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      Are We Ready to Drop the Term “Islamist” in Reference to Terrorism?

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      On July 20, The Times released a report indicating that UK police held a forum to explore a request to change the terminology surrounding terror attacks now commonly defined as “Islamist.” The discussion, which included the head of Counter Terrorism Policing, Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, and some 70 individuals with personal or professional experiences with terrorism, came as a result of the National Association of Muslim Police’s (NAMP) initial request for the abandonment of terms such as “Islamist” and “jihadi” on the grounds that they adversely impact public perceptions of the Muslim community.

      Far-Right Terrorism Is Now Britain’s Fastest Growing Problem

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      Proposed alternatives to present terminology include “faith-claimed terrorism,” “adherents of Osama bin Laden’s ideology,” “terrorists abusing religious motivations” and “irhabi” — an Arabic term common in the Middle East to reference terrorists. The mere suggestion of a change has since sparked passionate debates online, which reveal a great deal about public perceptions of terrorism and how it is policed in the UK.

      Finding the Right Words

      As the initial report stated, according to the NAMP, the existing lexicon has contributed to Islamophobia, itself on the rise in recent years. Among the reported comments was one that noted how far-right terrorist Anders Breivik, whose 2011 attacks in Norway killed nearly 80 people, mostly children, and others have invoked Christian imagery relating to the Crusades, yet their attacks are not identified as “Christianist.” Presently, counterterrorism experts employ the terms “Islamist extremism,” “extreme right-wing” and “Northern Ireland-related” when discussing terrorist ideology.

      News reports included lines such as “The police emphasized to The Times that the reform was not certain to go ahead,” and Chief Superintendent Nik Adams also stated that “We have no plans to change the terminology we use at present but welcomed the debate and contributions.” Yet within hours of the article going to print, news outlets around the world have covered the story, opinion pieces have been printed, and thousands of comments have been posted online arguing about the implications of a name change. Notably, many of the reasons against any alterations evidence troubling narratives circulating in society.

      One of the most frequent points employed by critics of the proposal resides in the belief that “Islamist terrorism” and “jihadism” are the most fitting terms because they recognize the centrality of Islam to these group’s ideologies and motivations. A significant portion of comments agreed with the assessment that the current vocabulary may prove harmful to their Muslim neighbors and colleagues. Nevertheless, they claimed that, as terrorists justified their actions in relation to Islam, the description of their actions should be identified as such. Also, worryingly, in many instances, such arguments spiraled out to present Islam as an inherently or even uniquely violent religion. Some writers posted snippets of Islamic texts that appear to reference the use of terror or how to treat non-Muslims. Others responded to the news by arguing that Islam and democracy or its values are mutually exclusive.

      Emblematic of others, one advised that the UK should establish “an enquiry into why so many Muslims become radical; terrorists; grooming gangs etc. The scriptures/teachings must be challenged, not terminology watered down.” Meanwhile, comments such as “As far as I’m aware, the Jews don’t have a section that advocates genocide of unbelievers. Neither do Christians, or Sikhs or the Hindus. Neither do the atheists. This is a uniquely Islamic problem” and “What other religion does this? Genuinely…which?” can be found repeated across the internet.

      In particular, many commenters took issue with the National Association of Muslim Police’s observation about the double standard at play in failures to identify certain far-right terror attacks as linked to Christianity. Exemplifying arguments found repeatedly across various platforms, one widely-liked tweet argued that “We don’t talk about ‘Christianist’ terror because there’s no such Christian movement.” This narrative defies reality. As noted by some online, the Troubles in Northern Ireland had a clear sectarian Christian element, Catholic identity played a fundamental role in the Spanish Falangist movement, and the attacks on abortion clinics and providers by groups such as the Army of God were motivated by a particular view of Christianity. These are just the tip of the iceberg.

      Christian Identity

      The Christian identity movement has been in operation for upward of a century in the United Kingdom and around the world. Its vitriolic anti-Semitism and racism are rooted in an alternative interpretation of Biblical stories. In the United States, the iconic cross-burning of the Ku Klux Klan has served merely as a symbol of the organization’s long history of a particular racist Protestant theology, and the knights of the Ku Klux Klan’s party envisions the establishment of a “White Christian government.” Other groups known to have engaged or encouraged violence in relation to a hybrid Christian, racist ideology include White Aryan Resistance, Aryan Nations, The Order and the National Alliance.

      Bible passages were cited as justification by the suspected perpetrators of both the Tree of Life and Poway synagogue shootings. Meanwhile, Anders Breivik’s manifesto shows his ideology to have been anchored in his interpretation of Christian beliefs. He viewed himself as part of a crusade against the multiculturalism he viewed to be destroying Christian European culture. Brenton Tarrant, whose two attacks in Christchurch killed more than 50 people last year, likewise published a manifesto with references to his as a crusade and citing quotations from Pope Urban II, who is widely considered to have orchestrated the First Crusade. One of the most famous neo-Nazi authors, James Mason — who has been of significant influence to extremist organization Atomwaffen Division — wrote a book linking Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” to the Bible.

      The reality is that each of these groups uses or has used Christian symbols and religious writings to justify their violence and racist aspirations. They have also done so while claiming to be the true expression of Christianity. Literally hundreds of people have died, and many others been injured, at the hands of those claiming that they were acting in the name of Christian values.

      While debates may and can be had about the fact that certain terrorist organizations do identify with terms such as “jihad” or self-identify as “jihadis,” and that, thereby, counterterrorism’s use of the term is merely mirroring terms on the ground, it is important not to claim that Christianity has no links to extremism and terrorism. This leaves aside arguments about the lack of violence perpetrated in the name of other religions, of which there are also ample examples.

      PC Culture

      The other potential worrying element to the critical narratives surrounding the proposal are those about why such a discussion happened. Hundreds of users have cited it as evidence that the UK has fallen victim to politically correct, or PC, culture. Charles Moore’s Telegraph opinion piece, for instance, implies this, linking Basu’s participation in this terminology discussion with his previous comments about media’s role in radicalization or about Boris Johnson’s comments likening women in niqabs to letterboxes. “You might think Mr Basu would eschew political or media disputations,” Moore observes. “Not so,” he goes on, before concluding that the name should not change and that “AC Basu should forget this elderly argument and get back to proper work.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      Others take this to a greater extreme, viewing the news as a sign that the UK is now in the hands, or at the mercy, of dangerous ethnic and religious minorities, or that those in charge of counterterrorism policing are weak-willed, apathetic or even side with the terrorists. References to George Orwell’s “1984” abound.

      “The police are now part of the Islamist problem,” one user wrote. “They have been extensively ‘Common Purposed’ and are riddled with fifth columnists.” Another asked: “Who is representing the majority white population of the UK? The majority is the least needy; the country revolves around minorities.” Frequently, Basu and other senior law enforcement officers, as well as politicians, are urged to quit or are called out by name as being unfit for service based on accusations that this discussion signals their pandering to the Muslim population.

      At times, these accusations amount to declarations that a change to the terminology would make the UK less safe. Many claim that this discussion could be linked to the UK’s “grooming gangs.” As one user posited, this mentality was “the same sort of PC mindset that let child abuse rings thrive in this country.” While not often fleshed out, the apparent logic relies on the idea that a police force, unwilling to specifically name the nature of a terrorist’s ideology for fear of perceived discrimination, would also be less capable of policing and preventing crime.

      Debates about the use of terms such as “jihad,” “Islamic” and “Islamist” are not new. Since at least the inception of the war on terror, law enforcement officers, scholars, media and community advocates have clashed over the best terminology to employ when discussing terrorism. As only one more moment in this ongoing dialogue, UK law enforcement’s discussion this summer is not yet set to change anything, and even if law enforcement changed its classification, this would by no means ensure a change in media reporting or popular vernacular.

      Yet thousands of people took to the internet to express their opinions, and that fact must be viewed as significant. In particular, the rush to criticize the police for even entertaining such an idea, as well as the commonality in the rhetoric used to defend existing terms, is illuminating. They point to implicit (or potentially willful) blindness about who perpetrates terrorism in the name of religion, outright racism and Islamophobia, and genuine distrust of major government institutions. These reactions, in fact, implicitly reinforce the argument made by the National Association of Muslim Police that vocabulary does make a difference.

      *[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      London’s “Mega Mosque:” Islamophobia in the COVID-19 “New Normal”

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      During the lockdown, the US-based news service, Breitbart, ran a story about plans for a new “mega-mosque” in central London. Proposed for the historic Trocadero building near Piccadilly Circus in the heart of London’s entertainment and theater districts, Breitbart claimed that plans had been submitted to Westminster’s local authority to convert parts of the building into a mosque with a capacity to host around 1,000 worshippers.

      Having been widely shared on social media, the Breitbart story not only claimed that local residents were shocked by the size of the mega mosque, but so too was it alleged that some had voiced concerns about the increased risk of terrorism, that worshippers would try and enforce an alcohol ban in the surrounding area, and that there would be a conflict with those frequenting Soho, London’s gay quarter.

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      While some of those lodging complaints about the mosque will no doubt have had legitimate claims, the Breitbart article clearly acted as a catalyst for the radical right in Britain to jump on the opposition bandwagon. By using the term “mega-mosque,’ Breitbart reverted a tried and tested trope that has been successfully deployed in other parts of the country by various radical-right groups to derail plans for other new mosques. While this affords an opportunity to consider how the radical right have focused on size when it comes to opposing mosques, so too does it give us a timely insight into how the radical right’s campaigns of Islamophobia might change in the “new normal” of a post-COVID-19 world.

      The “Old Normal”

      Standing on the corner of Shaftesbury Avenue and Piccadilly Circus, the Trocadero was built in 1896. Home to a restaurant until 1965, the building remained largely redundant until the early 1980s, when it was renovated and relaunched as an indoor entertainment complex, housing the UK’s first IMAX cinema and various other attractions, including the gaming arcade Segaworld. With every new initiative, however, came failure, and the building eventually became derelict in 2006. A year beforehand, Criterion Capital had purchased it along with another nearby building. Since then, the Trocadero has undergone significant changes: Today, for example, it houses a 740-bedroom hotel with a rooftop bar.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The man behind Criterion Capital is Asif Aziz. He also established the Aziz Foundation, an education charity for British Muslims that has its headquarters near Piccadilly Circus. The foundation was behind the plans submitted to the local authority to request permission to convert the basement and part of the ground floor into a prayer space and community center. With the intention of serving Muslims who live and work in the area, the plans state that it was likely that the prayer space would only attract near-capacity attendance for Friday prayers; on all other days, the plans claimed that no more than 100 worshippers would be in attendance. When the public consultation closed, nearly 9,000 comments had been filed about the plans. While the majority were supportive, a flood of comments opposing the mosque appeared once the mega mosque story was “broken” by Breitbart.

      Among these were a number of tropes that the radical right have been deploying about Muslims and the religion of Islam for some time: from changing the “character” of the area to the mosque being a potential “Islamist hotspot,” from Islam not being welcome in a “secular” society to the mosque being evidence of the further “Islamification” of Britain. Of course, the size of the mosque was also routinely cited as a problem.

      Under the “old normal,” the radical right have been scaremongering about the size of mosques for almost two decades. As the simple yet effective narrative goes, the bigger the mosque the bigger the threat posed. This was used to good effect in Dudley, a town on the outskirts of Birmingham in the West Midlands. While much was made of the size of the prayer hall, it was the height of the proposed minaret adjoining the “super-mosque” that garnered the most opposition.

      Alleged to be taller than the steeple of the town’s oldest church, opponents claimed Muslims were doing so in order to claim the supremacy of Islam over Christianity. Prompting more than a decade of radical-right protests, including some of the largest by the anti-Islam street protest movement, English Defence League, the plans for the mosque were withdrawn in 2018.

      Three years prior, a similar outcome met plans to build a 9,000-capacity “mega mosque” in Stratford, East London. There, more than a quarter of a million people signed a petition opposing the mosque following radical-right groups campaigns alleging that those behind the mosque had links with the 7/7 suicide bombers.

      The “New Normal”

      In the “new normal,” while various radical-right groups have jumped on the anti-mosque bandwagon, it has been by former anti-Islam political party and vigilante group, Britain First, that has led the way, at the time of writing acquiring near 125,002 signatures on its online petition to block the plans. Most interesting, however, are the reasons Britain First cites for opposing the new mosque.

      Alongside all of the old-normal reasons for doing so, it is the new attribution to the size of the mosque that is most insightful. As it states: “Local people have strongly objected to the application on the basis that the area was already heavily overcrowded even before the coronavirus pandemic introduced the need for social distancing – and that adding another 1,000 people, congregating in and around the mega mosque during prayer times would cause serious [problems].” As such, the new mosque should be opposed because it will increase the risk of spreading COVID-19 and thereby poses a threat to the health of local residents.

      While much has been made about the new normal that will ensue in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, what the Trocadero mosque shows is that some elements of the old normal will not only survive but will continue to thrive. As was the case in the old normal, mosques are problematic, the size even more so. Irrespective of any pandemic, little would appear to have changed.

      What does seem to have changed in the new normal, however, is how size is problematized. While the simple yet effective narrative technique used to be “the bigger the mosque, the bigger the threat posed” could, in the wake of 9/11,  always be understood as being either cultural or violent. As regards the former, this typically focused on the “takeover” of Britain, its values, way of life and so on. For the latter, this typically focused on terrorism and radicalization. Post-COVID-19, if Britain First is anything to go by, a more insidious dimension to that threat might now emerge. As the petition infers, the threat now posed by the mosque is also a biological one.

      Irrespective of whether such claims are true, one can see how effective and immediate this kind of claim could be among local people who are already fearful of the effects and impact of an invisible virus. Reshaping the narrative to “the bigger the mosque, the bigger the biological threat posed” may have the potential to be an even more effective means of mobilizing and opposing in the new normal than it was before. If Britain First is successful, expect others within the radical right to rapidly follow this new narrative technique in anti-mosque campaigns and other forms of Islamophobic mobilization throughout the UK.

      *[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Albania’s Ancient Blood Feuds Trap Entire Generations

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      Basmir Gjeloshaj, a young man from the north of Albania, has been confined to his home for most of his life, as described by Vincenzo Mattei for Al Jazeera. Walking outside could be deadly, not because of the novel coronavirus, but because his father’s murder has pulled him into a gjakmarrja (pronounced Jyak-MARR-Ya) — an Albanian blood feud. In recent months, the COVID-19 pandemic has swiftly halted daily life around the world and forced millions into isolation in their homes. The same fate has befallen hundreds of Albanians trapped inside, some for years on end, as a result of the region’s tradition of revenge killing.  

      These blood feuds are part of an ancient Albanian code of justice that obliges murder to be repaid with murder. Many of those involved in the feuds, including children or teenagers born into feuding families, are only safe from retaliation killings inside their homes. To step outside is to risk your life.

      A Question of Honor

      “I’m well, I’m isolating at home,” Nikollë Shullani said by phone from Shkodër, 100 kilometers (62 miles) north of the capital Tirana. He was referring to the government orders to self-isolate amid the spread of COVID-19 that has even reached his remote city. “Ngujim në shtëpi,” he said, using the same word for coronavirus-related isolation that is used for those locked inside because of a gjakmarrja. Shullani heads an organization called Missionaries of Peace and Reconciliation of Bloodshed, whose aim is to mediate the conflicts between feuding families.

      The goal is pajtimi, or reconciliation, which is achieved through a negotiation process between families. Traditionally the elderly, who are highly respected in Albanian culture, play a central role in these negotiations. Often, negotiations only begin years after the start of the conflict. Shullani has been successful in resolving 12 feuds, but he says that there are still at least 400 currently ongoing in northern Albania.

      These numbers are difficult to verify. In 2016, the chairman of the Committee of Nationwide Reconciliation (CNR) estimated that some 12,000 people have died in Albania’s blood feuds since 1991. The authorities recorded just three revenge killings in 2018, and Operazione Colomba, a volunteer organization, counted six murders “with blood feud elements” in 2016, two in 2015, four in 2014 and seven in 2013, according to a UK government report. But according to the CNR, as many as 1,000 families have been affected by the problem in 2018, with some 300 families living in fear for their lives.

      Blood feuds can begin from theft, threats or even insults — any action that questions one’s honor, which is of extreme importance in rural Albanian society. When such a dispute escalates to murder, the family of the victim is expected to obtain justice by killing the murderer or another male in his family. Then, the burden falls on that family to seek vengeance. This cycle can continue for generations, pulling in descendants who had nothing to do with the original conflict.

      The feuds are rooted in a code of laws known as the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini, which dates as far back as 5th century B.C., according to some scholars. It is named for the 15th-century Albanian nobleman Lekë Dukagjini, who codified the rules of the Kanun, which consists of 12 books and 1,291 articles. These laws are still well known among the northern malisors, or mountain people, and cover all aspects of life, from family and marriage to personal property and justice. They also lay down strict social rules, including that women cannot be targeted in blood feuds and that those who owe blood may not be targeted while inside their homes.

      This is why the men of families involved in gjak (blood) are often confined to their homes at risk of being killed, relying on the women in the family to bring home food and supplies. Even young boys can be targeted according to the Kanun, and lose their chance at an education unless their school sends a teacher to instruct them at home. Some children who were born into feuding families have been trapped indoors for most of their lives. 

      Many are paying for crimes they did not commit. In his article, Mattei recounts the plight of Gjion Mhilli, who “will forever remember the date of September 19, 1992, as the day his brother shot and killed a neighbour in a dispute over land. On the few occasions that Gjion has ventured outside since, he has been threatened or chased, often having to hide in the store rooms of sympathetic shopkeepers.”

      After centuries of practice, the Kanun was outlawed during the second half of the 20th century by Enver Hoxha, Albania’s communist dictator who ruled with an iron fist. Under his authoritarian regime, the practice completely halted. However, it saw a resurgence in rural Albania after the country’s turbulent transition to democracy in the 1990s, which left behind a frail and corruption-ridden government. The Kanun is still applied in the northern and central parts of Albania, and research from the British Embassy in Tirana concluded that these blood feuds are “largely restricted to remote pockets in the mountain north of the country.”  

      The Other Path

      Judges in Albania can often be bribed to dramatically reduce prison sentences, even in cases of murder, and Shullani explains that this weakness in Albania’s justice system is why the Kanun has reemerged in recent times. “The first best thing is the rule of law,” he said. “But when the law fails, the Kanun is the other path.” 

      Shullani recalled one feud that left a particularly strong impression on him — the story of a widow in a village near Shkodër. Her husband’s murderer was released from prison after only two years, which added insult to the pain of her loss. Her four sons lived abroad in Italy, and preferred to forgive the blood rather than initiate a feud, but the widow refused to pardon the murderer. She could not live with the dishonor that this would bring on her relatives and ancestors.

      Those who do not avenge a murdered relative face intense stigma in the region. “In some areas, the tradition of ‘coffee under the knee’ still exists, [whereby] on feast or wedding days coffee is not served at the table but at the level of the feet for those who did not avenge their killed relative,” writes Mattei. 

      Shullani has visited this widow 16 times, even with the village’s kryeplaku, or wise man, and other local elders in an effort to make peace. Her sons have begged her to forgive the murder, saying, “Mother, we want to forgive the blood of our father because we want to live,” Shullani related. “That is not a problem for me,” she replied. “I have four sons; one should give his life in the name of his father.” This widow took it upon herself to seek vengeance, even though feuds are usually fought among men in Albania’s patriarchal society. Her husband’s murderer is still in hiding out of fear that she will kill him, Shullani says.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Despite the barbaric nature of this ancient system, Shullani points out that the strict rules and established process for peacemaking set the blood feuds apart from the random, merciless crime that happens elsewhere. However, some have observed that the rules of the Kanun have begun to erode in recent years. The BBC quotes Liljana Luani, a teacher of children “involved in blood,” as saying: “Nowadays neither the Kanun nor the laws of the state are being followed. It has happened that there have been women killed and children killed” — a violation of the ancient Kanun. “I think the state law enforcement authorities should do more and that they are not working properly.”

      The Albanian Penal Code carries a 30-year sentence for blood feud murders and recent years have seen renewed efforts by police to squash the problem. Still, a report by Cedoca, the Documentation and Research Department of the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons of Belgium, cited meeting with “two experts who expressed strong doubt that the police is capable of controlling, monitoring, preventing and prosecuting the contemporary blood feud phenomenon,” stating that suspects are often released again after an initial arrest.

      Nonetheless, the British Embassy report quoted a local representative of the national ombudsman as saying “the presence of the law has very much advanced nowadays. In the last 5-6 years the law and order were reestablished. Closed cases have been re-opened and potential blood feud cases are treated with particular attention, even in the remote areas. If something happens, the police will intervene nowadays.”

      Shullani and Luani have both dedicated their life’s work to the victims of these feuds. They both agree that the blood feuds will not end until Albania’s government revitalizes its justice system once and for all.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Armenia and Azerbaijan Clash Again

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      The on-again, off-again conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the border region of Nagorno-Karabakh became hot again on the weekend of July 11. Skirmishes are common in the contested region, which is known as Artsakh to the Armenian side, but this recent round of deadly attacks is the most serious escalation since the Four Day War in 2016 and is outside the typical point of contact. As usual, international calls for restraint and a diplomatic solution have been voiced, but internal politics between the two sides continue to amplify their serious disagreements. It seems as though the situation will continue to escalate, but the current circumstances are unlikely to spark a full-scale confrontation.

      As in the case of other post-Soviet frozen conflicts — as well as land disputes in the North Caucasus — the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh is intrinsically linked to the early history of the 20th century. Shifts of power resultant from the loss of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the collapse of the Russian Empire and the territorial delineations configured in the formative days of the Soviet Union and its subsequent break-up created borders that did not appease all sides of the local populations. Nagorno-Karabakh has an ethnic Armenian majority, but political maneuvering in the 1920s handed its jurisdiction, and thus international recognition, to Azerbaijan. Armenia continued to voice its discontent over this arrangement, but matters of borders and ethnicity remained contained while the territories were part of a wider empire with one central government.

      As the Soviet Union neared its end, the question of Nagorno-Karabakh reemerged as Karabakh Armenians sought the reconnection of the territory with Armenia proper. Subsequent political actions, including an unofficial referendum and a petition to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to sanction the territorial transfer, infuriated the Azeri public. In 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh War officially broke out just as inter-ethnic relations deteriorated, killing between 20,000 and 30,000 people. A further referendum in 1991, boycotted by Azerbaijan, quashed the prior plea to join Armenia in favor of the pursuit of independence for Nagorno-Karabakh. Fighting escalated to the point that both Armenia and Azerbaijan accused each other of ethnic cleansing. It was at this point that the international community turned its attention to the regional conflict in the South Caucasus.

      Contemporary Crisis

      In 1994, the Russian Federation mediated a ceasefire between Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (as of 2017, officially the Republic of Artsakh). For the most part, this agreement has kept hostilities contained, minus the ongoing instances of low-level clashes and explicit violations by both sides. For example, the Four Day War in April 2016 witnessed Azerbaijan regain “two strategic hills, a village, and a total of about 2,000 hectares.” Nonetheless, Armenia has not fulfilled concessions required by UN Security Council resolutions, such as the withdrawal of its troops, leaving Azerbaijan perpetually frustrated.

      There has been a continued push for engagement and peace talks by the international community, primarily the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, chaired by Russia, France and the United States, since 1992. Still, there are no official relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a result, and it has been difficult to breathe life into peace talks in a decades-long conflict.

      It is unclear what exactly sparked the current round of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but both sides blame the other for the escalation. The heightened tensions came only days after Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, declared that peace talks to resolve the conflict had essentially have stalled. One key difference between the current situation and those in the past is that the deadly encounter between forces did not occur directly in Nagorno-Karabakh, but rather in the northern Tavush section of the Armenian border.

      On July 12, the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan announced that Armenia launched an offensive that consequently killed two Azerbaijani servicemen and left five others wounded. In retaliation, Azeri forces launched a counterstrike, setting the scene for yet another protracted spat. Attacks have continued almost on a daily basis since the outbreak of the current impasse, and there have been numerous reports of shelling, tank movements and the use of combat unmanned aerial vehicles and grenade launchers.

      While actions on the ground may be dramatic, they remain at a low level. On the other hand, authorities in Armenia and Azerbaijan up the ante through heightened threats and verbal tit-for-tats. This is typical of ethnic spats that rely heavily on nationalist rhetoric to amplify cohesive public support for military actions, whether offensive or defensive. In a case of a highly provocative statement that should raise eyebrows, the head of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense press service stated that “The Armenian side should not forget that the latest missile systems, which are in service with our army, allow hitting the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant with high precision, which can lead to a huge catastrophe for Armenia.”

      A retort by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that such possible violations of international law are “an explicit demonstration of state terrorism and genocidal intent of Azerbaijan” as well as “leadership of Azerbaijan acts as a menace to all the peoples of the region, including its own people.”

      Too Late for Diplomacy?

      After 30 years of a tense and barely tolerated relationship, it seems unlikely that any political or diplomatic solution will result from this latest round of tensions. Indeed, a significant diplomatic effort has been expended to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and wider disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan to no avail. At this time, it is simply enough that the sides generally adhere to the 1994 ceasefire and engage with the Minsk Group. For instance, the OSCE institution released a press statement that the belligerents of the conflict must “resume substantive negotiations as soon as possible and emphasize the importance of returning OSCE monitors to the region as soon as circumstances allow.”

      International voices have all chimed in and called for restraint by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Besides being a co-chair for the Minsk Group, Russia is understandably concerned about the clashes in its neighborhood. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko reiterated sentiments similar to the OSCE, calling on “both parties to immediately ceasefire and start negotiations in order to prevent a recurrence of these incidents.” On the other hand, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called on Armenia to “pull its head together” and subsequently expressed that “Whatever solution Baku prefers for the occupied lands and Karabakh, we will stand by Azerbaijan.”

      The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Artsakh consequently slammed the Turkish position, condemned the destabilizing actions of Azerbaijan in the Tavush region, and echoed the need to return to the OSCE table. With numerous political actors and geopolitical interests at play, the fight over such a small but strategically important swathe of land becomes much more complex once compounded by the factors of ethnicity, history and national pride.

      Embed from Getty Images

      But it seems unlikely that the current situation will transition into another full-scale war. Rather, it is fair to assume that actions on the ground could escalate for the short term, but any protracted operation would be a serious regional blow to civilian populations and the energy sector. The Nagorno-Karabakh War of 1988-1994 displaced some 860,000 on both sides, and a similar outcome is possible today, with skirmishes occurring in populated areas.

      Secondly, the Armenia-Azerbaijan borderlands are important transit points for oil and gas pipelines. Entities and media that follow energy markets have already raised concerns over the current fighting and how it may influence the flow of hydrocarbons. The ongoing situation around Tavush province is certainly more serious because it is closer to the South Caucasian Pipeline (SCP) that runs from the Azeri capital Baku to Tbilisi, Georgia, and then Erzurum, in Turkey. Furthermore, the SCP is part of the wider Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) — a network set to deliver gas to Europe upon completion later this year. These factors will obviously be taken into consideration by Azerbaijan’s strategists as they move forward with their plans in the region. It would be short-sighted to destabilize this network when diplomatic options are at hand to at least keep the status quo for the sake of business.

      Additionally, the South Caucasus is a busy neighborhood, geopolitically speaking. In the case that the situation escalates and interests are at risk, one could expect greater involvement from Russia and Turkey. Although the Turkish Foreign Ministry gave a statement in strong support of Baku, it does not mean that Ankara would be willing to send forces. Moscow has little taste for engagement in a military operation either. Further, even the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — a military alliance composed of countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Armenia and Russia — promote a political solution rather than a military one. The international community and organizations openly promote a return to the Minsk Group’s negotiation table and, ideally, this will be the immediate result of the ongoing skirmishes.

      The clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan are likely to continue in the short term just as their non-existent diplomatic relations will endure without the political will for an inclusive political solution. Tavush province has taken the spotlight between the foes right now, but the recent occurrences are being widely viewed as the greater Nagorno-Karabakh conflict due to the proximity and the historical antagonism over the border. While it is unfortunate that cross-border shelling and conflict has attracted international interest to the South Caucasus yet again, it is not unexpected as matters never really settle to a level of peaceful monotony in the region.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      COVID-19 and Populism: A Bad Combination for Europe’s Banks

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      As Germany takes over the EU’s rotating presidency, Chancellor Angela Merkel noted that the bloc is facing a triple challenge: the coronavirus pandemic — in retreat but still requiring constant vigilance — the EU’s steepest-ever economic downturn and political demons waiting in the wings, including the specter of populism. With the pandemic somewhat under control, European policymakers’ focus is shifting toward the knock-on effects of months of lockdown.

      Economies in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe (CESEE) are in a particularly precarious situation, as a number of factors, from bad debt to populist legislation, are cramping the ability of the banking sector —which performs a vital role in stabilizing the economy through loans, payment holidays and other forms of financial support to local businesses in times of crisis  — to withstand a potential economic downturn.

      Bad Loans on the Rise

      A troubling report recently released by the Vienna Initiative (created during the 2008 financial crisis to support emerging Europe’s financial sector) has indicated that CESEE banks are facing a wave of bad loans, or non-performing loans (NPL), caused by the COVID-19 pandemic that could last past 2021. The issue of bad debt is by no means limited to CESEE countries, but the problem is exacerbated by populist political decisions in many nations in the region.

      European banking regulators had previously estimated that EU banks had built up adequate buffers to withstand a certain number of bad loans, with “strong capital and liquidity buffers” that should allow them to “withstand the potential credit risk losses.” But many banks in the CESEE region, operating in more volatile economies and with their reserves already whittled away by populist measures, are uniquely vulnerable if hit by too many NPLs.

      Embed from Getty Images

      At the heart of the problem is the fact that an excess of NPLs can drain banks’ capital reserves, making them reliant on support from governments and central banks. If the regulators and politicians don’t then put the necessary measures in place to support banks, the entire economy could be in danger of collapsing.

      Lenders in countries including Hungary, Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovakia and Bulgaria have sought reassurance from national authorities in recent months that they will receive the necessary protections should restrictive COVID-19 measures last much longer, particularly if the continent is hit by a second wave of the virus before a vaccine or an effective treatment is found. At present, it is unclear whether governments across Europe will be willing to continue with the same level of support packages to businesses and employees. 

      It’s not just a matter of renewing special coronavirus provisions. In return for providing additional financial support to businesses, lenders understandably expect reciprocal measures from governments and central banks. These include favorable tax measures, or the relaxation of excessive levies, so that banks are able to maintain their reserve levels, a lowering of countercyclical capital buffers and a guarantee of emergency financial support from central banks if necessary.

      Populist Measures Exacerbate Financial Strain

      In the wake of COVID-19, banking sector outlooks have already been revised to negative in several countries including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Croatia. These problems are in danger of being intensified by populist political decisions in many CESEE countries, where governments have a tendency to see punitive measures on banks as an easy way of shoring up popular support.

      In particular, many CESEE countries’ financial sectors are still suffering from 2015 decisions to convert loans taken out in Swiss francs into loans denominated in the euro or the local currency. The conversions came in response to a sudden surge in value of the Swiss franc, which had previously allowed lenders to offer low-interest loans. The forced conversions benefited borrowers but left the country’s banks to pick up the tab, making it difficult for them to build up capital buffers.

      While some countries which carried out the forced loan conversions, like Hungary, at least provided lenders with euros from the central bank to ease the blow, others, such as Croatia, left banks to shoulder the full loss. Croatia’s loans conversion, pushed through quickly ahead of the 2015 parliamentary elections, was applied retroactively, foisting a bill of roughly €1 billion on the country’s banks, many of which are subsidiaries of financial institutions from elsewhere in the EU. A pending court ruling on whether or not Croatian borrowers who had taken out Swiss franc loans could apply for further compensation could impose another €2.6 billion in losses on the banks at the worst possible time.

      Nor is the controversial loans conversion the only policy sapping CESEE banks’ capital reserves. As part of its coronavirus recovery plan, the Hungarian government announced a special tax on both banks and multinational retailers back in April. The additional banking tax was worth HUF 55 billion ($176 million). Prime Minister Viktor Orban had already announced the toughest COVID-19 measures of any central or eastern European country, including a suspension of all loan payments until the end of the year. The move ignored a call from Hungary’s OTP Bank for a reduction in taxes to help banks deal with the pandemic’s fallout.

      A number of other countries in the region, including the Czech Republic and Romania — though Romania later eliminated the levy — have raised banking taxes in recent years, making it harder for the financial sectors in these emerging economies to respond to the crisis and has left it in a more precarious position should the effects of COVID-19 continue into 2021.

      The CESEE region’s financial sector suffered greatly in the wake of the 2008-09 global financial crisis, and much work has been done in the intervening years to shield the sector from future downturns. The Vienna Initiative report, however, makes it clear that the region’s banks still face headwinds due to the COVID-19 crisis. Hopefully, policymakers across CESEE will take heed of the report’s findings and realize that trying to scapegoat banks in these uncertain times will only make them more vulnerable, leaving them ill-equipped to deal with the onslaught of loan defaults expected over the next 12 months.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Mount of Autocrats

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      Donald Trump would dearly like to add his face to Mount Rushmore as the fifth presidential musketeer. His fireworks-and-fury extravaganza on July 3 was the next best thing. Trump’s dystopian speech was almost beside the point. Much more important was the photo op of his smirking face next to Abraham Lincoln’s.

      More fitting, however, would be to carve Trump’s face into a different Rushmore altogether. This one would be located in a more appropriate badlands, like Mount Hermon in Syria near the border with Israel. There, Trump’s visage would join those of his fellow autocrats, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. To honor the illiberal locals, the stony countenances of Bashar al-Assad and Benjamin Netanyahu would make it a cozy quintet.

      Has Putin Won the Vote on Constitutional Amendments?

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      Let’s be frank: Thomas Jefferson and George Washington are not the company that Trump keeps, despite his “America First” pretensions. His ideological compatriots are to be found in other countries: Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Narendra Modi of India, Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, Viktor Orban of Hungary and so on. Alas, this global Rushmore of autocrats is becoming as crowded as a football team pressed together for a selfie.

      But Putin and Xi stand out from the rest. They get pride of place because of their long records of authoritarian policies and the sheer brazenness of their recent power grabs. By comparison, Trump is the arrogant newcomer who may well not last the season, an impulsive sprinter in the marathon of geopolitics. If things go badly for Team Trump in November, America will suddenly be busy air-brushing 45 out of history and gratefully chiseling his face out of the global Rushmore. Putin and Xi, however, are in it for the long haul.

      Leader for Life

      At the end of June, Russia held a referendum on a raft of constitutional changes that President Putin proposed earlier in the year. In front of Russian voters were over 200 proposed amendments. No wonder the authorities gave Russians a full week to vote. They should have provided mandatory seminars on constitutional law as well.

      Of course, the Russian government wasn’t looking to stimulate a wide-ranging discussion of governance. The Russian parliament had already approved the changes. Putin simply wanted Russian voters to rubber-stamp his nationalist-conservative remaking of his country.

      At the same time, a poor turnout would not have been a good look. To guarantee what the Kremlin’s spokesman described as a “triumphant referendum on confidence” in Putin, workplaces pressured their employees to vote and the government distributed lottery prizes. Some people managed to vote more than once. On top of that, widespread fraud was necessary to achieve the preordained positive outcome.

      Instead of voting on each of the amendments, Russians had to approve or disapprove the whole package. Among the constitutional changes were declarations that marriage is only between a man and a woman, that Russians believe in God and that the Russian Constitution takes precedence over international law. Several measures increased executive power over the ministries and the judiciary. A few sops were thrown to Putin’s core constituencies, like pensioners. Who was going to vote against God or retirees?

      But the jewel in the crown was the amendment that allows Putin to run for the presidency two more times. Given his systematic suppression of the opposition, up to and including assassination, Putin will likely be in office until he’s 84 years old. That gives him plenty of time to, depending on your perspective, make Russia great again or make Russia into Putin, Inc.

      The Russian president does not dream of world domination. He has regional ambitions at best. Yet these ambitions have brought Russia into conflict with the United States over Ukraine, Syria, even outer space. And then there’s the perennial friction over Afghanistan. Much has been made in the US press about Putin offering the Taliban bounties for US and coalition soldiers. It’s ugly stuff, but no uglier than what the United States was doing back in the 1980s.

      Did you think that all the US money going to the mujahideen was to cultivate opium poppies, run madrasas and plan someday to bite the hand that fed them? The US government was giving the Afghan “freedom fighters” guns and funds to kill Soviet soldiers, nearly 15,000 of whom died over the course of the war. The Russians have been far less effective. At most, the Taliban have killed 18 US soldiers since the beginning of 2019, with perhaps a couple tied to the bounty program.

      Still, it is expected that a US president would protest such a direct targeting of US soldiers even if he has no intention to retaliate. Instead, Trump has claimed that Putin’s bounty program is a hoax. “The Russia Bounty story is just another made up by Fake News tale that is told only to damage me and the Republican Party,” Trump tweeted.

      Knowing how sensitive the US president and the public are to the death of America soldiers overseas, Putin couldn’t resist raising the stakes in Afghanistan and making US withdrawal that much more certain. Taking the United States out of the equation — reducing the transatlantic alliance, edging US troops out of the Middle East, applauding Washington’s exit from various international organizations — provides Russia with greater maneuvering room to consolidate power in the Eurasian space.

      Trump has dismissed pretty much every unsavory Kremlin act as a hoax, from US election interference to assassinations of critics overseas. Trump cares little about Ukraine, has been lukewarm if not hostile toward US sanctions against Moscow, and has consistently attempted to bring Russia back into the G8. Yet he has also undermined the most important mechanism of engagement with Russia, namely arms control treaties.

      President Trump’s servile approach to Putin and disengaged approach to Russia is the exact opposite of the kind of principled engagement policy that Washington should be constructing. The United States should be identifying common interests with Russia over nuclear weapons, climate, regional ceasefires, reviving the Iran nuclear deal — and, at the same time, criticizing Russian conduct that violates international norms.

      Territory Grab

      China’s Xi Jinping has already made himself leader for life, and he didn’t need to go to the pretense of a referendum on constitutional changes. In 2018, the National People’s Congress simply removed the two-term limit on the presidency and boom: Xi can be on top ‘til he drops. Forget about collective leadership within the party. And certainly forget about some kind of evolution toward democracy. Under President Xi, China has returned to the one-man rule of the Mao period.

      So, while Putin was busy securing his future this past weekend, Xi focused instead on securing China’s future as an integrated, politically homogeneous entity. In other words, Xi moved on Hong Kong.

      Hong Kong once had great economic value for Beijing as a gateway to the global economy. Now that China has all the access to the global economy that it needs and then some, Hong Kong has only symbolic value, as a former colonial territory returned to the Chinese nation in 1997. To the extent that Hong Kong remains an enclave of free-thinkers who take potshots at the Communist Party, Beijing will step by step deprive it of democracy.

      On June 30, a new national security law went into effect in Hong Kong. “The new law names four offences: secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces,” Matt Ho writes in the South China Morning Post. “It also laid out new law enforcement powers and established government agencies responsible for national security. Conviction under the law includes sentences of life in prison.”

      The protests that have roiled Hong Kong for the past many months, from Beijing’s point of view, violate the national security law in all four categories. So, violators may now face very long prison sentences indeed, and police have already arrested a number of people accused of violating the new law. The new law extends to virtually all aspects of society, including the schools, which now must “harmonize” their teaching with the party line in Beijing.

      What’s happening in Hong Kong, however, is still a dilute version of the crackdown taking place on the mainland. This week, the authorities in Beijing arrested Xu Zhangrun, a law professor and prominent critic of Xi. He joins other detainees, like real-estate mogul Ren Zhiqiang, who was linked to an article calling Xi a “clown with no clothes on who was still determined to play emperor” and Xu Zhiyong, who called on Xi to resign for his handling of the coronavirus crisis.

      Meanwhile, Beijing’s treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang province amounts to collective punishment: more than a million consigned to “reeducation camps,” children separated from their families, forced sterilization. Uighur exiles have charged China with genocide and war crimes before the International Criminal Court.

      Like Putin, Xi has aligned himself with a conservative nationalism that appeals to a large portion of the population. Unlike Putin, the Chinese leader doesn’t have to worry about approval ratings or periodic elections. He is also sitting on a far-larger economy, much greater foreign currency reserves, and the means to construct an illiberal internationalism to replace the Washington consensus that has prevailed for several decades. Moreover, there are no political alternatives on the horizon in China that could challenge Xi or his particular fusion of capitalism and nationalism.

      Trump has pursued the same kind of unprincipled engagement with China as he has with Russia: flattery of the king, indifference toward human rights and a focus on profit. Again, principled engagement requires working with China on points of common concern while pushing back against its human rights violations. Of course, that’s not going to happen under the human rights violation that currently occupies the White House.

      And Trump Makes Three

      Trump aspires to become a leader for life like his buddies Putin and Xi, as he has “joked” on numerous occasions. He has similarly attacked the mainstays of a democratic society — the free press, independent judges, inspectors general. He has embraced the same nationalist-conservative cultural policies. And he has branded his opponents as enemies of the people. In his Rushmore speech on July 3, Trump lashed out against:

      “… a new far-left fascism that demands absolute allegiance. If you do not speak its language, perform its rituals, recite its mantras, and follow its commandments, then you will be censored, banished, blacklisted, persecuted, and punished. It’s not going to happen to us. Make no mistake: this left-wing cultural revolution is designed to overthrow the American Revolution. In so doing, they would destroy the very civilization that rescued billions from poverty, disease, violence, and hunger, and that lifted humanity to new heights of achievement, discovery, and progress.”

      He went on to describe his crackdown on protesters, his opposition to “liberal Democrats,” his efforts to root out opposition in schools, newsrooms and “even our corporate boardrooms.” Like Putin, he sang the praises of the American family and religious values. He described an American people that stood with him and the Rushmore Four and against all those who have exercised their constitutional rights of speech and assembly. You’d never know from the president’s diatribe that protesters were trying to overthrow not the American Revolution but the remnants of the Confederacy.

      Trump’s supporters have taken to heart the president’s attacks on America’s “enemies.” Since the protests around George Floyd’s killing began in May, there have been at least 50 cases of cars ramming into demonstrators, a favorite tactic used by white supremacists. There have been over 400 reports of press freedom violations. T. Greg Doucette, a “never Trump” conservative lawyer, has collected over 700 videos of police misconduct, usually violent, toward peaceful demonstrators.

      As I’ve written, there is no left-wing “cultural revolution” sweeping the United States. It is Donald Trump who is hoping to unleash a cultural revolution carried out by a mob of violent backlashers who revere the Confederate flag, white supremacy and the Mussolini-like president who looks out upon all the American carnage from his perch on the global Rushmore of autocrats.

      *[This article was originally published by FPIF.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Has Putin Won the Vote on Constitutional Amendments?

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      On July 3, the Russian central election commission announced the results of the nationwide vote on constitutional reforms, the biggest shake-up of the constitution since it was adopted in 1993. According to official data, 77.92% of voters, or 57.7 million people, cast their ballots in favor of the reforms, with a 67.97% turnout. The vote […] More

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      The Circle of History in Radical-Right Symbolism

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      Bearing in mind that gaining access to political power remains the focus of all political parties, they not only attempt to acquire political power within government but, more importantly, actively work toward its acquisition and maintenance. In this effort, political parties try to establish a distinct identity in their effort to attract the support of […] More