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      in World Politics

      Time for a Sober Look at the Ukraine Crisis

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      Recent wars and crises show us how dangerous it can be when dishonest political elites unite with a powerful media to direct an uninformed public. It might be difficult to comprehend the combination. But unfortunately, even tragically, that’s exactly the combination that enabled wars to be launched in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and is now being used in the case of Ukraine.

      The West’s Middle Eastern Playbook

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      Remember the Gulf of Tonkin lie? It cost more than 3 million Vietnamese their lives, murdered in cold blood, using the most lethal weapons American war industry could produce and sell. An identical modus operandi was used as recently as 2003 to start the Iraq War. The lies about Saddam Hussein’s WMDs cost the lives of a million Iraqis, and counting. Last year, the US finally drew the curtain on its 20-year war in Afghanistan, at a cost of over $2.3 trillion and nearly 50,000 civilian lives. How is that possible? Because the public is ignorant and, therefore, easily fooled by decision-makers and powerful media.

      Same Playbook

      It’s the same playbook, again and again. The media refocus public attention from a country to a specific individual, presenting them as a bogeyman from whom the people are to be liberated. Now the war is not against a nation in which millions will die but against an individual. It’s easy to turn your ignorant people against one person. In Vietnam, it was Ho Chi Minh, in Afghanistan, Mullah Omar and his Taliban, and Hussein in Iraq.

      Take a look at the Ukrainian crisis: The conflict is not with Russia — it’s with Vladimir Putin. The narrative is, will Putin invade? Why is Putin amassing his — not Russia’s — army? The Russian president is the new bogeyman. And what do the nice people at NATO want? Just freedom for Ukraine to join NATO, which incidentally includes Kyiv’s right to allow NATO armies to amass on its territory, on Russia’s doorstep. How could there possibly be something wrong with that? Right? Wrong!

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      Here are some real thoughts for our domesticated friends on the other side of sobriety. It might even help free them from the confinements of their media and actually take a global, rather than a parochial, view of their problems.

      Suppose Ukraine, after joining NATO, becomes emboldened and decides to challenge Russia (or is it Putin?) in Donbas or Crimea? Both have a sizeable Russian population and, like all of Ukraine and Russia, were part of the former Soviet Union. What will NATO do? Trigger Article 5 and embark on a direct military confrontation against Russia on Ukraine’s side? Or will it unprecedentedly abandon a NATO member in war and risk breaking up the alliance, giving French President Emmanuel Macron’s description of NATO more credence?

      If war breaks out over Ukraine, as some never-seen-action, gung-ho rocking-chair warriors want, what will happen in Asia? What if China decides that the moment is right to take over Taiwan and the whole of the South China Sea? Will our Western warriors start a war with China while fighting Russia?

      In the Middle East, where Washington’s client states are on the run, will they be able to rely on American protection, which they desperately seem to need despite hundreds of billions spent on military hardware? What will happen if their regional adversaries decide to go full scale on them, creating a wider conflict across the Arab world because all hell has broken loose in Europe and the South China Sea?

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      And who is doing the actual saber-rattling? The leadership of major European countries — the front-line states — is scared, not by Russia invading Ukraine but of their own Anglo-Saxon war-mongering allies in London and Washington. The Europeans realize that these are the same people who pushed the world to disastrous wars repeatedly, killing countless millions but losing each one of these conflicts — unless, of course, the purpose of war is exclusively to kill and destroy.

      Trusting these same people with decisions of war and peace is like using the same failed mindset and same failed plan but hoping for different results. This has never worked. It will never work.

      Sitting on a Powder Keg

      These are realistic scenarios in a world sitting on a powder keg with everyone wanting to redraw geopolitical maps. Are these global ramifications even considered in the West? Does the public in the West even know or understand these global realities? The media there are busy entertaining the public with war scenarios and military hardware. No one is telling them that if the war starts; we will know where and when it started, but we won’t know where or when it will stop. Of course, we will be able to estimate how destructive it will be, assuming that it still matters.

      The path to war is littered with bravado, brinkmanship and ego. We then lose control of events, and all that is required is a spark, or a single bullet, like the one that murdered Archduke Franz Ferdinand and created an uncontrollable chain reaction leading to a war that killed 40 million people.

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      Following the fall of the Soviet Union, we drifted from a bipolar world that maintained decades of no major wars to a destructive unipolar system of unstoppable wars and invasions. With the reemergence of Russia and the rise of China, we now see a tripolar world in the making, with a number of regional superpowers such as India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey coming into their own. There is no going back on this.

      Attempts to prevent others from rising will only result in destructive wars. The sooner our friends across the big pond recognize and learn to coexist with that new world order, the better it is for everyone. This is not to say their time is up, rather that time has come to share power, and they must accept that new reality. The alternative is disastrous. Germany tried to control the world and become its dictator. We know how that ended. Lessons learned — time for sobriety.

      And here is a thought: Taking one’s nation to the edge of the cliff requires brinkmanship. Taking a step back requires leadership. 

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Understanding Russia’s Logic Vis-à-Vis Ukraine

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      When it comes to Russia’s troop deployment near the Ukrainian border, many Western governments are left wondering whether the escalation is merely intended to underpin Moscow’s demands for an end to NATO’s eastward expansion and the withdrawal of NATO and US troops and military infrastructure from eastern member states.

      In Ukraine, More Than European Peace Is at Stake

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      However, it cannot be excluded that the failure of the talks with the US and NATO on security guarantees has been calculated by Moscow from the outset in order to justify an intervention in Ukraine that was being planned regardless. The Russian leadership is deliberately playing on strategic ambivalence to complicate Western decision-making. It criticizes reports about a possible Russian invasion as a Western conspiracy theory, but at the same time, it brings a military response into play should the talks with the US and NATO fail.

      In this way, Moscow is trying to further polarize the Russia debate in Europe and make a unified European and transatlantic response more difficult.

      Russia’s Military Logic

      Against this backdrop, it is worth taking a look at the Kremlin’s previous pattern of using the Russian military as a foreign policy tool. From this, conclusions can be drawn regarding the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculations. First, the military show of force represents a firmly established instrument of Russian coercive diplomacy. For example, President Vladimir Putin achieved the first summit meeting with US President Joe Biden in May 2021 after moving Russian troops to the border with Ukraine.

      Second, Putin had kept Russia’s previous military interventions limited, either with regard to the duration or in terms of the number of forces deployed. In this way, he avoided causing resentment among the Russian population due to high casualty figures or massive economic costs.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Third, there has been only one case of military intervention leading to the annexation of territory — the conquest of Crimea in 2014, a mixture of military surprise, acceptable political and economic sanctions, and domestic mobilization potential that allowed Putin to raise his previously plummeting approval ratings to new heights.

      It cannot automatically be assumed that the previous logic for the military use of power will continue to apply unaltered. However, there are not yet sufficient indications that it has fundamentally changed. Based on this logic, three scenarios can be identified as more likely among the options being discussed in the media.

      How Will the Situation Develop?

      First, it is in line with previous logic to view the deployment on the border with Ukraine as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy to influence the US and NATO to make substantial concessions. The military exercise with Belarus scheduled for February is intended to increase pressure in the short term, given the stalled negotiations. If the talks fail, there is a risk of escalation. With its demands for a complete revision of the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture, Russia’s leadership risks running into a trap of its own making and losing the possibility of a face-saving solution.

      Moscow regards the negotiations being offered by the US and NATO on arms control and confidence and security-building measures as merely complementary to its demands, not as a substitute for them.

      Second, Moscow could further underpin its coercive diplomacy by permanently deploying Russian troops in Belarus. As a result, Russia would be in a better position to close the so-called Suwalki gap — a strategically important land corridor between Poland and Lithuania — and thus cut the Baltic states’ connection to the rest of NATO. Moreover, with a permanent military presence in Belarus, Russia could make its threat of a major invasion of Ukraine more credible.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Since the stationing of Russian troops requested by Belarusian ruler Alexander Lukashenko would not constitute a hostile incursion, Moscow would not be subject to political and economic sanctions, but it would have to expect increased military reassurance measures from NATO for the eastern member states.

      A third scenario is an open incursion by Russian troops into the separatist-controlled part of the Donbas region. The number of Russian soldiers massed on the border gives credibility to this version of events. The military costs for Moscow would be low, since pro-Russian forces and covertly deployed Russian soldiers already control the area. Russia would face sanctions from Western countries, but these would be limited compared to a full-scale invasion. To be sure, no surge of approval for Putin comparable to the one that followed the Crimean annexation is to be expected.

      Chain of Legitimacy

      However, a chain of legitimacy for the invasion could easily be constructed. In recent months, some 600,000 residents of Donbas have obtained Russian passports. The deployment of armed forces abroad is permitted under Russian legislation in order to protect Russian citizens against an armed attack. Some pretexts that could be used by Moscow for these actions include statements made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy about wanting to retake the separatist areas and false flag terrorist attacks by supposedly Ukrainian or Western forces.

      According to the logic so far, Russia is not expected to annex Donbas but to recognize it as an independent entity. An initiative to this effect is already being prepared by the Communist Party of Russia, which is loyal to the Kremlin. By taking this step, Moscow would lose the opportunity to gain a political veto position in Ukraine by granting Donbas autonomous status. However, it is no longer putting much hope in it.

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      With an open military intervention in Donbas, Russia would also put Zelenskiy in a precarious domestic and foreign policy position, in which he would lose room for maneuver and credibility between the demands for a military response and the warnings not to let the situation escalate. This would also further polarize the Western states.

      All other military scenarios — from the establishment of a land bridge to Crimea to the occupation of the Ukrainian Black Sea coast or other parts of the country — cannot be ruled out. However, they would then be associated with significantly higher military and economic costs as well as domestic political risks. This would be a clear sign that the Kremlin’s calculations have fundamentally changed.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in US Politics

      Antony Blinken says US will 'uphold principle of Nato’s open door' for Ukraine – video

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      US secretary of state Antony Blinken has said ‘there will be no change ‘to Washington’s support for Ukraine’s right to pursue Nato membership, the most contentious issue in relations with Moscow.
      The US has presented its written response to Russian demands on Ukraine, offering to negotiate with Russia over some aspects of European security, but not the issue of eventual Ukrainian membership to the Nato alliance.
      Blinken was speaking hours after his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, threatened ‘retaliatory measures’ if the US response did not satisfy the Kremlin

      US holds firm on Ukraine’s right to join Nato in its response to Russian demands
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      in Elections

      Ukraine: US puts 8,500 troops on alert to deploy to bolster Nato – video

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      The US military has put up to 8,500 troops on alert to be ready to deploy to Europe, potentially at very short notice, should the Nato alliance activate a rapid response force. It’s the latest sign of US resolve in the face of a Russian military buildup near Ukraine. The Pentagon spokesman John Kirby stressed that no decision had been made on whether to deploy the troops, and that any such deployment would separate from intra-European movements of US troops to Nato’s eastern flank, to reassure nervous allies. The White House press secretary, Jen Psaki, told US citizens in Ukraine that ‘now is the time to leave’

      US puts 8,500 troops on heightened alert amid fears over Ukraine
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      in US Politics

      The Biden doctrine: Ukraine gaffe sums up mixed year of foreign policy

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      The Biden doctrine: Ukraine gaffe sums up mixed year of foreign policy On Russia and Putin, the president said the quiet part loud. Re-engagement has been welcomed but the exit from Afghanistan was a disaster. Analysts see much to do to rebuild US credibilityJoe Biden marked his first anniversary in office with a gaffe over Ukraine that undid weeks of disciplined messaging and diplomatic preparation.Russian ships, tanks and troops on the move to Ukraine as peace talks stallRead moreThe president’s suggestion that a “minor incursion” by Russia might split Nato over how to respond sent the White House into frantic damage limitation mode.Officials insisted Biden had been referring to cyber attacks and paramilitary activities and not Russian troops crossing the border. That failed to entirely calm nerves in Kyiv and other European capitals, especially as Biden also raised eyebrows by predicting that Vladimir Putin would “move in” to Ukraine because “he has to do something” and would probably prevail.The analysis of Nato’s weaknesses and Putin’s intentions was no doubt widely shared but Biden had said the quiet part loud, contradicting what his own officials had been saying. Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, had just been telling Foreign Policy that one of the great successes of the Biden administration was that “the 30 allies of Nato [were] speaking with one voice in the Russia-Ukraine crisis”.Aides who have shadowed Biden through his long career as senator and vice-president are used to his prolix ways, his tendency to draw on his deep foreign policy expense to over-explain, but the stakes are immeasurably greater as a president, trying to stare down Putin as Europe stands on the threshold of war.The stumble distracted from some of the foreign policy achievements of Biden’s first year – the mending of transatlantic ties, the bolstering of US support for the embattled government in Kyiv and the development of a consistent policy towards Moscow – which combined a openness to talks with a readiness to inflict punitive measures and a refusal to be divided from Nato allies.None of those gains were a given in US foreign policy after four years of Donald Trump, a president who frequently put domestic political and business advantage ahead of strategic national interests, particularly when it came to Russia. Mending alliances, returning to multilateralism and restoring predictability to US policy after the volatile Trump era is widely regarded as Biden’s greatest success so far in foreign policy.His claim on taking office that “America is back” was backed up by a quick deal to extend the New Start treaty in Russia and thereby salvage the only major arms control agreement to survive Trump. The US rejoined the Paris climate accord and the United Nations Human Rights Council, re-engaged with major powers in nuclear talks with Iran, and convened a virtual Summit for Democracy in December.All those steps were in line with a broad strategy which Nathalie Tocci, director of the Rome-based Institute of International Affairs, describes as a Biden doctrine.“I think it’s a strategic reorientation towards competition/conflict with China and, the other side of that coin, strengthening relationships with partners in Europe and in Asia, both bilaterally and multilaterally,” Tocci said. “And relying less on the military instrument in order to pursue US foreign policy goals.”The Ukraine stumble was not the first time that strategy has been impaired by its execution. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was intended to be a decisive break with the past, extricating the US from its longest war so it could focus on its most important geopolitical challenge, the rapid rise of China.The departure turned to chaos when the Afghan army, which the US had spent $83m and 20 years trying to build, collapsed in a few days in the face of a Taliban offensive. The scenes of desperate Afghans trying to cling to departing US planes, some dying in the attempt, are an inescapable part of Biden’s legacy.Biden has argued he was boxed in by the Doha agreement the Trump administration signed with the Taliban in February 2020, under which the US was due to leave by May 2021. Biden was able to stretch that deadline by four months but maintained that staying any longer would have led to renewed attacks on US troops.Nathan Sales, an acting under secretary of state in the Trump administration, argued that the Doha deal was no longer binding on Biden, and he could have left a force to maintain US leverage.“When one side of an agreement breaches it serially and flagrantly like the Taliban did, I think the Biden administration would have been well within its rights to say: ‘We’re not bound by it either,’” said Sales, now a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.Current US officials argue that whether the US declared the Taliban had been in violation or not, there would have been renewed attacks on US troops, forcing a decision to cut and run or send large-scale reinforcements. The status quo, they say, was not sustainable.Putin, a ‘rogue male’ on the rampage, threatens to start a war no one wants | Simon Tisdall Read moreEven considering the constraints imposed by the previous administration, the withdrawal was a fiasco. US planners failed to anticipate the speed of the collapse even though a government watchdog, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, had warned in 2021 that without US contractors to service planes and helicopters, the Afghan air force would no longer be able to function, depriving troops on the ground of a key advantage.For Afghans who worked with the US and its allies, and for the country’s women and girls, the departure seemed like a betrayal, raising a serious question mark over the administration’s claims to have restored human rights to the heart of US foreign policy.Its record in that regard was already mixed.On one hand, the administration had taken a firm stand against China’s mass persecution of Muslim Uyghurs, declaring it a genocide. Furthermore, the assembly of a coalition of some 130 countries to establish a global minimum tax was, according to Matt Duss, foreign affairs adviser to Senator Bernie Sanders, “a step toward addressing global economic inequality which is one of the drivers of conflict and authoritarianism”.“It’s an important first step and a courageous one,” Duss said. He also pointed to the sanctions against surveillance companies like the Israeli NSO group, whose software was used by authoritarian regimes to target dissidents.“​​That was a very consequential move, and there has been a massive pressure campaign trying to get them to roll it back, but they’ve stood firm,” he said.However, the steps taken against the Saudi monarchy for the heavy civilian toll from its air war in Yemen and the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi felt well short of what human rights campaigners and progressive Democrats had hoped for. The Biden administration continued to sell Riyadh substantial quantities of advanced weaponry.“We’ve basically returned to the traditional US approach of supporting human rights in countries that don’t buy our weapons,” Duss said. “I very much hope that changes.”‘A lot of bad blood’Another way in which the manner of the US exit from Afghanistan undermined the administration’s wider objectives was by alienating European allies, who felt left out of a decision they were obliged to follow.“The pull-out really caused a lot of bad blood unnecessarily,” Elisabeth Braw, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said. “You can call it the root cause of unhappiness within the alliance.”The formation in September of Aukus, a partnership with the UK and Australia to help the latter acquire nuclear-powered submarines, was another sweeping move in the pivot towards Asia.Confusion over UK claim that Putin plans coup in UkraineRead moreBut the protagonists had omitted to inform France, who discovered on the same day that their contract to sell Australia diesel submarines had been cancelled. Biden was forced to acknowledge the “clumsy” way it had been handled, and the rift clouded bilateral relations for months.Putin’s threat to Ukraine has helped rally the transatlantic alliance but as Biden revealed in his own public reflections, there are still serious divisions below the surface, limiting his room for manoeuvre.The president’s freedom of action on other global issues, like making progress in climate action or finding a nuclear compromise with Iran, will be hindered still further if Republicans gain control of Congress in this year’s midterm elections. In that case, the administration’s record until now, mixed as it is, may prove to be the high point of the Biden doctrine.TopicsJoe BidenBiden administrationUS foreign policyUS national securityUS militaryUS politicsUkrainefeaturesReuse this content More

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      in US Politics

      Russia ‘very likely’ to invade Ukraine without ‘enormous sanctions’ – Schiff

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      Russia ‘very likely’ to invade Ukraine without ‘enormous sanctions’ – SchiffHouse intelligence chair: invasion might draw Nato closerSanctions must be ‘at level Russia has never seen’ to deter Putin Russia is “very likely” to invade Ukraine and might only be deterred by “enormous sanctions”, the chair of the US House intelligence committee said on Sunday.Ukraine crisis: how Putin feeds off anger over Nato’s eastward expansion Read moreAdam Schiff also said an invasion could backfire on Moscow, by drawing more countries into the Nato military alliance.“I also think that a powerful deterrent is the understanding that if they do invade, it is going to bring Nato closer to Russia, not push it farther away,” he said.This week, Joe Biden told Vladimir Putin the US would impose serious sanctions if Russia attacked.Talks are scheduled. But amid tensions heightened by both sides’ possession of nuclear weapons, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said that if “the west continues its aggressive line, Russia will be forced to take all necessary measures to ensure strategic balance and eliminate unacceptable threats to our security”.Russia has for years complained about Nato encroachment. Ukraine is not a member of the alliance, which guarantees collective defence, but Nato has expanded eastwards since the fall of the Soviet Union and Kiev is urgently seeking admission.Russia invaded Ukrainian territory in 2014, annexing Crimea.The US has supplied “small” arms to Ukraine.On CBS’s Face the Nation, Schiff was asked what would stop Putin ordering an invasion by Russian troops gathered near the border.“I think that it would require enormous sanctions on Russia to deter what appears to be a very likely Russian invasion of Ukraine again,” Schiff said. “And I think our allies need to be solidly on board with it. Russia needs to understand we are united in this.”Ukraine urges Nato to hasten membership as Russian troops gatherRead moreAn invasion, Schiff said, would see “more Nato assets closer to Russia. [It] will have the opposite impact of what Putin is trying to achieve”.Schiff said he had “no problem” with “going after Putin personally”, but thought “sector-sized sanctions will be the most important”.Asked if he thought scheduled talks had any chance of averting an invasion, he said: “I fear that Putin is very likely to invade. I still frankly don’t understand the full motivation for why now he’s doing this, but he certainly appears intent on it unless we can persuade him otherwise.“And I think nothing other than a level of sanctions that Russia has never seen will deter him, and that’s exactly what we need to do with our allies.”TopicsUkraineRussiaNatoUS foreign policyUS national securityUS CongressUS politicsnewsReuse this content More

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      in US Politics

      The Guardian view on Afghanistan withdrawal: a retreat into uncertainty | Editorial

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      OpinionAfghanistanThe Guardian view on Afghanistan withdrawal: a retreat into uncertaintyEditorialJoe Biden’s actions will be felt most keenly in Kabul, but they pose a broader question for an army-dominated Pakistan Mon 5 Jul 2021 14.20 EDTLast modified on Mon 5 Jul 2021 16.10 EDTBy bringing home US troops from Afghanistan, and leading Nato and allied forces out of the country, the US president, Joe Biden, is acting on his campaign trail argument that American “forever wars” distract from more pressing issues at home. While the effect of the withdrawal will be felt most keenly in Afghanistan, where there are justifiable fears that the Taliban are poised to reclaim power, the broader question Mr Biden poses is for neighbouring nuclear-armed Pakistan and the role that it wants to play in the region.Bluntly, there is little trust between Washington and Islamabad despite Pakistan being a frontline state in America’s longest war. Mr Biden served as vice-president to Barack Obama, who in his memoir, A Promised Land, wrote that he had preferred not to involve Pakistan in the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in 2011 because it was an “open secret” that elements inside Pakistan’s military, and especially its intelligence services, “maintained links to the Taliban and perhaps even al-Qaida, sometimes using them as strategic assets to ensure that the Afghan government remained weak and unable to align itself with Pakistan’s number one rival, India”.In Pakistan’s defence, it might be said that the past is another country. It says that it no longer provides any haven for terrorists or seeks to radicalise Muslim opinion with which it has influence. Pakistan has undoubtedly been the victim of terror attacks and shelters millions of refugees. Yet there was no disguising the anger of the Biden administration when, after eight days in office, Pakistan’s supreme court ordered the release of the man convicted in 2002 of orchestrating the abduction and killing of Daniel Pearl, a Wall Street Journal reporter.Pakistan is an army with a country attached. Imran Khan serves as prime minister. But it is the chief of army staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who calls most of the shots. The general has had a phone call from Mr Biden’s secretary of defence. After it, the army chief pledged to “bury the past” with India. Mr Khan has yet to be rung up by the White House. That may be because Washington had wanted to pressurise Pakistan into granting the CIA a base in the country to launch drone strikes against the Taliban. The US was kicked out of its last Pakistani facility in 2011. Last month, Mr Khan wrote an op-ed quashing the idea that the US could regain a military foothold in the country.The ever-growing risks of a Taliban takeover will shape the region’s dynamics. Not least because decades ago they subjected the country to a reign of pious Sunni terror. Adjoining Iran sponsored an armed resistance. A Taliban regime in Kabul gave Pakistan the idea that it could control Afghanistan and acquire the “strategic depth” needed to challenge India. Since then, China has drawn closer to Islamabad. New Delhi, faced with a hostile Beijing, has attempted to improve relations with Pakistan. Mr Biden knows that Afghanistan is known as a “graveyard of empires” for good reason. He wants his foreign policy to mark a break with the past and face the challenges of the future. But turning points only work out if one knows where to turn.TopicsAfghanistanOpinionJoe BidenAl-QaidaBarack ObamaUS foreign policyNatoPakistaneditorialsReuse this content More

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      Joe Biden’s foreign foray is all about shoring up democracy – in the US | Henry Farrell

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      During his first trip abroad as US president last week, Joe Biden kept telling Europe that “the US is back”. Before the G7 meeting, Biden signed a new Atlantic charter with Boris Johnson that agreed to protect democracy and open societies. After Cornwall, he went on to more meetings in Brussels with the European Union, as well as a Nato summit and a head to head with Vladimir Putin in Geneva. Past presidents have viewed the EU as an irrelevant bureaucracy or a sinister threat. Biden described it as an “incredibly strong and vibrant entity”. In his press conference with Emmanuel Macron, Biden seemed to promise that the US was returning to its normal role in international politics. After Donald Trump, some nostalgic politicians might even hope for a reinvigoration of the so-called rules-based liberal order which has purportedly prevailed since the second world war.Anyone with such hopes is bound to be disappointed. Despite his rhetoric, Biden isn’t really interested in a return to the status quo, or in reuniting the old band of transatlanticists to tour their greatest hits. The old transatlantic relationship reflected America’s needs after the 1939-45 war. The US didn’t create Nato or shovel money at shattered European economies out of disinterested generosity, but because it wanted to strengthen allies to better face shared threats.Now, the US’s needs have changed, and so will its actions. Biden genuinely and openly fears that American democracy is in danger. Threats come from outside, because China offers an attractive alternative model, with authoritarianism able to provide reasonable prosperity to its population. But more perniciously, American democracy is under threat from inside. Trump did not accept his election defeat in November and egged on his supporters to attack the US Capitol on 6 January to overturn the result. At the same time, Republicans are using their control of state legislatures to bring through a plethora of laws aimed at making it harder to vote and so cement their own rule.Biden is rather less keen to discuss the fact that he is relatively powerless to address those internal threats. Thin Democratic majorities in both the Senate and House of Representatives, combined with united Republican opposition and the presence of the Senate filibuster, make it nearly impossible to get any legislation passed.On external matters though, one of the few major areas of bipartisan agreement is distrust of China. This is why the administration and its allies have been able to pass legislation aimed at boosting American research projects, which they can justify as helping the US to compete with China. This shared outlook allows Biden more elbow room for a robust approach to China – and besides, it is much easier for him to act abroad unilaterally than to work on domestic matters through Congress. US presidents have very wide leeway to make foreign policy so long as they don’t try to sign binding treaties.The result is an approach that combines competition with China, efforts to protect global democracy and measures ultimately intended to shore up some of the gaping vulnerabilities in US domestic politics. Other presidents wanted to spread democracy around the world, whether through free-trade liberalism or through force. The new administration wants to bring democracy back home.This focus will remake the transatlantic relationship. The guiding mantra of his international team is that they are making “foreign policy for the middle class”. This phrase isn’t nearly as bland as it seems. It implies that the traditional approach to American foreign policy of years past – pressing for free-trade agreements to spread international liberalism – actually hurt ordinary Americans and made them more likely to vote for Trump, with all the dangers for democracy that entailed.The Biden administration is likely to be far less interested in free-trade agreements than its pre-Trump predecessors, especially when they are costly for American industry. It’s notable that the new Atlantic charter with Britain doesn’t have any reference to the World Trade Organization, and that it talks about “open and fair trade” rather than simply “open trade”. Meanwhile, the president wants to use economic measures such as rebuilding supply chains to minimise dependence on autocracies and prevent China’s access to key technologies. But those efforts are likely to sit awkwardly with WTO rules.Despite Biden’s outward friendliness this poses a big challenge to the EU, which has in some ways been more committed to rules-based multilateral trade than the US. It may also present difficulties for Johnson’s post-Brexit Britain. A world of existing, stable multilateral rules is much more comfortable for a mid-sized power than a new free-for-all. Economies such as Germany, which have depended heavily on the Chinese market, are also going to face some difficult choices.Biden’s new enthusiasm for more strict global tax rules also provides some problems for international partners. Again, the reasons are largely domestic: the policy echoes Bernie Sanders’ argument, leading from the left of the Democratic party, that tax havens and easy, anonymous money-flows damage democracy by enabling corruption and kleptocracy. That then becomes awkward for the UK, which has long turned a blind eye to inflows of dirty money and whose overseas territories are among the world’s leading tax havens. It’s also a problem for EU tax havens such as the Republic of Ireland and the Netherlands, and for islands like Cyprus and Malta with banking systems that cater for Russian and Eurasian oligarchs.While Biden proclaims that America is back on the world stage, truly he is looking homewards, preoccupied with a broken domestic political system and how to fix it. By tackling those vexed international issues of China, trade and tax, Biden hopes in turn to help US democracy to find its way again. If they really want to remake the transatlantic relationship, the UK and Europe are going to have to work together with an administration with a very different understanding of American interests than its predecessors. More