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    Why Is Somalia’s Political Crisis So Difficult to Solve?

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    There seems to be no end in sight for the political crisis in Somalia. On February 8, the mandate of President Muhammad Abdullahi Muhammad, commonly known as Farmajo, expired without a date set for either parliamentary or presidential elections. The protests called by the opposition Council of the Presidential Candidates in the following days were met with growing repression from government forces. In April, Farmajo extended his already overdue term by a further two years, igniting violence between the security forces and anti-government militias in the streets of the capital Mogadishu.

    In response, the international community, and the US in particular, increased pressure on Somali actors to come to an agreement, causing the states of Hirshabelle, Galmudug and South West to withdraw their support for Farmajo and call for new elections. Lacking international and domestic support, on May 1, Farmajo backtracked on his extended mandate and paved the way to new elections.

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    Despite optimism around recent advances, Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, who is in charge of organizing the elections, has a complicated task ahead. Armed confrontation created further distrust between political actors, and violence could easily flare up again in the run-up to the elections. Underlying constitutional, economic and international factors continue to drive this power struggle that is undermining Somalia’s already troubled state-building efforts.

    Federal Tensions

    On September 17, 2020, the federal government and the presidents of the member states agreed on amendments to the electoral process under pressure from the UN mission to Somalia, AMISOM. The agreement fell short of implementation, raising tensions between Mogadishu and the states of Puntland and Jubaland that staunchly oppose federal rule.

    There are three contentious issues on the table. The presidents of Puntland and Jubaland, Said Abdullahi Deni and Ahmed Islam Madobe, accused President Farmajo of staffing federal and state electoral commissions with his loyalists, thereby undermining their expected neutrality. Somaliland is yet another stumbling block on the path to elections. Despite its de facto independence, the transitional constitution still assigns 57 parliamentary seats (46 in the lower and 11 in the upper house) to the region. Those seats could be decisive for the election result, so Farmajo wants the federal government to appoint Somaliland MPs, whereas Puntland and Jubaland want the chairpersons of the houses to manage the selection.

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    Finally, the issue of the district of Gedo has created a deep rift between the parties. Formally, in the state of Jubaland, government forces launched a military operation in February-March 2020 to occupy the region, which is dominated by President Farmajo’s Marehan sub-clan, sparking tensions between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. If elections took place at this stage, Farmajo could secure the appointment of loyal MPs from the Gedo district; Jubaland’s Madobe and his allies reject this scenario.

    Behind these flashpoints, however, there are two divergent visions of Somalia’s state-building. President Farmajo envisages the return to a pre-1991 centralized state with himself in the top job. On the other side of the rift, federal member states, specifically Puntland and Jubaland, want to safeguard their far-reaching autonomy within a decentralized Somali state and, therefore, reject Farmajo’s centralization project. Such fear has grown after the president managed to install his allies at the head of the states of Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West during his tenure. On top of that, the unprecedented reelection of an incumbent could strain the balance of power between the major clans which, until now, have informally rotated the top positions of Somali federal institutions.

    Growing Stakes

    Somalia has faced similar impasses among its elites in the past. Yet this crisis is proving more difficult to solve. One reason for this is economic. Thanks to the 2012 constitutional pact and AMISOM stabilization efforts, federal institutions are no longer powerless and can tap into the economic activities that have sprung up in recent years, especially in Mogadishu. This is consolidating clan-based patronage networks in what Transparency International considers the most corrupt country of the world along with South Sudan. Consequently, the federal government has become a relevant actor in Somalia’s political economy, raising the stakes over its control.

    The most notable of these activities is the housing boom. In 2015, Mogadishu ranked second among the world’s fastest-growing cities as members of the Somali diaspora and wealthy locals built new properties in and around the capital. As there is no land tenure registry, affluent people often bribe public officials to obtain property rights and forcibly evict residents. This phenomenon has also driven severe tensions between public authorities and the local population, especially internally displaced persons.

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    The oil and gas sector represents the most lucrative opportunity in sight for the Somali rent-seeking elites. Seen as promising by experts, the sector has been reorganized in recent years under the Ministry of Petroleum and the Somali Petroleum Agency and, after the delays due to COVID-19, the first bidding round is about to end. Despite the so-called petroleum law on the distribution of revenues and powers, some outstanding issues remain on the table and the current crisis might catalyze them. Consequently, the oil and gas sector might become another key arena of competition between the federal government and member states in the coming years.

    Some relevant economic opportunities for the government also arrive from abroad. China, for example, showed its interest in Somalia given its strategic location along the Maritime Silk Road and, in turn, the Farmajo administration officialy joined Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2018. With the move, Somali authorities hope to attract investments in the country’s infrastructure. So far, the most visible result of the China-Somali cooperation is the fishing agreement through which Mogadishu granted fishing rights in Somali waters to a group of Chinese fishing companies in exchange for a $35,000 annual fee from each. This agreement, however, risks to upset the fragile livelihood of low-income fishing communities along the Somali coast.

    Neighborly View

    While cooperation with China has future potential, Turkey has been Mogadishu’s strongest partner for the last decade, with partnerships spanning across all sectors, from humanitarian aid to military training. Critically, Ankara has helped the government to train Somali special forces and build major infrastructural projects, like the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu. The Turkish Albayrak Group will soon manage the capital’s seaport and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is even planning to build a spaceport for the Turkish space program on Somali territory, with an estimated investment of $350 million.

    Given its extensive influence within Somalia, Turkey proposed itself as a mediator in the current crisis, with Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu conducting shuttle diplomacy in support of the September agreement. Another Farmajo ally hesitant to take sides is Ethiopia. Despite Abiy Ahmed’s embedded alliance with Farmajo, the Ethiopian prime minister is probably aware that a direct endorsement could prove counterproductive to both the Somali president and to himself as a promoter of regional stability. On top of that, according to International Crisis Group Somalia analyst Omar Muhammad, Ethiopia is busy coping with its multiple domestic crises.

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    During his years in office, President Farmajo has built strong ties not only with Ankara and Addis Ababa, but also with Doha. After receiving funds from Qatar and refusing to take sides in the Gulf standoff, Farmajo deepened development cooperation with Doha and offered a concession for the Port of Hobyo to the Qatari operator, Mwani, in 2019. This is the reason why Qatar has long backed the Somali president in the current dispute.

    However, as Farmajo’s chances of staying in power are narrowing, Doha is pulling its support and looking for new candidates to back. On the other hand, in reaction to Farmajo’s pro-Qatar stance, the UAE put its weight behind the presidents of Puntland and Jubaland over the past years by providing humanitarian aid, security cooperation and investments in the ports of Bossaso and Kismayo. Abu Dhabi was also the only country openly labeling Farmajo an interim president, a statement that attracted harsh criticism from the Somali government.

    Regardless of diplomatic positioning, the economic and political support provided over the years by external powers has contributed to the current crisis. Investments increased stakes in government positions, strengthened the role of the president and his regional foes, and eventually reduced their willingness to compromise. Electoral commissions, Somaliland delegates and Gedo district remain the core stumbling blocks in the rift between Somali political actors, colliding against divergent visions of governance.

    In the background, the terrorist group al-Shabaab, already in control of around two-thirds of the country, scaled up its bombing campaign at the beginning of the electoral cycle last summer. The international community has spearheaded an important step toward elections and now has to shore up a peaceful path to elections with the help of Somali leaders. Without this crucial support, al-Shabaab is likely to take full advantage of the impasse and further complicate the country’s fragile state-building project.

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      What the UAE-Turkey Rivalry Means for Europe’s Energy Security

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      In recent months, the United Arab Emirates has adopted a number of stances inimical to Turkish ambitions in the Mediterranean. This has taken the form of closer relations between the UAE, Greece and Greek Cyprus, more joint military exercises, and increased energy collaboration with Israel via the Abraham Accords. But with President Joe Biden in the Oval Office, the UAE has toned down its overt military posturing and complemented its strategy with economic means. The shift relies on hydrocarbon pipeline proposals that exclude Turkey with the aim to diminish its geopolitical importance to Europe.

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      The UAE views Turkey as a threat for two reasons. First, Ankara supports the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Emiratis have designated as a terrorist organization. Second, Turkey has been active both militarily and economically in North Africa, Syria and the Horn of Africa. In 2019 and 2020, competition between Abu Dhabi and Ankara flared, with both powers directly funneling mercenaries and money to Libya, stepping up competition in Somalia and castigating each other in diplomatic statements. The UAE also aligned with Greek Cyprus, Greece, France and Egypt against Turkey while providing financial and possibly military support in the form of mercenaries to anti-Turkish actors in the region.

      Energy Games

      During Biden’s first months in office, however, the UAE has undertaken two major actions that indicate a softer approach toward Ankara. First, on January 29, Abu Dhabi declared that it was ready to work closely with the UN on Libya. Second, the UAE began dismantling its base in Assab, in Eritrea. Although this move comes largely in an attempt to extricate itself from the war in Yemen, it also means losing a critical power-projection site that has acted as a counterbalance to Turkey’s and Qatar’s presence in Suakin, in Sudan. This does not mean that Abu Dhabi considers Turkey to be any less of a threat. On the contrary, recent UAE actions portend a refocusing on investment in pipelines and infrastructure in the eastern Mediterranean to blunt Ankara’s energy ambitions, especially concerning Turkey’s role in Europe’s energy security.

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      Moscow’s influence on Europe’s energy markets has emerged as a concern for the European Union and the US, with Russian supplies accounting for 40% of European gas consumption. Turkey is commonly floated as a solution because it can connect alternative pipelines from the Caspian and Central Asia. Turkey becoming an important energy transportation hub would give it leverage over the EU and allow it to better play the US, Western Europe and Russia against each other.

      However, the UAE’s attempts to lock Turkey out of the eastern Mediterranean energy pipelines threaten Ankara’s goals of becoming a larger player in the EU’s energy market. The UAE is attempting to do this by joining the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) — comprised of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan and Palestine — as an observer. Although the EMGF claims to be open to anyone, its ostensible purpose is to lock Turkey out of the Mediterranean hydrocarbons market, especially with the EastMed pipeline project. This pipeline would transfer gas from Cyprus and Israel to Greece and then further on to Europe; it is a major reason for Turkey’s involvement in Libya. The EastMed faces certain financial and political struggles, and the UAE’s endorsement of the project could galvanize initiative and create a breakthrough in rallying a coalition to circumvent Turkey on the energy market.

      Moreover, Abu Dhabi’s improving relations with Israel provide it more alternatives in convening an anti-Turkish coalition. The Abraham Accords also augment the UAE’s ability to constrain Turkey by allowing Abu Dhabi to collaborate with Israel on joint pipeline projects. If the UAE manages to connect itself to the EastMed, or any other, pipeline, Turkey’s status as an energy alternative to Russia would diminish in the eyes of Europe and the US. It appears as if the UAE has already taken initiative in this regard: On October 22, 2020, Israeli state-owned Europe Asia Pipeline Company signed a binding memorandum of understanding with MED-RED Land Bridge, a company that has both Israeli and Emirati owners, to transport oil from the UAE to Europe.

      The joint venture would rely on the Eilat-Asheklon pipeline, built by Israel and Iran in the 1960s, that would send Emirati hydrocarbons from Eilat, on Israel’s Red Sea coast, to Ashkelon, on the Mediterranean. Though this is an oil pipeline, this portends future initiatives that could see Emirati gas transported through Israel to Greece, via a connection to the EastMed. Furthermore, Emirati oil tankers disembarking in Eilat would come with an increased security presence in the area. Though not a military base, the venture could make up for the power projection loss from the now defunct base at Assab.  

      Economic Foothold

      An Emirati bid to manage an Israeli port at Haifa represents another Emirati attempt to cement an economic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. The port at Haifa is also close in proximity to Lebanon and Israel’s disputed oil blocs, some of whose drilling licenses have been awarded to France’s Total. As noted by Amos Hochstein, the former coordinator for international energy affairs at the US State Department, the UAE could adopt a larger role in resolving this dispute, which would free up more gas reserves that could be exported around Turkey. UAE mediation would also draw it economically closer to France, which has, for the most part, confronted Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. If Total receives new oil blocs, a French economic dimension could also align against Turkey in the region, bolstering the UAE’s initiatives.

      The Emirati bid for Haifa’s port comes after DP World, Abu Dhabi’s shipping and operations company, completed the Port of Limassol in Cyprus in 2018. Both actions represent the UAE’s push to bolster its infrastructure in the region, which would complement future pipeline initiatives. The UAE then signed a military cooperation agreement with Cyprus on January 12, which signified a deepening of this relationship. It followed an Emirati-Greek military partnership and a trilateral meeting between the UAE, Greece and Greek Cyprus, evidencing that Abu Dhabi is trying to complement military measures with diplomatic coalitions.

      Cyprus proves critical to the UAE’s energy ambitions. Not only is the island a vital connecting point for the EastMed pipeline, but it also recently discovered gas, both of which provide Europe with an alternative to Turkey’s energy supply. This gas will flow to Cairo via a pipeline agreed upon in 2018, where it will be liquified and exported to Europe. These pipelines may not decisively change Turkey’s role in Europe’s energy security, but they nevertheless threaten Ankara’s energy ambitions and indicate that the UAE is undertaking a multifaceted strategy to undermine its rival.

      Though both Turkey and the UAE would prefer to see each other’s geopolitical significance diminished in the eyes of Western Europe and the US, it would be best for Europe if the two actors worked together. Europe would face a crisis if a jingoistic Russia cuts off the gas deliveries to the continent. Moscow has already threatened Ukraine’s energy supply. As many have argued, Emirati-Turkish competition erupted because of a power vacuum left by incremental US withdrawal from the region. However, if the US and other disinterested states could attempt to broker a détente following the lifting of the blockade on Qatar, collaboration between Ankara and Abu Dhabi could prove a viable supplement for Europe’s energy security.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Biden’s Policy Shift on Yemen Rings Alarm Bells in Riyadh

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      At the beginning of February, the Biden administration made two relevant decisions on Yemen with far-reaching consequences for the country and US policy in the Arabian Peninsula. The first announcement concerned the end of US support for “offensive operations” conducted by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, a campaign promise President Joe Biden followed through. The US will suspend all pending arms deals with the countries intervening in the Yemeni Civil War. These notably include the sale of $500 million worth of precision-guided missiles to Saudi Arabia and the purchase of 50 F-35 fighter jets by the United Arab Emirates agreed under the Trump administration. In addition, the US Department of Defense announced a cessation of intelligence sharing related to military targets inside Yemen.

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      The second step concerns the revocation of the designation of Ansar Allah (the Houthis) as a terrorist organization. The designation was an 11th-hour move by the previous administration that had sparked an international outcry as it would have hindered the capacity of international NGOs to deliver much-needed humanitarian aid to Houthi-controlled areas, where 80% of the Yemeni population currently lives. The two decisions were accompanied by a renewed commitment to the UN-led peace process that saw the appointment of Timothy Lenderking, a career diplomat with extensive experience in the Arabian Peninsula, as the US envoy to Yemen. These policy shifts rang alarm bells in Saudi Arabia.

      Endless Odds in Yemen

      Although largely predicted, Biden’s move complicates the already shaky position of Saudi Arabia in the conflict. Riyadh faces multiple hurdles in Yemen while seeking an exit strategy. Over five years, a bombing campaign, a maritime blockade and military support to proxies on the ground, alongside the UAE, have not been sufficient to defeat the Houthi insurgency, while the human cost of this attempt has left indelible scars on Yemen and its people.

      After acknowledging the impossibility of victory, Riyadh underwent painful negotiations with the leadership of Ansar Allah in 2019. A mediated solution would allow the Saudis to scale down their costly intervention and spare the Al Saud royal family an outright display of weakness in a region where military prowess is a determinant of political weight. However, last November, Ansar Allah began to intensify its attacks against Saudi targets utilizing Iran-supplied military hardware.

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      The Houthi campaign exposed the vulnerability of the Saudi strategic infrastructure to asymmetric attacks launched through drones, missiles and explosives-laden boats targeting oil facilities, airports, commercial vessels and ports. As a result, the mediation went awry, and Saudi Arabia scaled up its bombing campaign against Ansar Allah once again.

      Moreover, the Saudi intervention in Yemen was confronted with another issue: southern separatism. After Abu Dhabi decided to partially pull out from Yemen in July 2019, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) — the UAE’s main political ally — cut ties with the internationally recognized government of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and began to push for the independence of southern Yemen. Since then, STC separatism has forced the Saudis to commit to the maintenance of the anti-Ansar Allah coalition through the Riyadh Agreement between Hadi and the STC, which collapsed in April 2020 and came back into force last December.

      Yet all evidence indicates that a power-sharing solution in Aden is far from secured as party-affiliated militias remain outside government control, some STC factions oppose the Riyadh Agreement, and tensions persist inside the coalition between the STC and the Islah party, the Yemeni offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. This indicates that Riyadh cannot disengage from southern Yemen without causing the collapse of the anti-Ansar Allah front.

      Anxiety in Riyadh

      In this situation, President Biden’s announcement poses two problems to Saudi Arabia. The end of US support is not enough to stop the intervention overnight as Saudi Arabia already possesses large reserves of American military supplies. The military cooperation between Washington and Riyadh is deep and multidimensional, including logistical, technical and training support to the Saudi army, especially the air force, and President Biden’s pledge to “help Saudi Arabia defend itself, its sovereignty, territorial integrity and its people” signals that these forms of assistance will likely continue unabated.

      Nonetheless, this decision makes the intervention unsustainable in the long term since the Saudi military apparatus is deeply reliant on US military hardware, which cannot be replaced quickly. Thus, the US is setting a deadline on the Saudi intervention without pulling the rug from under Riyadh’s feet.

      In parallel, the unconditional removal of Ansar Allah from the list of terrorist organizations seems to have empowered the Houthis. The designation was supposed to force the rebel group to halt its attacks and negotiate a solution with Saudi Arabia. After acknowledging the revocation and the de facto deadline on the Saudi intervention, Ansar Allah launched a new offensive in Yemen’s Marib and Taiz governorates alongside a series of cross-border attacks against Saudi targets. The Ansar Allah leadership wants to show that it is driving the Saudis out of Yemen and is losing interest in the peace negotiations. Consequently, Saudi Arabia now finds itself in a weaker position as pressure mounts against its intervention but fades when it comes to the Houthis.

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      Against this backdrop, Riyadh responded to Biden’s announcement on February 6 by praising the US commitment to reinforce defense cooperation but without mentioning the end of support for the war in Yemen. Even in official communications, Saudi Arabia pursues an appeasement strategy that has led its leadership to end the Qatar blockade in January, shorten the sentence of women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul, and release two US-Saudi dissidents detained since April 2019. The Saudis seem confident that once electoral promises are carried out and Riyadh exits the international spotlight, US-Saudi relations can return to business as usual.

      But the appeasement strategy has not brought substantial dividends, and Washington is even testing the water — so far unsuccessfully — regarding reentering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Tehran. If US commitment will prove serious, Biden will have to follow through before the next midterm elections in 2022, when the Democrats might lose the Senate and, along with it, the chance to ratify the Iran nuclear deal.

      In the meantime, Saudi Arabia continues to diversify its international alliances in line with the perceived withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East. Riyadh can already rely on strong economic ties with China, energy cooperation with Russia at OPEC+ level and security cooperation with these and other middle powers, such as India. As pressure mounts from Washington, Riyadh might be further incentivized to deepen relations with other partners and use them to balance out US demands on human rights.

      Crown Prince Under Pressure

      When it comes to Saudi leadership, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s three most important decisions have all been challenged in one way or another. The Qatar blockade did not bring any tangible results and was eventually revoked. The intervention in Yemen has been counterproductive on many grounds and will become increasingly unsustainable in light of a change of direction in Washington. Lastly, the economic transition planned in Vision 2030 has no end in sight, while the COVID-19 crisis has further slowed down progress.

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      On top of that, the crown prince was reportedly open to finding an agreement with Israel, as indicated by his secret meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in NEOM at the end of November last year. Yet the opposition of his father, King Salman, was sufficient to stop the recognition of Israel for the time being. Most notably, the message came through Prince Turki bin Faisal, who harshly criticized Israel at an international conference in the aftermath of the bin Salman-Netanyahu meeting.

      Thus, the new scenario of US-Saudi relations is not favorable to the leadership of Muhammad bin Salman. The Biden administration seems committed to reining in the crown prince’s adventurism in the Middle East and at home, complicating any future operation of domestic repression against the high ranks of the Al Saud family. President Biden’s criticism against bin Salman has culminated in the release of the CIA report on his role in the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The report sparked a new wave of criticism against the crown prince at the international level but not domestically. According to Dr. Cinzia Bianco, a senior analyst at Gulf State Analytics, “The Saudi youth perceived the report as a confirmation that the US has no definitive evidence of MBS’ responsibility in the assassination.”

      Therefore, it is safe to say that Mohammed bin Salman’s position inside the kingdom is robust. All his direct adversaries within the royal family have been sidelined or jailed over the past four years. In Bianco’s opinion, “If Washington really wanted to topple MBS, it could have applied sanctions against him.” Nevertheless, the latest events have weakened his leadership and possibly emboldened the princes who are discontent with his rule. Much will depend of the future of external relations with the United States and the results of economic reforms.

      Regardless of internal dynamics, President Biden’s move has complicated the Saudi position in Yemen, and a diplomatic solution to the war still seems out of reach. The dialogue between Washington and Tehran might further marginalize the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the US policy shift on Yemen is placing a heavy burden on Saudi foreign policy.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Russia Joins the Red Sea Scramble

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      Russia has come back to the crowded Red Sea. On November 11, 2020, the Russian government announced its agreement with Sudan to establish a naval base at the city of Port Sudan. While the Russian navy already enjoys access rights to the port, the concession with Khartoum envisages the creation of a Russian logistics center that will host up to 300 personnel and four naval units, including nuclear-powered vessels, for a renewable period of 25 years. In exchange for the concession, the Kremlin will send military advisers to train Sudanese forces and will be allowed to use Sudanese airports and airspace to support its base in Port Sudan.

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      On top of that, Moscow will be in charge of security at the base, giving it the chance to install advanced radar and air defense systems. Although it will be much smaller in size compared to the naval base of Tartus in Syria, the facility in Port Sudan will become a pivot of Moscow’s maritime projection spanning from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.

      Red Stars Align

      Russia’s landing in Port Sudan represents the convergence of several strategic goals. Traditionally a land power, Russia is vying to bolster its maritime prowess. The comprehensive program to modernize its fleet brought in 23 new vessels in 2019 and 40 in 2020. Most of them are more modest in size than the Soviet-era battle cruisers being decommissioned as Moscow leans toward a small-ship fleet — one that can hardly keep pace with the US or the Chinese navies, according to analysts.

      Nevertheless, Russia is arming new units with high-tech systems, like the Poseidon marine drones and the new 885M Kazan nuclear-powered submarine, which will reinforce the navy’s capability to operate at regional level in support of ground and air forces. This element suits the Kremlin’s strategy of intervention in crises, from Syria to Venezuela, and might be particularly useful in the Red Sea region.

      But the fleet itself is only half of the picture. Maritime power equally requires a network of naval bases where vessels can safely dock and be supplied. To date, Moscow not only set a firm foothold in the Mediterranean — a longstanding goal of Russia’s foreign policy — but also rose up as the preeminent maritime power in the region thanks to its naval base in Tartus and its military presence in eastern Libya in particular.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Now, as the Mediterranean regains centrality and the Indian Ocean witnesses growing power competition, the Red Sea has become a strategic pivot for countries with global ambitions like Russia. This is the rationale behind the long-sought naval base in Sudan, which will allow Moscow to span its military capabilities — and hence its influence — from the Black Sea, down through the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.

      Finally, the base in Port Sudan is a major achievement of Russia’s Africa policy. During the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2017, President Vladimir Putin pledged $20 billion in investments, skillfully attaching no conditionality to them. More importantly, he harnessed military cooperation as a crucial asset of Russia’s diplomacy in Africa. Building upon its successes in Syria and Libya, the Kremlin began to offer weapons and military services through the semi-private military company, Wagner, replicating a strategy adopted by South Africa and its Executive Outcomes PMC to expand its influence across the continent in the 1980s and 1990s. In exchange, Russia secured access rights to strategic natural resources, mainly uranium, gold and rare earth elements in the Central African Republic and Sudan, 80% of whose arsenals are filled with Russian weapons.

      In Sudan, Moscow struck a deal with former President Omar al-Bashir to provide training to the Sudanese army and support military operations in Darfur, the Blue Nile and South Kordofan; a Russian base on the Red Sea was allegedly part of the accord. Despite the fall of Bashir’s regime following widespread protests in 2019, Moscow navigated Sudanese politics and maintained strong ties with the president of the Sovereign Council, General Burhan, eventually obtaining the base in Port Sudan.

      Regional Power Play

      The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have been an arena of intense geopolitical competition among global and regional powers in recent years. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey have all scrambled to establish military outposts in the Horn of Africa. Russia makes no difference. Its quest for a military presence along the Red Sea led Moscow to enter into negotiations with Eritrea, Djibouti and even Somaliland over the past few years, but without success. Now, the base in Port Sudan has some notable implications for regional security and power competition.

      Russia has managed to stay outside regional disputes. Before Omar al-Bashir was ousted, Turkey and Qatar were about to finalize a concession in Suakin, just 50 kilometers south of Port Sudan. Under Saudi and Emirati pressure, the transitional government put the agreement with Ankara and Doha on hold. With a Russian presence in Port Sudan, Turkey’s chances of obtaining an outpost along the Sudanese coast become even slimmer. Consequently, the competition between Turkey and Russia will likely increase in the Horn of Africa, at least until the two powers will find an understanding as they did in Syria and Libya.

      The UAE and Saudi Arabia have a more nuanced position. The two countries have invested heavily, both economically and militarily, in the Red Sea. The Russian attempt to build a base in Eritrea reportedly went awry after Riyadh and Abu Dhabi stepped in to drag Eritrea from the field of Iranian influence. This suggests that a solid Russian presence in the Red Sea might be seen as an element of disturbance. Yet the UAE has already cooperated with Moscow in eastern Libya, backing General Khalifa Haftar, and has signed a strategic partnership in 2018, which also paved the way for the sale of Russian weapons to Abu Dhabi.

      Saudi Arabia might see Russia’s military engagement in the Red Sea as an opportunity. As the Houthi rebels in Yemen have proved capable of targeting ships and the Saudi oil infrastructure as far as Jeddah, Russia might become a useful ally in enforcing maritime security in the southern Red Sea region.

      Implications for the US

      Despite strong ties with Washington, the Gulf monarchies do not see Russia as a threat. Russia’s policy of non-interference, combined with its political stability, are generally perceived by autocratic regimes in the Middle East and beyond as less intrusive and dangerous. Conversely, the United States and the European powers often attach conditionalities to economic and military cooperation. Such tensions might be on the rise as the Biden administration pledges to keep a keen eye on human rights and democracy when it comes to foreign relations, with Saudi Arabia being already under the spotlight.

      Therefore, the Gulf monarchies and other actors in the region are more likely to cooperate with rather than confront Russia and possibly leverage these ties to water down requests from Washington and the like. This seems to be the case for Sudan as well, which has recently conducted deeply transactional negotiations with Washington around being delisted as a state sponsor of terrorism. The announcement of the Russian base probably accelerated the implementation of the accord too.

      Besides political considerations, the Red Sea is already particularly crowded — the US and China both maintain military bases in Djibouti. Now the US will have to deal with Russia’s accrued military presence in a pivotal region. The main reason of concern is Russia’s increased capability to operate militarily in the proximity of two of the most relevant chokepoints of the world, Suez and Bab el-Mandab. Since 10% of the world’s trade and 9% of oil shipments cross these points every day, controlling them is of crucial importance for global economic stability and security. In the long term, Russia’s footholds in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea will affect the US control over Suez and Bab el-Mandab, bringing an intensification of global power competition and potentially turning these chokepoints into flashpoints.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Ethiopia’s Heavy Hand in Tigray Sends a Message

      by

      The crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray region has come to an end — at least on the surface. In November 2020, the Ethiopian National Defense Force quickly recaptured all urban areas in Tigray with the support of the Amhara Fano militia and the Eritrean military. Although the parties avoided major confrontation, the military operation left hundreds of casualties on the ground and displaced an estimated 1 million people across the region, with over 50,000 refugees crossing the border to Sudan.

      In the meantime, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leadership went underground, probably in the remote mountains of Tigray. Despite the initial bravado, the TPLF was unable to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Ethiopian forces, finding itself encircled and losing a considerable portion of its military assets. The TPLF’s very survival will depend on popular support, which, in turn, will depend on how the Ethiopian authorities are going to handle the Tigray region and its civilian population in the foreseeable future. The situation on the ground convinced Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to declare the mission accomplished.

      Israel’s Comeback in the Horn of Africa

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      The heavy hand adopted against the TPLF sent a strong message in multiple directions. Domestically, it targeted Abiy’s Oromo and Amhara allies, but also the movements that currently defy the federal government across Ethiopia. Externally, the prime minister made it clear that the Tigray crisis was essentially a domestic issue, signaling to friends and foes that neither the country’s unity nor is his vision of an Ethiopia-centered regional order is under question. But why was such message deemed necessary in Addis Ababa and what impact did it have?

      A System Under Strain

      The label of “African Yugoslavia” has been hanging over Ethiopia for quite some time. Both states have enshrined a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society reflected in a federal constitutional system. Both countries have been ruled by a strong single party that initially controlled the political system from the center but subsequently gave way to regional, ethno-nationalist components. This shift eventually caused the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In today’s Ethiopia, strong party leadership might ensure a different outcome.

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      Since Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, some events made observers doubt his ability to carry out his reform program and keep Ethiopia’s federation together. In June 2019, an attempted coup orchestrated by the head of the Amhara security forces led to a series of clashes between the Ethiopian army and groups of Amhara rebels. In August 2019, violent protests broke out in Hawassa as local ethnic movements demanded the formation of their own state in the south. On June 29, the killing of a famous Oromo singer sparked widespread riots in Oromia, while a series of ethnic-based murders further inflamed the political climate across the country.

      Then came the constitutional quarrel with the TPLF. Back in June, Addis Ababa indeterminably postponed parliamentary elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The move was criticized by all opposition parties, yet only the TPLF defied the federal government and organized local elections, resulting in a relatively high turnout in support of the Tigrayan leadership. The situation spiraled out of control amid reciprocal accusations of illegitimacy. Ultimately, the TPLF attacked the bases of the Northern Command of the Ethiopian army on the night of November 3. Abiy’s response was swift and resolute, sending a convincing message regarding the state of the federation and his personal leadership.

      The operation targeted the main rival of Abiy’s political project. The Tigrayans bore the brunt of the war against Eritrea and Ethiopia’s Derg regime despite being a small minority in the country. When it came to power in 1991, the TPLF managed to design an ethnic federation and dominate it for nearly 30 years. This was made possible through a careful political strategy that pitted the Oromo and the Amhara, the two major ethnic groups, against one another.

      After his appointment as prime minister, Abiy heralded a new course for Ethiopia based on the unity between the Amhara and Oromo elites within his Prosperity Party. Along with his allies, he began to sideline the Tigray leadership through economic reforms and judicial prosecutions against security officers. This included an array of privatizations of Tigray-dominated public companies and tighter controls over financial flows that curtailed Tigrayan leaders’ grip on the Ethiopian economy. Now, by squashing the TPLF, the prime minister has killed two birds with one stone, eliminating his main domestic opposition and boosting unity among his allies.

      The View from Outside

      Prime Minister Abiy managed to convey a strong message abroad as well. Its first recipients have been Ethiopia’s neighbors in the Horn of Africa. The heavy hand in Tigray signaled that Ethiopia’s internal divisions did not affect the Addis Ababa-centered regional order currently under construction. When he came to power, Abiy understood that his country needed stability around its enormous borders in order to prosper and shield its periphery from instability. This is the reason why he developed strong relations with his Sudanese counterpart, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and, most notably, with Ethiopia’s traditional foes: Eritrea and the Somali federal government.

      The peace with Asmara, in particular, which won Abiy the Nobel Prize in 2019, marked a revolution in Ethiopian foreign policy. One of Addis Ababa’s key priorities is access to the Red Sea, a lack of which has made land-locked Ethiopia overly dependent on neighboring Djibouti. The main obstacle to the Asmara-Addis Ababa relations was once again the Tigrayans, Eritrea’s traditional enemies. Consequently, the operation against the TPLF will help consolidate the partnership between Prime Minister Abiy and Eritrea’s President Isaias Afewerki.

      One collateral victim of the Tigray crisis is the African Union (AU). The Addis Ababa-based organization has become a recognized peacemaker across the continent, as witnessed in Somalia and Sudan. Last year, the Ethiopian prime minister was praised by the AU as an example of African leadership and empowerment. In turn, he demanded the union’s intervention in the mediation over Ethiopia’s dispute with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). While Abiy accepted to meet with AU’s envoys, he made it clear that the Tigray crisis was a domestic issue. This approach undermined the AU’s peacemaking role by revealing that its efficacy is limited to small or failed states while it exerts very little influence over large African nations.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Finally, the message targets friends and foes in the Middle East, where all the regional powerhouses, especially in the Gulf, have stakes in the Horn of Africa. The United Arab Emirates has launched numerous investment projects in Ethiopia and opened a military base in Eritrea. The Tigray crisis represents a direct threat to its interests in the region and possibly provided a reason for alleged air support for the Ethiopian military operation, coupled with calls for mediation.

      Cairo was also closely monitoring the operation in Tigray. With Ethiopia’s dam project threatening Egypt’s water security, Cairo has considered all options, including military ones, as was echoed by US President Donald Trump during a phone call with Abdalla Hamdok and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In addition, there were allegations suggesting Egyptian support for anti-government riots that swept Oromia in the summer. The Tigray crisis could have looked like another opportunity to weaken Addis Ababa as part of the complex chess game around the GERD. But by swiftly suppressing the TPLF insurgency, Abiy eliminated a potential back door for any external power to exert pressure over his government.

      Although the TPLF has never posed a serious military threat to the federal army, the impact of the Tigray conflict on the future of Ethiopia is unquestionable. It laid bare the weaknesses of the country’s ethno-federal system and its propensity for crisis. At the same time, it convinced the prime minister to embrace a tougher approach to domestic challenges. The heavy hand used against the TPLF has delivered a powerful message aimed at consolidating the Amhara-Oromo partnership within the Prosperity Party and drew a red line for other opposition parties that may have considered defying Addis Ababa. Likewise, the military operation signaled to external actors that Ethiopia’s position in the region and beyond is not under discussion.

      Whether this new approach to Ethiopian politics will suffice to keep the federation together is yet to be seen. But the Tigray crisis has shown that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will no longer tolerate direct challenges to his leadership or to Ethiopia’s unity.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Oman Has Much to Offer the EU

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      Oman and the European Union share common interests in a number of political, economic, commercial and security fields. Oman’s strategic location and links to key international trade routes are of great importance to European interests in the region. In September 2018, Brussels and Muscat signed a cooperation agreement, in addition to the one signed by the European External Action Department and the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the aim of strengthening political dialogue and cooperation in sectors of mutual interest.

      Sultan Qaboos Brought Light and Modernity to Oman

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      Oman shares with the EU the challenge of maritime piracy, which is one of the most pressing security issues that both sides face in the Indian Ocean. Since 2008, Oman has been an important partner in Operation Atlanta, the EU Naval Force mission to combat piracy on the coasts of Somalia, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

      Oman’s policy of being open with the world and balanced between the poles on opposing sides of regional conflicts — especially those represented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States — is similar to many EU policies in the Middle East. Muscat has highlighted its role in many regional and international issues, with Omani diplomacy complementing EU efforts to preserve stability and security in the region in ways that serve European interests.

      Investor Confidence

      Oman is considered a major logistical center for the Middle East, with its three major ports of Sohar, Duqm and Salalah, as well as a number of economic, marine and land “free zones.” With the aim of establishing an integrated infrastructure system for Oman, the General Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones was launched in August to supervise the Special Economic Zone in Duqm and the free zones in Mazyouna, Salalah and Sohar.

      Embed from Getty Images

      An attractive environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) was created with the coming into force of the Foreign Capital Investment Law in January this year that allows foreigners to own 100% of investment projects as well as granting tax exemptions and customs duties. Moreover, the law does not set a minimum investment capital, facilitates procedures for establishing investment projects, grants extended rights to the use of investment lands and permits the transfer of capital to investor countries.

      In addition, Oman is the fifth safest country in the world and the third in the region, according to a recent report by Numbeo, which adds to investor confidence. In the first quarter of 2020, FDI reached over 15 billion Omani rials ($40 billion). With money coming from Iran, Kuwait, China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, numbers from the National Center for Statistics and Information indicate that American and British capital constituted the highest share of FDI. The EU, however, has seen low investment rates in the country, with only the Netherlands coming in at roughly 304.7 million rials.

      The Vice President of the European Investment Bank (EBI) Vazil Hudak, during the International Investors Forum held in Muscat in 2019, spoke of the strengths of EU investment in Oman and the “huge” opportunities it offers. EBI is the largest financial investment institution in the world, with assets of more than €600 billion ($726 billion) and annually lends out nearly €70 billion. The EU could deepen its bilateral cooperation with Oman, directing EIB investments to achieve sustainable economic development in Oman, particularly after the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

      Crisis Cooperation

      In the long term, Oman has paid attention to improving its economy by diversifying sources of income and raising the contribution of non-oil sectors to the gross domestic product. Oman was the first of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to develop plans to reduce its dependence on oil and diversify its economy. As a result of these policies, in 2020, Oman achieved nearly 3 billion rials in profits in the non-petroleum sector that made up 28% of the total contribution to the GDP, an increase of 6% over 2019.

      Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying lockdown measures that put strains on the economy, Oman has sought to avoid withdrawing from its sovereign reserves estimated to be worth $17 billion and moved toward setting policies to cut spending and adopt a short-term fiscal balance plan for the next four years with the aim of improving the economic situation and raising the country’s credit rating.

      The EU is currently witnessing difficult times as a result of the pandemic and the severe economic effects associated with it, coinciding with the UK’s exit from the European Union at the end of the year. In light of the circumstances, commercial and economic interests between Oman and the EU should expand into joint action, moving forward on pending agreements, including the free trade agreement that the two sides used to manage collectively through dialogue between the GCC and the EU. These negotiations were hit by apathy due to a lack of agreement over customs tariffs and the continuing blockade of Qatar since 2017. But talks on bilateral free trade agreements between Oman and the EU countries have become crucial to removing trade barriers and spurring economic growth.

      Tourism and transport sectors were among the most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic globally, with analysts predicting that tourism recovery will take up to two years, and air transportation estimated to take anywhere from two to six years. In 2018, the tourism sector contributed 2.6% to the country’s economy and was one of the five key sectors that Oman’s Ninth Five-Year Plan focused on. Given the damage inflicted on the sector during the pandemic, recovery should be stimulated by easing travel procedures. On December 9, Omani authorities issued a decision to exempt citizens of 103 countries (including the EU) from entry visa requirements for 10 days with the aim of stimulating transport and tourism after the pandemic.

      On the European Union side, the decision to exempt Omanis from the Schengen zone is still under consideration despite the ongoing talks between the two sides over the last years. An easing of entry requirements for Omanis will contribute to enhancing tourism traffic between the two sides.

      The cooperation and partnership in times of crisis creates opportunities for broader ties and paths toward economic sustainability, political stability and security for countries. The European Union is an important partner for Oman and can take advantage of the sultanate’s fortunate geographical location. The advancement of Oman-EU relations is an important factor for both sides, especially in the post-COVID-19 era.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Israel’s Comeback in the Horn of Africa

      by

      In 2016, Benjamin Netanyahu was the first Israeli prime minister to visit Africa in 30 years. The visit was consistent with his announced intent to rebuild Israel’s ties with the continent, especially East Africa, where his tour took him through Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Narrowing down focus on the Horn of Africa, Israel has a long history of engagement in the region that dates back to the 1960s. The Red Sea has always been a vital waterway for Tel Aviv as it connects the country to East Africa, Asia and Oceania through the tiny outlet of Eilat.

      This strategic imperative has always been confronted with the hostility of nearly all the states of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden basin. Only Ethiopia and Eritrea have maintained relations with the Jewish state in the past decades, though with some setbacks.

      Not All Arab States Will Normalize Ties With Israel

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      Now, even relations with Israel might see a significant change in the Horn of Africa. The Abraham Accords, signed in September by Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates to normalize bilateral relations with Israel, have caused a diplomatic earthquake in the Middle East and beyond. On the one hand, the treaty turned Abu Dhabi into a broker facilitating dialogue between its regional partners and Israel. On the other, the accords showed the friends and foes of the United States that there is a file rouge between their ties with Washington and their relationship with Tel Aviv.

      The Abraham Accords were undoubtedly part of an effort of the US administration to garner a foreign policy success ahead of the November presidential elections. Yet this policy might stay in place longer, even with a Democrat at the White House. The Horn of Africa mirrors the Middle East in many aspects, and the recognition of Israel might be yet another one.

      Perspective Allies in the Horn

      On October 23, US President Donald Trump made a double announcement about Sudan. He first revealed Khartoum’s intention to normalize ties with Israel. Then he removed Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for the payment of compensation for two terrorist attacks against American embassies in which the regime of erstwhile Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir was involved. The recognition of Israel clearly came down as an additional request for the delisting of Sudan — an indispensable, long-awaited measure that will allow international aid to flow into the country and help Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to address the deepest economic crisis in decades.

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      But the issue of normalization with Israel is a highly contentious one for Sudan. The two countries have a conflicting history. The Jewish state has financed and trained South Sudanese guerrilla groups in the past, while the Arab country has long served as an operational base to ship weapons and aid to Hamas in Gaza. Not surprisingly, the announcement of the normalization sparked protests in Khartoum and led the Islamist National Umma Party to declare its withdrawal from the government coalition. Against this backdrop, the agreement does not seem under immediate threat since the levers of power ultimately remain in the hands of General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagolo and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who chair the Sovereign Council. The two generals benefitted from the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s military and financial support, with Abu Dhabi especially keen to see Sudan build stronger relations with its new ally, Israel.

      Eritrea is another country set to move closer to Tel Aviv. Eritreans received crucial military assistance from Israel during the liberation war against Ethiopia. After obtaining independence in 1991 after 30 years of conflict, Asmara went beyond establishing diplomatic relations and reportedly offered Israel a concession to open a military base on the island of Daklah, strategically located in the Red Sea. However, Eritrea’s growing isolation in the mid-2000s pushed President Isaias Afwerki more into Iran’s sphere of influence and, subsequently, on a collision course with Israel. The Asmara-Tehran alignment then became a key strategic concern for Saudi Arabia and the UAE since Iran allegedly used Eritrean soil as a logistics base to smuggle weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

      This concern prompted the Saudi and Emirati engagement in Eritrea, with Asmara ultimately realigning with the two Gulf states as signaled by the port concessions offered to the Emirati DP World and Eritrea’s membership in the Saudi-sponsored Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Now, with mediation by Abu Dhabi, even relations with Israel might be back on the table if President Afwerki decides to soften his country’s international isolation through a rapprochement with the United States.

      The third actor on the list might be Somaliland. The Somali breakaway republic, which emerged from the collapse of the state back in 1991, is probably holding talks with Tel Aviv, as the chief of Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, Eli Cohen, suggested in a recent interview. Here again, the UAE seems to play a crucial role. Somaliland has become a strong Emirati partner in recent years because of its strategic location looking out to the Gulf of Aden and southern Yemen. The alliance between Abu Dhabi and Hargeisa took shape around the concession of the port of Berbera to DP World and the construction of an Emirati airbase nearby.

      Inching Closer

      The UAE is very well positioned to bring Somaliland and Israel closer. Besides gaining a useful security partner in the fight against al-Shabaab, Hargeisa might see a rapprochement with the Jewish state as valuable political capital to sell to Washington in exchange for advancement in the process of recognition of its independence from Mogadishu. But Somaliland is not the only Somali state to enjoy strong ties with the UAE. Puntland in the north and Jubaland in the south are ruled by state governments similarly aligned to Abu Dhabi that could also require Israeli assistance against terrorism or even the Somali federal government in the future.Last but not least, there is Ethiopia. Addis Ababa and Tel Aviv resumed bilateral diplomacy in 1989, when the Derg military regime was toppled in Ethiopia. After years of clement relations, in September 2019, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took a successful visit to Israel. On that occasion, he signed a joint declaration with Benjamin Netanyahu that underlined their intention to foster cooperation, particularly in terms of bilateral trade, as well as military, economic and technological assistance. In this specific situation, it might be Israel that pulls the brakes on cooperation in order to avoid any steps that might antagonize Egypt, currently at loggerheads with Addis Ababa over the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Blue Nile.

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      Finally, the two remaining states in the Horn of Africa, Somalia and Djibouti, do not seem willing to reproach Israel. The reason for that can be found in the relations that these countries enjoy with Turkey and Qatar as well as in the lack of incentives from the United States to move in that direction.Given Israel’s new posture in the Middle East and Africa, more states might be willing to open to Israel — or be pressed to do so — in order to improve their relations with the US and the UAE. Yet the Palestinian issue is still a contentious topic in the vast majority of the Muslim and the post-colonial world. This makes bilateral relations with Israel a divisive issue, both in domestic and regional politics. At the domestic level, recognition of Israel is often perceived as a betrayal of the Palestinian people, especially in those countries where the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist movements are active, such as Sudan.

      At the regional level, the Turkey-Qatar axis firmly opposes any opening to Israel and has deep political, economic and security ties with many state and non-state actors across the Horn of Africa. Consequently, any agreement with Israel is likely to fuel internal dissent and entrench regional polarization at the same time. While new bilateral relations are always good news for the international system, normalization with Israel should be handled more carefully than other rapprochements.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      What Turkey Stands to Gain From Its Natural Gas Discovery

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      Turkey’s first natural gas discovery was undoubtedly breaking news. As the world focused its attention on the escalation between Ankara and Athens in the eastern Mediterranean over natural resources and maritime borders, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the announcement on August 21 that marked the end of Turkey’s unsuccessful quest for indigenous oil and gas. If confirmed, the discovery of a 320-billion-cubic-meter natural gas deposit off Turkey’s Black Sea coast will enhance the country’s energy security and could help shape Ankara’s foreign policy trajectory.

      For years, Turkey has been tirelessly looking for oil and gas. To do so, Ankara mainly relied on the expertise of foreign companies. Encouraged by the recent discoveries of significant gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean, Ankara stepped up its efforts in the region as well as the Black Sea. This time, however, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) decided to explore opportunities on its own. As a result, TPAO purchased three drilling ships — Fatih, Yavuz and Kanuni, all named after Ottoman sultans — between 2017 and 2020, and deployed them in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The plan worked: Fatih was instrumental in making the August discovery.

      Discovery of Natural Gas Exposes Turkey’s Political Rifts

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      The finding could alleviate Turkey’s energy import options and equip Ankara with a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations with traditional suppliers. It could also help to transform TPAO into a significant player in the industry. The petroleum company has already made strides in this regard. During the last several years, the TPAO has intensified its efforts in oil and gas exploration and production.

      The company has also taken advantage of rapprochement between Ankara and the UN-recognized Libyan government in Tripoli in order to resume projects halted in 2014. Back then, the TPAO announced the successful completion of wells in Sirte and Sebha. In April, partnered with Russian Zarubezhneft, TPAO signed preliminary deals to participate in its upstream sector and has made strides in Algeria by signing up to an onshore project together with Sonatrach and Zarubezhneft. Furthermore, Turkish authorities have been vocal about their intentions to invest in Somalia’s and Ethiopia’s oil and gas sectors.

      Given the complexity of deep-water drilling, TPAO’s inexperience when it comes to offshore projects and the costliness of such endeavors, the development of the Black Sea fields may require partnerships with more experienced companies. Turkish authorities have already mulled over a potential collaboration with Russian and Iranian companies, but it seems less likely given the state of Ankara’s relations with both countries. Ankara has diverging interests with Tehran and Moscow in Syria and is also trying to reduce dependence on both Russian and Iranian gas supplies. Therefore, Turkey will likely be reluctant to add another dimension to this complex web of relations by inviting a Russian or Iranian company to the project. It is more likely for Turkish companies to partner with companies from friendly states with experience developing such complex and costly projects.

      TPAO has already partnered with the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in upstream projects in the Caspian Sea. Given the fraternal relations between the two countries, which have only solidified in light of the recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, SOCAR’s engagement in the project is not excluded. Ankara’s unequivocal support for Baku in the conflict with Armenia and Azerbaijan’s increasingly growing share in natural gas supplies to Turkey could be easily translated into cooperation in the oil and gas sector as well.  

      TPAO may also partner with Qatar Petroleum, which has extensive experience in managing such complex deep-water projects. Turkish authorities have already suggested such a possibility. In March, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that Ankara is considering a partnership with Malaysian, British and Qatari companies in the eastern Mediterranean. Qatar Petroleum has decades of experience in operating the North Dome, the largest natural gas field in the world. Turkey and Qatar may use the opportunity to capitalize on their political relations and channel the geopolitical alignment into cooperation in the business sector.

      If the findings are confirmed, aside from providing a strategic advantage in the energy sector, the deposits will be a crucial element in bolstering Turkey’s foreign policy efforts, such as the Blue Homeland strategy and the pivot to the Maghreb and the Sahel. TPAO’s recent expansion abroad, especially in Africa, indicates the prerogatives of Ankara’s foreign policy goals. Turkey already faces strong opposition from almost all eastern Mediterranean littoral states that have collectively aligned to resist Ankara’s endeavors. To cope with these challenges, Turkey will need to build geopolitical alliances and economic partnerships of its own.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Can Lebanon Overcome Its Sectarian Political Order?

      by

      Either the global COVID-19 pandemic or the catastrophic blast at the port of Beirut on August 4 could not have hit Lebanon at a worse time. The explosion killed nearly 200 people and displaced 300,000 residents, resulting in damage worth an estimated $15 billion. Prior to the tragedy, Lebanon was already experiencing daily blackouts. Given the strained infrastructure following the explosion, there is a real risk that the pandemic could spiral out of control.

      Mired in a severe crisis that shook the country and the instability stemming from last year’s “WhatsApp Revolution,” both developments unfolded as Lebanon’s volatile political order has been falling apart. According to the country’s 1926 constitution, the state is non-denominational, but it has the obligation to protect and guarantee the free exercise of all recognized faiths.

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      In practice, the system, commonly called muhasasa taifiya, means that political posts are proportionally allocated along confessional criteria. The presidency of the republic goes to a Maronite Christian since Maronites represented the majority confession at the time of the system’s conception; the prime minister is a Sunni, and the president of the chamber a Shia. Over time, expanding Muslim communities demanded a revision to reflect the demographic changes.

      In 1989, the Taif Accords, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, rebalanced the distribution of powers, but only partially. The system has influenced all areas of public life while exacerbating tensions among various communities. More significantly, many Lebanese blame the taifiya for clientelism, which breeds corruption. The thousands of protesters who descended on the streets of Lebanon through much of 2019 demanded radical amendments to the constitution to overturn its confessional nature.

      Sectarian Health Care

      The pandemic, in its most intense phase, managed to bring the anti-government demonstrations, which led to Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation, to a halt. But now the Lebanese people will have to deal with the aftermath of the explosion, a deepening economic crisis and a potential second wave of coronavirus infections.

      Lebanon’s physical and institutional structures are in a state of decay. The World Health Organization (WHO) has launched an international campaign to raise some $15 million for the country’s hospitals to help confront the shortage of medicines, exacerbated by the eroding purchasing power of the Lebanese lira. This might prove insufficient given that a large part of Lebanon’s population lives in refugee camps. Syrian refugees alone account for 30% of the country’s total population, and many could be excluded from securing help.

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      The situation could have been worse. Fortunately, only 20% of Lebanon’s available hospital beds are filled by COVID-19 patients. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs monitored 55 Beirut area hospitals, concluding that only 47% of these facilities are able to work at full capacity, guaranteeing all services. This has increased pressure on remaining facilities, which happen to be privately owned — as are 85% of all hospitals and clinics in the country — by the various confessional parties.

      The complex network of taifiya clientelism has reached far beyond the political into the social sphere. This heightens the very sectarian frictions that have weakened Lebanon’s socio-political fabric, hampering the provision of adequate care. Public spending on health, as well as education and other social services, has been geographically distributed according to confessional criteria on the basis of the political or confessional affiliation of the minister in charge of the relevant portfolio. Thus, it is the minister’s position that plays a decisive role in resource allocation instead of the actual needs of the population in a given area or region.

      The combination of deeply-rooted clientelist mechanisms and the wild privatization drive of the 1990s and early 2000s under Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri have resulted in many, mostly poor, Lebanese being effectively denied access to adequate medical care. The pandemic and the financial crisis have worsened an already intolerable situation. The American University Medical Center, one of the finest hospitals in Lebanon, was forced to dismiss hundreds of staff last July.

      Economic Collapse

      Already struggling with inflation and unemployment, Lebanon lacks the resources to compensate workers who have lost their jobs or offer free medicines to those most in need, who are destined to increase in number. In other words, Lebanon faces the unenviable choice of either enforcing a lockdown to control the spread of the coronavirus or losing total control of the contagion by allowing businesses to stay open in order to keep its struggling economy afloat.

      The pandemic — and the lockdown it mandated — came during the worst financial crisis in Lebanon’s history. Just days before the WHO declared the coronavirus a pandemic on March 11, Prime Minister Hassan Diab announced a default on Lebanon’s €1.2-billion eurobond. The default triggered a massive devaluation of the lira. The resulting hyperinflation hit both the most vulnerable sections of the population as well as the middle class. Prices for most food and consumer products doubled.

      Estimates suggest that one in three Lebanese is either unemployed or has received half, or sometimes just a quarter, of their salary due to the lockdown restrictions. And the official statistics fail to consider Palestinian and Syrian refugees, who face economic hardships in the best of times, let alone during a pandemic.

      The Lebanese people blame their country’s banking sector, specifically the central bank, Banque du Liban, and its governor, Riad Salameh, for their plight. Hezbollah, the largest party in parliament, demanded Salameh be fired, describing the banker as a stooge for American efforts to bankrupt the armed group, which Washington has designated as a terrorist organization since 1997. But the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, has refused to sack Salameh, who has played a key role in negotiating with foreign shareholders to cut Lebanon’s massive $87-billion debt, which stands at 170% of the country’s GDP.

      Most Lebanese people face economic challenges worse than those of the 1975-1990 civil war, and there’s some truth to the assumption that the chances of dying from COVID-19 or starvation are roughly the same today. The lockdown and a nationwide curfew, coupled with the country’s chronic economic vulnerabilities, have dealt a deadly blow even against the types of businesses that had managed to survive wars. Restaurants and bars have closed under the pressure of surging prices for basic goods and low demand due to financial collapse.

      Perpetuating the System

      Despite the debilitating effects of the pandemic, these appear as a mere footnote to the longstanding problems that have led some to label Lebanon as a failed state long before 2020. But for Hezbollah, which enjoys a parliamentary majority, and for the other political actors as well, a radical shift away from Lebanon’s confessional underpinnings implies political suicide. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for Lebanon’s political class to regain the people’s trust.

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      The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is tasked with investigating the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri, has convicted just one of the four Hezbollah-affiliated defendants. The verdict, which many Lebanese believed would find all four guilty, was widely expected to trigger riots and potentially plunge Lebanon into a political death spiral, pitting Sunni supporters of Saad Hariri’s Mustaqbal Party against Shia supporters of Hezbollah.

      That death spiral could still occur, but for the time being, the Lebanese people appear to have little energy for protesting, let alone for violent riots or another civil war, considering the current and seemingly intractable socio-economic crisis. Indeed, the lenient verdict in the Hariri case opens a narrow path, but a path nonetheless, toward unblocking loans and donations that have been hindered by sanctions against Hezbollah.

      It is, therefore, not entirely futile to maintain hope that Lebanon might find the fortitude to survive the complex combination of calamities hanging over the country. In the medium and longer terms, there are few economic solutions to effect substantial changes. Lebanon’s neoliberal economic order has few outlets for manufacturing or other production-based activities. Only heavy cash injections into the banking system from allies can fill the gap.

      Yet this economic model serves to perpetuate the sectarian political system that encourages foreign meddling. Notably, the rise of a Shia political consciousness in the 1960s and 1970s, which led to the formation of parties such as Amal and later Hezbollah, has invited considerable Iranian interest and support. Iranian interference contrasted with the Christian links to France or Sunni connections to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, rather than helping to end the cycle of foreign meddling, the COVID-19 emergency and the port explosion appear to have reinvited France to the messy Lebanese chessboard.

      France is ready to take advantage of this weakness. President Emmanuel Macron, during his recent visits to Beirut, has shown that he clearly wants Lebanon back in France’s sphere of interest, tying economic aid for reconstruction to political reform — in the sense of weakening Hezbollah, which has benefited from the taifiya, and links to Iran. But Turkey appears ready to challenge Macron’s ambitions. Turkish vice president, Fuat Oktay, also received a warm welcome in Beirut. He was keen to express solidarity and even happier to condemn French neo-colonialism.

      Of course, history suggests that Turkey’s aims might not be too different than those of France, namely to play a major hand in reshaping Lebanese politics in order to advance its own neo-Ottoman projection. Lebanon, before becoming a French protectorate, was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and the link between Turkey and Lebanon’s Turkmen population is still strong. It is to this minority that the Turkish foreign minister has promised citizenship after proposing to the Lebanese government the use of the port of Mersin until the port of Beirut is operational again.

      Failure to Reform

      As for the kind of radical political reform calling for a complete overhaul of the sectarian division of power, there are few opportunities for any significant change. The pandemic, along with the limited financial resources, may, in fact, serve to perpetuate the taifiya system as people become forced to rely on their traditional sources of solidarity and support, all of which are competing over a smaller pie of resources.

      The appointment of Mustapha Adib as Lebanon’s new prime minister suggests that the system will continue for the time being. Adib takes over from Hassan Diab, who resigned on August 10, and is a relative unknown. His career has been largely in academia and diplomacy, and he most recently served as ambassador to Berlin. It appears that former leaders Saad Hariri, Fouad Siniora and Najib Mikati backed Adib’s appointment. Adib is a Sunni Muslim, as the taifiya demands, and he has a good relationship with Hezbollah. But it is unlikely that the new head of government will have the ability to engage in anything more than a cosmetic change.

      In Lebanese politics, it has always been a case of “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” — The more it changes, the more it remains the same. It is clear that while the population at large has demanded radical changes and the de facto dissolution of the taifiya, such a change will not be forthcoming without considerable struggle, both social and political. On September 1, demonstrators poured into the streets of Beirut to demand the resignation of the government in toto. Before Adib could even settle in his role, he is faced with the kind of popular mobilization that forced the resignation of his predecessor.

      Fixing Lebanon now and reforming, let alone scrapping the taifiya — after a string of failed governments, in the midst of an unprecedented global pandemic compounded by one of the worst non-nuclear explosions in history, as competing foreign interests create further tensions — would require nothing short of a biblical effort.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.] More