, including 58 delegates chosen by regional councils and known as “great electors,” took part in the first stage of voting, which will be repeated every day until a consensus is reached. A clear vote is unlikely to be reached before Thursday as cross-party negotiations are still underway and the majority of lawmakers have decided to cast a blank vote as a delaying action amid intense backroom talks.

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    Usually a symbolic formality, Italy’s presidential election is this time a focus of special attention by media and citizens, as the country’s fragile national unity and political balance depend on its outcome. The vote comes at a pivotal time, as the country has recently agreed to an EU-sponsored €191.5 billion ($213 billion) program of economic and social reforms aimed at rebooting its national economy.

    Among the top contenders is Prime Minister Mario Draghi, a former president of the European Central Bank, who has openly signaled his willingness to run for the job. For Draghi, a seven-year presidential term is undoubtedly more appealing than ending his mandate with a disorderly, mixed coalition ahead of general elections next year.

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    But parties are reluctant to vote for Draghi as his eventual election as president and resignation as prime minister could lead to snap general elections. His exit as head of government, a role he was appointed to by Mattarella in February 2021 after the collapse of the so-called Conte II cabinet, in favor of the presidency could bring Italy back to a new phase of instability and political uncertainty. 

    Why Does This Election Matter?

    In recent decades, Italy’s national politics has undergone profound transformation concerning the structure and ideologies of both parties, and the role of the president has become increasingly important. Beyond exercising moral authority, representing national unity and being the guarantor of the independence and integrity of the nation, as defined by the Italian Constitution, the head of state takes charge during a political crisis.

    The president has the authority to select the new prime minister, as Mattarella did last year in choosing Draghi to lead the country out of a political impasse after the resignation of technocratic Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. The president also has the authority to approve or deny the appointment of ministers who will form the new cabinet, and they can refuse mandates to weak coalitions and dissolve parliament, setting the country on the path to national elections.

    Will the Government Fall Apart?

    The situation is particularly delicate as it involves the stability and longevity of the current government and the possibility of early general elections. The outcome of the presidential vote may lead to different scenarios, potentially able to shift allegiances, disrupt existing coalitions and alter the balance of power among Italy’s political parties.

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    If parliament fails to agree on a candidate, the vote will undoubtedly become a source of division between the left and the right, inevitably opening the path to a political rupture. 

    The government’s collapse would not only damage Italy’s political equilibrium, but also impact the European Union. Brussels has heavily bet on Italy’s ability to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic — which rocked the economy and markets — endorsing prime minister Draghi’s national recovery and resilience plan.

    What About Mario Draghi?

    The presidential election is also important because it could represent a turning point in determining the political future of Prime Minister Draghi, who has provided a period of balance and good governance in Italian politics.

    According to his supporters, choosing Draghi as the next president and having him in office for the next seven years would increase the chances to keep markets stable, which would imply the prospect of long-term economic recovery and, at the same time, give Italy more credibility at a European and international level.

    Yet, many lawmakers are pushing for President Mattarella to stay on for another year, arguing that this would be the best solution to guarantee the government’s stability until scheduled general elections in 2023.

    Who Are the Other Contenders? 

    As the prominent businessman and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi withdrew his candidacy, saying that Italy could not afford further political division, far-right leaders Matteo Salvini (Northern League) and Giorgia Meloni (Brothers of Italy) are considering a list of moderate right-wing figures. This includes former Senator Marcello Pera and ex-mayor of Milan Letizia Moratti as potential candidates, hoping to gain support from the center left.

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    Other possible contenders include Pier Ferdinando Casini, a long-serving centrist senator and former speaker of the lower house who reportedly has good cross-party relations, Marta Cartabia, a judge and former president of the Italian constitutional court currently serving as minister of justice, and Giuliano Amato, a former politician who served twice as prime minister and thrice as minister during the 1990s.

    After the first three ballots, where a two-thirds majority is required (673 out of 1,009 voters), an absolute majority of 505 votes is enough for a candidate to be elected. Yet if the voting process continues past the end of Mattarella’s term, it would be clear that the presidential election has paved the way for another unpredictable political earthquake.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The Fusion of Polish Nationalist Groups and Roman Catholicism

    It should not come as a surprise that in Poland, a country where “Catholicism has gained institutional status and an official place within civil society,” religion is being exploited for political activism, including radical ones.

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    Of course, not all nationalist far-right groups have connections with religion and the churches, but in contemporary Poland, the majority of far-right organizations are considered Catholic. According to one expert on the Polish nationalist movement, Catholicism in its nationalistic depictions has various dimensions — civilizational, moral, historical and political. This makes Polish right-wing groups an exception and an interesting topic in the field of studies on the far right, particularly as, for some scholars, “religion remains conspicuously absent in concepts of the radical right.”

    National Radical Camp: A Key Expression

    The National Radical Camp (ONR) serves as an example of how a far-right group frequently uses religious argumentation in its political activity. Strong attachment to God is part of the ONR’s ideological guidelines. The first point in the guidelines called, “Salvation — an ultimate goal of a human being” can be perceived as ONR’s confession of faith. The group says that these guidelines are the commandments of “the traditional Catholic Church” that lead people to discover truth. Belief in God, as an undisputed principle, also becomes a guiding rule in political life. The group further states: “Highlighting the enormous role of Catholicism, which for thousands of years has been a cultural principle, a pillar of Polishness and an anchor of national identity, we pursue the vision of Great Poland as a country soaked with Catholic spirit.”

    The idea of building a nationalist program on a firm religious base extends into the ONR’s publications, both online and in print. For example, in the group’s National Horizon magazine, there is an article on the above-mentioned first ideological principle. Since the contemporary ONR is inspired by another organization operating under the same name in the 1930s, the piece highlights historical continuity. Belief in God and obedience to religious principles are seen as an inherent part of the nationalist tradition.

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    An important point of reference for the author of the National Horizon article is Pope Leo XIII and the pre-conciliar church and customs in general. The author notices new challenges for the church and Catholics, especially the modernist movement within the church, claiming that “the modernists took our holy mass away.” Liberal democracy is listed as another contemporary threat. The author of the article goes on to claim that this political system fools people with ideas of freedom and civil liberties. Therefore, Catholic priests “raised in liberal spirit” cannot be seen as ONR’s allies.

    Interestingly, the application form for those wishing to become a member of the group includes a question about their attitude toward the Catholic Church. Religiosity might therefore be one of the decisive factors in the admission process. This appears important for recruitment since many activities organized by the group include religious practices. Wreath-laying ceremonies or other occasions, gatherings of ONR’s members and followers on various anniversaries, and celebrations of historical events are usually accompanied with prayers or followed by attendance of holy mass. ONR’s regional divisions also gather for a common Christmas Eve supper or to visit cemeteries on All Saints’ Day.

    Although these activities do not seem like standard practice within the far-right scene, they might be treated as a characteristic of many other Polish groups. In her work, scholar Dominika Tronina scrupulously tracked similar religiously focused activities of another far-right group, the All-Polish Youth. Of course, in Catholically oriented groups, religion is also used to support specific political positions, matters concerning the family or certain conservative educational policies.

    The Polish Radical Right and Wider Trends of Secularization

    Ardent Catholicism of far-right groups in Poland becomes even more interesting as we acknowledge that the religiosity of Polish society is currently on a downward trajectory. The recent publication of the opinion polling institute CBOS leaves no doubts about this trend, especially among young Poles. Public opinion polls show that the percentage of people between the age of 18 and 24 describing themselves as religious fell from 93% in 1992 to 71% in 2021. This means that the proportion of declared young non-believers tripled within this period.

    At the same time, religious Poles have become less scrupulous in the practice of religious rituals. The percentage of young people regularly going to mass or practicing their religion dropped from 62% to a mere 26%. The trend can be seen within society as a whole — with a decrease of believers from 94% to 87% in the last quarter century — but it is strikingly evident within younger generations.

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    The new quantitative evidence summing up the secularization process of the last 30 years surprises even Poles themselves. What has been discussed and suspected has now been proven with exact numbers. Although the phenomenon deserves deeper understanding through research, several possible explanations have made their way into public debate in recent months.

    One of them is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the religious practices of Poles. Since the outbreak of the coronavirus in 2020, entrance to churches has been temporarily restricted and many people have become used to practicing their religion at home. Another reason is a growing negative assessment of the church and clergymen due to the surfacing of sex scandals, both in Poland and abroad.

    It might also be hypothesized that many Poles are simply tired of the instrumentalization of religious arguments, which have repeatedly been used as justification for political (and social) decisions. For example, the clash of religious and non-religious motivations became apparent during recent debates over changes in Polish abortion laws. Decreasing acceptance of the intertwining of public life with religion is also evident when looking at the number of students attending Catholic catechism classes, falling rapidly in recent years.

    The increase in secularization could have an impact on many aspects of social and political life in the future. Since Polish far-right groups attract predominantly young people — who are increasingly secular — it might be interesting to observe whether decreasing religiosity of society will have an impact on the activities of ONR and other similar groups.

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Former Austrian President Heinz Fischer Talks to Fair Observer

    Austria is known as a stable Central European country that is the capital of classical music. It is also the home of prominent figures in the world of science and philosophy, including Sigmund Freud and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

    In 2014, Austria had the lowest unemployment rate in the European Union. That trend declined in the years that followed, but the economy remained largely competitive. Austria is also one of the top 10 countries with the fewest number of unemployed young people among member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

    Debate Over COVID-19 Is Exactly What Austria Needs

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    Austrians will head to the polls later this year for elections. The incumbent president, Alexander Van der Bellen, remains undecided over running again, but he is eligible for a second term in office. In the 2016 election, he defeated Norbert Hofer of the Freedom Party of Austria, thwarting his rival’s attempt to become the first far-right head of state in the EU.

    Recently identified as the world’s fifth-most peaceful country in the 2021 Global Peace Index, Austria has seen substantial economic fallout due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s decision to introduce mandatory vaccination and hefty penalties for those who do not comply has stirred controversy.

    Heinz Fischer, the president of Austria between 2004 and 2016, is a seasoned lawyer who had a long career in politics. He took his first step toward becoming a national leader in early 1963, when he served as a legal assistant to the vice president of the Austrian parliament. He later became a member of parliament himself and then served as the minister of science, before leading the national council, the lower house of parliament, from 1990 to 2002. He is currently the co-chairman of the Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens in Vienna.

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    I spoke to Dr. Fischer about the COVID-19 pandemic, the refugee crisis in Europe, the Iran nuclear talks in the Austrian capital and more.

    The transcript has been edited for clarity.

    Kourosh Ziabari: Mr. President, according to Statistics Austria and the Austrian Institute for Economic Research approximations, the total fiscal costs of the COVID-19 pandemic for Austria amount to roughly €70 billion [$79 billion] in the 2020-22 period. As of May 2021, the government had earmarked €37 billion for relief measures. Do you think this is a liability for the Austrian economy that may result in a short- or mid-term recession, or is it a deficit that can be made up for soon? Has the government been able to handle the economic burden of the pandemic efficiently?

    Heinz Fischer: When COVID-19 reached Austria and the first lockdown became mandatory, I was surprised to hear the finance minister from the conservative party announcing that he would compensate the economic burden with “whatever it costs.” This was unusual language for a conservative minister of finance.

    All in all, the government’s relief measures were crucial for reducing Austria’s economic damage of the pandemic. The Institute for Economic Research as well as our National Bank claim that Austria will be able to go back to the path of economic growth; this will reduce unemployment and keep recession lower than a traditional conservative finance policy of strict zero deficit would have done. But the performance of the government fighting against COVID-19 was less successful.

    Ziabari: It was reported that the government is planning to introduce mandatory inoculation starting in early 2022 and that those holding out will face fines of up to $4,000. Of course, vaccination is the most effective way of combating the effects of the coronavirus. But does a vaccine mandate and handing out substantial penalties not go against democratic practice in a country known for its democratic credentials? You are no longer in office, but as an observer, do you support the decision?

    Fischer: This is one of the hottest or even the hottest topic of current political debates in Austria. To answer your question promptly and directly: Yes, I believe it is necessary and legitimate to introduce mandatory inoculation — with justified exemptions — for a limited period of time in order to protect our population and our country in the best possible way. Other European countries start thinking in a similar way.

    It is not a one-issue question. You have, on the one hand, the obligation of the government to protect basic rights and individual freedom and, on the other hand, the obligation of the government to protect the health and life of its population. And it is obvious that there are different, even antagonistic basic rights, namely individual freedom on the one side and health insurance and fighting a pandemic on the other. It is not an either/or but an as-well-as situation. The government must take care of two responsibilities simultaneously, meaning that the democratically-elected parliament has to seek and find the balance between two values and two responsibilities.

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    If I remember correctly, a similar situation existed already two generations ago, when the danger of a smallpox pandemic justified an obligatory smallpox vaccination until the World Health Organization proclaimed the global eradication of the disease in 1980.

    Ziabari: Moving on from the pandemic, Austria was one of the countries hugely affected by the 2015-16 refugee crisis in Europe. When the government of former Chancellor Sebastian Kurz came to power, it took a hard line on migration and made major electoral gains as a result. Now, with the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a new wave of westward migration appears to be in the making. Does Austria have a moral and human responsibility to protect asylum-seekers fleeing war and persecution, or should the responsibility be outsourced to other nations for certain reasons?

    Fischer: My clear answer is, yes, Austria has a moral and human responsibility to protect asylum-seekers on the basis of international law and the international sharing of responsibilities.

    Of course, we must discuss the numbers, the conditions, the possibilities, etc. of the respective country. But immediately saying no, we will not take women from Afghanistan, or we will not participate in burden-sharing of the European Union with the excuse that earlier governments many years ago already accepted a substantial share of refugees, is not acceptable. One cannot outsource humanity and moral duties.

    Ziabari: How is Austria coping with the effects of climate change and its human rights implications? While the average global surface temperature rise from 1880 to 2012 has been 0.85° Celsius, it has been 2° Celsius for Austria. Austria’s target for 2030 is to cut greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the EU Emissions Trading System by 36%, but the International Energy Agency has forecast it may only achieve a 27% benchmark. Will Austria need external help to overcome the challenge? Are you positive it can fulfill the EU expectations?

    Fischer: I do not think that Austria needs external help to fulfill its climate commitments. I do, however, think it is urgently necessary for the Austrian government to find a way forward in combating the climate crisis, a way that does not only cut greenhouse gas emissions, but which will also help to achieve societal consensus on the measures that are to be taken. This means the government must also be supporting social coherence.

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    Combating climate change is a multi-stakeholder effort and includes a just transition to clean energy, rapid phase-out of coal and end to international fossil fuel finance. In Austria in 2018, already 77% of electricity came from renewable energy sources and the number is constantly rising. While building a sustainable and climate-friendly future, we must, however, not forget to create green jobs, uphold human rights around the world and leave no one behind. I am positive that Austria will fulfill its EU expectations because it has to. There is only one planet, and we have to protect it with all means.

    Ziabari: Let’s also touch upon some foreign policy issues. The former US president, Donald Trump, was rebuked by European politicians for alienating allies and spoiling partnerships with friendly, democratic nations and embracing repressive leaders instead. But Austria-US relations remained largely steady, and despite Trump’s protectionist trade policies, the United States imported a whopping $11.7 billion in goods and services from Austria. Do the elements that undergirded robust Austria-US connections still exist with a transition of power in the White House and a change of government in Austria?

    Fischer: Yes, the relations between Austria and the United States have a long history and stable basis. Austria has not forgotten the prominent role of the US in the fight against Hitler. It has not forgotten the Marshall Plan — 75 years ago — and other ways of American support after World War II. The United States was a lighthouse of democracy in the 20th century, including the time of Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Franco, Horthy, etc. in Europe.

    Of course, the Vietnam War, the political and economic pressure on countries in Latin America, the false arguments as the basis for a military invasion in Iraq and the heritage of racism have cast shadows on US policy. But having said all this, it is also true that the US has strengths in many fields of foreign policy and good relations between the US and Europe are a stabilizing factor in the world.

    I would like to add that Donald Trump was and still is a great challenge for democracy in the US and a danger for the positive image of the United States in Europe and elsewhere.

    Ziabari: Are you concerned about the tensions simmering between Russia and the West over Ukraine? Should it be assumed that Russia’s threats of deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe are serious, or are the Russians bluffing to test the West’s resolve, particularly now that one of Europe’s influential leaders, Angela Merkel, has departed? Are Russia’s complaints about NATO’s exploitation of Ukraine to expand eastwards and the ongoing discrimination against Ukraine’s Russian-speaking populace valid?

    Fischer: Yes, I am concerned about the growing conflict between Russia and the West, and this conflict has a long history. World War II was not started by Russia, the Soviet Union, but brutally against them.

    After World War II, there was a bipolar world developing between the East and the West, between Moscow and Washington, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. After the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new situation emerged. Gorbachev was honestly interested in a more peaceful world. He was accepting over the reunification of Germany and accepted the former Warsaw Pact member East Germany to become a member of NATO.

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    But the deal was that Russia’s security should not be reduced, and other parts of the former Soviet Union should not become part of NATO. And, in this respect, Ukraine is an extremely sensitive issue. It is already a while ago, but let’s remember how sensitive the United States reacted to the so-called Cuban Missile Crisis — the stationing of Russian weapons near the US. NATO weapons at the border of Russia are not supportive of peace and stability.

    Ziabari: German Chancellor Angela Merkel stepped down after 16 years in power. Aside from being referred to as the de facto leader of the EU, she was praised for her leadership during the eurozone debt crisis and her role in mustering global solidarity to fight COVID. What do you think about the legacy she has left behind? In terms of relations with Austria, do you think her differences with the government of Sebastian Kurz on immigration, Operation Sophia and the EU budget blighted the perception that Austrians had of her?

    Fischer: Angela Merkel was a great leader, crucial for Germany, crucial for Europe, crucial for human rights, crucial for peace. I admired and liked her. When former Austrian Chancellor Kurz and former German Chancellor Merkel shared different views, Merkel was, in my opinion, mostly on the right and Kurz on the wrong side. She was “Mrs. Stability and Reliability” in a positive sense.

    And her legacy? She belongs with Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt to the four great German leaders after World War II. Under her leadership, Germany was the most stable nation in the European Union and her relationship with Austria was a mirror to her character, namely balanced, friendly and correct.

    Ziabari: In the past couple of decades, Europe has been the scene of multiple terror attacks with hundreds of casualties, including the November 2020 shooting in Vienna, which European officials and media unanimously blamed on Islamist terrorism and political Islam. What are the stumbling blocks to the normalization of relations between secular Europe and its Muslim community? Is this civilizational, generational clash destined to last perennially, or are you optimistic that the two discourses can come to a co-existence?

    Fischer: The melting of different nationalities, cultures and religions is always a difficult task. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy finally collapsed because of unsolved conflicts between European nationalities.

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    Conflicts become even more difficult when they include different religions and ethnicities. We can say that the conflict between our German-speaking, Czech-speaking, Hungarian- or Polish-speaking grandparents is more or less overcome, but the conflict between Christians and Muslims will last longer. We can study this in the United States. But it is my personal hope that multi-religious integration is possible in the long run in a fair and democratic society.

    Ziabari: Talks to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, are underway in the Austrian capital. Are you hopeful that the moribund agreement can be brought back to life? Do you see the determination to save the accord in the Iranian side and the other parties, for the benefit of international peace and security?

    Fischer: I was very happy when the 2015 JCPOA was signed between Iran, the United States, China and several European countries. And I believe it was one of the very wrong and unwise decisions of Donald Trump to withdraw from that agreement. To revitalize this agreement is, as we can observe these days, very difficult.

    As you asked me about my opinion, I am inclined to a more pessimistic outlook, because the present Iranian leaders are more hardliners than the last government and President Biden is under heavy pressure and has not much room for compromises. On the other hand, I recently met a member of the Iranian negotiation team in Vienna and, to my surprise, he was rather optimistic.

    One of my wishes for 2022 is a reasonable and fair solution for the JCPOA negotiations and a détente between Iran and the Western world. But the chances for a positive outcome seem to be limited at the moment.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More