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    The Italian Job: Can Mario Draghi Master It?

    A political crisis was the last thing Italy needed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet a personal conflict between the leader of Italia Viva, Matteo Renzi, and the previous prime minister, Giuseppe Conte, led to the collapse of the coalition in mid-January. President Sergio Mattarella then commissioned 73-year-old Mario Draghi, the former head of the European Central Bank (ECB), to form a technocratic government, which he will preside over as prime minister.

    According to Mattarella, it would have been risky to organize early elections during the pandemic. Indeed, new elections would have delayed the fight against the pandemic. In addition, the prospect of a right-wing populist government would also probably have had a negative impact on the financial markets — a risk that had to be avoided in an already challenging situation.

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    Draghi is inheriting a difficult situation. In Italy, the health, economic and social crises triggered by the pandemic have exacerbated the country’s enormous structural problems. Italy’s “seven deadly sins” — as Italian economist Carlo Cottarelli called them — are tax evasion, corruption, excessive bureaucracy, an inefficient judicial system, demographic problems, the north-south divide and difficulty in functioning within the eurozone. As a result of the pandemic, gross domestic product (GDP) fell by almost 9% in 2020, public debt rose to around 160% of GDP and more than 400,000 jobs were lost. The inability of the traditional parties to find solutions for the economic problems keeps support for the right-wing populist coalition (Lega, Fratelli d’Italia, Forza Italia) at almost 50%.

    Even though almost all major political forces have declared their intent to cooperate with the Draghi government, the framework of a technocratic government offers the right-wing populists a target. It is quite conceivable that they will accuse Draghi of lacking democratic legitimacy. It will also be a challenge for the new head of government to govern without his own parliamentary majority.

    Managing the Health Crisis Without Austerity

    The top priority of the new leadership will be to manage the health crisis. This includes speeding up vaccinations and supporting schools and the labor market. This means applying for — and successfully using — funds from the financial assistance plan of the European Union to mitigate the economic and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The expected €200 billion ($243 billion) or so from this fund could benefit the economic recovery as well as the planned structural reforms in public administration, taxation and the judiciary, which will give the new government more room for maneuver in economic policy.

    Unlike the last technocratic government under Mario Monti between 2011 and 2013, the fact that Draghi will not have to enact politically-costly fiscal consolidation with possible negative effects on GDP growth can also be seen as an opportunity. This is mainly due to broad market confidence in Draghi and the fact that his government is operating from the outset under the protective umbrella of the ECB, which will not allow the cost for servicing public debt to rise excessively. The eurozone’s fiscal rules have also been temporarily suspended; this makes it possible to support the economy through fiscal policy measures.

    Finally, it should not be forgotten that, despite the structural problems, the Italian economy has many strengths: Italy is one of the most industrialized countries in Europe and the second-largest exporter after Germany. If some obstacles to growth are removed and, for example, credit is released by the Italian banking sector, the pace of recovery could pick up significantly. Draghi’s experience from the finance ministry and in central banking could help him set a decisive course.

    Who Will Succeed Mario Draghi?

    Nevertheless, given the major challenges facing Draghi’s technocratic government, one should be cautious about expectations. The next general election is less than two and a half years away, and it cannot be ruled out that it will be brought forward. That is very little time to address structural problems that have existed for decades.

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    To avert a victory for the right-wing populists, the new head of government will do everything he can to prevent early parliamentary elections until the current moderate majority in parliament has elected President Mattarella’s successor. The latter’s term ends in February 2022, and it cannot be ruled out that Draghi himself will succeed Mattarella. He could use his authority and power as president to stabilize politics, as is the traditional role of the Italian president.

    In 2012, Draghi saved the eurozone as head of Europe’s most important financial institution. In the current crisis, even if supported by figures from across a broad political spectrum, he will act as head of one of Europe’s most politically-fragile governments — an incomparably less favorable starting position.

    Draghi will make the best possible use of his time as head of government. That much is certain. However, given the massive level of support for the populists, the most important question is: After Draghi, will someone take the helm who will continue his reforms or reverse them? Not only Italy’s future but also that of the entire eurozone depends on it.

    *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The Brexit Deal Presents Opportunities for a New Partnership

    It was agreed almost at the last minute: The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union and the United Kingdom, signed on December 30, 2020, prevented a no-deal Brexit just one day before the end of the transition period. Four and a half years after the referendum, relations between the EU and its former member state have thus been put on a new footing. It is a considerable achievement of the negotiators on both sides that such a complex agreement was reached despite the adverse conditions.

    Yet the end result, due to the British quest for sovereignty, is a (very) hard Brexit. Although the movement of goods will continue with zero tariffs and zero quantitative restrictions, many new non-tariff trade barriers will arise when compared to single market membership. Services, including finance, are largely excluded from the treaty, and with very few exceptions, the British are leaving European projects such as Erasmus. London has also excluded foreign and security policy altogether from the institutional cooperation with the EU.

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    Despite the restricted market access, the EU can claim to have achieved the inclusion of comprehensive instruments to ensure fair competition, a level playing field. This includes the possibility of reintroducing tariffs and other trade restrictions should there be a significant divergence in labor or environmental standards in the future. Both sides have achieved their remarkably defensive goals: Boris Johnson gets his hard Brexit, and the EU was able to defend its single market and its standards.

    To Be Built Upon

    The original idea of an “ambitious and deep partnership” between the EU and the UK, however, has fallen by the wayside. In the first few weeks of 2021, the EU and the UK have already squabbled over vaccines and the status of the EU ambassador in London. Nevertheless, if used wisely, the agreement could represent the low point in British-European relations, from which a new partnership emerges after the difficult Brexit negotiations. However, there are five reasons the TCA could enable an improvement in relations.

    First, the trade deal does not mark the end of negotiations between London and Brussels. The agreement itself provides for a review after five years — that is, just under six months after the likely date of the next UK general election — in the course of which relations can also be deepened again. There is also a review clause for the Northern Ireland Protocol in 2024, transition periods for energy cooperation and fisheries, and further talks on data exchange and financial market services in 2021. Similar to Switzerland, there will be almost constant negotiations between the EU and the UK, albeit at a less politically dramatic level than recently. It is precisely this de-dramatization of relations that offers an opportunity to restore trust and improve cooperation.

    Second, the agreement is designed to be built upon. It establishes institutionalized cooperation between London and Brussels with an EU-UK Partnership Council and a number of specialized committees, for example on trade in goods, energy cooperation and British participation in EU programs. It is explicitly designed as an umbrella agreement into whose overall institutional framework further supplementary agreements can be inserted.

    Continued Interdependence

    Third, economic relations will remain important for both sides despite new trade restrictions. The geographical proximity, the close integration of supply and production chains in many economic sectors, and the mutual importance in trade will ensure continued economic interdependence. The EU remains by far the largest export market for the UK, which, in turn, as the second biggest economy in Europe, will also continue to be a major economic partner (and competitor) for the union. Added to this are the level playing field provisions of the TCA, with both partners committing to maintaining existing EU standards as far as they affect trade and investments, and incentives have been created to keep pace with new standards.

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    Fourth, the willingness of both sides to make compromises to avoid a no-deal Brexit paradoxically also clearly revealed the common interests despite the difficult divorce. For example, the TCA declares climate policy to be a shared interest, in which the UK will play a central role in 2021 by hosting the next climate summit together with Italy. Opportunities will also present themselves here for trilateral cooperation with the new US administration. The continued participation of the British in a small number of EU programs, such as the EU’s Copernicus Earth observation program and parts of the data exchange in home affairs and justice policy, is also stronger than expected.

    Fifth, with the combination of the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA, Northern Ireland has become a shared responsibility of the UK and the EU. In order to keep the border open with the EU member state of the Republic of Ireland, the rules of the EU single market will continue to apply in Northern Ireland, whereas a trade border has been created in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Any deviation from EU standards will now require the UK government to weigh not only whether this breaks the level playing field rules — thus allowing the EU to erect trade barriers — but also whether new intra-UK trade barriers with Northern Ireland are created.

    The EU equally has a responsibility in the interests of its member state Ireland to work with the British government to ensure that these complex arrangements work as smoothly as possible so as not to jeopardize peace in Northern Ireland.

    The trade treaty, which came into being under great pressure, both temporal and political, thus achieves one thing above all — the creation of a foundation on which British-European relationship can be reconstructed. Hard Brexit is now a fact, and the step from EU membership to a third country with a trade agreement has been completed. But negotiations are from over: As neighbors, the EU and the UK will continue to negotiate and renegotiate their relationship in the foreseeable future. It is now up to the political leadership on both sides to determine how this foundation is used. The EU and Germany should be open to building on this foundation with options for deepening cooperation in areas where there were gaps left behind by the TCA due to time or political circumstances.

    *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Brexit Trade Deal Brings Temporary, If Not Lasting, Relief

    “What we call the beginning is often the end / And to make an end is to make a beginning.” So said Ursula van der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, announcing the completion of Brexit negotiations on Christmas Eve, quoting from T.S. Eliot’s “Little Gidding,” the final quartet of his last great poem. Van der Leyen’s words perfectly capture the defining trait of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA): It is a platform for further ambition in cross-border partnership between the UK and EU rather than a ceiling on current ambitions.

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    Relief was the predominant emotion amongst the business community on both sides of the Channel before the New Year. Now that the dust has settled and attention has turned to the detail of the deal reached, there should be no illusions that the TCA ends EU-UK negotiations. We set out below what, in high-level terms, the TCA means for EU-UK trade in goods and services, and where there are gaps to fill and questions to still be answered over the coming months and years.

    What Does the TCA Mean for Trade in Goods?

    Firstly, the good news. Under the TCA, there are no tariffs or quotas on cross-border trade in qualifying goods between the United Kingdom and the European Union. In this regard, the TCA goes further than any EU trade agreement negotiated with a third country. This is a hugely positive outcome for businesses with UK and EU supply chains, particularly in sectors such as the automotive and agri-food industries, where tariffs imposed on so-called World Trade Organization terms under a no-deal Brexit would have been high.  

    However, it is crucial for those involved in cross-border trade to appreciate that only goods that are of EU or UK origin benefit from zero tariffs and zero quotas under the TCA. Rules of origin are a key component of every trade agreement and determine the “economic nationality” of products. Under the TCA, a product will attract a tariff if a certain percentage (beyond a “tolerance level”) of its pre-finished value or components are not of either UK or EU origin. The tolerance levels vary from product to product and require careful analysis. Therefore, businesses will need to understand the originating status of all the goods they trade between the UK and the EU to ensure they benefit from the zero tariffs and quotas under the agreement. Businesses will also need to ensure that their supply chains understand the new self-certification procedures to prove the origin of goods.

    Embed from Getty Images

    Beyond the qualified good news on tariffs and quotas, the deal is less helpful in that full regulatory approvals are required for goods being imported into the EU from the UK and vice versa. While in certain important sectors (automotive, chemicals and pharmaceuticals) the UK and the EU agreed on specific rules to reduce technical barriers to trade, the UK government did not achieve its longstanding negotiating objective of securing broad mutual recognition on product standards.

    Therefore, from January 1, 2021, all products exported from the EU to the UK will have to comply with the UK’s technical regulations and will be subject to any applicable regulatory compliance checks and controls. Similarly, all products imported from the UK to the EU will need to comply with EU technical regulations and will be subject to all applicable regulatory compliance obligations, checks and controls.

    There will also be specific changes to food and plant safety standards under the TCA. UK agri-food exporters will have to meet all EU sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) import requirements with immediate effect. In this sector, UK exports will be subject to official controls carried out by member state authorities at border control posts. Similarly, EU agri-food exporters will have to meet all UK SPS import requirements, following certain phase-in periods the UK government has provided.

    Far from being a “bonfire of red tape” promised by certain advocates of Brexit before the 2016 referendum, the TCA introduces a “bonanza of new red tape” for businesses who wish to sell their products in both UK and EU markets. On January 8, UK Cabinet Office minister, Michael Gove, acknowledged that there would be “significant additional disruption” at UK borders over the coming weeks as a result of customs changes and regulatory checks.

    What Does the TCA Mean for Trade in Services?

    As has been widely noted by commentators, the deal on services is far thinner than on goods. More than 40% of the UK’s exports to the EU are services, and the sector accounts for around 80% of the UK’s economic activity. As an inevitable consequence of leaving the EU single market, UK service suppliers will lose their automatic right to offer services across the union. UK business will have to comply with a patchwork of complex host-country rules which vary from country to country and may need to establish themselves in the EU to continue operating. Many have already done so.

    The level of market access will also depend on the way the service is supplied. There are four “modes” for this. Services can be supplied on a cross-border basis from the home country of the supplier, for example over the internet; to the consumer in the country of the supplier, such as a tourist traveling abroad and purchasing services; via a locally-established enterprise owned by the foreign service supplier; or through the temporary presence in the territory of another country by a service supplier who is a natural person.

    All of this means that UK-established businesses will need to look at domestic regulations on service access in each EU member state in which they seek to operate, and vice versa for EU-established businesses seeking market access in the UK.

    A Basis for Ongoing Negotiations

    The TCA does not mark the end of EU-UK negotiations, and in some areas these discussions start immediately. For example, the agreement has provided an end to so-called passporting of financial services under which banks, insurers and other financial service firms authorized in the UK had automatic right to access EU markets and vice versa.

    The EU and the UK have committed to agree on a memorandum of understanding that will establish a framework of regulatory cooperation in financial services by March this year. With an end to passporting, it is likely that there will be more friction in cross-border financial services, but the extent of that friction depends on the outcome of future negotiations between EU and UK governments and regulators.

    To take another example of importance to the UK economy, the TCA does not provide for the automatic mutual recognition of professional qualifications. As of January 1, UK nationals, irrespective of where they acquired their qualifications, and EU citizens with qualifications acquired in the UK, will need to have their qualifications recognized in the relevant EU member state on the basis of that state’s domestic rules. However, the TCA leaves the door open for the EU and the UK to agree on additional arrangements in the future for the mutual recognition of qualifications, something that professional bodies will be pushing for immediately.

    Whilst there has been understandable relief from politicians, businesses and populations on both sides of the Channel suffering from Brexit fatigue that a deal — any deal — has been reached, the sheer extent to which the TCA envisages ongoing negotiations between the UK and the EU on issues both large and small over the months and years ahead has not been widely appreciated.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The Abraham Accords: A Chance to Rethink the Arab-Israeli Conflict

    German facilitation of the first meeting between the Israeli and Emirati foreign ministers on October 6 is a welcome change in the European attitude toward the Abraham Accords, which are viewed very differently in Europe than in the Middle East. In the region, supporters and antagonists alike view the accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates as a meaningful development that revises the rules of engagement for Arabs and Israelis.

    However, in Europe, the agreement is often downplayed as being yet another PR stunt designed for the mutual electoral interests of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump. Others dismiss this step as symbolic — a mere formalization of the relations that have existed below the surface between the parties for years now.  

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    Improving Netanyahu’s declining approval ratings and boosting Trump’s image as a statesman before the US election on November 3 are among the main motivations behind this initiative. Nevertheless, they do not reduce the potential impact of the accords as a challenge to the status quo.

    The Abraham Accords set in motion new regional dynamics at a time of new regional needs. The lesson learned from previous rounds of conflict and peace in the Middle East — from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 — is that when the timing is right, symbolic steps can become the catalyst for major political developments.

    The accords break a long-standing taboo in the Arab world. The prevailing formula — as outlined by the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 — was that normalization would be granted to Israel in return for making meaningful political compromises vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

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    The accords have shattered this formula, as they replace the equation of “peace for land” with the Netanyahu-coined “peace for peace” approach, in which normalization is given almost unconditionally. Moreover, the accords reframe the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the framework of Arab-Israeli relations.

    The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been downgraded to yet another topic alongside other standing issues. The need to counter Iran’s regional ambitions or utilize economic opportunities have all become alternative frames of reference to Israeli-Arab relations. Prevention of annexation notwithstanding, Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian Territories have hardly served as main motives for the UAE and Bahrain to normalize relations with Israel. This process of disassociating Arab-Israeli relations from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may create a domino effect, in which other Arab nations that are not involved in direct confrontation with Israel will follow suit.

    Shifting Regional Priorities

    The potential of the Abraham Accords to change regional realities relies on its extraordinary timing. As the COVID-19 crisis takes its toll, national priorities — from Khartoum to Kuwait City — are partially shifting from traditional political considerations to urgent economic needs. The decline in oil prices and the expected decline in growth of more than 7% in Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2020 have turned general goals such as diversifying the Gulf economies and utilizing new global business opportunities into immediate necessities.

    In this nexus, normalization with Israel provides an undeniable opportunity. Israel’s status as a leading hi-tech hub presents a viable platform for joint cooperation in multiple fields, from agriculture to health. For other regional actors, such as Sudan, US endorsement of the normalization process offers the opportunity to mend relations in the hope of lifting sanctions and receiving financial aid.

    From an international perspective, the potential of the accords to influence the Israeli–Palestinian political stalemate remains a key question. On the one hand, the accords serve as yet another disincentive for Israel to reengage with the Palestinian issue. They demonstrate that Israel’s acceptance in the region does not necessitate paying the price of tough compromises on the Palestinian front.

    The Israeli public’s sense of urgency for dealing with topics such as the Israeli occupation or Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian Territories will decrease even further, as the accords enhance the comfortable illusion that the events shaping Israel’s future in the Middle East are taking place in Abu Dhabi and Muscat instead of in Gaza and Kalandia.

    Nevertheless, the accords reintroduced the terms “peace” and “normalization” into Israeli public discourse after a decade of absence. The violence affiliated with the Arab Spring in 2011 enhanced the Israelis’ self-perception of their country as a “villa in the jungle.” These events had turned their perception of normalization with the Arab world from a token concern into an outdated distraction. Now, and for the first time in decades, public polls indicate a change in the Israeli public mindset regarding normalization, both on the political and economic levels, reinstating it as a matter of value.

    Reengage With the Palestinian Issue

    The Abraham Accords invite European leaders to rethink their policy approach regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the last two decades, the European Union’s approach has been to compartmentalize the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians from the regional context and focus on bilateral relations. The accords offer new opportunities to leverage the broader regional context as a basis to reengage with the core Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    Europe’s involvement in enhancing Israel’s regional normalization is not a withdrawal from the two-state solution. On the contrary, it should become a factor in reconnecting the normalization process with efforts to influence Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian Territories and Gaza. The converging interests between the moderate regional forces and Europe have already been demonstrated in the campaign against annexation.

    At present, leveraging the accords to constructively influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict sounds highly unlikely, as the actors involved either aim to cement the separation between the topics (Netanyahu) or under-prioritize the need to engage with it (Trump). Nevertheless, possible changes to the political leadership in the near future in Israel, the United States and the Palestinian Authority — combined with growing Arab public pressure on the normalizing countries to address the Palestinian issue — might present an opportunity to harness regional influence to impact Israeli policies.

    Instead of observing from afar, Europe should be at the forefront of the effort to promote this regional dynamic as a conciliatory vector. After all, who can speak better for regionalism as a basis for peace than the EU?

    *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Negotiating the End of Brexit

    It is increasingly likely that, unless things change, on January 1, 2021, we will have a no-deal Brexit. That would mean the only deal between the European Union and the United Kingdom would be the already ratified EU withdrawal agreement of 2019.

    There are only around 50 working days left in which to make a broader agreement for a post-Brexit trade deal between the UK and the EU. The consequences of failing to do so for Ireland will be as profound — and perhaps even as long-lasting — as those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

    A failure to reach a UK-EU agreement would mean a deep rift between the UK and Ireland. It would also mean heightened tensions within Northern Ireland, disruptions to century-old business relations and a succession of high-profile court cases between the EU and the UK dragging on for years.

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    Issues on which a deal could have easily been reached in amicable give-and-take negotiations will be used as hostages or leverage on other matters. The economic and political damage would be incalculable. And we must do everything we can to avoid this.

    Changing the EU trade commissioner, Phil Hogan, under such circumstances would be dangerous. Trying to change horses in midstream is always difficult. But attempting to do so at the height of a flood — in high winds — would be even more so.

    The EU would lose an exceptionally competent trade commissioner when he was never more needed. An Irishman would no longer hold the trade portfolio. The independence of the European Commission, a vital ingredient in the EU’s success, would have been compromised — a huge loss for all smaller EU states.

    According to the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, talks between the European Union and the UK, which ended last week, seemed at times to be going “backwards rather than forwards.” The impasse has been reached for three reasons.

    The Meaning of Sovereignty

    First, the two sides have set themselves incompatible objectives. The European Union wants a wide-ranging “economic partnership” between the UK and the EU, with a “level playing field” for “open and fair” competition. The UK agreed to this objective in the joint political declaration made with the EU at the time of the withdrawal agreement, which was reached in October 2019.

    Since then, the UK has held a general election with the ruling Conservative Party winning an overall majority in Parliament, and it has changed its mind. It is now insisting, in the uncompromising words of it chief negotiator, David Frost, on “sovereign control of our own laws, borders, and waters.”

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    This formula fails to take account of the fact that any agreement the UK might make with the EU (or with anyone else) on standards for goods, services or food items necessarily involves a diminution of sovereign control. Even being in the World Trade Organization (WTO) involves accepting its rulings, which are a diminution of “sovereign control.” This is why US President Donald Trump does not like the WTO and is trying to undermine it.

    The 2019 withdrawal agreement from the EU also involves a diminution of sovereign control by Westminster over the laws that will apply in Northern Ireland and thus within the UK. That agreement obliges the UK to apply EU laws on tariffs and standards to goods entering Northern Ireland from Britain — i.e., going from one part of the UK to another.

    This obligation is one of the reasons given by a group of UK parliamentarians — including Iain Duncan Smith, David Trimble, Bill Cash, Owen Paterson and Sammy Wilson — for wanting the UK to pull out from the withdrawal agreement, even though most of them voted for it last year.

    Sovereignty is a metaphysical concept, not a practical policy. Attempting to apply it literally would make structured and predictable international cooperation between states impossible. That is not understood by many in the Conservative Party.

    The Method of Negotiation

    Second, the negotiating method has proved challenging. The legal and political timetables do not gel. The UK wants to discuss the legal texts of a possible free trade agreement first and leave the controversial issues — like competition and fisheries — until the endgame in October. But the EU wants serious engagement to start on these sticking points straight away.

    Any resolution of these matters will require complex legal drafting, which cannot be left to the last minute. After all, these texts will have to be approved by the European and British Parliaments before the end of 2020. There can be no ambiguities or late-night sloppy drafting.

    The problem is that the UK negotiator cannot yet get instructions on the compromises he can make from Boris Johnson, the British prime minister. Johnson is instead preoccupied with combating the spread of the COVID-19 disease, as well as keeping the likes of Duncan Smith and Co. onside. The prime minister is a last-minute type of guy.

    Trade Relations With Other Blocs

    Third, there is the matter of making provisions for the trade agreements the UK wants to make in the future with other countries, such as the US, Japan and New Zealand. Freedom to make such deals was presented to UK voters as one of the benefits of Brexit.

    The underlying problem here is that the UK government has yet to make up its mind on whether it will continue with the European Union’s strict precautionary policy on food safety or adopt the more permissive approach favored by the US. Similar policy choices will have to be made by the UK on chemicals, energy efficiency displays and geographical indicators.

    The more the UK diverges from existing EU standards on these issues, the more intrusive the controls on goods coming into Northern Ireland from Britain will have to be, and the more acute the distress will be for Unionist circles in Northern Ireland. Issues that are uncontroversial in themselves will assume vast symbolic significance and threaten peace on the island of Ireland

    The UK is likely to be forced to make side deals with the US on issues like hormone-treated beef, genetically modified organisms and chlorinated chicken. The US questions the scientific basis for the existing EU restrictions and has won a WTO case on beef over this. It would probably win on chlorinated chicken, too.

    If Britain conceded to the US on hormones and chlorination, this would create control problems at the border between the UK and the EU, wherever that border is in Ireland. Either UK officials would enforce EU rules on hormones and chlorination on the entry of beef or chicken to this island, or there would be a huge international court case.

    All this shows that, in the absence of some sort of partnership agreement between the EU and the UK, relations could spiral out of control. Ireland, as well as the European Union, needs its best team on the pitch to ensure that this does not happen.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The CO2 Border Adjustment for the EU

    The heads of state and government of the European Union propose introducing a “carbon border adjustment mechanism” from 2023, to charge imported goods according to the CO2 emitted during their production. At their recent summit, they decided to use the ensuing revenues to boost the EU’s budget. This gives a fiscal twist to an instrument actually designed for climate policy.

    Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, had already announced in 2019 that she would like to introduce a “carbon border tax” as part of her European Green Deal. In spring 2020, the commission launched a roadmap process to prepare concrete legislative proposals by 2021. Its proposal also responds to fears that higher European CO2 costs caused by EU emissions trading (EU ETS) could cause companies to relocate activities outside the union, causing carbon leakage.

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    Outsourcing would contribute to reducing European emissions, but not to tackling the global problem. To date, the European Union has addressed the risk of relocation by allocating free emission allowances to sectors at risk of carbon leakage. A CO2 border adjustment could create an alternative with a global impact.

    There is rising support for the idea, after years of resistance from many EU member states and business associations. And the pressure is set to grow, with an increase in the EU’s climate target for 2030 — and anticipated higher CO2 costs for EU businesses — expected this fall. Furthermore, a CO2 border adjustment for foreign products will be widely interpreted as a clear message, especially to Washington and Beijing, that the EU intends to implement the 2015 Paris Agreement. When designing the instrument, it will be important to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and to get important trading partners on board. 

    WTO-Compatible Design

    The European Commission proposes three ways in which a “carbon border adjustment mechanism” could be implemented: “a carbon tax on selected products, a new carbon customs duty or the extension of the EU ETS to imports.” From a trade law perspective, any of these options could be designed in accordance with WTO rules. The crucial aspect is the principle of non-discrimination: that a CO2 border adjustment must not differentiate among like products or between WTO members. If it were necessary to depart from the principle, for example, where a trading partner or individual company is able to demonstrate that it is already taking care of emissions reductions, the rules for exceptions would need to be observed.

    An EU-wide CO2 “product tax” and its implementation by the EU member states would be the most straightforward approach from a trade law perspective. To do this, the EU would first have to levy a CO2 tax on goods manufactured in the European Union. Then, it would be unproblematic to apply this tax to imports as well — the value-added tax, for example, follows this approach. Imported “like” products would be treated the same way as domestic products, which is WTO-compliant.

    Extending the EU ETS to industrial imports would be more complex. The task for the European. Commission would be to demonstrate that under trade law, the CO2 allowance price is ultimately equivalent to a “product tax.” Failing that, the commission could argue that it was acting to protect a global resource, i.e., that avoiding carbon leakage was the central aim of the EU legislation. The “conservation of exhaustible natural resources,” which includes the Earth’s atmosphere, is a valid ground for violating WTO principles, subject to certain conditions. Such an exemption would also have to be claimed for a new CO2 customs duty.

    However, the European Council decision has exacerbated the risk that WTO dispute settlement panels will regard the new instrument as a means of generating income, rather than a means to protect the climate. This would make a difference if trading partners challenged the new tool. The climate focus, which would be taken into account in WTO rulings, is currently slipping into the background.

    Don’t Underestimate the Diplomatic Effort

    A CO2 border adjustment mechanism will need extensive explanation given the many open details, and it can only promote international climate policy cooperation if trade partners are informed at an early stage and regularly consulted. For this, the European Union should use WTO forums and the climate regime as well as other international organizations. In 2012, the European Commission was made painfully aware of the difficulties involved in going it alone, after seeking to include international aviation in the EU ETS. Major partners put political pressure on the EU, even threatening sanctions, and the union decided to backtrack and reduce the coverage of the ETS to flights within the European Economic Area.

    Trust can only arise if the EU adheres to multilateral climate and trade agreements — i.e., supports the Paris Agreement and the troubled WTO and expresses this clearly and often. This task has probably become much more difficult after the European Council decision because a fiscally-motivated border adjustment cannot be convincingly attributed to these multilateral concerns — especially as the revenues would flow to the EU rather than to funds supporting climate protection, for example, in poorer countries. If a CO2 border adjustment specifically targeted cement, steel and other energy-intensive industries, as has already been discussed, producers from emerging and industrialized countries would be especially affected.

    The union should start discussions with these countries without delay. A good opportunity will arise at the meeting of G20 finance ministers in Saudi Arabia toward the end of the year. In addition, the EU should insist to the US that this initiative is not intended as a provocation in the smoldering customs dispute. Ultimately, the climate policy success of a CO2 border adjustment will depend on how the world’s major economies react to it.

    *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Is Europe More United Than the US?

    During the Trump era, America increasingly seems like a motley collection of states brought together for reasons of territorial contiguity and little else. The conservative South is ravaged by a pandemic. The liberal Northeast waits patiently for elections in November to oust a tyrant. A rebellious Pacific Northwest faces off against federal troops sent to “restore order.” The Farm Belt, the Rust Belt and the Sun Belt are like three nations divided by a common language.

    The European Union, on the other hand, really does consist of separate countries: 27 of them. The economic gap between Luxembourg and Latvia is huge, the difference in median household income even larger than that between America’s richest and poorest states (Maryland and West Virginia).

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    European countries have gone to war with each other more recently than the American states (a mere 25 years ago in the case of former Yugoslavia). All EU members are democracies, but the practice of politics varies wildly from perpetually fragmented Italy to stolid Germany to ever-more illiberal Hungary.

    Despite these economic and political differences, the EU recently managed to perform a miracle of consensus. After 90 hours of discussion, EU leaders hammered out a unified approach to rebuilding the region’s post-pandemic economy.

    The EU is looking at an 8.7% economic contraction for 2020. But the coronavirus pandemic clearly hit some parts of the EU worse than others, with Italy and Spain suffering disproportionately. Greece remains heavily indebted from the 2008-09 financial crisis. Most of Eastern Europe has yet to catch up to the rest of the EU. If left to themselves, EU members would recover from the current pandemic at very different rates and several might not recover at all.

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    That’s why the deal is so important. The EU could have helped out its struggling members by extending more loans, which was basically the approach after 2009. This time around, however, the EU is providing almost half of the money in the new recovery fund — $446 billion — in grants, not loans. The $1.3-trillion budget that European leaders negotiated for the next seven years will keep all critical EU programs afloat (like the European structural and investment funds that help bridge the gap between the wealthier and the less wealthy members).

    Sure, there were plenty of disagreements. The “frugal four” of the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Sweden argued down the amount of money allocated to the grant program and the budget numbers overall. Germany has often sided with the frugal faction in the past, but this time Chancellor Angela Merkel played a key role in negotiating the compromise. She also managed to bribe Hungary and Poland to support the deal by taking “rule-of-law” conditionality off the table. Both countries have run afoul of the EU by violating various rule-of-law norms with respect to media, judiciary and immigration. Yet both countries will still be able to access billions of dollars from the recovery fund and the overall budget.

    Until recently, the EU seemed to be on the brink of dissolution. The United Kingdom had bailed, Eastern Europe was increasingly authoritarian, the southern tier remained heavily in debt, and the pandemic was accelerating these centrifugal forces. But now it looks as the EU will spin together, not spin apart.

    The United States, on the other hand, looks ever more in disarray. As Lucrezia Reichlin, professor of economics at the London Business School, put it, “Despite being one country, the U.S. is coming out much more fragmented than Europe.”

    The Coming Storm

    The Trump administration has been all about restarting the US economy. President Donald Trump was reluctant to encourage states to lock down in the first place. He supported governors and even armed protesters demanding that states reopen prematurely.

    And now that the pandemic has returned even more dramatically than the first time around, the president is pretending as though the country isn’t registering over 60,000 new infections and over a thousand deaths every day. Trump was willing to cancel the Florida portion of the Republican Party convention for fear of infection, but he has no problem insisting that children hold the equivalent of thousands of mini-conventions when they return to school.

    Europe, which was much more stringent about prioritizing health over the economy, is now pretty much open for business.

    The challenge has been summer tourism. Vacationers hanging out on beaches and in bars are at heightened risk of catching the COVID-19 disease — which is caused by the novel coronavirus — and bringing it home with them. There have been some new outbreaks of the disease in Catalonia, an uptick in cases in Belgium and the Netherlands, and a significant increase in infections in Romania. Belgium is already re-instituting restrictions on social contacts. Sensibly, a number of European governments are setting up testing sites for returning tourists.

    The EU is determined not to repeat what’s going on in Florida, Texas and California. It is responding in a more deliberate and unified way to outbreaks leading to an average of 81 deaths a day than the United States is responding as a whole to a very nearly out-of-control situation producing more than 900 deaths a day.

    The US isn’t just facing a deadly resurgence of the pandemic. Various economic signals indicate that the so-called “V-shaped recovery” — much hyped by the Trump administration — is just not happening. More people are again filing for unemployment benefits. People are reluctant to go back to restaurants and hang out in hotels. The business sector in general is faring poorly.

    “The sugar rush from re-openings has now faded and a resurgence of domestic coronavirus cases, alongside very weak demand, supply chain disruptions, historically low oil prices, and high levels of uncertainty will weigh heavily on business investment,” according to Oren Klachkin, lead US economist at Oxford Economics in New York.

    The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released a report in July that offered two potential scenarios for the US economy through the end of the year. Neither looks good. The “optimistic scenario” puts the unemployment rate at the end of 2020 at 11.3% (more or less what it is right now) and an overall economic contraction of 7.3%. According to the pessimistic scenario, the unemployment rate would be nearer to 13% and the economic contraction at 8.5%.

    Much depends on what Congress does. The package that Senate Republicans unveiled last week is $2 trillion less than what the Democrats have proposed. It offers more individual stimulus checks, but nothing for states and municipalities and no hazard pay for essential workers.

    Unemployment benefits expired a few weeks ago, and Republicans would only extend them at a much-decreased level. Although Congress will likely renew the eviction moratorium, some landlords are already trying to kick out renters during the gap. The student loan moratorium affecting 40 million Americans runs out at the end of September.

    The only sign of economic resurgence is the stock market, which seems to be running entirely on hope (of a vaccine or a tech-led economic revival). At some point, this irrational exuberance will meet its evil twin, grim reality. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Europeans are preparing the foundation for precisely the V-shaped recovery that the United States, at the moment, can only dream about.

    The Transatlantic Future

    What does a world with a stronger Europe and a weaker America look like? A stronger Europe will no longer have to kowtow to America’s mercurial foreign policy. Take the example of the Iran nuclear deal, which the Obama administration took the lead in negotiating. Trump not only canceled US participation, but he also threatened to sanction any actors that continued to do business with Iran. Europe protested and even set up its own mechanisms to maintain economic ties with Tehran. But it wasn’t enough. Soon enough, however, the United States won’t have the economic muscle to blackmail its allies.

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    The EU has certainly taken a tougher stance toward China over the last couple years, particularly on economic issues. But in its negotiations with Beijing, the EU has also put far greater emphasis on cooperation around common interests. As such, expect the European Union to take full advantage of the US decline to solidify its position in an East Asian regional economy that recovers far more quickly from the pandemic than pretty much anywhere in the world.

    Europe is also well-positioned to take the lead on climate change issues, which the United States has forfeited in its four years of catastrophic backsliding under Trump. As part of its new climate pact, the EU has pledged to become carbon-neutral by 2050. The European Commission is also considering a radical new idea: a carbon tax on imports. In the future, if you want to be competitive in selling your products in the European market, you’ll have to consider the carbon footprint of your operation.

    Of course, the EU could do better. But compared to the US, Russia or China, it’s way out in front. The European Union is not a demilitarized space. It has a very mixed record on human rights conditionality. And its attitudes toward immigration range from half-welcoming to downright xenophobic.

    But let’s say that Europe emerges from this pandemic with greater global authority, much as the US did after World War II. A lot of Americans, and most American politicians, will bemoan this loss of status. But a world led by a unified Europe would be a significantly better place than one mismanaged by a fragmented United States.

    *[This article was originally published by FPIF.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    COVID-19 and Populism: A Bad Combination for Europe’s Banks

    As Germany takes over the EU’s rotating presidency, Chancellor Angela Merkel noted that the bloc is facing a triple challenge: the coronavirus pandemic — in retreat but still requiring constant vigilance — the EU’s steepest-ever economic downturn and political demons waiting in the wings, including the specter of populism. With the pandemic somewhat under control, European policymakers’ focus is shifting toward the knock-on effects of months of lockdown.

    Economies in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe (CESEE) are in a particularly precarious situation, as a number of factors, from bad debt to populist legislation, are cramping the ability of the banking sector —which performs a vital role in stabilizing the economy through loans, payment holidays and other forms of financial support to local businesses in times of crisis  — to withstand a potential economic downturn.

    Bad Loans on the Rise

    A troubling report recently released by the Vienna Initiative (created during the 2008 financial crisis to support emerging Europe’s financial sector) has indicated that CESEE banks are facing a wave of bad loans, or non-performing loans (NPL), caused by the COVID-19 pandemic that could last past 2021. The issue of bad debt is by no means limited to CESEE countries, but the problem is exacerbated by populist political decisions in many nations in the region.

    European banking regulators had previously estimated that EU banks had built up adequate buffers to withstand a certain number of bad loans, with “strong capital and liquidity buffers” that should allow them to “withstand the potential credit risk losses.” But many banks in the CESEE region, operating in more volatile economies and with their reserves already whittled away by populist measures, are uniquely vulnerable if hit by too many NPLs.

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    At the heart of the problem is the fact that an excess of NPLs can drain banks’ capital reserves, making them reliant on support from governments and central banks. If the regulators and politicians don’t then put the necessary measures in place to support banks, the entire economy could be in danger of collapsing.

    Lenders in countries including Hungary, Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovakia and Bulgaria have sought reassurance from national authorities in recent months that they will receive the necessary protections should restrictive COVID-19 measures last much longer, particularly if the continent is hit by a second wave of the virus before a vaccine or an effective treatment is found. At present, it is unclear whether governments across Europe will be willing to continue with the same level of support packages to businesses and employees. 

    It’s not just a matter of renewing special coronavirus provisions. In return for providing additional financial support to businesses, lenders understandably expect reciprocal measures from governments and central banks. These include favorable tax measures, or the relaxation of excessive levies, so that banks are able to maintain their reserve levels, a lowering of countercyclical capital buffers and a guarantee of emergency financial support from central banks if necessary.

    Populist Measures Exacerbate Financial Strain

    In the wake of COVID-19, banking sector outlooks have already been revised to negative in several countries including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Croatia. These problems are in danger of being intensified by populist political decisions in many CESEE countries, where governments have a tendency to see punitive measures on banks as an easy way of shoring up popular support.

    In particular, many CESEE countries’ financial sectors are still suffering from 2015 decisions to convert loans taken out in Swiss francs into loans denominated in the euro or the local currency. The conversions came in response to a sudden surge in value of the Swiss franc, which had previously allowed lenders to offer low-interest loans. The forced conversions benefited borrowers but left the country’s banks to pick up the tab, making it difficult for them to build up capital buffers.

    While some countries which carried out the forced loan conversions, like Hungary, at least provided lenders with euros from the central bank to ease the blow, others, such as Croatia, left banks to shoulder the full loss. Croatia’s loans conversion, pushed through quickly ahead of the 2015 parliamentary elections, was applied retroactively, foisting a bill of roughly €1 billion on the country’s banks, many of which are subsidiaries of financial institutions from elsewhere in the EU. A pending court ruling on whether or not Croatian borrowers who had taken out Swiss franc loans could apply for further compensation could impose another €2.6 billion in losses on the banks at the worst possible time.

    Nor is the controversial loans conversion the only policy sapping CESEE banks’ capital reserves. As part of its coronavirus recovery plan, the Hungarian government announced a special tax on both banks and multinational retailers back in April. The additional banking tax was worth HUF 55 billion ($176 million). Prime Minister Viktor Orban had already announced the toughest COVID-19 measures of any central or eastern European country, including a suspension of all loan payments until the end of the year. The move ignored a call from Hungary’s OTP Bank for a reduction in taxes to help banks deal with the pandemic’s fallout.

    A number of other countries in the region, including the Czech Republic and Romania — though Romania later eliminated the levy — have raised banking taxes in recent years, making it harder for the financial sectors in these emerging economies to respond to the crisis and has left it in a more precarious position should the effects of COVID-19 continue into 2021.

    The CESEE region’s financial sector suffered greatly in the wake of the 2008-09 global financial crisis, and much work has been done in the intervening years to shield the sector from future downturns. The Vienna Initiative report, however, makes it clear that the region’s banks still face headwinds due to the COVID-19 crisis. Hopefully, policymakers across CESEE will take heed of the report’s findings and realize that trying to scapegoat banks in these uncertain times will only make them more vulnerable, leaving them ill-equipped to deal with the onslaught of loan defaults expected over the next 12 months.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More