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    How the Legal Landscape Is Changing for War Crimes

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    War crimes, genocide, torture, forced disappearances, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international law have been characteristic of conflicts in the Arab world since even before they were codified in law. These crimes still occur in many Arab countries, most notably in Syria and Yemen. Not only do perpetrators often go unpunished, but they also find themselves rewarded and promoted.

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    So, when on November 30, 2021, a court in Frankfurt, Germany, handed down a life sentence to an Iraqi man who joined the Islamic State (IS) group for genocide against the Yazidi minority — the first time a former member of IS had been convicted of genocide and the first verdict for genocide against Yazidis — it was celebrated as a landmark case in the fight for justice and accountability. Taha al-Jumailly was found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity resulting in death, war crimes, aiding and abetting war crimes, and bodily harm resulting in death.

    “Today, ISIS member Taha AJ was convicted of genocide and sentenced to life in prison. This is the first genocide verdict against an ISIS member. This verdict is a win for survivors of genocide, survivors of sexual violence, & the Yazidi community,” tweeted Nadia Murad, a 2018 Nobel Peace Prize winner and a Yazidi survivor of IS enslavement.

    Universal Jurisdiction

    The trial was also the first in Germany based on the principle of universal jurisdiction addressing crimes under international law committed abroad by a perpetrator who is not a German citizen and was only extradited on the basis of an international arrest warrant. Universal jurisdiction is the principle that some crimes are so serious that states should be allowed to claim jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of where they were committed or any other relation with the prosecuting entity. None of the crimes in the Jumailly case were committed in Germany, and neither the victims nor the suspect were German nationals.

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    Though universal jurisdiction has been practiced in just a few countries in recent years, it has become an increasingly important tool for achieving accountability and justice for the survivors and victims of international crimes. Hundreds of investigations are ongoing and dozens of convictions have been obtained.

    The blossoming of universal jurisdiction is attributable to several factors, one of which is that the alternative route to prosecuting international crimes through the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court (ICC) has effectively been closed by geopolitics. The Syrian conflict, for example, has never been appraised by the ICC because Russia backs President Bashar al-Assad.

    The Pursuit of Cases

    In recent years, there has been a greater capacity and willingness on the part of some domestic authorities to pursue cases involving international crimes, at least in certain circumstances. More and more countries have also passed laws allowing them to conduct the kind of landmark prosecution that took place in Frankfurt. More countries are following the Dutch example in setting up specialized units within the police, prosecution and even immigration services dedicated to identifying perpetrators of international crimes and bringing them to trial.

    Another important factor in the power of universal jurisdiction is that victims and their advocates can contribute to investigations and prosecutions, and sometimes even influence the direction they take. In some countries, such as France and Belgium, victims and NGOs can initiate criminal proceedings. Even where this is not possible, victims and their advocates can still drive cases forward in other ways, such as by tracking perpetrators’ movements, sharing information with the authorities and exerting pressure on them to act.

    Dutch authorities have even issued directions for Syrians in the Netherlands on how to file a criminal complaint against other Syrians relating to violations in Syria. In February, after Germany’s top court ruled that war crimes committed abroad can be tried in the country, a court in Koblenz became the first court outside of Syria to rule on state-sponsored torture by the Assad regime when it sentenced a former member of the secret police to four and a half years in prison for being an accomplice to crimes against humanity. Another former Syrian intelligence officer is currently on trial in Germany for overseeing 58 counts of murder and at least 4,000 cases of torture, rape or sexual abuse.

    Many Challenges

    Despite this recent progress, enormous legal, evidentiary and logistical challenges remain before international criminal cases can be brought to trial. Investigating and prosecuting international crimes in domestic courts is not straightforward, especially in a complex conflict such as the Yemen war where crimes have been committed over many years by different actors.

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    Foreign investigators cannot easily gather evidence on the ground, so they have to rely on the cooperation of different parties to the conflict to build cases. UN bodies like the group of eminent experts, international organizations, local NGOs, and organizations such as Airwars assist with investigations.

    Even if evidence linking an individual perpetrator to war crimes can be established, the suspect still has to be apprehended. In some countries practicing universal jurisdiction, those accused of committing war crimes do not need to be within reach of authorities for an investigation to be opened, but they need to be physically brought to court before any trial can take place.

    Though international cooperation can be used to apprehend and extradite international pariahs like IS militants, pirates and slave traders, war criminals who are still serving members of Arab regimes are not about to be handed over. Only when they set foot in a country practicing universal jurisdiction — whether for work, vacation, claiming asylum or for any other reason — can they be arrested immediately, providing they do not benefit from immunity.

    Jumailly’s conviction “sends a clear message,” said Natia Navrouzov, a lawyer and member of the NGO Yazda, which gathers evidence of crimes committed by IS against the Yazidis. “It doesn’t matter where the crimes were committed and it doesn’t matter where the perpetrators are, thanks to the universal jurisdiction, they can’t hide and will still be put on trial.”

    *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner of Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The War on Terror Was Never Turkey’s Fight

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      Do you know where you were on August 14, 2001? Perhaps not, since it isn’t a defining day in world history in quite the same way as September 11, 2001, or 9/11, as it’s become known. Yet in the Turkish political landscape, August 14, 2001, can now be seen as something of a watershed moment.

      It was on this day that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded. One of its founding members was a man named Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It was the latest in a long list of parties catering to a religiously devout and socially conservative constituency in Turkey. All the previous ones had been banned.

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      What makes August 14, 2001, so significant is the simple fact that the AKP was never banned. Despite the party’s daring to tread on secularist principles that few others had dared, this time, the country, with strong European Union support, had no appetite for military-backed bans.

      Turkey Says No

      Just as September 11 didn’t really come out of a clear blue sky for anyone observing the tide of Islamist militancy, so too the success of the AKP in Turkey did not come unannounced. It was a long time in the making, but its assumption of power, so soon after 9/11, has been defining for the country.

      By 2003, when George W. Bush’s war on terror was swinging into action in Iraq, the AKP took control of Turkey‘s government. Despite repeated attempts to shutter the party and even a failed 2016 coup, the AKP remains in power. As perhaps the most successful Islamist party in the Middle East, its relationship to both the events of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror has always been a strained one. The Turkey of the 20th century would have been an unquestioning supporter of US policy. The new Turkey was not.

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      I was in Turkey on 9/11 and I saw the immediate reaction of ordinary people to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the hours after the towers fell, there were wild, yet in retrospect on-the-mark rumors that the US was about to bomb Afghanistan. The mood among ordinary Turks was not one of support.

      Visceral anger and anti-American sentiment were clearly palpable. While not outright cheering al-Qaeda, it was obvious that most people wouldn’t take the US side in a fight. This mood was reflected when Washington eventually went to war with Iraq and hoped to use the airbase at Incirlik in southeastern Turkey.

      The parliamentary vote that vetoed the use of the base for flights into Iraq was a pivotal one. It was the first strong sign of demonstrable national action in reflection of a national mood. In the post-Cold War world, Turkey’s Islamist government was ready to plow its own furrow.

      Who Defines Terrorism?

      The years that have followed have seen an ambiguous and often highly contorted relationship with the war on terror. Sometimes, Turkey has used the anti-terrorism concept to its own ends, as have many other US allies. At other times, it has turned a blind eye to activity that surely fell under the banner of terrorism.

      The Arab Spring of 2010 offered Islamists across the Middle East their big moment. Secular autocrats, long propped up by the West, tottered. Turkey’s Islamist government was one of the most vocal and active in attempting to ride this wave that they hoped would bring Islamist governments to a swathe of countries.

      Initially, the signs were good. The Muslim Brotherhood won the first free and fair elections in Egypt. Meanwhile, in neighboring Syria, the long-suppressed Islamist movement threatened to overwhelm the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad. For a time, Turkey became a beacon of hope and a model for how the rest of the Middle East might evolve.

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      Turkish flags were being waved by demonstrators in Syria, and President Erdogan became the most popular leader in the region, loved by people far beyond his own nation. Then the Egyptian coup destroyed the Brotherhood, and Russia and Iran stepped in to save Assad’s regime in Syria. The mood soured for Turkey.

      In an attempt to rescue something in the Syrian conflict and in response to the collapse of domestic peace talks between the government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Turkey’s border became a very porous route for jihadists entering into Syria. In time, these jihadists named themselves the Islamic State and declared a caliphate. This audacious move severely upped the stakes on al-Qaeda’s attempts of 2001, with an even more brutal brand of terrorism. Turkey’s ambiguous attitude to these developments was hardly a war on terror.

      Yet by this stage, the concept behind the war on terror had become so nebulous and the AKP’s relations to the US so strained by Washington’s support for the Kurds in Syria, that it was a case of realpolitik all the way. To any accusation of soft-handedness toward terrorists, Turkey pointed to US attitudes vis-à-vis Kurdish militants.

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      President Erdogan has, over time, began to carve a space for himself as an anti-Western champion, a leader of some kind of latter-day non-aligned movement, a spokesman for Muslim rights worldwide. This political and cultural position has made Turkey’s place in a liberal, democratic world order highly questionable.

      What seems clear in retrospect is that both 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror were never Turkey’s fights. Due to the longstanding Turkish alliance with the US and NATO, these have been constantly recurring themes in Turkish politics. But the events that have been so central to US policymaking for the past two decades have generally been used to advance Ankara’s own strategic goals in light of the assumption of power and entrenched hegemony of the Islamist movement in Turkey’s contemporary politics.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Can the Taliban Guarantee Security for Afghanistan’s Neighbors?

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      The Taliban’s second takeover since 1996 is taking place in a regional context that poses challenges for the regime but also opens up new opportunities. Twenty-five years ago, the Taliban took over a country largely destroyed by civil war; today, they find a reasonably functioning state.

      At that time, the Taliban regime was recognized internationally by only three states: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. Iran, Russia and India, on the other hand, supported the armed resistance by the Northern Alliance.

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      Even after 2001, Afghanistan remained the scene of regional disputes. While Pakistan backed the Taliban, India became a strategic partner of the Afghan government. The common enmity against the US even made cooperation between Iran and the Taliban possible, despite their ideological differences.

      Security Guarantees

      The stability of the new Taliban regime will depend on the extent to which it succeeds in avoiding renewed international isolation and proxy wars in Afghanistan. Central to this, both in relation to the Western states and to Afghanistan’s neighbors, is the question of security guarantees from the Taliban in return for political recognition and economic support.

      Not only the US and other Western states but also Afghanistan’s regional neighbors have called on the Taliban to take action against terrorist groups that supported the Taliban’s conquest from their safe havens across the country in early summer. The Western community of states has its sights set on groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

      Russia and the Central Asian republics fear a direct spillover of Islamist militancy onto their territory, whether by the ISKP or by extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or Jamaat Ansarullah, which recruits mainly from Tajiks or Chechen fighters.

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      China’s security interests in Afghanistan are also directed against the ISKP and against militant Uighur groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. Pakistan, considered the Taliban’s closest ally, is demanding that the new leadership in Kabul take action against the Pakistani Taliban of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which carries out attacks in Pakistan from Afghanistan. For its part, Shia-majority Iran has turned its attention to groups like the Sunni ISKP-affiliated Jundullah, which operates out of Afghanistan.

      In order to stabilize their rule, the Taliban must thus find ways to credibly limit the radius of action of foreign militant groups in Afghanistan, to the extent that they take into account the security concerns of the respective neighboring states. This appears easiest with regard to the ISKP, considered a threat by the neighbors as well as the Western states. However, since the Taliban and the ISKP are enemies, further fighting between the two groups is to be expected.

      It could be even more difficult for the Taliban to dissociate themselves from other militant groups such as the Haqqani Network, which is considered the military backbone of the Taliban and has close ties to al-Qaeda. Other Islamist groups are linked by different loyalties to individual factions within the Afghan Taliban.

      Security Benefits

      Consequently, the enforcement of security will probably not happen peacefully and is likely to become the starting point for renewed violence in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Taliban could benefit in several ways if they do achieve it.

      First, they will gain political recognition from neighboring states, which will increase their international legitimacy. Second, this may contribute to the country’s economic development. Afghanistan is central to a number of large-scale economic projects that would facilitate trade and transfer of energy between Central and South Asia and could also benefit the Taliban. Pakistan is interested in implementing these projects, as are Uzbekistan and China. Beijing could also increase economic cooperation with Afghanistan in the medium term as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.

      Third, the Taliban would benefit militarily from such cooperation as it would minimize the risk that an armed opposition like the Northern Alliance in the 1990s would again receive support from neighboring states.

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      At the same time, the different geopolitical environment and the Western states’ geostrategic rivalries with Russia and China now offer the Taliban more options for cooperation. The US and Europe will make their future relations with the new regime conditional on concessions on security issues, human rights and the participation of women.

      In contrast, neighbors such as China, Russia, the Central Asian states, Iran and Pakistan, while also emphasizing their security interests vis-à-vis the Taliban, will place less emphasis on human rights issues. This constellation is likely to significantly limit the West’s ability to influence Afghanistan’s future political and social development.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      No Clear Vision to End Violence in Afghanistan

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      Afghanistan has been engulfed in bloodshed and confusion for decades. The deal between the United States and the Taliban signed on February 29 in Doha, Qatar, has added more tension to the conflict by creating competition among anti-government militants. Groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) compete with the Taliban for political success and influence by perpetrating more violence. At the same time, they look to each other’s success as a source of inspiration and cooperation.

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      On November 2, Afghanistan was shocked by an attack on Kabul University that killed 35 students and wounded 50; officially, the death toll stands at 22, with 27 wounded. It was the latest of the many attacks on the country’s educational institutions. On October 24, a suicide bomber targeted the Kawsar-e Danish education center in western Kabul, killing at least 43 and wounding a further 57. In August 2018, another suicide attack in western Kabul on the Mawud tutoring center, which, like Kawsar-e Danish, was located in a Shai-dominated area, killed at least 48 and wounded 60. The victims at both schools were under the age of 20, some of them were as young as 14.

      Who Killed the Students?

      Due to the highly complex environment, survival for the people of Afghanistan is just a matter of chance. Sajjad Nijati was wounded in the attack on Kabul University. He is also one of the survivors of the attack on the Mawud education center. He has lost three of his family members in the attack on Kawsar-e Danish.

      ISK claimed responsibility for all three attacks, while the Taliban denied any connection. However, the Taliban attack on the American University of Afghanistan in August 2016 killed 14 and wounded 35, again mostly students. The attacks on Kawsar-e Danish and Mawud were mainly against the Shia Hazaras, a historically persecuted group that has invested in education as a strategy to break the cycle of its precarious position inside Afghanistan. Shamsea Alizada, a survivor of the attack on Mawud, topped the country’s national university tables by achieving the highest score out of nearly 200,000 students this year. When the attack happened, she was 15 and could have lost her life like many of her friends.

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      The day after the university attack, students protested and carried slogans against the Islamic State and the Taliban that read “Don’t kill us.” All in all, 13 people have been detained for their failure to prevent the attack, including the security commander of Kabul University and the district chief of police. However, Vice President Ambrulah Saleh reversed the decision arguing that the problem is systematic and needs broader attention. It is still unclear whether those arrested have been released.

      The question remains unanswered as to how the three gunmen entered the university campus. Kabul University has three main gates that are blocked by police checkpoints. The terrorists entered from the north gate, which is usually overseen by a large number of police officers who check all visitors’ IDs. With no sign of an explosion at the gate, Saleh, hours after the attack, called it an “intelligence failure.”

      Research shows that Afghan universities have been exposed to extremism in recent years and have become fertile ground for recruitment for groups like ISK and the Taliban; in July 2019, Afghan security agencies arrested three ISK recruiters at Kabul University. On November 14, Vice President Saleh announced that security forces have arrested the mastermind behind the attack on Kabul University. According to Saleh, Adel Mohammad was recruited by the Haqqani Network, a branch of the Taliban based in Miramshah, Pakistan, and had gone missing three years ago after completing his third year at Kabul University’s faculty of sharia law.

      Proxy War, Terrorism, Confusion

      In their peace deal with the US, the Taliban agreed to stop bombing urban centers and cut ties with other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. However, according to the US special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, attacks by the Taliban have increased by 50% in the past three months, to at least 55 attacks per day around the country. Since the official inauguration of the intra-Afghan talks in Qatar on September 12, the has been no reduction in civilian casualties. The Taliban use military operations as a bargaining chip in the talks, which has increased concerns about the group establishing a totalitarian and discriminatory regime in the country if it comes to power as a result of the negotiations.

      The frequently reported links between the Taliban and al-Qaeda remain another concern. Last month, Afghan security forces killed a senior al-Qaeda leader in Ghazni province in areas controlled by the Taliban. Another al-Qaeda member was killed in a Taliban-influenced area in Farah province, in the west. Research also shows that there has been cooperation — as well as clashes — between the Taliban and ISK in the past.

      Many in Afghanistan view the Taliban as responsible for hosting and cooperating with various terrorist groups. The continued war by the Taliban has severely undermined Afghanistan’s political stability, economic development and security. This has weakened the government’s functionality and territorial control, opening the door for other militant groups such as ISK. Both ISK and the Taliban have similar ideological positions toward secular education, and the situation on the ground today makes it clear that the war has turned into a deliberate strategy of indiscriminate violence against education centers and youth in the country.

      There are three theories about recent urban attacks in Afghanistan. The first is that the Taliban organize the attacks but deny responsibility to benefit from the chaos and backlash against the government, which allows ISK to claim responsibility. Vice President Saleh claimed that the ISK claiming the attack on Kabul University was fake. Saleh pointed to a Taliban flag apparently found at the scene as evidence of Taliban involvement. According to the vice president, the weapons found at the scene do not match those in photos released by ISK. The Taliban, however, rejects these claims.

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      The second theory is that the Haqqani Network, a branch of the Taliban close to Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), is carrying out attacks in urban areas. Some experts argue there is a disagreement between the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network branches. Therefore, without Quetta Shura’s approval, the Haqqani Network attack on urban areas but under the ISK name; since the appearance of ISK, the Haqqani Network did not claim most of the bigger urban attacks, with ISK taking responsibility instead. According to this theory, the main actor behind terrorist activity in Afghanistan is the Haqqani Network rather than ISK. It has been argued that the Haqqani Network has strong links and levels of cooperation not just with the ISI, but also al-Qaeda and ISK. Those who believe in this theory argue that there is a close relationship between the Haqqani Network and ISK.

      The third theory is that the ISK organizes urban attacks independently, such as the one on Kabul University. According to this analysis, ISK today has more influence in urban areas. At the moment, however, this argument does not have many supporters among experts and Afghan security officials. From the Afghan government’s point of view, ISK is a platform for Pakistan’s clandestine activities, where ISK is an umbrella for many actors including the Haqqani Network and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) for attacking targets in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, believes that ISK is supported by the same forces in Pakistan that back the Haqqani Network.

      Death by a Thousand Cuts

      The conflict in Afghanistan doesn’t have a single dimension. It is a combination of proxy wars and terrorism. The proxy dimension of the war since the 1980s produced countless intended and unintended consequences such as state fragility, terrorism, sectarianism, war crimes, social fragmentation and radicalization. Kabul University has found itself at the center of this strife over the four decades of war. In late 1983, a bomb was placed under a dining room table at the university, killing many. Later on, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, who was leading the Afghan Bureau of ISI at the time, revealed in his memoir that the attack was part of Pakistan’s strategy of “death by thousand cuts.”

      This specter of history is fresh in Afghanistan’s collective memory. Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan enabled the group to intensify the conflict. The complicated links and cooperation between the Taliban, ISK and al-Qaeda make it difficult to believe that they did not join forces to target educational institutions and carry out assassinations. At the same time, contextualizing the war in Afghanistan by considering the long history of cooperation between militant groups and the intelligence services in the region make the proxy dynamic of the war more apparent.

      With mistakes made on all sides, especially by the Trump administration in Washington, created both inspiration and hope for many extremist groups in the region. Particularly, the US-Taliban deal turned the country into a playground for various extremist groups and their supporters trying to either outdo each other or build tactical collaboration to defeat the Afghan government. Even Pakistani extremist groups have called upon the Afghan government to surrender to the Taliban.

      These groups are trying to build leverage through violence and claiming the honor of resisting the US and its partners. They are fighting to create frustration and chaos in order to expand their operational reach and lethality, thereby creating transnational inspiration for the movement. Unless there is a policy change to effectively deal with this threat, there is no clear vision for ending all this violence.

      *[Correction: An earlier version of this article stated that the attack on Kawsar-e Danish killed 24 people. This piece was updated at 17:50 GMT.]

      *[The author is one of the investigators on the Carnegie Corporation of New York-funded project “Assessing the impact of external actors in the Syria and Afghan proxy wars” (Grant number: G-18-55949) at Deakin University, Australia.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      For Libya, Peace Remains Unlikely

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      A recent ceasefire agreement and ongoing political reconciliation negotiations between Libya’s warring factions have significantly de-escalated tensions. A flurry of diplomatic engagement, with significant international support, has raised hopes that the Libyan conflict is about to enter a new stage, namely one that involves less fighting and more talking.

      Members of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) met in September in Hurghada, Egypt, to discuss a ceasefire for the first time since the early months of 2020, culminating in the October 23 agreement on a comprehensive ceasefire. This deal included provisions calling for the departure of all foreign fighters from Libya within three months, a freeze on military agreements with foreign parties, the demilitarization of the conflict’s frontlines (Sirte and Jufra districts) and the establishment of a joint policing force to monitor and secure the demilitarized frontlines.

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      Military talks have advanced alongside parallel political dialogue, which has also seen progress over recent months. Political talks have been held between members of the GNA and the Tripoli-based consultative body, the High Council of State, on one side, and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, which is aligned with the LNA, on the other side. Meetings between these actors — which have taken place on September 6 in Morocco, September 7-9 in Switzerland and October 11-13 in Egypt — are focusing on reaching an agreement on creating a new presidential council to govern Libya, setting a date for parliamentary elections and more broadly reunifying the country.

      The aim of the ongoing political dialogue, under the auspices of the UN, is to reach an agreement on these issues at the summit in Tunisia that began on November 9. However, the prospects of the conflict ending and the reunification of the country taking place in the coming year remain unlikely.

      Less Fighting, More Talking

      The progress of the political and military negotiations has been bolstered by the September 18 agreement between GNA Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq and LNA interlocutors to ease the nationwide oil blockade that the LNA had imposed since January this year. This agreement has been slowly implemented in Libya since the end of September, and oil production has risen from a low of approximately 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 1 million bpd on November 7. The blockade had been a major grievance for the GNA since oil exports account for more than 90% of Libya’s state revenues. The blockade had cost the state at least $9 billion in revenue.

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      These political and military talks are a positive step forward for the country, which had been in the midst of intense fighting just a few months ago. However, a comprehensive peace deal is not just over the horizon. This ceasefire is only the latest attempt to stop the fighting; the most recent ceasefire deal of January 11 collapsed within weeks of being signed. Moreover, efforts to build trust between the LNA and GNA will be difficult, and neither party is currently willing to sever their lifelines to key foreign backers or force them to leave the country.

      The GNA was only able to win the Tripoli battle because of the military support it received from Turkey, including the thousands of Syrian fighters deployed by Ankara. Just days after the ceasefire was agreed, the GNA signed a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation with Qatar in a move that undermines the spirit, if not the letter, of the ceasefire agreement. The GNA remains weary of the LNA and its leader Khalifa Haftar after the general launched the attack on Tripoli in April 2019 just days before a planned UN peace conference. There are also constituencies among the militia groups that make up the GNA’s armed forces that are resisting the ceasefire and broader military negotiations with the LNA.

      Meanwhile, the LNA has its own reasons to resist adhering to certain aspects of the ceasefire agreement. The LNA’s dependence on Russian and Emirati military, financial and political support has increased over the past year, and Russian private military companies aligned with the LNA are also present in the country. The LNA will not want to remove foreign forces, which provide important military support, from the country. Moreover, it is likely that Haftar is merely biding his time with this ceasefire, de-escalating tensions while allowing oil revenues to flow back into the system to appease the growing number of Libyans who are exasperated by the country’s sharp economic deterioration.

      General Haftar maintains the intent to rule Libya. However, he does not currently have the ability to impose his will by force, especially while the GNA has strong Turkish backing. Haftar will thus present a major obstacle to a comprehensive end to the conflict — unless he is effectively sidelined. This remains unlikely over the coming months since Haftar retains significant support of key tribal constituencies and because his interests remain aligned with those of his international backers.

      Back in Business

      While a total end to the conflict very likely remains out of reach in the coming months, the de-escalation in fighting has opened opportunities for business. The country, and particularly the state-owned General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), is in significant need of upgrades and repairs to power infrastructure. At the moment, GECOL is producing around 4,500 MW, but peak demand stands at around 7,000 MW. The end of the battle for Tripoli in June and the limited progress in military and political talks have created conditions that are allowing international firms to restart power projects. Moreover, the resumption of oil exports will generate government revenues that will make it possible to start additional projects.

      Business confidence in the oil and gas sector is also rising as operations are beginning to ramp up. Nuri Esaid, chairman of Tripoli-based Akakus Oil Operations, said on October 31 that the Sharara oilfield in Libya’s southwest will pump 300,000 bpd by the end of 2020, following the decision by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to lift force majeure at the field on October 11. The NOC also lifted force majeure at Sidre and Ras Lanuf oil export terminals on October 23, removing the final barriers to ramping up oil production nationwide. Businesses with operations in the country will cautiously seek to restart projects that have been regularly disrupted over the past years.

      Nevertheless, the operating environment remains fraught with risk. Companies must balance their relationships with both the LNA, which has physical control over most of the country’s oil and gas installations, and the GNA, which nominally controls all key state institutions, such as Libya’s central bank and the NOC. There are also security challenges arising from the presence of local Petroleum Facilities Guards that often have their own interests. In December 2018, for example, the Fezzan Rage Movement worked with members of the guards to shutdown the Sharara oilfield to demand greater government economic support for southern Libya.

      Local grievances in the southwest over lack of economic opportunity and government support, as well as tribal divisions, especially between local Tebu and Tuareg groups, in the area will sustain threats of unrest and communal violence. Moreover, the Islamic State is still present, if diminished, in central Libya and capable of launching small-scale attacks. Sustained political fragmentation will contribute to the continuation of longstanding security deficiencies as the country’s rival authorities will fail to adopt a unified, cooperative approach to country-wide security. As progress toward a more comprehensive political settlement stalls, the prospect that Khalifa Haftar will reimpose an oil blockade — and reignite the conflict — will grow.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      How the US Can Win Back Clout in Syria

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      The humanitarian crisis in northeastern Syria is well documented. Nonetheless, despite the devastation that has occurred and the likely peril that is soon to come, pleas from aid groups, journalists and refugees have not been enough to move policymakers to take action. One reason for this is that because the underlying causes of this crisis are political, the solution must be too. Washington could seize considerable political influence in Syria by throwing a lifeline to its strategic allies in the northeast. Unilateral action by US policymakers to open the Yarubiya border crossing between Iraq and Syria could increase American and Kurdish influence at the expense of Iran, Russia, Turkey, the Islamic State (IS) and the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

      A decade of civil war against the Syrian regime, a regional war against IS and a recent Turkish military incursion have turned half of Syria’s prewar population into refugees. More than 6 million Syrians are displaced internally, and 5.6 million are in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria governs the seven cantons of the northeast. Its alliance of paramilitary groups, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is led by the Kurdish majority People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Ankara considers a terrorist organization. Of the 3 million residents of this region, 700,000 are refugees living in numerous refugee and displaced persons camps, with 65,000 in the Al-Hol refugee camp alone. 

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      Humanitarian aid shipments were all but cut off to northeastern Syria in January 2020, when the United Nations ordered the closure of the Yarubiya border crossing between Syria and Iraq. As the only port of entry with sufficient capacity to handle the requisite shipments of aid and equipment, Yarubiya was the carotid artery bringing humanitarian aid into northeastern Syria. The border between Turkey and northeastern Syria is effectively closed. The Syrian regime allows minimal, if any, aid to cross from its territory into this part of the country, and it controls the Qamishli airport. The remaining border crossing at Samalka, between northeastern Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, is a river crossing over pontoon boats, which heavy rains regularly wash away; it is shut on most days.

      By closing the Yarubiya crossing, the UN was acceding to concerted pressure from Russia, officially to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State, but in reality to choke off aid to anti-Assad regime forces, primarily the SDF. To make matters worse, in August, Turkey cut off the flow of water through the Alouk pumping station, thereby weaponizing water by severing northeastern Syria’s main freshwater source. Aside from leaving hundreds of thousands without water for drinking, cooking and bathing, not to mention hampering the generation of electricity by hydroelectric plants dependent on it, this manmade political crisis has made the medical response to the region’s escalating COVID-19 crisis all the more helpless. 

      Lack of Interest and Resolve

      The squeezing of the ethnically diverse residents of northeastern Syria is the result of political jostling by Turkey, Iran and Russia to increase their respective regional influence at American and Kurdish expense. For Iran and Russia, who are working to rearm their pro-Assad proxy forces, the SDF stands in the way of the Assad regime reasserting control over the country. Although Turkey does not support Assad, it considers the YPG to be a mortal enemy and has even been supporting the Islamic State against it. 

      The Trump administration’s imposition of the Caesar Act — US sanctions targeting Bashar al-Assad’s government and its backers — may create obstacles for regime officials to transfer assets, but their benefactors will find a way to put their money where they want. Regardless, this policy will have no effect on the ongoing loss of American regional influence to Iran, Russia and Turkey. 

      Despite the recurring crises related to Syria over the last four years, it has not received consistent attention from the Trump administration, whose characteristic lack of interest and resolve to carry out complex foreign policy goals has allowed the crisis to escalate. This can be exemplified by the administration’s inconsistent messaging. For example, the official US position to justify the presence of American forces in Syria is to defeat IS, push out Iranian influence and resolve the civil conflict between the Assad regime and domestic opposition groups. However, President Donald Trump recently minimized the American presence to keeping the oil out of the hands of Iran, the IS and Russia, and to allow American companies and allies to benefit from its sale. 

      Aside from statements of support for opening the Yarubiya crossing, congressional committees have not expressed more than a nominal interest in the significant loss of American regional influence. This is despite the trillions of dollars the US has invested to build up the American position in Iraq and Syria over the past two decades. As a result, the harsh reality must be accepted that one cannot expect the US government to do anything to protect American interests or regain its squandered strategic regional influence without the executive and legislative branches being willing and able to design and implement policy to that effect.

      Unilateral Action

      Fortunately, the opening of the Yarubiya crossing is a relatively simple policy that will require minimum resolve to carry out. Nonetheless, it will bolster American regional influence at the expense of its most bitter regional rivals. Pleas to the UN by humanitarian groups and NGOs seeking to reopen the Yarubiya crossing to aid will never overcome Russian opposition. However, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Khadimi has separate authority over Yarubiya. Having spent close to $2 trillion in Iraq on military operations, hardware and training of local military, police and emergency medical staff, as well as operating the largest embassy in the world in Baghdad, the US government has more than enough leverage to instruct Khadimi to open the border crossing.

      There are other added benefits to unilateral action. For instance, sidestepping the UN will itself add leverage to both the US position and that of its ally, the SDF. Brokering a deal with its rivals for the UN to open the crossing would require the US to make considerable concessions. By design, all anticipated requests, such as allowing Turkey to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense systems, would likely be ones the US could never accept, as the status quo benefits all parties involved except the US and the population of northeastern Syria.

      Acting unilaterally would bypass such futile negotiations. Instead, the US would gain considerable leverage that it can save for a final status agreement in the long term or, at the very least, demand concessions from other parties in exchange for limiting what would be allowed through the crossing, thereby ensuring continued and adequate aid shipments. Aside from humanitarian considerations, from an economic standpoint, the move would provide an avenue for oil in northeastern Syria to be brought to market. The windfall profits would lead to a boom of economic development in northeastern Syria as well as Iraq, through which all materials would have to be shipped, and would save the United States millions of dollars in humanitarian aid. 

      Embed from Getty Images

      This must be done soon. The Assad regime is being continually strengthened by Iran and Russia in order to reassert control over northeastern Syria, the Deir Az Zour oil fields and the profits they hold. Northeastern Syria contains 90% of the country’s oil and natural gas, but it does not have an efficient route to export these energy resources. As a result, what does get exported goes through markets controlled by Iran, and profits are also siphoned off by the Islamic State as it rebuilds its infrastructure.

      The US finally allowed the export of oil from Deir Az Zour recently, which increased the political leverage of the SDF against Assad in future settlement negotiations. Opening the Yarubiya crossing will further extend that leverage to the United States. The more oil that is exported in the meantime, and the more involved the US is in protecting it, the more leverage the US will have and the stronger its regional ally, the SDF, will become. By fortifying itself, the SDF, which controls northeastern Syria, will be better equipped to cut off Iranian land access to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In effect, the stronger northeastern Syria becomes, the more influence the US will have to counter Iranian and Russian influence in Syria. 

      To reiterate, as America’s frontline ally in the fight against the IS, the SDF has led the fight against the armed group and continues to prevent its resurgence. However, as IS is now receiving aid from Turkey as part of Ankara’s effort to wipe out the Kurds, if the SDF were to lose its fight, American soldiers may be expected to take their place protecting considerable US strategic interests. Otherwise, the oil would fall into the hands of Russia, Iran and the IS. It is therefore imperative to act quickly so as to bolster the SDF as well as to mitigate the disaster of the COVID-19 pandemic that has increased humanitarian suffering in the region.

      Challenging Russia, Turkey and Iran

      Turkey and Russia have outmaneuvered the US in Syria over the last several years. As Seth Franztman writes in The Jerusalem Post, “Moscow has become friends with all sides in Syria — except with the Americans.” As a result, all of these actors have benefitted to different extents in Syria with the exception of the United States. Russian and Turkish efforts to divide up Syria include allowing Turkey to shore up its control in Idlib province in exchange for letting Russia fortify the Assad regime and act against US regional interests. Crucially, the opportunity created by sidelining Washington has allowed and will continue to allow the Assad regime and Iran to fortify their positions.

      Russia punches far above its weight in terms of international influence. As Anna Borshchevskaya reports for The Hill, Moscow’s efforts to defend its imperiled interests around the world by sowing unrest requires considerable personnel and resources. These resources are not unlimited and are effective because of the perceived threat of retaliation by Russian President Vladimir Putin against those who act contrary to his interests.

      Moscow’s interests in Syria are among its most heavily challenged. Russia cannot afford to lose its gambit in Syria and will remain invested no matter what the foreseeable cost. Thus, there is no better way to undermine Russian influence globally than to spread it thin and weaken it by acting against its various global interests concertedly. Russia worked very hard to get the UN to close the Yarubiya crossing, thereby freeing up its resources to fight battles on other fronts. Those resources cannot simply be reassigned back to Syria without being removed from other fights.

      As Turkey asserts itself as a regional political and military power, Ankara’s and Washington’s interests do not always align vis-à-vis Syria. For example, as analysis by the RAND corporation shows, Turkish attacks against YPG forces in northeastern Syria have led to the reappropriating of SDF personnel from fighting the IS in Deir Az Zour region to address Turkish incursions along the northern border. The State Department’s inspector general has accused Turkey of working in concert with the Islamic State to undermine US-supported YPG efforts in Syria. 

      Turkey has been threatening war with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, and its cutting off of water to northeastern Syria has considerably exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis in the region. Opening the Yarubiya crossing to allow in aid, supplies and water would challenge Ankara’s clout in northeastern Syria. It may cause Turkey to rethink its confrontation with Greece, making it more likely that Ankara will err on the side of diplomacy to resolve that conflict before it escalates into a military clash. It will also show Turkey that, despite its influence as a NATO ally, Ankara does not have carte blanche to act against US interests without facing consequences.

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      The involvement of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria has drained its coffers and its personnel. This has considerably frustrated the Iranian population as its resources are sent abroad rather than used to rebuild the struggling economy at home. Applying pressure by opening up the Yarubiya crossing will further drain Iranian resources as it will require even more money, personnel and influence to fight Iran’s battles in Syria and Iraq, which will in turn further inflame domestic opposition to the IRGC. 

      Opening the Yarubiya crossing will aid the Kurds in northeastern Syria to fortify their positions and take a big step toward economic stability in the territory. Historically, the Kurds have been reliable US allies in the region and will undoubtedly continue to be strategic allies in the near future. Leaving them in the lurch by allowing Turkey to attack them in October 2019 shattered American credibility with the YPG, and left them with little recourse other than to put their hope in Russia for protection from Turkey. However, opening the Yarubiya crossing will considerably improve American credibility with the Kurds and work toward improving relations with a critical strategic ally, which will be imperative for American regional influence in the future.

      Opening the Yarubiya crossing between Iraq and northeastern Syria is a singular action that will simultaneously put pressure on Putin, Iran, the Islamic State and the Assad regime. It will also reassert American leadership in NATO, rebuild credibility with regional strategic allies and safeguard US energy interests. Finally, and perhaps most critically, will improve humanitarian conditions on the ground, which will go a long way to win hearts and minds by saving lives.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.] More

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      Is Assad Gearing Up for a Final Push in Syria?

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      Ceasefires in Syria come and go, and so do the meetings between the outside players who hold it in their hands to determine if an end to the country’s 9-year civil war is in sight. The most recent meeting in Ankara between Turkish and Russian military officers was intended to discuss issues at a “technical level” in both the Syrian and Libyan theaters of war. Not much was achieved, with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reportedly calling the session “unproductive.” The minister called for the ceasefire to continue and insisted that “there must be more focus on political negotiations,” a sentiment few can disagree with but one that seems most unlikely to be realized in the near to middle future.

      Russia’s state-controlled Sputnik news agency reported that what it called a “source” had said that the Turks had declined to evacuate five observation posts in Syria’s Idlib province. According to the source, “After the Turkish side refused to withdraw the Turkish observation points and insisted on keeping them, it was decided to reduce the number of Turkish forces present in Idlib and to withdraw heavy weapons from the area.”

      A Coming Catastrophe

      Whether that is the case has yet to be confirmed. However, it was enough for the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) to issue a somber warning: “Turkey may have agreed to cede control of Southern Idlib to pro-Assad forces in a meeting with Russia September 16. If the reports of a deal are true, a pro-Assad offensive is likely imminent.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      The ISW buttresses its argument by noting that Turkey had already withdrawn hundreds of its forces from southern Idlib on September 8. Turkey’s claim that the withdrawal is the result of rising tensions with Greece over hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean were treated with skepticism by the ISW: “Turkey may have used its dispute with Greece as cover for action consistent with an impending deal with Russia in Idlib.”

      This may, indeed, be the “political negotiations” that Cavusoglu was speaking of. If so, and if an assault on what remains of Idlib in rebel hands is imminent, then it signals likely catastrophe for civilians trapped between advancing Assad forces and jihadist militias. Were the US not in the middle of a presidential race and were the incumbent in the White House not so inclined to call for the complete withdrawal of US forces from Syria (only to change his mind when presented with the outcomes of such a move), then there would be grounds for more hope for the civilian population of Idlib.

      But such is not the case. And beyond President Donald Trump’s view that, as he expressed it, “People said to me, ‘Why are you staying in Syria?’ Because I kept the oil, which frankly we should have done in Iraq,” uncertainty about just what America’s intentions in Syria are remains very much in play. It is a factor that other external players, that is the Russians, the Turks and Iran, can all exploit as they seek to advance their strategic efforts at the expense of the Syrian people.

      Old Enemies

      It is a situation that has left the 500 or so US troops still in Syria and their allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in a vulnerable and exposed place, a point the Pentagon clearly gets, even if the commander-in-chief doesn’t. Announcing a deployment of Bradley fighting vehicles to Eastern Syria on September 19, a Pentagon spokesperson stated: “These actions are a clear demonstration of US resolve to defend Coalition forces in the [Eastern Syria Security Area], and to ensure that they are able to continue their Defeat-ISIS mission without interference. The Defense Department has previously deployed Bradleys to northeast Syria pursuant to these goals.”

      That deployment reflects a growing concern that, as documented by ISW and others, the Islamic State (IS) is resurging in Syria. Its recent attacks have been aimed at tribal elders who support the SDF and at efforts to develop governance capabilities that benefit civilians by removing festering grievances that the jihadists seek to exploit.

      For their part, the Russians, playing on fears that the SDF Kurdish leadership has concerning an abrupt American withdrawal, may strive to build on pushing the Kurds to seek some sort of rapprochement with Damascus, thus hastening a US departure. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Russians were crucial to a deal in October last year that saw the Kurds cede territory to Assad forces and withdraw rather than face a Turkish offensive in northern Syria.

      Meanwhile, the ISW’s Jennifer Cafarella argues that a sudden withdrawal without a strategic endgame plays straight into the hands of not just Russia and Iran; it emboldens a rising IS and empowers the jihadist ideology it shares with America’s oldest enemy in its war on terror, al- Qaeda.

      Al-Qaeda has played a long game, happy for IS to take the brunt of the West’s military response. Cafarella says that while a global coalition led by America came together to defeat the caliphate (and force ISI into a guerrilla insurgency), the same cannot be said for al-Qaeda. “We have not been able to reach the same level of understanding with our allies and partners and that is in part because Al Qaeda is playing this much more sophisticated political game that in the long run, I do very much worry, could outflank us.”

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Shamima Begum: The Sensitive Case of IS Returnees

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      Born in the UK to Bangladeshi parents, Shamima Begum left London as a 15-year-old in 2015. Using her British passport, she traveled to Turkey with two of her friends from school. From there, Begum and her friends crossed into Syria, where they met their Islamic State (IS) contacts. While in Syria, Begum married an IS fighter. On February 19 this year, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission had stripped Begum of her citizenship as she was deemed to be a national security threat. On July 16, however, UK authorities granted this now adult British woman, who had joined a terrorist group as a teenager four years earlier, the right to return to Britain to challenge the UK government’s removal of her citizenship.

      The commission ruled that the decision to revoke Begum’s British citizenship did not render her stateless as, by default, the United Kingdom also considered her a Bangladeshi citizen “by descent.” However, the Bangladeshi Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it did not consider her as a citizen of that country. A statement released by Begum’s British lawyers argued that she indeed had never visited Bangladesh, nor had she ever applied for dual nationality.

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      In the meantime, the press has chastised Begum, who remains a detainee in a camp operated by ethnic Kurdish militias in northern Syria, for making controversial statements such and saying that seeing her first severed head did not faze her “at all” and suggesting that people should “have sympathy” toward her for everything she has been through.

      Why Women?

      England’s Court of Appeal, in turn, unanimously agreed that Begum should be granted the right to have a fair and effective appeal of the decision to strip her of her citizenship, but only if she is permitted to come back to Britain. Of course, that does not guarantee the reinstatement of her citizenship rights, just that she has a right to present her case in person. Regardless of the legal wrangling and the debate about the legality that her case has sparked, this example sheds some light on the issue of contextualizing female IS supporters and terrorists and the legality of stripping Western-born suspects of their European or North American citizenship.

      There has been some academic discussion of why women, especially young women, who were born, raised and educated in the West, migrate to IS-held territory and join terrorist groups, leaving behind family, friends and a way of life while abandoning liberal values and opportunities that countries such as the UK offer them. It is difficult to ascertain whether a particular female, such as Shamima Begum, was a victim of IS, an active supporter or both. The widely circulated stories of “jihadi brides” have projected an image of confused and naïve girls and women traveling to join the Islamic State. While certain dynamics lured a number of females to IS-held territories, many went of their own free will. Yet it is highly debatable to what extent a 15-year-old understands the realities of this extremist group.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Muslim women have migrated to IS-held areas for a multitude of reasons, including the romantic ideal of marrying a “lion” — a supposedly brave and noble warrior — looking for an adventure and contributing to the establishment of an Islamic “caliphate” regulated by strict enforcement of Sharia law. The sense that joining the Islamic State empowers people to live meaningful lives draws many of the migrant women. One study suggests that besides issues of belonging and identity — and a skewed interpretation of Islam — it is, in the case of young women like Begum, online social networks that appeared to be the primary venue and driving factor for radicalization. It turns out that the vast majority of foreign women who traveled to Syria and Iraq served IS primarily as one of several housewives or sex slaves.

      It is only by understanding the motivations and experiences of those who have gone to fight abroad that governments can prevent the recruitment of another generation of terrorists and terrorist sympathizers. The enemies of the Islamic State have ostensibly defeated the group in the Middle East, yet unknown numbers of surviving IS fighters have found the means to relocate to Afghanistan. Permutations of IS and other extremist groups are also active in many African countries like Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria and  Somalia, among others. Aside from Afghanistan, other places in South Asia are not immune.

      Displaced Burden

      The UK, US and some other countries have chosen to prevent the return of foreign fighters by revoking their citizenship. Although such actions may prevent the return of foreign fighters in the short term, they do not solve the problem and may also be illegal under both national and international laws. In several instances, this will simply displace the burden and force weakened states such as Syria and Iraq to deal with the consequences of radicalization. It may also instill further grievances and act as a trigger for radicalization into surviving Western-born radicals who may plot terrorist attacks against Western targets.

      In certain cases, citizenship revocation has led to concerns over statelessness. Rendering an individual stateless runs against Western legal principles and is contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In several legal systems, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to prosecute female returnees because of their domestic roles in Syria and Iraq. Another challenge associated with prosecutions of foreign fighters lies with demonstrating intent. This applies both to the intent of the actions committed while in the war zone and the intent of travel for aspiring foreign fighters. There is also an argument that many such individuals, especially the juveniles, were victims of human trafficking.

      A more fruitful approach would be to allow a panel of experts to determine whether an individual returning to the home country is dangerous or disillusioned. The prime example of this approach is Denmark, which has already implemented assessment protocols that allow authorities to determine the individual circumstances for each returnee. Based on the results of such screenings, Danish police, together with social services, develop a plan of action for each returnee. Together, they decide whether a returnee is imprisoned, placed in a rehabilitation program or is assigned a combination of both approaches. It is extremely difficult to separate a victim from a perpetrator, and the boundaries can be particularly murky for foreign fighters.

      *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Iraq Has a Unique Opportunity to Limit Iranian Influence

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      The appointment of the new Iraqi prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, could have significant implications for the country’s relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has heavily meddled in Iraq’s affairs post-2003. Kadhimi was serving as the director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service when President Barham Salih appointed him to the post of prime […] More