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      India-US Relationship Is Now Official

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      After decades of dithering, India has finally opted for American-led security architecture in Asia. In the latest US-India 2+2 meeting of foreign and defense ministers, the two countries concluded a fourth foundational agreement. The four key agreements between the United States and India to date include the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA, 2018), Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA, 2016), General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA, 2002) and, as of October this year, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). This alphabet soup of little-known pacts has created the basis of a US-India entente. 

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      The seeds of a new architecture have been germinating in the form of the Quad, a grouping of India, Australia, Japan and the United States. Indian scientists have gone on a missile testing spree, and the political leadership in New Delhi is not softening its stand on the India-China border. India is also boosting its defense ties with Southeast Asian nations threatened by China. It has offered the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile to the Philippines. BrahMos can be used against both land and sea targets. As an anti-ship missile, it has few peers. This missile effectively denies area entry to enemy surface combatants.

      In addition to BrahMos, India might soon start selling Akash air defense missiles to its Southeast Asian friends. New Delhi is now clearly making moves to counter Beijing, and closer cooperation with the US seems to be part of India’s new grand strategy.

      The Ghosts of 1962

      In the war of 1962 over a disputed border, India lost disastrously to China, yet it did not establish closer relations with the anti-communist US for largely ideological reasons. The then-prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a socialist. Deeply influenced by the Soviet Union, he was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. Poor at realpolitik, Nehru tried to cultivate the US after 1962 even as he continued to remain close to the Soviet Union. The effort did not lead to much, and Beijing concluded that an Indo-US entente was improbable.

      Since 1962, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has adopted an aggressive stance against the Indian Army. In contrast, India was chastened by the loss of territory and prestige. Therefore, successive Indian governments have adopted a diffident stance vis-à-vis Beijing. In 2020, this has changed. The brutal killing of an Indian colonel by the PLA triggered a ferocious response from Indian troops. A surge of patriotism followed. The Modi-led nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government drew a line in the Himalayas and has stood up to its northern neighbor.

      Many in the English-speaking Indian and Anglo-Saxon media expected and predicted Indian capitulation, defeat and disgrace. The turn of events has proved them wrong. India has conducted its quickest Himalayan mobilization. It has used creative tactics, nibbled some territory hitherto held by the Chinese and put all three of its armed forces — Army, Navy and Air Force — in a state of high operational readiness. India has also conducted special operations inside Chinese territory and openly used Tibetan troops for the first time in its history. 

      New Entente

      In October, Modi’s government has shed India’s traditional Nehruvian diffidence and embraced the US wholeheartedly. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper joined Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar for the third annual US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi.

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      By signing BECA, India has gained access to valuable geospatial data, improving situational awareness for military operations and increasing the accuracy of its missile systems. COMCASA enabled Indian and US military platforms to network with each other. LEMOA allowed Indian and US militaries access to each other’s refueling facilities and military material. GSOMIA started the sharing of sensitive military intelligence data.

      These four agreements enable logistics, communication and geospatial data sharing are in place, making India a de facto US ally. India has turned decisively to the US in part because it has lost faith in Russia’s ability to contain China. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, India and the US have steadily moved closer. However, relations have been greatly influenced by the chemistry of those in power in Washington and New Delhi. Successive governments have blown hot and cold. When there has been a change of power in either democracy, their relations have suffered in the transition.

      Now, the 2+2 dialogue has moved decisively toward operationalizing the Quad. Previously, the Quad had not quite taken off. Australia and Japan have all shied away from closer engagement. This year, Australian sailors are joining the navies of Japan, India and the US for the Malabar naval exercise. This is a major change in political and military alliances in the region.

      The latest meeting marks a watershed in US-India relations. No longer will American policy change if a new administration enters the White House. Even as Donald Trump leaves and Joe Biden takes over, the trajectory of US-India relations is likely to remain the same. Many in New Delhi fear that Biden is likely to initiate a rapprochement with China and pressure India to kick-start talks with Pakistan. Even if that turns out to be true, ties between India and the United States have now been institutionalized, and the countries have entered an entente, if not an alliance.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      For Libya, Peace Remains Unlikely

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      A recent ceasefire agreement and ongoing political reconciliation negotiations between Libya’s warring factions have significantly de-escalated tensions. A flurry of diplomatic engagement, with significant international support, has raised hopes that the Libyan conflict is about to enter a new stage, namely one that involves less fighting and more talking.

      Members of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) met in September in Hurghada, Egypt, to discuss a ceasefire for the first time since the early months of 2020, culminating in the October 23 agreement on a comprehensive ceasefire. This deal included provisions calling for the departure of all foreign fighters from Libya within three months, a freeze on military agreements with foreign parties, the demilitarization of the conflict’s frontlines (Sirte and Jufra districts) and the establishment of a joint policing force to monitor and secure the demilitarized frontlines.

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      Military talks have advanced alongside parallel political dialogue, which has also seen progress over recent months. Political talks have been held between members of the GNA and the Tripoli-based consultative body, the High Council of State, on one side, and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, which is aligned with the LNA, on the other side. Meetings between these actors — which have taken place on September 6 in Morocco, September 7-9 in Switzerland and October 11-13 in Egypt — are focusing on reaching an agreement on creating a new presidential council to govern Libya, setting a date for parliamentary elections and more broadly reunifying the country.

      The aim of the ongoing political dialogue, under the auspices of the UN, is to reach an agreement on these issues at the summit in Tunisia that began on November 9. However, the prospects of the conflict ending and the reunification of the country taking place in the coming year remain unlikely.

      Less Fighting, More Talking

      The progress of the political and military negotiations has been bolstered by the September 18 agreement between GNA Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq and LNA interlocutors to ease the nationwide oil blockade that the LNA had imposed since January this year. This agreement has been slowly implemented in Libya since the end of September, and oil production has risen from a low of approximately 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 1 million bpd on November 7. The blockade had been a major grievance for the GNA since oil exports account for more than 90% of Libya’s state revenues. The blockade had cost the state at least $9 billion in revenue.

      Embed from Getty Images

      These political and military talks are a positive step forward for the country, which had been in the midst of intense fighting just a few months ago. However, a comprehensive peace deal is not just over the horizon. This ceasefire is only the latest attempt to stop the fighting; the most recent ceasefire deal of January 11 collapsed within weeks of being signed. Moreover, efforts to build trust between the LNA and GNA will be difficult, and neither party is currently willing to sever their lifelines to key foreign backers or force them to leave the country.

      The GNA was only able to win the Tripoli battle because of the military support it received from Turkey, including the thousands of Syrian fighters deployed by Ankara. Just days after the ceasefire was agreed, the GNA signed a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation with Qatar in a move that undermines the spirit, if not the letter, of the ceasefire agreement. The GNA remains weary of the LNA and its leader Khalifa Haftar after the general launched the attack on Tripoli in April 2019 just days before a planned UN peace conference. There are also constituencies among the militia groups that make up the GNA’s armed forces that are resisting the ceasefire and broader military negotiations with the LNA.

      Meanwhile, the LNA has its own reasons to resist adhering to certain aspects of the ceasefire agreement. The LNA’s dependence on Russian and Emirati military, financial and political support has increased over the past year, and Russian private military companies aligned with the LNA are also present in the country. The LNA will not want to remove foreign forces, which provide important military support, from the country. Moreover, it is likely that Haftar is merely biding his time with this ceasefire, de-escalating tensions while allowing oil revenues to flow back into the system to appease the growing number of Libyans who are exasperated by the country’s sharp economic deterioration.

      General Haftar maintains the intent to rule Libya. However, he does not currently have the ability to impose his will by force, especially while the GNA has strong Turkish backing. Haftar will thus present a major obstacle to a comprehensive end to the conflict — unless he is effectively sidelined. This remains unlikely over the coming months since Haftar retains significant support of key tribal constituencies and because his interests remain aligned with those of his international backers.

      Back in Business

      While a total end to the conflict very likely remains out of reach in the coming months, the de-escalation in fighting has opened opportunities for business. The country, and particularly the state-owned General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), is in significant need of upgrades and repairs to power infrastructure. At the moment, GECOL is producing around 4,500 MW, but peak demand stands at around 7,000 MW. The end of the battle for Tripoli in June and the limited progress in military and political talks have created conditions that are allowing international firms to restart power projects. Moreover, the resumption of oil exports will generate government revenues that will make it possible to start additional projects.

      Business confidence in the oil and gas sector is also rising as operations are beginning to ramp up. Nuri Esaid, chairman of Tripoli-based Akakus Oil Operations, said on October 31 that the Sharara oilfield in Libya’s southwest will pump 300,000 bpd by the end of 2020, following the decision by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to lift force majeure at the field on October 11. The NOC also lifted force majeure at Sidre and Ras Lanuf oil export terminals on October 23, removing the final barriers to ramping up oil production nationwide. Businesses with operations in the country will cautiously seek to restart projects that have been regularly disrupted over the past years.

      Nevertheless, the operating environment remains fraught with risk. Companies must balance their relationships with both the LNA, which has physical control over most of the country’s oil and gas installations, and the GNA, which nominally controls all key state institutions, such as Libya’s central bank and the NOC. There are also security challenges arising from the presence of local Petroleum Facilities Guards that often have their own interests. In December 2018, for example, the Fezzan Rage Movement worked with members of the guards to shutdown the Sharara oilfield to demand greater government economic support for southern Libya.

      Local grievances in the southwest over lack of economic opportunity and government support, as well as tribal divisions, especially between local Tebu and Tuareg groups, in the area will sustain threats of unrest and communal violence. Moreover, the Islamic State is still present, if diminished, in central Libya and capable of launching small-scale attacks. Sustained political fragmentation will contribute to the continuation of longstanding security deficiencies as the country’s rival authorities will fail to adopt a unified, cooperative approach to country-wide security. As progress toward a more comprehensive political settlement stalls, the prospect that Khalifa Haftar will reimpose an oil blockade — and reignite the conflict — will grow.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is Ethiopia on the Brink of Civil War?

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      Two years ago, scenes of jubilation broke out across northern Ethiopia. The border between Ethiopia and its former adversary Eritrea was open again after 18 years. Siblings were reunited, grandparents saw grandchildren for the first time, phone links were suddenly restored. A new era appeared to have dawned in the Horn of Africa after decades characterized by bitter civil wars, famine and ideological rigidity. The youth, who represent more than half the population, placed especially high expectations in the young new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed.

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      A better life with work and dignity appeared possible. Ahmed had been a surprise candidate from the party of the largest ethnic group, the Oromo, which had never headed the government. He wanted to break with the rigid developmental state concept of the previous government, which had been dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Abiy’s guiding principles of democracy, privatization and love appeared outlandish. His peace settlement with neighboring Eritrea was a breakthrough that won him the Nobel Peace Prize.

      Escalating Power Struggle

      Today the borders between Eritrea and Ethiopia are firmly closed again. Hundreds of Ethiopians have died in ethnic pogroms in recent months. The killing of a prominent Oromo singer, Hachalu Hundessa, sparked weeks of protests, leading the government to block the internet for months and detain thousands of opposition supporters. The youth, whose protests propelled Abiy to power, have turned against him, their hopes dashed.

      The tinder ignited in early November, when fighting broke out between the TPLF and the federal armed forces in the northern state of Tigray. Internet and telephone connections were cut and flights suspended. The federal government imposed a state of emergency on the region, declared the TPLF a terrorist organization and appointed a parallel government for the TPLF-run state. Federal armed forces were deployed to the state border from other parts of the country and from neighboring Somalia. Both sides now claim to have the situation under control: Prime Minister Abiy reports successful strikes on TPLF air defenses while the TPLF claims to be militarily unscathed.

      The escalation began after Abiy indefinitely postponed the first free national elections, which had been scheduled for August, citing the COVID-19 pandemic. A few months earlier, he had dissolved the previous ruling party and founded the Prosperity Party. One effect of these moves was to reduce the political influence of the TPLF and enhance the position of previously neglected states like Somali and Afar.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The TPLF responded by questioning the government’s legitimacy — it regards Abiy as an opponent of ethnic federalism. In early September, the TPLF gained an absolute majority in elections to Tigray’s state parliament, which were deemed illegal by the federal government. After the TPLF’s long and harsh rule, many Ethiopians still bear resentment against it, and mass support for the group is therefore unlikely.

      This hardening of fronts reflects the weakness of Abiy’s government, which has failed to rein in ethnonationalist divisions and prevent ethnic pogroms. The prime minister had assumed that the completion of the gigantic Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile would generate enthusiasm and support across the entire population and function as a national unification project. That hope appears to have been dashed.

      A situation where conflict continues to escalate in Tigray and the country spirals into civil war could spell the end for Abiy’s transition. He risks losing the army’s loyalty and his control over parts of the country. A defeated TPLF could turn into an armed opposition, within or outside the country’s borders. There is also a risk that Eritrea’s president, Isayas Afewerki, will sense an opportunity to expand his country’s regional role again by intervening on Ethiopia’s side. This would weaken Ethiopia and render it more dependent.

      A Ceasefire Will Not Be Enough

      Internal collapse would have repercussions for Ethiopia itself — as the region’s most populous country – and for the entire Horn of Africa. A regional war would endanger the fragile transition in Sudan, while national fragmentation would directly impact the talks on a Nile dam agreement and the African Union Mission in Somalia, in which Ethiopia plays a decisive role.

      The first step toward conflict resolution would be for the TPLF and the federal government to recognize each other as legitimate actors. Talks could then be conducted by the region’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development under Sudanese leadership. The African Union, Europe, the UN and other partners should agree on a shared line on de-escalation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as the mediators of the Ethiopian-Eritrean peace agreement, could also play an important role as guarantors.

      But a ceasefire can only be the start. Dissatisfaction is growing in all of Ethiopia’s regions, separatist tendencies are proliferating, and the system of ethnic federalism is on the verge of violent collapse. If these dangers are to be avoided, it is vital that the security forces prevent ethnic pogroms. And if he is to retain popular backing, Prime Minister Abiy must guarantee due process for political detainees. Finally, if any hope of a new start, democratic change and devolution of power is to survive, a comprehensive national dialogue will be vital.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Third Countries Are Invited to Join European Military Projects

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      As the European Union comes to terms with a changing strategic environment, it needs to do more to provide for its own defense and security. This includes better and more comprehensive EU-NATO coordination but also the participation of non-EU members in projects and processes initiated within EU structures. This discussion is especially important now, when the EU, while coping with COVID-19, is simultaneously seeking to build its open strategic autonomy.

      Current gloomy economic projections indicate that the impact of the pandemic will neither spare the defense sector nor alleviate geopolitical tensions. Therefore, the EU, under certain conditions, should be open to cooperation with like-minded states, especially those with which member states already have a track record of cooperation. It is worth noting that discussions concerning third-country participation distinguish between various structures and pillars of European defense integration.

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      Specifically, the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) have different rules and are at varying stages of adopting them. While rules on third-country participation were established for the EDF and EDA in 2019, EU member states have only just agreed to a regime covering the politically more sensitive area of PESCO projects.

      Why Cooperate With Non-EU Countries?

      According to the latest agreement of the European Council, third parties will be allowed to participate if their inclusion were deemed to add substantial added value to respective projects being carried out and when such participation will not lead to dependencies on third states. Any third country participant need also to share “the values on which the EU is founded” and “respect the principle of good neighbourly relations with Member States.”

      The general conditions, consequently, of a fairly restrictive approach toward participation, undoubtedly satisfy only the closest partners of choice like the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom. In other words, the doors will remain closed to, for example, Turkey and China. Leaving open the possibility for Turkish participation was a sticking point, and some countries, including Greece and Cyprus, are wary. Some view a prior Finnish proposal as not sufficiently exclusionary on the matter. It is notable that neither PESCO nor the EDF alter the EU’s existing rules on defense procurement.

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      Third countries can contribute relevant capacities for military operations, technological know-how as well as research and development. Their participation also facilitates closer EU working relationships with neighbors and non-EU NATO allies, helping safeguard NATO unity. Take the example of Norway — an EU-oriented country with a third of its exports going to the bloc. As the only member of the European Free Trade Association that is both part of the European Economic Area and host to a notable defense industry, Norway would be a substantial contributor to PESCO projects, from research programs to the joint development and acquisition of defense capabilities initiatives.

      Norway indeed maintains a diversified and high-tech defense industry, spanning communication technology to air defense, from undersea systems to state-of-the-art missiles like the renowned Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS). Moreover, Norway is home to numerous EU defense contractor subsidiaries and production plants like the multinational Airbus, Spain’s Indra, Sweden’s Saab and France’s Thales. At a time when the EDF and PESCO provide a vehicle for fostering EU partnerships and consortia in the defense sector, Norway would be a particularly pertinent addition. Norway could, for example, contribute to the Modular Unmanned Ground Systems (MUGS), a PESCO initiative already supported by seven EU member states.

      Cooperation in Times of COVID-19

      But the benefits of joining PESCO initiatives are not limited to the positive economic impact that occurs from defense cooperation. Projects can also serve as platforms for nurturing resilience and improving preparedness for future pandemics. In this regard, military mobility, one of PESCO’s core projects, can aid, for example, in facilitating the movement of troops and military equipment, including sanitary and medical materials, across borders. Progress on the simplification and standardization of cross-border military transport, a key PESCO priority, would further enable a speedy and swift deployment of military personnel and equipment like food, doctors and field hospitals, for instance, from one country to the other, thereby strengthening EU solidarity.

      While the impetus for European defense integration is undeniable, we should not take for granted that it will translate into enhanced capabilities for Europe to provide security for the continent. To move closer toward achieving this goal, the EU needs to intensify efforts to develop politically sound, organizationally efficient and industrially complementary relations with like-minded countries. 

      *[This op-ed is part of the project, Enhanced European Opportunity Partners in the EU’s Defence and Security Initiatives: Study Case of Norway. The support of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defense for the production of this publication does not constitute endorsement of its content, which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Norwegian Ministry of Defense cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      How Will Joe Biden Approach Iran?

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      Addressing months of speculation over the future of US policy toward Tehran, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said on September 22 at the UN General Assembly, “We are not a bargaining chip in the US elections and domestic policy.” Earlier this year, Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden said if he is elected, the US will rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the Iran nuclear deal — which the current administration withdrew from in May 2018. This set of the rumor mills about a major shift in Washington’s handling of Iran.

      The JCPOA was signed in 2015 by the P5+1 group — the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany — and the Iranians in a diplomatic effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet today, the agreement is standing on its last legs. US President Donald Trump, who campaigned against the agreement during the 2016 presidential election, has imposed a policy of maximum pressure on Iran in order to force it to negotiate a better deal.

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      For the Trump administration, an improved agreement would address Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and its expansionist policies in the Middle East — two issues that the Obama administration and the European Union failed to incorporate in the JCPOA. This infuriated US allies in the Middle East, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which in particular has been on the receiving end of Iran’s destabilizing actions in the Gulf.

      With the presidential election on November 3, the question of whether US policy toward Iran will change should Biden win the keys to the White House is attracting the attention of pundits and policymakers in the Arab region. 

      Joe Biden’s Position on Iran

      Biden, who was vice president under the Obama administration, explained in a recent op-ed his proposed position regarding Iran. He said, “I have no illusions about the challenges the regime in Iran poses to America’s security interests, to our friends and partners and to [Iran’s] own people.” He listed four key principles as he outlined his approach.

      Embed from Getty Images

      First, he promised that a Biden administration would prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Second, he committed himself to rejoin the JCPOA if Iran returns to “strict compliance with the nuclear deal,” and only as “a starting point for follow-on negotiations.” In Biden’s words, these negotiations would aim at strengthening and extending the nuclear deal’s provisions and addressing “other issues of concern.” Third, he made a commitment to “push back against Iran‘s destabilizing activities” in the Middle East, which threaten US allies in the region. He also promised to continue to use “targeted sanctions against Iran‘s human rights abuses, its support for terrorism and ballistic missile program.”

      Finally, he said, if the Iranians choose to threaten vital American interests and troops in the region, the US would not hesitate to confront them. Despite this, Biden wrote that he is “ready to walk the path of diplomacy if Iran takes steps to show it is ready too.”

      But Will His Policy Be Any Different to Trump’s?

      In relation to Saudi Arabia, Biden issued a statement on the second anniversary of the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in which he said, “Under a Biden-Harris administration, we will reassess our relationship with the Kingdom, end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.”

      Although Biden’s approach is a departure from Trump’s maximum pressure on Iran and with regard to Saudi Arabia in its intervention in Yemen, it is possible that Biden might end up — at least concerning Iran —applying Trump’s same tactics. This is partly because, according to Biden himself, Iran has stockpiled 10 times as much enriched uranium since Trump has been in office. This is further complicated by the fact there is no guarantee that Iran will surrender its stockpiles to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

      Additionally, Iran has repeatedly declared that it will not negotiate additional provisions to the JCPOA, which is in direct conflict with Biden’s intention to put enforce additional restrictions on Tehran. Moreover, putting pressure on Iran to end its destabilizing regional activities, as Biden has promised, would certainly lead to points of confrontation between the two countries, especially in Iraq and Syria. If any of these scenarios take place, a Biden administration would be forced to impose even tougher sanctions on Iran with the help of EU countries.

      Three Key Factors

      Biden’s decision to rejoin the JCPOA rests on three issues. The first is the balance of power within Congress between the Republicans and the Democrats. The second is how Iran fits into his overall policy toward China. Finally, the position of the Saudi kingdom and its allies regarding any future agreement with Iran would play a key role.

      First, it is well known that members of Congress from both parties resisted then-President Barack Obama’s policy of negotiating with Iran and insisted on reviewing any agreement before the US would ratify it. For this reason, a majority in Congress passed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act in 2015, which forced the president to send any agreement he reaches with Iran to the US Congress for review.

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      When the P5+1 hit a breakthrough with the JCPOA, Obama sent the draft agreement to Congress as per the act, but the nuclear deal was neither approved nor rejected. The House of Representatives overwhelmingly opposed the deal. Yet Republicans in the Senate could not block the agreement because they did not have a 60-vote majority to move forward with a vote against the JCPOA. In other words, almost half of Congress — which consists of the House and the Senate — were against the Iran deal.

      If Biden becomes the 46th US president and decides to rejoin the agreement, he will face the same dilemma as Congress will have to review the JCPOA yet again, a process that will create tension between the president and Congress. Though considering the president needs Congress to pass domestic reforms related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the US economy, Biden would most likely not be in rush to act on Iran.

      Second, Biden would link the deal with Iran with his policy toward China. As president, Biden will continue Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy of redirecting the US military presence from the Middle East and other regions toward East Asia to confront China’s growing influence in the region.

      Meanwhile, Beijing has expanded its position in the Gulf where it has established several strategic partnerships, which are essential to connect China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to markets in Europe. With Iran’s signing of a strategic comprehensive partnership agreement with China in 2016 and its move to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Iran is very much part of the BRI.

      Thus, a Biden administration will likely tie Iran to its China containment policy. That is to say, any US policy that aims to weaken China will have to incorporate some pressure on the Iranians to be effective, including maintaining existing sanctions on Iran. Further, Iranian ties with China will push the US under Biden’s leadership to strengthen its relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in order to prevent China from extending its influence into the Middle East. The Biden administration cannot do so without taking into consideration the interests of Saudi Arabia, which are linked to the kind of agreement the US may strike with Iran.

      Finally, while the US has become self-sufficient in terms of oil supply, the world economy is still reliant on Saudi oil exports. Saudi Arabia is also the heart of the Muslim world, and it maintains control over 10% of global trade that passes through the Red Sea. The kingdom’s significance as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East is also increased with the demise of Syria, Iraq and the domestic troubles in Egypt, not to mention the challenges that Turkey is causing for the US in the region.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Accordingly, a Biden administration cannot afford to turn its back on Saudi interests. Such a policy would force Saudi Arabia to diversify its security, which would undoubtedly include strengthening its relations with China and other US rivals like Russia. This is something the US cannot afford to happen if it wishes to effectively confront its main competitors — China and Russia.

      As for Yemen, there is no reason that prevents Saudi Arabia and a Biden administration from reaching an agreement. In 2015, the kingdom intervened in Yemen to prevent Iran from threatening its southern borders. Saudi Arabia wants the war to end sooner rather than later, and it wants the Yemenis to thrive in their own state. However, the Yemen conflict is connected to the Iranian expansionist policies in the Middle East, and Biden’s administration would have to address this in its approach toward Iran.

      When adding to these reasons the fact that the conservatives won the Iranian parliamentary elections in early 2020 and are poised to win the presidential election in June 2021, it is highly doubtful that Iran will accept a renegotiated nuclear deal with the US.

      For all these reasons, returning to the JCPOA is unlikely.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Importance of the US-South Korea Relationship

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      There are many things we look for in a president. We look for leadership and the ability to manage grave challenges like a pandemic. While most people are focused on avoiding COVID-19 and keeping their jobs, we would be wise to remember that one of the most important roles for any president is to build a set of global allies who will stand with us when inevitable conflicts occur.

      Today, America faces unprecedented challenges from foreign powers, especially China and North Korea. To meet the challenges, we must build a coherent foreign policy that the world — especially our allies — can understand and support. We are witnessing China increasingly flexing its muscles on the Indian border, in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea and with Taiwan. America puts itself at risk to not realize that China is investing much of its resources into a growing, multifaceted military.

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      The US needs to build alliances throughout Asia to ensure our stability for the next century. We need to be doubling down on our relationships with India, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and especially South Korea. South Korea is the world’s 12th-largest economic power and one of America’s strongest allies for the last 60 years. It has been a bastion of democracy housing one of the largest US military bases in Asia. It also houses an essential element of the West’s global supply chain for technology, transportation and telecommunications. This supply chain is more important than ever if relations with China continue to deteriorate.

      While the importance of a strong South Korea policy is at an all-time high, US President Donald Trump managed to stick his finger in the eye of our Korean allies. In 2019, Trump demanded “out of thin air” that the Koreans pay $4.7 billion per year to station US military forces on the Korean Peninsula, according to CNN.

      There is no question that our allies have to pay their fair share for defense. However, cost-sharing negotiations must be based on rationale and data. At precisely the time we need strong allies in Asia, President Trump is burning bridges. This is a major political gaffe that America needs to correct before our relationship suffers long-term damage. If the South Koreans cannot count on reasonable and predictable US foreign policy, they will have little choice but to abandon Washington and to seek out other alliances.

      The South Koreans weren’t the only ones taken by surprise. Even Republican Senators Cory Gardner and Marco Rubio were unprepared to discuss the president’s comments. Senator Ed Markey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, said, “If South Korea decides that it is better off without the United States, President Trump will have undermined an over 60-year shared commitment to peace, stability, and rule of law.”

      The United States can do better. We need to deepen our relationship with South Korea as an essential partner for dealing with North Korea and China. We should be doing the same with other Asian countries and continue to promote the policies that Democratic and Republican secretaries of state have built over decades. A president needs to communicate a consistent game plan that the American people — and our allies — can understand and count on.

      Presidential leadership needs to be even-handed and sensitive to the concerns of our allies. Demands should be replaced by reasonable requests and ample explanations. Insisting that allies vastly increase payments to the United States might make good domestic election-year politics at the cost of American safety in the world.

      If we do not rethink the importance of our allies soon, we may be left to fight the next war alone.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Why Is the US Losing Against China in an Espionage War?

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      Chinese espionage cases in the US have assumed alarming proportions. On July 7, Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, declared: “We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost half are all related to China.”

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      Since the mid-1990s, evidence of Chinese espionage in the US had been mounting. However, it is only recently that the US began taking this issue seriously. Washington’s inability to recognize the threat from Beijing early on is due to its failure to understand Chinese espionage culture. This, in turn, is because the US lacks a strategic counterintelligence culture and focuses excessively on operations.

      Historical Roots of Chinese Espionage Culture

      Americans see the worsening of Sino-US relations from the prism of “betrayal” and “surprise.” This is because the US considers the 1972 US-China rapprochement as a watershed moment. Many in Washington believe the US was singularly responsible for the dramatic economic rise of China. Consequently, they had assumed that the Middle Kingdom would be grateful for American help and adopt Western norms over time. To their surprise, this did not happen. Beijing never really displayed gratitude and it has become increasingly defiant as it has become more powerful. The rising threat of espionage, both security and commercial, is just one of the many manifestations of this defiance.

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      A simple question arises: Why did the US fail to foresee the threat of espionage by China? The answer lies in the chronic inability of American intelligence and intelligentsia to pay adequate attention to the intelligence cultures of other countries. As early as the 1980s, this lacuna had been pointed out by some academics who understood the perils of neglecting foreign cultures. Their advice went unheeded, though.

      To understand Chinese intelligence culture, the operative date is not 1972 but the first recorded interaction between the Chinese and Western civilizations. In the 16th century, Italian-born Father Matteo Ricci led a team of Jesuit missionaries to the village of Shanghai. In a way, these missionaries were the first Western intelligence operatives in China. They came with the mission of converting the Chinese to Christianity. The Jesuits assumed that the lure of superior Western science and technology would convince the Chinese to embrace Christianity. This didn’t happen. By the end of the 19th century, the Jesuits concluded that their mission had been a “total failure.”

      The reason behind this failure is fairly straightforward. Hostility toward foreigners was deeply entrenched in the Chinese psyche. Any foreigner was categorized as “inferior” and “barbaric.” The missionaries were only welcome as long as they imparted knowledge in the scientific and technological realms. Beyond that, when they tried to propagate religion and philosophy, they were punished and sometimes executed. In essence, the Chinese saw the missionaries akin to a fat cow that was to be milked and then slaughtered. This episode offers important insights for understanding modern Chinese espionage culture.

      Today, China is again milking the West for advanced scientific and technical knowledge. This time, it has sent Chinese spies to infiltrate citadels of Western knowledge, especially in the US.

      Reassessing Chinese Espionage Operations

      Studies on Chinese intelligence have mostly focused on operational level analysis. Analysts have largely failed to place individual espionage operations within the cultural context. Few Americans understand that the principles guiding Chinese espionage operations are fundamentally at odds with western ones.  

      This difference could be spotted as early as the mid-20th century when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was building up its intelligence infrastructure with the help of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the CCP intelligence apparatus cooperated closely with Soviet intelligence. Yet, despite tutelage and operational cooperation, the influence of Soviet intelligence practices on the Chinese remained minimal.

      Just as 16th century China had welcomed Western science and discarded Western philosophy, the CCP followed the same practice. Operationally, the CCP intelligence services were keen to learn the tricks of the trade from the Soviets. However, they stuck with their ancient philosophies on the subject. In particular, the Chinese stayed true to Sun Tzu, the famous military strategist of the 6thcentury BCE. There was “no imitation or even emulation” of Soviet intelligence practices, but only “customization and improvisation.”

      One such customization can be seen in how the Chinese have employed the Sun Tzuvian concept of “expendable spies,” which conflicts with the Western philosophy of “ethical spying.” Empirical studies on the British, American and Soviet experience in running human intelligence operations reveal a remarkable degree of concern for field agents. In particular, Western intelligence agencies have historically shown great regard for the lives and security of their informers. The Americans and the British treated Russian informers like Adolf Tolkachev and Oleg Gordievsky rather well. The Soviets also took good care of strategic informants like the Cambridge Five. Western handling officers often insist on “informant security.”

      The “expendable spies” doctrine, on the other hand, does not extend to the field agents the privileges that come with “ethical spying.” The arrest of Candace Claiborne, the State Department official, illustrates this point. Claiborne’s true identity was revealed when she unsuspectingly accepted a compliment from an undercover FBI operative that she was one of the “highest regarded” assets of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the intelligence, security and secret police agency of China. This incident reveals that Chinese intelligence seems to have offered zero security training to an agent who enjoyed top-secret clearance. The CCP treats agents as “disposable” because it still follows Sun Tzu’s theory of “expendable spies.”    

      The expendable and ethical schools of intelligence lead to a qualitative versus quantitative dichotomy when it comes to informer networks. Western agencies look for a few reliable informers who can be secured. The Chinese employ a vacuum cleaner approach and prefer using a large number of intelligence collectors instead of a few trained professionals. This qualitative-quantitative distinction is certainly well known, but few Americans appreciate its historical origins that date back to the formative years of the CCP intelligence apparatus.

      Beijing has used the quantitative approach relentlessly when it comes to commercial espionage. In 2015, John Lewis of the Obama administration insisted to his Chinese counterpart that they discuss this thorny issue. After a few failed attempts at dodging it, the Chinese official made a rather candid observation. According to the official, the Chinese intelligence culture did not distinguish between espionage for national security and for economics. Such a dichotomy was solely a Western one. For the Chinese, it did not exist. Despite this clear confession, it took another five years for the American establishment to completely wake up to the reality of the Chinese threat.

      Fixing the American Culture of Counterintelligence

      The US can contain the Chinese threat by effective counterintelligence. However, the current state of play does not inspire much confidence. American misreading of Chinese espionage culture has given birth to an inadequate counterintelligence response. The US focuses too much on individual cases and not enough on developing a strategic counterintelligence doctrine.

      In such a strategy, the US would employ offensive operations to disrupt enemy intelligence goals. Instead, the FBI currently deploys a defensive strategy that involves the prosecution and conviction of foreign agents. This has two obvious flaws.

      Embed from Getty Images

      First, prosecution takes up scarce time, energy and money. It has an opportunity cost. It fails to exploit a compromised spy who could be used as a double agent. Prosecution also alerts enemy intelligence agencies who can then cover up their tracks.

      Second, convictions are hard to obtain in intelligence matters. Evidence is often insufficient, critical details of operations cannot be revealed and the gray matters of espionage do not translate as easily to the cut and dried approach of the court of law. This makes convictions difficult to secure. In fact, the shrinking arrest-to-conviction ratio feeds into the Chinese intelligence offensive, which feeds on accusations of racism and witch-hunting by the Americans. Every person accused by the FBI who walks away free adds to China’s psychological operations (PSYOP).

      In theory, PSYOP is shaped and targeted at a particular set of audiences to achieve a well-defined set of objectives. By accusing Americans of racism, the CCP aims to appeal to the sentiments of the American people in order to turn them against the FBI. In this regard, Beijing seems successful as American academic and scientific institutions have repeatedly resisted the FBI’s requests to monitor Chinese students. These institutions fear accusations of racism and perhaps a drying up of Chinese money. China has cleverly created rifts between American security agencies and its intellectual institutions to further its own purposes.

      To extricate American counterintelligence from this imbroglio, the US will have to embrace a strategic counterintelligence doctrine. It will have to use PSYOP effectively too. In particular, it could focus on China’s violations of human rights such as the brutal “traitor weeding” program followed by its intelligence agencies. Already, educated Americans are turning against Chinese actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet.

      Therefore, the need of the hour is for Americans to embrace the famed Sun Tzuvian dictum: “[K]now thyself and know thy enemy; a thousand battles, a thousand victories.”

      *[Atul Singh provided guidance for this article.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal

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      The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the Iran nuclear deal — is uncertain. In the absence of US leadership, representatives of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, China, Russia and Iran met on September 1 in Vienna to discuss the accord.

      The deal, which imposes limitations on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program, was agreed in July 2015 between the Iranians and the P5+1 group — China, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States — and implemented six months later. The deal was struck when the Obama administration was in the White House following years of negotiations. The JCPOA gave Iran relief from international economic sanctions in return for dismantling major parts of its nuclear program and giving access to its facilities for inspection.

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      Yet ever since Donald Trump was elected president of the United States in November 2016, the future of the JCPOA has hung in the balance. Trump made it a campaign promise to pull out of the Iran deal. He kept his word and officially withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018, saying the deal is “defective” and did not address Iran’s ballistic missile program or its interference in the affairs of other countries in the Middle East.

      Washington has since reinstated US sanctions on Iran and sought to penalize any nation doing trade with the Iranians, which has led to widespread criticism. In response, Iran has resumed its uranium enrichment at the Fordow nuclear plant, which is banned under the JCPOA.

      The events surrounding the Iran deal have seen their ups and downs, but one thing is for sure: The collapse of the JCPOA is in no one’s best interest.

      A Rocky Year

      Several incidents have marked 2020 as a critical year for Iran. In January, the US assassinated Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in an airstrike in Baghdad, which led to a further escalation in tensions. In response, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said, “Severe revenge awaits the criminals.” The Iranians later revealed they would no longer comply with the limits set to uranium enrichment under the nuclear deal.

      In July, a fire broke out in Natanz, Iran’s enrichment site. The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization claimed the explosion was the result of “sabotage,” and officials further stressed that the incident “could slow the development of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges.” Both the assassination of Soleimani and the explosion in Natanz have rocked the nuclear deal, which is standing on its last legs.

      Making Promises and Breaking Them

      The JCPOA is not the first international agreement the US has withdrawn from under the Trump administration. In August 2019, the US officially pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, an agreement signed by Washington and Moscow in 1987 that sought to eliminate the arsenals of short and intermediate-range missiles of both countries. Russia reciprocated and called the INF Treaty “formally dead.” Just months later, in May 2020, the US announced its decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, an accord that allows unarmed aerial surveillance flights over dozens of countries.

      When it comes to bilateral agreements, the world has experienced challenges with enforcing arms control and nonproliferation agreements, particularly since Trump was elected. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) — which, despite its own uncertainty, is the last remaining arms control pact between the US and Russia — is one clear example. The fact that Trump wants to strike a new deal with Iran but is quick to pull the trigger at torpedoing international agreements — including the 2015 Paris Climate Accord — does not bode well for building trust with the Iranians.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Considering that US–Iran diplomatic relations are a nonstarter under the Trump administration, the result of the US presidential election on November 3 will be critical. President Trump has promised to reach a new deal with Iran “within four weeks” if he is reelected. If he wins, his administration would have to reshape its approach toward Iran in a constructive way to meet the timeline he has set. On the other hand, if Democratic nominee Joe Biden wins, his administration would likely rejoin the JCPOA, as well as seek additional concessions from Tehran. In a recent op-ed for CNN, Biden stated, “If Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.”

      Biden served as the vice president under the previous Obama administration, which, together with the P5+1 group, negotiated the JCPOA back in 2015. Therefore, it is safe to say that the future of the nuclear deal might just rest on the outcome of the US election.

      A Regional Arms Race

      For now, however, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA has weakened the impact of the accord. More importantly, the near-collapse of the deal could have a direct impact on the next Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference in 2021, potentially drawing criticism from non-nuclear-weapon states that may wish to pursue civilian programs of their own.

      The JCPOA is not only important for global nonproliferation efforts, but also for stability in the Middle East. The complete failure of the deal would have severe implications. It would make neighboring countries feel less secure. As a result, this would encourage not just states but potentially non-state actors — such as terrorist groups — to focus on developing nuclear weapons. This would lead to an arms race in the geostrategic Middle East.

      Developing a civilian nuclear program is a long and expensive process that involves extensive oversight by international bodies. Therefore, while it may be an unlikely scenario, regional states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may think that nuclear weapons are essential for national security due to their rivalry with Iran and start building their own arsenal. The potential collapse of the JCPOA clearly has global ramifications that could be catastrophic for nuclear nonproliferation.

      Sanctions on Iran

      On August 20, France, Germany and the UK issued a joint statement saying they do not support the US request for the UN Security Council to initiate the “snapback mechanism” of the JCPOA, which would reimpose the international sanctions against Iran that were lifted in 2015. As the US is no longer a party to the JCPOA, it has limited influence over its enforcement. Therefore, the Security Council rejected the US move.

      The Iranian economy was already fragile before President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, and US-enforced sanctions are further complicating the situation. High living costs, a deep recession and plummeting oil exports are just the tip of the iceberg.

      The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is seen as an important mechanism to organize trade between Germany, France and Britain on the one side, and Iran on the other. INSTEX allows European companies to do business with Iran and bypass US sanctions. On March 31, these three European countries confirmed that INSTEX had “successfully concluded its first transaction, facilitating the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran.”

      Although INSTEX can be helpful for Iran, US sanctions have dealt a fatal blow to the country’s economy. According to the World Bank, Iran’s GDP “contracted by 7.6% in the first 9 months of 2019/20 (April-December 2019),” mostly due to a 37% drop in the oil sector.

      For the US, sanctions are a strategic way to deter Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Yet they can also be counterproductive. Iran is aware of the strategic benefit the JCPOA has for other states. This includes global and regional security. In this regard, the joint statement on upholding the nuclear deal during the recent meeting in Vienna came as no surprise. But if multilateral sanctions are reimposed, that could be the final straw for Iran. This may lead the Iranians to walk away from the JCPOA and up the game with its nuclear program.

      Nuclear Nonproliferation

      With all of this in mind, it is vital that the remaining parties to the JCPOA continue with constructive dialogue to try to uphold the agreement. Everyone benefits from the deal, and its success depends on each side’s fulfillment of their responsibilities and commitments, particularly Iran’s full compliance.

      Most importantly, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is necessary for the future of nuclear nonproliferation. If the deal collapses, then the world enters uncharted territory.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More