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      Annexation or No Annexation, Little Will Change in Israel-GCC Relations

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      It is important to question how the proposed Israeli annexation of 30% to 40% of the West Bank could impact Tel Aviv’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Although it is impossible to safely predict how regional dynamics would change if the annexation goes ahead, there are three main reasons why the move would probably neither elicit a discernible reaction from most Arab Gulf sheikdoms nor irreparably damage Israel’s existing partnerships with GCC members.

      First, most regimes in the Arabian Peninsula do not perceive Israel as a grave strategic threat, nor do most in the GCC view standing up for the Palestinian cause as a high-ranking priority, especially compared to dealing with the perceived Turkish and Iranian threats. Second, throughout the 20th century, Israel has developed extensive relations with some states in the GCC. Such engagement and cooperation spread across numerous domains such as intelligence, security and economic cooperation. Third, the question of Palestinian statehood is generally linked to either pan-Arabism or Islamism, and most Arab Gulf regimes seek to limit the power of such ideologies in their own countries.

      The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Faces Its Most Consequential Decision in Decades

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      Furthermore, while officials in the GCC have issued public statements warning Israel to not to go ahead with the planned annexation of the West Bank, such rhetoric is mainly intended for domestic and regional consumption and does not directly reflect the warming relations between Israel and the Gulf capitals. 

      Strategic Relations

      Foreign ministers and Gulf officials have publicly condemned the move, arguing that “annexation will certainly and immediately upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and with UAE.” Moreover, Bahraini minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, expressed that the “Israeli plan threatens international peace and security and endangers the region,” while both Kuwait’s ambassador to the United Nations and Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued similar statements condemning annexation. 

      Doha would likely react negatively to annexation based on the close relationships developed with Hamas and a litany of Islamist movements across the region since the 1990s. However, Qatar has had to go to pains to cement its close relations with the Trump administration amid the past three years of being subjected to a blockade by its neighbors. Thus, officials in Doha would likely have to be cautious about taking any steps vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine that could trigger a negative response from the most pro-Israel leader who has ever occupied the Oval Office.

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      At the same time, examining the strategic relations between Israel and the GCC member states allows one to understand the potential repercussions of annexation. Accordingly, Israel’s economic, security and intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE are likely to withstand annexation. This is mainly due to most Arab Gulf states’ tactical acceptance of Israel’s military and technological predominance in the region, especially when viewed in terms of the perceived Iranian threat, Turkish “neo-Ottomanism” and Washington’s waning military commitment to the region. Notwithstanding Qatar and Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman all formed durable ties in the realms of security, intelligence, and economics. In the domains of security and intelligence, the common enemy — Turkey — and the threat of Iranian hegemony cohere Israel with the UAE, Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

      Israel and Arab Gulf states’ clandestine diplomatic engagement began decades ago and surfaced into overtly public relations. Consequently, the move toward normalization of ties has shuttered away the long-standing Arab demand that Israel withdraw from lands captured in 1967 as a precondition for acceptance of Israel.

      Omani-Israeli relations are largely predicated on clandestine diplomacy and are historically orchestrated by the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency. To be sure, Mossad officers have routinely traveled to Muscat to consult with Omani officials regarding Iran and other shared regional concerns. Oman’s willingness to work with Tel Aviv is based on a historic pattern of bilateral economic and political ties. It follows that Oman will not disrupt ties with the Jewish state but rather continue its historical role as a diplomatic mediator — a position Muscat is likely to attempt to embrace in the short term in the event of annexation.

      Durable Ties

      Moreover, Israel established durable intelligence and security ties with other GCC members. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) caused a bit of a surprise in the regional when he declared that “there are a lot of interests we [Saudi Arabia] share with Israel and if there is peace, there would be a lot of interest between Israel and the GCC.” Further, GCC support for Israel was expressed during the 2019 Warsaw Mideast Summit, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE’s chief diplomats all defending Israel’s right to exist and alluding that the perceived Iranian threat overshadowed the question of Palestinian statehood. That same year, MBS declared that “the Palestinians need to accept [Trump’s] proposal or stop complaining.”

      Although, as noted, Tel Aviv’s intelligence and security relations with GCC member states are predicated on sharing information regarding Tehran and terrorism, many Arab Gulf monarchies are acquiring signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities from the Israeli defense sector. As an anonymous European intelligence official told The Washington Post, “The tools you need to combat terrorism are the same ones you need to suppress dissent.”

      To be sure, the Israeli defense sector has sold GCC member-states SIGINT collection methods and eavesdropping capabilities to monitor internal dissent and entrench the power of the central authority. For example, Israel sold Saudi Arabia over $250 million worth of electronic and signals intelligence eavesdropping equipment in 2018, while Tel Aviv sold the Iron Dome advance air defense system to the kingdom a short time earlier. In 2016, Israel sold more than $1 billion to Arabian Peninsula sheikdoms, with most of the weapons directed to the Emiratis and Saudis, although the majority of such deals are kept secret.

      The defense and intelligence relationships are again important given the convergence of interests around the Iranian threat, Ankara’s ambitious and Muslim Brotherhood-friendly foreign policy, along with the relative decline of Washington’s regional influence. For many Gulf monarchies, Israel represents a strategic partner that can effectively contribute to regional and global efforts to counter Iranian conduct in the wider Arab/Islamic world, provide intelligence information and collection capabilities to counterterrorism operations, and eavesdrop on domestic detractors while also gradually embracing the regional security role previously commanded by Washington.

      Domestic perceptions triggered by annexation among the GCC population are likely to dilute the strength of public diplomacy between the Gulf monarchies and Tel Aviv in the short term, despite Riyadh and Abu Dhabi often viewing Hamas with trepidation given the group’s Islamist ideology and its relations with Turkey, Qatar and Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are worried about Islamist movements and affiliated political power as a challenge to authority, yet they are equally concerned about domestic perceptions of annexation given the overtly public relations between the two monarchies and Tel Aviv.

      In sum, the annexation process is unlikely to rupture Tel Aviv’s relations with GCC members. Israel is united with the Arabian monarchies by the common perception of the Iranian threat, while the Israeli defense and intelligence establishment provides an abundance of weaponry, intelligence information and collection capabilities to Gulf partners. Moreover, while annexation will stir internal opposition in the region, the GCC member states are only likely to publicly condemn the policy while continuing with diplomatic engagement, trade, intelligence sharing and defense acquisitions.*[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Opposing Repressive Regimes in the Middle East Is a Death Sentence

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      The ruling by Bahrain’s top judicial body, the court of cassation, on July 13 to uphold the death sentences of Mohammed Ramadhan and Husain Moosa has been decried by human rights organizations, condemned in the UK House of Lords and questioned in the British Parliament. Whether any of that will save the men from execution is debatable.

      The men were convicted and sentenced to death in 2014 for the killing of a policeman. That conviction was overturned when evidence emerged that they had been tortured into giving false confessions. Despite that decision, the death penalty was reinstated and subsequently confirmed by the court of cassation. An official in the public prosecutor’s office defended the court’s latest ruling while denying the accusations of torture, claiming that medical reports showed that the confessions were obtained “in full consciousness and voluntarily, without any physical or verbal coercion.”

      In Bahrain, Justice Is Still a Far-Off Goal

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      That confounds the earlier court decision to throw out the convictions, which was based on an investigation undertaken by the Bahraini government’s own Special Investigation Unit that showed the men had been tortured. However, in the contorted reality of the kingdom’s politicized judicial system, the court of cassation decided that the convictions were not based on evidence extracted under torture but rather on other evidence.

      “Close and Important Relationship”

      Amnesty International denounced the latest verdict, saying: “The two men were taken to the Criminal Investigations Department where they were tortured during interrogation. Mohamed Ramadhan refused to sign a ‘confession’, though he was subjected to beating and electrocution. Hussain Ali Moosa said he was coerced to ‘confess’ and incriminate Mohamed Ramadhan after being suspended by the limbs and beaten for several days.”

      Moosa has said that, after his genitalia were repeatedly beaten, he was told that if he signed a confession implicating Ramadhan his sentence would be commuted to life: “They were kicking me on my reproductive organs, and would hit me repeatedly in the same place until I couldn’t speak from the pain. I decided to tell them what they wanted.” His repudiation of the confession was ignored by the courts.

      In UK Parliament, four days prior to the court of cassation ruling, the Conservative MP Sir Peter Bottomley had asked Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab for a statement on whether he would use what he called “the UK’s constructive dialogue” with Bahrain to publicly raise the cases of the men. In reply, the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa James Cleverly spoke of a “close and important relationship” with an “ongoing, open and genuine dialogue” with Bahrain. The minister averred that “this dynamic” enabled the UK to raise human rights concerns, adding “the cases of Mr Moosa and Mr Ramadhan had been, and would continue to be, raised in conversations with officials in Bahrain.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      Earlier this month, it was revealed that another heavily politicized judiciary, this time in Iran, had upheld the death sentences of three young Iranian protesters who had been arrested in November of last year during countrywide protests that saw hundreds killed by security forces. Though moving swiftly to convict the men and sentence them to death, the authorities have done virtually nothing about investigating the killings carried out by the state in suppressing the protests. Amongst media highlighting their case is the Saudi news site Al Arabiya. It noted that a hashtag trending in Iran, “#do not execute,” has had over 2 million tweets. On July 19, Iran halted the executions, according to one of the lawyers for the accused.

      In 2019, Saudi Arabia executed a record 184 people, including six women, many for drug-related offenses. Some were crucified after being beheaded. At least one was a minor. In April, the kingdom announced it would no longer execute juveniles; rather it would sentence them to a maximum of 10 years in a juvenile detention center. It is unclear if the decree will save the life of Ali al-Nimr, who was 17 when arrested and 19 when sentenced to death. His uncle Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Shia Muslim cleric and critic of the ruling family, was beheaded in 2016.

      State-Sanctioned Arbitrary Killing

      In Egypt, more than 2,000 people have been sentenced to death since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in 2013, with nearly 200 executed. At least 10 children have been sentenced to hang. In the country’s prison system, there is another kind of death — by deliberate medical neglect, as was the case with the country’s first democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi. He was repeatedly denied medication for his diabetes and collapsed and died in a Cairo court on June 17, 2019.

      On November 8 last year, a panel of UN experts led by Agnes Callamard, the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, concluded that Morsi’s death “after enduring those conditions could amount to a State-sanctioned arbitrary killing”. The case shed light on the horrific conditions in Egypt’s overcrowded and brutal prison system, a situation that has been severely exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

      On July 13, prominent Egyptian journalist Mohamed Monir died from COVID-19. He had been arrested and held in pre-trial detention for criticizing, on the Al Jazeera news network, the government’s handling of the coronavirus crisis. The charge against him was broadcasting false news. The 65-year-old suffered from heart disease and diabetes, and was therefore at high risk of contracting the disease. After falling ill Monir was released to hospital a week before he died. An influential critical voice was silenced. Surely that was the intention — death, be it by medical malfeasance or by execution, is a powerful weapon in the hands of authoritarian regimes.

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Political Implications of the Hagia Sophia Reconversion

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      On July 10, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan issued a decree reconverting the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque, thus realizing a long-cherished dream of conservative currents in Turkish society. Originally built as a cathedral by the Romans, the Hagia Sophia functioned as Istanbul’s main mosque throughout the Ottoman era. Its conversion into a museum in 1934 was one of a series of moves intended to distance Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s new secular republic from the Islamic heritage of the defunct Ottoman Empire — and became a totem of conservative resentment toward the Kemalist regime.

      Why Making Hagia Sophia a Mosque Again Is Good News

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      The reconversion of Hagia Sophia should, therefore, be considered a significant symbolic achievement for the conservative side and a settling of scores with the early republican period. Erdogan is also seeking political gain by treating this issue as an identity battle between conservatives and secularists.

      A Tactical Move?

      According to a poll conducted in June by MetroPOLL, a majority of the Turkish population regard the Hagia Sophia controversy as an attempt by the government to divert attention from economic problems and reverse its declining support. Only 30% said they felt it was really just about a change of use from a museum to a mosque. This means that even among supporters of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its ultranationalist junior partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), significant numbers consider the move to be more tactical than ideological — even if they ultimately agree with the outcome.

      Erdogan’s earlier statements also suggest that this is a tactical move. During campaigning for the local election in 2019, he responded angrily to a crowd that raised the topic of Hagia Sophia, pointing out that the adjacent Sultan Ahmad Mosque (Blue Mosque) is almost always empty during prayer times. He told his audience that he would consider reconverting the Hagia Sophia if they first filled the Sultan Ahmed Mosque. Given that this was consistent with previous remarks and little has changed since the exchange, political expediency now seems to have outweighed religious or ideological considerations. Erdogan expects reconversion to produce three political benefits.

      Erdogan’s Political Expectations

      The first benefit is to energize the more conservative segments of his power base by meeting one of their longstanding symbolic demands, in particular in light of the emergence of two splinter parties from the AKP, with the potential to appeal to this electorate. The prominence of the controversy suggests he has succeeded in this.

      The second benefit would be to distract the public from the country’s serious socioeconomic problems. Where the youth unemployment rate — including those who have given up seeking work — has reached 24.6%, the government would like to talk about anything but the economy. Here, Erdogan has gained relief, but probably not to the extent he hoped.

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      The third and most important benefit would be to establish yet another identity battle between conservatives and secularists. This is the arena where Erdogan feels most secure, and the Hagia Sophia issue appeared ideally suited for the AKP’s identity wars. Its symbolism is multi-layered.

      First of all, a fight over mosque versus museum slots easily into a religion/modernity binary. It can also be used to create an Islam/Christianity binary as Hagia Sophia was originally built as a church and functioned as such for nine centuries until the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul. Secondly, it awakens historical allusions and underlines the real or perceived dichotomy between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. Reversing a decision taken by Ataturk also inflames existing debates over the early republican reforms. Finally, the move is also expected to provoke adverse international reactions, thus offering a perfect opportunity for Erdogan to breathe new life into his narrative of Turkey encircled by enemies, with Western powers subverting its sovereignty.

      Domestically, Erdogan would expect the reconversion to provoke uproar among secularist circles and lead the secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP) in particular to condemn the decision and mobilize public opposition. This would create another opportunity for him to stir the “culture wars.”

      In fact, however, the CHP and most of the other opposition parties avoided this ploy and either supported the reconversion or remained neutral. This approach is in line with the new strategy of CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who has been careful to avoid such traps in recent years. While he has received much criticism from his party base — especially the secularist intelligentsia — for his calculated lack of interest in cultural conflicts, Kilicdaroglu seems to have been successful in preventing Erdogan from picking his fights.

      In light of the lack of domestic push-back, the Turkish president will focus on international condemnation to fan the flames of identity conflicts, presenting these reactions as interference in Turkey’s internal affairs — if not outright Islamophobia. Given that certain European countries have their own problems with accommodating Muslim places of worship, European criticisms can easily be framed as hypocritical and anti-Islamic.

      In that sense, Hagia Sophia is the perfect fight for Erdogan: it is symbolic, emotionally charged, politically polarizing and consolidates political camps. And all this is achieved with scant real-life consequences. European policymakers should follow the example set by the opposition parties in Turkey and deny Erdogan the trivial rhetorical fights he clearly seeks.

      *[The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy. An earlier version of this article was first published on the SWP website.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The West’s Middle Eastern Playbook

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      Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan, the wise ones say. I would add that failure suddenly gets you dumped like a hot potato in the hands of your benefactors. You don’t believe me? Just ask the Libyan has-been, Khalifa Haftar, at one time considered the best game in town by his foreign backers. The general knows a thing or two about hot potatoes.

      French President Emmanuel Macron has no qualms about claiming that France never supported Haftar. In the era of television and coronavirus social distancing, Macron was saved the embarrassment of looking us in the eye as he insulted our intelligence. Or perhaps he wasn’t. Unlike many of us, but still with a good memory, he was just too young to remember the French military helicopter shot down near Benghazi, killing three French soldiers in July 2016. Clearly, they were not there paying a social visit to Haftar, and not in a war chopper.

      Deeper Fragmentation Looms for Libya

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      Nor would he remember the Javelin missiles discovered in the possession of Haftar’s forces that France procured from the Americans, probably using cash it withdrew from one of the two petrodollar ATMs. But to be fair to France, it did confess ownership of those missiles, explaining, “Those missiles were damaged! Awaiting destruction!” In Haftar’s possession, we may ask? Seriously?

      Granted, torpedoing a political process intended to bring an accountable transparent rule of law is anathema to Haftar’s regional supporters and for Russian President Vladimir Putin too, who, like his colleagues in Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has fixed himself with job security until 2036 or eternity, whichever lasts longer. Installing another North African military junta makes sense — for them at least.  

      Ultimate Objective

      But what could possibly drive France to be involved in a destructive war with the ultimate objective to restore a brutal military dictatorship, which goes against everything the French people stand for? Moreover, France’s role in Libya has split the NATO alliance dangerously. French and Turkish warships recently faced each other as adversaries rather than allies in the Mediterranean Sea. Rather than work with a NATO partner who knows the dangers of, and has freed itself from, military rule, Turkey, Macron, in order to help bring a civilian-led political process in Libya, has taken the side of the region’s most ruthless dictatorships, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and also Russia, who must be applauding the NATO split.  

      By what measure of expression and democratic representation of the people does Macron’s policy reflect the will of the French majority? Probably the answer to that and other debacles of the Macron administration might come soon. The next election is in 2022, and the French do not suffer fools.

      Still insulting our intelligence, France insists it is engaged in fighting terrorism — everybody’s cause célèbre for rampage, plunder, death and destruction. From Afghanistan to Iraq and Yemen, to Libya and Syria, one wonders who has become more dangerous, more destructive, more criminal — the terrorists or those claiming to be fighting and saving us from them? 

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      The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan saw the creation of al-Qaeda by the CIA, which funded, trained and armed the group — complete with stinger missiles. Immediately after the Soviets left Afghanistan and America won that Cold War battlefield, the Afghans were dumped, only to be remembered when America itself decided to invade the country. Only this time, it is the Russians who are hitting back at the US there, if the reports on bounty money for dead Americans are to be believed.

      Even before the blood of Afghans and Americans dried up, Washington decided to launch another invasion, this time against weapons of mass destruction, or maybe to bring democracy, or maybe leading an anti-terrorism alliance. It took the maestro himself, Alan Greenspan, to admit what we already knew. In his book, “The Age of Turbulence,” Greenspan writes that “The Iraq war was largely about oil.” He goes on to say, “I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to admit what everybody knows.” There, so much for WMDs and fighting terrorism and bringing democracy on the backs of war tanks.

      Western Playbook

      There is a playbook in the West, used in every modern-day invasion of the Middle East. In it, loud noises are never the not-so-hidden agendas. Pardon me for stating the obvious. The problem with that short-sighted destructive playbook is its unnecessary cost in blood and treasure.  

      In 2012, at the height of the Arab Spring and our optimism, I attended a conference in Istanbul discussing “rebalancing.” Advocating for the idea of rebalancing Arab-Western relations, I said that  “while we Arabs must refuse to be held hostage by the past, and we will continue to advocate a forward looking new page in our relations. The West must also free itself from its past.” The West tragically was unable to live with the prospects of new realities emerging in the Arab world and went ahead to help cut the knees of the democratic forces.

      Our argument for creating governments that do not rely on foreign powers for protection but on their own electorates to whom they will also be answerable was exactly what was feared. When I said, “The West must realize that the incoming governments of Arabia, unlike the outgoing dictatorships, will be answerable to their people, and therefore have less wiggle room to make decisions that only serve short term external interests over their people’s long-term interests,” a Western friend came to me and said, “That’s exactly why your revolution will not be allowed to succeed.” 

      That kind of shift in the West toward the Middle East would require accepting representative governments created through a transparent, accountable political process and accepting economic exchange based on fair value. An exchange we have always been happy to engage in, no bloody and expensive invasions needed. After all, the Arab world can neither drink its oil nor live in economic isolation.

      But the West has never been used to that type of relationship with us. Not when it was the colonial power nor later, as the protector of proxy regimes it helped create at the end of its colonial presence. That inability to accept a change in the region lies at the center of its policies — supporting the survival of military and other undemocratic regimes in the region whose existence is not protected by the mandate of the people they govern but by foreign powers. The price for that quid pro quo is paid economically and politically and is never at fair value for the people who matter — the growing populations.

      The vicious cycle is perpetuated. The more such arrangements are created at the top, the more unrest is created at the base against the ruling tyrants, which in turn leads to more dependence on foreign protection. Imagining the violent outcome is a no brainer, and it is clear before our very eyes.   

      Whether it is America and Britain in Afghanistan and Iraq, or France in Libya and elsewhere in Africa, that playbook has become more costly not just for the people in whose territories it is played out, but also in the streets of the nations that employ it. Tyranny comes in different shapes and forms. It is also dressed differently, and not just in turbans and military uniforms. Perhaps the worst is the one that comes deceptively in a suit and necktie, controlling the levers that drive the others.  

      *[This article was originally published by the Daily Sabah.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Why Making Hagia Sophia a Mosque Again Is Good News

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      The reaction to the decision by Turkish authorities to turn Hagia Sophia from a museum back into a mosque has been illuminating. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is accused of playing religious politics. If so, he is not alone. When Pope Francis describes himself as “pained” by the news and says his thoughts are with Istanbul, as if some natural disaster had befallen the city, he too is playing religious politics.

      Turkey Secures a Reprieve in Libya

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      The fact that this building — with one of the largest freestanding domes in the world — has stood the test of time and conflict at all is a miracle. Yet since 1934, it has stood silent, but for the passing voices and feet of tourists, as a museum.

      Given its stature as a place of spirituality, this is an astonishing fact. Imagine the Notre Dame in Paris or St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome — or indeed the myriad religious sites built upon older religious sites — spending close to a century as museums.

      Western Hypocrisy

      Despite this, the media in the West have been almost uniform in their condemnation. UNESCO, which designates the building as a World Heritage Site, has criticized the move. Western media have noted the reaction of liberals in Turkey, lamenting the undermining of the secular state.

      The condemnation is, of course, based on a key distinction between Hagia Sophia and the likes of Notre Dame and St. Peter’s Basilica. The distinction — emphasized in almost every media report — is that Hagia Sophia was built in 537 by Justinian as the seat of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the spiritual center of the Byzantine Empire. It only became a mosque in 1453 with the conquest of Constantinople by Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II.

      Notre Dame de Paris in France © beboyGiven this history of conquest, it’s a wonder that Hagia Sophia is here at all. Consider the religious sites desecrated by conquerors with new faiths, from the Temple of Solomon to the Bamiyan Buddhas. Yet Mehmed II’s first act was to hold the Islamic Friday prayers in Hagia Sophia. He may have been a Muslim, but he recognized the sheer spiritual power and majesty of this building and honored it. 

      The Ottomans removed icon frescoes and mosaics and replaced them with Arabic calligraphy, but the spiritual life of this amazing building continued under new owners. That is a testament to the building and the comparative moderation of the conquerors.

      The Mezquita of Cordoba

      The idea that Hagia Sophia is a museum, and that this is a balanced compromise between faiths, has become received wisdom. Yet the truth is that turning Hagia Sophia into a museum was hardly an act of religious tolerance. Far from it, the move was a culminating act in a decade of cultural revolution in Turkey, in which the regime of republican leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk pulled up the Ottoman inheritance by its roots.

      It was not a generous gesture to the Greek Orthodox Church, but a symbolic attack on the power of Islam in Turkey. It remains that to this day. Unspoken in today’s debate is the fact that Hagia Sophia became a museum in an era when the Sufi brotherhoods of Turkey were outlawed, the adhan (call to prayer) could no longer be called in Arabic and religious dress was prohibited. Into recent times, Sufism has remained persecuted and the whirling dervishes perform for tourists — rites that the secular establishment had largely destroyed in any real sense. 

      Given this backdrop, the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum takes on a different complexion, as if spirituality itself were a museum, which is after all what Ataturk intended by such a move. Turning the building back into a place of worship can then be seen as one more step in the reemergence of an older Turkish cultural inheritance. 

      Inside the Mezquita of Cordoba in Spain © Matej KastelicThe fact that Hagia Sophia was once a cathedral is no barrier to it now being a mosque. Consider the Mezquita in Cordoba, one of the finest architectural monuments in the Iberian Peninsula (and itself built on the site of an earlier Visigoth church). It was perhaps the greatest mosque in Muslim Spain, before being converted into a cathedral in 1236 by King Ferdinand of Castile.

      Today, a cathedral stands in its center and it remains illegal for a Muslim to kneel there in prayer. Yet few Spaniards would countenance it being converted into a museum as an act of magnanimity toward Islam, nor are there calls from global institutions for Spain to do so. Requests by the Islamic Council of Spain to allow Muslim prayer have been opposed by the Vatican and Spanish ecclesiastical authorities.

      The Loss of Greek Anatolia

      Converting Hagia Sophia back into a mosque reflects the present reality of modern-day Turkey, which is that of a Muslim-majority population. Just as you expect Westminster Abbey in London to be a Christian place of worship, it’s natural that Hagia Sophia should be a Muslim place of worship, with due interfaith dialogue and public access.

      This contemporary reality doesn’t negate the very real tragedy of the loss of Greek Anatolia. That loss is far more recent than 1453. The same regime that turned Hagia Sophia into a museum was also responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Anatolia of Greek Orthodox communities. Over 1 million Greeks were forcibly removed from their ancestral homelands and sent as refugees to modern-day Athens and Thessaloniki.

      Today, you can wander through their empty churches in Cappadocia, in central Anatolia, or at sites like Karmylassos (Karakoy) in southwest Turkey, where an entire ghost town is left sprawled on the hillside as a brutal reminder of the wholesale removal of a people and culture. 

      What was done in the name of creating an ethnically Turkish republican state was barbaric, just as what was done to create an ethnically Greek republican state. Ethnic nationalism accepts no gray areas, and ordinary people are its victims, on both sides of the dividing line.

      In Support of Islam

      Yet the violent forces that produced that ethnic cleansing also produced the zealous ideology of Westernization that uprooted the Ottoman legacy in the land of modern Turkey. It means a seam of bitterness and division runs through the very heart of the modern state. 

      Inside Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, Turkey © Artur Bogacki / ShutterstockIt is disingenuous of Western observers to say that Hagia Sophia should remain a museum for the sake of religious tolerance. If tolerance and moderation are our goals, then we should welcome the return of the call to prayer to Hagia Sophia, just as we would welcome the return of church bells at Notre Dame, had it been turned into a museum by secular revolutionaries.

      To welcome it is to support moderate Islam. To not do so is to leave moderate Muslims in a curious bind, not wishing to create conflict, yet expected to disapprove of seeing the spiritual centerpiece of Turkey’s largest city being devoted once more to worship. It also turns the building into a focal point for the more extremist.

      The remarks of Pope Francis are astonishing for a religious leader. That he is “pained” by the idea of such a site of spirituality being turned from a museum back into a place of worship smacks of the worst kind of bigotry. Must it only be “my god” who is worshipped, both here and in former mosques elsewhere?

      Equally, secular outrage is disingenuous. This is a religious building. The secularists are right to resist attempts to constrain their lifestyle, such as the prohibition of alcohol or sexual freedoms, just as Muslims in Turkey have chafed at secular restrictions on their own lifestyles. But Hagia Sophia is a religious space, first and foremost.

      The historic mistake was turning Hagia Sophia into a museum in 1934, in a cultural revolution that has impoverished Turkish society ever since. Whether the pious nationalists of the ruling party will usher in a moderate or yet more divisive era for this unique building, only time will reveal.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The One-State Reality to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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      The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been raging for over seven decades, and the prospects for peace have never seemed more distant than today. The two-state solution, which was once the most widely-accepted remedy for the impasse, has lost traction, and efforts by the United Nations and other intermediaries to resolve the dispute have got nowhere.

      In 2018, a survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University found that only 43% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. This was down from 52% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews who favored a two-state concept just a year prior.

      In October 2019, the UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, Nickolay Mladenov, described the situation in the occupied Palestinian Territories as “a multi-generational tragedy.” He said to the Security Council that Israeli settlements — which are illegal under international law — on Palestinian land represent a substantial obstacle to the peace process.

      The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Faces Its Most Consequential Decision in Decades

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      US President Donald Trump, who is seen by some observers as the most pro-Israel president since Harry Truman, has billed himself as Israel’s best friend in the White House. Trump has overturned the US position on many aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the dismay of the Palestinian people and leadership. His administration has recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and no longer considers Israeli settlements in the West Bank to be inconsistent with international law.

      In January, the Trump administration unveiled its long-awaited peace plan. Dubbed the “deal of the century,” the 181-page document was promoted by Washington as the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian factions have rejected the proposal as overly biased and one-sided in favor of Israel.

      Ian Lustick is an American political scientist holding the Bess W. Heyman Chair in the Political Science Department of the University of Pennsylvania. He is an advocate of what he calls a “one-state reality” to solve the conflict. His latest book, published in October 2019, is called “Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality.”

      In this edition of The Interview, Fair Observer talks to Lustick about the ongoing skirmishes between the Israelis and Palestinians, the declining traction of the two-state solution, the BDS movement and the US support for Israel.

      The transcript has been edited for clarity.

      Kourosh Ziabari: In your 2013 article in The New York Times titled “Two-State Illusion,” you note that Israelis and Palestinians have their own reasons to cling to the two-state ideal. For the Palestinians, you write that it’s a matter of ensuring that diplomatic and financial aid they receive keeps coming, and for the Israelis, this notion is a reflection of the views of the Jewish Israeli majority that also shields Israel from international criticism. Are you saying that these reasons are morally unjustified? Why do you call the two-state solution an illusion?

      Ian Lustick: I do not argue they are morally unjustified. I am seeking to explain why they persist in the face of the implausibility if not the impossibility of attaining a negotiated two-state solution. I am trying to solve the puzzle of why public agitation for it continues by these groups, one that wants a real two-state solution and one that does not, even though the leaders of each group know that the two-state solution cannot be achieved. The key to the answer is a “Nash Equilibrium” in which both sides, and other actors as well — the US government and the peace process industry — can get what they minimally need by effectively giving up on what they really want.

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      The mistaken idea that Israelis and Palestinians can actually reach an agreement of a two-state solution through negotiations is an illusion because so many people still actually believe it is attainable when it is not.

      Ziabari: As you’ve explained in your writings, the favorable two-state situation envisioned by Israel is one that ignores Palestinian refugees’ “right of return,” guarantees that Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and controlled by Israel, and fortifies the position of Jewish settlements. On the other side, the Palestinian version of the two-state solution imagines the return of refugees, demands the evacuation of Israeli settlements and claims East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. Do you think the two sides will ever succeed in narrowing these stark differences?

      Lustick: No. The elements of the two-state solution that would make it acceptable to Palestinians are those that make it unacceptable to the majority of Israeli Jews who now have firm control of the Israeli government and of the Israeli political arena. But once a one-state reality is acknowledged, then both sides can agree that Jerusalem should be united and accessible to all who live within the state, that refugees within the borders of the state, at least, should have a right to move to and live in any part of the state, and that owners of land and property seized illegally or unjustly anywhere in the state can seek redress, or that discrimination in the right to own and inhabit homes anywhere in the state must be brought to an end.

      Ziabari: You are an advocate of a one-state solution to the decades-old Israeli–Palestinian conflict. What are the characteristics of such a country? Do you think Israelis and Palestinians will really agree to live alongside each other under a unified leadership, share resources, abandon their mutual grievances and refuse to engage in religious and political provocation against the other side while there are no geographical borders separating them?

      Lustick: I do not advocate a “one-state solution” in the sense that I do not see a clear path from where we are now to that “pretty picture” of the future. I instead seek to analyze a reality — a one-state reality — that is far from pretty, and thereby not a solution. But that reality has dynamics which are not under the control of any one group, and those dynamics can lead to processes of democratization within the one-state reality that could produce a set of problems in the future better than the problems that Jews and Arabs have today between the river and the sea.

      The substantive difference I have with advocates of the “one-state solution” is that they imagine Jews and Arabs “negotiating,” as two sides, to agree on a new “one-state” arrangement. I do not share that view as even a possibility. But within the one-state reality, different groups of Jews and Arabs can find different reasons to cooperate or oppose one another, leading to new and productive political processes and trends of democratization. That is how, for example, the United States was transformed from a white-ruled country with masses of freed slaves who exercised no political rights whatsoever into a multiracial democracy. Abraham Lincoln never imagined this as a “one-state solution” — it was the unintended consequence of the union’s annexation of the South, with its masses of black, non-citizen inhabitants, after the Civil War.

      Ziabari: Several UN Security Council resolutions have been issued that call upon Israel to refrain from resorting to violence against Palestinian citizens, safeguard the welfare and security of people living under occupation, halt its settlement constructions and withdraw from the lands it occupied during the 1967 war. Some of the most important ones are Resolution 237, Resolution 242 and Resolution 446. There are also resolutions deploring Israel’s efforts to alter the status of Jerusalem. However, Israel has ignored these formal expressions of the UN and seems to face no consequences. How has Israel been able to disregard these resolutions without paying a price?

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      Lustick: The short answer to this is that the Israel lobby has enforced extreme positions on US administrations so that the United States has provided the economic, military, political and diplomatic support necessary for Israel to withstand such international pressures. The reasons for the Israel lobby’s success are detailed in my book and can be traced, ultimately, to the hard work and dedication of lobby activists, the misconceived passion of American Jews and evangelicals to “protect” Israel, and the fundamental character of American politics which gives a single-issue movement in foreign policy enormous leverage over presidents and over members of Congress.

      Ziabari: You’ve worked with the State Department. How prudent and constructive is the current US administration’s policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? What are the implications of decisions such as recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, cutting off funding to UNRWA and closing down the PLO office in Washington, DC? Will the “deal of the century” resolve the Middle East deadlock?

      Lustick: US policy has, for decades, been unable to realize its foreign policy interests in this domain for reasons I explained earlier. Now that the opportunity to do so via a two-state solution has been lost, the policies of the Trump administration hardly matter, except that by not emphasizing America’s emphasis on democracy and equality, it postpones the time when Israelis and Palestinians will begin the kinds of internal struggles over democracy and equal rights that hold promise of improving the one-state reality.

      Ziabari: Is the Trump administration working to silence criticism of Israel by painting narratives that are unequivocal in censuring Israel’s policies as anti-Semitic? Do you see any difference between Trump’s efforts in protecting Israel against international criticism with those of his predecessors?

      Lustick: Yes. The Trump administration has sided in an unprecedentedly explicit way with the extreme wing of the Israel lobby and with extreme and intolerant right-wing forces in Israel. 

      Ziabari: The proponents of the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement, who believe that denying Israel economic opportunities and investment will serve to change its policies regarding the Palestinian people, are widely smeared as anti-Semites. Is the BDS movement anti-Semitic?

      Lustick: There may be some anti-Semites among BDS supporters, but the movement itself is no more anti-Semitic than the Jewish campaign to boycott France during the Dreyfus trial was “anti-French people.” In fact, as it becomes clearer to everyone that successful negotiations toward a two-state solution will not occur, the significance of the BDS movement will grow rapidly. 

      It is an effective way to express, non-violently, an approach to the conflict that emphasizes increasing justice and quality of life for all those living between the river and the sea. Its focus is not on the particular institutional architecture of an outcome, but on the extent to which values of equality, democracy and non-exclusivist rights to self-determination for Jews and Arabs can be realized. Nor do BDS supporters need to agree on which forms of discrimination, at which level, they focus on. Some may target sanctions against every Israeli institution, but many will target the most blatant forms of discrimination, such as radically different rights and protections accorded to Arabs vs. Jews in the West Bank, in the Jerusalem municipality or in southwest Israel, including the Gaza Strip.

      Ziabari: The settlement of disputes between Palestinians and Israelis requires a reliable and effective mediator, one in which both parties have trust. Which government or international organization is most qualified to fulfill this role?

      Lustick: The time for mediation or negotiation between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, as two groups, has effectively passed. That is no longer what is crucial. What is crucial are political processes within each group and across them. African Americans became empowered over generations, not because an outside mediator helped arrange an agreement between whites and blacks, but because gradually self-interested whites saw opportunities in the emancipation of and alliances with blacks. 

      This approach does imagine a long-time frame, but when states with democratic elements are confronted with masses of formerly excluded and despised populations, that is the kind of time it takes to achieve integration and democratization. In addition to the American case vis-à-vis blacks, consider how long it took to integrate Irish Catholics into British politics after Ireland was annexed in 1801, or how long it took South Africa to integrate and democratize its long excluded and oppressed black majority.

      Ziabari: And a final question: Will the unveiling of President Trump’s “deal of the century” change anything for the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Some Middle East observers say it is just a green light for Israel to go ahead with annexing more Palestinian territory. Others believe Israel doesn’t need such an endorsement and has been annexing Palestinian lands anyway. What do you think about the deal and how it will transform the demographics and political calculus of the region?

      Lustick: The Trump plan is a hoax. In the pages it devotes to its own justification appear all the Israeli government’s favorite propaganda lines. The “negotiations” that produced it were between the most ultranationalist and fundamentalist government in Israel’s history and a group of “Israel firsters” in the White House who are just as extreme, though substantially more ignorant. Advanced originally as a plan to give Palestinians a higher standard of living instead of a real state, it actually proposes no money for Palestinians until they become Finland. Only after that will Israel be empowered, if it wishes, to grant them not a state, but something Israel is willing for Palestinians to call a state but existing within the state of Israel.

      If realized as written, the plan would be an archipelago of sealed Palestinian ghettos. By awarding Israel prerogatives to patrol, supervise, intervene and regulate all movement to and from those ghettos, the plan affirms the one-state reality while offering Israel at least temporary protection against having to admit and defend apartheid by describing itself as a two-state solution. This is Palestine as Transkei or Bophuthatswana. As a plan, it has no chance of being implemented. Its real function is to give temporary cover to the deepening of silent apartheid.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Getting Qatar’s Tourism Sector Back on Track After COVID-19

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      COVID-19 has undoubtedly had a massive impact on the global tourism industry, perhaps none more so than in Europe, where many countries are considering or have already reopened resorts to limit the damage. While Qatar’s tourism sector remains small by comparison, there can be no denying that it has also taken a hit. However, this is not the first time the country has confronted an existential challenge to this increasingly important economic activity.

      Tourism makes a formidable contribution to the global economy. According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, in 2019 the sector accounted for 10.3% of global GDP and approximately 330 million jobs. Unsurprisingly, COVID-19 has been nothing short of a disaster for this vital sector. Thanks to lockdowns and other precautionary measures, this past April and May witnessed a near 100% reduction in tourist arrivals worldwide.

      The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) warns that COVID-19 might yet result in the loss of 1.1 billion tourist arrivals, $1.2 trillion in revenues and 120 million jobs. Hotels are already feeling the pinch, with the Intercontinental Group expecting revenue per available room — a commonly used indicator — to have dropped by 80% in April. Other hotel chains have made equally gloomy predictions.

      Trouble Ahead

      Though not as developed as major destinations in Europe, North America and further afield, Qatar’s tourist sector has also suffered under COVID-19. Statistics for March indicate a 78% reduction in tourist arrivals, with the figures for April and May expected to be even worse. With lockdown measures still firmly in place, it remains to be seen how many of the country’s restaurants and local tourist facilities will emerge from the pandemic unscathed.

      Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022 nevertheless underlines why its tourist industry needs to make as full a recovery as possible from COVID-19. It is expected that millions of fans will visit the country for the world’s top football tournament. Most will require accommodation and entertainment beyond the stadiums.

      In keeping with governments around the world, Qatar has initiated general support and subsidized loan programs to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus on business revenues. The country can also draw inspiration from a number of international efforts to restart the global tourism sector. These include 23 actionable recommendations developed by the UNWTO to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, accelerate recovery through national policies and build resilience through lessons learned.

      In a similar vein, the European Union has developed a comprehensive framework for rejuvenating its tourism sector. This calls for a recovery strategy and a common approach to lifting travel restrictions between member states. Additional measures include the development of detailed health and safety measures for hospitality establishments and the transportation of passengers and personnel to and from tourist destinations. In the case of the latter, Greece has already issued a list of protocols for traveling around its network of islands by ferry.

      When it comes to small states, Singapore has developed two initiatives that might be of interest to Qatar. The Marketing Partnership Program aims to improve cooperation and encourage synergies between stakeholders in the city state’s tourist industry. To assist, the program makes funds available for marketing costs and collaboration between businesses. From there, the Stories Content Fund encourages local and global content creators to create compelling and positive stories about Singapore’s tourist sector.

      Been Here Before

      These are by no means the only initiatives Qatar might look to when reawakening its currently dormant tourist sector. There is also a case for taking the best ideas from as many global efforts as possible to develop a hybrid action plan with two interconnected phases.

      Focusing on the short term, phase one is concerned with mitigating the impact of COVID-19 and restarting tourism activities following the easing of travel and social distancing measures. Taking a cue from Singapore, Qatar could develop public relations activities to highlight that the country is a safe and interesting place to visit. This could be supported by tourism vouchers for Qatar Airways stopover passengers, an initiative that resonates with the EU’s travel vouchers program.

      Phase two is focused on strategic and structural issues. As per the mandate of the Qatar National Tourism Council, the country should accelerate efforts to develop a clear vision for its tourist industry. Inspiration could be drawn from Australia’s bid to become “the most desirable and memorable destination on earth” or Morocco’s practical goal to make tourism an engine of development. Either way, Qatar needs to factor agility and resilience into its future tourism sector. This entails working with stakeholders to identify challenges as well as opportunities to diversify the country’s tourism offerings. Doing so will help shield Qatar from the volatility of limited market penetration.

      It should also be remembered that Qatar has prior experience of navigating its tourism industry through difficult times. In 2016, almost 3 million tourists visited the country, the majority coming from fellow Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab states. Tourist arrivals have nevertheless diminished in recent years due to the reduction of visitors from the states involved in the ongoing blockade of Qatar. According to the Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, arrivals from the Arab world declined by 76% between 2016 and 2019.

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      Qatar has responded with a strategy to diversify tourist arrivals and new tourism markets. In the immediate aftermath of the blockade, nationals from 80 countries were granted visa-free entry into the country. The development of the Qatar National Museum and other tourist attractions was also expedited. High-profile marketing campaigns such as Qatar Airways’ “A World like Never Before” continue to highlight the diversity of the country’s tourist sector.

      Such initiatives undoubtedly contributed to a 38% increase in tourist arrivals from other parts of the world between 2016 and 2019. Additionally, hotel bookings rose from 4.97 million nights in 2016 to 5.38 million in 2018, suggesting that the average length of stay in Qatar has increased. The country’s museums also benefited from a fresh approach to attracting tourists, with visits rising from 477,000 in 2016 to 597,000 just two years later. According to the UNWTO, Qatar’s tourism sector generated $5.6 billion in 2018 despite the negative impact of the blockade.

      Qatar’s response to the blockade offers key insights into how tourism can get back on track once the worst of COVID-19 is over. Tourism sectors around the world will need to act quickly and decisively upon the resumption of business as usual. Well-executed, creative public relations campaigns should highlight what makes a country, resort or attraction a compelling place to visit. Diversity, safety and resilience will also be at the heart of tomorrow’s tourism strategies.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Should Hezbollah Be Disarmed?

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      Amid Lebanon’s ongoing anti-government protests, various demonstrators have held signs demanding “No weapons but legal weapons. 1559, make it happen.” This is a clear reference to Hezbollah, a hybrid organization, political party, social movement and a regional player with global reach.

      There is a long history of Hezbollah and the disarmament issue being part of Lebanon’s political discourse. The issue is complex and contentious. There are various angles. First, one needs to distinguish between the internal Lebanese debate and the demands imposed externally by Western countries. Both perspectives are interconnected.

      Within the Lebanese context, Hezbollah has over time toned down its Islamic narrative and burnished its Lebanese credentials. The party has had representatives elected to parliament, various members in the cabinet, and stated that it would be willing to discuss disarmament within the framework of national dialogue. Hezbollah has pointed out that the Lebanese government itself has sanctioned and acknowledged the Shia organization’s role as a resistance movement. It has also repeatedly claimed that it would be willing to integrate into the national defense system once the Lebanese government is run efficiently, with the Lebanese armed forces proving capable of protecting the country.  

      A number of Western and Arab states and Israel have designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization. These governments view the Iranian-sponsored group as a major obstacle that is guilty of impairing progress in the Middle East, sowing chaos and advancing Iran and Syria’s sinister plans. A common narrative in Washington, some Gulf Arab capitals and Tel Aviv is that Hezbollah is mainly an Iranian stooge and/or a Syrian agent. The Shia organization, from this perspective, is a “state within a state” that willfully undermines the sovereignty of the Lebanese state while stripping the government of having the sole monopoly over the use of force in the country. The externally driven disarmament rhetoric, some have argued, is intended to demonize Iran as “harboring and abetting” terrorist movements and hence isolating it further.

      Protesters in Beirut, Lebanon on 10/28/2019 © Diplomedia / ShutterstockThe Taif Accords of 1989, which was the formal peace treaty that ended the Lebanese Civil War, stipulated and mandated that all militias be disbanded within a certain timeframe. Hezbollah was exempt from this and was allowed to hold on to its arms, which must be understood within the context of the Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon that lasted from 1982 to 2000. For Hezbollah, holding on to its arms fulfilled various purposes.

      Rationale for Retaining Its Weapons

      The Lebanese group has used the disarmament issue in order to strengthen its leverage vis-à-vis various parties, especially the state. While Hezbollah has participated in various elections and had representatives elected to parliament, the organization feels the system has not adequately reflected its legitimate grievances and power-sharing concerns. For many, Hezbollah has taken on a pragmatic wait-and-see approach, hoping that a political opportunity would arise. Giving up its arms would weaken its position and imply a strategic loss to the party. As some have claimed, this would jeopardize its survival as a party and as a movement as such.

      However, regarding recent events, Dr. Aurelie Daher, a researcher at Sciences Po in Paris, warns: “One has to keep in mind that Hezbollah is not a party in the sense that Western political science would give the notion, as much as it is a lobby. Hezbollah does not intend to rule, does not intend to grasp all the governmental portfolios or take all and any kind of decisions at every level.”

      She adds: “Their presence in Lebanese politics has been, since its beginning in the early 1990s, motivated by a will to prevent any threat against the interests [of the organization]. As long as the other political parties and groups do not jeopardize the Islamic Republic’s [Iran’s] weapons, Hezbollah is ready to leave rather a comfortable room for maneuver to the other political actors — whether they are friends or foes.”

      Hezbollah has repeatedly stressed its exclusive Lebanese identity while admitting to its longstanding ties to Iran and Syria. Undeniably, both countries are strategic allies that have played critical and essential roles in Hezbollah’s expansion of influence across Lebanon, the greater Middle East and presumably to other parts of the world, such as Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.

      A poster of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, Lebanon on 8/23/2006. © Umut Rosa / ShutterstockGiving up its arms would not just substantially weaken Hezbollah, but its major patrons in Tehran and Damascus would be less inclined to invest significant amounts of funding in a group that has had to give up its major asset, namely its military capacity. Of course, Hezbollah has been very astute at diversifying its funding sources over the years and is no longer exclusively reliant on Iranian cash, which has gradually declined.

      Another factor that has emboldened Hezbollah to hold on to its arms is its openly-declared success against Israel in its various confrontations, such as in the summer of 2006. Hezbollah representatives have used this event to point out the necessity of resisting Israel further. Although many argue that Hezbollah provoked the encounter with Israel and was viewed by many as instigating the conflict, it managed to take advantage of Israel’s misguided policy of coming down hard on the whole of Lebanon. By resisting the surge mounted by Israeli forces and by presenting itself as victorious in the conflict with Israel, Hezbollah managed to remind onlookers of its strength and its continued importance as a resistance movement.

      In the wake of the 34-day conflict, Hezbollah once again used its well-established social welfare system to supply money to distraught Lebanese citizens who lost their homes and property. Over time, Hezbollah’s arms narrative has evolved from liberation to resistance to deterrence.

      A Moment of Change?

      At the beginning of Lebanon’s thawra (also dubbed the “WhatsApp Revolution”) back in October 2019, there was little discussion about Hezbollah. Most of the protesters’ attention centered on issues such as corruption, mainstream politicians, sectarianism and the corrupt political system as such. Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, took the high ground by pointing to the party’s fight at Lebanon’s southern border with Israel and its moral stance of being a “clean” and “pure” party.

      The picture started to change when Hezbollah supporters started attacking demonstrators, according to certain sources such as Amnesty International. Many demonstrators subsequently felt that Hezbollah, in actuality, was part of the corrupt political system that has been “controlling” the Lebanese people. Many have come to see Hezbollah as the primary backer of the current government, along with its allies, the Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement.

      Protesters in Beirut, Lebanon on 11/22/2019 © Karim Naamani / ShutterstockHowever, according to Nicholas Blanford, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Hezbollah also faces an array of challenges. He says these include “financial difficulties, largely due to US sanctions against it and its supporters and against Iran; corruption issues which have surfaced in the past decade-plus in part because of the party’s sudden and huge expansion in numbers after the 2006 war; [and] the weakening resistance narrative — a whole new generation of Lebanese Shias have grown up since the Israelis departed Lebanon in May 2000, and they have no memory of the Israeli threat.”

      He adds: “The last major engagement with Israel was 14 years ago. Since then, Hezbollah has been fighting Arab Sunnis rather than Israeli Jews. The party has become deeply enmeshed in Lebanese politics, not out of choice but in order to better defend its resistance priority. But playing a greater political role brings its own complications.”

      Instability in Syria

      Looking ahead, the situation in Syria and the ways in which the US-imposed sanctions on Damascus, known as the Caesar Act, play out in the war-torn country will heavily impact on Hezbollah’s future. To be sure, the crisis in Syria is not resolved, as underscored by the situation in Idlib, the last rebel stronghold. Moreover, with anti-Assad protests breaking out in regime-controlled parts of Syria, saying that the government in Damascus faces major challenges would be an understatement.

      Within this context, many Lebanese, including the majority of Shia and Christian citizens, will see Hezbollah disarming as too dangerous from a security standpoint, given that Lebanon’s border with Syria could again become porous. Most likely, wealthier Lebanese citizens who are anti-Hezbollah will leave the country as a result of the Caesar Act’s destabilizing impact on Lebanon amidst other crises stemming from the unrest resulting from the WhatsApp Revolution, the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

      Perhaps this will all serve Hezbollah and its allies, who will defend the arsenal of the world’s most-heavily armed non-state actor.

      *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More