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    Is Trump Preparing a Pre-Election Surprise?

    In 2016, Alan Lichtman departed from conventional wisdom to predict a Donald Trump victory in that year’s presidential election. The political scientist was following something he called the “13 keys to the White House.” Using this relatively straightforward metric, Lichtman had correctly predicted the outcome of presidential elections stretching back to 1984. Trump was so delighted with Lichtman’s unorthodox prediction that, after the election, he sent a congratulatory note. Last week, Lichtman applied his model to this year’s presidential election. Biden narrowly beat Trump in seven out of the 13 categories.

    With three months to the election, Trump doesn’t have much of a chance to reverse any of the determinations in Lichtman’s test. Of the seven categories that he lost to Biden, the president can’t change the results of the 2018 midterms, erase the numerous scandals that have beset his administration, suddenly acquire the kind of charisma that attracts people outside his narrow base, eliminate the social unrest that has accompanied his rule or magically revive a cratering economy.

    Okay, on that last item, Trump is indeed trying to bluff the economy into a recovery and, in the absence of congressional action on another stimulus bill, use the limited powers of his executive orders as a magic wand. Wall Street might be fooled, but the tens of millions of unemployed are not.

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    Which leaves the two foreign policy keys in Lichtman’s model. The first, avoiding a foreign policy disaster, tips in Trump’s favor. To my mind, pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization all represent foreign policy fiascos, but Lichtman has in mind a screw-up on the order of the Iraq invasion in 2003.

    The second foreign policy key is achieving a major global victory. This, Lichtman points out, Trump has failed to do. Trump is well aware of Lichtman’s model and track record. He knows that he only has to flip one key to change Lichtman’s prediction. What are the prospects that the president will pull out the stops in an effort to achieve some grand foreign policy success in the final 100 days? Is Donald Trump preparing an October surprise?

    The Hibernating President

    To put it mildly, Donald Trump has not been the most engaged president in US history. He doesn’t pay attention to his briefings. He plays golf while a pandemic rages throughout the land. He has only a vague understanding of the world that exists beyond the global archipelago of Trump Organization holdings.

    Most recently, in discussing the explosions in Beirut, Trump falsely opined that it was “a bomb of some kind.” It was yet another flight of fancy from a president who prefers to make things up instead of hewing to the facts or keeping his mouth shut. “Yet aside from some initial concern among Lebanese officials, Trump’s assertions were largely met with a collective global shrug,” reports The Washington Post.

    The president who shook up the foreign policy consensus by meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, forging a new economic relationship with China and embracing a cadre of autocrats in the Middle East has seemingly gone into hibernation. The world knows quite well how royally Trump has screwed up the US response to the coronavirus. Global leaders see the blood in the water. They’re expecting a change in White House occupancy come November.

    Seasoned observers of the international scene have concluded that, with little geopolitical leverage, Trump will not be able to pull off any major foreign policy success in the days leading up to the election. There’s little time or political commitment on the ground to push through a peace agreement in Afghanistan that hastens the withdrawal of American troops. The much-vaunted Middle East peace deal that Jared Kushner presented to the UN in February is dead on arrival. Any meetings with North Korea, much less a surprise deal, are off the agenda between now and November. Denmark is not interested in selling Greenland.

    That doesn’t leave a lot of options for a president struggling with a raft of domestic issues that are likely to prove more influential in the long run at the polls. But don’t make the mistake of thinking that a foreign policy success has to be something constructive. Donald Trump is much better at destroying things than building them. He has already asked foreign leaders — in Ukraine, in China — for help in destroying Joe Biden’s reputation. He has looked the other way as Russia has worked to destroy American democracy. For an encore in November, Trump may well be planning something even more destructive.

    War With Iran

    Donald Trump has not tried to conceal his antipathy toward Tehran. He has done everything short of war to bring down the Iranian government. He withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal. He applied harsh sanctions to squeeze the Iranian economy. Two years ago, he provided the CIA with new authority to intensify a cyberwar against the country. And, to kick off 2020, he orchestrated the assassination of a top Iranian official, Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.

    Bizarrely, Trump continued to maintain throughout that he still held out hope of negotiating a new deal with Iran. But last week, Brian Hook, the instrument of that policy of continued engagement with Iran in the midst of a punishing cold war, stepped down. Hook was something of a moderate in the very skewed politics of the Trump administration. Indeed, compared to his successor, Hook’s a veritable peacenik.

    Replacing Hook as special envoy to Iran is Elliott Abrams. Fresh from his failures to promote regime change in Venezuela, Abrams will likely apply his extremist philosophy to his new portfolio. The first opportunity takes place this week as the administration pushes the UN to extend the arms embargo on Iran due to expire as per the terms of the nuclear deal. It’s part of an effort to destroy any chance of a Biden administration returning to the status quo ante with Iran.

    Abrams is assuming his new position at a fraught moment. An explosion took place last month at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. It was but one of several such mysterious “accidents” that are likely the result of covert Israeli operations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is anxious about the prospect of Joe Biden winning in November and resurrecting some version of the Obama administration’s détente with Iran. So, Netanyahu is getting in his licks while he can, though even he is not interested in a full-scale war with Iran.

    For hawks in the United States who were disappointed that the Bush administration didn’t march into Tehran after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the latest turmoil in the region is encouraging. “Iran has been in a weakened state, its economy hobbled by U.S. sanctions and its regime facing domestic discontent, including a massive protest campaign last fall,” writes Jonah Shepp in New York magazine. “Those protests raised hopes among Iran hawks in the U.S. that their dreams of regime change might soon be realized.”

    A war with a major Middle Eastern power is probably not on Trump’s agenda. After all, he’s been pushing for a withdrawal of US forces from the region. And in June 2019, after Iran shot down a US drone, Trump decided not to retaliate, even though a number of his advisers were urging him to do so. But this time, an election beckons, Trump is down in the polls, and desperate times call for desperate measures. It wouldn’t be the first time that Donald Trump rolled the dice in one last bid for the jackpot.

    What about China?

    After experimenting with North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba and Iran, the Trump administration has decided that China is the most useful adversary to distract attention from the president’s many failures. Just last week, the administration placed new restrictions on TikTok and WeChat, two Chinese social media applications. Microsoft has been in negotiations to acquire part of TikTok’s business, a deal Trump’s actions potentially disrupt.

    The administration also announced new sanctions against 11 Chinese and Hong Kong officials over the imposition of the recent national security law in the former British colony. Included in the list is Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s chief executive. Other recent US sanctions targeting China have focused on the treatment of the Uighur minority, on cybersecurity and for transporting Iranian oil. This week, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar is visiting Taiwan, a previously unheard-of breach in diplomatic etiquette since US officials have studiously ignored Taiwan for four decades.

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    These actions take place against an ominous backdrop: the US closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston in July, high-level complaints about Chinese actions in the South China Sea and the ongoing attempts to draw together security allies from India to Australia into an Indo-Pacific alliance against China. And don’t forget the speech by Mike Pompeo last month in which the secretary of state essentially declared the end of engagement with China because it failed to induce “the kind of change inside of China that President Nixon had hoped to induce.” Actually, Nixon was more interested in driving a further wedge between Beijing and Moscow and opening China up for business. That kind of change is exactly what happened. Democracy and human rights were never really much of a consideration for either Nixon or Henry Kissinger — just as they’re of little interest to Pompeo or Donald Trump.

    Pompeo’s speech and the various punitive measures directed at Beijing all amount to a fundamental shift in US policy: not just skepticism about engagement but support for regime change inside China. As with Iran, Trump is probably not thinking about starting a war with China. But a skirmish in the South China Sea that produces a rally-around-the-flag surge in support of the president could certainly fit the bill for an October surprise.

    The US military seems to be preparing for such a contingency, with Pentagon chief Mark Esper effectively drawing a line in the water near China. “The secretary said that the U.S. military is positioning forces to counter Chinese behavior and support U.S. policies, revealing that the U.S. conducted more freedom-of-navigation operations challenging unlawful movement restrictions and excessive claims in 2019 than it has any year in the past four decades,” writes Ryan Pickrell in Business Insider.

    Surely, you might be saying, Donald Trump wouldn’t pick a fight with China or Iran just to win an election. Wouldn’t the potential casualties, if nothing else, stay his hand? But remember, this is a president who has already dismissed more than 150,000 American coronavirus deaths as “it is what it is.” What’s another few thousand deaths to guarantee four more years?

    *[This article was originally published by Foreign Policy in Focus.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Israel-UAE Deal: Arab States Are Tired of Waiting on Palestine

    The August 13 announcement of normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates breaks the quarter-century standstill in Arab-Israeli relations and shows that Arab states will no longer hold their interests hostage to the long-dormant Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. President Donald Trump made the announcement of the establishment of relations between the two countries from the White House, suggesting that his administration played an instrumental role in the action. He referred to a call the same day with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates.

    The exact American role in the deal — other than giving the agreement a name, the Abraham Accord, in honor of the prophet important to both Judaism and Islam as well as Christianity — is unclear.

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    What is most apparent is that the two countries, which have had substantial informal interactions in fields like trade, technology, health and security for years, have finally moved to normalize those ties. The immediate upshot is that for the first time in nearly 26 years, an Arab state has formally recognized the Jewish state. Moreover, the UAE becomes the first Arab nation that has relations with Israel but no shared border. Egypt and Jordan, which each share borders with Israel, established ties in 1980 and 1994, respectively.

    Why Wait?

    Previously, Arab states, including the UAE, held out the prospect of normalized relations on condition of the establishment of two states, Israel and Palestine, along the borders that existed prior to the 1967 War. With its decision today, the UAE is saying it is no longer willing to wait for such an outcome, especially when its own interests are advanced by opening formal ties with Israel. Despite the Trump administration’s announced “deal of the century” — officially Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People — to much fanfare in June of last year, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have made no headway since Secretary of State John Kerry’s failed year-long effort six years ago.

    The UAE extracted one apparent concession from Jerusalem: Netanyahu will suspend annexation plans for the West Bank. That gives the Emirates the political cover it needs not only for its own population — by now probably agnostic on the whole Israel-Palestine dispute — but also for other Arab states, especially those more likely to criticize Abu Dhabi’s decision (likely few outside the usual pariahs). In fact, aware of the benefits that accrue to normalizing ties with the nation now considered the most powerful and technologically advanced in the Middle East, other Arab nations are now more likely to follow the UAE’s lead.

    Moreover, nations recognizing Israel are also more likely to earn Washington’s — and especially this administration’s — favor. In the case of the UAE, which already enjoys close ties with the US, that won’t mean a great deal immediately. Down the road, however — that is after the November election — it could mean attractive baubles like a free trade agreement or expanded security ties, regardless of who comes out on top in the American election.

    A Boon to Bibi in Troubled Times

    Traditionally, when nations establish diplomatic relations, they open embassies in respective capitals. For Israel, that will mean a new embassy in Abu Dhabi, and probably a consulate in Dubai as well, given its economic prominence in the country. But the UAE must decide where to locate its embassy. Will it be in Tel Aviv, where most nations of the world have had their embassies after Israeli independence in 1948, or in Jerusalem, Israel’s official capital and where the US relocated its embassy in February of 2018? Other nations also have opened embassies in Jerusalem, but no other major country. By setting up an embassy in Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi would implicitly recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, effectively a double win for Israel. That decision will be a thorny one for the wealthy Gulf state. It may wish to hold out for further concessions than just the annexation postponement.

    Annexation has been on indefinite hold since early last month when Netanyahu failed to act on previous pledges, reportedly because of Washington’s cold feet. Taking it off the table now is, therefore, hardly a sacrifice for Netanyahu. Even in Israel itself, it was viewed with mixed emotions.

    The ever-wily Bibi turned what had looked to be a political loss into a fairly significant foreign policy win for the Jewish state. And he needed it. Since early summer, thousands of Israelis have taken to the streets, mostly in Jerusalem, to protest against Netanyahu and call for his departure. Most of those critics are on the political left, which poses little threat to his continued rule. But he is also facing heat from his right, which presents far more of a threat. The conservative prime minister has historically drawn his support from the powerful right of Israel’s political spectrum, which dominates Israel’s electorate. So, getting this victory today — recognition by a major Arab state — allows him to again show his remarkable ability to advance Israel’s interests.

    That’s doubly important in view of the declining state of affairs between him and his erstwhile partner in government, Benny Gantz. Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial, a budget dispute between him and Gantz, and the recent surge in COVID-19 infections in Israel have cast a shadow over the unity government. Were it not for today’s announcement and Gantz’s declining political support within Israel, a new election, which now seems likely, Netanyahu’s 11-year reign might have been facing its denouement.

    Nothing for the Palestinians, Even Less for Iran

    Pointedly, in the entire announcement event at the White House, Palestine was not mentioned. Trump was accompanied by a parade of other administration officials, whose involvement in the accord was never made clear. None of them referred to either Israel-Palestine relations or to the annexation postponement. This is bad news for President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinians. The annexation postponement is a mere short-term sop, and they know it. Given the ambitions of those on Israel’s political right, annexation will be a fact of life. A Joe Biden win in November might stall it, but only for a while. A Trump victory will make it inevitable and likely soon.

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    The real message to Abbas is that Arab governments are tired of waiting. The UAE has made the first move. Other Arab states are likely to follow suit in the near future. Two in particular, Qatar and Oman, have already shown interest in expanded ties with Jerusalem for the very same reasons as the UAE.

    The announcement’s unspoken message to Ramallah is to get on with it — to negotiate and settle with Israel while there’s still some chance for an independent Palestinian state. The previous Arab conditions to the normalization of ties with Israel have exceeded their shelf life. Arab states are moving on. Abbas and the Palestinians need to do the same. Even a Biden victory won’t change this.

    Iran was briefly mentioned in the proceedings, by former administration Iran point man, Brian Hook, who resigned earlier this month. He needn’t have done so. Tehran can’t be pleased with the decision of the Emirates, which are located barely 25 miles across the Strait of Hormuz from Iran. Israel is likely to gain greater cooperation and coordination with the UAE armed forces, which already maintain very strong ties with the US. In addition, Israel will likely gain a prime observation perch for intelligence gathering on the Islamic Republic.

    Today’s announcement amounts to a significant setback for Iran. It may go too far to say that Washington’s dream of an Arab-Israeli anti-Iran alliance is in the works. But if one other Gulf state acts similarly, that’s exactly how the Trump administration will portray it — and how Iran may come to view it. That may be a good thing for the US, Arab nations and Israel, even if the likelihood of such an actual alliance is remote.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Shamima Begum: The Sensitive Case of IS Returnees

    Born in the UK to Bangladeshi parents, Shamima Begum left London as a 15-year-old in 2015. Using her British passport, she traveled to Turkey with two of her friends from school. From there, Begum and her friends crossed into Syria, where they met their Islamic State (IS) contacts. While in Syria, Begum married an IS fighter. On February 19 this year, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission had stripped Begum of her citizenship as she was deemed to be a national security threat. On July 16, however, UK authorities granted this now adult British woman, who had joined a terrorist group as a teenager four years earlier, the right to return to Britain to challenge the UK government’s removal of her citizenship.

    The commission ruled that the decision to revoke Begum’s British citizenship did not render her stateless as, by default, the United Kingdom also considered her a Bangladeshi citizen “by descent.” However, the Bangladeshi Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it did not consider her as a citizen of that country. A statement released by Begum’s British lawyers argued that she indeed had never visited Bangladesh, nor had she ever applied for dual nationality.

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    In the meantime, the press has chastised Begum, who remains a detainee in a camp operated by ethnic Kurdish militias in northern Syria, for making controversial statements such and saying that seeing her first severed head did not faze her “at all” and suggesting that people should “have sympathy” toward her for everything she has been through.

    Why Women?

    England’s Court of Appeal, in turn, unanimously agreed that Begum should be granted the right to have a fair and effective appeal of the decision to strip her of her citizenship, but only if she is permitted to come back to Britain. Of course, that does not guarantee the reinstatement of her citizenship rights, just that she has a right to present her case in person. Regardless of the legal wrangling and the debate about the legality that her case has sparked, this example sheds some light on the issue of contextualizing female IS supporters and terrorists and the legality of stripping Western-born suspects of their European or North American citizenship.

    There has been some academic discussion of why women, especially young women, who were born, raised and educated in the West, migrate to IS-held territory and join terrorist groups, leaving behind family, friends and a way of life while abandoning liberal values and opportunities that countries such as the UK offer them. It is difficult to ascertain whether a particular female, such as Shamima Begum, was a victim of IS, an active supporter or both. The widely circulated stories of “jihadi brides” have projected an image of confused and naïve girls and women traveling to join the Islamic State. While certain dynamics lured a number of females to IS-held territories, many went of their own free will. Yet it is highly debatable to what extent a 15-year-old understands the realities of this extremist group.

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    Muslim women have migrated to IS-held areas for a multitude of reasons, including the romantic ideal of marrying a “lion” — a supposedly brave and noble warrior — looking for an adventure and contributing to the establishment of an Islamic “caliphate” regulated by strict enforcement of Sharia law. The sense that joining the Islamic State empowers people to live meaningful lives draws many of the migrant women. One study suggests that besides issues of belonging and identity — and a skewed interpretation of Islam — it is, in the case of young women like Begum, online social networks that appeared to be the primary venue and driving factor for radicalization. It turns out that the vast majority of foreign women who traveled to Syria and Iraq served IS primarily as one of several housewives or sex slaves.

    It is only by understanding the motivations and experiences of those who have gone to fight abroad that governments can prevent the recruitment of another generation of terrorists and terrorist sympathizers. The enemies of the Islamic State have ostensibly defeated the group in the Middle East, yet unknown numbers of surviving IS fighters have found the means to relocate to Afghanistan. Permutations of IS and other extremist groups are also active in many African countries like Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria and  Somalia, among others. Aside from Afghanistan, other places in South Asia are not immune.

    Displaced Burden

    The UK, US and some other countries have chosen to prevent the return of foreign fighters by revoking their citizenship. Although such actions may prevent the return of foreign fighters in the short term, they do not solve the problem and may also be illegal under both national and international laws. In several instances, this will simply displace the burden and force weakened states such as Syria and Iraq to deal with the consequences of radicalization. It may also instill further grievances and act as a trigger for radicalization into surviving Western-born radicals who may plot terrorist attacks against Western targets.

    In certain cases, citizenship revocation has led to concerns over statelessness. Rendering an individual stateless runs against Western legal principles and is contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In several legal systems, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to prosecute female returnees because of their domestic roles in Syria and Iraq. Another challenge associated with prosecutions of foreign fighters lies with demonstrating intent. This applies both to the intent of the actions committed while in the war zone and the intent of travel for aspiring foreign fighters. There is also an argument that many such individuals, especially the juveniles, were victims of human trafficking.

    A more fruitful approach would be to allow a panel of experts to determine whether an individual returning to the home country is dangerous or disillusioned. The prime example of this approach is Denmark, which has already implemented assessment protocols that allow authorities to determine the individual circumstances for each returnee. Based on the results of such screenings, Danish police, together with social services, develop a plan of action for each returnee. Together, they decide whether a returnee is imprisoned, placed in a rehabilitation program or is assigned a combination of both approaches. It is extremely difficult to separate a victim from a perpetrator, and the boundaries can be particularly murky for foreign fighters.

    *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Beirushima: What Lebanon Needs to Survive

    It will be a while until we know what or who triggered the explosion destroyed the Beirut port and, with it, half of the Lebanese capital, on August 4. What we know for sure is who the ultimate culprits are, and, unfortunately, none of them are included among those under house arrest or currently being interrogated: the corrupt political mafia that has controlled and exploited the lives of ordinary Lebanese for many years. Each one of those in power, directly or indirectly, has contributed to the blast that not only killed at least 200 people and wounded more than 6,000, but also destroyed Lebanon’s desperately needed economic lifeline, turning the country into a beggar state that must survive on external charity.

    The fact that the petition launched on the eve of President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Beirut calling for Lebanon to return to the French mandate gathered 50,000 signatures in the first 24 hours is representative of the hopelessness that has pervaded this small, but historically proud, creative and industrious nation. The fact that regional and international scavengers have come closer, circling the Lebanese wagon, seeking to complete their meal, is testimony to the dangers that lie ahead as Lebanon must try to protect the last remaining elements of its sovereignty against another assault.

    This assault will further compound the UN Security Council ruling that overruled Lebanon’s parliament in the case of Rafiq Hariri, the former prime minister assassinated in 2005 — a process that has lost both its respect and even its entertainment value.

    Last Line of Defense

    But that is a discussion for another day when the delayed ruling is announced. For now, in the midst of one of the most destructive episodes in the country’s recent history, the Lebanese people find themselves faced with not only the greatest challenge to their survival as a nation but also the loss of what they fought hard to defend in the face of foreign usurpation: their ability to continue as a creative nation of free thinkers and artists and, above all, as partakers of a free political process that is the envy of all those subjugated to dictatorships in the region.

    Just two days apart, 75 years ago, in Hiroshima, Japan, another proud and industrious people were smitten by unprecedented magnitude. While the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and then Nagasaki were a deliberate act of premeditated evil, the jury is still out on Lebanon’s Beirushima. The jury is also still out on whether the Lebanese will follow the footsteps of their predecessors to rebuild their country into a vibrant and transparent economic regional player, but without surrendering the strength that first liberated most of their land and now continues to protect its territorial integrity — the last line of defense for what remains of Lebanon as a nation.

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    Beyond that imperative, nothing must be held sacred if reform is to be the true way forward. Losing that imperative is what many of the country’s regional enemies will seek to force upon Lebanon, exploiting the opportunities this very dark hour provides them. This will indeed prove to be a challenge that requires strong leadership that must protect Lebanon from foreign intervention.

    As shock turned into more street anger, Lebanon’s fragmented society has forgotten its religious and sectarian divides and united against a common internal enemy: the corrupt political system that has abused its democratic process and misruled Lebanon for far too long. This display of national unity is the silver lining that will hopefully ultimately save Lebanon.

    The entire political system must be overhauled if Lebanon is to survive as a nation. And the onus of leading the way lies with the people and not the leadership. Lebanese politicians have proven themselves to be one of the most corrupt political elite in the region, owning or being involved in everything ranging from garbage collection to power generation to banks that lend money to the government at exorbitant rates. The structure has created a ruling class with everything to lose and nothing to gain from economic reform. These are not the people trustworthy of leading the transformation the country so desperately needs.

    Pulling the Trigger

    On top of everything else, its ailing economy is loaded with more than 1.5 million refugees, the result of Israeli occupation, the Syrian Civil War and many regional conflicts that Lebanon is made to pay the price for. It is, therefore, not surprising that highly explosive ammonia nitrate abandoned at the port of Beirut for six years would be allowed to lie hidden and become a powder keg waiting for something or someone to trigger what Brian Castner, the lead weapons investigator for Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Team, called “the biggest explosion in an urban area in decades” that made 300,000 people homeless.

    In a country where economic indicators have lost their meaning, where law and order are decided by a judicial mafia, where the role of both political business leadership has lost its demarcations and where a foreign president is popularly welcomed where a native is banished, it is clearly a time to fold and start all over again. And only the street, now prompted and indeed strengthened by a massive explosion, can lead the way. Whether the blast that devastated the nation’s capital has also wiped away the corruption that brought Lebanon to its feet, only time will tell. For if it hasn’t, nothing ever will, and the noble, generous and hardworking Lebanese will become a nation that once was.

    This is, of course, assuming it was something, not someone, who pulled the trigger. Should it, in the end, become evident that the explosion was another act of premeditated evil, then all bets are off. Our worst fears will become true, and Lebanon, and the entire region, will go up in flames. Let us hope Donald Trump was once again wrong when he suggested the blast had been an attack, and let us hope that foreign election campaigns have not been the reason Beirut blew up, with the potential to take with it the rest of what’s remaining of our region.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Houthi Rebels Gain Momentum in Yemen

    Early on July 13, the Houthi rebels launched their second coordinated attack on Saudi Arabia in 20 days. The Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted and destroyed four ballistic missiles and six explosive drones that had been launched from the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital Sanaa. While the Saudis did not inform the location of the missile and drone attacks, a Houthi military spokesperson stated they were directed at “military aircraft, pilot accommodation and Patriot systems in Khamis Mushait, and other military targets at Abha, Jizan and Najran airports” and destroyed a number of those targets. He added that “the giant oil facility in the Jizan industrial zone” was also targeted, and that the “strike was accurate.” Additionally, the rebels claimed to have killed and injured dozens of Saudi military officers. 

    The new coordinated attack, which followed the airstrikes against targets that included the Saudi defense and intelligence headquarters and King Salman air base on June 23, aiming for military sites and equipment with the addition of an oil facility, shows that the Houthis are stepping up their offensives against the Saudi-led coalition. The rebels claimed the attack was a retaliation against Saudi aggression, the latest of which was an airstrike on the Hajjah governorate that killed seven children and two women on July 12.

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    Although the Saudi airstrike indeed provoked Houthi retaliation, another large-scale attack of that sort was already expected, and more are likely to come. With these two attacks, the Houthis have gained momentum based on their alleged ability to hit targets with high precision deep within Saudi Arabia, namely in Riyadh, and strike multiple targets in different cities at the same time. The Iran-backed group likely intends to push the Saudi-led coalition to approach ceasefire talks more seriously and consider concessions that the Saudis have so far deemed unnegotiable, such as the lifting of the sea, land and air blockade of Yemen.

    The Push for Marib City

    Tied to the Houthis’ intention to force the Saudi-led coalition to agree to better terms for a ceasefire is the rebels’ continuing push to capture Marib city, the Yemeni government’s last stronghold in the north of the country. On June 29, Houthis and pro-government fighters clashed in the Hashia district of Marib province, and on July 1, the Saudi-led coalition carried out airstrikes on the governorate, which is mostly controlled by the Houthis, except for parts that include its capital of the same name. Following the initial session (on July 7) of the trial of Houthi leaders accused of orchestrating the takeover of the Yemeni government, the Iran-backed group launched a ballistic missile that reportedly landed in a civilian area of Marib city on July 8, followed by another strike on July 14.

    The Saudis have been wanting to withdraw from the Yemeni conflict for quite some time now. But they cannot allow a complete Houthi takeover of the northwest and, without Saudi presence, possibly even further, as this would give the rebels more bargaining power ahead of eventual direct negotiations. After Houthi forces captured the city of al-Hazm, in al-Jawf province, in March, the rebels gained access to a pathway through the al-Ruwaik desert where they would be able to send fighters directly to Marib and/or carry out additional airstrikes on the city.

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    Considering the danger of that threat, army troops announced in late June that they had surrounded al-Hazm, and on July 15, the coalition allegedly carried out air raids on the city that killed several civilians, increasing pressure as it is aware of the strategic importance of the city in a potential Houthi takeover of Marib.

    It is highly unlikely that either of the two warring parties will achieve a complete military victory in Yemen. The Houthis will likely continue with their escalation approach hoping to capture Marib city so that they can increase their leverage ahead of eventual direct negotiations with the Saudi-led coalition, which are being pursued by the UN envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths. The coalition, in turn, will likely continue striking Houthi-controlled areas responding to the rebels’ attacks and keep on defending its last stronghold in the north, but, at some point, it will need to address ceasefire talks for the sake of the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

    Should the coalition decide to wait and see if the tables are turned in the conflict, in which at the moment Houthi forces enjoy the upper hand militarily, and continue to refuse to grant Houthis legitimacy, the Saudi-backed government might be perceived by the international community as one of the pieces hindering a successful political process in Yemen. That is not to say that the Houthis are facilitating the process, but the Yemeni government has more to lose in terms of legitimacy simply because it is the governing entity recognized worldwide.

    Endless fighting, with constant accusations of violations of international humanitarian law against the Saudi-led coalition, which currently amount to over 500 since 2015 according to the UK government, could eventually wear out the support for the government and its international legitimacy — the only thing knowingly corrupt President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi still holds onto — might start to fade.

    Undivided Attention

    In the south, the latest developments involving the Abu Dhabi-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) may affect the landscape of the war. The STC has been involved in on-and-off fights with the Saudi-led coalition for control of the south even after the power-sharing Riyadh Agreement the two parties signed in November 2019 and the announcement of a ceasefire in June. On July 26, however, the STC and the Yemeni government agreed on another attempt for the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement following a Saudi proposal to “accelerate” its fulfillment. 

    According to Yemeni media, the new deal brings similar points, such as the appointment of a governor and security director for Aden and the formation of a new cabinet with equal representation from both the north and the south, with new conditions, like the return of the governor of Socotra to the island and the revocation by the STC of its declaration of self-rule.

    The alleged adaptation of the Riyadh Agreement, the materialization of which is still to be seen, and the consequent reduction of tensions between the two parties would ultimately damage Houthi plans, since the Iran-backed group was likely taking advantage of the fragmented attention given by the coalition to the fight against the STC in the south and the Houthis themselves in the north. The question that remains is whether the now undivided coalition’s attention to the fight against the Houthis in the north, provided the new conditions with the STC bring stability to the south, will enable it to turn the table in the conflict.

    Looking ahead, there is a big chance the Houthis will continue to pressure the coalition, especially with offensives in and around Marib city and potentially in Saudi Arabia. Previous experiences show Houthi attacks are likely to continue even after the reported understanding between the coalition and the STC based on the fact that the June 23, Houthi-coordinated attacks on Saudi Arabia came a day after the coalition and the STC had announced a ceasefire. Meanwhile, if focused on the fight against the Houthis, the coalition might be able to respond to attacks with more vigor and prevent the rebels from increasing their leverage ahead of eventual direct negotiations.

    *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Was the First Gulf War the Last Triumph of Multilateralism?

    This week marks the 30th anniversary of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Desperate to pay off his nation’s seemingly insurmountable debt, acquired as a result of his invasion of and the futile 8-year war with Iran that had just ended, Saddam Hussein saw oil-rich Kuwait as the solution. Iraq had never recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty, claiming it had been hived off by the British during its occupation of Iraq in the early 20th century. Moreover, as he and many Iraqis asserted, it really was Iraq’s “19th province.”

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    Saddam deployed Iraqi troops to the border in July of 1990, prompting concern among neighboring Arab countries and the United States. In a much-reported meeting with then-US Ambassador April Glaspie late in July, he was asked about his intentions. Glaspie took pains to explain that the US had “no opinion” on Arab-Arab disputes, further expressing the US hope that the Iraqi-Kuwait border question might be resolved soon and without the use of force. (Egypt has been trying to mediate the dispute.) Saddam interpreted her response as an American green light to invade, as egregious a misinterpretation of a diplomatic communication as there ever was.

    A Multilateral Approach

    Within hours of the August 2 invasion, the UN Security Council convened and ordered Iraq’s immediate withdrawal. It was ignored by Saddam, as were multiple subsequent UNSC resolutions. Saddam did not believe that the US or any other nation would take action to defend the small patch of desert at the end of the Persian Gulf, despite its outsize oil wealth and massive reserves.

    He was wrong. Under the leadership of President George H. W. Bush and his able secretary of state, James Baker, the US organized a 34-nation coalition, including many Arab states and NATO allies. Armed with a UNSC resolution authorizing “all necessary means” if Saddam did not withdraw his forces by the January 15 deadline, the US and other coalition forces began assembling in Saudi Arabia, which many feared would be the next target of Saddam’s ambitions. Facing more than 650,000 troops and a massive US, British and French air assault, Iraqi forces were driven out of Kuwait. The three-day campaign cost coalition forces some 300 deaths, including 146 Americans. Iraqi casualties were never officially ascertained, but estimates range from 20,000 to 26,000 killed and 75,000 injured. Over 1,000 Kuwaitis also died, mostly civilians.

    The Kuwait incursion proved even more humiliating and costly than Iraq’s ill-fated invasion of Iran. Numerous and increasingly costly sanctions (including on critical oil exports), intrusive UN weapons inspectors and expansive no-fly zones in the country’s north and south decisively placed Iraq in pariah-nation status in the world. Ultimately, it set the stage for the American invasion and occupation of Iraq and Saddam’s removal in 2003.

    Leadership When It Counted

    The First Gulf War marked a significant achievement for American diplomacy, one that would be difficult to replicate today. Though Saddam remained unmoved by American warnings and UNSC resolutions and sanctions, the international community proceeded deliberately but measuredly before employing force. The UNSC’s approval of Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force, obtained 12 affirmative votes, including from four of the five permanent members (China abstained) and only two negatives (Cuba and Yemen).

    Deft diplomacy on the part of Bush and Baker attracted 33 other nations to the coalition that expelled Saddam’s forces. Secretary of Baker met on several occasions with Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, to resolve the crisis. This was a marked contrast to George W. Bush’s approach to, and eventual invasion of, Iraq in 2003, which failed to secure UNSC approval and incurred considerable worldwide condemnation.

    Importantly, despite a virtually open road to Baghdad and against the urgings of some in the US at the time, in 1991 President Bush withdrew all US forces from Iraq and did not seek to remove Saddam. This proved to be critical in maintaining the unprecedented coalition he had organized to address a Middle East crisis. Bush Sr. was able to capitalize on that achievement by assembling world leaders in Spain later that fall for the Madrid Conference, which brought together many of the same Arab countries from the coalition, plus Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and co-sponsor the Soviet Union to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conference became a stepping stone for increased action on the part of many Arab countries, the Palestinians and Israel, and the progress that followed.

    The Era of Great Power Rivalry

    The First Gulf War itself and what followed demonstrated what principled, deft and concerted diplomacy on the part of the US can achieve. Clearly, the task remains significantly short of its ultimate goal. But the hope of that seems all the more distant as the US under President Donald Trump eschews the Bush/Baker approach to multilateral diplomacy in favor of narrow, one-sided bilateral diplomacy. The latter has proven to be a contributing factor in the region’s — and perhaps the world’s — decided move toward “great power” competition.

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    Nations as diverse as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others now vie for increased influence and even dominance in the Middle East and elsewhere. Never a partisan in great power competition, the US now stands strangely quiet on the sidelines as these nations attempt to carve out spheres of influence, from the Crimea and Ukraine, to South and Central Asia, the Far East and the Middle East. For some of the peoples of the Middle East — Syria, Yemen and Libya — this has meant misery and devastation, and for the rest of the region, instability, uncertainty and fear. US-led multilateralism at a time when it stood unparalleled in military, political and economic power in the world helped address a genuine Middle East crisis 30 years ago. In that sense, America’s and the world’s actions in Iraq may very well have been the mythical “good” war in the Middle East, as much an oxymoron as that may sound.

    In an era of great-power maneuvering, it would be inconceivable to imagine now a similar response in the event of another crisis between nations of the region, say Iran and Saudi Arabia. With rival major powers choosing sides, one could more easily envision competing alliances being drawn up, culminating in the sort of conflict the world saw in Europe in World War I.

    Great-power competition seldom, if ever, leads to stability or peace. World War I amply proved that. The example of the First Gulf War, however, proved that multilateralism, especially when led by a powerful but principled nation, can diffuse escalating tensions, avert greater disaster and provide at least the prospect and a framework for peace and stability.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    How Will the UAE Cope With Growing Environmental Insecurity?

    Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the world is “living through an unrivalled drop in carbon output.” According to the International Energy Agency, global use of energy will drop 6% in 2020, an amount that equals India’s total energy demand. Worldwide demand for electricity has already fallen 5%, which is the largest amount since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The dramatic decline in pollution resulting from economic lockdowns was apparently visible and recorded by numerous satellites. However, it will take a decade of this kind of economic lockdown to make a significant impact on global warming and truly curb carbon emissions.

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    Environmental pollutants are indifferent to national boundaries. Addressing climate change requires long-term international cooperation. All countries must make serious and collective efforts to stop irreversible damage caused by climate change.

    The Environment-Security Nexus

    The United Arab Emirates is among the world’s biggest per capita emitters of greenhouse gases. In fact, the World Wide Fund for Nature has ranked the UAE as having the world’s highest per capita environmental footprint, which largely has to do with the unsustainable megaprojects that began in the Emirates amid the oil boom of the 1970s.

    Other factors such as the desert country’s climatic conditions are in the picture too. There are also the popular modes of transportation within the Emirates: According to a survey conducted by the Department of Transport in 2014, “60 per cent of Abu Dhabi and Dubai residents who owned a car said they never used public transport. Only two to three percent use public transport frequently.” This is in part due to the long-standing car culture in the Emirates and relatively cheap fuel as well as car prices, but also because of connectivity problems to certain destinations.

    As outlined by Jon Barnett in his 2013 essay “Environmental Security,” environmental problems pose threats to the national well-being as well as the quality of life of the inhabitants of any state. Analysts and scholars refer to environmental security when discussing the threats and dangers emanating from the environment. The principal source that threatens ecological security is human activity. The environment is one of the seven sectors outlined in the United Nations Development Program’s early definition of human security, and environmental change has long been identified as a human security issue.

    The Emiratis have been struggling with a number of environmental threats for decades. Today, numerous environmental issues — including pollution, waste, land degradation, desertification, biodiversity loss, etc. — all impact the UAE. Waste and air pollution constitute major challenges, in particular outdoor air pollution. The UAE ranks in the bottom fourth globally in exposure to particulate matter — tiny particles of sand, dust or chemicals registered at elevated levels that are highly dangerous and associated with risks of numerous diseases such as cancer, as well as respiratory and heart diseases. In 2017, the Environment Agency of Abu Dhabi considered poor air quality to be a “primary environmental threat to public health.”

    In terms of water, the UAE continues to have highly unsustainable groundwater extraction rates. Being largely a desert country, the contamination of its fresh groundwater reserves and seawater endangers the UAE’s future. Some experts have warned of the imminent depletion of groundwater sources by 2030.

    In the area of biodiversity conservation, the UAE boasts a number of protected areas both on land and in the sea. But its fish stocks are in a critical state. Overfishing and heavy commercial maritime shipping across the Persian Gulf have also contributed to a potentially irreversible decline in the health of fragile coral reefs off the coast. Silt from shoreline construction has had a negative impact on coral.

    “Greening” the Emirati Economy

    The UAE has long acknowledged climate change as a serious threat multiplier to the country and is ahead of the curve when compared to other countries that are still debating the seriousness of the issue or even outright denying its reality. Recognizing these environmental threats, the UAE has been in the process of “greening” its economy by developing a solar energy sector along with a nuclear energy sector and managing its scarce water resources with an emphasis on conservation and efficiency. It has been at the forefront of the renewables revolution with its solar farms while very slowly transforming its thermal desalination plants into reverse osmosis desalination facilities that produce far fewer greenhouse gas emissions.

    The UAE Vision 2021 document contains as one of its wide-reaching goals a “well-preserved natural environment” and seeks to address various environmental threats to the country. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi has put in place its Environment Vision 2030 strategy, which lists five priority areas, namely climate change impacts, air and noise pollution, water resources, biodiversity and waste. The UAE government has set up various institutions and initiatives to address environmental issues in the previous decades such as the Environment Agency — Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi Global Environmental Data Initiative and the Arab Water Academy, and has signed and ratified numerous international and regional environmental conventions. The government has launched a variety of awareness campaigns pertaining to environmental issues in order to educate different sectors of society.  

    According to Dr. Taoufik Ksiksi, a plant biologist and climate change researcher at the United Arab Emirates University at Al Ain, these awareness campaigns were not quite sufficient: “More needs to be done to raise the awareness levels, especially at the lower levels, in schools with young people, and there have to be substantial changes to the curriculum to incorporate courses on environmental sciences, native ecology and conservation in general,” he said in a phone interview. In addition, Ksiksi suggests that “more robust climate modeling approaches that focus primarily on the region need to be developed with increased processing power that take into account regional circumstances and are not geared towards climate conditions prevalent in Europe.”

    Embed from Getty Images

    Dr. Ksiksi thinks that UAE’s advantage is that it enjoys “the benefit of resources than can fund technology and new initiatives.” Yet the lack of synergy in terms of regional cooperation in the area of green economy building in the Arabian Peninsula somewhat hampers such efforts.    

    The UAE has for some time now incorporated narratives of sustainable development into the country’s national policy aims. Masdar City, described as a city of the future, is perhaps the best known and most ambitious example of an avowedly green megaproject. Other projects such as Sustainable City and Desert Rose City are additional examples of green cities that emphasize technological innovation in Masdar City’s manner.

    The greening of the Emirates takes on a central aspect of the modernization narrative. The main gist is that the existing ecological challenges can be measured, and existing institutions and policies find solutions to the problems. According to Dr. Gökçe Günel, the UAE is making a serious effort to maintain its status quo while offering up “technical adjustments” to environmental challenges. Sustainable development juxtaposes intense economic development along with high consumerism coexisting with an environmentally friendly and responsible society. This reveals a paradox in the greening process currently in place.

    These projects are small in scale and only take on a tiny space in the overall urbanity of the country. They take place in a bounded environment and constitute living laboratories that pioneer green technology. But they cannot be replicated on a larger scale or implemented and applied across the whole territory.

    Inevitably, rapid urban growth and transnational migration flows have massively enlarged the ecological footprints of countries such as the UAE. It will be very difficult to achieve sustainable development while Arab Gulf states subsidize massive energy consumption, continue to expand urban sprawl and expansion, and allow for traffic congestion while remaining careless about water and electricity consumption.

    *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Morocco Looks to a Future After COVID-19

    Many countries are facing declining growth rates due to the coronavirus pandemic, and Morocco is no exception. Given lockdowns and flight restrictions implemented worldwide from March, the tourism and hospitality sectors — usually the third-largest component of GDP — have suffered enormous losses and almost collapsed during the first 90 days of the global response to COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus.

    In the latest World Bank report, “Morocco Economic Monitor,” it is projected that the Moroccan economy will contract in the next year, which would be the first severe recession since 1995. “Over the past two decades, Morocco has achieved significant social and economic progress due to the large public investments, structural reforms, along with measures to ensure macroeconomic stability,” the report notes.

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    The World Bank’s forecast indicates that Morocco’s real GDP is projected to contract by 4% in 2020, which is a sharp swing from the 3.6% positive growth rate that was predicted before the pandemic. Consequently, the bank expects Morocco’s fiscal deficit to widen to 7.5% of GDP in 2020, around 4% more than expected before the COVID-19 outbreak.

    Meanwhile, the country’s public and external debt is to set rise but still remains manageable. In assessing the government’s well-regarded response to the crisis, the World Bank puts an emphasis on moving from mitigation to adaptation, which is key “to ensuring a resilient, inclusive, and growing Moroccan economy.” It also points out that despite this year’s setbacks, Morocco can still “build a more sustainable and resilient economy by developing a strategy to adapt,” similar to what it has done to address issues of climate change and environmental challenges.

    A Strong Position

    When viewed in comparison to the rest of North Africa and the Middle East, let alone its sub-Saharan neighbors, Morocco is in a strong position to capitalize on global changes as companies rethink supply chains and vulnerabilities in logistics. Globally, and especially in Europe and the US, corporations are rethinking their reliance on China as a key supplier, and Morocco is poised to benefit, as I mentioned in a previous article on Fair Observer.

    The European Union, in particular, is already calling for “strategic autonomy” in sectors such as pharmaceuticals by focusing on more reliable and diversified supply chains. The new strategy is expected to entail tighter rules on human rights and environmental protection on imported goods, a move that experts say would boost local manufacturers, and Morocco is near the top of the list.

    Guillaume Van Der Loo, a researcher at the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels, spoke to DW about the opportunities for Morocco. “If you look at Morocco, there are more favorable conditions there for specific areas in particular, in relation to renewable energy and environmental related sectors, [and] Morocco is quite a frontrunner and the EU tries to chip in on that,” he said. “The idea that the European Commission has already expressed about diversifying supply chains could be beneficial for Morocco and that could accelerate negotiations on the new trade agreement.”

    Morocco is one of few countries that have free-trade deals with both the United States and the European Union, and it is seen as an entry point for Western investment in Africa. As Alessandro Nicita, an economist at UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), says, “Morocco is very well positioned because of its proximity [and] because it’s part of [the] EU’s regional trade agreements, its rules of origin are kind of integrated with those of the EU.”

    The Challenges

    Yet Morocco faces challenges in grabbing these economic opportunities, including restrictive capital controls and a paucity of high-skilled workers. Having been overhauled in the 1980s, the country’s education system “has failed to raise skill levels among the country’s youth, making them especially unsuitable for middle management roles,” DW reports.

    Another concern has been raised by the National Competitive Council in Morocco, which said that if the country was to move forward efficiently, it had to end monopolies in key sectors. These include fuel distribution, telecoms, banks, insurance companies and cement producers, which have created an oligopolistic situation in the country.

    The Oxford Business Group (OBG) has also released a study focusing on the success that Morocco is achieving in terms of combating the effects of COVID-19. “Morocco boasts a robust and diversified industrial base, developed through years of heavy investment, which enabled the country to take actions to control the pandemic and mitigate supply chain disruptions,” the OBG notes. The investment-friendly climate and robust infrastructure, with Africa’s fastest train network, will enhance the country’s attraction for manufacturers looking to relocate Asia-based production, as supply-chain disruptions due to distant and vulnerable suppliers have resulted in many companies pursuing a strategy of near-shoring, the report adds.

    So, Morocco’s future in manufacturing, agro-business and technology may well determine the country’s capacity to recover its positive GDP growth rate as it overcomes the COVID-19-induced recession. To do so, it will need a robust marketing campaign as a country for reliable and relatively inexpensive supply chains and a skilled workforce.

    *[An earlier version of this article was published by Morocco on the Move.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More