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      in World Politics

      For Libya, Peace Remains Unlikely

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      A recent ceasefire agreement and ongoing political reconciliation negotiations between Libya’s warring factions have significantly de-escalated tensions. A flurry of diplomatic engagement, with significant international support, has raised hopes that the Libyan conflict is about to enter a new stage, namely one that involves less fighting and more talking.

      Members of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) met in September in Hurghada, Egypt, to discuss a ceasefire for the first time since the early months of 2020, culminating in the October 23 agreement on a comprehensive ceasefire. This deal included provisions calling for the departure of all foreign fighters from Libya within three months, a freeze on military agreements with foreign parties, the demilitarization of the conflict’s frontlines (Sirte and Jufra districts) and the establishment of a joint policing force to monitor and secure the demilitarized frontlines.

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      Military talks have advanced alongside parallel political dialogue, which has also seen progress over recent months. Political talks have been held between members of the GNA and the Tripoli-based consultative body, the High Council of State, on one side, and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, which is aligned with the LNA, on the other side. Meetings between these actors — which have taken place on September 6 in Morocco, September 7-9 in Switzerland and October 11-13 in Egypt — are focusing on reaching an agreement on creating a new presidential council to govern Libya, setting a date for parliamentary elections and more broadly reunifying the country.

      The aim of the ongoing political dialogue, under the auspices of the UN, is to reach an agreement on these issues at the summit in Tunisia that began on November 9. However, the prospects of the conflict ending and the reunification of the country taking place in the coming year remain unlikely.

      Less Fighting, More Talking

      The progress of the political and military negotiations has been bolstered by the September 18 agreement between GNA Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq and LNA interlocutors to ease the nationwide oil blockade that the LNA had imposed since January this year. This agreement has been slowly implemented in Libya since the end of September, and oil production has risen from a low of approximately 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 1 million bpd on November 7. The blockade had been a major grievance for the GNA since oil exports account for more than 90% of Libya’s state revenues. The blockade had cost the state at least $9 billion in revenue.

      Embed from Getty Images

      These political and military talks are a positive step forward for the country, which had been in the midst of intense fighting just a few months ago. However, a comprehensive peace deal is not just over the horizon. This ceasefire is only the latest attempt to stop the fighting; the most recent ceasefire deal of January 11 collapsed within weeks of being signed. Moreover, efforts to build trust between the LNA and GNA will be difficult, and neither party is currently willing to sever their lifelines to key foreign backers or force them to leave the country.

      The GNA was only able to win the Tripoli battle because of the military support it received from Turkey, including the thousands of Syrian fighters deployed by Ankara. Just days after the ceasefire was agreed, the GNA signed a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation with Qatar in a move that undermines the spirit, if not the letter, of the ceasefire agreement. The GNA remains weary of the LNA and its leader Khalifa Haftar after the general launched the attack on Tripoli in April 2019 just days before a planned UN peace conference. There are also constituencies among the militia groups that make up the GNA’s armed forces that are resisting the ceasefire and broader military negotiations with the LNA.

      Meanwhile, the LNA has its own reasons to resist adhering to certain aspects of the ceasefire agreement. The LNA’s dependence on Russian and Emirati military, financial and political support has increased over the past year, and Russian private military companies aligned with the LNA are also present in the country. The LNA will not want to remove foreign forces, which provide important military support, from the country. Moreover, it is likely that Haftar is merely biding his time with this ceasefire, de-escalating tensions while allowing oil revenues to flow back into the system to appease the growing number of Libyans who are exasperated by the country’s sharp economic deterioration.

      General Haftar maintains the intent to rule Libya. However, he does not currently have the ability to impose his will by force, especially while the GNA has strong Turkish backing. Haftar will thus present a major obstacle to a comprehensive end to the conflict — unless he is effectively sidelined. This remains unlikely over the coming months since Haftar retains significant support of key tribal constituencies and because his interests remain aligned with those of his international backers.

      Back in Business

      While a total end to the conflict very likely remains out of reach in the coming months, the de-escalation in fighting has opened opportunities for business. The country, and particularly the state-owned General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), is in significant need of upgrades and repairs to power infrastructure. At the moment, GECOL is producing around 4,500 MW, but peak demand stands at around 7,000 MW. The end of the battle for Tripoli in June and the limited progress in military and political talks have created conditions that are allowing international firms to restart power projects. Moreover, the resumption of oil exports will generate government revenues that will make it possible to start additional projects.

      Business confidence in the oil and gas sector is also rising as operations are beginning to ramp up. Nuri Esaid, chairman of Tripoli-based Akakus Oil Operations, said on October 31 that the Sharara oilfield in Libya’s southwest will pump 300,000 bpd by the end of 2020, following the decision by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to lift force majeure at the field on October 11. The NOC also lifted force majeure at Sidre and Ras Lanuf oil export terminals on October 23, removing the final barriers to ramping up oil production nationwide. Businesses with operations in the country will cautiously seek to restart projects that have been regularly disrupted over the past years.

      Nevertheless, the operating environment remains fraught with risk. Companies must balance their relationships with both the LNA, which has physical control over most of the country’s oil and gas installations, and the GNA, which nominally controls all key state institutions, such as Libya’s central bank and the NOC. There are also security challenges arising from the presence of local Petroleum Facilities Guards that often have their own interests. In December 2018, for example, the Fezzan Rage Movement worked with members of the guards to shutdown the Sharara oilfield to demand greater government economic support for southern Libya.

      Local grievances in the southwest over lack of economic opportunity and government support, as well as tribal divisions, especially between local Tebu and Tuareg groups, in the area will sustain threats of unrest and communal violence. Moreover, the Islamic State is still present, if diminished, in central Libya and capable of launching small-scale attacks. Sustained political fragmentation will contribute to the continuation of longstanding security deficiencies as the country’s rival authorities will fail to adopt a unified, cooperative approach to country-wide security. As progress toward a more comprehensive political settlement stalls, the prospect that Khalifa Haftar will reimpose an oil blockade — and reignite the conflict — will grow.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Why Populists at the Helm Are Bad for the Economy

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      Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a man on a mission. The goal: to make Turkey great again. Making Turkey great again, I guess, means wiping history clean of a series of humiliations, from the ignominious decline of the Ottoman Empire, dismissed as the “sick man upon the Bosporus” in the late 1800s, to the no less ignominious Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 that forced Istanbul to cede vast parts of its territory to France, the UK, Italy and Greece. The treaty not only marked the beginning of the empire’s demise, but also the origins of Turkish nationalism, which led to the establishment of the modern Turkish republic.

      President Erdogan is but the most recent and arguably most egregious expression of Turkish nationalism that seeks to restore past glory by gathering all Turkish peoples under one roof, similar to what once was known as pan-Slavism. This explains why Erdogan has been adamant in his support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Ironically enough, Erdogan has been amazingly sanguine with respect to the oppression of Muslim Uighurs in China’s Xinjiang province. As so often, money trumps convictions while hypocrisy runs rampant.

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      This is deplorable, but, as US President Donald Trump has put is so eloquently, albeit in a different context, “It is what it is.” In any case, the topic here isn’t Erdogan’s attempt to establish himself as the champion of pan-Turkish nationalism or his attempt to affirm his claim to champion the cause of Islam, exemplified in his recent attacks against French President Emmanuel Macron. Instead, the focus is on Erdogan as a typical exponent of contemporary authoritarian populism.

      Claim to Legitimacy

      Populists base their claim to legitimacy on the notion that they promote the interests of “ordinary citizens” against an aloof elite far removed from everyday life, an elite that could care less about people’s concerns and worries. Against that, populists maintain that if elected, they will make the concerns and wellbeing of ordinary citizens their main priority. This is how Erdogan, Trump, India’s Narendra Modi and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro swept into office. This is what has been their claim to legitimacy.

      Unfortunately, hard reality is a far cry from lofty promises. Decades of experience with populist regimes shows that populists in power have a disastrous economic track record. To make things worse, populists appear to be particularly resistant to taking advice from those who have studied populist economics or learning from the glaring mistakes made by populist regimes in the past.

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      There is, by now, a substantial record of serious analysis of populist economics, largely based on the experience of Latin American populism. Take, for instance, Jeffrey Sachs, who certainly is above any suspicion of harboring right-wing proclivities. In a paper from 1989, he analyzed what he called the “populist policy cycle”: Overly “expansionary macroeconomic policies,” he observed, “lead to high inflation and severe balance of payments crises.”

      In a similar vein, Rüdiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards noted in 1991, “Again and again, and in country after country, policymakers have embraced economic programs that rely heavily on the use of expansive fiscal and credit policies and overvalued currency to accelerate growth and redistribute income.” After a short-lived economic boom, problems emerge, engendering “unsustainable macroeconomic pressures that, at the end, result in the plummeting of real wages and severe balance of payment difficulties. The final outcome of these experiments has generally been galloping inflation, crisis, and the collapse of the economic system.” Ultimately, those supposed to benefit most from populist economic policies, i.e., the poor, end up worse off than they had been before the populists came to power.

      Recent developments in Turkey suggest that Erdogan’s regime might be heading in the same direction. Take, for instance, the evolution of the country’s currency, the lira. Over the past nine months, the lira has lost almost 25% of its value compared the US dollar and the euro. This reflects investor worries about rising inflation, depleting currency reserves and the fact that Turks appear to be fleeing into foreign currencies.

      Same Direction

      The concerns are hardly unfounded. In late September, the Turkish central bank raised interest rates by 200 basis points, from 8.25% to 10.25%, in an attempt to counter rising inflation. This marked a drastic reversal of previous policy. Starting in December 2019, it had successively slashed the interest rate, which at the time stood at 14%. The move was not entirely of the bank’s own making. In July, Erdogan, unhappy about the bank’s slow pace in cutting interest rates, dismissed its chief for not having “follow[ed] instruction.” His replacement dutifully embarked on a course of monetary easing, based on official projections that the inflation rate would fall to around 8% by the end of 2020.

      Monetary easing provoked a massive “credit binge” by both businesses and households, which, in turn, stoked the flames of inflation, far surpassing the projected 8% mark. In reality, inflation rose to around 12% in 2020. In response to monetary easing, private debt increased substantially, with often disastrous consequences. A prominent case in point is Turkey’s professional football clubs. The four most prominent ones — Besiktas, Galatasaray, Fenerbahce and Trabzonspor — have accumulated around €1.5 billion ($1.8 billion) worth of debt.

      The reason? In line with Erdogan’s goal to turn Turkey into a major global power, the country’s top football clubs endeavored to move into the Gotha of European football, on par with the likes of Real Madrid, Bayern München and Manchester City. In order to reach this goal, they borrowed heavily in euros and dollars in order to be able to attract international star players. The partial collapse of the Turkish lira, together with the drying up of revenues in the wake of COVID-19, has pushed all four clubs to the abyss of financial ruin.

      It would be going too far to suggest that this might be a preview of things to come for Turkey as a whole. In fact, the regime’s economic track record has been relatively successful in performing a balancing act between sane economic policy and populist inclinations. This has been due, to a significant extent, to the central bank’s relative independence, even if this has noticeably eroded over the past several years, constantly under pressure from the president to support the regime’s economic program. The recent rate hike might suggest, or so one might hope, that realism has once again gained the upper hand.

      This would certainly be a departure from business as usual as far as populist regimes are concerned. A recent extensive study by economists from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and the University of Bonn in Germany provides an extensive and detailed account of the profound incompetence populist regimes have demonstrated when it comes to the basics of economics. Silvio Berlusconi’s tenure, for instance, did little to advance the life chances of ordinary Italians.

      Embed from Getty Images

      On the contrary, the upsurge in voter discontent and disenchantment that, for a short period of time, propelled the Five Star Movement to the top of Italian politics, reflects the opportunities wasted during Berlusconi’s reign. This has been particularly pronounced in Latin America, but not only there. In the medium and long run, as the study’s authors conclude, “virtually all countries governed by populists witness subpar economic outcomes evidenced by a substantial decline in real GDP and consumption.” It would be easy to dismiss these outcomes as the result of misguided policies, informed by good intentions but with disastrous consequences. My guess is, however, that this is only part of the story, and the less important one at that. Not for nothing those who have studied populism have emphasized the importance of the “common sense of common people” as a central trope in populist rhetoric, targeting expert “elites.”

      Unfortunately, more often than not, the common sense of the common people is completely wrong. Even more unfortunately, ignoring expert advice more often than not has disastrous consequences — in economics, as well as with regard to the coronavirus pandemic.

      Once again, Erdogan is a prominent example. Despite an upsurge in COVID-19 infections, the president has been more than reluctant to follow advice to impose stringent measures to contain the virus. At the same time, his political allies have accused Turkish medical experts of “treason,” reminiscent of similar slanders in the United States. To make matters worse, Erdogan’s shameful attack on President Macron in the wake of Islamicist-inspired terrorist attacks in France is hardly conducive to improving Turkey’s economic relations with Western Europe, a vital market for Turkish exports. So much for common sense.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Israel Will Continue Disregarding International Law

      by

      The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is now in its 72nd year. Israel has been given renewed impetus after agreeing to the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates on August 13, when the two states announced the normalization of diplomatic relations. Bahrain soon followed in Abu Dhabi’s footsteps.

      Now, along with Sudan, there are five Arab countries that recognize Israel, and there are rumors that others like Oman will join the bandwagon. This recent development could have implications for the Palestinians, including the bitter realization that Arab and Muslim countries are betraying them. A 2019 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that nearly 80% of Palestinians feel they are abandoned by Arab states.

      The task of bringing Israel into compliance with its obligations as the occupying power vis-à-vis the Palestinians has become ever more convoluted. UN Security Council resolutions addressing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are routinely disregarded by the Israelis. A case in point is the Security Council Resolution 2334, adopted in 2016, which terms Israel’s settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “a flagrant violation under international law.”

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      Richard Seaford is a professor emeritus of classics and ancient history at the University of Exeter, United Kingdom. A distinguished scholar, he has been a fellow of the National Humanities Center in North Carolina and a member of the British Committee for the Universities of Palestine.

      In this edition of The Interview, Fair Observer talks to Seaford about the Israeli public’s perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Donald Trump’s “deal of the century,” and the global reception of the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement.

      The transcript has been edited for clarity. This interview took place in summer 2020.

      Kourosh Ziabari: How do Israel’s political, intelligence and military elites, particularly those on the right, perceive the status quo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The Israeli author Micah Goodman believes the dominant narrative is no longer about the “sanctity of the settlements, the fulfillment of biblical prophecies, and imminent redemption.” Rather, for him, the main concern is guaranteed security. Do you agree with this assumption? Can it be inferred that Israeli leaders are prepared for a compromise with the Palestinians, and possibly making territorial concessions, provided that their security concerns are addressed?

      Richard Seaford: The answer to both questions is no. The Israeli elite is no doubt concerned about security, and I recognize the problems that they face. But if security was their main motive, they would have established, and could still establish, an impregnable state on their own in pre-1967 borders, if necessary with a massive wall and all the sophisticated technology available to them.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Instead, they have illegally filled with settlements conquered land that belongs not to Israel but to more than 2 million Palestinian Arabs. In doing so, they have made a two-state solution impossible and created a further massive security problem that is used to justify unbearable suffering for the Palestinians and the further expansion of settlements. No doubt some of the elite are aware of the present and future nightmare created by this expansionism, but there is no sign of any political will to do anything substantial about it.

      The basic problem is that Israel is a military superpower up against a defenseless people — the Palestinians — with no genuine international pressure to prevent Israel from stealing as much land as it wants.

      Ziabari: In late June, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres told a meeting of the Security Council that Israel’s plans to annex swaths of the West Bank would threaten the vision of a two-state solution and represent a most serious violation of international law. Since the Trump administration has reversed the US position on the settlements and no longer considers them a breach of international law, do you expect the Security Council to take action to block further annexations? Is there any legal barrier dissuading Israel from annexing more West Bank lands?

      Seaford: No! Firstly, the past record of the Security Council does not encourage the belief that it will take action to require Israel to conform to international law and UN resolutions.

      Secondly, there is no reason to believe that Israel will reverse its decades-long disregard of international law, especially given the encouragement now given to its lawbreaking by Trump. A Biden government may not continue the policy of encouraging illegality, but it will probably do nothing substantial to prevent it.

      Western countries adopted sanctions against the Russian Federation after rightly regarding its annexation of Crimea in 2014 — after a referendum there — as a violation of international law. But when Israel illegally annexed East Jerusalem in 1980 and the Golan Heights in 1981, where were the sanctions? The double standards are so obvious as to be embarrassing, and they encourage Israel to further acts of illegal annexation.

      According to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, “the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territories it occupies.” The United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Court of Justice and the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, among others, have, unsurprisingly, all affirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the territories occupied by Israel. Trump has, in order to please his base, de facto withdrawn from the Geneva conventions.  

      Ziabari: In August 2018, the Trump administration suspended all US funding for UNRWA, the UN program supporting Palestinian refugees. UNRWA is now believed to face a major financial challenge, hindering its ability to provide education for 520,000 students, health care for 3 million patients and food assistance for 1.7 million refugees. On other occasions, the Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland and other countries have also cut or reduced their contributions. In what ways will these cuts affect the prosperity and wellbeing of the Palestinian people?

      Seaford: To cut off funding for those who live in some of the worst conditions in the world, while maintaining much more funding for the state that has dispossessed them, speaks for itself. A [recent] letter appeared in The Guardian signed by numerous European senior politicians stating that UNRWA needs funding desperately, not least to use its proven expertise in preventing the coronavirus from spreading through densely populated Palestinian refugee camps in the region.

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      Apart from the further intensification of the misery of the Palestinians, there are two less obvious consequences of the defunding. One is the potential for an increase in regional instability caused by the despair. The other is to diminish yet further the standing of the US in the region and in the world generally. One effect that the defunding will not have is the one desired by Trump: to force the Palestinians to give up their claim to their homeland.

      Ziabari: The United States has long worked to position itself as an intermediary in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. President Trump has renewed efforts to play this role by tabling his long-awaited “deal of the century.” Does this deal make any positive contribution to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Given the Palestinians’ lukewarm and uninterested response, does it have any chance of being successfully implemented?

      Seaford: No. The idea that the US is a neutral intermediary in the conflict is now absurd. The discussions that produced the “deal of the century” entirely excluded the Palestinians. It gives Israel virtually everything that it wants, and the Palestinians virtually nothing of what they want. It confirms the illegal expansionism of Israel, gives the Palestinians limited control of the fragments of a very small part of their historic homeland, and leaves by far the largest part of it to a state formed and controlled by 20th-century Jewish emigrants to Palestine and their descendants.

      I could go on and on detailing the one-sidedness of the plan. But people may be thinking: Why propose a plan that is so absurdly one-sided that it has no chance of being agreed by both sides?

      One answer might be the sheer ignorance of the people responsible for it — for example, Jared Kushner. But the more substantial reason is a kind of propaganda that has been used in the past. The plan helps to instill in the millions who do not bother to ascertain the details of the idea that Trump is trying to create peace, and that the Palestinians are being unreasonable in rejecting it.

      Ziabari: The UAE recently announced normalized relations with Israel. Negotiations are also underway between Israel and Oman. Why do you think a growing number of Muslim, Arab states are leaning toward forging closer relations with Israel? What are the implications for the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people?

      Seaford: The causes of the Gulf states’ rapprochement with Israel include their fear of Iran, the various consequences of the Arab Spring, and perhaps also the steep decline in the price of oil over the last few years, which will endanger states that are almost entirely dependent on it.

      However, the rapprochement should not be exaggerated on the basis of a few highly publicized statements or events. For the elites of the Gulf states, whose only concern is to remain in power, it retains its dangers. Surveys show that concern for the Palestinians amongst Arabs has generally risen, rather than fallen, over the past few years.

      The UAE has long had commercial and security links with Israel, and its claim to have averted annexation of parts of the West Bank in exchange for normalizing relations is bogus. The annexation was postponed earlier, for other reasons. Anyway, the fact is that the Arab states over the last decades have not succeeded in improving the political position of the Palestinians. What they have provided is financial support, which continues.

      Ziabari: Efforts are underway by independent scholars, public figures, artists and athletes as well as some businesses in Europe to boycott the Israeli government, institutions and universities in the framework of the BDS movement. What are the costs for Israel? Will it be induced into changing its policies?

      Seaford: The costs to Israel are so far not great in material terms, but there are some cultural and academic consequences. The reason why Israel and its apologists do so much to combat BDS by the anti-Semitism slur is what it calls its delegitimating effect. BDS does not, of course, seek to destroy the state of Israel. What it seeks to delegitimate is its defiance of international law and of UN resolutions.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Citizens, when their governments have abdicated all concern with international law, feel that they must act to enforce it. And the most immediate way of acting is to adopt the boycott personally, as well as urging companies to divest and governments to apply sanctions. Anybody can do it.

      Moreover, the call for BDS becomes a way of creating publicity and raising consciousness of the crimes of Israel. It is this change of opinion, especially among US students, that Israel fears, because it may eventually, though not any time soon, limit their expansionism. Israel will be induced to change its policies only by external pressure, a combination of the reduction in the massive amount of US aid, with diplomatic pressure, sanctions, boycott and divestment — the kind of combination that helped to end apartheid in South Africa.

      One imagined objection to BDS says: But what about the horrible things going on elsewhere? What is unique about Israel is the combination of illegal colonization, the inaction of governments and that the victims by a large majority are asking us to boycott. When someone who is being beaten up and robbed asks me to do something simple, safe and legal to help, I do it. Wouldn’t you? I boycotted apartheid South Africa, and so consistency requires me to boycott Israel, or anywhere else with the same combination of circumstances.

      Ziabari: Have international organizations and blocs, including the United Nations and European Union, lost their competence in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Israel is the subject of several dozen Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions, but it continues to defy them. How is it possible to be brought into compliance?

      Seaford: The answer to the first question is yes, and the answer to the second is that Israel will be brought into compliance only by external pressure. There are many good and brave Israelis who deserve our support, but any idea that the Israelis may elect a government that wants to dismantle the settlements, comply with international law and so on has been shown by the last few decades, especially recently, to be fantasy. A just peace will come only from citizens in other states, especially the US, raising consciousness and electing governments that will exercise the required pressure on Israel. It is our historic responsibility.

      In the UK, in the 1980s, there were only a few thousand of us in the anti-apartheid movement. But Western politicians who had done nothing to help the imprisoned Nelson Mandela or isolate apartheid attended his funeral [in 2013]. When we succeed in dissolving Israeli apartheid, there will be numerous Western politicians who will falsely take the credit. But it feels better to have changed history than to pretend to have done so. 

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Kuwait Succession: Keeping the Boat Steady in Troubled Waters

      by

      On September 29, Kuwaiti Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah passed away after ruling for 14 years. Messages of condolences flooded from all over the world to mourn a statesman who will be remembered as a respected mediator in a troubled region. After serving for 40 years as foreign minister, Emir Sabah had earned robust diplomatic credentials which he harnessed during his reign to mediate in various crises, from Iraq to the Gulf Cooperation Council standoff, from Yemen to the Iran-Arab Gulf confrontation.

      Kuwaiti Efforts to Help Stabilize Iraq

      READ MORE

      The late Kuwaiti emir managed to uphold a balanced position and steady policy for his country throughout the 2010s, despite increasing regional polarization. With his passing, the Middle East has lost an important peacemaker. The newly appointed Emir Nawaf al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, the late emir’s half-brother, now faces the task of keeping Kuwait on track amid domestic and external challenges.

      Who is Who in the al-Sabah Family?

      Emir Nawaf, who is 83, stepped onto the throne immediately after the death of his predecessor, as is customary in royal law. The new emir built his career in the security sector, serving as interior and defense minister of Kuwait, as well as the deputy chief of the national guard. Emir Nawaf has never taken outright positions on key political matters and has stayed outside the spotlight throughout his career. His approach is unlikely to change during his reign, something that leads experts to foresee an overall continuity with the policies and positions of his predecessor.

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      The profile of the new crown prince who is next in the line of succession, Meshaal al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, reflects that of the emir in terms of both security background and low profile. Like Emir Nawaf, 80-year-old Meshaal al-Sabah also served at the interior ministry and has largely contributed to shaping the national guard since 2004. Notably, the crown prince was nominated by the emir and approved by the national assembly just one week after the succession. And although Emir Sabah’s illness had given enough time to the ruling family to make internal decisions, the swift transition has also been orchestrated to send a signal of stability inside and outside the country.

      There are two main takeaways from the choice of Meshaal al-Sabah as crown prince. First, the al-Ahmad branch of the royal family consolidates its position in the line of succession. The al-Sabah family is indeed made of two branches, al-Jaber and al-Salem, which have alternated as emirs of Kuwait. With Meshaal, the al-Jaber branch has set its third consecutive member in the line of succession, after Emir Sabah and Emir Nawaf.

      Compensation to the al-Salem branch will probably come in the form of senior government positions. Secondly, there has been no shift toward the next generation of the family as happened elsewhere in other Gulf monarchies. Several experts indeed expected a move similar to that taken by King Salman of Saudi Arabia, who moved on to the next generation of the family by appointing his son, Muhammad Bin Salman, as crown prince in 2015.

      Two members of the al-Sabah’s next generation are poised to race for leadership, if not now, then at least in the foreseeable future, given the age of the current and next incumbents. One is Emir Sabah’s son, Nasser al-Sabah. He is the mastermind of the national development plan, New Kuwait 2035, to boost private investment and reduce economic dependency from oil revenues. But Sheikh Nasser Sabah is also heralding the fight against corruption.

      This role rallied popular support around him and allowed him to target the former prime minister and the interior minister, two potential competitors, amid a corruption scandal in 2019. Another family member is often mentioned among competitors for power is Nasser al-Mohammad, a nephew of the late emir who was forced to step down after a public outcry against him in 2011.

      Challenges Ahead

      Portrayed as guarantors of stability, the new emir and crown prince will have to deal with domestic and external questions from the very beginning. The first challenge ahead is the parliamentary election scheduled for November. The Kuwaiti national assembly is by and large the region’s most powerful parliamentary body given its veto right on legislation and the right to take away confidence from individual ministers. In recent times, the assembly has often clashed with the government, causing deadlock and leading the emir to dissolve the parliament on multiple occasions. As a signal of appeasement with the assembly, Nawaf al-Sabah met with two opposition figures and received a list of demands back in September.

      Parliamentary support will be essential for his highness’ government to pass critical legislation on financial borrowing. The recent oil price crisis has severely depleted state coffers. This year, Kuwait’s debt has soared to $46 billion, around 33% of the GDP, due to a combination of extraordinary expenditures to fight COVID-19 and falling oil revenues. These factors motivated Moody’s decision to downgrade Kuwait from A1 to Aa2 for the first time at the end of September. Another reason the rating agency mentioned in its report was the inability of the wealthy Gulf monarchy to borrow money abroad.

      Embed from Getty Images

      But here, the parliament comes back into the picture. The Kuwaiti executive cannot issue sovereign bonds on international markets without previous approval from the national assembly. Back in August, the parliament turned down a bill allowing the government to issue external bonds. But once a new legislature comes into effect, and given Kuwait’s dangerous financial situation, the government will likely put forward a similar bill again.

      Besides immediate financial concerns, Kuwait wants to undergo structural reforms not dissimilar from those of its fellow monarchies across the Gulf. That is the idea behind the national development plan that should reduce the share of oil revenues in the economy from 90% to one-third, according to its designers. Kuwait’s “vision” centers around large-scale infrastructural projects, like the Mubarak al-Kabir port and Silk City, the $86-billion town under construction that is expected to become a pivot along China’s New Silk Road.

      Another key reform concerns subsidies, in particular on fuel, since it takes the lion share in the state budget. The first attempts at reform had been made at the time of the 2008 financial crisis, but they have repeatedly faced opposition from the national assembly. Such rejection of reforms was not the result of opportunistic behavior by MPs but reflected a widespread sentiment among Kuwaitis who fear that subsidy reforms and a structural transition would undermine their position within a post-rentier economy. These are but the main domestic challenges that the new emir and the crown prince will have to confront.

      Consequences for the Region

      For Kuwait, external challenges equal domestic ones. Kuwait has been the main broker of intra-Gulf dialogue to solve the standoff between Qatar on one side, and Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. While Kuwait’s mediating strategy is here to stay, the absence of an experienced negotiator such as Emir Sabah behind the process will likely hinder its impact. At the same time, Crown Prince Meshaal is allegedly close to Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a result of the years spent leading security cooperation against the Muslim Brotherhood along with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In support of this claim, the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman reportedly called Meshaal al-Sabah both before and after his appointment as crown prince.

      The prospects of a region-wide dialogue involving Iran and Saudi Arabia might be similarly affected. Along with Oman, Kuwait has repeatedly called on the two shores of the Persian Gulf to come to the negotiation table. The European Union and other international actors saw Kuwait as the best-positioned country to host and drive any mediation initiative. Nevertheless, a combination of domestic concerns and the lack of a recognized mediator in the monarchy’s leadership might undermine such efforts. On 27 September, the Kuwaiti prime minister proposed a regional dialogue to defuse regional tensions but, unsurprisingly, only Tehran responded positively to the call.

      The passing of Emir Sabah has deprived Kuwait of a shrewd statesman. The new incumbents will try to maintain the Gulf monarchy on its track. Yet domestic challenges abound, and external pressures to abandon neutrality will likely be reinforced. Withing the al-Sabah family, the next generation is waiting to enter into the line of succession, positing major challenges for Emir Nawaf and Crown Prince Meshaal.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      How Will Joe Biden Approach Iran?

      by

      Addressing months of speculation over the future of US policy toward Tehran, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said on September 22 at the UN General Assembly, “We are not a bargaining chip in the US elections and domestic policy.” Earlier this year, Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden said if he is elected, the US will rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the Iran nuclear deal — which the current administration withdrew from in May 2018. This set of the rumor mills about a major shift in Washington’s handling of Iran.

      The JCPOA was signed in 2015 by the P5+1 group — the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany — and the Iranians in a diplomatic effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet today, the agreement is standing on its last legs. US President Donald Trump, who campaigned against the agreement during the 2016 presidential election, has imposed a policy of maximum pressure on Iran in order to force it to negotiate a better deal.

      360° Context: The 2020 US Election Explained

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      For the Trump administration, an improved agreement would address Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and its expansionist policies in the Middle East — two issues that the Obama administration and the European Union failed to incorporate in the JCPOA. This infuriated US allies in the Middle East, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which in particular has been on the receiving end of Iran’s destabilizing actions in the Gulf.

      With the presidential election on November 3, the question of whether US policy toward Iran will change should Biden win the keys to the White House is attracting the attention of pundits and policymakers in the Arab region. 

      Joe Biden’s Position on Iran

      Biden, who was vice president under the Obama administration, explained in a recent op-ed his proposed position regarding Iran. He said, “I have no illusions about the challenges the regime in Iran poses to America’s security interests, to our friends and partners and to [Iran’s] own people.” He listed four key principles as he outlined his approach.

      Embed from Getty Images

      First, he promised that a Biden administration would prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Second, he committed himself to rejoin the JCPOA if Iran returns to “strict compliance with the nuclear deal,” and only as “a starting point for follow-on negotiations.” In Biden’s words, these negotiations would aim at strengthening and extending the nuclear deal’s provisions and addressing “other issues of concern.” Third, he made a commitment to “push back against Iran‘s destabilizing activities” in the Middle East, which threaten US allies in the region. He also promised to continue to use “targeted sanctions against Iran‘s human rights abuses, its support for terrorism and ballistic missile program.”

      Finally, he said, if the Iranians choose to threaten vital American interests and troops in the region, the US would not hesitate to confront them. Despite this, Biden wrote that he is “ready to walk the path of diplomacy if Iran takes steps to show it is ready too.”

      But Will His Policy Be Any Different to Trump’s?

      In relation to Saudi Arabia, Biden issued a statement on the second anniversary of the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in which he said, “Under a Biden-Harris administration, we will reassess our relationship with the Kingdom, end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.”

      Although Biden’s approach is a departure from Trump’s maximum pressure on Iran and with regard to Saudi Arabia in its intervention in Yemen, it is possible that Biden might end up — at least concerning Iran —applying Trump’s same tactics. This is partly because, according to Biden himself, Iran has stockpiled 10 times as much enriched uranium since Trump has been in office. This is further complicated by the fact there is no guarantee that Iran will surrender its stockpiles to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

      Additionally, Iran has repeatedly declared that it will not negotiate additional provisions to the JCPOA, which is in direct conflict with Biden’s intention to put enforce additional restrictions on Tehran. Moreover, putting pressure on Iran to end its destabilizing regional activities, as Biden has promised, would certainly lead to points of confrontation between the two countries, especially in Iraq and Syria. If any of these scenarios take place, a Biden administration would be forced to impose even tougher sanctions on Iran with the help of EU countries.

      Three Key Factors

      Biden’s decision to rejoin the JCPOA rests on three issues. The first is the balance of power within Congress between the Republicans and the Democrats. The second is how Iran fits into his overall policy toward China. Finally, the position of the Saudi kingdom and its allies regarding any future agreement with Iran would play a key role.

      First, it is well known that members of Congress from both parties resisted then-President Barack Obama’s policy of negotiating with Iran and insisted on reviewing any agreement before the US would ratify it. For this reason, a majority in Congress passed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act in 2015, which forced the president to send any agreement he reaches with Iran to the US Congress for review.

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      When the P5+1 hit a breakthrough with the JCPOA, Obama sent the draft agreement to Congress as per the act, but the nuclear deal was neither approved nor rejected. The House of Representatives overwhelmingly opposed the deal. Yet Republicans in the Senate could not block the agreement because they did not have a 60-vote majority to move forward with a vote against the JCPOA. In other words, almost half of Congress — which consists of the House and the Senate — were against the Iran deal.

      If Biden becomes the 46th US president and decides to rejoin the agreement, he will face the same dilemma as Congress will have to review the JCPOA yet again, a process that will create tension between the president and Congress. Though considering the president needs Congress to pass domestic reforms related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the US economy, Biden would most likely not be in rush to act on Iran.

      Second, Biden would link the deal with Iran with his policy toward China. As president, Biden will continue Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy of redirecting the US military presence from the Middle East and other regions toward East Asia to confront China’s growing influence in the region.

      Meanwhile, Beijing has expanded its position in the Gulf where it has established several strategic partnerships, which are essential to connect China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to markets in Europe. With Iran’s signing of a strategic comprehensive partnership agreement with China in 2016 and its move to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Iran is very much part of the BRI.

      Thus, a Biden administration will likely tie Iran to its China containment policy. That is to say, any US policy that aims to weaken China will have to incorporate some pressure on the Iranians to be effective, including maintaining existing sanctions on Iran. Further, Iranian ties with China will push the US under Biden’s leadership to strengthen its relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in order to prevent China from extending its influence into the Middle East. The Biden administration cannot do so without taking into consideration the interests of Saudi Arabia, which are linked to the kind of agreement the US may strike with Iran.

      Finally, while the US has become self-sufficient in terms of oil supply, the world economy is still reliant on Saudi oil exports. Saudi Arabia is also the heart of the Muslim world, and it maintains control over 10% of global trade that passes through the Red Sea. The kingdom’s significance as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East is also increased with the demise of Syria, Iraq and the domestic troubles in Egypt, not to mention the challenges that Turkey is causing for the US in the region.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Accordingly, a Biden administration cannot afford to turn its back on Saudi interests. Such a policy would force Saudi Arabia to diversify its security, which would undoubtedly include strengthening its relations with China and other US rivals like Russia. This is something the US cannot afford to happen if it wishes to effectively confront its main competitors — China and Russia.

      As for Yemen, there is no reason that prevents Saudi Arabia and a Biden administration from reaching an agreement. In 2015, the kingdom intervened in Yemen to prevent Iran from threatening its southern borders. Saudi Arabia wants the war to end sooner rather than later, and it wants the Yemenis to thrive in their own state. However, the Yemen conflict is connected to the Iranian expansionist policies in the Middle East, and Biden’s administration would have to address this in its approach toward Iran.

      When adding to these reasons the fact that the conservatives won the Iranian parliamentary elections in early 2020 and are poised to win the presidential election in June 2021, it is highly doubtful that Iran will accept a renegotiated nuclear deal with the US.

      For all these reasons, returning to the JCPOA is unlikely.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Does Saad Hariri Really Believe He Can Save Lebanon?

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      My parents used to say, “Eat with your mouth and not your eyes.” This may be good advice for newly-minted Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri. He is clearly unable to resist trying once again to raise Lebanon from its deathbed, and this time the consequences may be more disastrous than just a bit of heartburn. Yes, I’m sure his supporters see this as the ultimate act of patriotism, and hopefully, he will be successful, but the odds are against him.

      First of all, Hariri is a well-known figure who understands the political calculus of his supporters and opponents. Yet this is not similar to his deal that brought the presidency to Michel Aoun in 2016. The reforms called for, and that Hariri has said he supports, are literally aimed at dismantling the edifice of economic and political corruption that has led to the erosion of Lebanon’s well-being.

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      Secondly, there is the matter of the timeframe called for under the French plan for change that serves as Hariri’s point of reference. It calls for significant reforms underway in six months as well as capital controls, anti-corruption measures, a robust social safety net and radical changes to how the government and banking system operate. Hariri, a three-time prime minister, has said that he will accept a government with a shelf life of six months and focus on the political and economic reforms to refresh and reinvigorate the country.

      Will the oligarchy, of which he is a member, yield to his office the necessary executive authority to bypass parliament to enact laws and regulations? There is no brotherly bond or even public tolerance between Hariri and Gebran Bassil, leader of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement. So, will the prime minister’s reliance on Hezbollah’s support bring him into the cross-hairs of US sanctions?

      A major sticking point will be the composition of the Hariri cabinet, which he promised will be made up of “nonpolitically aligned experts with the mission of economic, financial, and administrative reforms contained in the French initiative road map.” The downfall of the most recent prime minister, Mustapha Adib, was over this exact point, and it is a road too far for many of the political elites.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Finally, how much longer will the Lebanese people put up with leaders who are more concerned with their patrimony and their constituents rather than the health, safety and well-being of the country? Hariri may have the best of intentions, but we know which way that road can lead. As Al Jazeera reports, “Hariri’s return marks the biggest challenge yet for activists involved in the nationwide uprising against the country’s corrupt political class that had led to the resignation of Hariri and his coalition government last year.”

      The economic realities are well known, ranging from extensive corruption to government mismanagement and a failed government model built on cronyism. Soon, more than 70% of the people could be below the poverty line as the Lebanese pound has lost 80% of its value, unemployment is around 35% and people struggle with restrictions limiting access to their funds in banks. According to journalist Souad Lazkani, as many as 1 million will be unemployed by 2021 unless, by some miracle, reforms are urgently implemented by the new government.

      Deja Vu

      Hariri’s restart as prime minister is dreaded by many in the street who feel a sense of deja vu from the last decade. “Hariri’s return is the peak of the counter-revolution,” Nizar Hassan, a political activist told Al Jazeera. “A pillar of the political establishment, a multi-millionaire who represents the banks and foreign interests, and a symbol of inefficient governance and widespread corruption: He represents everything we revolted against.”

      So, the demonstrators who have been protesting for several months have to decide whether to publicly oppose these latest steps to maintain the status quo or come up with an alternative that, hopefully, will be nonviolent. With the hyperinflation that has caused shortages of basic goods like medicine and foods, the growing instability and dwindling prospects for change, Lebanon faces a very difficult winter.

      This is Hariri’s multilayered and multifaceted challenge. As he assembles his cabinet and prepares his ministerial statement of his government’s vision, he will be watched closely by people hoping that he can rise above the sectarian politics of the past, as well as by those who are most threatened by reforms. It is a difficult road ahead indeed.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      When It Comes to Israel, Saudi Arabia Is Playing an Astute Game

      by

      The lengthy interview that Prince Bandar bin Sultan gave to Al Arabiya English has been the subject of much commentary. On October 9, the BBC weighed in with an article headlined “Signs Saudis Edging Toward Historic Peace Deal.” Analysis by security correspondent Frank Gardner drew heavily on the Bandar interview to argue that “a Saudi-Israeli peace deal, while not necessarily imminent, is now a real possibility.” Gardner suggested that the changes initiated by the “maverick” Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman augured well for such a deal: “Women can now drive, there is public entertainment, and the country is slowly opening up to tourism.” A very conservative society was being readied for a potentially dramatic move — the recognition of the state of Israel.

      Had Prince Bandar’s been the only recent voice of a senior ruling family member on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, then it could be said that such a move was well and truly underway. However, like Bandar, another former Saudi ambassador and intelligence head had given interviews in English to both Arabian Business and to CNBC. His comments, however, have received little analysis.

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      Whereas Prince Bandar had castigated the Palestinian leadership for failing to grasp numerous opportunities — “they always bet on the losing side” was one of his more pungent denunciations — Prince Turki bin Faisal did not follow the same path. He chose to reiterate Saudi government support for the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative that called for recognition of the state of Israel by all Arab countries in return for the withdrawal of occupation forces and settler communities from the West Bank, recognition of a border on the 1967 Green Line and East Jerusalem as the capital of an independent Palestine.

      Where the Kingdom Stands

      Speaking to Arabian Business on September 26, Prince Turki was unequivocal: “Government officials have expressed the view that the kingdom is committed to the Arab Peace Initiative and will not change that position until there is a sovereign Palestinian state with its capital as East Jerusalem. We have not moved from that position in spite of what Mr. Netanyahu is throwing in, either through innuendo or smirk, smirk, winks at, particularly, Western media. … This is where the kingdom stands on this issue.”

      He made no mention of Jared Kushner’s Peace to Prosperity plan that would see much of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, annexed by Israel with Palestinians left with non-contiguous pockets of land, without East Jerusalem as a capital and a very constrained and encumbered semi-state beholden to the Israelis for its survival. In other words, the Swiss-cheese effect that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long privately presented as his ultimate solution to the Palestinian question is realized with the Kushner deal.

      Turki did, however, comment favorably on a Joe Biden presidency, saying that the former vice president “is not ignorant of the value of the relationship, he knows the kingdom and recognizes the importance of this relationship.” In endorsing Biden, the prince took a sly, though unstated, dig at the ignorance of President Donald Trump and his attitude that the Saudis are a cash cow, useful for weapons sales and little else unless that be to normalize relations with Israel.

      He had been less diplomatic in the interview with CNBC’s Hadley Gamble on September 23. Gamble had asked him if his father, King Faisal, would have been disappointed with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain’s recognition of Israel without a two-state solution for the Palestinians being first arrived at. “Most definitely,” he replied, “that’s my personal view knowing his commitment to getting a quid pro quo between Israel and Arab countries.” He noted the oil sanctions that Faisal had invoked in 1973 during the Ramadan War was to “force the United States to be an honest broker between Israel and the Arab world. I must say that President Trump is not such an honest broker, so yes, I think the late king would have been disappointed.” Prince Turki carefully sidestepped a question about splits in the ruling family over Palestine while noting that the Arab Peace Initiative has been “reaffirmed by King Salman many times, most recently in cabinet meetings last week and the week before.”

      Astute Game

      Gardner, in his piece about Bandar’s attack on the Palestinian leadership, writes: “Such words, said a Saudi official close to the ruling family, would not have been aired on Saudi-owned television without the prior approval of both King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.” He is entirely correct in that statement, and the same is true for Prince Turki. He, too, could only have spoken so frankly with the knowledge that his comments had prior approval. So what is going on here with these very different takes on the Israel-Palestine conflict from two royal greybeards who have, thus far, survived the several purges Mohammed bin Salman has inflicted on the ruling family?

      A clear indication that Turki al Faisal was on secure ground were the comments by the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, as part of a lengthy interview he gave to the Washington Institute on October 15. Prince Faisal averred that the kingdom was committed to the process of finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and part of the process was “an eventual normalization with Israel as envisioned by the Arab Peace Plan.” Regarding Bandar’s attack on the leadership he said: “That’s Prince Bandar’s opinion. I believe that the Palestinian leaders genuinely want what’s best for their people.”

      Take it all as a sign that in this, at least, the often headstrong Saudi crown prince is playing a more astute game: on the one hand supporting the Trump line on Palestine and normalization while on the other implacably rejecting it. Maybe, Mohammed bin Salman seems to be saying, we are for it but then maybe we are not. If so, it is an eerie echo of what President Trump said when asked if the crown prince had ordered the killing of the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi: “It could very well be that the crown prince had knowledge of this tragic event — maybe he did and maybe he didn’t!”

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      The Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal

      by

      The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the Iran nuclear deal — is uncertain. In the absence of US leadership, representatives of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, China, Russia and Iran met on September 1 in Vienna to discuss the accord.

      The deal, which imposes limitations on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program, was agreed in July 2015 between the Iranians and the P5+1 group — China, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States — and implemented six months later. The deal was struck when the Obama administration was in the White House following years of negotiations. The JCPOA gave Iran relief from international economic sanctions in return for dismantling major parts of its nuclear program and giving access to its facilities for inspection.

      Reworking US Policy in the Middle East and North Africa

      READ MORE

      Yet ever since Donald Trump was elected president of the United States in November 2016, the future of the JCPOA has hung in the balance. Trump made it a campaign promise to pull out of the Iran deal. He kept his word and officially withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018, saying the deal is “defective” and did not address Iran’s ballistic missile program or its interference in the affairs of other countries in the Middle East.

      Washington has since reinstated US sanctions on Iran and sought to penalize any nation doing trade with the Iranians, which has led to widespread criticism. In response, Iran has resumed its uranium enrichment at the Fordow nuclear plant, which is banned under the JCPOA.

      The events surrounding the Iran deal have seen their ups and downs, but one thing is for sure: The collapse of the JCPOA is in no one’s best interest.

      A Rocky Year

      Several incidents have marked 2020 as a critical year for Iran. In January, the US assassinated Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in an airstrike in Baghdad, which led to a further escalation in tensions. In response, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said, “Severe revenge awaits the criminals.” The Iranians later revealed they would no longer comply with the limits set to uranium enrichment under the nuclear deal.

      In July, a fire broke out in Natanz, Iran’s enrichment site. The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization claimed the explosion was the result of “sabotage,” and officials further stressed that the incident “could slow the development of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges.” Both the assassination of Soleimani and the explosion in Natanz have rocked the nuclear deal, which is standing on its last legs.

      Making Promises and Breaking Them

      The JCPOA is not the first international agreement the US has withdrawn from under the Trump administration. In August 2019, the US officially pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, an agreement signed by Washington and Moscow in 1987 that sought to eliminate the arsenals of short and intermediate-range missiles of both countries. Russia reciprocated and called the INF Treaty “formally dead.” Just months later, in May 2020, the US announced its decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, an accord that allows unarmed aerial surveillance flights over dozens of countries.

      When it comes to bilateral agreements, the world has experienced challenges with enforcing arms control and nonproliferation agreements, particularly since Trump was elected. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) — which, despite its own uncertainty, is the last remaining arms control pact between the US and Russia — is one clear example. The fact that Trump wants to strike a new deal with Iran but is quick to pull the trigger at torpedoing international agreements — including the 2015 Paris Climate Accord — does not bode well for building trust with the Iranians.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Considering that US–Iran diplomatic relations are a nonstarter under the Trump administration, the result of the US presidential election on November 3 will be critical. President Trump has promised to reach a new deal with Iran “within four weeks” if he is reelected. If he wins, his administration would have to reshape its approach toward Iran in a constructive way to meet the timeline he has set. On the other hand, if Democratic nominee Joe Biden wins, his administration would likely rejoin the JCPOA, as well as seek additional concessions from Tehran. In a recent op-ed for CNN, Biden stated, “If Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.”

      Biden served as the vice president under the previous Obama administration, which, together with the P5+1 group, negotiated the JCPOA back in 2015. Therefore, it is safe to say that the future of the nuclear deal might just rest on the outcome of the US election.

      A Regional Arms Race

      For now, however, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA has weakened the impact of the accord. More importantly, the near-collapse of the deal could have a direct impact on the next Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference in 2021, potentially drawing criticism from non-nuclear-weapon states that may wish to pursue civilian programs of their own.

      The JCPOA is not only important for global nonproliferation efforts, but also for stability in the Middle East. The complete failure of the deal would have severe implications. It would make neighboring countries feel less secure. As a result, this would encourage not just states but potentially non-state actors — such as terrorist groups — to focus on developing nuclear weapons. This would lead to an arms race in the geostrategic Middle East.

      Developing a civilian nuclear program is a long and expensive process that involves extensive oversight by international bodies. Therefore, while it may be an unlikely scenario, regional states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may think that nuclear weapons are essential for national security due to their rivalry with Iran and start building their own arsenal. The potential collapse of the JCPOA clearly has global ramifications that could be catastrophic for nuclear nonproliferation.

      Sanctions on Iran

      On August 20, France, Germany and the UK issued a joint statement saying they do not support the US request for the UN Security Council to initiate the “snapback mechanism” of the JCPOA, which would reimpose the international sanctions against Iran that were lifted in 2015. As the US is no longer a party to the JCPOA, it has limited influence over its enforcement. Therefore, the Security Council rejected the US move.

      The Iranian economy was already fragile before President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, and US-enforced sanctions are further complicating the situation. High living costs, a deep recession and plummeting oil exports are just the tip of the iceberg.

      The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is seen as an important mechanism to organize trade between Germany, France and Britain on the one side, and Iran on the other. INSTEX allows European companies to do business with Iran and bypass US sanctions. On March 31, these three European countries confirmed that INSTEX had “successfully concluded its first transaction, facilitating the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran.”

      Although INSTEX can be helpful for Iran, US sanctions have dealt a fatal blow to the country’s economy. According to the World Bank, Iran’s GDP “contracted by 7.6% in the first 9 months of 2019/20 (April-December 2019),” mostly due to a 37% drop in the oil sector.

      For the US, sanctions are a strategic way to deter Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Yet they can also be counterproductive. Iran is aware of the strategic benefit the JCPOA has for other states. This includes global and regional security. In this regard, the joint statement on upholding the nuclear deal during the recent meeting in Vienna came as no surprise. But if multilateral sanctions are reimposed, that could be the final straw for Iran. This may lead the Iranians to walk away from the JCPOA and up the game with its nuclear program.

      Nuclear Nonproliferation

      With all of this in mind, it is vital that the remaining parties to the JCPOA continue with constructive dialogue to try to uphold the agreement. Everyone benefits from the deal, and its success depends on each side’s fulfillment of their responsibilities and commitments, particularly Iran’s full compliance.

      Most importantly, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is necessary for the future of nuclear nonproliferation. If the deal collapses, then the world enters uncharted territory.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More