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    India Is Slowly Evolving Into a Market Economy

    India has come a long way since its independence from colonial rule in 1947. It started as a mixed economy where elements of both capitalism and socialism coexisted uneasily. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, was a self-declared Fabian socialist who admired the Soviet Union. His daughter, Indira Gandhi, amended the constitution in 1976 and declared India to be a socialist country. She nationalized banks, insurance companies, mines and more. 

    Gandhi tied Indian industry in chains. She imposed capacity constraints, price controls, foreign exchange control and red tape. India’s colonial-era bureaucracy now ran the commanding heights of the economy. Such measures stifled the Indian economy, created a black market and increased bureaucratic corruption. The Soviet-inspired Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices remains infamous to this day.

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    India also adopted the Soviet five-year plans. A centralized economy emerged with the state controlling the media and telecom, financial, infrastructure and energy sectors. Even in seemingly private sectors such as consumer and industrial, the state handled too many aspects of investment, production and resource allocation.

    Opening Up the Economy

    In the 1980s, India took gentle strides toward a market economy and opened many sectors to private competition. In 1991, the Gulf War led to a spike in oil prices, causing a balance-of-payments crisis. In response, India rolled back the state and liberalized its economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union that year pushed India toward a more market-oriented economy. 

    Over the years, state-run monopolies have been decimated by private companies in industries such as aviation and telecoms. However, India still retains a strong legacy of socialism. The government remains a major participant in sectors such as energy and financial services.

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    After years of piecemeal reforms, the Indian government is again unleashing bolder measures. These involve the opening up of several state monopolies to private competition. They are diluting state ownership of public sector units. In some cases, they are selling these units to domestic or foreign buyers. In due course, professionals, not bureaucrats, will be running this sector.

    The government’s bold move to privatization is because of two reasons. First, India’s public sector has proved notoriously inefficient and been a burden on the taxpayer. Second, the COVID-19 pandemic has made the economy shrink and caused a shortfall in tax revenue. Privatization is a way for the government to balance its books.

    As Shwweta Punj, Anilesh S. Mahajan and M.G. Arun rightly point out in India Today, the country “will have to rethink how it sells” its public sector units for privatization to be a success. India’s track record is poor. The banana peels of political opposition, bureaucratic incompetence and judicial proceedings lie in waiting.

    Potential Benefits of Privatization

    Yet privatization, if managed well, could lead to several benefits. It will lead to more efficiently managed businesses and a more vibrant economy. Once a state-controlled firm is privatized, it could either be turned around by its new owner or perish. In case the company fails, it would create space for better players. Importantly, privatization could strengthen the government’s fiscal position, giving it greater freedom to invest in sectors like health care and education where the Indian government has historically underinvested. Furthermore, privatization could increase investable opportunities in both public and private markets.

    Given India’s fractious nature and labyrinthine institutions, privatization is likely to lead to mixed results and uneven progress. One thing is certain, though. Privatization is inevitable and cannot be rolled back. Sectors in which market forces reign supreme and shareholder interests are aligned are likely to do well. State-controlled companies that prioritize policy goals over shareholder value are unlikely to do so. Similarly, sectors that have experienced frequent policy changes are unlikely to thrive. 

    There is a reason why savvy investors are constructing portfolios weighted toward consumer and technology sectors. So far, companies in these sectors have operated largely free of state intervention. They have had the liberty to grow and function autonomously. Unsurprisingly, they have delivered good returns.

    The state-dominated financial services sector also offers promise. Well-managed private companies have a long runway to speed up on. Among large economies, India’s financial services sector offers unique promise. In the capitalist US, the state has limited presence and private players dominate. This mature market offers few prospects of high growth. In communist China, state-controlled firms dominate financial services, leaving little space for the private sector. With the Indian government planning to reduce its stake in a state-controlled life insurance company, as well as sell two state-owned banks and one general insurance company, the financial services sector arguably offers a uniquely important opportunity for investors.

    Just as India did well after its 1991 balance-of-payments crisis, the country may bounce back after the COVID-19 pandemic. The taxpayer may no longer need to subsidize underperforming state-owned companies holding the country back. Instead, market competition may attract investment, create jobs and increase growth.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The Good Old Days: Nostalgia’s Political Appeal

    Donald Trump is gone, yet his specter continues to haunt American politics. The UK is no longer part of the European Union, yet Brexit continues to provoke emotions on both sides of the Channel. Both Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election and the outcome of the Brexit referendum of 2016 were driven by a range of widespread and profound emotions. One of the most prominent was nostalgia.

    Nostalgia has been around for ages. The first one to recognize its significance was a Swiss doctor, Johannes Hofer. In 1688, Hofer coined the word — a compound derived from the Greek nostro, meaning “home,” and algos, meaning “pain” — to describe what he considered to be a medical malaise he detected among Swiss mercenary soldiers, expressed as a profound yearning for their home (what in German is called Heimweh — homesickness).

    Hofer might have drawn inspiration from Homer’s Odyssey. Its hero, after spending seven years in the company of the sea nymph Calypso, felt compelled to return home. The longing to see his home was so overwhelming that he rejected Calypso’s offer to make him immortal if he stayed.

    The Meaning of Nostalgia

    Since Hofer’s times, the meaning of nostalgia has both substantially changed and significantly broadened. It is no longer associated with homesickness. Instead, in today’s parlance, nostalgia stands for “a sentimental longing for one’s past.” More specifically, nostalgia stands for a yearning for an idealized, lost past, a past more often than not seen through rose-tinted glasses. For a long time, nostalgia was seen as a pathology, reflecting the refusal to confront an unpleasant present and an even worse future.

    In this view, the yearning for “an irretrievable past becomes a narcissistic illusion,” a “deflection from current unpleasant circumstances.” More recently, however, nostalgia is predominantly seen as a positive emotion, an effective coping mechanism in times of turmoil and crisis. In this case, nostalgia serves as “an important resource that helps people find meaning in life and regulate meaning-related distress.” In the face of tectonic demographic, technological and geopolitical changes, seeking comfort in a past where life was arguably simpler and easier to navigate is human, all too human. As Edoardo Campanella and Marta Dassu have put it, nostalgia “offers relief from socio-economic angst. Yesterday is associated with progress; tomorrow with stasis or regression.”  

    This type of nostalgia — because nostalgia comes in different guises — reflects “an affective yearning for a community with a collective memory, a longing for continuity in a fragmented world.” In this context, as Matthias Stephan has recently suggested, nostalgia represents “both a look back to an idealized past (whether real or imagined) and a hope that the romanticized past will become our future.”

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    Here, nostalgia “inevitably reappears as a defense mechanism in a time of accelerated rhythms of life and historical upheavals.” The author of these lines, Svetlana Boym, characterized this iteration as “restorative nostalgia.” Against this, Boym sets what she called “reflective nostalgia.” Reflective nostalgia accepts the fact that the past is past, that it cannot be retrieved. As Hal McDonald has put it, “This acknowledgment of the irretrievability of our autobiographical past provides an aesthetic distance that allows us to enjoy a memory in the same way that we enjoy a movie or a good book.”

    At the same time, it engenders a realistic, and perhaps even critical, view of the past. It is this constellation that makes nostalgia extremely political. In fact, because of its inherently binary nature, nostalgia is ideally suited to inform both progressive and reactionary politics.

    Today, nostalgia is primarily evoked on the nationalist right. More often than not, this is a type of nostalgia that depends on the “disparagement of the present,” which Christopher Lasch once considered the “hallmark of the nostalgic attitude.” Feeling discombobulated by and disenchanted with the present, as well as uneasy about the future, a growing number of people feel tempted to go down the memory lane and retreat to the past where, as the German expression goes, the world was presumably still in order.

    When the World Was in Order

    On the nationalist right, it is particularly radical right-wing populist parties and actors that have drawn the greatest political benefit from the appeal to nostalgia. Donald’s Trump is a prominent case in point. His campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” implies that there was a time when the United States was still great, that today it no longer is, but that tomorrow it will be great again — as long as the people follow The Donald.

    The promoters of Brexit played a similar tune. Nigel Farage, the former leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), holding up his new non-EU passport and triumphantly exclaiming, “We got our passports back!,” evoked a time when Great Britain still maintained the pretense to be a great power rather than one among 28 EU member states where it was not even primus inter pares. Once freed from the shackles of the EU, a once again completely sovereign Great Britain would regain its lost glory. Or, as Britain’s Secretary of Defense Gavin Williamson claimed in late 2018, once Britain was out of the European Union, it would become a “true global player,” establishing new military bases all over the world. As an article in the Financial Times from early 2016 put it, “Brexiters are Nostalgics in Search of a Lost Empire.”

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    Public opinion polls conducted a few months prior to the referendum provided ample evidence of the extent to which the British public glorified the country’s past. In early 2016, a YouGov poll found more than 40% of British respondents expressing pride in Britain’s colonial history; about the same number thought the British Empire had been a good thing. Only a fifth of respondents had a negative view. In a similar survey, two years earlier, around 50% of respondents thought that Britain’s former colonies were better off today because they had been part of the British Empire, while a third thought that it would be a good thing if Britain still had an empire. At the same, there were strong sentiments that Britain was in decline. In fact, some 80% of “leavers” shared that view in 2016.

    Hardly surprising that, in the wake of the referendum, one of Britain’s leading tabloids, The Daily Star, called on its readers to “Make Britain Great Again!” Nostalgia, paired with mass delusion and a portion of righteous resentment, obviously paid handsome political dividends — at least for Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson and their comrades in arms.

    Similarly in the United States, Trump’s main slogan “Make America Great Again” appealed to widespread nostalgia, particularly among the country’s white majority. In September 2016, for instance, half of the respondents in the annual American Values Survey agreed with the statement that their country’s best days were “behind us.” A few months earlier, a Pew survey found more than 45% of respondents agreeing with the statement that compared to 50 years earlier, life for people like them had gotten worse.

    Among Trump supporters, three out of four agreed with that statement. In a similar vein, one year earlier, around half of US respondents in a representative poll thought that “America’s best days” were in the past. At the same time, in 2016, more than 60% of Americans believed their children would be worse off than they were. This is also reflected in surveys that seek to gauge what Americans think about, for instance, the American dream — the notion that hard work will allow them to get ahead.

    Most notably, these sentiments were particularly pronounced among America’s white population, far more than among African Americans, Hispanics and other minorities. Donald Trump, ever so tuned in to the grievances of white America, stoked the fire of white resentment, charging, at a town hall meeting in the fall of 2015, that “the American dream is in trouble,” only to add the promise that with him in the White House, “we will get it back.” To be sure, this was hardly original. Four years earlier, the Republican Platform already committed to “Restoring the American Dream.”

    The Good Old Days

    Conjuring up idealized images of the good old days is a crucial tool in the ideational repertoire of nativist and national-populist parties and actors. And for good reasons. For one, the evocation of nostalgic fantasies creates a sense of collective identity, community and a common purpose, all of them of central concern on the radical populist right. At the same time, in the hands of radical right-wing populists, nostalgia serves as an indirect indictment of the present, linked to an appeal to the notion that the best of the past could somehow replace the current situation.

    Here, nostalgia represents what S. D. Chrostowska has called a “malaise of dissatisfaction with the present and the direction that present” has taken. The more profound and widespread collective disenchantment with the present happens to be, the more pronounced is the appeal of the past. An exemplary case in point is a sociological study from 2016 in Poland, whose authors explored the extent to which nostalgia for the communist period was prevalent among current-day Poles. The results were striking. They showed that people who felt they had been better off during that period than at present were much more nostalgic and had a significantly better opinion about the communist government than other respondents.

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    Poland is hardly unique. The arguably best-known case of post-communist nostalgia is what in German is known as Ostalgie. Ostalgie entails a revaluation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) — former East Germany — on the part of a substantial part of its population following reunification. To a large extent, this was in response to “the perceived threat of a West German depreciation of their life experiences.” Substantial numbers of citizens in the east had the feeling that they and their past were treated with condescension, if not outright disdain. Even 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the sentiment that easterners are second-class citizens finds widespread resonance in what once was the GDR. Ostalgie is all about a demand for recognition, dignity and respect rather than crude material interests. As sociologist Cecilia Ridgeway has noted, we tend to forget “how much people care about public acknowledgement of their worth.”

    Yet they tend to “care about status quite as intensely as they do [about] money and power.” They want “to be someone.” Ostalgie is also informed by the sentiment that in the GDR, ordinary workers were valued — they were someone. Not for nothing, the GDR prided itself on being an Arbeiter und Bauernstaat — the state of workers and farmers.

    Nostalgia in post-communist societies might be somewhat puzzling to outside observers, yet politically it is of no consequences. There is no craving for a return of what in German was known as Realsozialismus — loosely translated as “actually existing socialism.” A regime that imprisoned its citizens behind walls, barbed wires and minefields in order to prevent them from fleeing the country has nothing in common with the radical humanist spirit of socialism, reflected, for instance, in Karl Marx’s “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” and the writings of leading exponents of the Frankfurt School.

    Radical Reconstruction

    Matters are entirely different when populist leaders use nostalgia for the dismantling and radical (from the roots) reconstitution of a society’s collective identity. This is what has happened with two of the most important contemporary populist regimes: Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey and Narendra Modi’s India. At first sight, the two cases could not be more different. Here, a representative of political Islam, there, of political Hinduism. Yet below the surface, the similarities are quite striking.

    These similarities are seen, in particular, in the place nostalgia — and the appeal to nostalgia — has in the rhetoric of both leaders. In the Turkish case, nostalgia is reflected in what Turkish observers have called neo-Ottomanism. Erdogan, as Hakan Yavuz has argued, has been seeking “to remold Turkey in the form of an imagined, ahistorical conceptualization of the former Ottoman Empire.” The ultimate objective is “to resurrect a powerful Muslim state in the ancestral mold of the former Ottoman Empire.”

    At the same time, Erdogan’s political project represents a frontal assault on and complete disavowal of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s foundation of the modern “Kemalist” Turkish state. This project was based on a progressive, secular vision of equality adopted from the French Revolution. Here, citizenship and identity derive from a common adherence to civic principles; in the case of Erdogan’s project, citizenship and identity derive from adherence to a common ethno-religious community, which bodes ill for Turkey’s minorities such as Kurds and Armenians.

    In the Indian case, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party, BJP), has never made a secret of the fact that it seeks to eradicate the legacy of Nehruvian secularism and replace it with Hindutva. Long before Modi became prime minister, the BJP mobilized against what it called Nehru’s “pseudo-secularism.” In reality, the BJP charged, secularism discriminated against Hindus while according concessions to India’s sizeable Muslim minority. In fact, in 2018, Sonia Gandhi admitted that the BJP had managed to convince a sizeable portion of the Indian public that the Indian National Congress was a pro-Muslim and, implicitly, anti-Hindu party.

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    Central to the BJP’s ideology is the myth of the Vedic golden age, exemplified, in particular, by the reign of the mythical Ram, largely seen as the epitome of India’s golden age. This golden age came to an abrupt end with the Muslim invasion and conquest, which ushered in what Modi has characterized as “1,200 years of slavery.” This is the central trope of Hindu nationalist historiography and victimology — the juxtaposition of “a glorious Hindu golden age followed by an era of Muslim oppression.”

    In order to bolster their case of that golden age, Hindu nationalists have gone to great lengths, in some cases transcending into the ridiculous. A case in point is the various claims that in ancient times, India already achieved stunning scientific and technological accomplishments, from advanced reproductive technologies to stem cell research, “spacecraft, the internet, and nuclear weapons — long before Western science come on the scene.” More often than not, these claims were advanced not by crackpots but by respected scientists fallen under the sway of Hindu nationalist nostalgia.

    In both cases, the combination of nostalgia and populism serves to mobilize the “true” people against a Westernized elite, from — but not of — the people. At the same time, it serves as a means to eradicate national humiliations: in the case of India, centuries of being subjugated to Islamic rulers; in the Turkish case, the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, symbolized by the Treaty of Sèvres which, had it ever been implemented, would have left only a small area around Ankara under Turkish rule.  

    Erdogan’s recent decision to reclassify the Hagia Sophia — once the “ultimate icon of Christian civilization” — as a mosque, constitutes a reversal of Kemalist “secularist suppression.” Similarly, laying the foundations of a Ram temple on the site of an ancient mosque, known as Babri Masjid, in the city of Ayodhya in northern India, serves as highly visible expressions of the will to reverse — and perhaps even avenge — the past.

    Resurrecting Grievances

    The arguably most successful populist resort to this combination of grievance-based nostalgia and the exploitation of national humiliation is epitomized by Hungary’s Victor Orban. To be sure, Hungarians have good reasons for historically-grounded grief — the bloody suppression of the Hungarian people’s 1956 uprising against the communist regime and the Soviets is a prominent case in point. The most important episode, however, which continues to haunt Hungarian collective national consciousness until today, dates back to 1920, when the victorious powers imposed on Hungary the Trianon Treaty. The treaty deprived Hungary of two-thirds of its prewar territory and three-fifths of its prewar population, which turned Hungary into what Stanley Payne has called “the most nationally aggrieved state in all of Europe.”

    Victor Orban has been particularly adroit not only in manipulating diffuse sentiments of humiliation and resentment but also in evoking nostalgia for Hungary’s golden age. This was the period spanning from the formation of the dual monarchy following Vienna’s defeat in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, which put the Hungarians on par with the Austrians until the end of the First World War — a period which saw all ethnic Hungarians united in the same state. Together, these two ideational elements constitute the core of Orban’s national-populist project, which over the past decade or so has progressively gained cultural hegemony in Hungary.

    Orban, Modi and Erdogan are prominent examples of how nationalist-populist actors have weaponized nostalgia for political gain the same way they have weaponized other emotions such as anxiety, anger and empathy. As Yale professor Paul Bloom has recently pointed out in his indictment of emotional empathy, “unscrupulous politicians use our empathy for victims of certain crimes to motivate anger and hatred toward other, marginalized, groups.” Emblematic of this strategy is Donald Trump’s exploitation of “our empathic feelings toward victims of rape and assault to build hatred toward undocumented immigrants.”

    Here, Trump instinctively exploited a central characteristic of this emotion, namely its intrinsic in-group bias. Neuropsychological studies suggest that more often than not, empathy extends significantly more to those we feel close to rather than out-groups, “potentially making them likely targets for prejudice and discrimination.”

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    The same is true for nostalgia. Experiments in social psychology have shown that collective nostalgia — the type of nostalgia routinely evoked by national populist actors — tends to confer “sociability benefits,” such as support and loyalty, to the in-group while tending to evoke exclusionary sentiments toward out-groups. Constantine Sedikides and Tim Wildschut have argued that “Collective nostalgia’s sociality is amenable to exploitation and can have controversial ramifications.” A recent empirical study on the effect of national nostalgia on out-group perceptions in the context of the 2016 US presidential election shows that national nostalgia “significantly predicted racial prejudice and this relationship was mediated by perceived outgroup threat.”

    This also holds true for Europe. A Bertelsmann study on nostalgia from 2018 found that more than three-quarters of European respondents classified as nostalgics (two-thirds of the sample) agreed with the statement that recent immigrants did not want to integrate into the host society; more than half thought they were taking jobs away from the natives. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that radical right-wing populist parties have found fertile ground for their nativist politics of exclusion.

    A case in point is the adoption of the concept of the folkhemmet by the Sweden Democrats, the country’s radical populist right. The folkhemmet (people’s home) stands for the heydays of Sweden’s Social Democratic welfare state, a golden age that spanned four decades, from the 1930s to the 1970s. This was a time of ethnocultural homogeneity, civic egalitarianism and social solidarity. The Sweden Democrats’ adoption of the sentimental notion of the folkhemmet appeals to nostalgic sentiments while, at the same time, serving as a justification for the exclusion of non-ethnic minorities such as refugees from social benefits.

    The Sweden Democrats’ manipulation of nostalgia in the service of their politics of welfare chauvinism is exemplary of the flexible and polyvalent possibilities of applying this emotion. It is for this reason that nostalgia lends itself ideally to national populist mobilization. One of the central ideational tropes informing populism is the notion of the united people, a unity derived from a shared past and a common destiny, confronting a common adversary, if not an enemy. The evocation of a glorious past is a great way to make people feel good about themselves at a time when there is little to be cheerful or optimistic about.

    These days, the glorious past is not far away, not more than two years, the time before social distancing, lockdowns and vaccination jitters. Under the circumstances, nostalgia is likely to persist, ready to be exploited by populist entrepreneurs for political gain. Those who still think that the pandemic will substantially weaken support for the radical populist right might take a look at Spain. There, Vox, whose rhetoric is replete with nostalgia, is the only party that has substantially increased its support base over the past several months.

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Where India Went Wrong

    In just over a month, India has gone from boasting about its vaccine diplomacy to becoming the global epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic. As this author explained in a previous article, many have questioned whether India’s vaccine diplomacy was a bold masterstroke or an unwise distraction.

    Before the start of the second wave of COVID-19 infections in March, the pandemic seemed to be under control in India. In September 2020, the country recorded an average of 95,000 daily cases of COVID-19 during the peak of the first wave. By January 2021, that figure had dropped to under 20,000.

    At the same time, the United States went from around 35,000 confirmed cases per day in September to a peak of over 300,000 in January. At the start of the year, the United Kingdom was in the midst of a deadly second wave of infections, which reached over 60,000 cases a day. At that time, Britain was battling a more contagious strain of COVID-19 known as the “Kent variant,” which is named after the region where it was first discovered in England. Countries in Europe and around the world raced to halt flights to and from the UK in a bid to control the spread of the new strain, which they feared would soon go beyond the British isles.

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    To put these figures in perspective, the UK population is 66.6 million, the US is 328 million and India is around 1.36 billion. That means at the start of 2021, the infection ratio per 100,000 people in India was far lower than in the UK and the US.

    Lax Safety Measures

    As a result, Indians thought the country was beyond the worst of the pandemic. In March, Harsh Vardhan, the Indian health minister, said the country had entered the “endgame” of the health crisis. This led to a false sense of hope, which made the public and the central and state governments complacent. Restrictions that were brought in to curb the spread of the coronavirus were quickly eased. Life had almost returned to normal in January with the opening up of nightclubs, restaurants, hotels, tourist locations and public transport.

    At the same time, elections were announced in five states, including West Bengal, which the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had set its sights on winning. All political parties and their supporters held rallies with tens of thousands of people in attendance. The Hindu festival of Kumbh Mela attracted millions of people who took a dip in the Ganges, a river considered sacred in Hinduism. Nearly 60,000 spectators were also allowed to enter stadiums to watch cricket matches. All of these events took place with lax safety measures in place, with no social distancing or wearing of masks.

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    In hindsight, India did not anticipate a second wave of COVID-19. It lifted the lid on public restrictions at a time when countries such as the UK were battling a winter wave of infections. As mainland Europe realized, it was inevitable that the more contagious strain of COVID-19 discovered in the UK would spread. India failed to realize this despite repeated warnings.

    Now, India is battling its own second wave. The country has repeatedly broken the record for the daily number of confirmed cases of COVID-19. On May 2, India recorded more than 400,000 new daily infections. The actual number of cases is believed to be far higher due to a shortage of testing kits and people getting tested. Many Indians are not getting checked because they have no symptoms but are contagious or they are worried about testing positive for the virus. States like Bihar, West Bengal and Maharashtra have been accused of manipulating and underreporting the number of positive cases and deaths from COVID-19 to avoid criticism over inefficient governance. Worryingly, epidemiologists believe that India has not yet hit the peak of the second wave and that the worst is yet to come.

    No Improvement to Health Care

    It has been argued by many that the pandemic will not come to an end until it is under control everywhere. This is because “viruses naturally mutate over time.” There are currently thousands of mutations of the coronavirus around the world, but only a few of them are variants of concern for scientists. As more people contract the virus and spread it to others, it is inevitable that different strains will emerge. This is why despite the successful vaccination rollout in countries like Israel, the UK and the US, authorities have been cautious as they reopen economies and reduce restrictions for the public. The fear is that some variants, such as the one discovered in South Africa, will evade the existing vaccines and render them less effective.

    India has discovered a worrying COVID-19 variant of its own that is officially called B.1.617. This new strain — which is also known as the “double mutant” due to two mutations coming together in the same variant — accounts for 61% of infections in Maharashtra, a major epicenter for infections. It is unclear whether the Indian variant is driving the second wave, but it is believed to be more transmissible than previous strains of the virus. This is in addition to fear over the UK strain, which has spread to more than 50 countries.

    Complacency by the central and state governments has made the health care system crumble as Indians desperately seek medical assistance. When the pandemic first hit India in March 2020, authorities failed to strengthen the infrastructure at hospitals. As of 2018, the Indian government spent only 3.54% of GDP on health care. Other emerging economies such as Brazil and South Africa spent 9.51% and 8.25%, respectively. In India, there is only one doctor per 1,445 people, which is far lower than the figure the World Health Organization recommends. At public hospitals, there were only 0.7 beds available per 1,000 people.

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    In July 2020, state governments opted to build temporary centers for COVID-19 patients instead of buying additional beds for existing hospitals and allocating more resources. These centers were barely used. Due to their high maintenance costs, they were dismantled a couple of months before the second wave hit. Now, as hospitals face a short supply of beds and a high demand for them, some state governments are considering whether to rebuild the makeshift centers.

    In March 2020, Modi allocated 150 billion rupees ($2.03 billion) to strengthen the infrastructure of health care in India. The government purchased personal protective equipment (PPE) and an additional 60,000 ventilators. Yet as of last fall, just under 24,000 of the ventilators had been installed in hospitals across the country. Both public and private hospitals are currently short of beds, ventilators and oxygen in many major cities.

    As COVID-19 infections sweep the country, social media networks have been flooded with posts calling for help. Friends and families of those suffering from the virus have desperately sought to find available beds in hospitals, oxygen supplies or medication to combat COVID-19. Disturbing reports of people dying after being unable to access treatment have been heard all over the country. Ambulances and other vehicles with COVID-19 victims inside them have lined up outside hospitals that no longer have space available. Many hospitals have reported that patients they were treating died as the oxygen supply ran out. Outside crematoriums, the number of dead bodies is mounting.

    The Government’s “Vaccine Diplomacy”

    With the situation worsening, the BJP-led government has been criticized by Indian courts for focusing on state election campaigns instead of taking preemptive action to combat the second wave. Aside from easing restrictions too quickly and not reinforcing the health care system in time, many states face shortages of COVID-19 vaccines. In January, Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed to have rolled out the “world’s largest vaccination drive,” aiming to get jabs in the arms of 300 million people by July. At the time of writing, only 2% of the Indian population — 29 million — has been fully vaccinated with two doses. This is compared to 23% in the UK and 30% in the US, both of which focused on vaccinating their most vulnerable citizens first to drive down new infections and deaths.

    India had other things in mind. It sought to distribute doses worldwide as part of its vaccine diplomacy. With the world’s largest manufacturer of vaccines, India has so far exported 66 million doses to 95 countries. Yet, earlier this year, the Modi government implemented an initiative to donate free batches in an attempt to boost the country’s soft power when the pandemic was seemingly under control. Many observers questioned whether the move was necessary instead of focusing on vaccinating Indians themselves. Toward the end of March, as infections increased and vaccines decreased, the Modi government realized that its decision to export millions of doses was premature. It decided to halt the export of doses and instead vaccinate Indians over the age of 45. Yet the damage had already been done due to poor planning by the BJP-led government.

    Embed from Getty Images

    Meanwhile, state administrations in Maharashtra, Delhi and Andhra Pradesh that are not ruled by the BJP have claimed they are running short of vaccines. Critics have accused Modi of playing politics with vaccine distribution as states with BJP governments, such as Gujarat, were given almost the same number of vaccine doses as Maharashtra, which has a population double that of Gujarat. The health minister has denied that regions were short of supplies and instead blamed state governments for the poor rollout of vaccines.

    In order to counter criticism over its inefficient planning, the central government announced on April 19 that all citizens above 18 would be able to get vaccinated from May 1; it had previously focused on health and frontline workers and those over 45. By opening the door for all adults, an additional 600 million citizens are now eligible. Yet with vaccines in short supply, some states have postponed the rollout. The website through which citizens can book a jab crashed minutes after it went live for the new age group.

    The government has approved additional funds for vaccine manufacturers to ramp up production. However, the increased production is unlikely to be available for a few months as vaccines go through a lengthy process of packaging and safety checks. To make up for this shortage, the government has fast-tracked the approval process for foreign-produced vaccines. These include Johnson and Johnson from Belgium and Sputnik V from Russia, which cost more than domestically-produced ones.

    Public Image

    In an attempt to maintain his public image, Modi addressed the nation on April 20. Indians needed assurances and demanded answers, but the prime minister offered none. He neither informed the public about plans to tackle the crisis, nor did he give any reasons about why the country is facing a horrific second wave. This is despite him previously boasting that India’s handling of the pandemic had been exemplary and should a model for the world. It seems the central government is content with placing the blame on state administrations and the public instead of admitting that it made mistakes.

    Earlier this week, the BJP failed to win in the state of West Bengal despite heavy election campaigning. It seems that Indians are beginning to realize that Modi’s preoccupation with his public image, and his need to win votes, is costing the country dearly. In fact, the obsession with elections on the part of Indian politicians has contributed to the second wave of COVID-19 infections. India can only hope that Modi and other politicians shift their focus from politics to health care before it is too late.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Shaping the Future of Energy Collaboration

    The cancelation of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s much-awaited visit to India is disappointing but unsurprising. India, a country with nearly 1.4 billion people, is currently confronting a second wave of COVID-19 infections. Though all is not lost as bilateral talks are expected to take place virtually on April 26. High on the agenda remains the launch of Roadmap 2030, which will foreseeably set the tone for India-UK relations in a post-COVID era and pave the way for a free trade agreement.

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    This shared vision, forming a critical piece of the “global Britain” agenda and the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy, is expected to lay out a framework for enhanced cooperation across a much broader set of policy pillars. One such area is climate action, which is a key part of economic growth strategies and the global green energy agenda for both countries.

    As signatories to the 2015 Paris Agreement — the international treaty on climate change — India and the UK have sizable ambitions to invest in creating cleaner and sustainable energy systems. This time last year, the United Kingdom experienced its longest coal-free run to date, a significant milestone for an economy that generated about 40% of its electricity from coal just a decade ago. While India’s green energy transition is comparatively nascent, it has made significant strides toward expanding its renewable energy capacity, especially in solar power, where it is emerging as a global leader.

    Energy Sources

    Although the two countries have vastly different energy sources and consumption patterns, this creates a unique opportunity for each economy to capitalize on its individual strengths. In offshore wind power, the UK is the largest global player, while India has only begun to scratch the surface of its wind potential. The United Kingdom’s technical prowess will play a crucial role in supporting the growth of India’s offshore wind energy — from the meteorological expertise required to evaluate wind patterns and energy production potential to joint research and development opportunities.

    The growth of electric vehicles (EVs) is another area where each market has distinct strengths. India, for example, can rely on the UK’s experience as it undertakes the massive infrastructure exercise of deploying smart charging EV stations. The UK can draw on India’s success with battery-powered three-wheelers to develop sustainable last-mile connectivity solutions. Strengthened bilateral cooperation on these fronts will not only accelerate the EV revolution globally but can also serve to contain China’s dominance in this market.

    Embed from Getty Images

    The Indian and British governments are closely collaborating around climate action. This is evident from recent trips to India by the UK’s Alok Sharma, the president of this year’s UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) that will take place in Glasgow, and Lord Tariq Ahmad, the minister for South Asia and the Commonwealth.

    It is, however, important to expand the scope of these engagements to include small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which constitute a powerhouse of skill and experience. SMEs based in the UK can play a significant role in supporting India’s energy transition. British companies could adapt their innovations for the local market, while in turn benefiting from India’s strong manufacturing base and engineering skills. To tap into this market opportunity, governments could facilitate SME-focused trade delegations as well as joint-venture opportunities for cleantech startups.

    Green financing would play an equally important role in truly unlocking the value of such partnerships. This would be through existing bilateral instruments like the Sustainable Finance Forum and Green Growth Equity Fund or the UK’s soon-to-be-launched revenue mechanism that will mobilize private investment into carbon capture and hydrogen projects. This is especially important for India, which is looking at green hydrogen in a big way and is set to launch its first national hydrogen roadmap this year. As the UK’s carbon capture market grows, this could support India’s plans to produce hydrogen from natural gas, creating new avenues for technology sharing.

    If one thing is clear, it is that the opportunities are immense and the existing foundation is strong. With the stage set and the actors in place, Roadmap 2030 could certainly stand to benefit not just India and the UK, but the world at large in delivering a cleaner, more affordable and resilient energy future.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Is India’s Vaccine Diplomacy a Good Idea?

    In terms of numbers, India ranks the third worst after the US and Brazil when it comes to COVID-19 infections. At the time of publishing, the country has recorded over 12.3 million confirmed cases and more than 163,000 deaths. The BBC reports that India is facing a “severe, intensive” second wave of the pandemic. The situation in states like Maharashtra, Gujarat and Punjab has reached alarming proportions.

    How Did India Combat COVID-19 in 2020?

    Last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi imposed a stringent lockdown that brought economic activity to a shuddering halt. This lockdown led to a dramatic contraction of India’s GDP by 23.9% in the April-June 2020 quarter. The economy recovered somewhat in later quarters, but it experienced a recession in the 2020-21 financial year for the first time in 25 years.

    Arguably, the lockdown was a success in preventing a rapid spread of COVID-19 last year. In percentage terms, India did not do too badly. After all, it has nearly 1.4 billion people in contrast to the US population of 330 million. The daily new cases in India dramatically declined until recently when the second wave hit the country. Thanks to a young population and public health measures, India experienced a remarkably low mortality rate.

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    India has low per capita income and poor health care facilities. So, its achievement in controlling the COVID-19 outbreak has been hailed by many public health experts, including the World Health Organization (WHO). In January, India launched a massive vaccination program to fight the pandemic. This was possible because the country has a track record of mass vaccination and massive vaccine production.

    Indian manufacturers supply more than 60% of the world’s vaccines against diseases like polio and measles. Early on, the country began mass production of two COVID-19 vaccines: Covishield and Covaxin. The Serum Institute of India (SII), which partnered with the University of Oxford and AstraZeneca, had already produced and stocked approximately 70 million Covishield doses even before India granted emergency approval to their vaccine. 

    On January 16, India launched an ambitious plan to vaccinate around 300 million people by June. The world’s largest vaccination program focused first on those with high vulnerability to the coronavirus. First on the list were health care workers. They were followed by those who were 65 years or older. This ensured that the vaccine was not monopolized by the richest sections of Indian society. 

    As vaccinations have increased, the Modi government has eased restrictions in the country. Crowds have gathered at large weddings, sporting events and festival celebrations. The government lifted restrictions to stimulate economic activity. A poor country like India with a large population could not afford a lockdown for too long. However, the easing of restrictions has not only led to increased economic growth, but also rising cases of COVID-19 infections. India faces a tough balancing act between stimulating economic activity and curtailing a pandemic.

    India’s Vaccine Diplomacy

    During the pandemic, India has embarked on an ambitious foreign policy initiative. Modi announced the Vaccine Maitri initiative to supply COVID-19 vaccines to other nations only four days after India began domestic vaccinations. With the world’s largest manufacturer of vaccines, India has shipped approximately 61 million doses to 84 countries, which have included free batches. It has pledged 200 million doses for the WHO’s COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative to ensure vaccines for 92 low and middle-income countries.

    Embed from Getty Images

    India began its vaccine diplomacy by distributing doses to its immediate neighbors: Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The country has also exported vaccines to faraway places such as the Caribbean, where the likes of Barbados, Dominica and Jamaica have benefited from Indian aid. Leaders of countries such as Brazil and Antigua and Barbuda have publicly thanked Modi for his country’s generosity.

    As per some foreign policy experts, India’s vaccine distribution is a diplomatic masterstroke. It helps the country gain goodwill and increase its soft power. It could lead to a more peaceful neighborhood. In the future, India might win much support, strengthen its claim to a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and emerge as a great world power.

    Vaccine diplomacy might be giving a rare chance to counter China, which has launched the Belt and Road Initiative to increase its global footprint. For decades, China has backed Pakistan and, for the last few years, has increased its presence in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. With Chinese influence growing in India’s closest neighbors, the country has understandably become anxious.

    In June 2020, Chinese and Indian troops engaged in a bloody hand-to-hand combat with many dying in the process. Since that clash, relations between India and China have been fraught. India has banned over 200 Chinese apps and restricted Chinese investment into the country. COVID-19 has given a unique opportunity to India — the “pharmacy of the world” — to compete with China. By shipping vaccines to low and middle-income countries, India is gaining influence at the Chinese expense whose vaccines have been questioned by Western media.

    Rich countries have failed poorer ones because they have focused on domestic programs. Unlike India, the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom are focused completely on vaccinating their domestic populations. India’s generosity is unique and might lead to long-term gains.

    Masterstroke or Distraction?

    However, there is a counterargument that India has been premature in kicking off vaccine diplomacy. It did so before setting its own house in order. According to the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, as of April 2, India has administered nearly 69 million doses, fully inoculating only 9.6 million people. That is just 0.71% of its population. India’s focus should have been getting every one of its citizens vaccinated instead of basking in complimentary tweets from foreign leaders. Such goodwill might turn out to be very transient. 

    Recently, India has slowed down its vaccine exports and speeded up its vaccination program. The government has now enrolled private hospitals in its vaccination drive, and everyone above the age of 45 is now eligible for the vaccine. Modi himself got vaccinated on March 1, boosting public faith in COVID-19 vaccines and increasing their uptake nearly four-fold. It seems that the government is paying attention to its critics.

    Time will tell whether India’s vaccine diplomacy was a bold masterstroke or an unwise distraction. It reveals that there are no easy choices for any nation during a raging pandemic.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The Other Side of the Indian Farmers’ Protests

    In November 2020, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation published an article by Paul Nemitz and Matthias Pfeffer on the threat to digital sovereignty in Europe. They called attention to the need in Europe for “decentralised digital technologies” to combat a trend they see as essential for preserving “a flourishing medium-sized business sector, growing tax revenues, rising prosperity, a functioning democracy and rule of law.” 

    The authors felt encouraged by the fact that the European Council was at last looking at challenging the US tech platforms that dominate global cyberspace: Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft. Europe appears ready to draft laws that would impose targeted regulation strategies different from those that apply to “small and medium-sized actors, or sectoral actors generally.”

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    There are multiple reasons for such a move, which will inevitably be attacked by the corporations as violating the sacrosanct principle of free trade. Nemitz and Pfeffer recognize the complexity of the implicit goal, to ensure “strategic autonomy while preserving an open economy.” Besides the threat to traditional businesses incapable of competing with the platforms, they cite the fact that “unregulated digitalisation of the public sphere has already endangered the systemic role of the media in two respects” to the extent that 80% of “online advertising revenues today flow to just two corporations: Google and Facebook.” This threatens the viability of “costly professional journalism that is vital for democracy.”

    Europe is struggling to find a solution. In the context of the farmers’ protests in India, the Joint Action Committee Against Foreign Retail and E-commerce (JACAFRE) recently took an emphatic stand on the same subject by publishing an open letter addressed to Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In this case, the designated culprits are the US powerhouses of retail commerce, Amazon and Walmart, but the authors include what they see as a Quisling Indian company: the mega-corporation, Reliance Industries.

    The giant conglomerate claims to be “committed to innovation-led, exponential growth in the areas of hydrocarbon exploration and production, petroleum refining and marketing, petrochemicals, retail and telecommunications.” JACAFRE suspects it may also be committed to the idea of monopolistic control. It complains that Reliance’s propensity for establishing partnerships with Facebook and Google is akin to letting the fox in the henhouse. This has less to do with the platforms’ direct action than the coercive power their ever-increasingly possession and control of data represents. “If the new farm laws are closely examined,” the JACAFE’s authors claim, “it will be evident that unregulated digitalisation is a very important aspect of them.”

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Unregulated digitalization:

    A pandemic that grew slowly in the first two decades of the 21st century with the effect of undermining most human economic activities, personal relationships and even mental equilibrium

    Contextual Note

    Three years ago, Walmart purchased the Indian retailer Flipkart. Interviewed at the time, Parminder Jeet Singh, the executive director of IT for Change, complained that the data controlled by e-commerce companies is no longer limited to patterns of consumption but also extends to production and logistics. “They know everything, who needs it, when they need it, who should produce it, who should move it, when it should be moved, the complete control of the data of the whole system,” he said. That capacity is more than invasive. It is tantamount to omniscient and undetectable industrial spying combined with forms of social control that are potentially as powerful as China’s much decried social credit system.

    Embed from Getty Images

    In 2018, Singh appeared to worry more about Walmart than Facebook or Amazon, because it represents the physical economy. The day US companies dominate both the data and the physical resources of the Indian economy, Singh believes it would “game over” for Indian economic independence. He framed it in these terms: “If these two companies become a duopoly in the e-commerce sector, it’s actually a duopoly over the whole economy.” 

    On the positive side, he insisted that, contrary to many other countries, India has the “digitally industrialized” culture that would allow it not only to resist the domination of a US-based global company, but also permit it to succeed in building a native equivalent. He viewed Flipkart before Walmart’s takeover as a successful Indian company that had no need of a monopolistic US company to ensure its future growth. 

    Historical Note

    Fair Observer’s founder, CEO and editor-in-chief, Atul Singh, recently collaborated with analyst Manu Sharma on an article debunking the simplistic view shared across international media that persists in painting India’s protesting farmers as a David challenging a globalized Goliath insidiously promoted by Narendra Modi’s government. The Western media’s narrative puts the farmers in the role of resistance heroes against a new form of market-based tyranny.

    But as Singh and Sharma point out, this requires ignoring history and refusing to recognize the pressing need to move away from a “Soviet-inspired model” that ended up creating pockets of privilege and artificial dependence. These relics of India’s post-independence past became obstacles not only to productivity but to justice as well, to the extent that the existing system favored those who had learned to successfully exploit it.

    Singh and Sharma highlight the incoherence of a system that risks provoking deeper crises. Does that mean that Modi’s proposed reform is viable and without risk? The two authors acknowledge the very real fear farmers feel “that big private players will offer good money to farmers in the beginning, kill off their competition and then pay little for agricultural produce.” They realistically concede that, once in place, “India’s agricultural reforms will have intended and unintended consequences, both positive and negative.”

    But there may be more to the story. From the JACAFE’s perspective, the farmers’ instincts are correct. Their fear of the big players leveraging their clout in the traditional marketplace by exercising discretionary control of production and distribution becomes exponentially greater when considering that, thanks to their mastery of data, their control is not limited to the commodities themselves. It extends to all the data associated not only with the modes and means of production, but also with the channels of distribution and even habits of consumption. That explains why the JACAFE sees the 2018 takeover of Flipkart by Walmart as particularly foreboding.

    This dimension of the issue should also help us to understand why Prime Minister Modi has recently been playing cat and mouse with both Jeff Bezos of Amazon and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook. At some point, the purely rhetorical game that even a mouse with a 56-inch chest can play while dodging the bite of a pair of voracious and muscular cats (Amazon and Walmart) has its limits. India is faced with a major quandary. It needs to accelerate its development of domestic resources in a manner that allows it to control the future economic consequences for its population but must, at the same time, look abroad for the investment that will fund such endeavors.

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    In a recent article on foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in India, Singh and Sharma noted that the recent flood of cash can be attributed to the fact that “corporations from the US and the Gulf have bought big stakes in Reliance Industries, India’s biggest conglomerate. They are also buying shares in Indian companies. In effect, they are betting on future growth.” The problem with all foreign investment is that while it is focused on growth, the growth that investors are targeting is the value of their own investment and its contribution to augmenting their global power. From the investors’ point of view, the growth of the Indian economy is at best only a side-effect. The case of Reliance in particular will need to be monitored.

    In December 2020, Reliance’s chairman, Mukesh Ambani, promised a “more equal India … with increased incomes, increased employment, and improved quality of life for 1 billion Indians at the middle and bottom of the economic pyramid” thanks to the achievement of a $5-trillion economy by 2025. While reminding readers that “Facebook and Google are already partnered with Reliance and own stakes in Jio Platforms,” the Deccan Herald reports that the three companies have joined hands again to “to set up a national digital payment network.” The question some may be asking is this: When three partners occupy a central place in expanding Asia’s second-largest economy, who are the foxes and who are the hens?

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Bangladesh Celebrates 50 Years of Independence

    On March 26, Bangladesh will be celebrating the golden jubilee of its freedom. Few outside South Asia remember that Bangladesh was once part of Pakistan. From 1947 to 1971, modern-day Pakistan was West Pakistan and Bangladesh was East Pakistan. They were both incongruously part of the same new country even though they were more than 2,200 kilometers apart.

    A Tortured Past

    Soon after Pakistan’s creation in 1947, the east was subjected to discrimination and repression. East Pakistanis demanded the recognition of Bengali as an official language. Their western brethren rejected that demand. In March 1948, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, visited the eastern part of the country for the first time and emphatically declared that “the state language of Pakistan [was] going to be Urdu and no other language, and anyone who [tried] to mislead [them] was really the enemy of Pakistan.”

    Jinnah’s view that Pakistan would not remain unified without a single national language did not take into account East Pakistani aspirations. Protests broke out in Dhaka, the capital of modern-day Bangladesh, and the situation remained volatile till 1952. That year, the constituent assembly declared Urdu to be Pakistan’s national language. This caused students in Dhaka to protest and clash with security forces. Hundreds were injured and five died during the clashes. Today, the United Nations marks February 21, the day of the Dhaka killings, as International Mother Language Day.

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    For the next two decades, West Pakistan continued to oppress East Pakistan. It became the dominant of the two halves of the country. Its military was dominated by Punjabis and Pashtuns. Its bureaucracy was staffed by muhajirs, the Urdu-speaking refugees who had fled west from India. Bangladeshis found themselves increasingly marginalized in the power structures of the new state. Jinnah’s two-nation theory assumed all Muslims were equal in a new Islamic nation. Instead, in this new state, taller and fairer Muslims were more equal than shorter and darker Muslims.

    West Pakistan continued the British policy of economic exploitation of East Pakistan. Between 1947 and 1970, only 25% of industrial investment and 30% of imports went to East Pakistan, which provided 59% of the exports. West Pakistan gorged on the meat, leaving only bones for East Pakistan. West Pakistanis did so because they saw their eastern brethren as culturally and ethnically inferior. East Pakistanis seethed but could do little against a state controlled by an ever more powerful military.

    On November 11, 1970, a major cyclone hit East Pakistan. With winds over 240 kilometers per hour, it left 500,000 people dead and 2.5 million homeless. West Pakistan responded slowly and poorly. As little relief trickled in, resentment grew. Things came to a head in the 1970 elections. Many parties divided the vote share in West Pakistan. In contrast, the Awami League, led by East Pakistani leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won a resounding victory in the national election. He had campaigned on the plank of Bengali autonomy. This was unacceptable to General Yahya Khan, the president of Pakistan, who instituted martial law. Protests erupted in East Pakistan. Emulating Mahatma Gandhi, Rahman called for a civil disobedience movement on March 7, 1971.

    Campaign of Terror

    Khan and Rahman met from March 16 to 24 but failed to come to an agreement. On the night of March 25, Rahman was arrested and Khan launched Operation Searchlight to restore the writ of the federal government. In reality, it was what the BBC has called a “campaign of terror.” Members of the Awami League, members of the intelligentsia, the Hindu minority comprising 20% of the population in East Pakistan and other perceived opponents of the West Pakistani regime were mercilessly killed.

    Troops indulged in “kill and burn missions,” pogroms and mass rape. About 200,000 to 400,000 women and girls were raped. Anthony Mascarenhas, a courageous Pakistani reporter from a small community of Goan Christians in Karachi, broke the news to the world. On June 13, 1971, The Sunday Times published his story titled, “Genocide.” Mascarenhas was not far off the mark. This story captured global attention. George Harrison, the lead guitarist of the Beatles, along with Indian classical music maestro Ravi Shankar and other friends, organized a concert for Bangladesh at Madison Square Garden on August 1.

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    Not only journalists and artists but also intelligence officials and diplomats became increasingly disturbed about West Pakistani actions in East Pakistan. Archer Blood, the US consul-general in Dhaka, sent a telegram to Washington that has since come to be known as the “Blood Telegram,” the subject of a multiple award-winning book. He accused his superiors of failing to prevent genocide. In his view, US President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger supported a military regime in West Pakistan that was crushing democracy and slaughtering innocent people. The two hated Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi whom they saw as a strong Soviet ally and who had termed West Pakistani brutality a “genocide” as early as March 31, 1971. Nixon and Kissinger labeled Blood “the maniac in Dhaka,” recalled him to Washington and continued to back its Cold War ally in complete disregard of its wanton use of violence.

    West Pakistani brutality triggered “the largest single displacement of refugees in the second half of the 20th century.” An estimated 10 million East Pakistanis sought refuge in India, forcing the country to intervene. Initially, India backed Mukti Bahini, the Bangladeshi guerrilla resistance movement. Then, it prepared for war. When West Pakistani aerial strikes hit 11 air bases in India on December 3, 1971, Indian troops invaded East Pakistan. On December 16, Dhaka fell and 93,000 West Pakistani troops surrendered. With the war over, Bangladesh was born.

    Different Memories Drive Different Trajectories

    The 1971 war has left different memories in the three countries of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. In Bangladesh, the war itself is seen as one of liberation, though different parties spin the narrative to suit themselves. Rahman’s daughter, Sheikh Hasina, is prime minister, a position she has occupied since 2009. For India, the war is often regarded as the nation’s finest moment. It liberated David from Goliath and won its greatest military victory. In Pakistan, the war is airbrushed out of history, but its military elite has never forgotten its humiliating defeat. It embarked on using asymmetric warfare by using state-sponsored terrorism against its bigger neighbor, India. Pakistan has also sought to cultivate strategic depth by dominating Afghanistan to counter New Delhi.

    In contrast to Pakistan, Bangladesh retains a close bond with India. Both countries share many commonalities. Both nations have settled their border disputes peacefully by signing the historic 2015 Land Boundary Agreement. India transferred 111 enclaves comprising 17,160.63 acres to Bangladesh, while the latter transferred 51 enclaves comprising 7,110.02 acres to India. Residents of these enclaves were offered citizenship of either country and, though it is early days yet, the agreement has held up remarkably well.

    Bangladesh is India’s biggest trading partner in South Asia. India has given away millions of COVID-19 vaccines to Bangladesh for free. South and Southeast Asian nations, including Pakistan, have also benefited from India’s generosity that has been termed “vaccine diplomacy” in many circles. This diplomacy has worked exceptionally well with Bangladesh. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is to be the guest of honor on March 26, Bangladesh’s national day. In his first overseas visit since the COVID-19 pandemic began, Modi will visit Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s memorial, two historic temples and sign a deal or two. It almost seems that this golden jubilee is rekindling an old love affair.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Narendra Modi’s War With Social Media

    The Wall Street Journal reports on the Indian government’s intention to clamp down on social platforms that have played a role in the recent farmers’ protests. According to Wall Street Journal sources, Narendra Modi’s government has threatened to jail employees of Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter “as it seeks to quash political protests and gain far-reaching powers over discourse on foreign-owned tech platforms.”

    The article claims that this initiative constitutes the government’s response to the foreign tech companies’ refusal “to comply with data and takedown requests from the government related to protests by Indian farmers that have made international headlines.” In other words, the Indian government wishes to control the content that may be allowed to appear on these platforms.

    Why Are India’s Farmers Protesting?

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    But we also learn that it isn’t simply the response to a specific event, such as the farmers’ protests, but a matter of principle. It involves rewriting the rules of India’s democracy. “The rules would also compel companies to remove content that undermines security, public order and ‘decency of morality,’” The WSJ reports.

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Undermine:

    Express ideas or facts that, however sincere truthful, are deemed dangerous because they challenge a government’s official narrative, the only one permissible for public dissemination.

    Contextual note

    Since the beginning of the “global war on terror” in 2001, governments across the world have regularly appealed to the theme of “national security,” applying it to oppose anything that might vaguely embarrass them. Prime Minister Modi’s government has boldly added the much broader categories of “public order” and “decency of morality” to the mix. States in the past that have actually managed to accomplish that kind of behavioral control have generally been referred to as fascist. While it may seem abusive to apply that term to any democratically elected government today, the similarity of such policies with those practiced by fascist regimes from the past should be obvious. 

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    Nations that seek to apply such policies today should only deserve to be called “aspirationally fascist.” Given the availability of communication technology to even the humblest among us, the effective repression of expression and enforcement of morality applied to an entire population would immediately undermine any nation’s pretension of democracy. We should ask ourselves if Modi is serious in his demands. The difficulty of achieving those goals in the era of global platforms appears to be insurmountable. If it were to succeed, it would imply dismantling one of the givens of the globalized economy and the stoutest pillar of any democracy: the free circulation of ideas.

    In its reporting on the same topic, Business Insider focuses on the immediate challenge to the Indian government represented by the farmer protests. It describes the government’s initiative as an attempt “to pressure the firms into sharing data related” to the protests. If this is true, the aim would no longer appear to be the mere prevention of unfavorable discourse disseminated through the media. It would imply the harnessing of data produced by these foreign platforms for surveillance purposes. That would then serve the state to crack down on elements suspected of subversion or threatening the public order.

    This would seem to contradict the idea that the government’s aim is simply to censor subversive ideas. Instead, its aim would be to partner with the social platforms to gain access to their data and metadata. This would serve, not to suppress certain ideas, but to suppress the people who express those ideas.

    Modi may simply be casting his lines in all directions at the same time, unconcerned with the type of fish he may reel in. It could be compared to the Trumpian foreign policy notion of “maximum pressure” to make the adversary bend. In Modi’s case, it is directed at the platforms to convince them to take some action that he finds acceptable — it doesn’t really matter which. He appears to be giving his victims the choice between applying his criteria of censorship, which means banning specific content, or quietly handing him the data they collect, which will make it possible for India to identify and punish the culprits. At the same time, by personally threatening the employees of the platform, Modi is showing that he means business, much like Donald Trump and Mike Pompeo when they imposed sanctions on the officials of the International Criminal Court to discourage them from investigating the US and Israel.

    The WSJ reveals the deeper ambitions of the Indian government concerning the surveillance of social media. It cites a member of the government who “said the rules would require platforms to track and store records of specific messages as they traveled among users.” This would have radical implications, defining user privacy in the use of social platforms as a relic of the past. The threats against employees of the platforms demonstrate the conclusion The WSJ has reached: “The Indian government appears ready for a fight.”

    Historical Note

    Narendra Modi’s government appears to see this as a possible historical turning point. India’s rivalry with China, at least in terms of soft power, has been defined in many people’s minds as the contest between the world’s two powerful but highly contrasted nations that can be called billionaires (in terms of population). One is an autocracy and the other a democracy. One ambiguously carries the heritage of Western colonization; the other defies it. 

    Seen as competition, it has turned out not to be a truly fair fight. China has obviously been progressing exponentially in its economic and military influence, whereas India seems to be handicapped by its confusing democratic institutions and traditions, coupled with its incomprehensible and ungovernable demography. The traditionally conflictual relationship that has prevailed between the two nations has recently been exacerbated not just by India’s unfocused economic orientations — illustrated by the complexity of the debate around the farmers’ protests — but also with regard to contested borders, where some recent skirmishes have taken place.

    The WSJ article offers a curious hint that Modi’s government may be seeking to emulate China: “The big difference between the earlier history and where we are now is that China has done just fine without those companies.” Coming from Modi’s government, this sounds either like an expression of envy or the resolution to mobilize all its forces to go to battle with the social platforms, applying the logic of China which has peremptorily curtailed their freedom to operate.

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    The fact that Facebook and Twitter are banned in China has enabled the emergence of Chinese non-global equivalents such as Weibo and Renren. Modi would appear to be dreaming that something similar could take place in India, though the government’s ability to control what happens on such networks as effectively as the Chinese seems more than unlikely. Modi may simply be citing the Chinese case to frighten the American owners of the dominant platforms.

    The WSJ presents Modi’s gambit as a negotiating stance. The prime minister believes he is in a position to “threaten the tech companies’ future in a market of more than 1.3 billion people that, since they are locked out of China, is the key to their global growth.” The article cites Jason Pielemeyer, the policy director of the Global Network Initiative, focused on human rights: “In a market the size of India, it’s hard to take the nuclear option, which is to say, ‘We’re not going to comply, and if you block us, we’ll call your bluff or accept the consequences.’” 

    At the same time, The WSJ reveals what may be the truly “noble” underlying motive of the Indians, one we should all applaud. It’s a motive that sounds far more generous and respectful than either threats against American tech companies or the desire to emulate China’s policy of social control. “Officials have said the government wants to protect small Indian businesses, secure user data and allow room for India’s own tech firms to grow,” The Journal reports. 

    So, which one is it: the emulation of China’s surveillance society and despotic control of the media or a democratic encouragement of small businesses? Because India is a democracy, all that will only become clear in the next election, in 2024. Only three years to wait for the moment of clarity. Isn’t that what democracy is all about, waiting for the next election in the hope that the truth will then become manifest?

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More