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      Why Kuwait Rejects Normalization With Israel

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      On August 13, the United Arab Emirates agreed in principle to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for suspending the annexation of portions of the West Bank. This US-brokered deal reflects years of growing ties between Israel and Gulf states that have long rested just below the surface of official relations. Saudi Arabia has shared intelligence, Bahrain has called for peace and the UAE has penned deals with Israeli defense companies. For their part, Qatar previously maintained commercial ties with Israel and Oman has hosted Israeli leaders over the years. Although their means and motivations differ, it is clear that Gulf-Israeli relations are rising.

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      Yet one Gulf state rejects this trend: Kuwait. According to Al-Qabas, a Kuwaiti newspaper, government sources affirm that “Kuwait maintains its position and will be the last country to normalize with Israel.” Beyond Kuwaiti officials, analysts and academics, few have addressed Kuwait’s position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

      Adam Hoffman and Moran Zaga acknowledged in February that Kuwait is “the only Gulf state that opposes even discrete normalisation with Israel.” In January 2019, Giorgio Cafiero wrote that “Kuwait has become the one GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] state that refuses to see warmer ties with Israel as prudent.” Even White House senior adviser Jared Kushner said to Reuters that Kuwait is “out there taking a very radical view on the conflict to date in favour of the Palestinians.”

      Why does Kuwait take a different approach to Israel compared to its Gulf neighbors? Kuwait’s democratic institutions, historical ties to Palestine and pan-Arab ideals are three factors that lead both its government and society to reject normalization.

      Parliament and Parlors

      Kuwait’s most unique aspect is its semi-democratic institutions. The national assembly wields significant power and channels public sentiment against normalization. Notably, Speaker Marzouq al-Ghanim chastised Israeli Knesset members in 2017 as “occupiers and murderers of children.” Parliamentarian Osama al-Shaheen declared in late April 2020 that “Kuwait is against any cultural, political, or social normalization with the ‘Zionist entity.’” This statement is emblematic of the relative autonomy of Kuwait‘s Islamist political opposition and their position in parliament. As of August 18, 39 of Kuwait’s 50 parliamentarians signed a statement stressing their view against normalization with Israel.

      In addition to the formal institution of parliament, Kuwait’s distinct political culture is also reflected in diwaniyya. These gatherings in parlors attached to homes represent the intersection of political campaigning and social commentary in Kuwait. Diwaniyya are more autonomous from government oversight than other Gulf majlis gatherings, resulting in a more free exchange of ideas. Among the Gulf publics, Kuwaiti civil society has been most able to pressure the government against normalization.

      Palestinian Community

      Another factor that distinguishes Kuwait is its link to one of the Gulf’s largest Palestinian communities. Beginning with immigration in the 1940s, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians settled in Kuwait and ties improved after Yasser Arafat founded Fatah while living in the country from 1959. However, Arafat’s support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 degraded relations severely, resulting in the expulsion and exodus of most of Kuwait’s 400,000 Palestinian residents.

      Ultimately, relations improved in 2013 when the Palestinian Authority opened an embassy in Kuwait City. During a recent international conference, Palestinian Ambassador Rami Tahboub praised Kuwait as “proactive in supporting the Palestinian cause.” Today, around 80,000 Palestinian residents remain as an integral aspect of Kuwait’s normative commitment to Palestine.

      Pan-Arab Solidarity

      Perhaps the strongest aspect of Kuwait’s position is that its leaders, especially Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, remain dedicated to Arab nationalism and Muslim solidarity. Kuwaiti officials have been more forceful in their condemnation of Israel than their Gulf peers. In July 2018, Mansour al-Otaibi, Kuwait’s ambassador to the United Nations, condemned Israeli use of force “against unarmed Palestinian people” as “war crimes and crimes against humanity.” In February 2019, Kuwait’s deputy foreign minister, Khaled al-Jarallah, was quick to affirm that a group picture taken during the Warsaw security conference, in which Kuwaiti and Israeli representatives were part of, was not indicative of normalization.

      Kuwait has also broken from Gulf consensus toward American peace initiatives to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Kuwait boycotted the “Peace to Prosperity” workshop in Bahrain in June 2019. Members of its parliament criticized the gathering as “consecrating the occupation, imparting legitimacy onto it, and charging the Gulf and Arab states with the expenses and burdens of installing it.” Following US President Donald Trump’s unveiling of the so-called “deal of the century,” Ghanim criticized the plan and theatrically dropped it into a proverbial “dustbin of history.”

      A Steady Stance

      Kuwait completely rejects the expanding cultural, diplomatic, economic and security ties characterizing broader Gulf–Israeli relations. Arguments related to divergent threat perceptions are insufficient to explain Kuwait’s exception considering it has historically been just as, and perhaps even more, vulnerable to jihadi attacks and Iranian subversion as its southern neighbors. What makes Kuwait unique is its democratic tradition, historical links to Palestinian political movements and the commitment to pan-Islamic and Arab nationalist ideals.

      The Kuwaiti exception holds two implications for the study of international politics in the Middle East. First, Kuwait reveals that small states can wield sizable ideational power in international institutions. Second, Kuwait challenges a recent claim that “Arab states have lost interest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue because there’s a whole host of other things going.” When analysts address Arab-Israeli relations, it is important to explore the causes and qualities of states’ distinct approaches. As its Gulf neighbors warm to Israel, Kuwait stands out.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Why the UAE Wants Somalia in the Yemen Conflict

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      In late June, the United Arab Emirates asked Somalia to enter the conflict in Yemen in return for financial incentives and the reopening of a medical facility. Somalia’s instant rejection partially resulted from the strained Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi relationship. Why did the UAE initially make the offer? The answer has more to do with longer-term strategic calculations than Somalia’s military prowess.

      Well documented is the Somali National Army’s (SNA) decline from one of Africa’s most effective fighting forces into corruption and inefficiency. Efforts to breathe new life into the country’s military nevertheless took a turn for the better following the brokering of a National Security Architecture. Signed by the federal government and member states in April 2017, this outlines the size and scope of Somalia’s security forces. The agreement also adds further definition to international efforts to redevelop the SNA’s capabilities.

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      High-quality training provided by the United States, the African Union (AU) and others has enabled the SNA to score some notable victories over the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab, including the recapture of resource-rich Middle Juba as well as towns and villages that were out of reach for years. However, Somalia’s armed forces are by no means the finished article, with US military personnel continuing to provide intelligence and logistics for special forces operations. A recent Pentagon report also highlights limited progress with Operation Badbaado, a joint SNA-AU mission to retake Somalia’s southern provinces from al-Shabaab.

      Concerns also remain over the SNA’s lack of numbers (approximately 20,000 personnel), poor quality hardware and continued susceptibility to corruption. Furthermore, despite the emergence of the National Security Architecture, forces loyal to Mogadishu are not necessarily under the same flag. Back in February, SNA troops clashed with members of the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaa, a moderate Sufi militia that has also taken the fight to al-Shabaab. The skirmish prompted warnings that internal rivalries are slowing Somalia’s efforts to defeat the insurgency.

      Ties Unbind

      It would be naïve to assume that the UAE is oblivious to the current state of the SNA and the narrow capabilities it would bring to Yemen’s conflict. This also extends to providing humanitarian relief for Somali migrants caught in the crosshairs of the warring factions and allegedly experiencing mistreatment at the hands of their “hosts.” The UAE knows this because, prior to the Gulf crisis that erupted in mid-2017, Abu Dhabi was also a major provider of military support to Somalia.

      Back in 2014, the Emirates embarked on its own program to train and mentor Somali troops. This arrangement started to unravel following Mogadishu’s refusal to take sides in the ongoing blockade of Qatar. The final nail came April 2018, after Somali security forces seized $9.6 million from a plane recently landed from the UAE. Despite Abu Dhabi’s protestations that the money was to pay the troops it was training, Mogadishu suspected the cash was to be used for more insidious purposes.

      With an irksome SNA now effectively someone else’s problem, the UAE recalibrated its support for Somalia’s semi-autonomous regions. This included military and police training and the construction of an airbase at the Somaliland port of Berbera. Situated just 300 kilometers away from Yemen, the city is a strategically important location for a country heavily involved in the conflict, not to mention determined to cement its influence around the Red Sea.

      However, the UAE’s relations with Somalia’s autonomous states are by no means perfect. On March 4, Abu Dhabi announced the cancellation of its construction of military bases in Somaliland. While presented as its own decision, it is speculated that Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi actually called time on the arrangement. Some analysts have mooted behind-the-scenes tensions over the UAE’s regional presence as a possible reason. Elsewhere, Puntland’s policymakers have expressed dissatisfaction at DP World’s lack of progress developing the Port of Bosaso. Arbitration between the federal government and a freight company is scheduled for this month.  

      For its part, Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo offset poor relations with the UAE by drawing closer to Qatar and Turkey. Over the past decade, Doha has reportedly invested $4 billion in the country and recently struck a deal to build a seaport at Hobyo on the Bab-el-Mandeb. While Turkey has also poured billions into Somalia, Ankara’s most significant investment comes in the shape of Camp TURKSOM, Turkey’s biggest overseas military base. Costing approximately $50 million, this Turkish facility assists in the training of SNA recruits. It also underscores Ankara’s growing influence across the Horn of Africa region.

      Meet the Opposition

      Just as Abu Dhabi knows all about the SNA’s limitations, it also knew its request for Mogadishu to become involved in the Yemen conflict would be rebuffed. Beyond Somalia’s brotherly affinity with its neighbors across the Gulf of Aden, the aforementioned investments demonstrate the depth of its relations with two of the UAE’s biggest strategic rivals. However, this could change once the country is in a position to hold parliamentary and presidential elections.

      Originally scheduled to take place on November 27, 2020, and February 8, 2021, both elections have fallen victim to COVID-19, flooding, internal security, constitutional challenges and technical issues. Once these problems resolve satisfactorily, Farmajo and his Tayo Party’s main rival will most likely be the Forum for National Parties (FNP). Formed in November 2019, the alliance unites six political parties opposed to the “blatant violation of the constitution and other laws by the current government.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      Among the politicians on the FNP ticket are two former presidents, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Both have difficult relations with Qatar. After being elected head of Somalia’s transitional federal government in 2009, Doha urged Sharif Sheikh to negotiate with all warring factions, only for Sharif Sheikh to eventually accuse Qatar of supporting al-Shabaab. Despite funding Hassan Sheikh’s 2012 presidential bid, Doha eventually lost patience with his government, accusing it of being as ineffective as its predecessors.

      Accordingly, the UAE and other blockading states seemingly have a cohesive Somali opposition movement to throw its weight behind come election time. Electoral success could result in the redrawing of Mogadishu’s relations with the Emirates at the expense of Somalia’s partnerships with Turkey and Qatar. While the FNP will fight both elections on an anti-corruption and pro-constitution platform, the potential to spin the UAE’s request to join the Yemen conflict is unmissable. By failing to support its neighbor, Somalia has deprived itself of much-needed investment and access to health care just when it needs it most.

      As the Emirates Policy Center sees it, the Somali opposition’s failure to align behind one candidate will keep Famajo in power. To overcome this, the FNP might just be the political movement to offer the incumbent president a serious run for his money. If so, then the UAE might have already signaled what it wants in return for its moral and material support: at least a token SNA presence in the Yemen conflict and the normalization of ties with Abu Dhabi. Achieving both will strengthen the UAE’s influence in a region of critical strategic importance to Gulf powerhouses.

      *[Gulf State Analytics a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The UAE’s Deal With Israel Is a Sham

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      Gary Grappo, the chairman of Fair Observer, has commented in these columns on the deal between Israel and the UAE that has shocked many in the Arab and Muslim world. As a former US diplomat, Grappo expresses his satisfaction, or perhaps simply his relief, at the idea “that Arab states will no longer hold their interests hostage to the long-dormant Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations.”

      That formulation of the dynamics of a complex multilateral relationship reveals what may appear to be a less than diplomatic bias. Accusing one party of holding a hostage sounds like taking sides rather than playing the honest broker. Moreover, Grappo’s judgment may be premature when he evokes “Arab states” using the plural. The United Arab Emirates is only one state. The most influential nation in the region, Saudi Arabia, has remained prudently silent on the UAE’s initiative.

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      Echoing the US claims that the deal to normalize relations between Israel and the UAE was a major step toward peace, Grappo asserts: “The UAE extracted one apparent concession from Jerusalem: [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu will suspend annexation plans for the West Bank.”

      Here is today’s 3D definition:

      Concession:

      In diplomatic language, anything that can be presented as an impressive, painful sacrifice from one side that will be made highlighted even more emphatically if it entails no actual sacrifice
      Example: “We tend to equate progress with concessions. We can no longer make that mistake.”
      — H. Rap Brown, Oakland, 1968

      Contextual Note

      In an article for Haaretz, Anshel Pfeffer underscores the one major problem with calling this a concession. “Netanyahu never had a real plan for annexing parts of the West Bank,” he writes. “There was no timetable, no map, no draft resolution to be brought to the government or the Knesset.”

      Grappo does call the concession “apparent” while admiring Netanyahu’s “remarkable ability to advance Israel’s interests.” This translates as his ability to marginalize Palestinian interests. Grappo understands that the postponement of the annexation of Palestinian territory in the West Bank “is a mere short-term sop” and that “annexation will be a fact of life.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      In other words, the deal was shamefully one-sided and, as a negotiation, thoroughly meaningless. To consider it a negotiation would require believing that the UAE was bargaining in favor of the Palestinians’ interests. But its rulers care no more about the Palestinians than they do about the Yemenis, whose civilian populations they have been bombing for the past five years in partnership with Saudi Arabia.

      Grappo gives an indication of his personal attitude to this complex question in a paragraph that contains a series of what might be called “attitude tropes.” He tells us Ramallah should “get on with it … while there’s still some chance for an independent Palestinian state.” Americans are prone to judge even moral issues in terms of the cost of wasted time. The rhetoric continues with the complaint that “previous Arab conditions to the normalization of ties with Israel have exceeded their shelf life.” What could be more insulting to Palestinians than seeing comparing what is for them an existential question to the presentation of perishable consumer products?

      Grappo then offers this unfounded assertion: “Arab states are moving on.” This is only marginally different and slightly more diplomatic than Elon Musk’s recent tweet defending US foreign policy: “We will coup whoever we want. Deal with it.” Grappo continues by offering this avuncular advice to the Palestinians: “[President Mahmoud] Abbas and the Palestinians need to do the same.” He menacingly warns that even a Joe Biden victory in the US presidential election “won’t change this.”

      Marwan Bishara, Al Jazeera’s senior political analyst, sees things differently. He explains the UAE’s initiative in these terms: “The agreement rewards US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for their protracted assault on the Palestinians over the past four years.” Trita Parsi, a Middle East specialist at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, quotes a knowledgeable Arab official: “This was something that the UAE did in order to be able to help Trump with re-election.”

      Bishara makes an important point that Grappo prefers to ignore or dismiss. “Once signed, and implemented, [the deal] is likely to embolden Netanyahu‘s coalition, deepen Israel‘s occupation [of Palestinian territory] and strengthen Israel‘s alliance with Arab autocrats,” Bishara writes. If true, that can hardly be a recipe for future peace.

      Parsi and others have noted of the deal that “the Arab street sees it as a betrayal of the Palestinians.” This may be the best explanation for Saudi Arabia’s silence. Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia and its de facto ruler, can’t afford to provoke his own people any more than his outrageously autocratic behavior has already done. As with any population — Belarus, for example — there is a point at which even an authoritarian rule begins to crack.

      Moreover, as The Indian Express points out, though Mohammed bin Salman is almost certainly on board with the US-Israel–UAE alliance, “as the leader of the Arab world, and the custodian of Islam’s holiest shrines, [Saudi Arabia] might have preferred someone else to take the revolutionary first step on this.” And most commentators seem not to have noticed another factor. This new alliance reinforces the already growing role of Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, as the top strategic leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It propels the UAE into a stronger geopolitical position within the Arabian Peninsula that could eclipse troubled Saudi Arabia.

      This is occurring at the same time as when Mohammed bin Salman’s image has taken a new hit. The crown prince is being sued in the US by former Saudi intelligence officer Saad al-Jabri for an attempt on his life, similar to the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018.

      Historical Note

      Marwan Bishara reminds his readers of the UAE’s recent role in Middle Eastern history. He calls the UAE “the most pro-war in the region, rivalled only by Israel.” Created in 1971, this young nation’s political actions over the past decade have been marked by its government’s increasingly aggressive bellicosity. “The UAE and Saudi Arabia’s opposition to the Arab Spring [in 2011] and to any form of democracy in the region, and their deep hostility towards all popular, progressive, liberal or Islamist movements, put them at the helm of counter revolutionary forces throughout the Middle East and North Africa,” Bishara reminds us.

      So, if the UAE’s interest isn’t the furthering of the prospects of peace in the eastern Mediterranean, what is its goal? Bishara describes it as an act of “‘bandwagoning’ with Israel and the United States, in the hope of establishing a trilateral US-Israeli–Arab strategic alliance to contain Turkey’s influence and tame or destroy the Iranian regime.”

      Trita Parsi adds that the GCC is counting on the continued presence of the US military in the region, which Saudi Arabia’s best friend, Donald Trump, has in the past promised to reduce. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and their allies see it as their security umbrella. They know that an increasingly disunited and despotically-managed GCC cannot handle it on its own. Israel is part of that umbrella. The region is thus divided between countries and peoples that either actively seek the maintenance of a US military presence or that, on the contrary, wish to see it removed from their lands after decades of strife. On this issue, the governments and their own populations are often at odds.

      Bishara offers a challenge to those who, like Gary Grappo, celebrate the touted “breakthrough” announced by Trump. “Those celebrating the ‘historical peace agreement’ may soon discover it is nothing more than a drive towards another regional conflict or worse, war,” Bishara writes. This difference of appreciation merits a debate, and it’s a debate that goes beyond the relationship between two Middle Eastern nations, with wide-ranging geopolitical significance. Fair Observer is an open platform to continue the debate.

      For decades, US diplomacy has adopted a model that seeks primarily to get the economic and political elites of a range of willing nations to agree strategically on their common interests and form the kind of loose alliance that promises to maintain some kind of general order in the world. Grappo’s analysis conforms perfectly to that model. The model works on one of two conditions: that the government and its people agree on the direction of that policy, or that the government wields the authoritarian power that can stifle opposition by the people.

      The first case is rare and, when it exists, requires careful management. The second represents the norm, particularly in the Middle East. The careful management it requires focuses on the needs of the elite and, in most cases, leaves in the background the expectations of the people. That is how the new Israeli-UAE alliance came into being and why it merits the positive appreciations of Western media outlets that are willing to see it as an overture to peace.

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is Trump Preparing a Pre-Election Surprise?

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      In 2016, Alan Lichtman departed from conventional wisdom to predict a Donald Trump victory in that year’s presidential election. The political scientist was following something he called the “13 keys to the White House.” Using this relatively straightforward metric, Lichtman had correctly predicted the outcome of presidential elections stretching back to 1984. Trump was so delighted with Lichtman’s unorthodox prediction that, after the election, he sent a congratulatory note. Last week, Lichtman applied his model to this year’s presidential election. Biden narrowly beat Trump in seven out of the 13 categories.

      With three months to the election, Trump doesn’t have much of a chance to reverse any of the determinations in Lichtman’s test. Of the seven categories that he lost to Biden, the president can’t change the results of the 2018 midterms, erase the numerous scandals that have beset his administration, suddenly acquire the kind of charisma that attracts people outside his narrow base, eliminate the social unrest that has accompanied his rule or magically revive a cratering economy.

      Okay, on that last item, Trump is indeed trying to bluff the economy into a recovery and, in the absence of congressional action on another stimulus bill, use the limited powers of his executive orders as a magic wand. Wall Street might be fooled, but the tens of millions of unemployed are not.

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      Which leaves the two foreign policy keys in Lichtman’s model. The first, avoiding a foreign policy disaster, tips in Trump’s favor. To my mind, pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization all represent foreign policy fiascos, but Lichtman has in mind a screw-up on the order of the Iraq invasion in 2003.

      The second foreign policy key is achieving a major global victory. This, Lichtman points out, Trump has failed to do. Trump is well aware of Lichtman’s model and track record. He knows that he only has to flip one key to change Lichtman’s prediction. What are the prospects that the president will pull out the stops in an effort to achieve some grand foreign policy success in the final 100 days? Is Donald Trump preparing an October surprise?

      The Hibernating President

      To put it mildly, Donald Trump has not been the most engaged president in US history. He doesn’t pay attention to his briefings. He plays golf while a pandemic rages throughout the land. He has only a vague understanding of the world that exists beyond the global archipelago of Trump Organization holdings.

      Most recently, in discussing the explosions in Beirut, Trump falsely opined that it was “a bomb of some kind.” It was yet another flight of fancy from a president who prefers to make things up instead of hewing to the facts or keeping his mouth shut. “Yet aside from some initial concern among Lebanese officials, Trump’s assertions were largely met with a collective global shrug,” reports The Washington Post.

      The president who shook up the foreign policy consensus by meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, forging a new economic relationship with China and embracing a cadre of autocrats in the Middle East has seemingly gone into hibernation. The world knows quite well how royally Trump has screwed up the US response to the coronavirus. Global leaders see the blood in the water. They’re expecting a change in White House occupancy come November.

      Seasoned observers of the international scene have concluded that, with little geopolitical leverage, Trump will not be able to pull off any major foreign policy success in the days leading up to the election. There’s little time or political commitment on the ground to push through a peace agreement in Afghanistan that hastens the withdrawal of American troops. The much-vaunted Middle East peace deal that Jared Kushner presented to the UN in February is dead on arrival. Any meetings with North Korea, much less a surprise deal, are off the agenda between now and November. Denmark is not interested in selling Greenland.

      That doesn’t leave a lot of options for a president struggling with a raft of domestic issues that are likely to prove more influential in the long run at the polls. But don’t make the mistake of thinking that a foreign policy success has to be something constructive. Donald Trump is much better at destroying things than building them. He has already asked foreign leaders — in Ukraine, in China — for help in destroying Joe Biden’s reputation. He has looked the other way as Russia has worked to destroy American democracy. For an encore in November, Trump may well be planning something even more destructive.

      War With Iran

      Donald Trump has not tried to conceal his antipathy toward Tehran. He has done everything short of war to bring down the Iranian government. He withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal. He applied harsh sanctions to squeeze the Iranian economy. Two years ago, he provided the CIA with new authority to intensify a cyberwar against the country. And, to kick off 2020, he orchestrated the assassination of a top Iranian official, Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.

      Bizarrely, Trump continued to maintain throughout that he still held out hope of negotiating a new deal with Iran. But last week, Brian Hook, the instrument of that policy of continued engagement with Iran in the midst of a punishing cold war, stepped down. Hook was something of a moderate in the very skewed politics of the Trump administration. Indeed, compared to his successor, Hook’s a veritable peacenik.

      Replacing Hook as special envoy to Iran is Elliott Abrams. Fresh from his failures to promote regime change in Venezuela, Abrams will likely apply his extremist philosophy to his new portfolio. The first opportunity takes place this week as the administration pushes the UN to extend the arms embargo on Iran due to expire as per the terms of the nuclear deal. It’s part of an effort to destroy any chance of a Biden administration returning to the status quo ante with Iran.

      Abrams is assuming his new position at a fraught moment. An explosion took place last month at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. It was but one of several such mysterious “accidents” that are likely the result of covert Israeli operations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is anxious about the prospect of Joe Biden winning in November and resurrecting some version of the Obama administration’s détente with Iran. So, Netanyahu is getting in his licks while he can, though even he is not interested in a full-scale war with Iran.

      For hawks in the United States who were disappointed that the Bush administration didn’t march into Tehran after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the latest turmoil in the region is encouraging. “Iran has been in a weakened state, its economy hobbled by U.S. sanctions and its regime facing domestic discontent, including a massive protest campaign last fall,” writes Jonah Shepp in New York magazine. “Those protests raised hopes among Iran hawks in the U.S. that their dreams of regime change might soon be realized.”

      A war with a major Middle Eastern power is probably not on Trump’s agenda. After all, he’s been pushing for a withdrawal of US forces from the region. And in June 2019, after Iran shot down a US drone, Trump decided not to retaliate, even though a number of his advisers were urging him to do so. But this time, an election beckons, Trump is down in the polls, and desperate times call for desperate measures. It wouldn’t be the first time that Donald Trump rolled the dice in one last bid for the jackpot.

      What about China?

      After experimenting with North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba and Iran, the Trump administration has decided that China is the most useful adversary to distract attention from the president’s many failures. Just last week, the administration placed new restrictions on TikTok and WeChat, two Chinese social media applications. Microsoft has been in negotiations to acquire part of TikTok’s business, a deal Trump’s actions potentially disrupt.

      The administration also announced new sanctions against 11 Chinese and Hong Kong officials over the imposition of the recent national security law in the former British colony. Included in the list is Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s chief executive. Other recent US sanctions targeting China have focused on the treatment of the Uighur minority, on cybersecurity and for transporting Iranian oil. This week, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar is visiting Taiwan, a previously unheard-of breach in diplomatic etiquette since US officials have studiously ignored Taiwan for four decades.

      Embed from Getty Images

      These actions take place against an ominous backdrop: the US closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston in July, high-level complaints about Chinese actions in the South China Sea and the ongoing attempts to draw together security allies from India to Australia into an Indo-Pacific alliance against China. And don’t forget the speech by Mike Pompeo last month in which the secretary of state essentially declared the end of engagement with China because it failed to induce “the kind of change inside of China that President Nixon had hoped to induce.” Actually, Nixon was more interested in driving a further wedge between Beijing and Moscow and opening China up for business. That kind of change is exactly what happened. Democracy and human rights were never really much of a consideration for either Nixon or Henry Kissinger — just as they’re of little interest to Pompeo or Donald Trump.

      Pompeo’s speech and the various punitive measures directed at Beijing all amount to a fundamental shift in US policy: not just skepticism about engagement but support for regime change inside China. As with Iran, Trump is probably not thinking about starting a war with China. But a skirmish in the South China Sea that produces a rally-around-the-flag surge in support of the president could certainly fit the bill for an October surprise.

      The US military seems to be preparing for such a contingency, with Pentagon chief Mark Esper effectively drawing a line in the water near China. “The secretary said that the U.S. military is positioning forces to counter Chinese behavior and support U.S. policies, revealing that the U.S. conducted more freedom-of-navigation operations challenging unlawful movement restrictions and excessive claims in 2019 than it has any year in the past four decades,” writes Ryan Pickrell in Business Insider.

      Surely, you might be saying, Donald Trump wouldn’t pick a fight with China or Iran just to win an election. Wouldn’t the potential casualties, if nothing else, stay his hand? But remember, this is a president who has already dismissed more than 150,000 American coronavirus deaths as “it is what it is.” What’s another few thousand deaths to guarantee four more years?

      *[This article was originally published by Foreign Policy in Focus.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Israel-UAE Deal: Arab States Are Tired of Waiting on Palestine

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      The August 13 announcement of normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates breaks the quarter-century standstill in Arab-Israeli relations and shows that Arab states will no longer hold their interests hostage to the long-dormant Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. President Donald Trump made the announcement of the establishment of relations between the two countries from the White House, suggesting that his administration played an instrumental role in the action. He referred to a call the same day with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates.

      The exact American role in the deal — other than giving the agreement a name, the Abraham Accord, in honor of the prophet important to both Judaism and Islam as well as Christianity — is unclear.

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      What is most apparent is that the two countries, which have had substantial informal interactions in fields like trade, technology, health and security for years, have finally moved to normalize those ties. The immediate upshot is that for the first time in nearly 26 years, an Arab state has formally recognized the Jewish state. Moreover, the UAE becomes the first Arab nation that has relations with Israel but no shared border. Egypt and Jordan, which each share borders with Israel, established ties in 1980 and 1994, respectively.

      Why Wait?

      Previously, Arab states, including the UAE, held out the prospect of normalized relations on condition of the establishment of two states, Israel and Palestine, along the borders that existed prior to the 1967 War. With its decision today, the UAE is saying it is no longer willing to wait for such an outcome, especially when its own interests are advanced by opening formal ties with Israel. Despite the Trump administration’s announced “deal of the century” — officially Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People — to much fanfare in June of last year, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have made no headway since Secretary of State John Kerry’s failed year-long effort six years ago.

      The UAE extracted one apparent concession from Jerusalem: Netanyahu will suspend annexation plans for the West Bank. That gives the Emirates the political cover it needs not only for its own population — by now probably agnostic on the whole Israel-Palestine dispute — but also for other Arab states, especially those more likely to criticize Abu Dhabi’s decision (likely few outside the usual pariahs). In fact, aware of the benefits that accrue to normalizing ties with the nation now considered the most powerful and technologically advanced in the Middle East, other Arab nations are now more likely to follow the UAE’s lead.

      Moreover, nations recognizing Israel are also more likely to earn Washington’s — and especially this administration’s — favor. In the case of the UAE, which already enjoys close ties with the US, that won’t mean a great deal immediately. Down the road, however — that is after the November election — it could mean attractive baubles like a free trade agreement or expanded security ties, regardless of who comes out on top in the American election.

      A Boon to Bibi in Troubled Times

      Traditionally, when nations establish diplomatic relations, they open embassies in respective capitals. For Israel, that will mean a new embassy in Abu Dhabi, and probably a consulate in Dubai as well, given its economic prominence in the country. But the UAE must decide where to locate its embassy. Will it be in Tel Aviv, where most nations of the world have had their embassies after Israeli independence in 1948, or in Jerusalem, Israel’s official capital and where the US relocated its embassy in February of 2018? Other nations also have opened embassies in Jerusalem, but no other major country. By setting up an embassy in Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi would implicitly recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, effectively a double win for Israel. That decision will be a thorny one for the wealthy Gulf state. It may wish to hold out for further concessions than just the annexation postponement.

      Annexation has been on indefinite hold since early last month when Netanyahu failed to act on previous pledges, reportedly because of Washington’s cold feet. Taking it off the table now is, therefore, hardly a sacrifice for Netanyahu. Even in Israel itself, it was viewed with mixed emotions.

      The ever-wily Bibi turned what had looked to be a political loss into a fairly significant foreign policy win for the Jewish state. And he needed it. Since early summer, thousands of Israelis have taken to the streets, mostly in Jerusalem, to protest against Netanyahu and call for his departure. Most of those critics are on the political left, which poses little threat to his continued rule. But he is also facing heat from his right, which presents far more of a threat. The conservative prime minister has historically drawn his support from the powerful right of Israel’s political spectrum, which dominates Israel’s electorate. So, getting this victory today — recognition by a major Arab state — allows him to again show his remarkable ability to advance Israel’s interests.

      That’s doubly important in view of the declining state of affairs between him and his erstwhile partner in government, Benny Gantz. Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial, a budget dispute between him and Gantz, and the recent surge in COVID-19 infections in Israel have cast a shadow over the unity government. Were it not for today’s announcement and Gantz’s declining political support within Israel, a new election, which now seems likely, Netanyahu’s 11-year reign might have been facing its denouement.

      Nothing for the Palestinians, Even Less for Iran

      Pointedly, in the entire announcement event at the White House, Palestine was not mentioned. Trump was accompanied by a parade of other administration officials, whose involvement in the accord was never made clear. None of them referred to either Israel-Palestine relations or to the annexation postponement. This is bad news for President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinians. The annexation postponement is a mere short-term sop, and they know it. Given the ambitions of those on Israel’s political right, annexation will be a fact of life. A Joe Biden win in November might stall it, but only for a while. A Trump victory will make it inevitable and likely soon.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The real message to Abbas is that Arab governments are tired of waiting. The UAE has made the first move. Other Arab states are likely to follow suit in the near future. Two in particular, Qatar and Oman, have already shown interest in expanded ties with Jerusalem for the very same reasons as the UAE.

      The announcement’s unspoken message to Ramallah is to get on with it — to negotiate and settle with Israel while there’s still some chance for an independent Palestinian state. The previous Arab conditions to the normalization of ties with Israel have exceeded their shelf life. Arab states are moving on. Abbas and the Palestinians need to do the same. Even a Biden victory won’t change this.

      Iran was briefly mentioned in the proceedings, by former administration Iran point man, Brian Hook, who resigned earlier this month. He needn’t have done so. Tehran can’t be pleased with the decision of the Emirates, which are located barely 25 miles across the Strait of Hormuz from Iran. Israel is likely to gain greater cooperation and coordination with the UAE armed forces, which already maintain very strong ties with the US. In addition, Israel will likely gain a prime observation perch for intelligence gathering on the Islamic Republic.

      Today’s announcement amounts to a significant setback for Iran. It may go too far to say that Washington’s dream of an Arab-Israeli anti-Iran alliance is in the works. But if one other Gulf state acts similarly, that’s exactly how the Trump administration will portray it — and how Iran may come to view it. That may be a good thing for the US, Arab nations and Israel, even if the likelihood of such an actual alliance is remote.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Shamima Begum: The Sensitive Case of IS Returnees

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      Born in the UK to Bangladeshi parents, Shamima Begum left London as a 15-year-old in 2015. Using her British passport, she traveled to Turkey with two of her friends from school. From there, Begum and her friends crossed into Syria, where they met their Islamic State (IS) contacts. While in Syria, Begum married an IS fighter. On February 19 this year, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission had stripped Begum of her citizenship as she was deemed to be a national security threat. On July 16, however, UK authorities granted this now adult British woman, who had joined a terrorist group as a teenager four years earlier, the right to return to Britain to challenge the UK government’s removal of her citizenship.

      The commission ruled that the decision to revoke Begum’s British citizenship did not render her stateless as, by default, the United Kingdom also considered her a Bangladeshi citizen “by descent.” However, the Bangladeshi Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it did not consider her as a citizen of that country. A statement released by Begum’s British lawyers argued that she indeed had never visited Bangladesh, nor had she ever applied for dual nationality.

      Made in Britain: Understanding the Realities of Radicalization

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      In the meantime, the press has chastised Begum, who remains a detainee in a camp operated by ethnic Kurdish militias in northern Syria, for making controversial statements such and saying that seeing her first severed head did not faze her “at all” and suggesting that people should “have sympathy” toward her for everything she has been through.

      Why Women?

      England’s Court of Appeal, in turn, unanimously agreed that Begum should be granted the right to have a fair and effective appeal of the decision to strip her of her citizenship, but only if she is permitted to come back to Britain. Of course, that does not guarantee the reinstatement of her citizenship rights, just that she has a right to present her case in person. Regardless of the legal wrangling and the debate about the legality that her case has sparked, this example sheds some light on the issue of contextualizing female IS supporters and terrorists and the legality of stripping Western-born suspects of their European or North American citizenship.

      There has been some academic discussion of why women, especially young women, who were born, raised and educated in the West, migrate to IS-held territory and join terrorist groups, leaving behind family, friends and a way of life while abandoning liberal values and opportunities that countries such as the UK offer them. It is difficult to ascertain whether a particular female, such as Shamima Begum, was a victim of IS, an active supporter or both. The widely circulated stories of “jihadi brides” have projected an image of confused and naïve girls and women traveling to join the Islamic State. While certain dynamics lured a number of females to IS-held territories, many went of their own free will. Yet it is highly debatable to what extent a 15-year-old understands the realities of this extremist group.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Muslim women have migrated to IS-held areas for a multitude of reasons, including the romantic ideal of marrying a “lion” — a supposedly brave and noble warrior — looking for an adventure and contributing to the establishment of an Islamic “caliphate” regulated by strict enforcement of Sharia law. The sense that joining the Islamic State empowers people to live meaningful lives draws many of the migrant women. One study suggests that besides issues of belonging and identity — and a skewed interpretation of Islam — it is, in the case of young women like Begum, online social networks that appeared to be the primary venue and driving factor for radicalization. It turns out that the vast majority of foreign women who traveled to Syria and Iraq served IS primarily as one of several housewives or sex slaves.

      It is only by understanding the motivations and experiences of those who have gone to fight abroad that governments can prevent the recruitment of another generation of terrorists and terrorist sympathizers. The enemies of the Islamic State have ostensibly defeated the group in the Middle East, yet unknown numbers of surviving IS fighters have found the means to relocate to Afghanistan. Permutations of IS and other extremist groups are also active in many African countries like Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria and  Somalia, among others. Aside from Afghanistan, other places in South Asia are not immune.

      Displaced Burden

      The UK, US and some other countries have chosen to prevent the return of foreign fighters by revoking their citizenship. Although such actions may prevent the return of foreign fighters in the short term, they do not solve the problem and may also be illegal under both national and international laws. In several instances, this will simply displace the burden and force weakened states such as Syria and Iraq to deal with the consequences of radicalization. It may also instill further grievances and act as a trigger for radicalization into surviving Western-born radicals who may plot terrorist attacks against Western targets.

      In certain cases, citizenship revocation has led to concerns over statelessness. Rendering an individual stateless runs against Western legal principles and is contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In several legal systems, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to prosecute female returnees because of their domestic roles in Syria and Iraq. Another challenge associated with prosecutions of foreign fighters lies with demonstrating intent. This applies both to the intent of the actions committed while in the war zone and the intent of travel for aspiring foreign fighters. There is also an argument that many such individuals, especially the juveniles, were victims of human trafficking.

      A more fruitful approach would be to allow a panel of experts to determine whether an individual returning to the home country is dangerous or disillusioned. The prime example of this approach is Denmark, which has already implemented assessment protocols that allow authorities to determine the individual circumstances for each returnee. Based on the results of such screenings, Danish police, together with social services, develop a plan of action for each returnee. Together, they decide whether a returnee is imprisoned, placed in a rehabilitation program or is assigned a combination of both approaches. It is extremely difficult to separate a victim from a perpetrator, and the boundaries can be particularly murky for foreign fighters.

      *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Beirushima: What Lebanon Needs to Survive

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      It will be a while until we know what or who triggered the explosion destroyed the Beirut port and, with it, half of the Lebanese capital, on August 4. What we know for sure is who the ultimate culprits are, and, unfortunately, none of them are included among those under house arrest or currently being interrogated: the corrupt political mafia that has controlled and exploited the lives of ordinary Lebanese for many years. Each one of those in power, directly or indirectly, has contributed to the blast that not only killed at least 200 people and wounded more than 6,000, but also destroyed Lebanon’s desperately needed economic lifeline, turning the country into a beggar state that must survive on external charity.

      The fact that the petition launched on the eve of President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Beirut calling for Lebanon to return to the French mandate gathered 50,000 signatures in the first 24 hours is representative of the hopelessness that has pervaded this small, but historically proud, creative and industrious nation. The fact that regional and international scavengers have come closer, circling the Lebanese wagon, seeking to complete their meal, is testimony to the dangers that lie ahead as Lebanon must try to protect the last remaining elements of its sovereignty against another assault.

      This assault will further compound the UN Security Council ruling that overruled Lebanon’s parliament in the case of Rafiq Hariri, the former prime minister assassinated in 2005 — a process that has lost both its respect and even its entertainment value.

      Last Line of Defense

      But that is a discussion for another day when the delayed ruling is announced. For now, in the midst of one of the most destructive episodes in the country’s recent history, the Lebanese people find themselves faced with not only the greatest challenge to their survival as a nation but also the loss of what they fought hard to defend in the face of foreign usurpation: their ability to continue as a creative nation of free thinkers and artists and, above all, as partakers of a free political process that is the envy of all those subjugated to dictatorships in the region.

      Just two days apart, 75 years ago, in Hiroshima, Japan, another proud and industrious people were smitten by unprecedented magnitude. While the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and then Nagasaki were a deliberate act of premeditated evil, the jury is still out on Lebanon’s Beirushima. The jury is also still out on whether the Lebanese will follow the footsteps of their predecessors to rebuild their country into a vibrant and transparent economic regional player, but without surrendering the strength that first liberated most of their land and now continues to protect its territorial integrity — the last line of defense for what remains of Lebanon as a nation.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Beyond that imperative, nothing must be held sacred if reform is to be the true way forward. Losing that imperative is what many of the country’s regional enemies will seek to force upon Lebanon, exploiting the opportunities this very dark hour provides them. This will indeed prove to be a challenge that requires strong leadership that must protect Lebanon from foreign intervention.

      As shock turned into more street anger, Lebanon’s fragmented society has forgotten its religious and sectarian divides and united against a common internal enemy: the corrupt political system that has abused its democratic process and misruled Lebanon for far too long. This display of national unity is the silver lining that will hopefully ultimately save Lebanon.

      The entire political system must be overhauled if Lebanon is to survive as a nation. And the onus of leading the way lies with the people and not the leadership. Lebanese politicians have proven themselves to be one of the most corrupt political elite in the region, owning or being involved in everything ranging from garbage collection to power generation to banks that lend money to the government at exorbitant rates. The structure has created a ruling class with everything to lose and nothing to gain from economic reform. These are not the people trustworthy of leading the transformation the country so desperately needs.

      Pulling the Trigger

      On top of everything else, its ailing economy is loaded with more than 1.5 million refugees, the result of Israeli occupation, the Syrian Civil War and many regional conflicts that Lebanon is made to pay the price for. It is, therefore, not surprising that highly explosive ammonia nitrate abandoned at the port of Beirut for six years would be allowed to lie hidden and become a powder keg waiting for something or someone to trigger what Brian Castner, the lead weapons investigator for Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Team, called “the biggest explosion in an urban area in decades” that made 300,000 people homeless.

      In a country where economic indicators have lost their meaning, where law and order are decided by a judicial mafia, where the role of both political business leadership has lost its demarcations and where a foreign president is popularly welcomed where a native is banished, it is clearly a time to fold and start all over again. And only the street, now prompted and indeed strengthened by a massive explosion, can lead the way. Whether the blast that devastated the nation’s capital has also wiped away the corruption that brought Lebanon to its feet, only time will tell. For if it hasn’t, nothing ever will, and the noble, generous and hardworking Lebanese will become a nation that once was.

      This is, of course, assuming it was something, not someone, who pulled the trigger. Should it, in the end, become evident that the explosion was another act of premeditated evil, then all bets are off. Our worst fears will become true, and Lebanon, and the entire region, will go up in flames. Let us hope Donald Trump was once again wrong when he suggested the blast had been an attack, and let us hope that foreign election campaigns have not been the reason Beirut blew up, with the potential to take with it the rest of what’s remaining of our region.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Houthi Rebels Gain Momentum in Yemen

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      Early on July 13, the Houthi rebels launched their second coordinated attack on Saudi Arabia in 20 days. The Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted and destroyed four ballistic missiles and six explosive drones that had been launched from the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital Sanaa. While the Saudis did not inform the location of the missile and drone attacks, a Houthi military spokesperson stated they were directed at “military aircraft, pilot accommodation and Patriot systems in Khamis Mushait, and other military targets at Abha, Jizan and Najran airports” and destroyed a number of those targets. He added that “the giant oil facility in the Jizan industrial zone” was also targeted, and that the “strike was accurate.” Additionally, the rebels claimed to have killed and injured dozens of Saudi military officers. 

      The new coordinated attack, which followed the airstrikes against targets that included the Saudi defense and intelligence headquarters and King Salman air base on June 23, aiming for military sites and equipment with the addition of an oil facility, shows that the Houthis are stepping up their offensives against the Saudi-led coalition. The rebels claimed the attack was a retaliation against Saudi aggression, the latest of which was an airstrike on the Hajjah governorate that killed seven children and two women on July 12.

      Is Saudi Arabia Looking for an Exit from Yemen?

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      Although the Saudi airstrike indeed provoked Houthi retaliation, another large-scale attack of that sort was already expected, and more are likely to come. With these two attacks, the Houthis have gained momentum based on their alleged ability to hit targets with high precision deep within Saudi Arabia, namely in Riyadh, and strike multiple targets in different cities at the same time. The Iran-backed group likely intends to push the Saudi-led coalition to approach ceasefire talks more seriously and consider concessions that the Saudis have so far deemed unnegotiable, such as the lifting of the sea, land and air blockade of Yemen.

      The Push for Marib City

      Tied to the Houthis’ intention to force the Saudi-led coalition to agree to better terms for a ceasefire is the rebels’ continuing push to capture Marib city, the Yemeni government’s last stronghold in the north of the country. On June 29, Houthis and pro-government fighters clashed in the Hashia district of Marib province, and on July 1, the Saudi-led coalition carried out airstrikes on the governorate, which is mostly controlled by the Houthis, except for parts that include its capital of the same name. Following the initial session (on July 7) of the trial of Houthi leaders accused of orchestrating the takeover of the Yemeni government, the Iran-backed group launched a ballistic missile that reportedly landed in a civilian area of Marib city on July 8, followed by another strike on July 14.

      The Saudis have been wanting to withdraw from the Yemeni conflict for quite some time now. But they cannot allow a complete Houthi takeover of the northwest and, without Saudi presence, possibly even further, as this would give the rebels more bargaining power ahead of eventual direct negotiations. After Houthi forces captured the city of al-Hazm, in al-Jawf province, in March, the rebels gained access to a pathway through the al-Ruwaik desert where they would be able to send fighters directly to Marib and/or carry out additional airstrikes on the city.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Considering the danger of that threat, army troops announced in late June that they had surrounded al-Hazm, and on July 15, the coalition allegedly carried out air raids on the city that killed several civilians, increasing pressure as it is aware of the strategic importance of the city in a potential Houthi takeover of Marib.

      It is highly unlikely that either of the two warring parties will achieve a complete military victory in Yemen. The Houthis will likely continue with their escalation approach hoping to capture Marib city so that they can increase their leverage ahead of eventual direct negotiations with the Saudi-led coalition, which are being pursued by the UN envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths. The coalition, in turn, will likely continue striking Houthi-controlled areas responding to the rebels’ attacks and keep on defending its last stronghold in the north, but, at some point, it will need to address ceasefire talks for the sake of the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

      Should the coalition decide to wait and see if the tables are turned in the conflict, in which at the moment Houthi forces enjoy the upper hand militarily, and continue to refuse to grant Houthis legitimacy, the Saudi-backed government might be perceived by the international community as one of the pieces hindering a successful political process in Yemen. That is not to say that the Houthis are facilitating the process, but the Yemeni government has more to lose in terms of legitimacy simply because it is the governing entity recognized worldwide.

      Endless fighting, with constant accusations of violations of international humanitarian law against the Saudi-led coalition, which currently amount to over 500 since 2015 according to the UK government, could eventually wear out the support for the government and its international legitimacy — the only thing knowingly corrupt President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi still holds onto — might start to fade.

      Undivided Attention

      In the south, the latest developments involving the Abu Dhabi-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) may affect the landscape of the war. The STC has been involved in on-and-off fights with the Saudi-led coalition for control of the south even after the power-sharing Riyadh Agreement the two parties signed in November 2019 and the announcement of a ceasefire in June. On July 26, however, the STC and the Yemeni government agreed on another attempt for the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement following a Saudi proposal to “accelerate” its fulfillment. 

      According to Yemeni media, the new deal brings similar points, such as the appointment of a governor and security director for Aden and the formation of a new cabinet with equal representation from both the north and the south, with new conditions, like the return of the governor of Socotra to the island and the revocation by the STC of its declaration of self-rule.

      The alleged adaptation of the Riyadh Agreement, the materialization of which is still to be seen, and the consequent reduction of tensions between the two parties would ultimately damage Houthi plans, since the Iran-backed group was likely taking advantage of the fragmented attention given by the coalition to the fight against the STC in the south and the Houthis themselves in the north. The question that remains is whether the now undivided coalition’s attention to the fight against the Houthis in the north, provided the new conditions with the STC bring stability to the south, will enable it to turn the table in the conflict.

      Looking ahead, there is a big chance the Houthis will continue to pressure the coalition, especially with offensives in and around Marib city and potentially in Saudi Arabia. Previous experiences show Houthi attacks are likely to continue even after the reported understanding between the coalition and the STC based on the fact that the June 23, Houthi-coordinated attacks on Saudi Arabia came a day after the coalition and the STC had announced a ceasefire. Meanwhile, if focused on the fight against the Houthis, the coalition might be able to respond to attacks with more vigor and prevent the rebels from increasing their leverage ahead of eventual direct negotiations.

      *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More