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    Emmanuel Macron’s Dishonorable Legion

    In recent years, France and Egypt have developed a close relationship based on common interests in the Middle East. Some might suggest that it harkens back to the tradition established with Napoleon Bonaparte’s campaign in Egypt at the end of the 18th century. It led to the future emperor’s sincere fascination with Egyptian history and …
    Continue Reading “Emmanuel Macron’s Dishonorable Legion”
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    Joe Biden Will Face a Much-Changed and Skeptical World

    Joe Biden was not elected for his positions on foreign policy and national security. Few US presidential candidates are. In his debates with outgoing President Donald Trump prior to the election, those issues were hardly discussed. So, the success or failure of the Biden presidency will not be determined by foreign policy.

    For President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris, domestic policy will dominate their time and efforts. Overcoming the coronavirus pandemic, ensuring that newly released vaccines are quickly and effectively administered, and righting a still stressed US economy will be their top priorities in the first year. It is what the American people want and expect. Furthermore, there is America’s worsening and more pernicious longer-term problems: increasing economic inequality, continuing racial injustice and growing political polarization.

    Joe Biden and America’s Second Reconstruction

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    These will be profoundly difficult problems to address successfully, especially as President Biden could face a US Senate controlled by the Republican Party and a thinner Democratic Party majority in the House of Representatives.

    First, Image Repair

    Nevertheless, after four years of an unprecedentedly destructive foreign policy and simply by virtue of the fact he will lead still the world’s most powerful and wealthiest nation, Joe Biden cannot ignore foreign policy. In fact, amidst his formidable domestic challenges, he must confront serious foreign policy challenges vital to America’s interests and to those of its many friends and allies around the world.

    We may already have caught a glimpse of how different Joe Biden’s foreign policy will be from Donald Trump’s, considering the first officials named to his senior foreign policy team: Antony Blinken as secretary of state, Linda Thomas-Greenfield as US ambassador to the UN with cabinet rank, Jake Sullivan as national security adviser, Avril Haines as director of National Intelligence and Katherine Tai as the US trade representative. They are all highly experienced, proven, knowledgeable, principled and committed public servants. Under President Trump, we saw few of those and many more self-interested, self-promoting political hacks and ideologues.

    One of the first jobs Biden must tackle is America’s badly damaged reputation around the world. Donald Trump undermined critical alliances, pointlessly insulted and demeaned allies, abandoned international agreements and institutions, embraced autocrats and dictators from Russia to North Korea, discarded traditional free trade principles and turned America’s back on core values of human rights, democracy and rule of law. In short, it was a side of America no one had ever seen, certainly not in the history of the modern presidency. Most profoundly, it raised the question: Who is America?

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    Joe Biden must try to answer that question, and not just with the eloquent prose of President Barack Obama, under whom he served as vice president. The world expects and will demand to see concrete action, preferably guided by some overarching policy that can show to the world that the United States can still play — and indeed, must play — a leadership role again on the global stage.

    There are some decisions that Joe Biden has indicated he will make right out of the starting block when he takes office on January 20. He will rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization. Those are relatively easy and straightforward but also very necessary. He is also likely to make clear in his inauguration address that America will return to be the leading voice for democracy, human rights and rule of law in the world, starting first at home but also unafraid to speak in their defense abroad.

    Then begins the hard part. One priority he has made clear that his administration will take on immediately is reaffirming American membership in and commitment to its alliances and critical partnerships. These constitute America’s competitive advantage in global affairs and remain the heart of its still formidable soft power in the world. After Trump’s destructive practices, Biden will have to appeal to America’s allies in Europe, e.g., NATO and the EU, and in Asia and the Pacific, like Japan, South Korea, Australia and others. And he’ll have to do it with humility, understanding that under his predecessor, America seemingly abandoned principles that had previously united them all.

    China: Work With Allies, Pursue Hard-nosed Diplomacy

    China will be Joe Biden’s biggest challenge. On trade, defense, the South China Sea, Taiwan, cybersecurity, human rights and global leadership, China presents a daunting challenge. We should expect his administration to drive a hard bargain with Beijing but to use a very different approach than his predecessor. Pursued smartly, however, he may be surprised by the inherent advantages America still holds. For example, fortifying the alliances and partnerships as previously mentioned will aid his administration in addressing the China challenge. In fact, if he is to succeed on this account, he will need those allies and partners with him at the negotiating table. Another advantage: He will likely have bipartisan support in an otherwise partisan Congress for taking a strong position on China.

    Trade is the clearest area where the US can capitalize on its extensive network of allies. China’s most important trading relationships — those with the EU and the East Asian nations — also happen to be America’s closest allies. The most effective approach will be one that joins their efforts with the administration to address China’s aggressive and predatory trade practices. Those range from intellectual property theft to intimidation and threats against foreign businesses to coopting confidential and proprietary techniques, practices and technology. But this approach works only if the new administration can establish that it can be trusted again, and not only on trade. If the US can succeed in its trade negotiations with China, it opens opportunities on other fronts.

    The objective must be clear: The US isn’t interested in standing in China’s way as it progresses to superpower status. However, China must understand that it must do so within an international community governed by collaboratively set rules.

    Renewed US Global Leadership: Climate and Global Health

    Climate and global health are two other priority issues for Biden. He has indicated he will want not only to reestablish America’s commitment to them but also to take the lead. Rejoining the Paris accords won’t be enough. The US must marshal a critical mass of other nations in joining a reinvigorated effort to go beyond the mandates of Paris. In that, he’s likely to garner support from the EU and other developed nations. Appointing former Secretary of State John Kerry as his special envoy on climate change demonstrates Biden’s seriousness about the issue and the intention to take a much-needed lead role on this global existential challenge.

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    The COVID-19 pandemic raging at home makes it imperative that President-elect Biden make global health security a clear foreign policy priority. If there is one thing Americans have learned from the novel coronavirus, it’s that there is no greater threat to America’s national security and economic prosperity than another pandemic, especially one perhaps more catastrophic than COVID-19. If America is to be better prepared for the next pandemic, so must be the rest of the world.

    As he did for climate, Biden may even wish to name a special envoy for global health to begin galvanizing America’s efforts and those of the rest of the world to prepare and coordinate global initiatives for preventing, containing and treating the next pandemic.

    Climate and global health present the Biden administration with just the sort of challenge-cum-opportunity to which America was known to rise in the past. They are issues on which it is uniquely positioned to lead by virtue of its power, size, wealth and technological prowess. To reassume the mantle of global leadership, President-elect Biden must lead the global effort to combat climate change and strengthen the international community’s capacity to address pandemics.

    In the Middle East, Iran and Then Everything Else

    Unlike for the US administrations dating back to Jimmy Carter, the Middle East will not be a top-five priority in 2021. Americans have lost their appetite for inserting themselves into problems that the region’s residents cannot or will not work to resolve themselves. Biden and his foreign policy team recognize this, even as they know they can’t turn their backs on this dangerously volatile region.

    But there remains one exception. Iran is a grave problem, perhaps less for the US than for Washington’s allies in the Middle East, most especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. It also constitutes a major challenge to America’s traditionally unflinching support for the Nonproliferation Treaty. Nothing could be more destabilizing in that region than the introduction of nuclear weapons. It will require almost immediate attention from President Biden.

    The Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” via its punishing sanctions has indeed inflicted enormous economic pain on Iran and its people. But it hasn’t changed Tehran’s behavior. Iran today has begun to reconstitute the nuclear program that had been effectively contained under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated under President Obama in 2015 and then abandoned by Trump in 2018.

    The purpose of the sanctions cannot be inflicting pain on the Iranian people, who are not responsible for their government’s policies. The objective of sanctions and an overall policy toward Iran must be to change its behavior. By that measurement, the Trump administration’s pressure campaign has not worked. Iran continues to: develop and build longer-range missiles; support malign behavior through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Shia proxies throughout the region, from Iraq and Yemen to Syria and Lebanon; senselessly threaten Israel; and deny the most basic human rights to its own citizens, most especially women, journalists, perceived political opponents and religious minorities.

    Whatever trust President Obama and then-Secretary of State Kerry may have been able to build with the Iranians in reaching the JCPOA has been largely destroyed now. So, short of immediately rejoining that agreement, which would be unwise, face-to-face negotiations between Washington and Tehran will not be in the offing for at least one year.

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    In fact, to tackle the Iran question, Biden and Blinken must address the failures of the Obama approach. That will mean: (a) turning to America’s P5+1 partners — the UK, France and Germany — to work out a modus operandi for rejoining the JCPOA while simultaneously securing a commitment to negotiate a stronger JCPOA version 2.0; (b) consulting regularly and frequently with key regional allies to ensure their concerns and interests are addressed in any follow-on agreement with Tehran; and, most important, (c) including key congressional members in the negotiation process, at least on the Washington end. The last is most vital because the absence of Congressional support was ultimately Barack Obama and the agreement’s downfall. Any new accord negotiated must have the support of a majority of the Congress if it is to avoid the fate of the JCPOA, even it isn’t submitted for formal approval to the Congress. All of these are sine qua non for successfully addressing the Iranian challenge and securing a durable solution.

    While the Iran portfolio remains an urgent priority for Joe Biden, it won’t be one resolved in his first year and perhaps not until well into his second. His administration and the Congress must understand that the US cannot not sanction, bomb, assassinate or otherwise forcibly compel Iran into complying with its norms for behavior. It will take patient, deliberate and determined diplomacy.

    Can’t Ignore the Rest

    These are likely to be President Biden’s top priorities. But they won’t be his only ones. His administration and the US also face serious challenges from a menacing and malign Russia, an arms control agreement with whom due to expire within weeks of his taking office; still extant terrorism and cybersecurity threats; a wave of autocrats with a full head of steam, from Turkey and Hungary to Venezuela and the Philippines; ill-behaved and irrationally aggressive regional actors vying for preeminence in the Middle East; continuing conflict and humanitarian crises in the Middle East, Africa and the Caucasus and elsewhere.

    Joe Biden will be the most experienced and knowledgeable president on foreign policy since George H.W. Bush. As such, he surely knows that it is issues like these that can suddenly rise to crisis proportions and take over his foreign policy or even his presidency. So, they won’t be far from his attention. But a clear-eyed view of what is most important will drive Biden toward those highlighted above.

    However, there is likely to be a critically important domestic component of the Biden foreign policy agenda. This gets to the Achilles heel of previous administrations’ foreign policies that Donald Trump cleverly exploited. Biden and his administration must be able to convincingly articulate to the American people a foreign policy that they will see as in their interests. That will mean a policy that protects American jobs, addresses threats to climate and the environment, ensures security and offers a promise of a better future.

    Crafting a policy that meets these criteria may be Joe Biden’s biggest challenge, especially in view of the historic disconnect between foreign policy and the American people and polarization of the American public exacerbated by four years of Donald Trump. But if this administration is to be successful in confronting and capitalizing on America’s many challenges abroad, it must be able to show that it holds the interests of Americans uppermost — and that they stand behind this policy.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Oman Has Much to Offer the EU

    Oman and the European Union share common interests in a number of political, economic, commercial and security fields. Oman’s strategic location and links to key international trade routes are of great importance to European interests in the region. In September 2018, Brussels and Muscat signed a cooperation agreement, in addition to the one signed by the European External Action Department and the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the aim of strengthening political dialogue and cooperation in sectors of mutual interest.

    Sultan Qaboos Brought Light and Modernity to Oman

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    Oman shares with the EU the challenge of maritime piracy, which is one of the most pressing security issues that both sides face in the Indian Ocean. Since 2008, Oman has been an important partner in Operation Atlanta, the EU Naval Force mission to combat piracy on the coasts of Somalia, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

    Oman’s policy of being open with the world and balanced between the poles on opposing sides of regional conflicts — especially those represented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States — is similar to many EU policies in the Middle East. Muscat has highlighted its role in many regional and international issues, with Omani diplomacy complementing EU efforts to preserve stability and security in the region in ways that serve European interests.

    Investor Confidence

    Oman is considered a major logistical center for the Middle East, with its three major ports of Sohar, Duqm and Salalah, as well as a number of economic, marine and land “free zones.” With the aim of establishing an integrated infrastructure system for Oman, the General Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones was launched in August to supervise the Special Economic Zone in Duqm and the free zones in Mazyouna, Salalah and Sohar.

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    An attractive environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) was created with the coming into force of the Foreign Capital Investment Law in January this year that allows foreigners to own 100% of investment projects as well as granting tax exemptions and customs duties. Moreover, the law does not set a minimum investment capital, facilitates procedures for establishing investment projects, grants extended rights to the use of investment lands and permits the transfer of capital to investor countries.

    In addition, Oman is the fifth safest country in the world and the third in the region, according to a recent report by Numbeo, which adds to investor confidence. In the first quarter of 2020, FDI reached over 15 billion Omani rials ($40 billion). With money coming from Iran, Kuwait, China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, numbers from the National Center for Statistics and Information indicate that American and British capital constituted the highest share of FDI. The EU, however, has seen low investment rates in the country, with only the Netherlands coming in at roughly 304.7 million rials.

    The Vice President of the European Investment Bank (EBI) Vazil Hudak, during the International Investors Forum held in Muscat in 2019, spoke of the strengths of EU investment in Oman and the “huge” opportunities it offers. EBI is the largest financial investment institution in the world, with assets of more than €600 billion ($726 billion) and annually lends out nearly €70 billion. The EU could deepen its bilateral cooperation with Oman, directing EIB investments to achieve sustainable economic development in Oman, particularly after the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Crisis Cooperation

    In the long term, Oman has paid attention to improving its economy by diversifying sources of income and raising the contribution of non-oil sectors to the gross domestic product. Oman was the first of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to develop plans to reduce its dependence on oil and diversify its economy. As a result of these policies, in 2020, Oman achieved nearly 3 billion rials in profits in the non-petroleum sector that made up 28% of the total contribution to the GDP, an increase of 6% over 2019.

    Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying lockdown measures that put strains on the economy, Oman has sought to avoid withdrawing from its sovereign reserves estimated to be worth $17 billion and moved toward setting policies to cut spending and adopt a short-term fiscal balance plan for the next four years with the aim of improving the economic situation and raising the country’s credit rating.

    The EU is currently witnessing difficult times as a result of the pandemic and the severe economic effects associated with it, coinciding with the UK’s exit from the European Union at the end of the year. In light of the circumstances, commercial and economic interests between Oman and the EU should expand into joint action, moving forward on pending agreements, including the free trade agreement that the two sides used to manage collectively through dialogue between the GCC and the EU. These negotiations were hit by apathy due to a lack of agreement over customs tariffs and the continuing blockade of Qatar since 2017. But talks on bilateral free trade agreements between Oman and the EU countries have become crucial to removing trade barriers and spurring economic growth.

    Tourism and transport sectors were among the most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic globally, with analysts predicting that tourism recovery will take up to two years, and air transportation estimated to take anywhere from two to six years. In 2018, the tourism sector contributed 2.6% to the country’s economy and was one of the five key sectors that Oman’s Ninth Five-Year Plan focused on. Given the damage inflicted on the sector during the pandemic, recovery should be stimulated by easing travel procedures. On December 9, Omani authorities issued a decision to exempt citizens of 103 countries (including the EU) from entry visa requirements for 10 days with the aim of stimulating transport and tourism after the pandemic.

    On the European Union side, the decision to exempt Omanis from the Schengen zone is still under consideration despite the ongoing talks between the two sides over the last years. An easing of entry requirements for Omanis will contribute to enhancing tourism traffic between the two sides.

    The cooperation and partnership in times of crisis creates opportunities for broader ties and paths toward economic sustainability, political stability and security for countries. The European Union is an important partner for Oman and can take advantage of the sultanate’s fortunate geographical location. The advancement of Oman-EU relations is an important factor for both sides, especially in the post-COVID-19 era.

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Qatar Is Set for Its First National Elections

    President-elect Joe Biden’s foreign policy will be anchored in the traditional pursuit of America’s international role and interests. Biden has had a lengthy career in the Senate, where he served as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. He also served as vice president under Barack Obama for eight years. Biden’s many speeches and comments …
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    Iran’s Revenge Against Israel Will Be a Long Game

    Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, shot to death by a remote-controlled weapon on November 27 in Iran’s capital Tehran, was the fifth nuclear scientist Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, has assassinated over the past 13 years. He joins a list of dozens killed by Israeli special forces over the last five decades in the occupied territories and abroad. For many years, most of the targets were Palestinian activists or “terrorists,” but also included others deemed “enemies.” Now, the Mossad is focused on killing the leaders of the Iranian nuclear industry.

    As a general rule, the Mossad clears its lines with Washington before conducting such operations to avoid accidentally assassinating CIA penetration agents. Israel would of course have considered the imminent departure of President Donald Trump in the timing of the killing of Fakhrizadeh. The Mossad could guarantee that Trump would not veto the operation, so there was a strong incentive to do it before January 20, when Joe Biden’s inauguration takes place. Biden is going to attempt the complicated task of trying to revive the Iran nuclear deal and would have prevented the operation from going ahead to avoid even more difficulty with Tehran.   

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    However, the chance to kill Fakhrizadeh was undoubtedly fleeting, the result of a chain of coincidences — just as the opportunity for the US to assassinate General Qassem Soleimani back in January suddenly materialized. For this reason, still having Trump in the White House was fortuitous.

    Israel conducts its extra-territorial executions with total impunity. No retaliatory action, such as the expulsion of Mossad officers for example, ever follows. One notorious Mossad operation was the 1990 killing of Gerald Bull, the Canadian scientist who was shot in his apartment in Belgium. Bull had been engaged, at a price of $25 million, by Saddam Hussein to help build the Big Babylon “supergun” Baghdad had hoped would be capable of firing satellites into orbit or “blinding” spy satellites, as well as having the potential to fire projectiles from Iraq into Israel. After the assassination, Belgium took no action.

    Only Vladimir Putin’s Russia comes close to Israel — and only then a very distant second — in terms of the number of political assassinations it conducts. By contrast, Russia is heavily sanctioned for its actions.  

    The leading scientists and engineers working in the Iranian nuclear industry or ballistic missile program will all be on the Mossad’s death list. Also on the list will be the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Iranian intelligence services and the leaders of Iranian military operations in Iraq and Syria. The Mossad launches highly complex and detailed operations to identify such individuals and to track every detail of their personal lives — where they live and work, what their interests are, which restaurants they like, where they go hiking, who their friends are — anything that might provide an opportunity for a strike.  

    The Mossad uses human sources, communications intercepts and social engineering on social media to gather this information. Anyone on its list foolish enough to have a GPS tracker in their phone should not be surprised if a drone appears and fires at them.

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    Iran knows that Israel is not going to stop its murderous campaign. Tehran may anticipate that the Biden administration will at least try to slow down this strategy of targeted attacks while he tries some sort of rapprochement with the Iranian regime. But Iranians are chess players, and have been for thousands of years; they think strategically and several moves ahead. Iran’s rulers will not jeopardize their strategic goals for the short-term satisfaction of a revenge attack. That can wait.  

    First Iran wants to consolidate its positions in Syria, Iraq and Yemen and remove some, if not all, of the US sanctions. Iran also wants to hurry the remaining US forces in Iraq out of the country. There is also a larger strategic dimension. Iran and the Gulf are well aware the US is in retreat from the region. Moreover, the Gulf monarchies are bleeding money as a result of profligate spending and what appears to be a permanent downward shift in the demand and price for oil. They can no longer afford the monstrously wasteful spending on US arms nor rely on the US defense shield that goes with it.  

    The alternative is an accommodation with Iran, perhaps even a security dialogue. That is the carrot. The stick that Iran also wields is that if the Gulf chooses to continue or escalate confrontation, then Iran can wipe out their oil processing refineries and loading terminals — and the vital desalination plants — in an afternoon. The devastating but deliberately restricted missile attack on the Abqaiq oil processing facility in September 2019 was a clear signal of what might be expected if Iran is cornered. This realization following the Abqaiq attack prompted the immediate opening of backchannel communications between UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran.  

    Those lines will surely be humming with excuses and special pleading in the aftermath of the Fakhrizadeh assassination. This moment could be the high-water mark of the failed US campaign of “maximum pressure” and the Trump administration’s disastrous Middle Eastern policy.  

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Not All Quiet on the Western Sahara Front

    On October 21, groups of Polisario Front’s supporters blocked the highway at Guergarat, in the extreme southwest of the Western Sahara. This is in the buffer zone between territory controlled by Morocco and the land claimed by the Polisario — the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro, the rebel movement fighting for the independence of the former Spanish territory of Western Sahara, now under Rabat’s control — effectively blocking transportation between Morocco, Mauritania and countries further south. Moroccan troops responded quickly and cleared the road so that more than 100 trucks could resume carrying goods. The Polisario claimed no knowledge of the action and labeled Morocco’s response as an “act of war.”

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    What happens next could determine the fate of the 29-year-old ceasefire that marked the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of UN efforts to resolve the status of the territory that Morocco claims is part of its kingdom. While Rabat has offered broad autonomy to the region under its sovereignty, the Polisario Front and its backer, Algeria, are demanding a referendum that the UN Security Council dropped from its agenda in 2007 after multiple failed attempts at compiling a mutually agreed voter list stymied any credibility for that option.

    So far, 16 African countries, the UAE and Jordan have opened consulates in the region, providing Morocco with crucial international support for its territorial claims. As per Al Jazeera, “The strategy has been effective: Out of 84 countries that previously recognized the Polisario, 44 recently rescinded their support and recognition.”

    Tension Builds

    Morocco described the blocking of the road by Polisario supporters, allegedly backed by armed fighters, as a breach of the ceasefire. The Polisario said the Moroccan army’s entry into the buffer zone had fatally undermined the ceasefire. And so the tension builds. Behind it are lingering questions of why (and why now), of what the end game is, and of why Algeria and the Polisario are of one mind on this latest conflict?

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    The UN is now on alert despite the lack of a special envoy to monitor the crisis after the previous representative resigned last year due to health issues. The African Union has also indicated its concern, although it has not proposed a concrete intervention. Among the Arab states, only Algeria condemned Morocco’s reaction to the blockade. The war of words continues.

    For years, supporters on both sides have indicated displeasure at the lack of formal and realistic negotiations between the parties. Morocco has garnered broad international support for its autonomy proposal, which has been called “serious and credible” by the US and many others. While in the Polisario camp, its youth are becoming increasingly restive at the lack of more aggressive action by the leadership to change the status quo and push for independence or something more acceptable than the present doldrums.

    To some analysts, this is what lies at the core of the current tension — actions by a small group of unhappy camp-dwellers, fed up with the cronyism and corruption of the leadership. The Polisario Front and Algeria had no option but to follow behind this tiny minority as neither has a better alternative other than engaging in negotiations. The status quo has many benefits regionally and internationally. First of all, Algeria, which is in a serious domestic crisis with its own people and competing leadership cadres, sees this as a way to help relieve some of the dissonance at home. However, this does not seem to be working as there have been no public expressions of support for the Polisario’s announced withdrawal from the ceasefire.

    Similarly, the Polisario elite, who have refined their autocratic leadership and kleptomania for more than four decades, cannot allow the dissidents to draw them into a war that they are neither prepared for nor capable of carrying out effectively. Morocco benefits from the perception that the Polisario — and, by inference, Algeria — are more interested in fomenting instability in a critical region where terrorism in the neighboring Sahel is of concern rather than in engaging in formal negotiations to resolve the conflict.

    The UN, the United States and France, the major international players at the scene, would be happy with the former status quo as it relieved parties of using diplomatic leverage to move the combatants to proactively engage in peaceful steps for conflict resolution. It has become increasingly obvious that the modus operandi here goes along the lines that if no crisis exists, there is no point in starting something that no one wants to intervene in. In his statement, UN Secretary-General António Guterres voiced “grave concerns” surrounding the most recent developments in Western Sahara, warning against “violations of the ceasefire and the serious consequences of any changes to the status quo.”

    No Simple Way

    There is no simple way forward or return to the status quo without Algeria facing up to its role in sponsoring the Polisario Front for over 40 years and enabling some kind of diplomatic movement. In the words of the Organization for World Peace, “As the Polisario’s main backer, Algeria has a responsibility to prevent this situation from escalating or being manipulated by other organizations. Working with Morocco, both sides should encourage a peaceful de-escalation of the current violent rhetoric in order to prevent the conflict from reigniting.”

    Similarly, Morocco should take no action beyond its setting up a military outpost in the buffer zone until the Polisario Front returns to the ceasefire agreement. It should also work with the UN to restart formal and comprehensive negotiations on its autonomy proposal. Algeria cannot, for its own domestic reasons, escalate military threats that destabilize the area. It should work to calm the situation so that it can more effectively mediate its own Hirak movement going on now for more than a year.

    Finally, the incoming Biden administration in Washington — quite familiar with the Western Sahara as it is comprised of many members of the Obama administration, which was a strong supporter of delaying any proactive US push to resolve the conflict — should understand the larger potential disaster if regional destabilization accelerates, terrorist cells expand from ungoverned spaces, and other players agitate for their own interests in the area. This is not the best scenario for starting out the new US administration’s North Africa strategy.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Saudi Arabia’s Mission to Correct “Distorted Narrative”

    The virtual G20 Leaders’ Summit hosted by Saudi Arabia this past weekend was intended to be a moment of triumph for Riyadh and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It was the first time an Arab state has hosted the gathering, which represented a golden opportunity to flaunt on the global stage the many changes the kingdom has undergone in a very short period of time — changes that frequent visitors to the kingdom have remarked upon with a degree of amazement.

    They speak about that which was previously forbidden: concerts with pop stars from the West, movie theaters, cultural exhibitions and sporting events such as the World Wrestling Entertainment Super ShowDown at the Mohammed Abdu Arena in Riyadh in February and the just-concluded inaugural Aramco Saudi Ladies International golf tournament, all with mixed audiences of men and women. And, of course, seeing women driving — a right that was granted in June 2018.

    Is the US Ready to Back Real Change in Saudi Arabia?

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    The relaxation of the male guardianship system in August of this year has also been hailed as a significant advance for women. At the time, the decision was celebrated by Princess Reema bint Bandar Al Saud, the Saudi ambassador in Washington. Gathering together a group of female employees in the embassy, she said: “You have unalienable rights now, the right to your own identity, to move, dream, work.”

    Correcting the Narrative

    Speaking on November 19, the ambassador discussed the importance of gender equity and women’s advancement as a cornerstone of Vision 2030, Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious and audacious program of economic and social transformation. She also took up a theme often expressed by Saudi authorities: Hers was a country “too often misunderstood, our remarkable progress, reform and change too often overlooked.” She added, “We need to do a better job of correcting an inaccurate and distorted narrative.”

    That was what the G20 summit was designed to do — to shift the narrative away from the negative. But COVID-19 intervened, and what was to have been a glittering showcase of Saudi innovation, creative drive and women’s empowerment became a flat Zoom reality. The opportunity to press the flesh and wow their guests with trips to sites like the $500-billion futuristic Neom city now under construction morphed into a dull screen of faces. Still, there was one moment of technical wizardry projecting a group photo of G20 leaders onto the walls of the historic ruins of the city of Diriyah on the outskirts of Riyadh.

    But haunting that moment was another image, cast onto the Louvre museum in Paris. It was of three women activists detained in Saudi prisons: Loujain al-Hathloul, Nassima al-Sadah and Samar Badawi. Their plight and the plight of other women prisoners is the subject of a just-released report by Baroness Helena Kennedy, QC. She cites multiple Saudi and international laws and agreements that have been violated during the arrests and detention of the women. She details credible allegations of torture and names two individuals very close to the Saudi crown prince either directly engaged in or presiding over torture. The torture, the report says, included beatings, electric shock, sexual assault and threats to rape and kill family members.

    Embed from Getty Images

    The two named individuals are Saud al-Qahtani, implicated in the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, in October 2018, and Mohammed bin Salman’s younger brother and the former ambassador in Washington, Khalid bin Salman. Al-Qahtani escaped prosecution in Saudi Arabia for the killing of Khashoggi but remains on the US sanctions list he was put on shortly after the murder; in July, his name was added to the UK sanctions list.

    Khalid bin Salman, while serving as ambassador to the US, reportedly encouraged Jamal Khashoggi in the belief that he could return safely to Saudi Arabia. Prince Khalid left the United States shortly after details of the killing began to emerge. He returned briefly, then quit his post. In February 2019, he was appointed deputy defense minister. His older brother, the crown prince, is defense minister. As Helena Kennedy’s report states:

    “Al-Qahtani personally tortured Loujain on a number of occasions. Al-Qahtani’s involvement is also attested to by the former female inmate of Dhabhan, who stated that one of the Women’s Rights Activists had told her that Saud Al-Qahtani was present at the unofficial facility for much of the time she was there, directed a number of both individual and group torture sessions, threatened her with rape, and sexually abused her. She also told the former inmate that she had witnessed Saud Al-Qahtani sexually assaulting several other Women’s Rights Activists in their rooms, including Loujain Al-Hathloul and Eman Al-Nafjan.

    Additionally, the former female inmate of Dhabhan reports that Khalid bin Salman was occasionally present at the unofficial facility, and would sometimes attend interrogations. One of the Women’s Rights Activists told her that he would threaten rape and murder when overseeing interrogations, and would boast about his position and power, saying ‘do you know who I am? I am Prince Khalid bin Salman, I am the ambassador to the US, and I can do anything I like to you’, or words to that effect.”

    These are very serious allegations. However, they are not proven and the Saudi authorities have consistently denied the claims. But rather than have an independent investigation, the authorities have chosen to take the view that those detained and the manner of their detention are internal issues for the Saudi courts to deal with. It’s a position they took in convicting eight individuals and sentencing them to between seven and 20 years in jail for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Saud al-Qahtani was not among those charged.

    “People Have Not Been Fair”

    In an interview with the BBC’s Lyse Doucet, Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs, said, “Our judiciary is independent and we do not allow people to lecture us or tell us what we should or shouldn’t do.” The minister claimed that Loujain al-Hathloul was not detained for her women’s rights activism but because she was being investigated as a national security risk. In 2018, Mohammed bin Salman called her a spy and said he would produce evidence “the next day” to prove it, but no such evidence has emerged.

    Al-Jubeir also complained, as has Princess Reema, that Riyadh is a victim of unwarranted criticism: “I think that people have not been fair when it comes to dealing with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” he told Doucet. “I think they always look for the negative part of it rather than the positive part of it.”

    Had US President Donald Trump secured reelection earlier this month, telling that “positive part” would have been less challenging. As it was, with the Saudis attempting to focus the summit on the global battle against COVID-19, Trump made a brief appearance via Zoom to extol his administration’s efforts at combating the pandemic and then left to play a round of golf. Joe Biden described Saudi Arabia as a “pariah” state in 2019, stating in October that his administration would “reassess our relationship with the Kingdom, end US support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.”

    The Saudis are hoping that was just electioneering talk. Speaking to Reuters in a virtual interview on the sidelines of the G20 summit, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, the Saudi foreign minister, said: “I’m confident that a Biden administration would continue to pursue policies that are in the interest of regional stability.” The foreign minister is likely correct in that assessment. But with the current abysmal state of human rights in the kingdom, it is far less likely that the Biden White House will buy into the positive narrative of reform and change Princess Reema has been deployed to sell in Washington.

    *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Israel’s Comeback in the Horn of Africa

    In 2016, Benjamin Netanyahu was the first Israeli prime minister to visit Africa in 30 years. The visit was consistent with his announced intent to rebuild Israel’s ties with the continent, especially East Africa, where his tour took him through Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Narrowing down focus on the Horn of Africa, Israel has a long history of engagement in the region that dates back to the 1960s. The Red Sea has always been a vital waterway for Tel Aviv as it connects the country to East Africa, Asia and Oceania through the tiny outlet of Eilat.

    This strategic imperative has always been confronted with the hostility of nearly all the states of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden basin. Only Ethiopia and Eritrea have maintained relations with the Jewish state in the past decades, though with some setbacks.

    Not All Arab States Will Normalize Ties With Israel

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    Now, even relations with Israel might see a significant change in the Horn of Africa. The Abraham Accords, signed in September by Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates to normalize bilateral relations with Israel, have caused a diplomatic earthquake in the Middle East and beyond. On the one hand, the treaty turned Abu Dhabi into a broker facilitating dialogue between its regional partners and Israel. On the other, the accords showed the friends and foes of the United States that there is a file rouge between their ties with Washington and their relationship with Tel Aviv.

    The Abraham Accords were undoubtedly part of an effort of the US administration to garner a foreign policy success ahead of the November presidential elections. Yet this policy might stay in place longer, even with a Democrat at the White House. The Horn of Africa mirrors the Middle East in many aspects, and the recognition of Israel might be yet another one.

    Perspective Allies in the Horn

    On October 23, US President Donald Trump made a double announcement about Sudan. He first revealed Khartoum’s intention to normalize ties with Israel. Then he removed Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for the payment of compensation for two terrorist attacks against American embassies in which the regime of erstwhile Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir was involved. The recognition of Israel clearly came down as an additional request for the delisting of Sudan — an indispensable, long-awaited measure that will allow international aid to flow into the country and help Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to address the deepest economic crisis in decades.

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    But the issue of normalization with Israel is a highly contentious one for Sudan. The two countries have a conflicting history. The Jewish state has financed and trained South Sudanese guerrilla groups in the past, while the Arab country has long served as an operational base to ship weapons and aid to Hamas in Gaza. Not surprisingly, the announcement of the normalization sparked protests in Khartoum and led the Islamist National Umma Party to declare its withdrawal from the government coalition. Against this backdrop, the agreement does not seem under immediate threat since the levers of power ultimately remain in the hands of General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagolo and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who chair the Sovereign Council. The two generals benefitted from the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s military and financial support, with Abu Dhabi especially keen to see Sudan build stronger relations with its new ally, Israel.

    Eritrea is another country set to move closer to Tel Aviv. Eritreans received crucial military assistance from Israel during the liberation war against Ethiopia. After obtaining independence in 1991 after 30 years of conflict, Asmara went beyond establishing diplomatic relations and reportedly offered Israel a concession to open a military base on the island of Daklah, strategically located in the Red Sea. However, Eritrea’s growing isolation in the mid-2000s pushed President Isaias Afwerki more into Iran’s sphere of influence and, subsequently, on a collision course with Israel. The Asmara-Tehran alignment then became a key strategic concern for Saudi Arabia and the UAE since Iran allegedly used Eritrean soil as a logistics base to smuggle weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

    This concern prompted the Saudi and Emirati engagement in Eritrea, with Asmara ultimately realigning with the two Gulf states as signaled by the port concessions offered to the Emirati DP World and Eritrea’s membership in the Saudi-sponsored Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Now, with mediation by Abu Dhabi, even relations with Israel might be back on the table if President Afwerki decides to soften his country’s international isolation through a rapprochement with the United States.

    The third actor on the list might be Somaliland. The Somali breakaway republic, which emerged from the collapse of the state back in 1991, is probably holding talks with Tel Aviv, as the chief of Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, Eli Cohen, suggested in a recent interview. Here again, the UAE seems to play a crucial role. Somaliland has become a strong Emirati partner in recent years because of its strategic location looking out to the Gulf of Aden and southern Yemen. The alliance between Abu Dhabi and Hargeisa took shape around the concession of the port of Berbera to DP World and the construction of an Emirati airbase nearby.

    Inching Closer

    The UAE is very well positioned to bring Somaliland and Israel closer. Besides gaining a useful security partner in the fight against al-Shabaab, Hargeisa might see a rapprochement with the Jewish state as valuable political capital to sell to Washington in exchange for advancement in the process of recognition of its independence from Mogadishu. But Somaliland is not the only Somali state to enjoy strong ties with the UAE. Puntland in the north and Jubaland in the south are ruled by state governments similarly aligned to Abu Dhabi that could also require Israeli assistance against terrorism or even the Somali federal government in the future.Last but not least, there is Ethiopia. Addis Ababa and Tel Aviv resumed bilateral diplomacy in 1989, when the Derg military regime was toppled in Ethiopia. After years of clement relations, in September 2019, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took a successful visit to Israel. On that occasion, he signed a joint declaration with Benjamin Netanyahu that underlined their intention to foster cooperation, particularly in terms of bilateral trade, as well as military, economic and technological assistance. In this specific situation, it might be Israel that pulls the brakes on cooperation in order to avoid any steps that might antagonize Egypt, currently at loggerheads with Addis Ababa over the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Blue Nile.

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    Finally, the two remaining states in the Horn of Africa, Somalia and Djibouti, do not seem willing to reproach Israel. The reason for that can be found in the relations that these countries enjoy with Turkey and Qatar as well as in the lack of incentives from the United States to move in that direction.Given Israel’s new posture in the Middle East and Africa, more states might be willing to open to Israel — or be pressed to do so — in order to improve their relations with the US and the UAE. Yet the Palestinian issue is still a contentious topic in the vast majority of the Muslim and the post-colonial world. This makes bilateral relations with Israel a divisive issue, both in domestic and regional politics. At the domestic level, recognition of Israel is often perceived as a betrayal of the Palestinian people, especially in those countries where the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist movements are active, such as Sudan.

    At the regional level, the Turkey-Qatar axis firmly opposes any opening to Israel and has deep political, economic and security ties with many state and non-state actors across the Horn of Africa. Consequently, any agreement with Israel is likely to fuel internal dissent and entrench regional polarization at the same time. While new bilateral relations are always good news for the international system, normalization with Israel should be handled more carefully than other rapprochements.

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More