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    Democracy is Now Dangerously Fracturing in Lebanon

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      Austerity for the Poor and Prosperity for the Rich

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      There has been a growing interest in social protection policies in the Arab region dating back to the 1990s. Yet the impact of such measures has not been empirically and independently assessed. Evidence shows that, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the poor have been getting poorer and the number of vulnerable groups and people living below the poverty line is increasing.

      Poverty rates have risen throughout a decade of turmoil. This started with the Arab Spring in 2010-11 and intensified when the pandemic began in 2020. The situation is worse in Arab countries where there is ongoing conflict, economic hardship or political crises. These indicators of rising poverty mean the effectiveness of the social protection policies in the region must be placed under critical examination.

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      The Arab Mashreq is a case in point. This region, which consists of Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and, in some definitions, Egypt, has been marred by prolonged conflict, economic turmoil and political upheaval. In response to the crises, there has been an added focus on people’s resilience mechanisms to cope with the socioeconomic uncertainty.

      From Economic Reforms to the COVID Crisis

      Since 2015, many Arab governments have introduced financial and economic reform policies, supported by the International Monetary Fund. However, in the absence of effective social protection policies, these changes led to a sharp increase in inflation. This exacerbated the hardship of the poor, caused negative repercussions for people’s living conditions and led to further structural social stratification. The negative impact on the poor was accompanied by a political narrative of austerity for a better future. Simultaneously, generous policies were introduced for the upper class.

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      The policy response in Mashreq countries to the pandemic was not an exception from this inequality paradigm. The poor have been excluded in the design of policy responses. The fragile health sectors and the coverage gap of medical insurance generated an association between appropriate recovery and the upper class. Accordingly, access to quality care was exclusively for the rich. On the other hand, the poor had to rely on public health, which is often underfunded, understaffed and lacks sufficient resources.

      In addition, government support in the form of loans and financial subsidies to recover from the economic fallout of the pandemic was directed exclusively at big businesses. This led to the shutdown of many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and caused unemployment to rise in all Mashreq countries.

      Moreover, refugees and internally displaced people were left behind in the policy response. Instead of prioritizing their needs as vulnerable people, they faced restrictions on moving out from overcrowded camps due to the lockdown measures, which exacerbated their plight. In particular, they suffered from a lack of access to health services and malnutrition.

      Resilience Mechanisms

      In the Mashreq, people have used different coping and resilience mechanisms throughout the pandemic. Yet defining what appears to be the relatively simple concept of resilience is complex. Resilience is a term that has been applied to research and practice in nearly every possible area of life and academia — from science to sociology, psychology, nursing and medicine to business and ecology. The theoretical definition of resilience is “one’s ability to bounce back or recover from adversity.” Research on coping with poverty emphasizes the importance of resilience mechanisms to be considered in the design, development and implementation of social protection policies for the prevention of risks associated with irrational resilience mechanisms.

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      Some resilience mechanisms in Arab Mashreq countries are constructive. For instance, there has been a rise in transnational family support, including remittances, and a revival in the agricultural sector due to food shortages. Dual-earner households have also increased as more women are joining the labor force. Yet the majority of reported resilience mechanisms are destructive. Seven areas are particularly important.

      First, reports show increasing numbers of children who have ab­stained from going to school or dropped out altogether, often due to rampant poverty. In recent years, economic reform policies have included a sharp reduction of fuel, electricity and water subsidies. This has led to higher living costs. In response, children have been forced to work to earn money and contribute to the family income. The pandemic has made the situation even bleaker with the new educational setup, as not everyone has access to computers or the internet. The lack of technological infrastructure has meant the poor are excluded from the online classes introduced by lockdowns.  

      Second, even before the pandemic, leftover or used food markets emerged in countries such as Jordan and Egypt. At these places, the poor can buy food at reduced prices. These markets, which sell scraps of food, have become increasingly common in areas with people on low incomes. Often, the remains of meals from restaurants and hotels are offered to families at a discounted rate, with many food items unpackaged and no information as to where or when they were made. Some customers have said that no matter the quality, they are in need of the low prices as they cannot afford to buy other food products.

      Third, the cut in subsidies and rising food prices have not only affected the poor. Many middle-class people cannot afford quality food due to the increase in prices and their depleted family savings. This has been exacerbated by economic hardship and the pandemic. This is particularly the case in Lebanon, where the lira (or pound) has lost most of its value, leading to higher costs of living. Lebanese people are reportedly cutting out meat from their diets or skipping meals. In Iraq, throughout the COVID-19 crisis, people have been forced to sell their furniture and personal items, just for the sake of buying food. Many Iraqis have lost jobs and the country lacks social protection measures.  

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      Fourth, in response to the rising prices of medicine in the region, people have turned to traditional medicine and herbal remedies instead. For instance, due to the loss of more than 90% of the Lebanese pound’s value, there has been a shortage of essential medicines. The catalyst behind this was the ongoing national economic crisis in Lebanon and the state measures on lifting subsidies on medicine. Pharmacies often lack basic medications for blood pressure and even painkillers and antibiotics.

      Fifth, to cope with poverty, mothers are joining the informal sector in order to have dual-earner families. Daughters have also joined the workforce. But the problem is that this sector is not covered by any social protection schemes, which means that families struggled during the height of lockdowns to curb the spread of COVID-19.

      Sixth, the unprecedented rise in food prices has led some of the poor to buy their daily needs of food products via the postpaid system, or the so-called popular “note.” This system, known as shokok, is based on mutual trust between grocery store owners and residents in poor areas. As part of shokok, a shop owner archives either daily or weekly the merchant records of customer withdrawals on a note before collecting the cash at the end of each month.

      Seventh, the United Nations and several media outlets have reported increased rates of crimes, drug abuse, robberies and rising cases of suicide as some people struggle to cope with poverty and hardship.

      In light of these resilience mechanisms, social protection systems have to be rethought in Arab Mashreq countries. When left behind, most vulnerable people generate their own forms of resilience, which might be destructive. To a major extent, the policy response is designed for the poor to fund the rich. However, the unmet needs of the poor are not only affecting their wellbeing negatively, but it will also impact the state in the long term.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is Lebanon at Risk in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?

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      Media attention has focused on the loss of life and property in the bombardment of Gaza, the domestic skirmishes between Jewish and Arab Israelis, and Hamas’ rocket attacks on Israel. Yet there are unique implications for Palestinian communities in Lebanon, too.

      In Lebanon, more than 470,000 Palestinians are registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Of this number, around 180,000 currently seek refuge inside the country. Most of these Palestinians are descendants of refugees from the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. In addition, Lebanon hosts a further 27,700 Palestinian refugees who had lived in Syria but fled that country after a civil war erupted in 2011. According to unofficial estimates, there were already 250,000 Palestinians in Lebanon and another 53,000 who arrived from Syria.

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      If fighting between the Israelis and Palestinians were to resume after the brokering of the current ceasefire, and if violence spread to northern Israel, adjacent to the Lebanese border, there is the potential for a new Palestinian exodus to neighboring countries. Yet in Lebanon, one of the taboo topics among the political elites is an open dialogue about the country’s responsibility toward Palestinian refugees. This is rooted in two historical facts: First, the existence of Palestinian camps in Lebanon as a state within a state, having their own community rules and norms, and second, the vivid memories of the role Palestinians played in the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1990 and subsequent agreements that enshrined their extra-legal status.

      Second-Class Residents in Lebanon

      The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) recently published a policy brief titled, “Legal Limbo: Who is a Refugee in Lebanon?” According to the LCPS, Lebanese “authorities have been unwilling to recognize … [the] refugee status [of Palestinians] or carry out their responsibilities in providing them with key rights.” Lebanon refuses to acknowledge their status because it would entitle Palestinians to certain rights under international law, such as freedom of movement, health care and education. The paper states that “the Lebanese government insists that Lebanon is not a country of asylum, and provides refugees with limited protection space and rights. … [Palestinians] are among the most deprived communities in Lebanon: They face poor living and housing conditions, high unemployment, restrictions from exercising 39 liberal and syndicated professions, restrictions on property ownership, and limited access to public services.”

      Some fortunate Palestinians in Lebanon have been able to surreptitiously own businesses fronted by Lebanese companies, while others have found specialized employment as a result of their educational credentials. But the reality remains that Palestinians are second-class residents in Lebanon with restricted rights. Their only available employment options are limited to guest worker status in construction, agriculture, domestic services and similar low-paid jobs that Lebanese citizens have been reluctant to perform. Generally, Palestinians have double the poverty level and unemployment of the Lebanese.

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      For decades, Lebanese leaders have insisted that recognizing Palestinians as refugees would impose enormous costs on Lebanon. They argue that doing so could lead to consequences that would upset the sectarian balance that is the basis of the government; political offices in Lebanon are split among the country’s three biggest communities — Christian, Shia and Sunni.

      In the 1950s and 1960s, around 50,000 Christian Palestinians were given Lebanese citizenship. In the 1990s, about 60,000 mostly Shia Muslims received Lebanese nationality. This resulted in an uproar by Lebanese Maronites, which led to citizenship being given to “mainly Christian Palestinians.” The majority of the remaining stateless Palestinians are Sunnis. If they were to be given citizenship, Lebanese authorities “fear that integration of so many Sunnis would upset the country’s precarious sectarian” makeup, posing challenging questions.

      Lebanon is not a signatory to most international protocols extending protections to refugee populations. The Lebanese Constitution was amended after the civil war to explicitly state, “There shall be no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no fragmentation, partition, or settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon.” This was done to make clear that any resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon would violate the constitution.

      More Refugees

      This question becomes relevant in light of the reality that the latest Gaza conflict between Israel and Hamas may reach the West Bank. Such a scenario would lead to more Palestinian refugees and the possibility of fighting spreading to the north of Israel.

      Under international law, there are three durable solutions for refugees: voluntary repatriation, resettlement and local integration. Voluntary repatriation, referred to as the “right of return,” is anathema to Israelis who cannot consider even a fraction of Palestinian refugees and their descendants attempting to reclaim property they owned before 1948 but now largely occupied by Israelis. Resettlement refers to third-country placement, which has seen Palestinians emigrating to Europe, Gulf Arab states, the US and other destinations where quotas for refugees are recently being curtailed.

      Local integration would require Lebanon to follow Jordan’s example and allow Palestinians, over time, to acquire citizenship and the rights entitled to them. This is further complicated by the fact that under the UN Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone has the right to see and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Since that document is a reference point in the preamble to the Lebanese Constitution, it can then be argued that the right to seek asylum in Lebanon is a constitutional right.

      So, the outcome of this latest conflict has consequences for Lebanon, even though there were no cross-border provocations that the Israelis may deem acts of war — yet. It is not inconceivable that Israel may turn to forced emigration of Palestinian-Israeli citizens as a security measure, should there be a major conflict within its borders. Whether or not this is being considered at this point remains to be seen, but it is an issue that cannot be overlooked. It is up to Lebanon’s friends to insist under any scenario that the country’s territorial integrity be honored and that the Lebanese government does all that it can to limit provocations from its territory.

      It is also time for the Lebanese to face the reality that Palestinians are not returning to Palestine. A more creative and stable set of options must be discussed before the choices become constrained by another conflict.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Does Saad Hariri Really Believe He Can Save Lebanon?

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      My parents used to say, “Eat with your mouth and not your eyes.” This may be good advice for newly-minted Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri. He is clearly unable to resist trying once again to raise Lebanon from its deathbed, and this time the consequences may be more disastrous than just a bit of heartburn. Yes, I’m sure his supporters see this as the ultimate act of patriotism, and hopefully, he will be successful, but the odds are against him.

      First of all, Hariri is a well-known figure who understands the political calculus of his supporters and opponents. Yet this is not similar to his deal that brought the presidency to Michel Aoun in 2016. The reforms called for, and that Hariri has said he supports, are literally aimed at dismantling the edifice of economic and political corruption that has led to the erosion of Lebanon’s well-being.

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      Secondly, there is the matter of the timeframe called for under the French plan for change that serves as Hariri’s point of reference. It calls for significant reforms underway in six months as well as capital controls, anti-corruption measures, a robust social safety net and radical changes to how the government and banking system operate. Hariri, a three-time prime minister, has said that he will accept a government with a shelf life of six months and focus on the political and economic reforms to refresh and reinvigorate the country.

      Will the oligarchy, of which he is a member, yield to his office the necessary executive authority to bypass parliament to enact laws and regulations? There is no brotherly bond or even public tolerance between Hariri and Gebran Bassil, leader of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement. So, will the prime minister’s reliance on Hezbollah’s support bring him into the cross-hairs of US sanctions?

      A major sticking point will be the composition of the Hariri cabinet, which he promised will be made up of “nonpolitically aligned experts with the mission of economic, financial, and administrative reforms contained in the French initiative road map.” The downfall of the most recent prime minister, Mustapha Adib, was over this exact point, and it is a road too far for many of the political elites.

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      Finally, how much longer will the Lebanese people put up with leaders who are more concerned with their patrimony and their constituents rather than the health, safety and well-being of the country? Hariri may have the best of intentions, but we know which way that road can lead. As Al Jazeera reports, “Hariri’s return marks the biggest challenge yet for activists involved in the nationwide uprising against the country’s corrupt political class that had led to the resignation of Hariri and his coalition government last year.”

      The economic realities are well known, ranging from extensive corruption to government mismanagement and a failed government model built on cronyism. Soon, more than 70% of the people could be below the poverty line as the Lebanese pound has lost 80% of its value, unemployment is around 35% and people struggle with restrictions limiting access to their funds in banks. According to journalist Souad Lazkani, as many as 1 million will be unemployed by 2021 unless, by some miracle, reforms are urgently implemented by the new government.

      Deja Vu

      Hariri’s restart as prime minister is dreaded by many in the street who feel a sense of deja vu from the last decade. “Hariri’s return is the peak of the counter-revolution,” Nizar Hassan, a political activist told Al Jazeera. “A pillar of the political establishment, a multi-millionaire who represents the banks and foreign interests, and a symbol of inefficient governance and widespread corruption: He represents everything we revolted against.”

      So, the demonstrators who have been protesting for several months have to decide whether to publicly oppose these latest steps to maintain the status quo or come up with an alternative that, hopefully, will be nonviolent. With the hyperinflation that has caused shortages of basic goods like medicine and foods, the growing instability and dwindling prospects for change, Lebanon faces a very difficult winter.

      This is Hariri’s multilayered and multifaceted challenge. As he assembles his cabinet and prepares his ministerial statement of his government’s vision, he will be watched closely by people hoping that he can rise above the sectarian politics of the past, as well as by those who are most threatened by reforms. It is a difficult road ahead indeed.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Finding a Cure for Lebanon’s Imperialist Hangover

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      Lebanon, as a nation, was destined for conflict since its creation in November 1943 by the French colonial power. To this day, it remains a client state with several competing foreign powers trying to exploit the country’s social, political and economic systems for their benefit. The current socio-economic crisis has clearly exposed the inadequacies of …
      Continue Reading “Finding a Cure for Lebanon’s Imperialist Hangover”
      The post Finding a Cure for Lebanon’s Imperialist Hangover appeared first on Fair Observer. More

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      Can Lebanon Overcome Its Sectarian Political Order?

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      Either the global COVID-19 pandemic or the catastrophic blast at the port of Beirut on August 4 could not have hit Lebanon at a worse time. The explosion killed nearly 200 people and displaced 300,000 residents, resulting in damage worth an estimated $15 billion. Prior to the tragedy, Lebanon was already experiencing daily blackouts. Given the strained infrastructure following the explosion, there is a real risk that the pandemic could spiral out of control.

      Mired in a severe crisis that shook the country and the instability stemming from last year’s “WhatsApp Revolution,” both developments unfolded as Lebanon’s volatile political order has been falling apart. According to the country’s 1926 constitution, the state is non-denominational, but it has the obligation to protect and guarantee the free exercise of all recognized faiths.

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      In practice, the system, commonly called muhasasa taifiya, means that political posts are proportionally allocated along confessional criteria. The presidency of the republic goes to a Maronite Christian since Maronites represented the majority confession at the time of the system’s conception; the prime minister is a Sunni, and the president of the chamber a Shia. Over time, expanding Muslim communities demanded a revision to reflect the demographic changes.

      In 1989, the Taif Accords, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, rebalanced the distribution of powers, but only partially. The system has influenced all areas of public life while exacerbating tensions among various communities. More significantly, many Lebanese blame the taifiya for clientelism, which breeds corruption. The thousands of protesters who descended on the streets of Lebanon through much of 2019 demanded radical amendments to the constitution to overturn its confessional nature.

      Sectarian Health Care

      The pandemic, in its most intense phase, managed to bring the anti-government demonstrations, which led to Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation, to a halt. But now the Lebanese people will have to deal with the aftermath of the explosion, a deepening economic crisis and a potential second wave of coronavirus infections.

      Lebanon’s physical and institutional structures are in a state of decay. The World Health Organization (WHO) has launched an international campaign to raise some $15 million for the country’s hospitals to help confront the shortage of medicines, exacerbated by the eroding purchasing power of the Lebanese lira. This might prove insufficient given that a large part of Lebanon’s population lives in refugee camps. Syrian refugees alone account for 30% of the country’s total population, and many could be excluded from securing help.

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      The situation could have been worse. Fortunately, only 20% of Lebanon’s available hospital beds are filled by COVID-19 patients. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs monitored 55 Beirut area hospitals, concluding that only 47% of these facilities are able to work at full capacity, guaranteeing all services. This has increased pressure on remaining facilities, which happen to be privately owned — as are 85% of all hospitals and clinics in the country — by the various confessional parties.

      The complex network of taifiya clientelism has reached far beyond the political into the social sphere. This heightens the very sectarian frictions that have weakened Lebanon’s socio-political fabric, hampering the provision of adequate care. Public spending on health, as well as education and other social services, has been geographically distributed according to confessional criteria on the basis of the political or confessional affiliation of the minister in charge of the relevant portfolio. Thus, it is the minister’s position that plays a decisive role in resource allocation instead of the actual needs of the population in a given area or region.

      The combination of deeply-rooted clientelist mechanisms and the wild privatization drive of the 1990s and early 2000s under Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri have resulted in many, mostly poor, Lebanese being effectively denied access to adequate medical care. The pandemic and the financial crisis have worsened an already intolerable situation. The American University Medical Center, one of the finest hospitals in Lebanon, was forced to dismiss hundreds of staff last July.

      Economic Collapse

      Already struggling with inflation and unemployment, Lebanon lacks the resources to compensate workers who have lost their jobs or offer free medicines to those most in need, who are destined to increase in number. In other words, Lebanon faces the unenviable choice of either enforcing a lockdown to control the spread of the coronavirus or losing total control of the contagion by allowing businesses to stay open in order to keep its struggling economy afloat.

      The pandemic — and the lockdown it mandated — came during the worst financial crisis in Lebanon’s history. Just days before the WHO declared the coronavirus a pandemic on March 11, Prime Minister Hassan Diab announced a default on Lebanon’s €1.2-billion eurobond. The default triggered a massive devaluation of the lira. The resulting hyperinflation hit both the most vulnerable sections of the population as well as the middle class. Prices for most food and consumer products doubled.

      Estimates suggest that one in three Lebanese is either unemployed or has received half, or sometimes just a quarter, of their salary due to the lockdown restrictions. And the official statistics fail to consider Palestinian and Syrian refugees, who face economic hardships in the best of times, let alone during a pandemic.

      The Lebanese people blame their country’s banking sector, specifically the central bank, Banque du Liban, and its governor, Riad Salameh, for their plight. Hezbollah, the largest party in parliament, demanded Salameh be fired, describing the banker as a stooge for American efforts to bankrupt the armed group, which Washington has designated as a terrorist organization since 1997. But the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, has refused to sack Salameh, who has played a key role in negotiating with foreign shareholders to cut Lebanon’s massive $87-billion debt, which stands at 170% of the country’s GDP.

      Most Lebanese people face economic challenges worse than those of the 1975-1990 civil war, and there’s some truth to the assumption that the chances of dying from COVID-19 or starvation are roughly the same today. The lockdown and a nationwide curfew, coupled with the country’s chronic economic vulnerabilities, have dealt a deadly blow even against the types of businesses that had managed to survive wars. Restaurants and bars have closed under the pressure of surging prices for basic goods and low demand due to financial collapse.

      Perpetuating the System

      Despite the debilitating effects of the pandemic, these appear as a mere footnote to the longstanding problems that have led some to label Lebanon as a failed state long before 2020. But for Hezbollah, which enjoys a parliamentary majority, and for the other political actors as well, a radical shift away from Lebanon’s confessional underpinnings implies political suicide. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for Lebanon’s political class to regain the people’s trust.

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      The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is tasked with investigating the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri, has convicted just one of the four Hezbollah-affiliated defendants. The verdict, which many Lebanese believed would find all four guilty, was widely expected to trigger riots and potentially plunge Lebanon into a political death spiral, pitting Sunni supporters of Saad Hariri’s Mustaqbal Party against Shia supporters of Hezbollah.

      That death spiral could still occur, but for the time being, the Lebanese people appear to have little energy for protesting, let alone for violent riots or another civil war, considering the current and seemingly intractable socio-economic crisis. Indeed, the lenient verdict in the Hariri case opens a narrow path, but a path nonetheless, toward unblocking loans and donations that have been hindered by sanctions against Hezbollah.

      It is, therefore, not entirely futile to maintain hope that Lebanon might find the fortitude to survive the complex combination of calamities hanging over the country. In the medium and longer terms, there are few economic solutions to effect substantial changes. Lebanon’s neoliberal economic order has few outlets for manufacturing or other production-based activities. Only heavy cash injections into the banking system from allies can fill the gap.

      Yet this economic model serves to perpetuate the sectarian political system that encourages foreign meddling. Notably, the rise of a Shia political consciousness in the 1960s and 1970s, which led to the formation of parties such as Amal and later Hezbollah, has invited considerable Iranian interest and support. Iranian interference contrasted with the Christian links to France or Sunni connections to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, rather than helping to end the cycle of foreign meddling, the COVID-19 emergency and the port explosion appear to have reinvited France to the messy Lebanese chessboard.

      France is ready to take advantage of this weakness. President Emmanuel Macron, during his recent visits to Beirut, has shown that he clearly wants Lebanon back in France’s sphere of interest, tying economic aid for reconstruction to political reform — in the sense of weakening Hezbollah, which has benefited from the taifiya, and links to Iran. But Turkey appears ready to challenge Macron’s ambitions. Turkish vice president, Fuat Oktay, also received a warm welcome in Beirut. He was keen to express solidarity and even happier to condemn French neo-colonialism.

      Of course, history suggests that Turkey’s aims might not be too different than those of France, namely to play a major hand in reshaping Lebanese politics in order to advance its own neo-Ottoman projection. Lebanon, before becoming a French protectorate, was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and the link between Turkey and Lebanon’s Turkmen population is still strong. It is to this minority that the Turkish foreign minister has promised citizenship after proposing to the Lebanese government the use of the port of Mersin until the port of Beirut is operational again.

      Failure to Reform

      As for the kind of radical political reform calling for a complete overhaul of the sectarian division of power, there are few opportunities for any significant change. The pandemic, along with the limited financial resources, may, in fact, serve to perpetuate the taifiya system as people become forced to rely on their traditional sources of solidarity and support, all of which are competing over a smaller pie of resources.

      The appointment of Mustapha Adib as Lebanon’s new prime minister suggests that the system will continue for the time being. Adib takes over from Hassan Diab, who resigned on August 10, and is a relative unknown. His career has been largely in academia and diplomacy, and he most recently served as ambassador to Berlin. It appears that former leaders Saad Hariri, Fouad Siniora and Najib Mikati backed Adib’s appointment. Adib is a Sunni Muslim, as the taifiya demands, and he has a good relationship with Hezbollah. But it is unlikely that the new head of government will have the ability to engage in anything more than a cosmetic change.

      In Lebanese politics, it has always been a case of “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” — The more it changes, the more it remains the same. It is clear that while the population at large has demanded radical changes and the de facto dissolution of the taifiya, such a change will not be forthcoming without considerable struggle, both social and political. On September 1, demonstrators poured into the streets of Beirut to demand the resignation of the government in toto. Before Adib could even settle in his role, he is faced with the kind of popular mobilization that forced the resignation of his predecessor.

      Fixing Lebanon now and reforming, let alone scrapping the taifiya — after a string of failed governments, in the midst of an unprecedented global pandemic compounded by one of the worst non-nuclear explosions in history, as competing foreign interests create further tensions — would require nothing short of a biblical effort.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.] More

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      Should Hezbollah Be Disarmed?

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      Amid Lebanon’s ongoing anti-government protests, various demonstrators have held signs demanding “No weapons but legal weapons. 1559, make it happen.” This is a clear reference to Hezbollah, a hybrid organization, political party, social movement and a regional player with global reach.

      There is a long history of Hezbollah and the disarmament issue being part of Lebanon’s political discourse. The issue is complex and contentious. There are various angles. First, one needs to distinguish between the internal Lebanese debate and the demands imposed externally by Western countries. Both perspectives are interconnected.

      Within the Lebanese context, Hezbollah has over time toned down its Islamic narrative and burnished its Lebanese credentials. The party has had representatives elected to parliament, various members in the cabinet, and stated that it would be willing to discuss disarmament within the framework of national dialogue. Hezbollah has pointed out that the Lebanese government itself has sanctioned and acknowledged the Shia organization’s role as a resistance movement. It has also repeatedly claimed that it would be willing to integrate into the national defense system once the Lebanese government is run efficiently, with the Lebanese armed forces proving capable of protecting the country.  

      A number of Western and Arab states and Israel have designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization. These governments view the Iranian-sponsored group as a major obstacle that is guilty of impairing progress in the Middle East, sowing chaos and advancing Iran and Syria’s sinister plans. A common narrative in Washington, some Gulf Arab capitals and Tel Aviv is that Hezbollah is mainly an Iranian stooge and/or a Syrian agent. The Shia organization, from this perspective, is a “state within a state” that willfully undermines the sovereignty of the Lebanese state while stripping the government of having the sole monopoly over the use of force in the country. The externally driven disarmament rhetoric, some have argued, is intended to demonize Iran as “harboring and abetting” terrorist movements and hence isolating it further.

      Protesters in Beirut, Lebanon on 10/28/2019 © Diplomedia / ShutterstockThe Taif Accords of 1989, which was the formal peace treaty that ended the Lebanese Civil War, stipulated and mandated that all militias be disbanded within a certain timeframe. Hezbollah was exempt from this and was allowed to hold on to its arms, which must be understood within the context of the Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon that lasted from 1982 to 2000. For Hezbollah, holding on to its arms fulfilled various purposes.

      Rationale for Retaining Its Weapons

      The Lebanese group has used the disarmament issue in order to strengthen its leverage vis-à-vis various parties, especially the state. While Hezbollah has participated in various elections and had representatives elected to parliament, the organization feels the system has not adequately reflected its legitimate grievances and power-sharing concerns. For many, Hezbollah has taken on a pragmatic wait-and-see approach, hoping that a political opportunity would arise. Giving up its arms would weaken its position and imply a strategic loss to the party. As some have claimed, this would jeopardize its survival as a party and as a movement as such.

      However, regarding recent events, Dr. Aurelie Daher, a researcher at Sciences Po in Paris, warns: “One has to keep in mind that Hezbollah is not a party in the sense that Western political science would give the notion, as much as it is a lobby. Hezbollah does not intend to rule, does not intend to grasp all the governmental portfolios or take all and any kind of decisions at every level.”

      She adds: “Their presence in Lebanese politics has been, since its beginning in the early 1990s, motivated by a will to prevent any threat against the interests [of the organization]. As long as the other political parties and groups do not jeopardize the Islamic Republic’s [Iran’s] weapons, Hezbollah is ready to leave rather a comfortable room for maneuver to the other political actors — whether they are friends or foes.”

      Hezbollah has repeatedly stressed its exclusive Lebanese identity while admitting to its longstanding ties to Iran and Syria. Undeniably, both countries are strategic allies that have played critical and essential roles in Hezbollah’s expansion of influence across Lebanon, the greater Middle East and presumably to other parts of the world, such as Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.

      A poster of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, Lebanon on 8/23/2006. © Umut Rosa / ShutterstockGiving up its arms would not just substantially weaken Hezbollah, but its major patrons in Tehran and Damascus would be less inclined to invest significant amounts of funding in a group that has had to give up its major asset, namely its military capacity. Of course, Hezbollah has been very astute at diversifying its funding sources over the years and is no longer exclusively reliant on Iranian cash, which has gradually declined.

      Another factor that has emboldened Hezbollah to hold on to its arms is its openly-declared success against Israel in its various confrontations, such as in the summer of 2006. Hezbollah representatives have used this event to point out the necessity of resisting Israel further. Although many argue that Hezbollah provoked the encounter with Israel and was viewed by many as instigating the conflict, it managed to take advantage of Israel’s misguided policy of coming down hard on the whole of Lebanon. By resisting the surge mounted by Israeli forces and by presenting itself as victorious in the conflict with Israel, Hezbollah managed to remind onlookers of its strength and its continued importance as a resistance movement.

      In the wake of the 34-day conflict, Hezbollah once again used its well-established social welfare system to supply money to distraught Lebanese citizens who lost their homes and property. Over time, Hezbollah’s arms narrative has evolved from liberation to resistance to deterrence.

      A Moment of Change?

      At the beginning of Lebanon’s thawra (also dubbed the “WhatsApp Revolution”) back in October 2019, there was little discussion about Hezbollah. Most of the protesters’ attention centered on issues such as corruption, mainstream politicians, sectarianism and the corrupt political system as such. Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, took the high ground by pointing to the party’s fight at Lebanon’s southern border with Israel and its moral stance of being a “clean” and “pure” party.

      The picture started to change when Hezbollah supporters started attacking demonstrators, according to certain sources such as Amnesty International. Many demonstrators subsequently felt that Hezbollah, in actuality, was part of the corrupt political system that has been “controlling” the Lebanese people. Many have come to see Hezbollah as the primary backer of the current government, along with its allies, the Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement.

      Protesters in Beirut, Lebanon on 11/22/2019 © Karim Naamani / ShutterstockHowever, according to Nicholas Blanford, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Hezbollah also faces an array of challenges. He says these include “financial difficulties, largely due to US sanctions against it and its supporters and against Iran; corruption issues which have surfaced in the past decade-plus in part because of the party’s sudden and huge expansion in numbers after the 2006 war; [and] the weakening resistance narrative — a whole new generation of Lebanese Shias have grown up since the Israelis departed Lebanon in May 2000, and they have no memory of the Israeli threat.”

      He adds: “The last major engagement with Israel was 14 years ago. Since then, Hezbollah has been fighting Arab Sunnis rather than Israeli Jews. The party has become deeply enmeshed in Lebanese politics, not out of choice but in order to better defend its resistance priority. But playing a greater political role brings its own complications.”

      Instability in Syria

      Looking ahead, the situation in Syria and the ways in which the US-imposed sanctions on Damascus, known as the Caesar Act, play out in the war-torn country will heavily impact on Hezbollah’s future. To be sure, the crisis in Syria is not resolved, as underscored by the situation in Idlib, the last rebel stronghold. Moreover, with anti-Assad protests breaking out in regime-controlled parts of Syria, saying that the government in Damascus faces major challenges would be an understatement.

      Within this context, many Lebanese, including the majority of Shia and Christian citizens, will see Hezbollah disarming as too dangerous from a security standpoint, given that Lebanon’s border with Syria could again become porous. Most likely, wealthier Lebanese citizens who are anti-Hezbollah will leave the country as a result of the Caesar Act’s destabilizing impact on Lebanon amidst other crises stemming from the unrest resulting from the WhatsApp Revolution, the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

      Perhaps this will all serve Hezbollah and its allies, who will defend the arsenal of the world’s most-heavily armed non-state actor.

      *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More