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      The US Must Support Sudan’s Path to Democracy

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      In the aftermath of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain formalizing diplomatic relations with Israel on August 13 and September 11, respectively, many experts predict that Sudan will be the next Arab state to follow suit. The main reason for this pertains to the fact that the Trump administration has been putting pressure on Khartoum to abandon the Arab Peace Initiative (API) and open up full-fledged ties with Tel Aviv. Undoubtedly the White House would desperately like to see Sudan take this step prior to America’s presidential election in November.

      In a characteristically transnational manner, President Donald Trump and those around him, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and adviser Jared Kushner, are reportedly making a quid pro quo deal with Khartoum. The US State Department will remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list in exchange for Khartoum normalizing relations with the Jewish state. Nonetheless, this is a cynical and misguided way for the Trump administration to approach Sudan as it disregards the significant ways in which Sudan has changed its policies, both domestically and internationally. Ultimately, it would serve US national interests to immediately remove Sudan from this list regardless of Khartoum’s stances on Israel and the API.

      Africa Needs Its Own “New Deal”

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      Since Sudan’s former president Omar Hassan al-Bashir fell from power in the spring of 2019, the country’s democratic experiment has faced myriad challenges. From COVID-19 to human rights abuses committed by the Sudanese military and major economic problems, Sudan has been dealing with many difficult issues amid the post-Bashir period. Today, there is no denying that the popular and non-violent revolution which ended Sudan’s three-decades-long dictatorship is fragile. International support for Khartoum is necessary for Sudan’s democratic struggle to succeed.

      Yet this is not forthcoming, due to a lack of focus in US foreign policy that has resulted in insufficient attention being paid to the specific policy drivers that must be implemented if Washington can hope to engage constructively with Sudan’s democratic process. It would behoove officials in Washington to adopt policies that result in the US helping, rather than hindering, Sudan’s difficult transition to democracy and civilian rule.

      Struggle for Democracy

      After Bashir’s ouster in a palace coup in April 2019, Sudan’s revolutionaries, millions of whom spent months on the streets pressuring the dictator to step down, continued protesting in favor of civilian leadership. In contrast to the many Egyptians who supported the military-backed coup in Egypt that toppled their country’s president, Mohammed Morsi, in July 2013, Sudan’s wider public knew not to blindly trust the country’s military to defend a democratic revolution. By June 3, 2019, hardline elements tied to the Bashir regime, including militants from the notorious Janjaweed militia, massacred Sudanese protesters in the capital, resulting in roughly 120 deaths and hundreds of injuries.

      Yet about two months after that atrocity, Sudan’s military and civilian revolutionaries agreed to a political compromise that came up with a government that is led by civilians but also maintains significant military representation.

      Since August 2019, a sovereign council consisting of six civilian and five military officials has been governing Sudan. Additionally, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok heads a technocratic cabinet comprised of civilians. Sudan plans to run free and democratic elections in 2022, with the interim period of time supposed to give Sudanese civil society an opportunity to regrow after being harshly oppressed under Bashir’s rule. During the present period, there has been a restoration of the freedoms of assembly, press and speech. But the democratic transition was agreed upon in the pre-COVID-19 era and at a time when impacts of the pandemic on public health, the economy and society could not possibly have been foreseen.

      For Sudan’s government, the gravest risk is that it will lose its legitimacy among more Sudanese citizens if the country’s economic situation remains bleak. Youth unemployment stands around 40% and could widen societal divisions if left unaddressed or if tackled in ways that exacerbate and widen existing fault-lines and inequalities. Long lines for petrol as well as staple foods are common in Sudan, where the country’s annual inflation rate reached 167% in September. The global coronavirus pandemic and the lockdown have only exacerbated the country’s economic problems and made it more urgent that actions be taken as soon as possible to support the political transition underway in Sudan rather than wait until 2022, by which time the impact of economic and social dislocation generated by the current crisis might be too late to effect a positive democratic outcome.

      Harm of US Sanctions

      “The single biggest obstacle to Sudan’s economic recovery is the continued U.S. economic sanctions, which … not only impacts trade with and investment from the United States, but from other countries and multilateral entities as well,” explained renowned American Middle East scholar, Dr. Stephen Zunes. Other experts such as the Atlantic Council’s Cameron Hudson agree that Sudan’s long-term economic progress depends on Washington removing its sanctions on Khartoum. Imposed by the US in 1993 when Washington labeled Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism, these sanctions were aimed at punishing Bashir’s government for its links to Osama bin Laden and other global terrorists, plus the regime’s sponsorship of armed Palestinian and Arab groups like Hamas, the Abu Nidal Organization, the Fatah-Revolutionary Council, Hezbollah, Jamaat al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

      Yet today, Sudan’s post-Bashir government is not sponsoring any Salafi-jihadi terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS). In fact, even Bashir’s government was not doing so during its final years in power. In its 2015 country report on terrorism, the US State Department stated that Washington and Khartoum “worked cooperatively in countering the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and ISIL.”

      Thus, Washington’s current policy vis-à-vis Sudan suffers from being stuck in a previous era in which leaders, institutions and both regional and global circumstances were fundamentally different and in no way reflect the considerable changes in Sudanese politics over the past year and more. Hudson described the continued designation of Sudan as a state sponsor terrorism as representing to many “an anachronism and a symbol of Washington’s own lethargy in updating its policy toward Khartoum.” In sum, problems which the US had with Bashir’s regime decades ago should not be “effectively punishing [the Sudanese] further for having overthrown [the Bashir] dictatorship,” as Zunes argues.

      Last year, Prime Minister Hamdok spoke before the UN General Assembly and addressed Washington’s outdated policies in relation to Sudan: “The Sudanese people have never sponsored, nor were supportive of terrorism. On the contrary, those were the acts of the former regime which has been continuously resisted by the Sudanese people until its final ouster. These sanctions have played havoc on our people, causing them untold misery of all types and forms.” There is a risk that the longer these sanctions remain in place, the more the US becomes vulnerable to narratives that portray bureaucratic inertia in responding to changing circumstances as something more sinister, ascribing to Washington malign policy motivations that damage America’s standing and public diplomacy interests.

      A major concern is that Sudan’s economic situation and COVID-19 crisis could jeopardize the country’s transition to democracy. If the period of time between now and the planned 2022 elections is defined by economic crises and resultant social and political unrest, other actors including the military or conservative Islamists tied to the Muslim Brotherhood may find themselves best positioned to take power. The Sudanese public, so energized by the revolutionary success of 2019, may quickly become disillusioned if it perceives its struggle to have been in vain or to have been betrayed. The experience of disillusioned activists in Tunisia and Egypt has shown how some may be drawn toward radicalization if they feel there is no realistic alternative to an authoritarian status quo.

      Policy Recommendations

      In order to best secure the hopes for a future Sudan led by inclusive, secular, moderate and democratic civilians, the US government should end all its sanctions on Khartoum and establish fully normalized diplomatic relations with Sudan. Thus, given the urgency of helping Sudan preserve its hard-fought-for democratic gains since 2019 and US interests in seeing a smooth transition occur in the country, below are four key policy recommendations.

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      First, Washington should remove Sudan’s designation on the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Sudan’s inclusion on the SST list not only bars the US from economically assisting Sudan but mandates that Washington prevent the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other global financial institutions from giving Sudan loans or other forms of assistance. As coronavirus spreads across Sudan, the authorities have had a more difficult time coping with the pandemic because the World Bank came under US pressure in April 2020 to exclude Sudan from a list of developing countries that received help from a $1.9-million emergency fund. Furthermore, the designation requires US citizens to obtain the Treasury Department’s approval prior to engaging in any financial transaction with these Sudanese government. So long as Sudan is on the SST list, it will be difficult to imagine the impoverished country receiving sufficient levels of investment and trade in order to develop and prosper in the future.

      Second, the US should lift all other remaining sanctions on Khartoum and encourage multinational institutions to help Sudan, especially amid the global COVID-19 crisis. Because Omar al-Bashir ascended to power in an Islamist-driven military coup in 1989, and the military that took power in the 2019 palace coup did not come to power as a result of a democratic election, there remain prohibitions under Section 7008 of the State Department Foreign Operations funding. In practice, this prevents the US from providing much assistance to any country where the “military has overthrown, or played a decisive role in overthrowing, the government.”

      Yet the US should not wait to pull these prohibitions until after the 2022 elections, which is what Washington currently plans to do. Darfur-related sanctions are also still enforced, which as Hudson argues “will continue to have a dampening effect on outside investment until durable peace and credible accountability mechanisms have been implemented.” These sanctions deter banks and other financial institutions around the world from taking the risks that currently come with Sudan-related opportunities. Thus, lifting these sanctions could help boost Sudan’s foreign investment climate.

      Third, Washington should reverse its decision, made in February 2020, to end migrant visas from Sudan. This move basically brings all immigration from Sudan to a complete halt, and it will continue to do so even in the post-COVID-19 period if not addressed. As experts such as the Chatham House’s Matthew T. Page have explained, Trump’s domestic political agenda of taking hard stances on immigration issues amid his reelection campaign was largely behind this policy decision, which targeted Sudan and three other African countries. In the process, however, the US loses influence in these developing nations that see the American door slamming on them as only further reason to invest in even deeper ties with China and Russia.

      Finally, the US should stand with Sudan’s government in solidarity against COVID-19. While the US should first end sanctions on Sudan, which would help combat the spread of coronavirus in the country and among its neighbors, Washington should also give Khartoum aid to help the Sudanese authorities deal with the pandemic within their own borders. As other states worldwide have practiced “coronavirus diplomacy” to boost their humanitarian credentials, this demonstration of American soft power could secure some goodwill from the Sudanese public following decades of negative relations between Washington and Khartoum.

      Key Interests

      Ultimately, there is no good reason for the US to be working to undermine Sudan’s democratic experiment, even if that is not the intent but rather the unfortunate byproduct of a bureaucracy that is slow to respond, giving the impression of stasis. Perceptions often play a key role in shaping emerging realities, and for the Sudanese, who feel that their actions in ousting a dictator are deserving of American support, there may not be an open-ended window before expectation turns to disillusionment.

      Moreover, there are key American interests that can be advanced through a US-Sudan rapprochement that follows an unwinding of Washington’s sanctions on Khartoum. In terms of competition among global powers, Washington has long-term foreign policy interests in establishing a positive relationship with post-Bashir Sudan. Washington’s sanctions on Sudan, as well as outright American hostility against the country — most exemplified by the Clinton administration’s decision to bomb a factory in Khartoum in 1998 — have only pushed the country closer to China, Russia, and at previous junctures Iran too.

      Although Sudan is not a high-ranking issue of interest to the diplomatic establishment in Washington nor to the US public, the American and Sudanese people alike could stand to gain in many ways if their governments reconcile and work toward a more cooperative relationship following a rapprochement. As a farmland-rich country situated along the Red Sea at the intersection of the Arab and African worlds, Sudan represents an important part of the conflict-prone Horn of Africa. In this volatile part of Africa, many powers — China, Israel, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Russia, United Arab Emirates, etc. — are scrambling to consolidate their clout, and the US certainly has its own interests in the immediate and broader neighborhood.

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      While the focus on countering terrorism and violent extremism has, to an extent, taken center stage in the US, measures taken now that support the political transition to democracy and strengthen Sudan’s economy can have a significant impact in bolstering Sudanese resilience to potential shocks such as COVID-19 that, if mishandled, could undermine much of the progress made on the security and stability fronts.

      Yet beyond such strategic interests shaped by Sudan’s geopolitical position in the wider African, Arab and Islamic regions, the US would in an ideational sense be living up to its professed values if Washington adopted new policies that are aimed at supporting the Sudanese people in their struggle for democracy following 30 years of brutal dictatorial rule. Ultimately, the US is sending the wrong message when it emphasizes the importance of human rights but turns its back on Sudan’s non-violent, democratic revolutionaries while engaging openly with highly authoritarian states around Sudan such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

      From a soft power and public diplomacy perspective, too, greater support for Sudan would be a significant tool for the US to project as the world retreats into a great power rivalry synonymous with the Cold War in the 20th century, not least because the African continent has emerged as one of the frontlines for such perceived geopolitical competition with China.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is Assad Gearing Up for a Final Push in Syria?

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      Ceasefires in Syria come and go, and so do the meetings between the outside players who hold it in their hands to determine if an end to the country’s 9-year civil war is in sight. The most recent meeting in Ankara between Turkish and Russian military officers was intended to discuss issues at a “technical level” in both the Syrian and Libyan theaters of war. Not much was achieved, with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reportedly calling the session “unproductive.” The minister called for the ceasefire to continue and insisted that “there must be more focus on political negotiations,” a sentiment few can disagree with but one that seems most unlikely to be realized in the near to middle future.

      Russia’s state-controlled Sputnik news agency reported that what it called a “source” had said that the Turks had declined to evacuate five observation posts in Syria’s Idlib province. According to the source, “After the Turkish side refused to withdraw the Turkish observation points and insisted on keeping them, it was decided to reduce the number of Turkish forces present in Idlib and to withdraw heavy weapons from the area.”

      A Coming Catastrophe

      Whether that is the case has yet to be confirmed. However, it was enough for the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) to issue a somber warning: “Turkey may have agreed to cede control of Southern Idlib to pro-Assad forces in a meeting with Russia September 16. If the reports of a deal are true, a pro-Assad offensive is likely imminent.”

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      The ISW buttresses its argument by noting that Turkey had already withdrawn hundreds of its forces from southern Idlib on September 8. Turkey’s claim that the withdrawal is the result of rising tensions with Greece over hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean were treated with skepticism by the ISW: “Turkey may have used its dispute with Greece as cover for action consistent with an impending deal with Russia in Idlib.”

      This may, indeed, be the “political negotiations” that Cavusoglu was speaking of. If so, and if an assault on what remains of Idlib in rebel hands is imminent, then it signals likely catastrophe for civilians trapped between advancing Assad forces and jihadist militias. Were the US not in the middle of a presidential race and were the incumbent in the White House not so inclined to call for the complete withdrawal of US forces from Syria (only to change his mind when presented with the outcomes of such a move), then there would be grounds for more hope for the civilian population of Idlib.

      But such is not the case. And beyond President Donald Trump’s view that, as he expressed it, “People said to me, ‘Why are you staying in Syria?’ Because I kept the oil, which frankly we should have done in Iraq,” uncertainty about just what America’s intentions in Syria are remains very much in play. It is a factor that other external players, that is the Russians, the Turks and Iran, can all exploit as they seek to advance their strategic efforts at the expense of the Syrian people.

      Old Enemies

      It is a situation that has left the 500 or so US troops still in Syria and their allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in a vulnerable and exposed place, a point the Pentagon clearly gets, even if the commander-in-chief doesn’t. Announcing a deployment of Bradley fighting vehicles to Eastern Syria on September 19, a Pentagon spokesperson stated: “These actions are a clear demonstration of US resolve to defend Coalition forces in the [Eastern Syria Security Area], and to ensure that they are able to continue their Defeat-ISIS mission without interference. The Defense Department has previously deployed Bradleys to northeast Syria pursuant to these goals.”

      That deployment reflects a growing concern that, as documented by ISW and others, the Islamic State (IS) is resurging in Syria. Its recent attacks have been aimed at tribal elders who support the SDF and at efforts to develop governance capabilities that benefit civilians by removing festering grievances that the jihadists seek to exploit.

      For their part, the Russians, playing on fears that the SDF Kurdish leadership has concerning an abrupt American withdrawal, may strive to build on pushing the Kurds to seek some sort of rapprochement with Damascus, thus hastening a US departure. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Russians were crucial to a deal in October last year that saw the Kurds cede territory to Assad forces and withdraw rather than face a Turkish offensive in northern Syria.

      Meanwhile, the ISW’s Jennifer Cafarella argues that a sudden withdrawal without a strategic endgame plays straight into the hands of not just Russia and Iran; it emboldens a rising IS and empowers the jihadist ideology it shares with America’s oldest enemy in its war on terror, al- Qaeda.

      Al-Qaeda has played a long game, happy for IS to take the brunt of the West’s military response. Cafarella says that while a global coalition led by America came together to defeat the caliphate (and force ISI into a guerrilla insurgency), the same cannot be said for al-Qaeda. “We have not been able to reach the same level of understanding with our allies and partners and that is in part because Al Qaeda is playing this much more sophisticated political game that in the long run, I do very much worry, could outflank us.”

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      India Must Modernize Its Inefficient Defense Production System

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      In a complex world, countries have to clearly identify and evaluate external threats on a continuous basis. These are no longer only military, insurgent and terror, but also scientific, technological and economic.

      360° Context: The State of the Indian Republic

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      In the Indian situation, foreign powers have engaged in cyberattacks, electronic warfare, illegal fake currency circulation and media manipulation to exacerbate the country’s internal fault lines. To counter such a multiplicity of threats, India must build up comprehensive national power. More than ever, this power is a composite of economic, industrial, scientific, technological, innovation, military and intelligence capabilities.

      Threats, External and Internal

      India is the only country that shares land borders with two nuclear states: China and Pakistan. With Pakistan, India shares a maritime boundary too. Pakistan, a country born after the partitioning of British India in 1947, has been congenitally hostile to and consistently opposed the very idea of India. It waged wars against India in 1948, 1965 and 1971. A little more than two decades ago, it destroyed a promising Indian peace initiative by taking over strategic heights in Kargil, an Indian district in Ladakh, provoking a limited but bloody conflict in 1999.

      The bitter bone of contention between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. As a self-defined haven for Muslims, Pakistan refuses to accept Kashmir as a part of India. It has backed an armed insurgency as part of its strategy to bleed India with a thousand cuts. Pakistan’s goal is to dismember its larger neighbor, beginning with Kashmir. In the 1980s, it backed a bloody insurgency in Punjab, which eventually failed. Since then, it has doubled down on Kashmir.

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      Pakistan’s fixation with India has defined its foreign policy since its inception. During the Cold War, Islamabad allied with the US, mainly to wrest Kashmir from India. In recent years, it has aligned itself with China to counter India in every possible manner.

      China’s relations with India are becoming increasingly complicated. This can be explained as a big power competition. This began as early as the 1950s when both countries were emerging from the shadows of imperial powers after two centuries of domination. In 1962, India lost to China in a brief but traumatic war. Since then, the two countries have not been able to agree upon a border, and the Chinese have been nibbling away at Indian territory more aggressively in recent years. At its essence, the Chinese game plan is simple: China wants to emerge as a superpower and a rival to the US. It wants to block India’s rise as an Asian power and a rival in the region.

      Like any large and diverse country, India has numerous internal security challenges. Insurgency remains a serious threat in Kashmir as well as India’s northeastern region that borders Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh. India has faced a communist Naxalite insurgency since the 1950s. Islamic extremism, aided and abetted by foreign powers and jihadi organizations, especially Pakistan and its proxies, is increasing dramatically. The long coastline of India makes it extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks as the 2008 massacre in Mumbai demonstrated.

      Given such threats, it goes without saying that India needs a strong security apparatus of military, police and intelligence. Importantly, the country also requires a robust defense production apparatus for three reasons.

      First, India must have the ability to produce key requirements of its armed forces to enable them to be combat-ready. Otherwise, India would be dependent on imports and at the mercy of foreign suppliers, especially at critical times. Second, India must profit from new dual-use technologies and capabilities that emerge from defense production as France, Russia and the US have demonstrated repeatedly. These have a multiplier effect in boosting a country’s technological base, driving growth in its economy and creating new jobs. Third, India cannot rely exclusively on the public exchequer for ensuring defense preparedness, given competing demands on the budget, paucity of foreign exchange reserves, dependency on Middle Eastern oil and welfare-oriented policies. Hence, the participation of the private sector in defense production is a sine qua non.

      The Story of Defense Production in India    

      India has credible experience in defense production for over two centuries. The British set up a gun carriage factory in 1801 that began production in 1802 and is still operational today. World War I provided the impetus for the British to increase production. The number and range of these factories increased significantly until the end of World War II. Defense facilities and their management structure, namely the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), are yet another legacy of the British like India’s bureaucracy, judiciary and military.

      After the defeat in 1962, India created a number of defense public sector undertakings (DPSUs). These are units owned and managed by the government. Like most other government-owned entities, these units never really had any incentive to achieve excellence. They have been unable to satisfy the requirements of the armed forces even partially. India has consequently continued to import critical equipment from foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The foreign OEMs have earned the trust of the armed forces for quality, delivery schedules and even confidentiality. India continues to pay huge royalties for technologies transferred for producing imported equipment in the DPSUs.

      These foreign OEMs are largely privately owned but enjoy strong state support from their home governments. Yet India has not demonstrated the same level of trust in its own private sector companies. Even though India liberalized its economy in 1991, it permitted private sector participation in defense only in 2001. Nearly 20 years later, the private sector production of 170 billion rupees ($2.27 billion) comprises just about 21.3% of the 800 billion rupees ($10.67 billion) total defense sector. Most of this production is in low-value goods.

      While the US relies on Boeing, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman for many of its new defense technologies, India has entrusted the task of development of such technologies exclusively to its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). In theory, India should be producing cutting-edge, high-quality defense material with institutions like the DRDO. The reality is very different

      In a nutshell, the present apparatus that India has for satisfying the requirements of its defense services is entirely inadequate. In view of the deteriorating security conditions on its borders and increasing internal threats, this failure could prove catastrophic. In the past, India’s failures led to colonization. Tomorrow, these might lead to Balkanization.

      What Has Gone Wrong?

      Ordnance factories are India’s oldest defense production units. They produce a vast variety of equipment and supplies. Run by the OFB, they fall under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defense. These OFB factories are run by officers of the Indian Ordnance Factory Service (IOFS) who are a part of Indian civil services. They are generalist administrators with little technological expertise.

      Like much of the government, the OFB is not accountable for quality, timeliness and efficiency. There is no pressure to produce returns on public investment. The OFB pays little attention to operational efficiency, and cost-effectiveness has seldom been part of its calculus. They do not even produce annual profit and loss statements or balance sheets. They function in absolute opacity as monopolies with captive buyers.

      The Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA), another colonial legacy, is responsible for the quality assurance of products produced by OFB factories. It falls under the administrative control of the defense ministry just like the OFB. This arrangement is misguided. While the OFB is the producer, the DGQA is supposedly responsible for the quality of OFB products. The armed forces are the consumers but have no right to evaluate the quality of the products they use. The DGQA neither produces nor consumes and is not responsible or liable for poor quality or anything going wrong. It is bureaucratic, inefficient and incompetent. Over time, the DGQA has even acquired an odious reputation for its integrity. This has serious implications for India’s national security.

      Many in India have long recognized the need for reform. A proposal recently emerged to convert the OFB into a public sector company. This would make India’s 33 ordnance factories into DPSUs. Importantly, the DPSUs themselves have been a failure as explained above. This reform measure is ill-conceived, half-hearted and doomed to failure.

      The problems of the post-1962 DPSU model run deep too. They also operate as monopolies with the armed forces as their captive customers. DPSU employees enjoy complete job security, are not accountable for quality, delays or cost overruns. Strong unions resist any reforms. DPSUs operate in an environment of financial indiscipline. There is no compulsion to generate a reasonable return on capital and even continuous losses do not lead to closure. These losses have become a persistent drain on the public exchequer and suck up taxpayer money that could have gone to health, education or infrastructure.

      To be fair to DPSUs, they are not responsible for all their shortcomings. They have no autonomy to run their organizations. The Ministry of Defense micromanages recruitment, promotion, pay structure and investment decisions. DPSUs do very little in-house research or development. Instead, they rely on the DRDO or foreign licenses. Top management appointments by the government are far too often dispensed as patronage. Merit and achievement often become secondary considerations and, at times, interventions to promote a social justice agenda weaken DPSU performance.

      This performance has dangerous consequences. If a soldier guarding India’s borders gets inferior DPSU products, then it diminishes his fighting ability. The lack of DPSU accountability for quality, timely delivery and cost control weakens India’s national security. When a plane made by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) fails midair and the pilot dies, the country does not hold HAL accountable. This means that DPSUs have no incentive to maintain quality standards. Even items produced under a license are subject to unconscionable delays and extreme cost escalations. For example, the Germans can produce a submarine completing all trials within two years. In contrast, India’s DPSUs take over 10 years to assemble semi-knocked-down kits. DPSUs took an eternity to manufacture Arjun, India’s main battle tank, even though most of its critical components are simply imports.

      Whose Fault?

      Undoubtedly, it is not just DPSUs who are at fault. There are deeper reasons for India’s failure to achieve even a reasonable degree of self-reliance in the vital area of defense production and its defense research and development capabilities.

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      First, India has a narrow technological and scientific base. Since the mid-1990s India has invested less than 1% of its GDP for research and development activities. On the other hand, China has steadily boosted its research and development expenditure and has crossed 2% of its GDP.

      It is important to note that China’s GDP has grown faster than India’s and is now four times the size of its southern neighbor. Thanks to its increased expenditure, China now manufactures products that sell across the world.

      In contrast, Indian industry still struggles to sell globally and is starved of skilled manpower. India’s best technical talent still migrates to greener pastures. Except for a handful of enterprises, none of the vaunted information technology firms in India have created a top brand or a reputed product line. The situation is worse in the manufacturing sector.

      Second, India suffers from a lack of skilled manpower for even the most basic of industrial activities. An outmoded education system churns out millions of white-collar job seekers. Technical jobs like machining, plumbing, electrical works, mechanical works and quality assurance are treated as inferior pursuits. Even engineers from premier institutes seldom aspire for a hands-on career profile. They prefer to go into management or government service.

      India is desperately short of a workforce with advanced manufacturing floor skills. The few skilled technicians are a prized lot. Both the private and the public sectors compete for them. Enlightened thought leaders in the information technology sector like Narayana Murthy have often bemoaned the fact that India’s education system is failing to produce employable candidates, forcing private enterprises to establish in-house training institutions.

      To increase the scale and improve the quality of industrial production, India needs to raise an army of trained workers. This would involve nothing short of a cultural revolution in both industry and education.

      Some Solutions to Defense Production Problems

      In truth, the real answer to the problem is privatization. Taxpayer money must not be wasted on inefficient ordnance factories or DPSUs. If the armed forces could choose suppliers from a competitive marketplace, there would be huge savings for the taxpayer. Furthermore, the forces would be able to get high-quality products that meet the highest standards. Those who object to privatization should remember that India buys all its high-end defense equipment from private players, well-known OEMs such as Rafale jets from Dassault Aviation and M777 howitzers from BAE Systems.

      Not all ordnance factories can be turned into DPSUs and not all DPSUs can be privatized. Those units that cannot be turned around must be closed down. In addition, not all DPSUs need to be privatized. Some would be in core strategic sectors and they need professional management and operational autonomy. A part of their shareholding could be sold in the market to bring financial discipline and competitiveness to these DPSUs.

      Like any high-performing company in the world, the government should empower the board of directors of DPSUs and give them operational autonomy. Any DPSU board should be able to select its top management and hold its feet to the fire. The DPSUs must select top management from the open market by offering competitive pay, allowances and incentives. Similarly, they must recruit other employees on the basis of merit, and merit alone. The board must set high-performance standards for employees and foster a culture of excellence. The board and management must exercise financial discipline to generate returns on capital.

      The DPSUs must also do their own research and development. This does not mean that they stop working with the DRDO. It just means that they are responsible for all aspects of their performance. They can and indeed must collaborate with other institutions, especially the DRDO, but the buck for all aspects of their performance stops with them. Also, the DPSUs must have the power to raise capital in the form of both equity and debt from capital markets. The value of their shares and the rating of their debt will reflect the true worth of their enterprise, make the DPSU management accountable and compel them to perform optimally.

      In theory, the DRDO is expected to develop world-class defense technologies India needs to lessen reliance on imports. In reality, the DRDO is yet to establish itself as a reliable source for high-technology and battle-ready products that can more than match that of the adversaries. Of course, there are notable exceptions, particularly when it comes to rockets and guided missiles. The DRDO needs to replicate these successes in other fields.

      Like DPSUs, the DRDO also needs operational autonomy. Those who run the DRDO must be able to hire and fire, set pay and standards, and run the organization optimally to produce technologies that Indian armed forces need. At the same time, the DRDO must be accountable for its performance. Its key job is to produce indigenous technology and reduce dependence on imports. Furthermore, the DRDO has to achieve this under tight timelines, given rising threats to India’s national security.

      The DGQA has become totally outdated. This colonial institution must be disbanded. The consumer of the product must have the right to decide if a product is good enough, while the producer must be held fully responsible for both the quality and the delivery of its supplies. The producer must also suffer penalties for its failures. In practical terms, the armed forces who use defense products must have a choice to select products and producers. They should also be able to go to court and claim damages or ask for penalties if producers supply products that fall short of their quality standards.

      Finally, the defense sector needs some of the same reforms that one of the authors suggested to the prime minister in a memo on May 5. In their words, India “must no longer have the power to throttle supply-side activity.” Indian entrepreneurs do well around the world. It is time to unleash Indian entrepreneurial energy in the defense sector too. This will improve quality, cut costs and make India more secure in the years and decades ahead.

      For too long, India has failed to promote a culture of excellence while allowing mediocrity to flourish. It has derided merit and achievement while tolerating inefficiency and dishonesty. This has caused serious damage to the nation’s economic progress and the welfare of its people. This culture has imperiled national security. Hence, India must focus on developing a culture of excellence in all fields. Given the multiplicity of threats, defense production must be the sector that becomes an exemplar of excellence for this new culture of excellence.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is Switzerland’s Air2030 Program the Right Choice for the Country?

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      Various international media have reported on Switzerland’s current defense procurement, the largest in its history. Switzerland’s goal is to redefine the defense of its national airspace in a program called Air2030. They will determine what aircraft the Swiss air force will fly for the foreseeable future (the next 40 years) and what ground-based air defense system will protect the country. Although international reports have discussed aspects of the Swiss procurement process, particularly about the fighter aircraft being considered, the political debate has been overlooked. A closer look will clearly show the importance of security and defense issues for an international audience.

      Switzerland is a unique country in a unique geostrategic and political situation. It is famous for its strict adherence to neutrality and its citizens-in-arms as part of an army that would make it difficult for any invader to conquer. This concept of armed neutrality has been a considerable factor in establishing Switzerland’s notable wealth and political stability. According to its constitution, it is not allowed to be involved in armed or political conflict between other states. Switzerland has the world’s oldest policy of military neutrality and has never participated in a foreign war since its neutrality was officially established in 1815.

      It is worth noting that there are ongoing debates as to whether this neutrality is real or an oft-stated but realistically inaccurate description. This will not be discussed in this article. The focus is on the political and operational discussion surrounding the procurement process of Air2030.

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      Geographically, Switzerland is situated in one of the world’s most stable regions, between France, Italy, Germany and Austria. All of its neighbors are EU members and, with the exception of neutral Austria, also NATO members. Anyone contemplating a military incursion by land or air into this land-locked nation would have to pass through NATO territory or NATO airspace. Politically, Switzerland developed a democratic system in which its citizens have the right to participate directly in government decisions and sometimes even in defense-related decisions.

      Many in the world envy and admire the Swiss for such direct democracy, and while the success of Switzerland’s political framework is clear, its effectiveness is based upon access to accurate information. In the current national debate about Air2030 however, this access is highly questionable.

      Procedural Adjustments

      Switzerland’s Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS) oversees the country’s defense issues. Its previous plan for the procurement of fighter aircraft was rejected by a majority of the Swiss people. In 2014, the Gripen fighter jet, manufactured by Saab in Sweden, was turned down by 53% of the Swiss. The Gripen rejection was a major blow for the DDPS and has certainly influenced their current procurement effort. During the previous procurement attempt, the Gripen did not pass all internal Swiss evaluation tests and compared less favorably against the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale.

      Still, the Swiss government decided to promote the purchasing process in 2011 for a little more than $3 billion. Saab’s competitors, of course, disagreed vehemently with this decision and protested. Coincidently, internal Swiss test results of the aircraft evaluation were anonymously leaked and the Swiss media started to call the Gripen a “paper plane.” Petitions against the Gripen began. In 2014, an unlikely coalition of military critics, pacifists, political skeptics and those who preferred a more capable aircraft stopped the Swiss procurement plans through a referendum.

      In 2020, the DDPS is again trying to convince the Swiss electorate of the need for a new aircraft. This time, it’s the Air2030 defense plan, which entails the acquisition of new fighter jets at a price tag of around $6 billion and ground-based air defense systems at a further $2 billion. Learning from the Gripen rejection, direct involvement of the Swiss voters has been adjusted accordingly: The people will not have the chance to vote for or against ground-based air defense or what system will be purchased. However, they will still have the opportunity to influence the procurement of fighter jets, but not around a particular aircraft type.

      The DDPS will evaluate and choose among four aircraft: the European (Germany, UK, Italy, Spain) coproduction Eurofighter Typhoon; the French Dassault Rafale; or the American Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet or Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II. On September 27, the Swiss referendum will determine whether the DDPS has the mandate to choose one of these aircraft or not. The referendum cannot influence which aircraft Switzerland will ultimately purchase. Many Swiss citizens are frustrated at their inability to influence this procurement decision.

      The aircraft type is of operational and military importance, but also of political relevance. The purchasing decision will wed the Swiss military to the country producing the aircraft they select for many years to come. In a country dominated by a mindset of neutrality, this is not a decision to be made lightly.

      So far, the Air2030 discussion in Switzerland has been emotional and politically motivated, with many facts frequently discarded from the conversation. The DDPS has framed the upcoming referendum as an essential question about Switzerland’s defense capability. According to the DDPS, a no to Air2030 would be a vote against the Swiss military and would leave Switzerland defenseless after 2030, due to its supposed eight-to-10-year procurement process. DDPS argues that if this opportunity is missed now, Switzerland will not be able to field new fighter jets by 2030. Without fighter jets, it claims the Swiss military cannot fulfill its basic defense functions.

      The commander of the Swiss air force further warned that there was no “plan B” and that Switzerland without Air2030 will not have a functioning air force after 2030. Needless to say, not having a plan B does not speak well for Swiss military planning functions. It is also important to note that the Swiss air force commander implied that Switzerland would start fielding the first new fighter aircraft as early as 2025 if Air2030 was approved by the Swiss people. Contrary to the DDPS statements, it should be absolutely possible to go back to the drawing board and come up with a new viable defense plan if the people vote against Air2030 and still have a solution fielded by 2030.

      The Hornet

      The DDPS justifies the need for new fighter jets by 2030 due to the aging fleet of the current F/A-18 Hornets. According to the DDPS, the F/A-18 Hornet is outdated and obsolete. In the Swiss press, the aircraft has been called an “old-timer plane.” Swiss defense minister, Viola Amherd, stated in parliament and in numerous interviews that Switzerland would be the world’s last country to fly the F/A-18 Hornet by 2030. Put simply, this is not true. Canada will operate its F/A-18 Hornets, which are much older than the Swiss ones, until 2032. The Canadian Air Force was one of the first to acquire the Hornet in 1982, while Switzerland was one of the last countries to do so between 1997 and 1999.

      The Canadian F/A-18 Hornets were used during Operation Desert Storm over Kuwait and Iraq, during NATO operations over Yugoslavia and Libya, and during the military air campaign against the Islamic State in Syria. They are currently actively engaged with the US Air Force under the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in protecting the North American continental airspace and are part of NATO’s air policing missions in the Baltic states, Romania and Iceland.

      These real-world missions will continue to be carried out by Canadian F/A-18 Hornets into the 2030s. Canada, together with the US Marine Corps, is currently upgrading its Hornets. Just like Canada, the Marine Corps will continue to operate the F/A-18 Hornet in the future. It is therefore difficult to believe the Swiss argument that its Hornets are no longer adequate for the mission of the Swiss air force. In 2016 already, the Canadian Air Force declared that some of its Hornets had up to 8,000 flight hours, many of them under combat conditions. Switzerland is currently modifying its Hornet fleet from 5,000 to 6,000 flight hours and is claiming that the planes have reached their ultimate limit.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Malaysia is also prolonging the life of its Hornets. In this process, Malaysia is acquiring used F/A-18 Hornets from Kuwait that will be delivered by 2021 and then be operated by Malaysia for an additional 10 to 15 years. Especially interesting is the fact that the Swiss DDPS is aware of this. The maintenance of the Malaysian F/A-18 Hornets is done by RUAG, a Swiss company specializing in defense and aerospace engineering. RUAG emerged in 2003 from the Swiss Federal Office of Topography of the Armament Group, which was divided into the commercial RUAG and the federal agency Armasuisse (Federal Office for Defense Procurement), which falls under the DDPS. The Swiss voters, however, will likely not be aware of any of this when they vote on the replacement of the F/A-18 Hornet. Mainstream Swiss media has almost unanimously repeated the notion that the F/A-18 Hornet is obsolete, outdated and inadequate for continuous service. No one in the media questioned the defense minister’s false statements about Switzerland being the last country to continue to operate the F/A-18 Hornet.

      Air Policing

      The main task of the new Swiss fighter jets will be so-called air policing in order to maintain air sovereignty and security. As part of air policing activities, the air force checks with its live missions that the flight routes of aircraft correspond with the clearance they have been given. Air policing missions carried out to assist civilian aircraft or in response to serious violations of air sovereignty or air traffic rules are called hot missions. The Swiss government declared that the Swiss air force conducted an average of 270 live and 20 hot missions per year over the last decade. The Air2030 critics argue that, in the rare cases of a more robust scenario, Switzerland could still use the F/A-18 Hornet.

      According to the critics, all 270 live missions, and even the majority of hot missions, could be carried out by less sophisticated and less expensive military aircraft than those the DDPS is proposing. Such alternatives are light fighters and combat variants of training aircraft. The DDPS and the defense minister responded that training planes do not have the technical ability nor are they equipped to carry out air policing missions. This is repeated in almost every discussion and open hearing in Switzerland. The defense minister even stated that such training aircraft couldn’t be armed at all and that they are a “total waste.”

      Further, according to the DDPS, no air force in the world is using training aircraft for such missions. The mainstream Swiss media was quick to again parrot these comments and helped shape the opinion that the critics were providing unrealistic, ill-informed and absurd ideas. Again, this is not true. Contrary to the statements by Viola Amherd, it must be understood that the alternative aircraft options are not exclusive training jets. They are light fighters based on airframes that are also used for aircraft dedicated to training.

      Uniquely, Switzerland should not be unfamiliar with this concept. The F-5 Tiger, operated by the Swiss air force for decades in air policing missions is this type of plane. The F-5 Tiger is the fighter version of the T-38, which has been a training aircraft for many air forces, including the US Air Force. Interestingly enough, seasoned and combat-proven US Air Force fighter pilots have openly advocated for new and more economic light fighters derived from training platforms to fill a role to maintain air sovereignty alert in the United States. In their eyes, these aircraft could be used to respond to airspace incursions, external threats, wayward aircraft and terrorist operations. Such planes could execute this essential mission at a much lower cost, avoiding the need to allocate expensive F-35s for a task they are less than optimal for.

      In 2019, US Congress mandated the Air Force to explore its future inventory. As a result, the renowned MITRE Corporation and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recommended that the US Air Force arm its new trainer jets to fly homeland defense missions. Further, those fighter versions of training aircraft could be exported overseas to countries for whom complex fifth-generation fighter jets would make little sense. Despite overwhelming examples supporting the critics’ viewpoint, the Swiss public has not been informed. Not one mainstream Swiss media outlet has reported on such plans for training platforms in the US Air Force.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The new US jet trainer, the T-7 Red Hawk, a co-production between Boeing and Saab, will be marketed in a light fighter version as an alternative for air forces (such as Switzerland’s) operating the F-5 Tiger. A combat variant of its T-7 jet trainer is viewed as a replacement of the world’s aging fleets of F-5 Tigers. Serbia has recently voiced interest in buying the T-7 Red Hawk to complement and support its current MIG-29 Fulcrum fleet to counter and intercept airspace incursions. When taking a look at examples from around the world, it is clear that not every air force is using only strictly dedicated multirole fighters to defend airspace. Armed trainers have been successfully employed by many air forces, including many top tier ones. Nevertheless, the Swiss are kept in the dark about this. Repeatedly, it has been stated by official Swiss channels and the media that such a thing cannot and does not exist.

      There is reason to believe that this misinformation is deliberate. How is it that the DPPS is not aware of armed training aircraft serving to control airspace? Especially, since the Swiss RUAG is actively engaged with air forces that use said aircraft types in such a function. Armed trainers like the BAE Hawk are in service with the royal Malaysian air force to supplement its fighter fleet and directly contribute to the country’s air defense.

      Problematic Threat Analysis

      A question that has been asked in Switzerland is about the plans of how to protect the expensive and complex aircraft on the ground as well as their facilities. If airbases and runways are not adequately protected, the most sophisticated combat aircraft could become useless. In this respect, the RAND Corporation recently published an extensive study on airbase defense in Europe for the US Air Force and concluded that cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and drones pose major threats. Enemy aircraft, on the other hand, are only considered a moderate risk, given NATO capabilities to counter combat aircraft and the low probability that any single threat aircraft (let alone a large force) could reach an airbase in the rear.

      This should be important for Switzerland and its defense planning. Surrounded by NATO countries, this means that it would be highly unlikely that the Swiss air force will encounter enemy aircraft in an open conflict, but instead it needs to consider missiles and drones. However, Air2030 identifies combat aircraft as its main threat and does not believe that ballistic missiles pose any threat at all. According to the Air2030 planners, ballistic missiles aren’t accurate and, therefore, are not used as effective military means.

      Justifiably, international military experts vehemently disagree. Ever since the precise Iranian ballistic missile attacks on US airbases in Iraq, it is clear that the Swiss defense planners were absolutely wrong in their assessment. In this context it is critical to know that only certain ground-based air defenses could combat ballistic missiles; fighter jets do not have that capability. When the DPPS was confronted with criticism about its unrealistic position on ballistic missiles and its neglect of defense considerations, its initial reaction was to personally attack the critics. The DPPS continually maintained that its new ground-based air defense only needs to be capable of intercepting aircraft and that ballistic missiles are not a threat.

      Then, suddenly, in January this year, this position changed. Now, the DPPS claims that defense options against ballistic missiles must be discussed within the evaluation of new ground-based air defense systems for Switzerland. This change of opinion was not well communicated to the media or the Swiss people but arose in a seemingly minor alteration of the text to the requirements for the procurement of ground-based air defenses. The significance of this was lost on the Swiss press. This abrupt change is essentially an admission by the DPPS that its threat assessment was wrong.

      Threat analysis is the most foundational aspect of any defense plan. If the threat assessment was flawed, it means the entire defense plan must be critically reevaluated. As the defense plan’s main operational asset and financial focus is a new Swiss fighter jet that cannot protect against ballistic missiles, this reevaluation is imperative.

      Interconnectedness

      From the beginning of the debate around Air2030, critics have tried to point out the dependence that Switzerland would be under with the purchase of new aircraft. The F-35 especially was criticized as a means for the United States to have access to sensitive Swiss data and have the ability to control the performance of the Swiss air force. These claims are not unjustified. The F-35 is the world’s most sophisticated and highly capable aircraft. However, international avionics experts have questioned if this fifth-generation multirole fighter is not “overkill” for a country like Switzerland.

      Very early into the program, the foreign partners of the F-35 were already worried about the data the aircraft is collecting, storing and sending back to the United States. Further concerns entailed links to the aircraft collection system that could get cut, especially in the middle of a crisis. The F-35’s interconnectedness gives the US government or its manufacturer Lockheed Martin unprecedented access and level of export control of software updates to foreign operators. The only foreign operator that is not dependent on the US upgrades is Israel, which was able to negotiate for itself the right to install a different software system.

      Embed from Getty Images

      It is interesting that just at the same time as the debate in the United States and Israel about the features and dependencies of the F-35 in regard of a possible sale to UAE is ongoing, the head of security policy in the DPPS and the defense minister assured the Swiss that no foreign power could have any influence on the performance of any of the potential Swiss aircraft and could neither ground them. According to the head of security policy for the DPPS, there are absolutely no grounds for such rumors. Externally influencing aircraft, according to her, is impossible, and any such notions are “complete nonsense.” The Swiss mainstream media accepted these assurances and let them stand without questioning them.

      One has to wonder how this is possible when at the same time international experts are contemplating in public that the US could very well go ahead and sell the F-35 to the UAE without endangering Israel’s qualitative military edge since the United States could interfere with its performance at any time. It is internationally widely reported that the US government has enhanced safeguards to curtail F-35s in the hands of potential Arab buyers should the geopolitical situation change. The US would have little trouble grounding the Emirati fleet should Abu Dhabi ever “go rogue.” Without US support, the F-35 fleet would be effectively useless.

      The Swiss people now have to decide if Air2030 will be the right concept for the defense of Switzerland or not. In order to do so, they need to have access to a broad spectrum of information and different perspectives. Given an honest and factual approach, they may very well vote for Air2030 in support of the DPPS. But, undeniably, the question of new fighter jets for the Swiss air force appears to be preordained for certain outcomes based on previous negative procurement experience. To this date, the Air2030 program has been characterized by disingenuous political maneuvering, an inaccurate capability discussion and a flawed defense design. With the exception of a few journalists, the Swiss mainstream media has hardly produced factual content or critical analysis of the biggest defense procurement in the nation’s history.

      For September 27, the Swiss media has predicted an overwhelming victory for Air2030 and the first female Swiss defense minister, who appears to have political ambition for more than just her current position. A win in the referendum will catapult her popularity, increase her weight in Swiss politics and may facilitate her rise to even more prestigious positions. However, if Air2030 will be approved, it certainly will become clear relatively soon that this project was a bad investment with dubious defense value under a false pretense.

      *[The expressed opinions are the author’s own and do not represent those of the US Air Force or any other military branch, the US Department of Defense or the US government.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Nord Stream 2: Leverage Against Russia?

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      Following the poisoning of the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny with a nerve agent from the Novichok group, the possibility of using Nord Stream 2 to put pressure on Russia has been widely discussed. Specifically, there are calls to abandon the project, to impose a moratorium or to block gas deliveries through the pipelines if the Kremlin refuses to assist investigations.

      The Nord Stream 2 Baltic gas pipeline is highly symbolic, embodying the willingness of Germany and other European partners to cooperate with Russia. Five European energy companies hold stakes in the project, which is led by Gazprom. It began in 2015 — one year after Moscow’s annexation of Crimea — and has been the target of unrelenting criticism ever since, initially concentrating on Moscow’s declared goal of bypassing Ukraine.

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      The German government recognizes the project’s economic benefits for consumers and the gas market and has backed it within the existing legal framework under the paradigm of keeping politics out of business. In order to cushion Ukraine’s losses, Berlin also backed a Russian-Ukrainian agreement guaranteeing Kyiv gas transit revenues for another five years. To keep its options for completing the pipeline open, Berlin blocked attempts by Brussels to assert control. That is now both a burden and an opportunity.

      Pressure From Washington

      Recent developments have been largely driven by the US, which has successively stepped up pressure to abandon the project. The American Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act has succeeded in stopping pipelaying since the end of 2019, and Congress has taken steps to make it impossible to resume the work. The US administration has also altered the guidance of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, threatening to penalize any entity or individual involved in construction since July 15, 2020.

      If construction is to resume, Berlin will have to act more proactively to counter the impact of Washington’s sanctions. On the one hand, it will be difficult to politically justify actively supporting the construction of Nord Stream 2, while on the other hand, Berlin must continue to reject and criticize such secondary sanctions as a matter of principle.

      Stopping Nord Stream 2 would be seismic. But what happens when the dust has settled? The government will have to make difficult choices. The following four aspects need to be considered.

      First, the immediate effect on the energy supply would be marginal. The project is neither — as so often asserted — a danger to European energy security, nor is it essential. Existing pipelines through Ukraine retain an annual capacity estimated at 100 to 120 billion cubic meters, with the Yamal-Europe pipeline through Poland and Belarus adding 33 billion cubic meters and Nord Stream 1 another 55 billion. There are also pipelines to Turkey and Finland. Together, these would easily cope with the peak volume of more than 190 billion cubic meters, which Gazprom supplied to Europe in 2017-18.

      Embed from Getty Images

      That means, conversely, that stopping Nord Stream 2 would not in the slightest reduce the volume of gas purchased from Gazprom. But this direct, efficient modern pipeline would reduce the risks of transit disruption and technical failure. Without it, Nord Stream 1 and its connecting pipelines become crucial.

      Second, indirect effects on the economy and energy supply are hard to estimate. Sunk costs in the Baltic would hurt Gazprom but would also be costly for European companies. Aside from the commercial repercussions, it should be remembered that Nord Stream 2 would improve the resilience of the European gas supply and that an expanded gas supply would benefit industry and consumers.

      The gas reserves on the Siberian Yamal Peninsula have already been developed, while the global LNG market can quickly tighten again. The “Energiewende” (green energy transition) will naturally reduce demand for natural gas, but the speed with which that occurs will also depend on an expansion of the power grid and a rapid, consistent transformation in heating and industry. Here, there is still much work to be done.

      Third, abandoning an economic infrastructure project for political reasons would represent a paradigm shift for Berlin. Major infrastructure projects undeniably have (geo)political implications, and other states do link business and politics in pursuit of national interests, too. That new geo-economic reality represents a challenge for Germany’s strategic sovereignty, also in the energy sphere.

      But that is precisely the point: Other states act in pursuit of their interests. For all the political fireworks, the project is a strategic asset for German commerce and industry. Germany and its EU partners would only be harming themselves if they stopped construction just to send a normative message to the Kremlin. Putin would probably interpret this as Germany simply caving to US pressure, further weakening the political signal

      Fourth, the normative justification raises questions: Is the situation really qualitatively new? Would earlier events not actually have offered more solid grounds? Here, we are confronted with an almost insoluble dilemma of the fossil-based energy system: We purchase oil and gas from authoritarian regimes every day. In that regard, the Energiewende has a geopolitical dividend.

      But make no mistake: Even a successful energy transition will rely on energy imports from these countries, and on the ability to reliably realize major infrastructure projects. The days of the special strategic energy partnership with Russia are over, but a functioning modus vivendi for trade and exchange with this big and resource-abundant neighbor remains essential. From that perspective, a moratorium would gain time for all involved. But the conditions for resumption would have to be clearly communicated, agreed with EU partners and implementable for Russia.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Tug of War in Washington Around the War in Afghanistan

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      The struggle has been going on for four years and is once again approaching a possible turning point. On one side you have a majority of Democrat and Republican legislators united with the intelligence community in the team called “proponents of a massive US military presence across the globe.” On the other side, an unpredictable US president who, since his 2016 election campaign, has consistently confirmed his intention to pull back the troops still engaged in the greater Middle East by the two presidents who preceded him.

      The tug of war continues between these two opposing forces as the place of the United States as “leader of the free world” appears up for grabs. (“Free” in the preceding sentence can be defined as “subject exclusively to corporate control” as corporations are deemed the only legitimate wielders of power.)

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      It has been a full 19 years since President George W. Bush launched his first campaign of perennial military occupation that the media labeled the “war in Afghanistan,” as if it was just another struggle between two opposing national armies. Bush still called it a war, but by ennobling it with the moniker the “global war on terror,” he made sure that, at least concerning public expectations, it was a war whose narrative didn’t require rational battle plans, declarations of victory, surrenders or truces. Nor did it require any of those singular moments that have defined past wars, producing all those “important dates” on the calendar that future generations of schoolchildren can memorize and then regurgitate as their responses to multiple choice questions on the tests that will decide whether or not they have mastered the logic of history.

      For anyone familiar with the mechanisms that require a constantly expanding military budget, US President Donald Trump’s insistence on reducing the footprint of the American military in the greater Middle East is heresy. Do Americans really think their continued presence is vital in Afghanistan? They said the same thing about Vietnam in 1973 when they abandoned Saigon to the Vietnamese communists. What disaster followed? The Vietnamese developed their country within a global economic context dominated by the United States and the two nations have since become best of friends, even though the communist party still officially runs Vietnam.

      Embed from Getty Images

      In 2001, Bush launched the war that was intended to drive the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Regime change didn’t take long to complete. Though officially banished from power, the Taliban have remained the most powerful political force in the country. Driven by his impatience, Trump imagined that the only solution might come from recognizing that state of affairs and reaching an agreement with the Taliban. After several false starts, negotiations began again on September 12. This propension for dialogue with the enemy does not sit well with those Americans who see their nation’s role in the world as the defenders of democracy, who because they believe in that ideal deserve absolute trust. For these strategic thinkers, history has shown that the Taliban are untrustworthy and simply do not merit the confidence of the always respectful and trustworthy United States. 

      Reviewing the reactions of the camp committed to maintaining the US presence, Sean D. Naylor, Yahoo’s national security correspondent, cites retired Admiral William McRaven, former commander of Joint Special Operations Command. He tells us that McRaven opposes the negotiations because he is “skeptical that the Taliban would follow through on its commitments.”

      Here is today’s 3D definition:

      Commitment:

      In diplomacy, a formal promise to respect a number of agreed-upon rules and behaviors until one of the parties can demonstrate, thanks to its obviously superior force and capacity to intimidate, that the respect of those rules and behaviors is no longer required

      Contextual Note

      McRaven was blunt in his appreciation, using a tired cliché to express his conviction that no official agreement should be taken seriously. “I’m not personally convinced that any deal with the Taliban will be worth the paper that it’s written on.” Joining McRaven in his opposition to negotiations, Michael Morell, former deputy director of the CIA, asserted that his “assessment is that the Taliban would take over the country again in a matter of months.”

      For those unfamiliar with CIA jargon, “assessment” is synonymous with “my self-interested opinion.” Pursuing with the same vocabulary, Morell added that despite the terms of the envisaged peace deal that explicitly forbid it, “my assessment is that they would provide safe haven to al-Qaida.”

      This seals the case that in the intelligence community, the word “assessment” literally means “opinion” and not much more. Like a banker analyzing the curves of a real estate market in 2007 who believed it would keep growing forever, or like a schoolboy ready for a history test, Morell remembers the reasons Bush cited to attack the Afghan government in 2001: they had given “safe haven to al-Qaida.” If they did it once, they’ll do it again. Morell may be right, but he should also know that it was the US that gave the initial impetus to the creation and development of al-Qaida when they mobilized Osama bin Laden against the Soviets who had taken control of Afghanistan in 1979.

      The language feast continues when McRaven suggests that keeping troops in Afghanistan may be “a high price to pay” before adding this thought: “But what we have learned in the military is how to do this in a way that hopefully will not lose a lot of great soldiers.” The generals hope; the soldiers die. It’s just a question of when to pat yourself on the back when the numbers announced by the media remain sufficiently low.

      Historical note

      William McRaven and Michael Morrell have every reason to be suspicious of the value of commitments by any political entity. International understanding and world peace depend on trust and the respect of agreements reached by the political leaders of all nations. To wield clout in this complex world of international relations, financial power and military might may be sufficient to impose a nation’s policies in specific contexts, but the capacity to conduct business with every other nation in the world depends on the ability to maintain a reputation for keeping one’s commitments.

      The US has proved its capacity to wield financial power and military might, though not always to convincing effect. In his book, “In the Shadows of the American Century,” historian Alfred McCoy wrote, “Future historians are likely to identify George W. Bush’s rash invasion of Iraq, in 2003, as the start of America’s downfall.” It was the misuse of American power under Bush that began a precipitous decline in the reputation of the US as a political model and as a legitimate defender of the rule of law.

      That meant that to redress the balance, it became more important than ever for the US to show its determination to respect commitments. But as Annalisa Merelli, writing for Quartz, documented with a long list of examples, “the US is an unreliable international partner—and it has long been one, even before the current administration pulled out from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris agreement on climate change, and threatened to end NAFTA. History is dotted with treaties that the US has signed but not ratified, signed and then unsigned, and even refused to sign after pushing everyone else to sign.”

      Americans find this hard to understand because the media rarely, if ever, track the international reputation of the US in its proclaimed role as “leader of the free world.” They prefer to see the constant betrayals of trust as inevitable and regrettable but, at the same time, forgettable results of the differences between the two sacred political parties — Democrats and Republicans. Each has a different view of the world and, once in power, quite naturally seeks to impose that view, if only to keep their campaign promises to voters (and donors). International agreements always take a backseat to electoral tactics. 

      Joe Biden, the Democratic presidential nominee for the US election in November, has expressed his admiration of McRaven’s “moral courage” and his pride in being associated with him. McRaven, who supported Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election and has openly criticized Donald Trump, has a clear vision of the future that gives a good indication of what Biden’s foreign policy may look like. He affirmed that the US will “probably need to be in Afghanistan for a very long time.” Nineteen years has clearly not been long enough.

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

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      No Credible Alternative to the US Grand Strategy in Europe

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      Never in the last 75 years has the US-led liberal order in Europe been intellectually more contested. Some in the United States, especially among realist and neorealist scholars, disapprove of what is commonly referred to as the West-centric institutional and rules-based order. They generally raise three interrelated, skeptical and somewhat pessimistic assumptions for growing isolationist sentiments in the US.

      First, there is are good reasons to think that the unipolar moment is coming to an end. As America’s primacy gradually declines with the rise of China, its grand strategy of liberal hegemony should also dissipate, including its institutional leg of collective security in Europe to which the US has given too much and received too little in return. Second, the Euro-Atlantic liberal order has generated more problems than solutions in the post-Cold War period. NATO expansion beyond the Iron Curtain poisoned relations with Russia and provoked unnecessary tensions in Georgia and Ukraine. The United States, so the argument goes, should gradually reduce its military presence in Europe and turn “NATO over to the Europeans.”

      The US Empire’s Quest for Global Hegemony

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      Third, Russia, in reality, is not as big a peril to European security as it is generally portrayed and perceived in the US and across Europe, for that matter. Moscow is driven more by defensive aims (or so it claims), so balancing between Russia and the European states on one hand and a restrained US foreign policy on the other is a better way forward for everyone. If we are to assume this logic is correct, then those who still prefer the liberal Euro-Atlantic unipolarity are wrong. Are they? 

      No Competitors Yet

      On first assumption, the United States is still by all major accounts the top dog on the world stage. It is wealthier, more powerful and more influential relative to any potential competitor in the international system despite an ongoing debate, additionally fueled by global disruptive events such as COVID-19. Its geography, an often-cited structural advantage, will persist despite the pandemic. While the US is flanked by two enormous oceans and surrounded by much weaker and friendly states, Russia and China, on the other hand, face balancing behavior from powerful regional rivals coupled with having ongoing territorial disputes.

      Second, Washington’s annual defense spending is at least twice as much as Moscow’s and Beijing’s — combined. America’s preponderance of power and strategic advance is far more superior considering increased military spending of its formal allies in the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. Out of 15 countries with the largest military spending, 11 are security partners of the United States. Russia and China neither have formal allies among the top 15, nor do any of their allies believe that an attack on one is an attack against all.

      Third, the US still boasts the world’s largest economy that can afford to fund the most powerful military in the world despite a disproportionately hard economic downturn triggered by the pandemic. Its global GDP share is still larger than the global GDP share of China and Russia combined, even by factoring in GDP reductions in the US this July. Moreover, the share of the global economic output by NATO members reaches more than 40% in world proportions and roughly 50% if other democratic allies in the Pacific theater are incorporated as well.

      America’s geopolitical leverage is even greater considering three additional factors. The primacy of the US dollar has not waned in 2020 just as it had not waned during 2008 financial crisis. The US also rests on soft-power capabilities. The top spots in global rankings, such as the Soft Power 30, are held by democracies — the United States was in fifth position in 2019. Russia and China are ranked far lower. And third, its population growth rate has also been relatively high.

      On the other hand, the Russian and Chinese workforce is aging, judging by all available measures. Given all these factors, it seems, as Gregory Mitrovich suggests, “wholly premature, short of a devastating major event, to claim that we are witnessing the end of America’s global dominance.” Equally premature is any call for American withdrawal from Europe, where the US is not only unchallenged but is largely accepted as benevolent.

      Whole and Free

      On second assumption, from a realist or neorealist perspective, a more powerful country does not necessarily mean a more attractive choice. What makes great powers more appealing, especially in the European theater, rests on an enduring combination of other capabilities grounded in less tangible resources. In other words, dominant powers are to be feared, but no liberal European state in the post-World War II era has ever felt a military threat from American hegemony — as Gilford John Ikenberry put it, “reluctant, open and highly institutionalized — or, in a word, liberal.” Some may correctly argue this was an act of deterrence against the common threat of the Soviet bloc in the bipolar system.

      However, when the unipolar era began, America’s liberal primacy has continued to offer system-wide benefits both within Europe’s old and new democracies with lasting and far-reaching consequences for their peace and stability. Its benevolent leadership, for example, stood shoulder to shoulder with the Germans seeking freedom and reunification despite some opposition from Paris and London. Washington also laid out its vision for Europe’s new security order and sought to keep a reunited Germany in NATO. Without such leadership, France and the United Kingdom would have been more fearful of Germany’s unilateral plans, let alone weaker neighbors that would find new realities difficult to balance against. As one senior European diplomat put it, “We can agree on U.S. leadership, but not on one of our own.”

      American leadership also persuaded Ukraine — also to a great benefit of Russia’s vital interests — to relinquish possession of nuclear arms it had inherited after the dissolution of the USSR. Without such leadership, Ukraine would probably have had second thoughts. As Ukraine’s then-Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov put it, plainly, “Ukraine would have posed no threat to anyone if, hypothetically speaking, it had possessed tactical nuclear weapons.” Had American leadership missed this opportunity, other states in the region would have also regarded their respective security distinctly from each other. Germany, for example, would have also been more tempted to contemplate nuclear deterrence at some point.

      To zoom out a little wider, American liberal hegemony in general, and the NATO alliance with its institutional and rules-based order in particular, attracted central, eastern and southeastern European countries — former illiberal states — to choose a common prescription for perennial peace and prosperity in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. New democracies from beyond the Iron Curtain have managed to transform themselves: Their economies have largely prospered, and their political systems liberalized despite recent authoritarian tendencies in Hungary and Poland. While some variation does exist, almost all new NATO members remain “free” according to the 2020 Freedom House scores. The only exceptions are Hungary, Montenegro and North Macedonia, which are marked as “partially free.”

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      NATO enlargement has been a net positive on security grounds as well. Europe has largely enjoyed peace and stability for the past 30 years. New allies offered themselves as foundational military partners and have willingly chosen to share the security burden to fight alongside the US. This mutual attraction within the Euro-Atlantic alliance has been so overwhelming in historical proportions that structural realists struggle to explain its extended lifespan and recent vitality. This includes the two latest enlargement rounds in southeastern Europe that happened on President Donald Trump’s watch, not sufficient but certainly greater share of collective defense burdens by European member states, regular military deployments and common military exercises all over the continent, as well as effective multilateral aid using NATO capacities during the COVID-19 crisis. This suggests, contrary to many pessimistic views, that American liberal hegemony in Europe is far from being in decline.  

      One can only imagine the different scenarios had the US decided to pursue a more restrained foreign policy in the region. Not only supporters but also critics of NATO enlargement also offered the possibility that Euro-Atlantic adversaries, namely Russia, would have been emboldened to expand the Kremlin’s sphere of influence beyond the current lines had any geopolitical vacuum existed in central and eastern Europe. J. J. Mearsheimer, for example, argues in his book that great powers “are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal.” Stephen M. Walt also conceded that relations with Moscow, provided Russia regained some of its former strength, “might still have worsened.”

      Counterfactuals such as these can hardly be verified. However, Russia’s brutal treatment of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine made it very clear what actually happens with states in geopolitical gray areas. Belarus, which falls in Russia’s sphere of influence, is not happy either.

      Net Positive

      American liberal hegemony has also been a net positive when it comes to security in the Balkans — if measured by the progress on where Balkan states started from and not their distance from a liberal Western world. US leadership, for example, contained an outbreak of nationalism in the region after the EU demonstrated neither effectiveness nor capacity of preemption in the early 1990s. The Clinton administration successfully brokered the Dayton Peace Agreement in a positive-sum game whereby Republika Srpska received formal recognition as a political entity within the sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the post-Dayton phase, the liberal-led European order, primarily NATO and the EU, patiently put in place new structures and policies so the country can move forward with the peace process.

      Notwithstanding NATO’s intervention in Serbia in 1999 and CIA interference in 2000, the US and its allies also used an array of softer policy instruments to promote successful democratic change in Serbia. The International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and former activists from new NATO members advised and supported independent civil organizations and opposition parties in Serbia to replace the “Butcher of the Balkans” Slobodan Milosevic in a democratic election. In recent years, Washington and Brussels also played an instrumental role in brokering the Prespa Agreement between Northern Macedonia and Greece. A bilateral deal between two bordering countries in 2018 put an end to the long-standing name dispute on the one hand and unlocked the Euro-Atlantic membership perspective for Northern Macedonia on the other.

      Some of these hard-won historical achievements could have not been possible had the US decided to pursue a more restrained foreign policy. In all likelihood, weaker American leadership in Europe in the post-Cold War era would have created more problems, making European states less liberal and more domestically nationalist, rendering the European periphery full of prolonged proxy wars and skirmishes.

      Russia would have also had more space to moderate such conflicts with its power-projection capabilities in the region. Likewise, absent integration into Western institutions, Europe’s soft underbelly would have exposed itself to sudden geopolitical stress bringing different local and regional powers into direct collision.

      In Russia’s Image

      On third assumption, Russian President Vladimir Putin said in his speech at the Munich security conference in 2007 that “the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world.” Thirteen years later, speaking at the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov endorsed a multipolar concert with new centers of influence at the international level and common geopolitical space from Lisbon to Jakarta at the wider regional level. Lavrov also stated that “Our common European home needs serious reconstruction if we want all of its residents to live in prosperity.”

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      On a mission to correct “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” — the collapse of the Soviet Union — the Kremlin is practically interested in replacing an existing liberal order, primarily the one extended beyond the Iron Curtain, with favorable and less democratic European regimes that fit Russia’s image. Second, it is also interested in replacing the hierarchic order in Europe with some unknown and certainly more anarchic multipolar structure. However, it is not surprising that the Kremlin’s foreign policy attracted limited support from the former Soviet republics and other central and eastern European countries. Most of them continue to fear Russia. Unlike their attraction to the US, their anxiety toward Moscow can be explained from their shared national memory of what can happen under the rule of an illiberal hegemon — or a potential hegemon that is, by the logic of Walt’s balance of threat theory, too close, too powerful and too offensive.

      So far, all attempts from the Kremlin to impose its own illiberal and structural order in Europe, largely constrained by its limits of hard and soft power, have only made young democracies and vulnerable countries scattered around the European periphery more divided and, eventually, more anarchic. In August 2008, Russia’s military intervention in Georgia restored the Kremlin’s geopolitical relevance in the European neighborhood. However, Georgia was divided between Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on one hand and the rest of Georgia on the other.

      This small triumph encouraged Russia to bully again by lopping off Crimea from neighboring Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine was then equally forcefully divided along similar geostrategic and domestic lines between Kyiv’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and secessionist tendencies by a pro-Russian minority in the east. Some have argued that Moscow’s incursions into Georgia and Ukraine were conducted preemptively and in reaction to perceived NATO enlargement and were therefore defensive in nature. Mearsheimer famously rejected prevailing wisdom in the West that this problem is largely the result of Russian aggression.

      Stephen F. Cohen also justified Russia’s interest in restoring traditional zones of national security on its borders, including Ukraine. However, Russia marched into Syria, dropping bunker-buster bombs on Aleppo, supported mercenaries in Libya and became increasingly offensive in the Balkans — not Russia’s “near abroad” but deep inside NATO and the EU’s eastern borders. The Kremlin has reportedly fanned the flames of internal crisis in Montenegro in 2015-16 and Northern Macedonia in 2017-18. Milorad Dodik, a pro-Russian Serb leader in Bosnia and Herzegovina called his own country “an impossible state.” In February this year, he bluntly declared: “Goodbye B&H, welcome RSexit.”

      Serbia and Russia carried out a joint Slavic Shield military exercise in 2019, including Russia’s first use of its advanced S-400 missile defense system abroad. In the meantime, Serbia also received Russian donations of MIG-29 fighter jets, T-72 tanks, BRDM-2MS armored vehicles and purchased, at Putin’s suggestion, the Pantsir S-1 air defense system in 2020. Russia’s appetite, therefore, goes well beyond its immediate neighborhood. It openly challenges the established liberal order in Europe by taking advantage of tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, and different ethnicities within North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and so on.

      This revisionist path doesn’t lead to security in Europe but rather to new skirmishes and security dilemmas in the Balkans, a region divided between rival power dyads, which is at worst all too reminiscent of the 1900s, when unintended consequences of nationalist fervor led to the murder of millions.

      Bottom Line

      Contrary to claims that the US strategy of liberal hegemony is generally a source of endless trouble, supported by real failures and terrible misadventures of social engineering in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, its mission in Europe was historically successful and mutually beneficial both before and after the Cold War. American leadership in Europe has been a net-positive force, essentially without US military casualties, mutually acceptable and institutional — all missing in other troubled areas. It has secured undisrupted peace dividends among major European powers, provided various public goods to newcomers from beyond the Iron Curtain, and eventually brought peace to the Balkans after the international community failed to prevent genocide in Srebrenica.

      The United States, which is still the preeminent global power, does not need to reassess this grand strategy in Europe or quit NATO, an alliance encompassing nearly a billion people and half the world’s military and economic might. Down that road lie many other long-lasting win-win outcomes as well as serious challenges that are better faced collectively.

      An alternative order that is promoted by some American realist and neorealist pundits on one side and revisionist challengers in the Kremlin on the other might have different motivations, means and ends. However, their common preference for dissolving NATO or having different poles in the European theater brings, by logic of structural realism, crosscutting relationships among different axes of conflict. That gloomy trajectory, if it ever happens, would make a perfect setting for a 21st-century Gavrilo Princip to fire his bullet again and trigger a chain of regrettable events here, there and everywhere.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Can the Afghans Work Toward a Lasting Peace Deal?

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      Afghanistan is at a critical stage in its decades-long conflict. A combination of factors has led to a deterioration of the country’s security. These include political corruption, dysfunctional institutions, patron-clientelism and social instability. Violence has intensified in recent years, causing numerous causalities of civilians and troops. 

      Can the Taliban and the Afghan Government Make Peace?

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      Washington has been a key supporter of the Afghan political system ever since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001, when NATO invaded Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks in the US. Since then, the US has sought to strike a deal with the Taliban, who have led an insurgency against NATO and Afghan security forces.

      Making Peace

      The US-Taliban peace deal — which the Afghan government is not a party to — was struck on February 29. If successful, it could help bring an end to the longest war in US history. The deal, which was signed in Doha after mediation by the Qataris, was the result of months of talks between Taliban officials and Zalmay Khalilzad, the US special envoy to Afghanistan. The agreement aims to pave the way for the end of US military involvement in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country if the Taliban uphold their side of the deal.

      The accord has been met with opposition due to continued attacks by Taliban militants against Afghan forces and civilians. On March 10, the Taliban and the government in Kabul were due to enter intra-Afghan peace talks for a separate agreement. However, an attack on a hospital maternity ward in May, which caused the death of mothers, midwives and newborns, threw the idea of peace in Afghanistan up in the air. As a result, the government resumed offensive operations against Taliban militants soon after the attacks. Afghan officials have since confirmed that peace talks are set to begin in September.

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      “This is cradle-to-grave terrorism,” says columnist Max Boot in an op-ed for The Washington Post, referring to the attack on the hospital. Nonetheless, US officials, including President Donald Trump, have stressed their desire for Afghans to take charge of their own security rather than relying on US and NATO forces. The US insists on intra-Afghan negotiations and is in a hurry for there to be a political settlement between the government and the Taliban.

      Based on its continued stance, there is no doubt that the Trump administration is committed to the Doha deal and its withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, whatever the circumstances or consequences. This makes it more unclear what the US-Taliban agreement could lead to and, more importantly, how much influence the Taliban would have on Afghan politics and society as a result.

      Ending Decades of Conflict in Afghanistan

      Ever since the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghans have witnessed violence. Many young people are fed up with warlords who have destroyed the country and profited from its misery. Yet there is optimism that a political solution will emerge from the Doha agreement. This could have a lasting and positive impact if certain conditions are addressed.

      In this context, a number of local, regional and global factors are crucially significant to bring an end to the longstanding conflict and ensure a durable political settlement in Afghanistan.

      First, Afghans need to work on a local and national consensus. In a divided and diverse country like Afghanistan, the people must build strong social networks that include all factions and ethnic groups. They must work on a general consensus pertaining to a power-sharing structure.

      That said, the power distribution should be based on citizenship, not ethnic and religious lines. In the long term, stability and development are likely to be ensured if power-sharing is based on Afghan citizenship. Aside from this, the government needs to support such community networks, strengthen key institutions, continue to empower Afghan security forces and clamp down on widespread corruption.

      Second, under the auspices of the United Nations, a shura (council) should be created that consists of all sociopolitical elites, including political, tribal and community leaders, to lead the Afghan peace process. This shura needs to negotiate a ceasefire as a first step. Holding direct talks between rival groups is the second step. This would involve the government, the Taliban and former mujahideen commanders.

      To carry out the talks, the shura needs to form an inclusive and consultative negotiating team from all ethnic and political groups to be able to address the deeper grievances in the country. These issues should be aired by the people and addressed under Afghan legal frameworks and the rule of law.

      The shura needs to help all opposition groups resolve their differences and conflicts through dialogue. For a peace agreement to succeed, the Afghan government, the Taliban, all Afghan leaders, ambassadors of regional states, representatives of major Muslim countries and members of NATO must be a party to the deal. These stakeholders would need to guarantee that they would abide by any conditions in the settlement, and regional states would have to agree to end all meddling in Afghan affairs.

      Third, there is a need for economic and political pressure at a regional level. Considerable pressure should be imposed on influential states like Pakistan and Iran. These two countries are considered to be the root of the problem in Afghanistan and have been accused of harboring and supporting insurgents. Hence, it is necessary that Islamabad and Tehran assure the Afghan government that they will not provide safe havens for terrorists and that anyone doing so will be brought to justice.

      It is also vital that Pakistan and Iran own up to their covert interventions in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Both of these nations should be transparent about such operations with the Afghan government and external stakeholders. Furthermore, regional states must recognize the political independence, territorial integrity and the rights of Afghan people to self-determination in their choice of political system.

      The assurances and regional consensus also need to be based on a commitment by the Afghans. In other words, in order to ensure an end to meddling in Afghan affairs, the government in Kabul must remain impartial when it comes to the political situation of other regional states.

      In addition, Kabul needs to assure regional states — Iran and Pakistan, particular — that their legitimate interests in Afghanistan will not be harmed. The Afghans must pledge to be active partners in trade, transit and energy resources. This would be a gamechanger for the region. There would be a shift away from the destructive intervention of neighboring states toward regional connectivity and an economy-focused approach that would benefit all nearby nations.

      Fourth, once a peace deal is reached, the international community could transform a treaty into a sustainable settlement through political and economic assistance. With this in mind, once a peace agreement is ratified, Kabul should engage with the US, the European Union, the World Bank and other international partners to design and implement nuanced development programs that could lead Afghanistan toward greater physical and economic stability. This would create job opportunities for all civilians and even militants, who would, presumably, put down their guns.

      In the first phase after a peace deal is enforced, a clear future plan needs to be implemented so members of opposition groups can be appointed in official positions. In this regard, the rights and obligations of the political forces of militant groups would be on the same footing as other Afghan citizens in a democratic and fair manner. The aim would be to reintegrate opposition groups and to encourage dialogue to prevent future conflict. Furthermore, the international community, alongside the shura, should persuade all parties — including the Taliban’s political wing — to participate in free and fair elections.

      If Peace Isn’t Possible?

      These measures would strengthen and consolidate the peace process to ensure that weapons are put down and stay down. A failure to address these conditions could lead to an intensified proxy war. As a result, non-state actors like the Taliban would step up with their insurgency, leading to an escalation of violence. This would not only bury any possible political settlement, but it would also derail global security.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More