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    Influence Has Become Democracy’s Influenza

    Two months after the departure of Donald Trump, the world is seeking to understand the contours of the new administration’s still hesitating foreign policy. US President Joe Biden made a bold step forward this week when he vowed to pursue the fantasy of Russiagate, the Democratic equivalent of QAnon. He may fear that without the Russian bugbear, MSNBC, the news channel that contributed so effectively to his election, will see its audience plummet even further than in the weeks since the inauguration. Russiagate alone kept MSNBC’s audience hooked through four years of Donald Trump.

    CNBC delves into the private thoughts of a president who now apparently feels empowered to judge the moral status of other leaders: “President Joe Biden says he believes Russian leader Vladimir Putin is a killer with no soul.” Biden intends to make the Russian president “pay a price” for interfering in the 2020 US election.

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    Biden’s remarks followed a report issued by US intelligence that included the following observation: “A key element of Moscow’s strategy this election cycle was its use of people linked to Russian intelligence to launder influence narratives including — misleading or unsubstantiated allegations against President Biden — through US media organizations, US officials, and prominent US individuals, some of whom were close to former President Trump and his administration.”

    One may forgive the incoherence of the author’s punctuation, but no reasonable reader can fail to deplore the confusion of the charges, highlighted by the use of phrases such as “people linked to” and “some of whom.” And then there is the semantic enormity of the phrase, “launder influence narratives.”

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Influence narrative:

    Anything any politician or diplomat of any nation happens to utter in speech or writing. The basis of all political discourse.

    Contextual Note

    In his book, “The Ultimate Goal,” former Indian spy chief Vikram Sood explores the way governments and their intelligence arms build and promote their self-interested narratives. Like a modern Machiavelli, Sood offers today’s princes the basic recipe: “Manage narratives to manage your destiny … tell your story first, any other story thereafter will only be a reaction.” That sums up the business of the CIA. The fact that US intelligence operatives want people to feel shocked that Russia might be using “influence narratives” reveals more about the CIA and its belief in the naivety of the US public than it does about Russia. The report itself is a perfect example of an “influence narrative.”

    Covering the same topic for The Washington Post, Ellen Nakashima confusingly repeats the CIA’s metaphor of laundering when she cites the report’s claim that Russians used “Ukrainians linked to Russian intelligence to ‘launder’ unsubstantiated allegations against Biden through U.S. media, lawmakers and prominent individuals.” “Launder,” in this context, is clearly a metaphor in spy language borrowed from the idea of “money laundering,” the act of pushing dirty money through indirect channels to return to the economy with a clean appearance. 

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    It may seem odd to apply a metaphor borrowed from the banking world and apply it to the hyperreal field of political narrative. But given the intelligence community’s well-documented predilection for dirty information — otherwise known as lies — it should hardly surprise us that the masters of plots and subplots see the public narrative as something that needs to be laundered. Sood, after all, tells us that the political language in any official narrative “is designed to make lies sound truthful and to give an appearance of solidity to the pure wind.”

    Since the idea of “laundered narrative” belongs specifically to spy vocabulary, it may seem disconcerting that Washington Post journalists have uncritically adopted the term and feel no need to explain what it means. Could it be that they are corrupted by their incestuous relations with the spymasters in Langley, Virginia, who feed them much of their most valuable content and which they reprint uncritically? In contrast with The Post, Al Jazeera took the liberty of substituting a different verb, writing: “Moscow sought to ‘push influence narratives’ that included misleading or unsubstantiated claims.” 

    “Launder” has become part of The Post’s standard vocabulary. In September 2020, during the presidential election campaign, Post columnist Josh Rogin had used the term concerning the same claims about Moscow’s interference. According to Rogin, Democratic leaders demanded “a briefing based on concerns that members of Congress were being used to launder information as part of a foreign interference operation.”

    This pushes the accusation a little further by supposing that the members of Congress referred to were actively involved in making the dirty information look clean. But that’s exactly how the fabricated Russiagate narrative is designed to play out: Putin’s accomplices and useful idiots can be found under every table. Just like in the good ol’ days of Joe McCarthy. After all, if the narrative tells us there’s a threat, we really do need to feel threatened. That’s the CIA and the media doing their job. Who doesn’t remember all the al-Qaeda sleeper cells that populated every American city following 9/11?

    Historical Note

    The website Strategic Culture offers a succinct explanation of the CIA’s Operation Mockingbird that permitted it to infiltrate domestic media in the US. The journalist, Wayne Madsen, writes: “A major focus of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency from its very inception was the penetration of the news media, including the assignment of CIA agents to the newsrooms and editorial offices of America’s largest media operations, including The Washington Post, The New York Times, Hearst Newspaper, NBC News, ABC News, CBS News, and other major newspapers and broadcast networks.” That has been ever since one of the harder components of US soft power.

    This week, Matt Taibbi interviewed the famous whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg, who, in 1971, leaked the Pentagon Papers to The New York Times, exposing the embarrassing truth about the war in Vietnam that had been carefully hidden from the media. Taibbi recounts how “Ellsberg described a vicious cycle, in which leaders lie pervasively, then learn to have so much contempt for the public that swallows those lies, that they feel justified in lying more.”

    In its own dissemination of the content of the intel report released this week, The New York Times admits that the “report did not explain how the intelligence community had reached its conclusions about Russian operations during the 2020 election.” The report itself explains: “The Intelligence Community rarely can publicly reveal the full extent of its knowledge or the specific information on which it bases its analytic conclusions, as doing so could endanger sensitive sources and methods.” In other words, don’t ask for evidence, you won’t get it. Glenn Greenwald reminds his readers that when, last October, the story broke concerning Hunter Biden’s laptop that intel attributed to Moscow’s meddling, the FBI had already “acknowledged that it had not found any Russian disinformation on the laptop.”

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    When the same discredited story reappeared months later with no significant changes and still with zero evidence, instead of casting doubt on the entire story, the obedient media interpreted it as confirmation of the original narrative. What better illustration of Vikram Sood’s principle, “tell your story first, any other story thereafter will only be a reaction”?

    Perhaps the most neglected dimension of this debate concerns the official role of intelligence. A month after John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, former President Harry Truman complained in an op-ed for The Washington Post that the CIA — an agency he had created — had betrayed its straightforward mission of gathering information to clarify the president in his decision-making. Truman insisted that “the most important thing was to guard against the chance of intelligence being used to influence or to lead the President into unwise decisions.” When Operation Mockingbird under the direction of Cord Meyer was launched during Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency, the CIA had not only begun focusing on influencing the president, it realized that the best way of influencing executive decisions was to control the narrative that the media would share with the public.

    The result is visible today, though no public figure will admit it. Democracy itself is engulfed within an elaborate system coordinated between the intelligence community, vested interests and the commercial media that generates and disseminates an endless stream of influence narratives.

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Georgia’s Democracy Is on the Brink of Chaos

    The ongoing political crisis in Georgia has been ramped up a notch over the last few days. The polarization of Georgian society, which is reflected at the political level, has reached a new high after the parliamentary elections last October, but especially so since the arrest and imprisonment of opposition leader Nika Melia and the raid on his United National Movement (UNM) headquarters on February 23. In a gesture of defiance, Melia threw away his police tracking bracelet, which he had to wear due to the charges of inciting violence during protests in 2019, when the opposition accused the governing Georgian Dream party of being pro-Moscow and demonstrated against what they believe is Russian occupation.

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    Following the charges being brought against Melia, Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia resigned in protest. This has led to a situation now being described by people in Georgia as “hate being in the air,” drawing protesters into the streets in support of the opposition. While this has been a gradual development over the past decade, penetrating deep into the social fabric of Georgia, there is a looming danger of escalation today.

    Turbulent Road to Democracy

    Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia has been on a road to real reform and European integration. In January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili became president and initiated, among other things, significant and wide-ranging reforms in justice and policing. Real change was visible and also felt by the population. Saakashvili’s UNM stayed in power until 2012, when it was voted out and replaced by the populist billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream coalition, which continues to run the country. Even though Ivanishvili withdrew from politics last month, he has a history of pulling the strings from the shadows — an impression reinforced by the recent appointment of Irakli Garibashvili, former defense minister and close ally of Ivanishvili, as Gakharia’s replacement.

    Nevertheless, even today, Saakashvili exerts influence on the politics of the UNM, despite having left the country in 2013 and having only stepped down as party leader in 2019. Saakashvili currently leads the executive committee of Ukraine’s National Reform Council, and his recent inflammatory comments mentioning civil war are clearly unhelpful and serve to further division in Georgian society. As is the case in most political crises, there seems to be no option for neutrality within Georgia at the moment. Even a new election, which the UNM is calling for, would most likely result in nothing but another 50/50 split.

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    While the governing Georgian Dream coalition has certainly acted irrationally in case of Melia’s arrest, to a certain extent, the events have been provoked by the UNM to further deepen the divide. These events come alongside accusations of Georgian Dream being too pro-Russian. Ivanishvili, the former prime minister the country’s richest man, made his nearly $5-billion fortune in the Russian Federation — a feat clearly only possible with close ties to the Kremlin. Yet the current government follows the approach of European integration and has even, rather optimistically, set a goal to apply for EU membership in 2024. This apparent disconnect can be explained by Georgian Dream trying to remain the party of the economy by maintaining open trade with Russia while embracing deeper European integration.  

    On the other hand, although the pro-European agenda of the UNM is beyond doubt, by undermining certain European values during its time in power, the party has shown its willingness to use authoritarian methods of governance, including human rights violations such as the Gldani prison scandal, which strongly contributed to its electoral downfall in 2012. It has since remained in opposition.  

    Volatility and Opportunity

    The South Caucasus is becoming increasingly volatile. In September 2020, the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted once again in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to a six-week war between the two countries. In the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement signed on November 9, Azerbaijan gained control over the territories captured during the fighting, and beyond. Armenia’s prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power via peaceful protests in 2018 — the so-called Velvet Revolution — has now had to face protests himself. On February 25, the Armenian army demanded his resignation, which he refused, calling it an attempted coup.

    Political instability in Georgia and Armenia, the persisting unsolved issue of breakaway territories and continued Russian involvement in the region, on top of the current COVID-19 crisis, make the region uncomfortably unstable at present. The pandemic has hit Georgia especially hard. As a country reliant on foreign tourism, many thousands in the industry have lost their jobs. With proportionally little government aid compared to Western European countries and with Georgian society only recently beginning to come out of a lockdown, societal tensions are running high and patience is wearing thin.

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    However, with woeful tidings comes an opportunity for the European Union’s regional policy in Georgia. On March 3, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, will visit Georgia. Once again, this will be a delicate mission, as the main task must be to call on all parties to calm down, and the EU will need to take the lead in facilitating that process. While the recent attack on the opposition should be condemned, it is possible that this could be interpreted by supporters of Georgian Dream as Brussels backing the UNM. Such as scenario needs to be avoided at all costs in order to prevent further escalating the conflict.

    The EU finds itself in a uniquely advantageous position in Georgian politics. Both the UNM and Georgian Dream are committed pro-European political parties and actively seek EU membership for Georgia. If the EU were to engage both sides bilaterally, it could calm political nerves and potentially lead to it mediating a dialogue. Georgia has long looked to Brussels as a democratic role model to fulfill its European aspirations. In offering to mediate, the EU could incentivize both sides to come to the table and demonstrate their political maturity.

    Although EU foreign policy has often struggled to find a common approach supported by all member states — still the dominant players in the external relations of the bloc — Michel might just be the right person. As Belgium’s former prime minister, he has at least some experience in mediating internal political and societal polarization. And while Georgian politics is a far cry from the halls of Brussels, Michel can make use of the fact that both the UNM and Georgian Dream would bolster their pro-European credentials significantly if they were to heed Brussels’ advice in this matter.

    Staying on Course

    Ultimately, if this political crisis cannot be solved, authoritarianism will be the only winner in this situation. Georgia’s authoritarian neighbors — Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey — have made it through the pandemic politically unscathed, while Azerbaijan’s recent victory in Nagorno-Karabakh has strengthened the Aliyev dynasty and left Armenia’s extremely vulnerable democracy in peril. If Georgia’s dwindling beacon of democracy, human rights and the rule of law were to falter, there may be little hope in salvaging its remarkable advancements the country made over the last 20 years.

    If the EU truly values the Eastern Partnership and shares Georgia’s vision for eventual EU membership, more than warm gestures will be necessary on its part in this crisis. In order to save democracy in the Caucasus, the EU may have to show its mettle and get creative, for only it can provide the necessary incentives, be they political or economic, to inspire Georgia to stay on course.

    In order to remind ourselves why events in this lesser-known region carry a wider significance, it is worth looking at its history. Almost to the day 100 years ago, the Red Army entered Tbilisi and Georgia lost its independence. Although the Soviet Union is long gone, there is a real danger that Georgia may lose its political independence if all parties involved do not find a way for a real dialogue.

    Another conflict in the South Caucasus might just set the necessary precedent for another regional power play. We should not forget that the Russian army has been present on Georgian territory since the five-day war of 2008, with Moscow supporting Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s declaration of independence. The Kremlin has always been quick to seize an arising opportunity. It will surely be ready to reassert itself over Georgia and to restore fully its sphere of influence in the Caucasus.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Russia Joins the Red Sea Scramble

    Russia has come back to the crowded Red Sea. On November 11, 2020, the Russian government announced its agreement with Sudan to establish a naval base at the city of Port Sudan. While the Russian navy already enjoys access rights to the port, the concession with Khartoum envisages the creation of a Russian logistics center that will host up to 300 personnel and four naval units, including nuclear-powered vessels, for a renewable period of 25 years. In exchange for the concession, the Kremlin will send military advisers to train Sudanese forces and will be allowed to use Sudanese airports and airspace to support its base in Port Sudan.

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    On top of that, Moscow will be in charge of security at the base, giving it the chance to install advanced radar and air defense systems. Although it will be much smaller in size compared to the naval base of Tartus in Syria, the facility in Port Sudan will become a pivot of Moscow’s maritime projection spanning from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.

    Red Stars Align

    Russia’s landing in Port Sudan represents the convergence of several strategic goals. Traditionally a land power, Russia is vying to bolster its maritime prowess. The comprehensive program to modernize its fleet brought in 23 new vessels in 2019 and 40 in 2020. Most of them are more modest in size than the Soviet-era battle cruisers being decommissioned as Moscow leans toward a small-ship fleet — one that can hardly keep pace with the US or the Chinese navies, according to analysts.

    Nevertheless, Russia is arming new units with high-tech systems, like the Poseidon marine drones and the new 885M Kazan nuclear-powered submarine, which will reinforce the navy’s capability to operate at regional level in support of ground and air forces. This element suits the Kremlin’s strategy of intervention in crises, from Syria to Venezuela, and might be particularly useful in the Red Sea region.

    But the fleet itself is only half of the picture. Maritime power equally requires a network of naval bases where vessels can safely dock and be supplied. To date, Moscow not only set a firm foothold in the Mediterranean — a longstanding goal of Russia’s foreign policy — but also rose up as the preeminent maritime power in the region thanks to its naval base in Tartus and its military presence in eastern Libya in particular.

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    Now, as the Mediterranean regains centrality and the Indian Ocean witnesses growing power competition, the Red Sea has become a strategic pivot for countries with global ambitions like Russia. This is the rationale behind the long-sought naval base in Sudan, which will allow Moscow to span its military capabilities — and hence its influence — from the Black Sea, down through the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.

    Finally, the base in Port Sudan is a major achievement of Russia’s Africa policy. During the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2017, President Vladimir Putin pledged $20 billion in investments, skillfully attaching no conditionality to them. More importantly, he harnessed military cooperation as a crucial asset of Russia’s diplomacy in Africa. Building upon its successes in Syria and Libya, the Kremlin began to offer weapons and military services through the semi-private military company, Wagner, replicating a strategy adopted by South Africa and its Executive Outcomes PMC to expand its influence across the continent in the 1980s and 1990s. In exchange, Russia secured access rights to strategic natural resources, mainly uranium, gold and rare earth elements in the Central African Republic and Sudan, 80% of whose arsenals are filled with Russian weapons.

    In Sudan, Moscow struck a deal with former President Omar al-Bashir to provide training to the Sudanese army and support military operations in Darfur, the Blue Nile and South Kordofan; a Russian base on the Red Sea was allegedly part of the accord. Despite the fall of Bashir’s regime following widespread protests in 2019, Moscow navigated Sudanese politics and maintained strong ties with the president of the Sovereign Council, General Burhan, eventually obtaining the base in Port Sudan.

    Regional Power Play

    The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have been an arena of intense geopolitical competition among global and regional powers in recent years. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey have all scrambled to establish military outposts in the Horn of Africa. Russia makes no difference. Its quest for a military presence along the Red Sea led Moscow to enter into negotiations with Eritrea, Djibouti and even Somaliland over the past few years, but without success. Now, the base in Port Sudan has some notable implications for regional security and power competition.

    Russia has managed to stay outside regional disputes. Before Omar al-Bashir was ousted, Turkey and Qatar were about to finalize a concession in Suakin, just 50 kilometers south of Port Sudan. Under Saudi and Emirati pressure, the transitional government put the agreement with Ankara and Doha on hold. With a Russian presence in Port Sudan, Turkey’s chances of obtaining an outpost along the Sudanese coast become even slimmer. Consequently, the competition between Turkey and Russia will likely increase in the Horn of Africa, at least until the two powers will find an understanding as they did in Syria and Libya.

    The UAE and Saudi Arabia have a more nuanced position. The two countries have invested heavily, both economically and militarily, in the Red Sea. The Russian attempt to build a base in Eritrea reportedly went awry after Riyadh and Abu Dhabi stepped in to drag Eritrea from the field of Iranian influence. This suggests that a solid Russian presence in the Red Sea might be seen as an element of disturbance. Yet the UAE has already cooperated with Moscow in eastern Libya, backing General Khalifa Haftar, and has signed a strategic partnership in 2018, which also paved the way for the sale of Russian weapons to Abu Dhabi.

    Saudi Arabia might see Russia’s military engagement in the Red Sea as an opportunity. As the Houthi rebels in Yemen have proved capable of targeting ships and the Saudi oil infrastructure as far as Jeddah, Russia might become a useful ally in enforcing maritime security in the southern Red Sea region.

    Implications for the US

    Despite strong ties with Washington, the Gulf monarchies do not see Russia as a threat. Russia’s policy of non-interference, combined with its political stability, are generally perceived by autocratic regimes in the Middle East and beyond as less intrusive and dangerous. Conversely, the United States and the European powers often attach conditionalities to economic and military cooperation. Such tensions might be on the rise as the Biden administration pledges to keep a keen eye on human rights and democracy when it comes to foreign relations, with Saudi Arabia being already under the spotlight.

    Therefore, the Gulf monarchies and other actors in the region are more likely to cooperate with rather than confront Russia and possibly leverage these ties to water down requests from Washington and the like. This seems to be the case for Sudan as well, which has recently conducted deeply transactional negotiations with Washington around being delisted as a state sponsor of terrorism. The announcement of the Russian base probably accelerated the implementation of the accord too.

    Besides political considerations, the Red Sea is already particularly crowded — the US and China both maintain military bases in Djibouti. Now the US will have to deal with Russia’s accrued military presence in a pivotal region. The main reason of concern is Russia’s increased capability to operate militarily in the proximity of two of the most relevant chokepoints of the world, Suez and Bab el-Mandab. Since 10% of the world’s trade and 9% of oil shipments cross these points every day, controlling them is of crucial importance for global economic stability and security. In the long term, Russia’s footholds in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea will affect the US control over Suez and Bab el-Mandab, bringing an intensification of global power competition and potentially turning these chokepoints into flashpoints.

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Will the US and Russia Start Over?

    It’s winter in Russia, which is not a season for the faint-hearted. The pandemic is still hitting the country hard, with the number of new COVID cases hovering around 20,000 a day, which has cumulatively put the country in the global top five in terms of infections.

    Under these inauspicious conditions, if you are brave enough to face down the cold and COVID to protest openly against the government of President Vladimir Putin, your reward may well be a trip to jail. If you’re very good at your job of protesting, you might win the grand prize of an attempt on your life.

    Yet, for the last two weeks, Russians have poured into the streets in the tens of thousands. Even in the Russian Far East, protesters turned out in Yakutsk (45 below zero) and Krasnoyarsk (22 below). Putin has predictably responded with force, throwing more than 5,000 people into jail.

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    Media coverage of the Russian protests focus, not surprisingly, on Alexei Navalny. After recovering in Germany from an assassination attempt, the Russian opposition leader returned to Moscow on January 17. He was promptly arrested at the airport where his plane was rerouted. His close associates, who’d shown up at the original destination of his flight to welcome him home, were also detained. These arrests, and the government’s desire to lock Navalny away in prison for as long as possible, triggered the latest round of demonstrations throughout the country.

    Putin has ruled over Russia for more than two decades. Because of the constitutional changes he rammed through last year, he has effectively made himself leader for life. Will these latest protests make a dent in his carapace of power?

    Meanwhile, the US and Russian governments this week exhibited a modest form of engagement by extending the New START treaty on nuclear weapons for another five years. Despite this hopeful sign, no one expects anything close to a full reset of US–Russian relations during a Biden administration.

    But as Putin faces protests in the street and US President Joe Biden deals with recalcitrant Republicans in Congress, the US and Russia might at least avoid direct conflict with one another. More optimistically — and can you blame a boy for dreaming? — the two countries could perhaps find common cause against the global scourges of nuclear weapons, climate change and pandemics.

    Putin vs. Navalny

    Although they face each other across the Russian chessboard, Putin and Navalny share some basic attributes. They are both adept politicians who know the power of visuals, symbols and stories. They rely on the media to sustain their popularity, Putin using state-controlled media and Navalny exploiting social media.

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    And they have both been willing to adjust their messages to grow their appeal among everyday Russians by turning to nationalism. Putin started out as a rather conventional Soviet bureaucrat, with a commitment to all of the ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. Even when he became the leader of Russia in 1999, he thought of himself as the head of a multiethnic country. Particularly after 2014 and the conflict with Ukraine, however, Putin began to make appeals to russky (ethnic) Russians rather than rossisky (civic) Russians. He has made the defense of ethnic Russians in surrounding regions — Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltics — a priority for his administration.

    Navalny, meanwhile, started out as a rather conventional Russian liberal who joined the reformist party Yabloko. Liberalism, however, has never really appealed to a majority of Russians, and parties like Yabloko attracted few voters. Navalny began to promote some rather ugly xenophobic and chauvinistic messages. As Alexey Sakhnin writes in Jacobin:

    “He participated in the far-right Russian Marches, waged war on “illegal immigration,” and even launched campaign “Stop Feeding the Caucasus” directed against government subsidies to poor, ethnic minority-populated autonomous regions in the south of the country. It was a time when right-wing sentiments were widespread, and urban youth sympathized with ultra-right groups almost en masse. It seemed to Navalny that this wind would fill his sails — and partly, it worked.”

    Navalny used nationalism to wipe away any memories of his unpopular liberalism, but it was difficult to compete with Putin on that score. So, increasingly, the oppositionist focused on the corruption of the Putin regime, publishing exposes of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s wealth and most recently a video tour of a huge palace on the Black Sea said to be the Russian president’s (which Putin denies).

    With these critiques of the ruling elite’s corruption, Navalny can bring tens of thousands of angry protesters, particularly young people, onto the streets. Unlike present-day Belarus or Ukraine 2014, the Russian protesters don’t represent the overwhelming majority of their fellow citizens. Putin remains a relatively popular figure in Russia. Although his approval ratings have dropped from the 80% range that was common five years ago, they still hover around 70%. US presidents would be thrilled with those numbers. Approval of the Russian government is considerably less — around 50% — which suggests that Putin has successfully portrayed himself as somehow above everyday politics.

    Putin Is Worried

    Still, the Russian leader is worried. In his latest speech at the World Economic Forum, Putin spoke in apocalyptic terms of a deteriorating international situation. “The pandemic has exacerbated the problems and disbalances that have been accumulating,” he said. “International institutions are weakening, regional conflicts are multiplying, and the global security is degrading.”

    His comments on the global situation reflect more parochial concerns. Because of COVID-19, the Russian economy contracted by 4% in 2020. Although the government implemented various measures to cushion the impact, many Russians are suffering as a result of rising unemployment and falling production. The Russian economy depends a great deal on sales of oil and natural gas. Any further reduction in global trade — either because of the pandemic or tariff wars — would complicate Russia’s economic recovery and consequently undermine Putin’s political position.

    The immediate challenge comes from the parliamentary elections later this year. Putin’s United Russia party currently holds a comfortable majority in the Duma. The other two top parties are led by nationalists who are equally if not more fanatical — Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party and Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the Liberal Democratic Party. But a political force coalescing around a figure like Navalny could disrupt Putin’s balance of power.

    That’s why Navalny returned to Moscow. And that’s why the Russian court decided this week to lock Navalny away for more than two years — for violations of parole that required him to report to the authorities that tried to kill him. Navalny has taken an enormous risk, while Putin is taking no chances. The Russian leader has long deployed a preemptive strategy against any potential rival. Those who dare to oppose him have been killed (Boris Nemtsov), poisoned (Vladimir Kara-Murza), jailed (Mikhail Khodorkovsky) or forced into exile (Garry Kasparov).

    Embed from Getty Images

    Civil society is also under siege in Russia, with activists vulnerable to charges of being, basically, spies and saboteurs under a “foreign agent law.” Yet the environmental movement, the women’s movement, the LGBT community and others continue to protest against the country’s authoritarian system. And these protests are not just taking place in relatively liberal enclaves in the western part of the country like Moscow and St. Petersburg. Large-scale demonstrations took place at the end of 2020 in Khabarovsk, in the Russian Far East, over the arrest of the region’s independent-minded governor. While Navalny gets the press, civil society activists have quietly built up networks around the country that can turn people out onto the streets when necessary.

    Like all authoritarians, Putin uses “law and order” arguments to his advantage. Russians have a horror of anarchy and civil strife. They have long favored an “iron fist” approach to domestic politics, which helps explain the persistent, posthumous fondness for Joseph Stalin, who had a 70% approval rating in 2019. According to polling conducted last year, three in four Russians believe that the Soviet era was the best period of time for Russia, and it certainly wasn’t the dissident movement of that period that made them nostalgic.

    The protesters thus have to tread carefully to avoid losing popular support among a population fond of an iron fist but also deeply disgusted by the corruption, economic mismanagement and social inequality of the Putin era. The Russian opposition also has to grapple with the distinct possibility that getting rid of Putin will usher in someone even worse.

    US-Russia Relations: A New START?

    The extension of New START, the last nuclear arms control treaty in effect between Russia and the United States, is a spot of good news in an otherwise dismal outlook for relations between the two countries. Joe Biden has prided himself on his knowledge of and commitment to arms control. So, if the two countries can agree on terms of selective engagement, the next four years could be profitably taken up by a series of negotiations on military weaponry.

    New START merely establishes ceilings on nuclear warheads for both sides and addresses only strategic, not tactical, nukes. So, as Stephen Pifer argues, a follow-on treaty could establish a ceiling on all nuclear warheads, for instance at 2,500, which would cover battlefield nuclear weapons and result in at least a 50% cut in the arsenals of the two sides. Another option for bilateral negotiations would be to focus on limitations to missile defense or, at the very least, cooperation to protect against third-party missile attacks. A third option would be to focus on conventional weaponry and constraints on weapons sales.

    The Biden administration could even move more quickly with an announcement of a no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons — something Biden has supported in the past — and agreeing with Moscow to de-alert intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) much as Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev de-alerted another leg of the nuclear triad, strategic bombers, back in 1991.

    This arms control agenda is only part of a larger potential program of selective engagement. The US and Russia could return to their coordination around the Iran nuclear deal. They could explore ways to cooperate on global challenges like climate change and pandemics. They could even start addressing together the harmful effects of economic globalization, a topic Putin brought up in his recent Davos speech.

    Embed from Getty Images

    To do so, however, the two countries will have to manage the numerous points of friction in their relationship. For one thing, they’ve gone head-to-head in various proxy battles — in Afghanistan, Syria and Libya. Russia is legitimately furious that NATO expanded to its very doorstep, and the United States is legitimately concerned about Russian interventions in its “near abroad,” most recently in Ukraine. The US has lots of evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election — not to mention Russian involvement in a coup attempt in Montenegro that same year and its meddling in the presidential election in Madagascar two years later — and Russia is pissed off at US “democracy promotion” in the Color Revolutions and within Russia itself. Russia is eager to finish the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that would bring natural gas to Germany, while the US is eager to sell its own gas to its European ally. Then there’s Russia’s penchant for assassinating Russians in other countries and repressing protestors at home.

    Any of these issues could scuttle cooperation between Moscow and Washington. One way of negotiating around this minefield is to delink the agendas of cooperation and conflict. Arms control advocates have a long history of doing just that by resisting calls to link other issues to arms control negotiations. Thus, the Iran nuclear deal focuses exclusively on the country’s nuclear program, not its missiles, not its relations with other countries in the region, not its human rights situation. The same lack of linkage has historically applied to all the arms control agreements between Washington and Moscow.

    This strategy of delinking doesn’t mean that these other issues are completely off the table. They are simply addressed at different tables.

    Those who desperately want a new cold war with Russia will not be happy with such a practical solution. They don’t want to talk with Putin about anything. As repugnant as I find the Russian leader, I have to acknowledge that he heads up an important global player and he has the support (for the time being at least) of much of his population. So, even as we challenge the Russian leadership’s conduct at home and abroad, we must also work with Moscow in the interests of global peace, prosperity and sustainability.

    Of course, there’s another word for all this: diplomacy.

    *[This article was originally published by FPIF.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    The US Will Need Turkey to Counter Russia

    When it comes to the already abysmal Turkish-American relations, Joe Biden’s presidency is being viewed as an ominous train wreck waiting to happen. The president-elect has previously signaled that his administration would “tame” Turkey for policies Ankara has pursued in Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh and the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, in a sensational video that surfaced last summer, Biden hinted that his administration would provide all necessary tools (with the exception of military equipment) to the Turkish opposition in its endeavor to oust President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who went ballistic over the revelations.

    To make things worse for bilateral relations, in December 2020, Ankara was slapped with the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act for the procurement of the Russian S-400 high-altitude defense system. However, there are mounting signs that the Biden administration will be reluctant to tighten its grip on Turkey, which would compel Washington to find ways to work with Ankara.   

    As Europe Weakens, Turkey Is on the Rise

    READ MORE

    Denouncing President Donald Trump’s denigration of the transatlantic alliance, Biden underscored NATO’s critical role in US national security, writing in Foreign Affairs last year: “To counter Russian aggression, we must keep the alliance’s military capabilities sharp. We must impose real costs on Russia for its violations of international norms.” The reality for the next administration is that Russia cannot be countered without Turkey being on board, given that its combat-proven military is considered to be a valuable NATO pillar and its unique geopolitical location has historically acted as a bulwark against Russia’s expansionist instincts.

    There is the perception that Turkey had drifted into the Russian orbit after the procurement of the S-400 system. However, due to having to frequently work with Moscow, Ankara has single-handedly developed capabilities and has taken steps in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus and Syria that have proven to be effective in limiting Russian influence.  

    The Black Sea 

    The 2015 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation clearly prioritizes the Black Sea as a pillar of Moscow’s power projection. In the last two decades, Russia has consolidated its Black Sea presence by annexing Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region in 2008 and Ukraine’s Crimea, home to the Sevastopol naval base, in 2014. Other strategic locations include the Baltic Sea and the Alaska region of the North Pacific, where American and Russian militaries frequently come dangerously close to physically clashing.

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    Last August, two Russian Su-27s intercepted a US Air Force B-52 strategic bomber over the Black Sea, about which General Jeff Harrigan, commander of US Air Forces in Europe and Africa, warned of possible future mid-air collisions. All things considered, Turkey has the means to limit Russian influence and has displayed resoluteness to not let the Black Sea be turned into “a Russian lake.” 

    In case of Russian aggression, Turkey’s support would be critical to any NATO or US response because of Turkish naval capabilities and responsibility for the straits under the Montreux Convention. The RAND Corporation’s 2018 Black Sea simulation suggests that effective deterrence will require a NATO Black Sea Center of Excellence to be established in Turkey alongside an active use of the Turkish straits. As Sweden’s former Prime Minister Carl Bildt succinctly puts it, “What happens on the Bosporus affects us all.” 

    Turkey has made moves in the Black Sea by establishing robust political and military cooperation with Ukraine. This particularly drew Moscow’s ire given the ongoing conflict between Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Last year, Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar Makina and the Ukrainian defense company Ukrspecexport signed an agreement involving the development and production of “sensitive technologies in defense and aerospace.” Furthermore, Ukraine is poised to purchase 50 Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, which have a proven record of destroying sophisticated Russian-made arms such as S-300, Pantsir C1 and TOR-M.

    The success of the Turkish defense industry in the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has inspired experts to float the idea that the Ankara-Kyiv military cooperation may very well tip the balance in Donbas and Crimea in favor of Ukraine. Despite the potential of straining relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Erdogan has conveyed Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a rare area of mutual agreement between Washington and Ankara. Erdogan went so far as to support the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in its row against the Moscow Patriarchate. Finally, Ankara has expressed its full support for the admission in NATO of the Black Sea nation of Georgia, Turkey’s neighbor, a move Putin has declared as a “red line.” 

    Caucasus and Syria 

    Turkey’s explicit military and political support for Azerbaijan in its decisive victory against Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh at the end of last year has propelled Turkey to major-player status in the South Caucasus, traditionally Russia’s backyard. For the first time in more than a century — the last time being the Battle of Baku of 1918 — Turkish military is to be deployed to the South Caucasus after Ankara and Moscow agreed to monitor the ceasefire. The uncomfortable reality for Russia here is, at the end of the day, that soldiers from a NATO member country will be present in its “near abroad.” If Russia had been as strong in the region as it was once believed, it could have singlehandedly navigated the Azeri-Armenian conflict without having to concede to Turkey’s demands.  

    Even more disturbing for Moscow is Turkey’s acquisition of a physical route via Armenian territories to Azerbaijan, which is being dubbed as the Pan-Turkic superhighway, referring to Turkey’s uninterrupted physical link to its ethnic brethren in Azerbaijan and the Turkestan region in Central Asia —  another one of Russia’s post-Soviet satellites. Turkey has, since the fall of the Soviet Union, aspired to establish itself as the leader of the Turkic world. The last thing Moscow would want is to deal with is an ascendant Turkey in Turkestan. As the recent crisis in Kyrgyzstan has shown, Russia may be losing influence there.

    Turkey’s rising influence in the South Caucasus has also raised fears in Iran, home to some 30 million Azeri Turks whose secessionist feelings are now stronger than ever after Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh victory. With Turkey’s permanent presence in the South Caucasus, Russia and Iran will have to take Ankara more seriously in their regional calculations, particularly in Syria. All things considered, President Putin appears to have accepted Turkey’s broader role in the Caucasus. When asked about the topic on Russian television, he conceded: “What can I tell you. It’s a geopolitical fallout from the downfall of the Soviet Union.” 

    Embed from Getty Images

    In Syria, as in the Caucasus, Russia has found itself having to work with Ankara. Through a series of accords like the Sochi Agreements of 2018 and 2019, as well as the ongoing Astana Process launched in 2017, Moscow has had to agree (to a certain extent) to concede to Ankara’s demands. Most importantly, Ankara has been able to keep Russia from employing Grozny-style destruction of Idlib province, the last rebel stronghold along Turkey’s border that is home to some 4 million civilians. When 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an assault by the forces of President Bashar al-Assad last February, Turkey did not hesitate to retaliate by killing hundreds of Russian-backed Syrian army soldiers and destroying countless Syrian tanks and weaponry, which prompted Putin’s plea for a ceasefire agreement with Turkey. 

    If President Biden is serious about containing Russia through reinvigorating NATO, he will need Turkey’s geopolitical standing as well as its military and political clout, both of which have grown exponentially in recent years. The Biden administration will soon have to decide whether US national interests dictate a perpetual punitive approach toward the second-largest NATO member or a better understanding of Turkey’s concerns, particularly when it comes to the Syrian YPG (the Kurdish People’s Protection Units) and the need for a high-altitude missile defense system.  

    Turkey under President Erdogan has grown to be more self-confident. Pushing Ankara away may result in the complete loss of a valuable NATO ally. As James Jeffrey, the former US envoy to Syria, stated, “We really can’t do the Middle East, the Caucuses, or the Black Sea without Turkey.  And, Turkey is a natural opponent of Russia and Iran.” Losing Iran in 1979 cost the United States a strategic foothold in the region. Losing Turkey altogether may cost it Eurasia, where Russia — in tandem with China — has already been steadily building up its standing in defiance of American hegemony.  

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    A Tale of Two Historical Adversaries

    As Joe Biden settles into the White House and the Democrats in Congress play out the final act of their formal confrontation with the man now known as Citizen Trump, observers will begin focusing on another drama, one that the Democrats and their preferred media have obsessively elevated to the top of the hierarchy of concerns at the very moment when a global pandemic has undermined the health of humanity and a climate crisis threatens the health of the planet. What is that drama? Russia’s role in the great SolarWinds hack.

    Much of the credibility of the Democratic Party hinges on justifying what increasingly resembles a conspiracy theory designed to offer the Democrats psychological thrills comparable to those that QAnon offers to Republicans. The difference is that, apart from Citizen Trump himself, the members of the Republican Party obsessed by QAnon are mostly marginal personalities, such as newly elected Representatives Marjorie Taylor Greene and Lauren Boebert. In contrast, proponents of the Democratic conspiracy theory include, no less, Hillary Clinton and Nancy Pelosi. They appear to believe that Trump not only commanded the attempt to occupy the Capitol, but coordinated the operation with Vladimir Putin.

    President Joe Biden has not personally embraced the Democratic obsession with Russia. As the elected president and now leader of the party, Biden will have to clarify the state of play on the Russia question that has come to define the party during its four years of opposition to Donald Trump. Paradoxically, though deemed a puppet of President Putin, Trump’s “America First” orientation seriously damaged the theoretically cordial relations that existed since the end of the Cold War between Russia and the United States. An objective observer could only conclude that Trump may have appreciated Putin’s style, but — apart from fragilizing NATO, which he did for purely financial reasons — his policies did little to accommodate Putin’s politics.

    Who Is Nancy Pelosi Enabling?

    READ MORE

    The Democrats want Biden to flamboyantly punish Russia for every real or imaginary sin they can think of, if only to avenge Hillary Clinton’s defeat in 2016. The problem is that the first order of business on the new president’s agenda is not about punishment, but collaboration. Biden must rectify one of the most egregious errors made by Trump, who refused to extend the New START — the last nuclear treaty between the US and Russia remaining in effect, which expires this year.

    Most reasonable people would like to see the risk of nuclear war reduced even if it cannot be eliminated. Democrats, unlike Trump, consider themselves reasonable people and, therefore, are intent upon extending the expiring treaty. The New York Times makes this clear while worrying that the question is more complex than simply reaching an agreement: “While Mr. Biden has long favored the extension, there was debate among his top aides about how long it should be. He chose the most time available under the treaty’s terms, in hopes … of preventing a nuclear arms race at a time the new president expects to be in a state of near-constant, low-level competition and confrontation with Moscow around the world — and particularly in cyberspace.”

    Jen Psaki, the White House press secretary, reduced this complex reasoning to something the media could understand: “This extension makes even more sense when the relationship with Russia is adversarial as it is at this time.”

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Adversarial:

    Not in total conformity with a powerful nation’s expectations and requirements and therefore susceptible to being severely punished militarily or economically.

    Contextual Note

    The quandary Biden is now facing has nothing to do with nuclear security. It concerns the theme The Times and other media have been pushing since early December: the SolarWinds cyberattack now thought to have affected at least 250 US federal agencies and businesses. To this day, the experts have been left guessing about who did it and to what end. The Democrats and, of course, The Times immediately proclaimed that it was Russia. Proof is never required because, as most Democrats now believe, hacking is an integral part of the Russian genome (bad science is often brought in to bolster this kind of specious reasoning).

    To make the case, all the pundits require is finding someone in the government or the “serious” media to affirm that, whatever the complaint, they consider it “likely” that the Russians were responsible. CNN, for example, correctly designates “The computer intrusion campaign that has been linked to Russia.” This phrase is designed to make readers assume that Russia did it. But “linked to” means nothing more than speculated about. Anyone versed in the basics of criminology should understand that, even when there is a “likely” suspect, if no concrete proof exists to accuse them and the investigation has failed to unearth a clue as to the motive, taking legal action against that suspect simply makes no sense and would be considered an abuse of justice.

    The frustration of not being able to prove one’s suspicions marks the point at which imaginary genetic reasoning can easily take over. It also opens the door to geopolitical conspiracy theories. What precise instructions, we must ask, did Vladimir Putin give to Donald Trump in the telephone conversation Hillary Clinton believes the two men had on January 6, as the assembled troops of the colluding presidents were assaulting the Capitol?

    Historical Note

    The Times rightly points out that the suspicion of Russia has complicated Joe Biden’s decision-making. It “puts Mr. Biden in the awkward position of seeking to extend the nuclear treaty — which Mr. Putin has already said he is willing to renew — while very publicly discussing the need to make Russia pay a price for the hacking.” In serious criminology, attempting to evaluate the “price to pay” for a crime when the very nature of the crime is in doubt would be extremely unprofessional. It is tantamount to conducting the trial before making the charges. That has, of course, become a kind of a historical norm in US foreign policy. From the Gulf of Tonkin incident to waging war on Afghanistan instead of targeting the likely criminal organization, al-Qaeda, American politicians have consistently botched their criminology to precipitate a war.

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    The Times article grudgingly admits that the SolarWinds hack was more likely traditional spying rather than the “act of war” some politicians have been shouting about. Reuters quotes “U.S. Senator Dick Durbin calling it ‘virtually a declaration of war’ and U.S. Senator Marco Rubio saying that ‘America must retaliate, and not just with sanctions.’” Does the fact that if may have been spying rather than political or military aggression make it excusable? After all, everybody spies.

    The true criminologist might reframe the investigation by asking two basic questions. The first is, who among all possible suspects is really good at sophisticated cyber spying? The second is, what data was being breached and why would the perpetrator be interested in it? To the first question, there are several serious leads, including Russia. But the list also includes China (Trump’s claim), Israel and the US. The last two have been eliminated because they are not adversaries of the US. But is spying only adversarial? Our criminologist knows that, despite official denials, the NSA spies on Americans. So do Facebook and Google. What those two platforms glean appears to be valuable.

    Cyber spying feeds the world of Big Data, essential for managing economies and economic relations. Israel, perhaps the world’s most sophisticated purveyor of cyber spying, spies on any target of interest, as an Al Jazeera documentary recently revealed. If the investigators had an idea of the purpose of the spying, the criminologists might have a clearer idea about which of the many suspects are truly “likely.”

    The Times’ characterization of the relationship with Russia as a “near-constant, low-level competition and confrontation” is an interesting innovation that may reveal something about the Democrats’ conception of psychological warfare. If the glorious Cold War of the past, when the Soviet Union looked like an empire, could be accurately characterized as constant, high-level competition and confrontation, then the new Cold War still focused on Russia represents a certain form of progress. “Constant” has become “near-constant” and “high-level” has become low-level. That should be reassuring.

    The other question to ask about the Biden administration is this: Will the effort at constant, high-level confrontation now be directed at China? And can the declining US empire simultaneously handle two cold wars alongside a potential civil war at home?

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    US Media Still Has Russia on Its Mind

    In December, a breaking story about massive hacking of US computer networks dominated The New York Times columns for weeks. With the new year, The Times is still nourishing its alarmed indignation at the evil force behind the event. In an article this week, David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth and Julian E. Barnes describe the event as “a hacking, now believed to have affected upward of 250 federal agencies and businesses … aimed not at the election system but at the rest of the United States government and many large American corporations.”

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    In an opinion piece from December, Thomas P. Bossert, former homeland security adviser to President Donald Trump, described the event as an attack on “the networks of the federal government and much of corporate America” which were “compromised by a foreign nation.” Consistently with The New York Times editorial policy in place for the past four years, he went further than the non-committal reference to “a foreign nation” and designated a particular nation as the culprit: Russia.

    Bossert explained not only why he could jump to this conclusion, but also why it was so fearful: “Domestic and geopolitical tensions could escalate quite easily if they use their access for malign influence and misinformation — both hallmarks of Russian behavior.”

    Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

    Hallmark:

    A term designating a superficial feature of a hostile act that, thanks to some vague similarity with incidents from the past, can be cited as conclusive proof of culpability, which proves especially useful when no tangible evidence exists to blame the party one prefers to blame.

    Contextual Note

    Consumers of mainstream media should by now understand that when they encounter the word “hallmark,” it expresses a supposition of guilt when the journalist has no real evidence to back it up. For example, a December 2016 piece in The New York Times stated that “In post-Soviet Russia, the same cynical mendacity has become the Putin government’s hallmark.” In August 2019, another article claimed that “Several American officials who follow Russia closely say the hacking bears the hallmark of an operation by Russia’s military intelligence service.”

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    Sometimes, the term “earmarks” is used to express the same idea. In October, the story of Hunter Biden’s compromising emails broke, to the delight of Donald Trump’s campaign.The media supporting Joe Biden responded with the assessment of the intelligence community: “More than 50 former senior intelligence officials have signed on to a letter outlining their belief that the recent disclosure of emails allegedly belonging to Joe Biden’s son ‘has all the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation.’” No one denied the reality of the emails, but accusing the Russians made the story sound fake.

    To establish a “truth” worthy of the media, the US intelligence community systematically looks for hallmarks or earmarks. Because the assessment comes from intelligence, the media present it as fact. On January 2, David Sanger claimed that the culprit of the massive hack was “almost certainly a Russian intelligence agency, according to federal and private experts.” On January 5, Sanger and Barnes offered this update: “American intelligence agencies formally named Russia as the ‘likely’ source of the broad hacking.” Their use of “almost certainly” and “likely” tells us that nothing is certain about that claim. It does, however, tell us what the intelligence community wants Times readers to believe.

    It didn’t take long for the Boston Herald to notice that the “classic earmarks” in the Hunter Biden story cited above turned out to have been totally imaginary. In the same document, the officials paradoxically admitted that “we do not have evidence of Russian involvement — just that our experience makes us deeply suspicious that the Russian government played a significant role in this case.” The Herald comments: “That also should have tipped reporters off to the fact that the letter was rank speculation masquerading as informed analysis, but true to form, they happily ran with it instead.”

    In a post-truth world, the media runs happily with anything it believes will excite its audience. Spinning accusations against Russia serves not only the media, but also the objectives of the political class. With no clear evidence about who the perpetrator may be, Julian E. Barnes, writing for The New York Times on December 18, reported on the reaction from politicians: “The recent hack on numerous federal agencies by Russia’s elite spy service demonstrated the need for new defenses, key lawmakers said.” Is it a coincidence that the scandal broke at the very moment Congress was preparing to vote on the Defense Authorization Act, with its bloated $740-billion price tag?  

    Democratic Senator Mark Warner was delighted to echo the media’s accusations on December 20. “All indications point to Russia.” By “indications” he obviously meant hallmarks. Warner added that Russia “came away with a big, big haul.” But even today nobody knows what the hackers were seeking or what they may have purloined. No one has signaled any form of damage. The hackers may, after all, just have been gathering information, which is what every nation routinely does.

    AP offered the most honest take, avoiding a direct accusation of Russia: “U.S. government statements so far have not mentioned Russia. Asked about Russian involvement in a radio interview Monday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo acknowledged that Russia consistently tries to penetrate American servers, but quickly pivoted to threats from China and North Korea.” Russia spies. What else is new?

    Historical Note

    Could all this simply be a case of the good, old, tried-and-true strategy of fear that emerged during the Cold War and has been renewed regularly by Western governments ever since? Filmmaker Adam Curtis documented this historical pattern in his compelling three-part survey, “The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear.” In Curtis’ words, politicians “turned to fear not because of a real enemy outside, but because they feel their own sense of legitimacy and authority dwindling.”

    Nearly a month after the initial report, can we say there is a real enemy? On December 17,The Times expressed its “concerns that hackers could ultimately use their access to shutter American systems, corrupt or destroy data, or take command of computer systems that run industrial processes. So far, though, there has been no evidence of that happening.” With all the talk about Russia but only hallmarks for evidence, nothing tells us that the hacking may not have come from another credible source, like Israel for example or, more credibly, from the NSA, which has always denied domestic spying. It was NSA Director James Clapper’s denial, under sworn testimony during a Senate hearing, that incited Edward Snowden to release his trove of confidential data proving the contrary.

    Embed from Getty Images

    Since the Cold War, Americans expect Russia to be dreaming of harming the US. Any clever operator should know that accusing Russia of what the US itself may be doing — in this case, spying on its own corporations to better control the economy — makes a lot of sense. People immediately find the accusation against Russia credible. They won’t even think about suspecting their own intelligence services. But there is no evidence to support the idea that US intelligence did it … other than hallmarks.

    And many such hallmarks exist. The anthrax attacks that followed 9/11 permitted the George W. Bush administration to blame them on Iraq. Saddam Hussein was known to have experimented with anthrax, initially provided by the US during Saddam’s war with Iran. Everyone could see at the time that Bush was looking for an excuse to attack Iraq, which he only managed to do in March 2003 after a massive campaign of creative disinformation.

    The anthrax plot failed because the strain of anthrax used had its own “hallmarks.” It was produced only in the US and specifically at a defense laboratory at Fort Detrick. The authorities took years to find a patsy to accuse in a “lone wolf” scenario. The FBI’s psychological campaign eventually drove the presumed culprit to commit suicide, obscuring any investigation into possible complicity from the team at the White House, who had the most to gain from the operation.

    On the day the story of the massive hack broke on December 12, the author of spy novels, David Cornwell, aka John le Carré, died. It’s unfortunate, because Le Carré might have been the most qualified person to tease out the play of interests and intrigues that lies behind this spying hack of the century.

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Washington’s Sanctions on Turkey Are Another Gift to Putin

    The latest sanctions against Turkey introduced by Washington on December 13 were invoked under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, a US federal law that imposes economic sanctions on Iran, Russia and North Korea. The act came into effect in August 2017. This is the first time it has been used against an ally and, what makes it even more remarkable, an ally who is also a NATO member.

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    As reported by AFP, “The sanctions target Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries, the country’s military procurement agency, its chief Ismail Demir and three other senior officials. The penalties block any assets the four officials may have in U.S. jurisdictions and bar their entry into the U.S. They also include a ban on most export licenses, loans and credits to the agency.”

    Long Anticipated

    The decision, long anticipated — and long resisted by President Donald Trump — came about because of Ankara’s refusal to back down from the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system. Turkey announced back in 2017 it was going ahead with the deal, after feeling it had been rebuffed in its efforts to acquire the US Patriot system at what it considered a fair price and by the refusal of the US to allow for a transfer of the system’s technology.

    Tied into the politics swirling around the S-400 is the F-35, the stealth fighter jet the sale of which to the United Arab Emirates has caused ripples of anxiety in Israel. And given the ambitions of and mutual animosities between Mohammed bin Zayed, the Abu Dhabi crown prince and de facto UAE ruler, and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, there are, without doubt, similar feelings of anxiety in Ankara, though for different reasons.

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    The Americans took the sale of 100 F-35s to Turkey off the table because of concerns that the presence of the S-400 would potentially enable the Russians to acquire in-depth knowledge of the stealth fighter. In July last year, the White House released a statement that said, in part, that “Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible. The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence-collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.”

    It was a decision that President Trump, eyeing the half a billion dollars the deal was worth, only grudgingly agreed to. “It’s not fair,” he said. And he groused: “Turkey is very good with us, very good, and we are now telling Turkey that because you have really been forced to buy another missile system, we’re not going to sell you the F-35 fighter jets. It’s a very tough situation that they’re in, and it’s a very tough situation that we’ve been placed in, the United States.”

    Trump, it hardly needs to be said, blamed the Obama administration, claiming his predecessor had blocked the sale. As ever with this president, that’s not true. (For readers who are interested in the actual story, the defense and security site War on the Rocks provides a blow by blow account which can be found here.)

    More in Sorrow

    Though Erdoğan and Trump have had a good relationship, the US president has no time now for anything other than his increasingly pathetic and forlorn crusade to stay in the White House. He couldn’t be bothered to veto the bipartisan decision to invoke sanctions on Turkey. It was left to the outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to try to paper over the cracks. In a statement couched in a tone of “more in sorrow, than in anger,” Pompeo said: “Turkey is a valued ally and an important regional security partner for the United States,” adding that “we seek to continue our decades-long history of productive defense-sector co-operation by removing the obstacle of Turkey’s S-400 possession as soon as possible.”

    The Turks were having none of it. And from them, there was plenty of anger and no sorrow. Calling the decision “inexplicable,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry delivered a blunt rejoinder: “We call on the United States to revise the unjust sanctions (and) to turn back from this grave mistake as soon as possible. Turkey is ready to tackle the issue through dialogue and diplomacy in a manner worthy of the spirit of alliance. (The sanctions) will inevitably negatively impact our relations, and (Turkey) will retaliate in a manner and time it sees appropriate.”

    Purring like the proverbial Cheshire cat was Vladimir Putin. The sanctions, though less harsh than might have been anticipated, play well to his strategy of pulling a NATO member, one with the second-largest standing army in the pact, closer to Moscow. Building on initiatives in Syria where Russian and Turkish forces are jointly policing a shaky ceasefire and on the deal the two countries brokered in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Russian president has further strengthened his hand.

    Faced with an already challenging Middle East portfolio, it is yet another Trumpian mess that the incoming president, Joe Biden, and his pick as secretary of state Antony Blinken, will have to contend with.

    *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More