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      in World Politics

      What Starts in Afghanistan Does Not Stay in Afghanistan

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      The Taliban’s offensive in Afghanistan has shifted the Central Asian playing field on which China, India and the United States compete with rival infrastructure-driven approaches. At first glance, a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan would give China a 2:0 advantage against the US and India, but that could prove to be a shaky head start.

      The fall of the US-backed Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani will shelve if not kill Indian support for the Iranian port of Chabahar, which was intended to facilitate Indian trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Chabahar was also viewed by India as a counterweight to the Chinese-supported Pakistani port of Gwadar, a crown jewel of Beijing’s transportation, telecommunications and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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      The United States facilitated Indian investment in Chabahar by exempting the port from harsh sanctions against Iran. The exemption was intended to “support the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.” However, due to stalled negotiations with Iran about a revival of the 2015 nuclear agreement, the US announced in July — together with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan — plans to create a platform that would foster regional trade, business ties and connectivity.

      The connectivity end of the plan resembled an effort to cut off one’s nose to spite one’s face. It would have circumvented Iran and weakened Chabahar but potentially strengthened China’s Gwadar alongside the port of Karachi. That has become a moot point with the plans certain to be shelved as the Taliban take over Afghanistan and form a government that would be denied recognition by at least the democratic parts of the international community.

      China

      Like other Afghan neighbors, neither Pakistan, Uzbekistan nor China are likely to join a boycott of the Taliban. On the contrary, China last month made a point of giving a visiting Taliban delegation a warm welcome. Yet recognition by Iran, Central Asian states and China of a Taliban government is unlikely to be enough to salvage the Chabahar project. “Changed circumstances and alternative connectivity routes are being conjured up by other countries to make Chabahar irrelevant,” an Iranian source told Hard News, a Delhi-based publication.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The Taliban have sought to reassure China, Iran, Uzbekistan and other Afghan neighbors that they will not allow Afghanistan to become an operational base for jihadist groups. This includes al-Qaeda and Uighur militants of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). The Taliban have positioned themselves as solely concerned with creating an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan and having no inclination to operate beyond the country’s borders. But they have been consistent in their refusal to expel al-Qaeda, even if the group is a shadow of what it was when it launched the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

      The TIP has occasionally issued videos documenting its presence in Afghanistan. But it has, by and large, kept a low profile and refrained from attacking Chinese targets in Afghanistan or across the border in Xinjiang, the northwestern Chinese province in which authorities have brutally cracked down on ethnic Turkic Uighurs. As a result, the Taliban reassurance was insufficient to stop China from repeatedly advising its citizens to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible. “Currently, the security situation in Afghanistan has further deteriorated … If Chinese citizens insist on staying in Afghanistan, they will face extremely high-security risks, and all the consequences will be borne by themselves,” the Chinese foreign ministry said.

      Pakistan

      The fallout of the Taliban’s sweep across Afghanistan is likely to affect China beyond Afghan borders, perhaps no more so than in Pakistan, a major focus of Beijing’s single largest BRI-related investment. This has made China a target for attacks by militants, primarily Baloch nationalists. In July, nine Chinese nationals were killed in an explosion on a bus transporting Chinese workers to the construction site of a dam in the northern mountains of Pakistan, a region prone to attacks by religious militants. This incident raises the specter of jihadists also targeting China. It was the highest loss of life of Chinese citizens in recent years in Pakistan.

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      The attack occurred amid fears that the Taliban will bolster ultra-conservative religious sentiment in Pakistan that celebrates the group as heroes, whose success enhances the chances for austere religious rule. “Our jihadis will be emboldened. They will say that ‘if America can be beaten, what is the Pakistan army to stand in our way?’” said a senior Pakistani official. Indicating its concern, China has delayed the signing of a framework agreement on industrial cooperation, which would have accelerated the implementation of projects that are part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

      Kamran Bokhari, writing for The Wall Street Journal, explained: “Regime change is a terribly messy process. Weak regimes can be toppled; replacing them is the hard part. It is only a matter of time before the Afghan state collapses, unleashing chaos that will spill beyond its borders. All of Afghanistan’s neighbors will be affected to varying degrees, but Pakistan and China have the most to lose.”

      The demise of Chabahar and/or the targeting by the Taliban of Hazara Shia Muslims in Afghanistan could potentially turn Iran into a significant loser too.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      The New York Times Predicts Our Future

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      The banner headline on the front page of Wednesday’s New York Times contained what can be interpreted as either a promise, a prophecy, a wild hope or a meaningless truism. It read: “Withdrawal of U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Will End Longest American War.” The headline linked to an article with a slightly less assertive title: “Biden to Withdraw All Combat Troops From Afghanistan by Sept. 11.” Nevertheless, it quickly returned to the prophetic tone, while adding one significant dramatic detail: “President Biden will withdraw American combat troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, declaring an end to the nation’s longest war and overruling warnings from his military advisers.” Instead of the traditional tactic of divide and rule, Biden will be applying a new one: withdraw and overrule.

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      How can The New York Times promise that an event “will” happen months before the date? Does The Times, as the “paper of record,” have the authority to report future events? Expressions of intention, even by a sitting president, are not predictions. Is The Times now in the business of publishing prophetic journalism? More likely its certainty about what will happen in the future should be branded a wild partisan hope. The Times has been willing to go overboard to give the Biden administration credit long before credit is due. It has become a pattern since the election in its reporting and even the opinions of its Republican editorialists.

      The Times’ initial affirmation can nevertheless be justified as a truism. Though it fails to refer to a real event, its meaning is undeniably true. The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan at any time in the future — whether it’s September 2021 or even 2051 — will effectively end the longest war in US history, simply because in April 2021 it is already the nation’s longest war.

      To underline the very real seriousness of President Joe Biden’s resolution and to support the idea that the future will happen as reported, The Times cites a significant fact: “A senior Biden administration official said the president had come to believe that a ‘conditions-based approach’ would mean that American troops would never leave the country.”

      Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

      Conditions-based approach:

      A tactic that allows a government to promise to carry out an action and then, at the critical moment, announce that it is justified in refusing to carry out that action

      Contextual Note

      The resolution of any serious problem in the realm of geopolitics is subject to conditions on the ground. That is why negotiations are important. But the situation in Afghanistan has always been so complex and asymmetrical that even attempting to negotiate is doomed to failure. The current situation involves three parties: the US, which is seeking to withdraw after 20 years of failed military efforts; the Taliban, who control most of the territory of a country traditionally administered by local warlords; and the so-called legitimate Afghan government initially put in place and supported economically and militarily by the US.

      Barack Obama and Donald Trump both announced plans to withdraw from the conflict. But as soon as discussions began, the US insisted that certain conditions must be met. Those conditions were always framed as minimal criteria of political stability and a guaranteed role for the official government, even in a power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban. There was never any serious chance of realizing those objectives. Withdrawal dates could only be formulated as a target, not as a predefined moment. It also meant that those who opposed withdrawal simply needed to make sure that things on the ground remained suitably unstable.

      Embed from Getty Images

      President Biden has clearly, even shockingly, innovated by unilaterally canceling the criterion of conditions. It appears to be a move designed to counter not the actors in Afghanistan, but his political opponents in Washington and the Pentagon. He has done so because in every case from the past, Congress and the Pentagon have managed to declare that the sacrosanct conditions were not met. The US economy thrives on military engagement. The Afghan government has had a permanent incentive to maintain the presence of the US, which guarantees the billions of dollars funding of the government’s operations. Once the US leaves, even while promising to provide aid to a new composite regime, the Taliban will undoubtedly have the upper hand in a negotiated power-sharing arrangement.

      In other words, there are two actors in the drama who have used the idea of conditions to oppose withdrawal: the NATO-supported Afghan government and the Pentagon. Obama and Trump failed in their plans to withdraw because they placed all their trust in the Pentagon. That is why the Biden administration’s decision to abandon a conditions-based approach may not only be constructive but absolutely necessary to achieve a goal ardently desired by the American public but opposed by the military-industrial complex that includes the Pentagon, the defense industry and members of Congress who depend on the defense industry for funding their campaigns and providing jobs in their jurisdictions.

      How inevitable is The New York Times’ bold prophecy that withdrawal will effectively happen in September? Already, powerful senators who can stop it from happening, both Republican and Democrat, are beginning to speak up to condemn what they call a shameful and humiliating retreat from an engagement that began 20 years ago. The lobbyists are mobilizing to make sure the interests of the defense industry and the Pentagon continue to exercise effective control of US foreign policy.

      But on April 14, Biden himself made it clear that there actually is a condition. The Times reports that he warned the Taliban “that if American forces are attacked on the way out of the country, ‘we’re going to defend ourselves and our partners with all the tools at our disposal.’” That certainly sounds like a condition.

      Historical Note

      When running for president in 2000, George W. Bush asserted that he wanted the US to avoid any temptation of nation-building. Eight months into his presidency, using the pretext of the 9/11 attacks, Bush initiated a foreign policy that obliged the US to engage actively in nation-building, first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq.

      The foreign policy of the past three presidents has transformed both Afghanistan and Iraq into examples of what may be called “government-creating and defending” rather than “nation-building.” After toppling an existing regime and putting in its place a puppet government committed to Western liberal values, the game has consisted of ensuring the minimum required to keep such governments from collapsing as they take on the impossible burden of defeating America’s designated enemy.

      It is a recipe for geopolitical failure that worries presidents, who prefer being thought of as winners. But it comforts everyone else in a system with its own internal logic. Spending money on weapons, selling those weapons to a captive client government and deploying them operationally whenever necessary in real, non-simulated wartime situations constitute a major factor of motivation for all parties concerned.

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      The beauty of it is that they can count on the US taxpayer to foot the bill. In the parlance of sports, the Middle East and now parts of Africa have become the equivalent of the expensive training facilities of a professional sports franchise motivated to push competition to its extreme and emerge as uncontested champions. Training can be carried on at all times and can endure decades, but when things get hot, these exotic locations also serve as the stadium itself, where the games are played and the scores tabulated.

      It took decades after World War II to build such a coherent system. For multiple reasons, however, this system is incompatible with the idea of democracy and the morality of a civilized society dedicated to the idea of human rights and responding to human needs. It is coherent to the extent that those who exercise power — in government, industry, the media and academe — share a common interest. The system provides them with the lifeline they need to maintain their activities. The problem is that the only parties left out and left holding the bag are… the people.

      Today’s economico-political situation reflects a “conditions-based approach.” The condition is that the interests that control the machine must never be forced to lose their control, because the result would be anarchy. And no civilized person — apart from the late anthropologist David Graeber — can seriously defend the idea of anarchy.

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Is the Long War Finally Ending?

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      In October 1944, with the end of World War II in sight, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin passed a note back and forth to each other at a conference in Moscow. On the piece of paper, Churchill had assigned percentages to several Eastern European countries. Stalin amended the numbers and Churchill agreed. The deal remained secret for nearly a decade.

      The percentages on the piece of paper referred to the amount of influence that the Soviet Union and the West would wield in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece, with the first three countries falling in the Soviet sphere, control divided evenly in Yugoslavia, and Greece staying in the Western camp. It was the first major articulation of the geopolitical “spheres of influence” that would characterize the Cold War era.

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      During the first post-war elections in Eastern Europe, communist and non-communist parties vied for power, eventually cobbling together different versions of coalition governments. Ultimately, however, the communist parties seized control, except in Greece, where the West intervened in a civil war to help defeat leftist insurgents. By 1948, the region looked very much like the agreement that Churchill and Stalin had drawn up.

      The Long War

      Today, the end of a much longer war appears to be approaching. The fighting in Afghanistan has lasted nearly two decades, the most protracted conflict the United States has ever endured. This war is, in turn, part of a much larger battle that has been variously described as “America’s endless wars,” the “war on terror” or simply the “long war” that began in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, though earlier skirmishes took place during the 1990s.

      The Biden administration is currently trying to negotiate a spheres-of-influence arrangement in Afghanistan that resembles what Churchill laid out in 1944. The American-backed government in Kabul, according to this proposal, would share power with the insurgent Taliban forces as an interim step until elections can be held under a new constitution.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Such a deal would make it easier for the United States to withdraw all of its 3,500 soldiers from Afghanistan by May 1, as laid out in a peace deal signed in 2020. Even if that withdrawal goes through, however, the institutional apparatus of the larger “long war” will still be operational. US forces remain in Iraq and Syria, and the Pentagon eyes the civil war in Libya with concern.

      In all, after drawdowns in Afghanistan and Iraq, about 50,000 US troops are stationed in the greater Middle East, with 7,000 mostly naval personnel in Bahrain, 13,000 soldiers in Kuwait and a roughly equal number in Qatar, 5,000 in the United Arab Emirates and several thousand in Saudi Arabia. US Special Forces are also scattered across Africa, while the United States is still conducting air operations throughout the region.

      But, as in 1944, the preliminary discussion of a power-sharing arrangement in Afghanistan suggests that the active phase of the “long war” is coming to an end. The specific US adversaries — al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and various smaller global actors — have more or less been defeated. Local groups that have battled US forces, like the Taliban, remain powerful, as do adversarial governments like Bashar al-Assad’s in Syria, but they don’t pose a threat to the US homeland. Larger geopolitical rivalries, with Russia and Iran in particular, continue to shape the conflicts in the region, but the US has already established an uneven pattern of engagement and containment with these actors.

      If history is to be replayed, the United States will wind down direct combat in favor of a tense cold war and intermittent “out-of-area” operations. The end of this “long war” against the architects of the 9/11 attacks and their supporters is long overdue. The Biden administration is eager to focus on “building back better” at home, enjoy a post-war economic expansion and beef up the US capacity to challenge China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. The administration is reassessing its military capabilities to reflect these priorities.

      All of this begs the question: Will it be possible to avoid repeating the 1945 scenario by ending the “long war” and not replacing it with a cold war?

      After promising to end the forever wars during the 2020 election campaign, President Joe Biden is eager to enjoy his own “mission accomplished” moment in Afghanistan. But that pledge comes with a couple asterisks.

      For one, Biden would like to maintain a “counterterrorism” force in Afghanistan with the permission of the Taliban. Such an agreement would parallel the arrangement in Iraq, where the government allows around 2,500 US troops to focus on suppressing any remnants of the Islamic State (as well as reining in Iran-backed paramilitaries). Second, Biden has in the past broached the possibility of moving US military bases from Afghanistan to Pakistan, where they would continue to serve their counterterrorism function. It’s not at all clear whether the Taliban or Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan would be enthusiastic about these options.

      At the moment, the United States is paying a relatively low price for its continued presence in Afghanistan. After last year’s peace deal, there haven’t been any US combat deaths in the country, which means that Afghanistan is basically absent from the hearts and minds of Americans. The US foreign policy community would like to preserve that status quo as long as possible, particularly given the post-withdrawal prospects of “ethnic cleansing, mass slaughter and the ultimate dismemberment of the country,” as Madiha Afzal and Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings have written. Similar arguments were made around the proposed withdrawal of the bulk of US troops from Iraq, and yet those worst-case scenarios haven’t come to pass.

      In recent days, the warnings about Afghanistan have increased. According to The New York Times:

      “American intelligence agencies have told the Biden administration that if U.S. troops leave before a power-sharing settlement is reached between the Taliban and the Afghan government, the country could fall largely under the control of the Taliban within two or three years after the withdrawal of international forces. That could potentially open the door for Al Qaeda to rebuild its strength within the country, according to American officials.”

      It doesn’t take an intelligence agency to predict that the Taliban will play a major role in any future Afghanistan, with or without a power-sharing settlement. The Taliban control about 20% of the country with as much as 85,000 full-time soldiers (though the areas under Taliban control are relatively underpopulated). At the same time, the insurgents are active over a much larger stretch — as much as 70% of the country — and are putting pressure on a number of key cities, including Kunduz in the north and Kandahar in the south.

      Embed from Getty Images

      In other words, there’s a good possibility that regardless of power-sharing arrangements, the Taliban will simply take over the country, much as the communists did throughout Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. Given the record of the Taliban’s last sojourn in power, the prospect of a reestablishment of their rule is very sobering.

      But the US has failed in two decades to defeat the Taliban with the full force of its military. Keeping a few thousand soldiers in the country is not going to change the balance of power on the ground. “The hawks argue that to leave Afghanistan is simply unthinkable until someday when they have finished winning the war,” writes Scott Horton in his new book, “Enough Already: Time to End the War on Terrorism.” “But they lost the war more than a decade ago, and no one who protested against Trump’s drawdown had a single coherent thing to say about how staying there is supposed to somehow change the reality of Taliban power in that country.”

      Won’t Afghanistan again become a safe haven for international terrorists once the US troops withdraw along with their NATO partners? For all their immersion in Islamic religion and culture, the Taliban are Pashtun nationalists interested above all in kicking out the foreigners. They’re not big fans of the Islamic State group, but they do maintain a close relationship at the moment with the 200-250 al-Qaeda militants in the country. Take NATO out of the equation, however, and that relationship will likely fray at the seams, particularly if international recognition, access to the global economy and the support of powerful neighbors like Russia and Iran depend on a verifiable divorce.

      When he proposed the two spheres of influence, Churchill was not relying on the goodwill of the Soviet state. The British leader hated Stalin and communism. He was taking a clear-eyed look at the balance of power at the time and striking what he thought was the best deal he could, even if that meant “losing” most of Eastern Europe. A power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban that “loses” Afghanistan is comparably pragmatic. But will it be accompanied by other, equally pragmatic policies to bring the long war to an end?

      The Rest of the War

      The “endless wars” are obviously not just being fought by the 3,500 troops in Afghanistan and 2,500 soldiers in Iraq. As the Bush administration transitioned to the Obama era and war fatigue began to set in, the United States shifted its focus from ground operations to an air war. In Afghanistan for instance, as the number of troops declined from a high of 100,000 in 2011, the number of airstrikes steadily increased, with a peak in terms of bombs dropped in 2018 and 2019 and a consequent rise in casualties. “The number of civilians killed by international airstrikes increased about 330 percent from 2016, the last full year of the Obama Administration, to 2019, the most recent year for which there is complete data from the United Nations,” reports Neta Crawford of the Costs of War project. Throughout the greater Middle East, the United States has launched in excess of 14,000 drone strikes, which have killed as many as 16,000 people, including several hundred children.

      Since taking office, as I note in my recent study of Biden’s take on multilateralism, the new administration has launched two airstrikes, one against Iranian targets in Syria on February 25 and the other in Iraq on February 9 against the Islamic State. The Syrian attack, in particular, has prompted a bipartisan effort in Congress to repeal the Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (passed in 1991 and 2002) in order to narrow the presidential ability to launch future airstrikes.

      Meanwhile, the administration has yet to report any drone strikes. This is in marked contrast to the strikes that Barack Obama and Donald Trump ordered almost immediately upon taking office as well as the escalation in attacks that took place in Trump’s final months. In one of its first orders, the Biden administration issued a temporary halt to any drone strikes outside of combat areas such as Afghanistan and Syria. As Charli Carpenter, an expert in the laws of war, points out:

      “Essentially what Biden is doing is he’s moving the barometer back to where it was before Trump devolved authority for drone strikes away from the executive branch and into the hands of commanders. What that means is that anytime a drone strike is envisioned, it needs to be approved by the White House. There’s going to be a much higher level of oversight and much more concern over the legal nuances of each strike. It will just make drones harder to use, and you can imagine the weaponized drones will only be used in the most extreme cases.”

      In addition to initiating a review of drone strikes, the administration has launched a probe into Special Forces operations to ascertain whether they have adhered to the Pentagon’s “law of war” requirements. In effect, the Biden administration is applying greater oversight across the range of military operations to bring them into closer compliance with international rules and regulations. Such oversight, however, does not imply the end of the endless wars.

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      For that to happen, the United States would have to dramatically shrink its global military footprint, the constellation of US bases around the world that serve as the launching pad for myriad operations. About 220,000 military and civilian personnel operate in more than 150 countries and over 800 overseas military bases. A significant chunk of the Pentagon’s $700 billion-plus budget goes toward maintaining this immense archipelago of force.

      In early February, the Biden administration also announced a Global Posture Review to assess the US. footprint. Such a review is much needed. After all, did this massive apparatus save a single one of the more than half a million Americans who have died from COVID-19? Is the Pentagon protecting the United States from climate change (or merely contributing to the problem with its own carbon emissions and its protection of overseas fossil fuel production and distribution)? And all that “forward-based defense” has done absolutely nothing to safeguard US infrastructure from cyberattacks like the SolarWinds hack (that, by the way, gained access to the emails of Trump’s cybersecurity team at the Department of Homeland Security).

      For the time being, the architects of the Global Posture Review are thinking primarily of refocusing “strategic capabilities” against China in the Far East and Russia in the Arctic. But that just replaces one set of threats with another, which will adjust the footprint without actually reducing it.

      So, let’s remember that the 3,500 American troops in Afghanistan are just the tip of the iceberg. For the United States to avoid the fate of the Titanic — also famous at one time for being immense and impregnable — it had better address the rest of the icy hazard of war.

      *[This article was originally published by FPIF.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      What an Afghan Peace Deal Could Look Like

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      In a recent interview with the BBC, President Ashraf Ghani insisted that the condition for peace in Afghanistan depends on the condition of the war. First, according to him, Afghan security forces need international support due to intensifying violence by armed groups, including the Taliban. Second, without addressing Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, the situation with the conflict will not change. “My message is those who provide sanctuaries to the Taliban should be talked very straight,” he said. “There’s so many fears of collapse into civil war.”

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      His message is for the Biden administration to have serious talks with officials in Pakistan, the Taliban’s main supporter. Ghani added that the only way he would leave the office to compromise for peace is via an election, while the Taliban does not yet recognize elections as a legitimate political mechanism. The Taliban want Ghani to resign and for Afghanistan’s political system to change back to their Islamic emirate of the 1990s or something similar to it.

      The Doha Deal

      Since the first round of the intra-Afghan peace talks in September 2020, violence in Afghanistan has intensified, while the negotiations resumed just last week after a six-month delay. The Doha deal, signed by the Taliban and the Trump administration early last year in Qatar, has failed to stop the violence in the country. Shortly after his inauguration in January 2021, US President Joe Biden launched a review of the Doha deal to determine whether the Taliban have upheld their commitments to cut ties with other militant groups and engage in meaningful peace talks with the Afghan government.

      Pakistan has urged the Biden administration to “persevere” with the Doha agreement and not attempt to amend it. The deal gave the Taliban the upper hand and undermined the Afghan government. The agreement excluded the Afghan government and allowed the Taliban to gain legitimacy, while also mandating that US and NATO troops leave the country within 14 months if militants uphold their end of the bargain. For Pakistan, while this is a step in the “right direction” for peace talks, as per Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, it also enhanced the Taliban’s position and made regime change in Kabul a real possibility.  

      Embed from Getty Images

      Although the war has a complicated domestic dimension, it is effectively a proxy conflict that Pakistan has waged against the Afghan government amidst perceived Indian influence in Afghanistan. From Pakistan’s point of view, Afghanistan has changed into an Indian playground and the Taliban are the only force that can secure Pakistani interests. As a result, the Afghan peace process also has a complicated regional dimension.  

      At the same time, the Taliban’s ideological system has proved to be inflexible for a democratic process that upholds citizens’ rights, leading to concerns about the Taliban seeking to build a new regime based on discrimination. Considering the strategic nature of proxy war, the history of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Taliban’s ideology, the following four scenarios are conceivable if the Biden administration underestimates the situation.

      Scenario 1: A Civil War Without the Government

      The Taliban insurgency has reduced the government’s territorial control, limiting it to urban cities and district centers. This has increased the likelihood of Taliban attacks on large cities.

      In the first scenario, the Taliban would seek to conquer and control through violence, leading to the collapse of the government and a descent into all-out civil war. In such a situation, the ground is prepared for mass atrocities due to ethnic tension, poverty and the presence of other militias, such as the Islamic State-Khorasan, an affiliate of ISIS. Just imagine the war affecting cities like the capital Kabul with millions of people. Political crises are rife in Afghanistan, which would be exacerbated by the early withdrawal of NATO forces. Therefore, the pullout of foreign troops according to the Doha agreement’s timetable is a cause for alarm. Under the deal, all US and NATO troops are scheduled to leave the country by May 1.

      This scenario is more likely to happen if the government is dismantled in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement between the Afghan officials and the Taliban. There are growing calls for Ghani to step down to pave the way for an interim government that includes the Taliban. However, an interim administration without the presence of a peace deal — one that includes mechanisms to ensure it is upheld — is risky. Such a scenario makes it hard to keep the Afghan security forces united if another round of violence erupts under an interim administration. This would be especially the case if the international community does not have a strategy for securing such a fragile peace arrangement.

      Scenario 2: A Civil War Despite the Government

      Another danger is that the withdrawal of US and NATO forces will take place without a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In this scenario, the government would not completely collapse if it mobilizes anti-Taliban forces and receives foreign support, but violence would spread from rural areas to populated cities.

      As a result, government officials would retreat to an area outside Kabul and continue their fight against militants as long as they have international recognition and receive support from foreign powers — possibly India, Russia and Iran. This situation is similar to what President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government faced in the 1990s amidst an insurgency by Taliban militants. That administration withdrew from Kabul but continued its role in the conflict and retained international backing.

      In the second scenario, the war takes on a local context, with violence in pockets around the country. In order to survive, the government would ally with local forces. The government would not have the ability to mount a viable challenge against the Taliban and other armed groups, and its role would largely be reduced to a symbolic one. At the same time, it would be extremely hard for the Taliban to conquer the whole country. Anti-Taliban forces — from the constituency of the old Northern Alliance — would still fight them.

      Scenario 3: Parallel Balance With the Government

      In the third scenario, the Taliban challenge the government through greater territorial control and contestation, but the government would not completely collapse. Instead, it would retain control of large cities and many other areas.

      An example of a parallel balance is Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the Shia organization has both political and military wings. In practice, however, the Taliban have already achieved this by controlling 75 of 405 districts in Afghanistan and contested another 189. As soon as a ceasefire is reached, as per this scenario, the political landscape of some districts under Taliban control and others under government authority would be officially recognized.

      Interestingly, both the government and the Taliban are not in favor of such a situation. The Taliban want complete control of Afghanistan, while the government wants the Taliban to be integrated into the current political system. Under this scenario, international assistance to the Afghan government could continue, but without Pakistan’s cooperation, nothing would change and the Taliban would push on with their insurgency. This scenario is likely if the US and other NATO members continue their support for the government.  

      Scenario 4: Maximum Balance From Within, But Without the Government

      In the final scenario, military and political pressure is exerted on the government to accept a fragile peace agreement that meets the Taliban’s demands. The Taliban impose their type of political system, which gives them religious legitimacy and allows them to influence other political and social forces. A peace deal under the Taliban’s terms would enable them to eventually take over — or have the upper hand in — the legislature and the judiciary system. Besides, the Taliban are estimated to have tens of thousands of fighters and, under such a peace deal, they would either join the security forces or remain armed as parallel forces ready to take action, if necessary.

      This scenario may seem like a soft conquest, but it could easily turn violent. The international community’s departure from Afghanistan and the unrealistic optimism about the Taliban’s ideological position and proxy relations may contribute to such a situation. Pakistan supports this version of a peace agreement to place the Taliban in Afghanistan’s polity to have a dominating position. This scenario is not acceptable for many people in Afghanistan and could create a fragile situation that would likely lead to violence at some point.

      Moving Forward for a Durable Peace

      A durable peace arrangement is only likely when both sides consider several key factors. These include what a possible peace agreement would look like, its implementation, what the future political system would involve and how citizens’ rights are ensured.

      First, there is a need to put pressure on Pakistan to take action against Taliban sanctuaries inside that country. At the very least, Pakistan must ensure there is a reduction in violence and that the Taliban are flexible when it negotiates with the Afghan government. Otherwise, it is hard to imagine a sustainable peace in the context of a proxy war. At the same time, Afghanistan should be neutral when it comes to regional politics, and its future should not depend on the rivalry between India and Pakistan.

      Second, a power-sharing process with the Taliban should be based on transparency. A peace agreement must be mutually agreed and include multiple stages of implementation and international monitoring. However, a power-sharing arrangement should be part of the peace agreement, not the other way around. The implementation of power-sharing before a peace agreement is highly risky and could lead to the collapse of the political order.

      Third, citizens’ and women’s rights and democratic legitimacy should be the basis of the future political system. Otherwise, in a country as diverse as Afghanistan, sustainable peace is not possible.

      Fourth, a political system that focuses on the separation of powers is necessary. Ensuring that political power is not concentrated in one party’s hands, such as the Taliban’s, would protect Afghanistan from the misuse of power.

      Therefore, to ensure peace in Afghanistan and the responsible withdrawal of foreign troops, it is crucial for the Biden administration to consider the implication of the war’s proxy dynamics on peacemaking efforts. When it comes to the domestic context, without considering the country’s sociopolitical diversity and citizens’ rights, it would be extremely hard to think about lasting peace.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Mike Pompeo’s Dismal Legacy

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      As the transition from Donald Trump to Joe Biden takes place, pundits have begun offering political obituaries of prominent personalities associated with the outgoing administration. Mike Pompeo, for example. At 57, his career may not be over, but there is a sense in which, were it to be revived on the national stage, the nation …
      Continue Reading “Mike Pompeo’s Dismal Legacy”
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      12 Years After Mumbai, the Fight Against Terrorism Continues

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      The 12th anniversary of the November 26, 2008, Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks in Mumbai is an apt occasion to evaluate not only India’s struggle against terrorism but also how other major countries have dealt with this menace.

      Nine gunmen traveled from Karachi to Mumbai by boat to unleash mayhem over the course of three days. They attacked multiple locations, killing 164 people and wounding more than 300. Iconic locations such as the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel next to the Gateway of India, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (earlier known as Victoria Terminus) and the Leopold Cafe were hit. The attacks paralyzed the city, triggered mass panic and caused the collapse of India’s booming stock market.

      Cat-and-Mouse Game

      India absorbed the monstrous nature of the Mumbai attacks and resumed direct political dialogue with Pakistan in July 2009. India even agreed to make a major political concession: It delinked the dialogue from the issue of terrorism in the hope that the two countries could have a free, frank and uninterrupted conversation. Pakistan treated this as a political victory at India’s expense. Instead of initiating a process of normalizing ties with India, Pakistan continued with its policy of supporting jihadi groups dedicated to launching terror attacks in neighboring countries.

      India’s policy was based on the assumption that Pakistan would realize the internal cost of nurturing jihadi groups on its soil. Like Frankenstein, terrorists have turned on Pakistan itself. In 2013, an explosion killed at least 45 people in a Shia district of Karachi, and the 2014 Peshawar school massacre led to 150 deaths, of which at least 134 were students. These are just two of the many such incidents that have been taking place in Pakistan over the past decade.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Yet Pakistani support for terror as an instrument of state policy has continued. India has thus reverted to its position of putting terrorism at the center of any India-Pakistan dialogue. Pakistan refuses to accept India’s position. Instead, it wants dialogue on Kashmir and uses terror as a tactic to wage war against India for this territory.

      Pakistan-sponsored attacks against India have continued unabated. Most recently, on November 20, four suspected terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammad, a jihadist group headquartered in Pakistan, waged a three-hour-long gun battle with the police on the Jammu-Srinagar national highway. They had entered India to disrupt local elections in Kashmir. Reportedly, they were planning a spectacular attack to commemorate the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

      India-Pakistan relations continue to be in a stalemate on the issue of terrorism. In a cat-and-mouse game, Pakistan promotes terrorist attacks while India prevents them. Since 2019, one thing has changed. After the 2019 Pulwama attack that killed 40 paramilitary personnel, India conducted airstrikes on Pakistani territory. For the first time since the 1971 war, India crossed the line of control, the de facto India-Pakistan border in Jammu and Kashmir. The airstrikes demonstrated that India is no longer deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear capability. If Pakistan instigates a major terrorist attack on Indian soil, New Delhi has shown to be willing to take limited military action in retaliation.

      An Increasingly Extremist Society

      Even as Pakistan continues to promote terrorism across the border, its society has become increasingly extremist. In 2012, the German news agency Deutsche Welle analyzed the rise in extremism in Pakistani society. Many see cultural plurality as un-Islamic. Arabization is on the rise. Numerous jihadist and terrorist organizations operate freely in the country. This trend taking place in a nuclear state is and should be a matter of great international concern.

      Pakistan now exports terror not only to India and Afghanistan, but also to other countries. As per the European Foundation for South Asian Studies, there is an “unholy alliance” between Pakistan’s army and terrorism. Islamic extremists from Pakistan or of Pakistani origin have been involved in many terrorist attacks in other countries. In September, the main suspect for a knife attack outside the former Paris offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo was of Pakistani origin.

      Most recently, street protests have erupted in Pakistan against French President Emmanuel Macron after he claimed that Islam is in crisis following the beheading of schoolteacher Samuel Paty, killed by a Chechen refugee disgruntled over Paty’s discussion of the controversial Charlie Hebdo cartoons during a civic education class. Protesters burned a defaced image of Macron and the French flag outside the French consulate in Karachi. Many sought the expulsion of the French ambassador and demanded that Pakistan break off diplomatic ties with France.

      Pakistan has taken great umbrage at Macron’s actions to curb Islamic extremism. Pakistani leaders object to France’s insistence that Muslim leaders agree to a “charter of republican values,” reject political Islam and foreign interference. Shireen Mazari, Pakistan’s human rights minister, tweeted: “Macron is doing to Muslims what the Nazis did to the Jews — Muslim children will get ID numbers (other children won’t) just as Jews were forced to wear the yellow star on their clothing for identification.” After French protestations, she withdrew her comments, but the damage was done.

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      In October, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global terror financing watchdog, put Pakistan on its grey list for its failure to “effectively crackdown on means of financing terror activities.” The FATF found “strategic deficiencies in [Pakistan’s] regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.”

      To improve its international image, Pakistan has taken some judicial action against the masterminds of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Hafiz Saeed, one of the founders of Lashkar-e-Taiba and the leader of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, two notorious jihadist organizations, has been convicted on charges of terror financing. As Pakistan’s leading English newspaper Dawn observed, the conviction came “as Pakistan tries to avoid punitive blacklisting” by FATF. Given Pakistan’s incestuous relationship with the likes of Saeed, he might get off lightly after an appeal once Pakistan has escaped censure from the FATF.

      The big international concern is that the Pakistani establishment continues to aid and abet terrorism. There has been no fundamental change in either policy or actions. In fact, Islamabad’s ratcheting up of its rhetoric on Macron is alarming because it is accompanied by “rising religious intolerance at home.”

      Nelson’s Eye

      Despite the fact that six Americans were killed in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the US has been relatively soft on Pakistan. For decades, Islamabad was a Cold War ally. The US and Saudi Arabia funded the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet Union through Pakistan. These led to close ties between the American and Pakistani establishments. Of late, these ties have been weakening and Washington has been inching closer to New Delhi.

      In the most recent joint statement, India and the US have called “for concerted action against all terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.” They have also asked “Pakistan to take immediate, sustained and irreversible action to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks, and to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators and planners of all such attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai, Uri, and Pathankot.”

      While this statement might give diplomatic satisfaction to India, it is important to remember that Saeed was able to freely address public rallies in Pakistan despite the US putting a bounty of $10 million on his head. The US could not, or did not, put Pakistan on the mat for failure to act against the Haqqani Network, responsible for inflicting casualties on US soldiers in Afghanistan.

      The US has imposed the most draconian sanctions on Iran and has not spared a powerful nuclear state like Russia. Yet it has hesitated to impose serious sanctions on Pakistan, giving, unconvincingly, its nuclear status as one of the excuses. The limited military and economic sanctions the US has imposed on Pakistan are neutralized by Islamabad’s ever-increasing economic and military links with China. In any case, despite the FATF proceedings against Pakistan, the country has obtained yet another bailout from the International Monetary Fund.

      The US has turned Nelson’s eye on Pakistan’s promotion of terror because it needs the country’s assistance to retreat from Afghanistan. The war on terror has not quite succeeded. Like the UK and the Soviet Union, the US is worn out after nearly two decades on the ground in Afghanistan. It needs to save face and avoid the impression of total defeat. It is willing to negotiate with the Taliban even as the armed group continues to commit horrific acts of terror against innocent Afghans. A report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction showed a 50% increase in attacks over the past three months alone, with the UN estimating that some 6,000 civilians have died in the violence in the first nine months of 2020.

      India’s Unique Vulnerability to Terror

      As the US makes peace with the Taliban, India’s problems with Pakistan-sponsored terror are likely to grow. Even Russia has opened a “channel to the Taliban,” a historic sworn enemy. The Taliban leadership is demonstrating diplomatic savvy by negotiating their way back to power. This leadership might appear relatively urbane, but the Taliban rank and file continue to be fanatics. They now believe they have defeated two superpowers thanks to their faith in Islam.

      Once the Taliban win power, they will impose their obscurantist ideology. This will embolden extremists in Pakistan. Lest we forget, an Indian plane hijacked by terrorists landed in Kandahar in 1999. India released terrorists to bring back hostages. One of the terrorists was Masood Azhar. He went on to start Jaish-e-Muhammad, responsible for the deaths of hundreds over the years. Azhar is to India what Osama bin Laden was to the US. He got his initial training in Afghanistan, and many more like him are likely to receive similar training once the Taliban are firmly back in the saddle.

      While the Taliban might not engage in direct terrorism against the US, India would be fair game. Pakistan would promote Taliban efforts, and China would ignore, if not abet, them. For a decade, China opposed resolutions in the United Nations Security Council to designate Azhar as an international terrorist, leading Michael Kugelman, a noted South Asia analyst, to call him “China’s favorite terrorist.” China has become a loyal ally of Pakistan and lauds Islamabad’s fight against international terrorism even as its junior ally stays deafeningly silent on the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. As India and China clash, an increase in terror attacks on Indian soil would serve Chinese interests. Pakistan and the Taliban are likely to oblige.

      Attacks across Europe and elsewhere demonstrate that India is not alone in facing the scourge of terrorism. As we mark the 12th anniversary of the Mumbai attacks, India’s 1996 proposal for a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism is more relevant than ever. The world needs to increase security, boost peace and safeguard the lives of innocents.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      No Clear Vision to End Violence in Afghanistan

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      Afghanistan has been engulfed in bloodshed and confusion for decades. The deal between the United States and the Taliban signed on February 29 in Doha, Qatar, has added more tension to the conflict by creating competition among anti-government militants. Groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) compete with the Taliban for political success and influence by perpetrating more violence. At the same time, they look to each other’s success as a source of inspiration and cooperation.

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      On November 2, Afghanistan was shocked by an attack on Kabul University that killed 35 students and wounded 50; officially, the death toll stands at 22, with 27 wounded. It was the latest of the many attacks on the country’s educational institutions. On October 24, a suicide bomber targeted the Kawsar-e Danish education center in western Kabul, killing at least 43 and wounding a further 57. In August 2018, another suicide attack in western Kabul on the Mawud tutoring center, which, like Kawsar-e Danish, was located in a Shai-dominated area, killed at least 48 and wounded 60. The victims at both schools were under the age of 20, some of them were as young as 14.

      Who Killed the Students?

      Due to the highly complex environment, survival for the people of Afghanistan is just a matter of chance. Sajjad Nijati was wounded in the attack on Kabul University. He is also one of the survivors of the attack on the Mawud education center. He has lost three of his family members in the attack on Kawsar-e Danish.

      ISK claimed responsibility for all three attacks, while the Taliban denied any connection. However, the Taliban attack on the American University of Afghanistan in August 2016 killed 14 and wounded 35, again mostly students. The attacks on Kawsar-e Danish and Mawud were mainly against the Shia Hazaras, a historically persecuted group that has invested in education as a strategy to break the cycle of its precarious position inside Afghanistan. Shamsea Alizada, a survivor of the attack on Mawud, topped the country’s national university tables by achieving the highest score out of nearly 200,000 students this year. When the attack happened, she was 15 and could have lost her life like many of her friends.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The day after the university attack, students protested and carried slogans against the Islamic State and the Taliban that read “Don’t kill us.” All in all, 13 people have been detained for their failure to prevent the attack, including the security commander of Kabul University and the district chief of police. However, Vice President Ambrulah Saleh reversed the decision arguing that the problem is systematic and needs broader attention. It is still unclear whether those arrested have been released.

      The question remains unanswered as to how the three gunmen entered the university campus. Kabul University has three main gates that are blocked by police checkpoints. The terrorists entered from the north gate, which is usually overseen by a large number of police officers who check all visitors’ IDs. With no sign of an explosion at the gate, Saleh, hours after the attack, called it an “intelligence failure.”

      Research shows that Afghan universities have been exposed to extremism in recent years and have become fertile ground for recruitment for groups like ISK and the Taliban; in July 2019, Afghan security agencies arrested three ISK recruiters at Kabul University. On November 14, Vice President Saleh announced that security forces have arrested the mastermind behind the attack on Kabul University. According to Saleh, Adel Mohammad was recruited by the Haqqani Network, a branch of the Taliban based in Miramshah, Pakistan, and had gone missing three years ago after completing his third year at Kabul University’s faculty of sharia law.

      Proxy War, Terrorism, Confusion

      In their peace deal with the US, the Taliban agreed to stop bombing urban centers and cut ties with other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. However, according to the US special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, attacks by the Taliban have increased by 50% in the past three months, to at least 55 attacks per day around the country. Since the official inauguration of the intra-Afghan talks in Qatar on September 12, the has been no reduction in civilian casualties. The Taliban use military operations as a bargaining chip in the talks, which has increased concerns about the group establishing a totalitarian and discriminatory regime in the country if it comes to power as a result of the negotiations.

      The frequently reported links between the Taliban and al-Qaeda remain another concern. Last month, Afghan security forces killed a senior al-Qaeda leader in Ghazni province in areas controlled by the Taliban. Another al-Qaeda member was killed in a Taliban-influenced area in Farah province, in the west. Research also shows that there has been cooperation — as well as clashes — between the Taliban and ISK in the past.

      Many in Afghanistan view the Taliban as responsible for hosting and cooperating with various terrorist groups. The continued war by the Taliban has severely undermined Afghanistan’s political stability, economic development and security. This has weakened the government’s functionality and territorial control, opening the door for other militant groups such as ISK. Both ISK and the Taliban have similar ideological positions toward secular education, and the situation on the ground today makes it clear that the war has turned into a deliberate strategy of indiscriminate violence against education centers and youth in the country.

      There are three theories about recent urban attacks in Afghanistan. The first is that the Taliban organize the attacks but deny responsibility to benefit from the chaos and backlash against the government, which allows ISK to claim responsibility. Vice President Saleh claimed that the ISK claiming the attack on Kabul University was fake. Saleh pointed to a Taliban flag apparently found at the scene as evidence of Taliban involvement. According to the vice president, the weapons found at the scene do not match those in photos released by ISK. The Taliban, however, rejects these claims.

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      The second theory is that the Haqqani Network, a branch of the Taliban close to Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), is carrying out attacks in urban areas. Some experts argue there is a disagreement between the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network branches. Therefore, without Quetta Shura’s approval, the Haqqani Network attack on urban areas but under the ISK name; since the appearance of ISK, the Haqqani Network did not claim most of the bigger urban attacks, with ISK taking responsibility instead. According to this theory, the main actor behind terrorist activity in Afghanistan is the Haqqani Network rather than ISK. It has been argued that the Haqqani Network has strong links and levels of cooperation not just with the ISI, but also al-Qaeda and ISK. Those who believe in this theory argue that there is a close relationship between the Haqqani Network and ISK.

      The third theory is that the ISK organizes urban attacks independently, such as the one on Kabul University. According to this analysis, ISK today has more influence in urban areas. At the moment, however, this argument does not have many supporters among experts and Afghan security officials. From the Afghan government’s point of view, ISK is a platform for Pakistan’s clandestine activities, where ISK is an umbrella for many actors including the Haqqani Network and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) for attacking targets in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, believes that ISK is supported by the same forces in Pakistan that back the Haqqani Network.

      Death by a Thousand Cuts

      The conflict in Afghanistan doesn’t have a single dimension. It is a combination of proxy wars and terrorism. The proxy dimension of the war since the 1980s produced countless intended and unintended consequences such as state fragility, terrorism, sectarianism, war crimes, social fragmentation and radicalization. Kabul University has found itself at the center of this strife over the four decades of war. In late 1983, a bomb was placed under a dining room table at the university, killing many. Later on, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, who was leading the Afghan Bureau of ISI at the time, revealed in his memoir that the attack was part of Pakistan’s strategy of “death by thousand cuts.”

      This specter of history is fresh in Afghanistan’s collective memory. Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan enabled the group to intensify the conflict. The complicated links and cooperation between the Taliban, ISK and al-Qaeda make it difficult to believe that they did not join forces to target educational institutions and carry out assassinations. At the same time, contextualizing the war in Afghanistan by considering the long history of cooperation between militant groups and the intelligence services in the region make the proxy dynamic of the war more apparent.

      With mistakes made on all sides, especially by the Trump administration in Washington, created both inspiration and hope for many extremist groups in the region. Particularly, the US-Taliban deal turned the country into a playground for various extremist groups and their supporters trying to either outdo each other or build tactical collaboration to defeat the Afghan government. Even Pakistani extremist groups have called upon the Afghan government to surrender to the Taliban.

      These groups are trying to build leverage through violence and claiming the honor of resisting the US and its partners. They are fighting to create frustration and chaos in order to expand their operational reach and lethality, thereby creating transnational inspiration for the movement. Unless there is a policy change to effectively deal with this threat, there is no clear vision for ending all this violence.

      *[Correction: An earlier version of this article stated that the attack on Kawsar-e Danish killed 24 people. This piece was updated at 17:50 GMT.]

      *[The author is one of the investigators on the Carnegie Corporation of New York-funded project “Assessing the impact of external actors in the Syria and Afghan proxy wars” (Grant number: G-18-55949) at Deakin University, Australia.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Can the Taliban and the Afghan Government Make Peace?

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      Having harbored al-Qaeda militants, the Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 was toppled by the US following the 9/11 attacks in the US. In 2003, the Taliban reorganized and began their insurgency against the Afghan government and NATO forces. Since then, despite national and international efforts to negotiate a peace settlement, the insurgency has continued. As a result, Afghanistan has faced years of instability and violence.

      In late 2018, Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed by Washington as the US special envoy to Afghanistan in a bid to strike a deal with the Taliban, which was signed on February 29, 2020, in Qatar. Under this agreement, peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban should have started at the beginning of March.

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      Yet after months of political wrangling, the negotiations will begin in September, according to Afghan officials. The US-Taliban deal states that prisoners on both sides should be released before the intra-Afghan peace talks commence, including 5,000 for the Taliban and 1,000 for the Afghan government. This has proved to be a contentious issue.

      The Afghan peace talks are to start soon, but one thing is clear: The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan cannot be easily reconciled with the government’s Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Hence, with a number of sticking points, including a permanent ceasefire or a significant reduction in violence, peace talks will be extremely strenuous.

      Both sides have been at a stalemate. The main reasons for this are conflicting positions between the Taliban and the government. The Afghan government has taken an intransigent view regarding the republic system. It has called it a “red line” that cannot be negotiated, though it has made some concessions since the US-Taliban peace talks began. The Taliban have always focused on reinstating an Islamic emirate, often vaguely calling it an “Islamic system” that should be harmonious with Afghan cultural values.

      In particular, there are three main areas of contention for both parties.

      The Constitution

      First, the negotiations could focus on either the revocation or amendment of the Afghan Constitution, which conflicts with the Taliban’s goal of an Islamic emirate. While the current constitution guarantees equal rights for all Afghan males and females, the Taliban sternly deny gender equality as well as other basic human rights.

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      This is why, in their Moscow statement of February 2019, the Taliban called Afghanistan’s current constitutional law un-Islamic, urging for a new constitution based on “Islamic tenets.” The existing constitution of Afghanistan is believed to be one of the most liberal Islamic constitutions in the region, and the Taliban want to Islamize it based on their extreme interpretation of Islam.

      By Islamization, the Taliban would likely centralize power in the hands of one man — the group’s leader — who would have ultimate control as the head of state. He would handpick members of an Islamic council that would serve as the legislative body. The constitution of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which was drafted in three days in 1998 by 500 clerics, is a case in point of what governance by the Taliban looks like.

      Elections

      Second, according to Article 61 of the current constitution, the president can only be elected by the people. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, a staunch supporter of the existing political system, has repeatedly said that the government will decisively defend the constitution based on the “republic system.”

      In this system, the head of state and other elected bodies are elected directly by the people. Article 4 of the constitution explicitly says that national “sovereignty in Afghanistan shall belong to the nation, manifested directly and through its elected representatives.” Afghanistan has held elections as a feature of democracy since the fall of the Taliban, including four presidential and three parliamentary elections. 

      In contrast, in the Taliban system based on sharia law, legitimacy comes from the decision of an exclusive, small group of religious elites. That is why the Taliban have continuously opposed elections in Afghanistan. Taliban militants have repeatedly carried out attacks around election time, including in 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019. The aims of such assaults were to disrupt the elections, undermine the government and, ultimately, to taint the legitimacy of the outcome of these votes.

      More importantly, democratic decision-making is an alien concept to the Taliban as a movement. For instance, the founder of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omar, declared himself as the leader in 1994. Similarly, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor and Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the successors to Omar, were both appointed by members of the supreme council.

      Many Taliban members have also expressly rejected elections as a means of choosing a government. In 2018, a senior member of Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s leadership council, flatly rejected elections. Referring to the shura, he said that the leadership of a government should be selected by a supreme council because “elections are not according” to sharia law. Likewise, Jalaluddin Shinwari, the former deputy minister of justice under the Taliban regime of the 1990s, said in 2019 that the “Taliban will not accept elections.” The group has asked the US to return power to them and to accept the Taliban’s emirate.

      However, aside from the theological argument of opposing elections, the Taliban’s biggest fear in this process stems from the uncertain outcome of allowing the people to choose. The Taliban’s odds of winning and eventually returning to power are extremely slim. Therefore, the group is likely to make every effort in the Afghan peace talks to win power as long as they do not involve elections.

      Human Rights

      Third, human rights are of the utmost importance when examining the Taliban. Respect and the protection of individual rights supported by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are fundamental elements of a democratic system. Article 7 of the current Afghan Constitution assures respect for human rights. Likewise, Article 22 guarantees equal rights for all Afghans before the law, irrespective of their gender, ethnicity or religion.

      Conversely, the Taliban are strongly opposed to respecting such universally accepted values and rights. They have never shown flexibility to accept a democratic and republican state, which values human rights. Rather, the Taliban have steadfastly reiterated their intent to reinstall an Islamic emirate that will respect human rights under their model of an “Islamic framework.” As per the Taliban‘s ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam, this would be incompatible with a democratic state’s human rights values.  

      To cite just a few examples, the Taliban have been notorious for their hostility and discriminatory policies toward ethnic and religious minorities and women. When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, they committed massacres against Hazaras in Mazari Sharif and Bamyan, slaughtering hundreds of civilians, including women and children. This attitude remains unchanged. 

      Similarly, under Taliban rule, Sikh minorities in Afghanistan were required to hang a yellow cloth on their rooftops and, in particular, Sikh women had to wear yellow cloths in public to identify themselves. Likewise, when they captured Kabul in 1996, the Taliban forbade girls and women from attending school and going to work, except in rare cases as medical staff with strict conditions. 

      Finally, the Taliban’s Dastur (draft constitution) stipulates that the amir al-mumineen, an Arabic term that means commander of the faithful, “must be a male Muslim follower of the Hanafi Islamic jurisprudence” — referring to a Sunni Muslim school of thought. The Taliban originally reserved this title for Mullah Omar.

      Though the matter of Dastur seems to be missing from the current discourse of the movement, the patriarchal nature of the Taliban still holds true, not only for the head of the state but also for other key positions. By only allowing a man to hold the role of head of state, the Taliban’s system of governance discriminates against women and members of other faiths — including Muslims of different Islamic sects — both of which are conflict with basic principles of human rights.  

      Despite claims by the Taliban and speculation by some researchers, the group’s general values have not changed. For example, in Taliban-controlled areas of today, women who wish to work or get an education are forced to do so under stringent conditions. In reality, this deprives women of the right to education and work as they are likely to be reluctant to attend a school or get a job.  

      Will the Afghan Peace Talks Work?

      The evidence so far suggests that both the Taliban and the Afghan government have shown some flexibility in agreeing to talks. Yet the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remain incompatible. Both forms of governance negate each other. Unless the two sides accept considerable concessions in their positions, the possibility of reconciliation appears slim. This is particularly applicable to the Taliban.

      If the Taliban wish to smoothly reintegrate into society, they will have to adapt their policy about the governance system to a society that is very different from what they saw in the late 1990s. If they do not give in to the will of the new Afghan society of today, the group will face the resistance of Afghans who have sacrificed a lot over the last 19 years. Moreover, the chance of overthrowing the Western-backed Afghan government — if that is still the Taliban’s goal — seems far less than possible. 

      As a nation marred by violent conflict for decades, Afghanistan is highly dependent on international aid and assistance. Therefore, as the intra-Afghan talks begin, the Taliban have no option but to change their restrictive position with regard to holding free and fair elections and upholding human rights and other critical issues protected by the current constitution.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More