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    Silicon Valley Bank said it was too small to need regulation. Now it’s ‘too big to fail’ | Rebecca Burns and Julia Rock

    Silicon Valley Bank was supposedly the type of institution that would never need a government bailout – right until its backers spent three days on social media demanding one, and then promptly receiving it, after the bank’s spectacular collapse last week.Eight years ago, when the bank’s CEO, Greg Becker, personally pressed Congress to exempt SVB from post-2008 financial reform rules, he cited its “low risk profile” and role supporting “job-creating companies in the innovation economy”. Those companies include crypto outfits and venture capital firms typically opposed to the kind of government intervention they benefited from on Sunday, when regulators moved to guarantee SVB customers immediate access to their largely uninsured deposits.Fifteen years after the global financial crisis, the logic of “too big to fail” still prevails. The financial hardship of student debtors and underwater homeowners is a private problem – but losses sustained by titans of tech and finance are a matter of urgent public interest. Moral hazard for thee, but not for me.What’s more, SVB’s meteoric rise and fall serves as a reminder that many of the guardrails erected after the last crisis have since been dismantled – at the behest of banks like SVB, and with the help of lawmakers from both parties beholden to entrenched finance and tech lobbies.Before becoming the second-largest bank to fail in US history, SVB had transformed itself into a formidable influence machine – both in northern California, where it became the go-to lender for startups, and on Capitol Hill, where it spent close to a million dollars in a five-year period lobbying for the deregulatory policies that ultimately created the conditions for its downfall.“There are many ways to describe us,” SVB boasts on its website. “‘Bank’ is just one.”Indeed, SVB’s management appears to have neglected the basics of actual banking – the bank had no chief risk officer for most of last year, and failed to hedge its bets on interest rates, which ultimately played a key role in the bank’s downfall. In the meantime, the bank’s deposits ballooned from less than $50bn in 2019 to nearly $200bn in 2021.From the moment that Congress passed banking reforms through the 2010 Dodd-Frank law, SVB lobbied to defang the same rules that would probably have allowed regulators to spot trouble sooner. On many occasions, lawmakers and regulators from both parties bowed to the bank’s demands.One of SVB’s first targets was a key Dodd-Frank reform aimed at preventing federally insured banks from using deposits for risky investments. In 2012, SVB petitioned the Obama administration to exempt venture capital from the so-called Volcker Rule, which prevented banks from investing in or sponsoring private equity or hedge funds.​​“Venture investments are not the type of high-risk, ‘casino-like’ activities Congress designed the Volcker Rule to eliminate,” the bank argued to regulators. “Venture capital investments fund the high-growth startup companies that will drive innovation, create jobs, promote our economic growth, and help the United States compete in the global marketplace.”After the Obama administration finalized the Volcker Rule in 2014 without a venture capital carveout, SVB sought its own exemption that would allow it to maintain direct investments in venture capital funds, in addition to providing traditional banking services for roughly half of all venture-backed companies.One such firm was Ribbit Capital, a key investor in the collapsed cryptocurrency exchange FTX, which lauded SVB’s tech-friendly ethos in a 2015 New York Times profile. “You can go to a big bank, but you have to teach them how you are doing your investment,” Ribbit’s founder told the Times. At SBV, “these guys breathe, eat and drink this Kool-Aid every day.”In the transition between the Obama and Trump administrations, SVB got what it wanted: a string of deregulation, based on the idea that the bank posed no threat to the financial system.In 2015, Becker, the CEO, submitted testimony to Congress arguing that SVB, “like our mid-size peers, does not present systemic risks” – and therefore should not be subject to the more stringent regulations, stress tests and capital requirements required at the time for banks with $50bn or more in assets.Two years later, SVB was one of just a handful of banks to receive a five-year exemption from the Volcker Rule, allowing it to maintain its investments in high-risk venture capital funds.The deregulatory drumbeat grew louder in Congress, and in 2018 lawmakers passed legislation increasing to $250bn the threshold at which banks receive enhanced supervision – again, based on the argument that smaller banks would never prove “too big to fail”.The Federal Reserve chairman, Jerome Powell, supported the deregulatory push. Under Powell, a former private equity executive, the Fed in 2019 implemented a so-called “tailoring rule”, further exempting mid-size banks from liquidity requirements and stress tests.Even then, the banks’ lobbying groups continued to push a blanket exemption to the Volcker Rule for venture capital funds, which Powell advocated for and banking regulators granted in 2020.Then, in 2021, SVB won the Federal Reserve’s signoff on its $900m acquisition of Boston Private Bank and Trust, on the grounds that the post-merger bank would not “pose significant risk to the financial system in the event of financial distress”.“SVB Group’s management has the experience and resources to ensure that the combined organization would operate in a safe and sound manner,” Federal Reserve officials wrote.Since the financial crisis, SVB has reported spending more than $2m on federal lobbying efforts, while the bank’s political action committee and executives have made nearly $650,000 in campaign contributions, the bulk to Democrats.Among the highlights of this influence campaign was a 2016 fundraiser for the Democratic senator Mark Warner of Virginia, hosted by Greg Becker in his Menlo Park home. A few months later, Warner and three other Democratic senators wrote to regulators arguing for weaker capital rules on regional banks.Warner went on to become one of 50 congressional Democrats who joined with Republicans to pass the 2018 Dodd-Frank rollback. When asked this week about his vote, Warner said: “I think it put in place an appropriate level of regulation on mid-sized banks … these mid-sized banks needed some regulatory relief.”In the wake of SVB’s collapse, Republicans have not renounced their votes for deregulation – nor have most of the Democrats who joined them, even as Biden is promising a crackdown.Warner took to ABC’s This Week on Sunday to defend his vote; Senator Jeanne Shaheen, the Democrat from New Hampshire, told NBC on Tuesday that “all the regulation in the world isn’t going to fix bad management practices”. Senator Jon Tester, the Democrat from Montana and a co-sponsor of the 2018 deregulatory law, even held a fundraiser in Silicon Valley the day after the SVB bailout was announced.Unless they reverse course, the Silicon Valley Bank bailout could prove politically disastrous for Democrats, who just oversaw the rescue of coastal elites in a moment of ongoing economic pain for everyone else.The good news is that there are straightforward steps that Democrats can take to start fixing things.For example: Senator Elizabeth Warren’s legislation to repeal Trump-era financial deregulation.Democrats can also revisit the areas where Dodd-Frank fell short, including stronger minimum capital requirements, and consider longstanding proposals to disincentivize risky behavior by banks by reforming bankers’ pay. And they should demand that Powell recuse himself from the Federal Reserve investigation of recent bank failures and take a hard look at whether his disastrous record merits outright dismissal under the Federal Reserve Act, which allows the president to fire a central bank chair “for cause”.And yet even now – amid the wreckage of deregulation – these and other measures to better regulate the banks may still be nonstarters among both the Republicans and corporate Democrats who voted for the regulatory rollbacks and have so far shown little sign of repentance.The words of the Illinois Democratic senator Dick Durbin still ring true, 14 years after the financial crisis.“The banks – hard to believe in a time when we’re facing a banking crisis that many of the banks created – are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill,” he said back in 2009. “And they frankly own the place.”If that remains true today, the possibility of change looks grim.
    Rebecca Burns and Julia Rock are reporters for the Lever, an independent investigative news outlet, where a version of this article also appeared More

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    Is Biden’s appointment of a pioneering young lawyer bad news for big tech? | John Naughton

    A flashback: it’s Wednesday 29 July 2020. I’m sitting glued to the US TV network C-Span, which is relaying – live – a hearing of the House of Representatives subcommittee on antitrust, commercial and administrative law. The hearing is being held following the publication of a sprawling report of a year-long investigation into the market dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google.Arrayed on big screens before the members of the subcommittee are the four bosses of the aforementioned tech giants: Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, then midway through his Star Trek makeover; Tim Cook of Apple, looking like the clean-living lad who never understood the locker-room jokes; Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, wearing his trademark glued-on hairdo; and the Google boss, Sundar Pichai, every inch the scholarship boy who can’t understand why he’s been arrested by the Feds. And on the vast mahogany bench towering above these screened moguls sits David Cicilline, subcommittee chairman and the politician who has overseen the investigation.To be honest, I was watching out of duty and with low expectations. All the previous congressional interrogations of Zuckerberg and co had alternated between political grandstanding and farce. I expected much the same from this encounter. And then I noticed a young woman wearing a black mask standing behind Cicilline. She looked vaguely familiar, but it took me a few moments before I twigged that she was Lina Khan. At which point I sat up and started taking notes.I had been following her for years, ever since a paper she had published as a graduate student in the Yale Law Journal in January 2017. The title of the paper – Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox – signalled that there was something radical coming up, because since the mid-1970s US antitrust philosophy had been shaped by a landmark book by another lawyer, Robert Bork. Its title was The Antitrust Paradox and it argued that the prime focus of action against monopolies should not be corporate power, per se, but consumer harm as measured by unreasonably high prices. And since many of the products and services offered by the tech giants were “free” to their users they could hardly be accused of this; their wielding of monopoly power should not therefore be penalised by the state, for doing so would be tantamount to “penalising excellence”. Thus was shaped the legal doctrine that allowed a small number of tech companies to acquire immense power without being unduly troubled by legislators.This was the doctrine that Khan set out to demolish in her paper. She argued that Amazon was a dangerous monopoly that charged unsustainably low prices because the company knew that its shareholders would allow it to lose money for longer than its competitors. And it was also able to operate a “marketplace” that competed with the businesses that relied on it to reach customers, while amassing data on them that further entrenched its advantages. In other words, it wielded significant power for which there was no real redress.Khan’s paper lit a fuse that’s been fizzing ever since. It informed the Cicilline investigation and the subsequent report. And it’s what underpinned four of the five new bills that were unveiled last week, each one co-sponsored by Republican as well as Democratic politicians and each one targeted at monopolistic abuses identified in the report. The “Cicilline Salvo” is how the incomparable tech analyst Ben Thompson summarises them. The American innovation and choice online bill forbids platforms from giving advantages to their own products and services on marketplaces that they operate. The platform competition and opportunity bill outlaws pre-emptive acquisitions by tech giants of startups that might threaten their dominance (such as Facebook acquiring Instagram and WhatsApp, for instance). The ending platform monopolies bill bans platforms from owning any product or service that rests on top of its platform and competes with third parties in any way. And the augmenting compatibility and competition by enabling service switching bill requires tech platforms to make it easy for users to switch platforms (and take their data and social graph with them); in other words, it imposes on platforms what many jurisdictions now enforce on mobile phone operators, energy companies and other businesses.Of course, there’s many a slip ’twixt drafting and the statute book, but these are very significant pieces of legislation that go some way towards bringing tech companies under democratic control. And, to cap it all, last week also saw the announcement that Khan was to become chair of the Federal Trade Commission, the agency that, along with the US Department of Justice, has the legal muscle to enforce compliance with whatever these new laws stipulate.Which leaves us with two reflections. One is, as David Runciman pointed out in The Confidence Trap, his landmark study of the recent history of democracy, that while democracies can take a long time to awaken from their slumbers, once aroused they can be very effective. The other is a confirmation of the power of ideas, even those of a young graduate student, to change history.What I’ve been readingSituation vacant On Algorithmic Communism is a long, thoughtful review by Ian Lorrie in the LA Review of Books of Nick Srnicek’s and Alex Williams’s book, Inventing the Future, about a world without work.What’s in a phrase?There Is Nothing so Deep as the Gleaming Surface of the Aphorism is a nice – aphoristic – essay by Noreen Masud.Net costsThe Cost of Cloud: A Trillion-Dollar Paradox is a perceptive piece by Sarah Wang and Martin Casado on the expensive technology on which our networked world now depends. More

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    All I want for 2021 is to see Mark Zuckerberg up in court | John Naughton

    It’s always risky making predictions about the tech industry, but this year looks like being different, at least in the sense that there are two safe bets. One is that the attempts to regulate the tech giants that began last year will intensify; the second that we will be increasingly deluged by sanctimonious cant from Facebook & co as they seek to avoid democratic curbing of their unaccountable power.On the regulation front, last year in the US, Alphabet, Google’s corporate owner, found itself facing major antitrust suits from 38 states as well as from the Department of Justice. On this side of the pond, there are preparations for a Digital Markets Unit with statutory powers that will be able to neatly sidestep the tricky definitional questions of what constitutes a monopoly in a digital age. Instead, the unit will decide on a case-by-case basis whether a particular tech company has “strategic market status” if it possesses “substantial, entrenched market power in at least one digital activity” or if it acts as an online “gateway” for other businesses. And if a company is judged to have this status, then penalties and regulations will be imposed on it.Over in Brussels, the European Union has come up with a new two-pronged legal framework for curbing digital power – the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. The Digital Markets Act is aimed at curbing anti-competitive practices in the tech industry (like buying up potential competitors before they can scale up) and will include fines of 10% of global revenues for infringers. The Digital Services Act, for its part, will oblige social media platforms to take more responsibility for illegal content on their platforms – scams, terrorist content, images of abuse, etc – for which they could face fines of up to 6% of global revenue if they fail to police content adequately. So the US and UK approach focuses on corporate behaviour; the EU approach focuses on defining what is allowed legally.All of this action has been a long time coming and while it’s difficult to say exactly how it will play out, the bottom line is that the tech industry is – finally – going to become a regulated one. Its law-free bonanza is going to come to an end.Joe Biden’s choices for top staff in his administration include a depressing proportion of former tech company stalwartsThe big question, though, is: when? Antitrust actions proceed at a glacial pace because of the complexity of the issues and the bottomless legal budgets of the companies involved. The judge in one of the big American antitrust cases against Google has said that he expects the case to get to court only in late 2023 and then it could run for several years (as the Microsoft case did in the 1990s).The problem with that, as the veteran anti-monopoly campaigner Matt Stoller has pointed out, is that the longer monopolistic behaviour goes on, the more damage (eg, to advertisers whose revenue is being stolen and other businesses whose property is being appropriated) is being done. Google had $170bn in revenue last year and is growing on average at 10-20% a year. On a conservative estimate of 10% growth, the company will add another $100bn to its revenue by 2025, when the case will still be in the court. Facebook, says Stoller, “is at $80bn of revenue this year, but it is growing faster, so the net increase of revenue is a roughly similar amount. In other words, if the claims of the government are credible, then the lengthy case, while perhaps necessary, is also enabling these monopolists to steal an additional $100bn apiece.”What could speed up bringing these monopolists to account? A key factor is the vigour with which the US Department of Justice prosecutes its case(s). In the run-up to the 2020 election, the Democrats in Congress displayed an encouraging enthusiasm for tackling tech monopolies, but Joe Biden’s choices for top staff in his administration include a depressing proportion of former tech company stalwarts. And his vice-president-elect, Kamala Harris, consistently turned a blind eye to the anti-competitive acquisitions of the Silicon Valley giants throughout her time as California’s attorney general. So if people are hoping for antitrust zeal from the new US government, they may be in for disappointment.Interestingly, Stoller suggests that another approach (inspired by the way trust-busters in the US acted in the 1930s) could have useful leverage on corporate behaviour from now on. Monopolisation isn’t just illegal, he points out, “it is in fact a crime, an appropriation of the rights and property of others by a dominant actor. The lengthy trial is essentially akin to saying that bank robbers getting to keep robbing banks until they are convicted and can probably keep the additional loot.”Since a basic principle of the rule of law is that crime shouldn’t pay, an addition of the possibility of criminal charges to the antitrust actions might, like the prospect of being hanged in the morning (pace Dr Johnson), concentrate minds in Facebook, Google, Amazon and Apple. As an eternal optimist, I cannot think of a nicer prospect for 2021 than the sight of Mark Zuckerberg and Sundar Pichai in the dock – with Nick Clegg in attendance, taking notes. Happy new year!What I’ve been readingWho knew?What We Want Doesn’t Always Make Us Happy is a great Bloomberg column by Noah Smith.Far outIntriguing piece on how investors are using real-time satellite images to predict retailers’ sales (Stock Picks From Space), by Frank Partnoy on the Atlantic website.An American dream Lovely meditation on Nora Ephron’s New York, by Carrie Courogen on the Bright Wall/Dark Room website. More