South America News

Subterms

    Latest story

    113 Shares189 Views

    Brazil’s New President and Hope for a Democratic Revival

    by

    The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media. More

    More stories

    • 88 Shares129 Views

      in World Politics

      Toxic Spiral of Violence Has Wrecked Mexico

      by

      The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media. More

    • 138 Shares179 Views

      in World Politics

      France and Colombia: The Center Keeps Trying (but Failing) to Hold

      by

      The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media. More

    • 113 Shares149 Views

      in World Politics

      Chile Has an Opportunity to Write a New Chapter

      by

      Chile is going through political change. In May, Chileans voted to elect an assembly that will write a new constitution. Those elected to redraw the country’s magna carta feature a large contingent of independents. Left-wing parties are most favorably positioned among institutional actors, but right-wing parties did not reach the one-third threshold needed to enjoy veto power.

      At the end of 2019, months of social protest and days of violence across Chile gripped the country. At the time, mainstream political forces and President Sebastian Pinera’s government managed to appease the protesters and halt social upheaval. In return, he gave in to growing calls for a vote on whether or not Chile should get a new constitution.

      Joe Biden Faces Many Challenges in Latin America

      READ MORE

      Almost a year later, in October 2020, Chileans voted in a national referendum and chose to abandon their current constitution, which was inherited from the era of General Augusto Pinochet. Now, the people have elected an assembly that is in charge of writing and proposing a new charter.

      Tectonic Shift

      In a race that represented a political earthquake, 155 constituents were elected to form a Constitutional Convention. Chile’s traditional political elite lost significant ground to independent candidates, political influencers and social movements.

      Center-right and center-left parties, which led the transition to democracy in the 1990s, took the hardest hit. Chile Vamos, a center-right coalition led by the president, failed to reach the one-third of seats it expected. Pinera has led the country since 2018 and had previously governed between 2010 and 2014. The loss means Chile Vamos cannot veto reforms perceived as too left leaning.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Apruebo Dignidad, a new, more militant left-wing coalition, outperformed the traditional center left, known simply as Apruebo. Now, Apruebo Dignidad has senior-partner status and a more favorable position within the Constitutional Convention than the Apruebo coalition. A faction of the Apruebo Dignidad coalition, known as the Frente Amplio, first entered the political stage in 2017, emerging from student movements with a militant agenda.

      Independent candidates are the biggest winners. The convention is controlled by 64% of constituents who do not belong to a political party — only 36% of them are party militants, excluding the 17 seats reserved for indigenous peoples. However, it is fair to say that most of these independent constituents have left-leaning affinities.

      The next step in the country’s constitutional process includes the swearing-in of the convention, which will be on July 4. This will be followed by nine months of discussions and the drafting of the new magna carta. Once the new constitution is ready, a national plebiscite or referendum will be held in which Chileans will vote on whether to adopt it.

      Participation and Abstention

      During the referendum in 2020, 79% of voters favored drafting a new constitution. Despite this, electoral participation has been weak throughout the entire process. In 2012, Chile abandoned compulsory voting. Since then, the fact that many Chileans choose not to vote might become an issue in the mid-to-long term. This could have an impact on how representative the Constitutional Convention is of public sentiment. The highest rate of voter participation throughout the constitutional review process was achieved during the initial referendum in 2020, in which 50.8% of registered voters took part.

      Last month, just 43% of the 15 million registered voters cast their ballot, representing just over 6 million in a country of around 19 million people. Taking into account the number of null-and-void votes and blank ballot papers, only 38.3% of registered voters chose their preferred candidates for the composition of the Constitutional Convention. The numbers were even worse in the election of governors, which took place on June 13, in which only 19.6% of voters participated. This was the worst rate ever recorded in Chile.

      A survey conducted two days after the May elections found that people did not vote for four main reasons. Some Chileans cited transportation problems to reach a voting site, while others mentioned election fatigue due to the number of votes that have taken place lately. Some were not sure who to vote for. Others said they had a general lack of interest in politics or in these polls. Election fatigue was compounded by the fact that the vote for the convention was held at the same time as regional and local elections — the latter of which were part of the regular electoral schedule.

      Short-Term Fallout

      Only after the May election did important developments take place. On May 19, three days after polls closed, parties had to register their candidates for the presidential primaries, which will be held in July. The primaries will determine who runs in the general election in November. Whoever wins that contest would be in charge of implementing Chile‘s constitutional transition.

      .custom-post-from {float:right; margin: 0 10px 10px; max-width: 50%; width: 100%; text-align: center; background: #000000; color: #ffffff; padding: 15px 0 30px; }
      .custom-post-from img { max-width: 85% !important; margin: 15px auto; filter: brightness(0) invert(1); }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-h4 { font-size: 18px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-h5 { font-size: 14px; letter-spacing: 1px; line-height: 22px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
      .custom-post-from input[type=”email”] { font-size: 14px; color: #000 !important; width: 240px; margin: auto; height: 30px; box-shadow:none; border: none; padding: 0 10px; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-pen-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: center right 14px; background-size:14px;}
      .custom-post-from input[type=”submit”] { font-weight: normal; margin: 15px auto; height: 30px; box-shadow: none; border: none; padding: 0 10px 0 35px; background-color: #1878f3; color: #ffffff; border-radius: 4px; display: inline-block; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-email-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: 14px center; background-size: 14px; }

      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox { width: 90%; margin: auto; position: relative; display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label { text-align: left; display: block; padding-left: 32px; margin-bottom: 0; cursor: pointer; font-size: 11px; line-height: 18px;
      -webkit-user-select: none;
      -moz-user-select: none;
      -ms-user-select: none;
      user-select: none;
      order: 1;
      color: #ffffff;
      font-weight: normal;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label a { color: #ffffff; text-decoration: underline; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input { position: absolute; opacity: 0; cursor: pointer; height: 100%; width: 24%; left: 0;
      right: 0; margin: 0; z-index: 3; order: 2;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:before { content: “f0c8”; font-family: Font Awesome 5 Free; color: #eee; font-size: 24px; position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0; line-height: 28px; color: #ffffff; width: 20px; height: 20px; margin-top: 5px; z-index: 2; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:before { content: “f14a”; font-weight: 600; color: #2196F3; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:after { content: “”; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:after { position: absolute; left: 2px; width: 18px; height: 18px; margin-top: 10px; background: #ffffff; top: 10px; margin: auto; z-index: 1; }
      .custom-post-from .error{ display: block; color: #ff6461; order: 3 !important;}

      Thus, the last few weeks have represented a political earthquake for traditional coalitions. In particular, the historically dominant center left dropped several presidential candidates for November’s contest. It also broke historical alliances and failed to reach broad agreements to nominate a single coalition candidate for the general election. Only the center-right Chile Vamos and the left-wing Apruebo Dignidadregistered their candidates for the primaries on July 18. To the surprise and concern of many, communist candidate Daniel Jadue will, according to the latest polling, make it to the presidential election’s runoff.

      Meanwhile, the June election for the 16 governors of Chile’s regions, which is an early indicator for the presidential race, shifted territorial power to the moderate left.

      The outcome of the presidential and parliamentary elections will be significant in the short term as it will determine the checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government. This, in turn, will affect the practical workings of the Constitutional Convention. It will also have an impact on whether Chile’s political shift to the left is structural or temporary.

      The End of the Chicago Boys

      With this in mind, it is currently difficult to predict the makeup of Chile’s next government. The question is whether it will be dominated by left-wing forces or if the Chile Vamos coalition manages to distance itself from the unpopular Pinera and secure another term in office. Nevertheless, as the work of the Constitutional Convention gets underway, it is evident that the resulting charter will represent a much more socioeconomically progressive framework than what Chile has had since its transition to democracy in 1990.

      Chile’s new constitution will undoubtedly turn the page on the country’s laissez-faire orthodoxy inherited from the “Chicago Boys,” who shaped the country’s economy under Pinochet. The constitution will likely also have an impact on other issues, including gender equality, the recognition of indigenous peoples, the social safety net and environmental concerns.

      It remains to be seen whether Chile’s constitutional revisions will set it on a path of more equitable growth or one of uncontrolled state spending. But one thing is clear: Chile’s post-Pinochet model has become unsustainable. It is now up to the statespersons of South America’s most prosperous and advanced economy to ensure that this chapter does not go down in history as a missed opportunity.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 63 Shares179 Views

      in World Politics

      What’s Behind Chile’s Vaccination Success?

      by

      The deadly impact of COVID-19 has been felt in every corner of the globe. On February 22, the United States reached a tragic landmark of 500,000 deaths. Across the Atlantic, nine of the top 10 nations in deaths per million are in Europe, with tiny enclaves of Gibraltar and San Marino topping the tables. The list of countries that have dealt with the pandemic relatively well is much shorter. Almost a year ago, I wrote about how leaders in Brazil and Mexico were slow in taking tougher action to prevent the spread of the virus. I falsely predicted that Latin America is unlikely to witness the death rates seen in Europe. Unfortunately, the effects of the pandemic were equally devastating in the region, if not worse.

      Images of mass graves in the Amazonian town of Manaus and the dead bodies left in coffins in the streets of Guayaquil, Ecuador, have spread worldwide. More than 260,000 Brazilians and nearly 190,000 Mexicans died because of the virus, placing the two countries second and third in absolute numbers of fatalities. Peru registered 1,421 deaths per million and Panama 1,352 on March 4 — numbers that show the devastation caused by the virus in the region so far. Chile has also experienced a significant death rate of 1,084 per million.

      Why Are Mexico and Brazil So Slow in Reacting to COVID-19?

      READ MORE

      The big difference in Chile was that authorities mobilized in advance to secure vaccines, hedging bets on various suppliers in different stages of development. In September last year, President Sebastian Pinera announced the purchase of 10 million doses of Pfizer-BioNtech vaccine. Deliveries commenced on December 24, making Chile the first Latin American nation to start its vaccination program. The country has ordered some 90 million doses, more than enough to immunize its 19 million citizens. By March 4, more than 20% of its population received at least one shot, placing Chile fifth in the world when it comes to vaccination rates, just behind Israel, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

      Political Conflict

      On December 29, Argentinians started to receive the Russian Sputnik V vaccine. The pace of immunization in Argentina has been much slower than expected, with several complaints of those not in priority groups receiving the jab before health workers and the elderly. The “VIP vaccination” scandal has caused the resignation of the health minister, drawing protesters onto the streets and generating criticism against President Alberto Fernandez. So far, Argentina has vaccinated only 2.61% of its 45 million citizens. The slower pace seems to be standard in the region, with most nations unable to vaccinate even 1% of their citizens. The cause is not only the shortage of vaccines but lack of planning and, more significantly, internal political conflict. 

      In Brazil, president Jair Bolsonaro has made several statements that undermined efforts to slow the pandemic. In a national broadcast on March 24, 2020, he criticized the restrictive measures adopted by governors and mayors, urging people to return to work and referring to COVID-19 as a “little flu.” The president also highly publicized the unproven anti-malarian drug chloroquine as being effective against the virus, ordering the Ministry of Health to produce four million doses. His insistence on the use of the drug caused the loss of two health ministers, Dr. Henrique Mandetta, fired by Bolsonaro last April, and Dr. Nelson Teich, who resigned less than a month after taking over. Since then, the position has been filled by an army general specializing in logistics, with neither medical education nor experience.

      .custom-post-from {float:right; margin: 0 10px 10px; max-width: 50%; width: 100%; text-align: center; background: #000000; color: #ffffff; padding: 15px 0 30px; }
      .custom-post-from img { max-width: 85% !important; margin: 15px auto; filter: brightness(0) invert(1); }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-h4 { font-size: 18px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-h5 { font-size: 14px; letter-spacing: 1px; line-height: 22px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
      .custom-post-from input[type=”email”] { font-size: 14px; color: #000 !important; width: 240px; margin: auto; height: 30px; box-shadow:none; border: none; padding: 0 10px; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-pen-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: center right 14px; background-size:14px;}
      .custom-post-from input[type=”submit”] { font-weight: normal; margin: 15px auto; height: 30px; box-shadow: none; border: none; padding: 0 10px 0 35px; background-color: #1878f3; color: #ffffff; border-radius: 4px; display: inline-block; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-email-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: 14px center; background-size: 14px; }

      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox { width: 90%; margin: auto; position: relative; display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label { text-align: left; display: block; padding-left: 32px; margin-bottom: 0; cursor: pointer; font-size: 11px; line-height: 18px;
      -webkit-user-select: none;
      -moz-user-select: none;
      -ms-user-select: none;
      user-select: none;
      order: 1;
      color: #ffffff;
      font-weight: normal;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label a { color: #ffffff; text-decoration: underline; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input { position: absolute; opacity: 0; cursor: pointer; height: 100%; width: 24%; left: 0;
      right: 0; margin: 0; z-index: 3; order: 2;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:before { content: “f0c8”; font-family: Font Awesome 5 Free; color: #eee; font-size: 24px; position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0; line-height: 28px; color: #ffffff; width: 20px; height: 20px; margin-top: 5px; z-index: 2; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:before { content: “f14a”; font-weight: 600; color: #2196F3; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:after { content: “”; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:after { position: absolute; left: 2px; width: 18px; height: 18px; margin-top: 10px; background: #ffffff; top: 10px; margin: auto; z-index: 1; }
      .custom-post-from .error{ display: block; color: #ff6461; order: 3 !important;}

      Over the course of the pandemic, Bolsonaro has been exchanging public barbs with the state governments, such as over lockdown measures adopted by individual governors last month. On March 1, 16 of the country’s 26 governors, including three Bolsonaro allies, signed a letter criticizing the government and accusing the president of misleading the public about federal pandemic relief funds. Sao Paulo’s governor, Joao Doria, a former ally in the 2018 elections and a potential competitor in 2022, has been the president’s most vociferous antagonist over the handling of the pandemic.

      At the center of the dispute is the Butantan Institute, one of the most prestigious health centers in Latin America, situated in the state of Sao Paolo. Back in June, Butantan signed a partnership with the Chinese laboratory Sinovac Biotech to produce the CoronaVac vaccine. Initially, Bolsonaro has signaled that Brazil would not purchase the Chinese vaccine, questioning its efficiency, but in January, the Ministry of Health added the vaccine to the national immunization plan following approval by the health regulator, Anvisa. Last month, Doria announced a deal for a further 20 million doses of CoronaVac to complement the 100 million already secured by Butantan.

      Last August, Pfizer said it offered 70 million batches of its vaccine to Brazil, with a delivery scheduled for December. However, with Brazil dissatisfied with the terms of the contract, the deal is still being negotiated. Health Minister Eduardo Pazuello hopes to secure 100 million doses from Pfizer and 38 million from a pharmaceutical subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, Janssen, to start deliveries in May and August respectively. Due to this lack of urgency and an absence of a unified policy between the federal and state governments, Brazil has so far vaccinated just 3,67% of its population.

      Crisis Management

      Chile has also faced political unrest. Since 2019, the country experienced several mass protests calling for education and pension reforms. In a televised address, President Pinera declared a state of emergency, granting powers to restrain freedom of movement and assembly. The measure resulted in violence that cost 18 lives in five days, leading the UN to examine possible human rights abuses. As a result, Pinera’s approval rating fell to just 7%. In 2020, amid the ongoing political crisis, COVID-19 hit the country hard, provoking the resignation of the health minister, Jaime Manalich.

      However, Pinera managed to turn the situation around. With a degree in commercial engineering from the Catholic University of Chile and a PhD in economics from Harvard, the president is a billionaire businessman, with an estimated net worth of $2,9 billion. He has already led the country once, between 2010 and 2014, earning crucial government nous. Pinera made several concessions to the protesters and supported the calls for a new constitution in an attempt to turn down the political temperature.  

      A referendum on October 25 saw 78% of the population approve a new constitution that will substitute the current one created in 1980 under General Augusto Pinochet. The new Magna Carta will be written by a 155-strong body also elected through a popular vote and with an equal number of men and women. The document will then be confirmed by a popular vote before being implemented.

      Embed from Getty Images

      To assuage popular discontent caused by the initial handling of the pandemic in combination with other historical grievances relating to health care, education and pensions, Pinera focused his negotiation abilities to mediate the purchase of million doses of vaccine from different laboratories and suppliers. While most developing nations have been struggling with a lack of supplies, Chile is among the top three countries, along with Canada and the UK, when it comes to the number of doses ordered per capita. Back in September, just before the peak of protests, Pinera announced partnerships on the development and clinical trials between the Catholic University of Chile and Sinovac; the University of Chile, Janssen/Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca; as well as the University of Frontera and another Chinese laboratory, CanSino Biologics. More than that, purchases were agreed with Pfizer, Covax, Sinovac and AstraZeneca.

      But despite perceived goodwill from an unpopular right-wing government, the president still faces an uphill climb when it comes to popularity. By March 1, 83% of the Chileans deemed the massive vaccination as good or very good, 58% asses the general management of the pandemic as positive, but Pinera’s personal approval is still only at 24%.

      The successful vaccination has already yielded positive outcomes. According to Chile’s Health Ministry, the number of new COVID-19 cases has decreased in six of the country’s 16 regions in the last seven days and in eight the last 14 days. Chile hopes to vaccinate at least 15 million people in the first semester, which would allow the country to immunize its entire population by the end of June. These numbers would put Chile way ahead in the vaccination game not only in Latin America but worldwide, suggesting that resolute leadership is as important for the nation’s well-being as a robust medical system.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 100 Shares99 Views

      in World Politics

      What Should Business Expect From Bolivia’s New President?

      by

      On October 18, the Bolivian public went to the polls and elected Luis Arce Catacora as the country’s 67th president in a surprise result that returned the socialist party of former President Evo Morales to power. Morales had previously ruled Bolivia as the leader of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) between January 2006 and November 2019, when he resigned from office and fled the country under pressure from the military following a controversial general election.

      The closeness of that contest — in which the conservative candidate Carlos Mesa missed forcing a runoff against Morales by 0.58% of the official vote tally — meant that 2020 was also expected to be a tight race. In the event, this year’s election saw Arce gain over half a million more votes than Morales had the previous year, with a similar amount bled away from Mesa’s 2019 total, handing Arce an outright victory without the need for a run-off.

      Why Is Foreign Investment Flooding Into India?

      READ MORE

      While it would be tempting to see the Arce administration as a continuation of the Morales era, on the campaign trail, the new president repeatedly stated, “I am not Evo Morales.” Since being elected, Arce has made clear that Morales would have “no role” in his government. Nevertheless, with Arce serving as minister of economy and public finance for most of Morales’ tenure, any consideration of what to expect from the new president must take into account his predecessor’s record. 

      Business Under Morales

      The Morales administration presided over a period of considerable economic growth and social development, which saw the rate of extreme poverty drop by more than half, from 48% in 2006 to 23% in 2018, while gross national income (GNI) per capita — a general indicator of prosperity among the population — more than tripled to reach $3,530 in 2019. GDP growth was also continuous and relatively consistent during this period, fluctuating between 3.4% and 6.8% until 2019, when it dipped to 2.2%. Those figures made Bolivia one of the fastest-growing countries in the region for much of Morales’ presidency.

      Embed from Getty Images

      These changes were partly the result of a policy of nationalizing the petroleum, telecommunications and mining industries, enacted by decree early in Morales’ first year in office and less than two years after 92% of Bolivian voters had supported the nationalization of hydrocarbons during a compulsory referendum. While the country’s revenues from hydrocarbons increased dramatically and provided the funds to support poverty alleviation programs, that approach did not lead to a dramatic fall in foreign direct investment (FDI) in oil and gas extraction or mining, as many expected. In fact, both industries saw significant increases in FDI, which subsequently declined again but never below the levels seen before Morales came into office. Throughout this time, it was Arce overseeing these programs and investment, as well as a process of agricultural development and rural land redistribution, which was followed by both a significant increase in cereal and fisheries production. 

      It is important to note that a major policy shift occurred toward the latter years of the administration, with Arce himself stating during Morales’ final term that “our nationalisation agenda is over. … we need FDI, and we respect genuine, new private investment. Today FDI makes up 2 percent to 3% of our GDP. We want to double that by 2020.” In 2017, the country signed deals with foreign investors for hydrocarbon exploitation worth $1.6 billion, supplemented by a further $2.5-billion deal the following year. 

      The fact that the interim presidency of Jeanine Añez, who occupied the office between Morales and Arce, largely coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic makes it incredibly difficult to properly assess its performance, given the massive economic upheaval experienced throughout the region. While the interim government ordered an audit of the previous administration early on, it was soon forced to focus on implementing a range of measures designed to address the closure of businesses and an increase in unemployment.  

      In October, the interim government reported that the economic damage caused by the pandemic totaled around $5 billion, with an economic contraction of at least 4% expected by the end of 2020. While this unprecedented situation might make an assessment of the interim government difficult, it at least provides some important context for Arce’s approach to business and investment, which will be framed by the need to address the deep economic wounds caused by the pandemic.

      Arce’s Approach to Business

      As a candidate, Arce highlighted the efficacy of the economic policies pursued during the Morales administration and his intention to continue them. While this has been met with concern among some commentators, the more FDI-friendly latter years under Morales should give some cause for hope for investment in the country. Arce has proposed a drive for industrialization to replace importing foreign products in order to stimulate the internal market and generate more opportunities for locally-based companies. He has also said that he wants to encourage new company formation in Bolivia in order to stimulate employment.

      Yet Arce has also said that some form of austerity to deal with the country’s economic woes will be needed, even as he has pledged not to reduce public expenditure. In a sign of his pro-FDI approach, he has also highlighted his desire to tap into Bolivia’s massive and unexploited lithium reserves, at a time when demand for the mineral is skyrocketing in the face of the shift toward electric vehicles. Arce has stated that exploitation of those reserves will demand the help of a “strategic partner” and could pour an additional $2 billion into state coffers over the course of his five-year term.

      With the economic uncertainty that continues to swirl due to the ongoing pandemic, it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions about what to expect from the Arce administration, given that it is impossible to know what challenges and obstacles may present themselves in the coming months or years. Nevertheless, his early moves have pointed to a clear desire to stimulate business, with measures taken to provide for deferred credit, refinancing and rescheduling of debts, as well as forbidding additional interest being added to such credit by banks. 

      What is abundantly clear is that Luis Arce understands how critical FDI is to Bolivia’s future development, and that understanding will surely only have deepened in the context of the economic turmoil that has traversed the globe. With Bolivia boasting a host of investment opportunities and unsaturated markets, and with the new president already highlighting his desire to bring foreign investment into Bolivia’s massive untapped lithium reserves, it seems reasonable to expect that his administration will pursue a significant deepening of FDI even while he maintains the high levels of social spending seen under Evo Morales.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 125 Shares199 Views

      in World Politics

      Will Bolsonaro Leave Trumpism Behind to Embrace a Biden-led US?

      by

      Joe Biden’s victory in the US election is distressing news for Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s right-wing populist president who admires Donald Trump. Five days after the American media called the race in Biden’s favor, Bolsonaro was yet to congratulate the Democrat. Since Brazil became a democracy under the Sixth Republic in 1985, almost every Brazilian president has formally congratulated the American president-elect within 24 hours of the election. The exception was the 2000 US presidential race because of the Florida recount.

      The 2020 election is another exception. Oddly, Bolsonaro has kept a low profile on the topic. On November 4, he expressed support for Trump: “I think everyone has a preference, and I will not argue with anyone. You know my position, it’s clear, and that’s not interference. I have a good policy with Trump, I hope he will be re-elected. I hope.” Officials said that Brasilia was awaiting the US Supreme Court’s decision on the final vote tally before congratulating anyone — which Bolsonaro finally did yesterday, following Biden’s Electoral College win.

      The Biden-Bolsonaro equation matters because the United States and Brazil have had strong links for nearly two centuries. The US was the first country to recognize Brazil’s independence in 1822. During the period of the First Republic, from 1889 to 1930, the country’s official name was the Republic of the United States of Brazil. It imported a federal system of governance from the US and tried to associate with its northern counterpart.

      Brazil Rejects Bolsonaro’s Anti-Politics

      READ MORE

      The US-Brazil relationship goes back a long way and is deeper than ideological affinities between the two countries’ presidents. Until China overtook it in 2010, the US was Brazil’s biggest economic partner. A report by the United States Congressional Research Service on US-Brazil trade relations gives insight into American thinking. China’s investments in Latin America and the Caribbean from 2005 to 2019 amounted to $130 billion, with Brazil accounting for $60 billion and Peru for $27 billion. It is no surprise that the report states that there are “strategic and economic reasons for strengthening trade ties” with Brazil.

      In 2016, bilateral trade between Brazil and the US hit a low of $23.2 billion in exports and $23.8 billion in imports. In the first year of Bolsonaro’s presidency, exports reached $29.7 billion, a new high since 2008, and imports rose to $30.1 billion, the highest figure since 2014. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic, falling oil prices and restrictions on trade have led to a negative performance. Amcham Brasil, published by the American Chamber of Commerce, tells us that exports and imports have fallen by 25% this year as compared to 2019. The total trade figure from January to September was $33.4 billion, the lowest in 11 years.

      A Conservative Alliance

      When Biden enters the White House next January, Brazil may suffer a stronger fallout. Bolsonaro aligned very closely with Trump’s highly conservative, anti-globalization agenda. Brazil and the US will have to sort out their personal and strategic differences.

      .custom-post-from {float:right; margin: 0 10px 10px; max-width: 50%; width: 100%; text-align: center; background: #000000; color: #ffffff; padding: 15px 0 30px; }
      .custom-post-from img { max-width: 85% !important; margin: 15px auto; filter: brightness(0) invert(1); }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-h4 { font-size: 18px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-h5 { font-size: 14px; letter-spacing: 1px; line-height: 22px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
      .custom-post-from input[type=”email”] { font-size: 14px; color: #000 !important; width: 240px; margin: auto; height: 30px; box-shadow:none; border: none; padding: 0 10px; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-pen-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: center right 14px; background-size:14px;}
      .custom-post-from input[type=”submit”] { font-weight: normal; margin: 15px auto; height: 30px; box-shadow: none; border: none; padding: 0 10px 0 35px; background-color: #1878f3; color: #ffffff; border-radius: 4px; display: inline-block; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-email-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: 14px center; background-size: 14px; }

      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox { width: 90%; margin: auto; position: relative; display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label { text-align: left; display: block; padding-left: 32px; margin-bottom: 0; cursor: pointer; font-size: 11px; line-height: 18px;
      -webkit-user-select: none;
      -moz-user-select: none;
      -ms-user-select: none;
      user-select: none;
      order: 1;
      color: #ffffff;
      font-weight: normal;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label a { color: #ffffff; text-decoration: underline; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input { position: absolute; opacity: 0; cursor: pointer; height: 100%; width: 24%; left: 0;
      right: 0; margin: 0; z-index: 3; order: 2;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:before { content: “f0c8”; font-family: Font Awesome 5 Free; color: #eee; font-size: 24px; position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0; line-height: 28px; color: #ffffff; width: 20px; height: 20px; margin-top: 5px; z-index: 2; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:before { content: “f14a”; font-weight: 600; color: #2196F3; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:after { content: “”; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:after { position: absolute; left: 2px; width: 18px; height: 18px; margin-top: 10px; background: #ffffff; top: 10px; margin: auto; z-index: 1; }
      .custom-post-from .error{ display: block; color: #ff6461; order: 3 !important;}

      According to Cristina Pecequilo, author and professor of international relations at the Federal University of São Paulo, the personal bond between Bolsonaro and Trump will be difficult to let go of. Bolsonaro and his minister of international affairs, Ernesto Araujo, have aligned themselves with and have often emulated Trump. They repudiated multilateralism, undermined state actors and attacked intergovernmental organizations. Bolsonaro was critical of the World Health Organization and the United Nations in his speech at the UN General Assembly this year. He was appealing more to his anti-globalization voters back home than his audience at the UN.

      “There is this idea that Brazil and the US belong to the West and that they should be a unit. However, when we look north, it is clear that they historically understand it as themselves and Western Europe, what we call the ‘new transatlantic.’ Brazil is out of that equation,” Pecequilo told me in an interview.

      Araujo sees the world differently. He is a strong Trump supporter. In 2017, in an article titled “Trump and the West,” Araujo praised the US president, describing him as a crusader against communism, Islam and globalism. Araujo then reposted the text in his blog Metapolítica. In the minister’s view, “The United States was getting into the boat of western decay, surrendering to nihilism, by deidentifying itself, by deculturation, by replacing living history with abstract, absolute, unquestionable values. They were going into that, until Trump.” Last month, he deleted the post.

      Such words are unlikely to have gone down well with the Biden team. Therefore, Pecequilo believes that Araujo will have no option but to resign when all legal challenges to the US election result are exhausted.

      The Question of the Environment

      Apart from ideological differences, environmental and human rights issues will also present major challenges to US-Brazil relations. Joe Biden and Kamala Harris have both openly and repeatedly criticized Bolsonaro’s environmental policies and beliefs. On September 29, Biden even took the issue to the first presidential debate, saying that he “would be right now organizing the hemisphere and the world to provide $20 billion for the Amazon, for Brazil to no longer to burn the Amazon. And if it doesn’t stop, it would face significant economic consequences.”

      The statement generated an angry response from Bolsonaro, who characterized the comment as “regrettable, disastrous and gratuitous.” Ricardo Salles, Brazil’s environment minister, mocked the speech and questioned whether the amount would be an annual or a single transfer.

      Nevertheless, it is necessary to place Biden’s remarks in context, delivered by a candidate reaching out to the more progressive voter. Such rhetoric often comes up in a debate. Biden will behave differently when in the Oval Office. His policy will be more centrist. Gabriel Adam, professor at Brazil’s Superior School of Advertising and Marketing, says: “There will be pressure concerning the Amazon, but there will be no sanctions. Pressure shall come through diplomatic means, but at no time will it harm relations concretely. Brazil has more risks of damaging trade relations with the European Union.”

      Bolsonaro’s handling of the environment is a key element for Brazil’s relations with the European Union. In 2019, the EU and Mercosur, the South American trading bloc formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, announced an agreement to boost trade between the two continents. They agreed to eliminate import tariffs on more than 90% of the products. However, the ratification faces opposition by European civil groups and members of the European Parliament. Both criticize Brazil’s environmental policies. Last October, parliamentarians passed a non-binding resolution calling for changes in Mercosur countries’ environmental agenda to ratify the agreement. This is likely to hurt not only Brazil but also Mercosur’s other members.

      Historically, the US has not been a great advocate for the environment. Recently, this issue has been growing in importance. At the center of the recent discussion is the Green New Deal, the project conceived by Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markley. Nevertheless, not even Biden and Harris seem to agree on a position on the subject. While Harris claims to support the plan, Biden says the Green New Deal is a “crucial framework” for his own platform but shies away from fully embracing the plan.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Biden’s climate plan is aggressive when compared to other American presidents. His first duty is to work domestically and demonstrate that the US is no longer a climate change denier. Internationally, the president-elect intends to “name and shame global climate outlaws” through “a new Global Climate Change Report to hold countries to account for meeting, or failing to meet, their Paris commitments and for other steps that promote or undermine global climate solutions.” Brazil is a candidate to be part of this ignominious group.

      Brazil faces international outrage over deforestation in the Amazon. It must also decide whether to strengthen the country’s environmental targets under the Paris Climate Agreement by the end of the year. This decision could improve or worsen Brazil’s image on the international arena. On November 4 this year, the US formally withdraw from its commitments under the Paris accords, but the Biden administration promises to rejoin on its first day in office. American action may push Brazil in the same direction, even if unwillingly.

      More Pragmatism, Less Ideology

      Like their American counterparts, many Brazilians value the US-Brazil relationship. In an interview with CNN Brazil, the Brazilian ambassador to Washington, Nestor Forster, said that a Biden victory would change in the relationship’s emphasis, not its essence. He stressed that he would seek to increase the Brazilian presence in discussions in the US Congress. 

      Some people in Bolsonaro’s government have shown signs that they understand that changes are about to take place in January 2021. Paulo Guedes, the minister for the economy, said that Biden’s eventual victory would not affect the country’s growth dynamics. An admirer of the Chicago School of minimal state intervention and free competition, Guedes declared that Brazil’s government would “dance with everyone.”

      While Bolsonaro’s silence on the US election and failure to recognize Biden as the president-elect has been widely criticized as hostile, the president, unlike his congressman son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, has not openly speculated about voter fraud. While the time it took the Brazilian president to recognize Biden’s win was damaging, it is unlikely to undermine a historic and extremely important relationship where strong mutual interests remain. Yet there are wrinkles to iron over. The Biden administration will not accept open hostility from Bolsonaro.

      Despite current ideological differences, common sense will prevail on the American side. Good relations with Brazil will help the US contain China in Latin America. Pecequilo believes that “Biden will keep his pragmatism. We will see localized tensions, but, structurally, Biden will not want to lose the advantages that Trump obtained in the Brazilian market.”

      It is Bolsonaro who faces a great dilemma. If Brazil’s ties with the US are further corroded by a blind belief in Trumpism and a lack of pragmatism, the South American giant will emerge as the major loser. As a superpower, it is easier for the US to find other partners and make Brazil a global pariah. Jair Bolsonaro’s choice will have significant consequences for Brazil.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 88 Shares99 Views

      in World Politics

      The Bolsonaro Family’s Downward Spiral of Corruption

      by

      The Bolsonaro family suffered a severe blow in the first week of November. It was not Donald Trump’s loss in the US election, given that the businessman is the benchmark by which Jair Bolsonaro tries to model his presidency in Brazil. On November 3, the public prosecutor of Rio de Janeiro has named the president’s eldest son, Flavio Bolsonaro, as the head of a criminal organization, formally accusing him of embezzlement, money laundering and misappropriation of public funds to the tune of 2.3 million reais ($554.000).

      Jair Bolsonaro’s Image Crisis

      READ MORE

      The accusations against Flavio Bolsonaro pertain to the period between 2007 and 2018, when he served four terms as state deputy. The chronology of the facts and the characters involved expose the shadowy political trajectory of his father’s path to the presidency of Brazil.

      Splitting the Salary

      Jair Bolsonaro has five children. His three eldest sons — 01, 02 and 03, as he refers to them — followed their father into politics. Flavio was born in 1981; Carlos, in 1982, and Eduardo in 1984. At the time, Bolsonaro Sr. was a paratrooper in the army, where he met Fabricio Queiroz, who became a military police officer in 1987, serving in the rank of lieutenant until 2018. Jair Bolsonaro’s military career ended after he threatened to plant bombs in army barracks in retaliation for low wages. He was tried, acquitted and sent to the reserves in 1987, entering public life the following year.

      Upon winning his first term as state deputy in Rio de Janeiro, in 2003, Flavio Bolsonaro hired Mariana Mota, a friend of his mother (to whom Jair Bolsonaro was no longer married) as an adviser. The public prosecutor designated her as the first operator of the so-called rachadinha (salary split), a scheme where employees are “hired” only to return most of their income to the employer. These “salary splits” constitute the main charges against the president’s eldest son.

      .custom-post-from {float:right; margin: 0 10px 10px; max-width: 50%; width: 100%; text-align: center; background: #000000; color: #ffffff; padding: 15px 0 30px; }
      .custom-post-from img { max-width: 85% !important; margin: 15px auto; filter: brightness(0) invert(1); }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-h4 { font-size: 18px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-h5 { font-size: 14px; letter-spacing: 1px; line-height: 22px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
      .custom-post-from input[type=”email”] { font-size: 14px; color: #000 !important; width: 240px; margin: auto; height: 30px; box-shadow:none; border: none; padding: 0 10px; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-pen-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: center right 14px; background-size:14px;}
      .custom-post-from input[type=”submit”] { font-weight: normal; margin: 15px auto; height: 30px; box-shadow: none; border: none; padding: 0 10px 0 35px; background-color: #1878f3; color: #ffffff; border-radius: 4px; display: inline-block; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-email-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: 14px center; background-size: 14px; }

      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox { width: 90%; margin: auto; position: relative; display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label { text-align: left; display: block; padding-left: 32px; margin-bottom: 0; cursor: pointer; font-size: 11px; line-height: 18px;
      -webkit-user-select: none;
      -moz-user-select: none;
      -ms-user-select: none;
      user-select: none;
      order: 1;
      color: #ffffff;
      font-weight: normal;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label a { color: #ffffff; text-decoration: underline; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input { position: absolute; opacity: 0; cursor: pointer; height: 100%; width: 24%; left: 0;
      right: 0; margin: 0; z-index: 3; order: 2;}
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:before { content: “f0c8”; font-family: Font Awesome 5 Free; color: #eee; font-size: 24px; position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0; line-height: 28px; color: #ffffff; width: 20px; height: 20px; margin-top: 5px; z-index: 2; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:before { content: “f14a”; font-weight: 600; color: #2196F3; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:after { content: “”; }
      .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:after { position: absolute; left: 2px; width: 18px; height: 18px; margin-top: 10px; background: #ffffff; top: 10px; margin: auto; z-index: 1; }
      .custom-post-from .error{ display: block; color: #ff6461; order: 3 !important;}

      In 2007, Flavio Bolsonaro began his second term and hired his father’s army friend, Fabricio Queiroz — as well as Queiroz’s wife and daughter. He also hired the wife and mother of the leader of one of Brazil’s largest militias, Office of Crime, Adriano da Nobrega, who ran an extortion racket in ​​Rio. Flavio Bolsonaro had already awarded Nobrega the Tiradentes medal, the highest honor of the legislative assembly of Rio de Janeiro, in 2005, when the former policeman captain was serving jail time for murder. In 2007, Nobrega was released after Jair Bolsonaro, then a federal deputy with the right-wing Progressive Party, appealed to the chamber of deputies in his favor.

      Nobrega was killed in a police ambush earlier this year, when he was on the run after being accused of the murder of Councilwoman Marielle Franco. The case caused widespread national commotion. Nobrega and Fabricio Queiroz were friends. 

      Debt and Real Estate

      The list of suspected criminal activity in connection with Flavio Bolsonaro is lengthy. Mainly, it entails cash payments for real estate and debts, in a country where cash is notoriously linked to illegal activities such as drug trafficking and extortion. In 2008, Flavio Bolsonaro paid 86,779.43 reais (around $40,000 at the time) in cash for the purchase of 12 commercial offices in a high-end shopping mall in Rio, which he resold less than a month later at a healthy profit. The following year, he spent 31,000 reais in cash to pay off his losses on the stock exchange.

      In 2012, 638,000 reais in cash went toward the purchase of two properties in Copacabana, on which Bolosnaro Jr. declared a profit of nearly 300% when they were sold in 2014. In 2016, he acquired a franchise branch of luxury chocolate stores. An investigation by the public prosecutor’s office concluded that the establishment was used for money laundering since it sold products below the list price while filling invoices with integral values.

      Fabricio Queiroz, meanwhile, was investigated until 2018, when the public prosecutor’s office pointed out suspicious movements on his accounts in the order of 5.3 million reais between 2014 and 2015, and a further 1.2 million in 2016 and 2017. A businessman in charge of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign, Paulo Marinho, said that the Bolsonaros were warned of the federal police operation to detain Queiroz on the eve of the election. Queiroz fled, remaining at large until June this year, when he was found and arrested at the country home of Flavio Bolsonaro’s lawyer, Frederick Wassef. 

      Another explosive testimony by Flavio’s former adviser, Luiza Souza Paes, revealed that between 2011 and 2017, she passed on more than 90% of her salary back to Queiroz, providing bank statements as evidence. Between December 2014 and November 2017, she was at her designated workplace at Rio de Janeiro’s assembly just three times.

      The investigation into Flavio Bolsonaro has continued in parallel over the past two years, tracking the suspicious hiring of advisers by the family. In 2018, Flavio was elected senator, Carlos councilman, Eduardo deputy, and Jair Bolsonaro president. An investigation by O Globo revealed last year that since 1991, the Bolsonaros — nicknamed “familicia” in Brazil — had hired 102 people with family ties to work in their four respective offices. In total, 15 of Flavio Bolsonaro’s aides were denounced. If the court accepts the motion against the president’s eldest son, he will become a defendant in a criminal case. Fabricio Queiroz has served a month in jail and currently remains under house arrest.

      Downward Spiral

      With these revelations, the downward spiral of Jair Bolsonaro’s government seems to be increasing. Bolsonaro was elected on the promise of ending corruption in the country, distancing himself from “old politics” that distributed high posts to politicians with a questionable past in exchange for support, as well as ending benefits and privileges for those in public office.

      In the first month of the COVID-19 pandemic, after trying to interfere in the federal police investigation into his children, his main asset in the fight against corruption, Judge Sergio Moro, who was responsible for the arrest of former President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, resigned his post as minister of justice, accusing the president of political interference for personal reasons.

      Bolsonaro sought help from party politicians he said he disliked, who are known for shifting positions and accepting money for support, and recently faced public embarrassment when his deputy in the senate, Chico Rodrigues, was caught by the federal police with 33,000 reais in his underwear, some of which was stashed between his buttocks. In addition to the detention of Fabricio Queiroz, Flavio Bolsonaro faces possible arrest; the public prosecutor has demanded that the senator give up his mandate at the end of the investigation if he is convicted.

      Embed from Getty Images

      All of these events betray Jair Bolsonaro as a politician trying to balance himself in a tightrope of popularity. He was elected on the right-wing wave that has swept many parts of the globe in recent years, spurred on, to a degree, by the election of Donald Trump in the United States. The Bolsonaro family even hired Trump’s controversial campaign strategist, Steve Bannon. Adopting strategies seen in the 2016 US election, Bolsonaro’s campaign employed bots to influence social media narratives at an opportune time when Brazil’s leftist government opened the black box of corruption, which started by exploding the then-ruling Workers’ Party from within. Bolsonaro assumed the position of his middle name, Messias — the savior — who would rid the country of corruption, with guns if necessary; his campaign gimmick was to make a weapon gesture with both hands.

      Tightrope of Popularity

      Bolsonaro took office with a 50% approval rating. When the first signs of family corruption began to appear, the index dropped to around 40%. Much of this falling popularity was sustained on creating smoke screens, making fiery speeches against imaginary opponents and trying to divert attention. At the end of 2019, when the rachadinha case made headlines, ratings dropped further, to around 30%. As Bolsonaro fumbled with the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, following Trump in denial of the seriousness of the threat and disdain for preventative measures against the virus, Sergio Moro’s resignation brought the president’s popularity down to the 20% range.

      During this nadir of his government, the national congress demanded emergency aid for the population unable to work and who could not survive without financial assistance. Approximately $100 in monthly allowance was approved and, as a consequence, Bolsonaro realized that he could buy back his popularity since most of those who received it believed they have the president to thank for it.

      Bolsonaro then began to fight for the maintenance of emergency aid, which diverted attention from the problems of corruption in the family. But Brazil is not a rich country, and financial assistance is being reduced gradually; it is now at $50.

      Without the purchase of popularity, with nothing to conceal the tenebrious connections that marked his entire political trajectory and that of his children, and without his idol in power — Bolsonaro even said “I love you” to Trump during the UN General Assembly last year — the clouds appear to be gathering above the heads of the Bolsonaro familicia.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 75 Shares189 Views

      in World Politics

      Will Chile Listen to Its People?

      by

      The country with the highest per capita infection rate of COVID-19 is in South America — but it isn’t Brazil. Chile, despite its high incomes and access to resources, has struggled to keep the pandemic under control and suffers from infection rates higher than the United States, which currently leads with the highest number of total coronavirus cases in the world. What the pandemic has done is highlight one of Chile’s biggest problems — income inequality.      

      Mortality rates in Santiago’s public hospitals are twice that of the nation’s private hospitals. However, those with fewer resources in Chile have been marginalized from the elites in the nation’s capital long before the virus. A highly privatized economy has allowed many to fall through the cracks, bringing millions of Chileans to the streets in protest in 2019. To close this gap, economic, social and educational reforms are required.

      What Is Driving the Protests in Latin America?

      READ MORE

      The Chilean government is aware of the discontent among its citizens. In 2006, 800,000 students took to the streets, with subsequent protests in 2008 and 2011 in response to the rising costs of higher education. Then, in October last year, a 4% subway fare increase sparked nationwide protests that brought over a million Chileans to the streets of Santiago, the largest protest in the country’s history. The 2019 protests have resulted in at least 30 deaths and 11,000 injured. Human rights organizations have reported incidents of torture, sexual abuse and assault by Chilean security forces.

      Most Unequal

      The government of President Sebastian Pinera has responded with various reforms, such as a middle-class stimulus package, early access to pensions as well as a promise of a vote on a new constitution. Chile’s current constitution was written in 1980, during the 17-year military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, furthering the need for a new democratic framework. The Chilean government must make good on its promises if it is to shake its place as the most unequal among the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.

      The virus has disproportionately affected Chile’s poorest citizens, who often live in densely populated areas and do not have the luxury of working from home. Speaking to The Guardian, a university professor commented, “What are people in poor rural communities supposed to do with online yoga and cooking classes?” Chile must reach into its savings and provide immediate relief for those who are struggling. A stimulus package that benefits low-income populations should be implemented immediately.

      In the long term, Chile must reverse its stance on fiscal prudence. Savings can help mitigate recession, but Chile’s conservative fiscal management is its Achilles’ heel. Chile offers very few social services, ranking second only to Mexico in social spending among OECD countries. Even water is a private commodity. However, Chile has taken actions that indicate less austere policies may be coming. The lower house of parliament voted to allow Chileans to dip into their private pensions to provide immediate COVID-19 relief. President Pinera announced a 1$.5-billion middle-class stimulus as well. This is a positive step, but more funds must be directed to the country’s poorest citizens.

      “One Bread per Person”

      Looking to the long term, educational reform must be prioritized. Public schools in Chile are underfunded, while private education is often unaffordable. Average annual college tuition in Chile is $7,600 — approximately half of the median income and among the highest in the world; only American private universities and British universities have higher tuition rates adjusted for income.

      There have been efforts to reduce public university costs, such as when the gratuidad system was introduced in 2016. While the program mitigated university costs for low-income students, it has reduced funding for public universities. For public universities to be competitive with their private counterparts, funding is critical. Not only is an improved education system perhaps the most important factor in reducing inequality, but it is something that Chileans have been asking of their government for over 15 years.

      Feeling pressure from its citizens, Chile has pushed forward an agreement to vote on a new constitution in October. Polling showed last year that three-quarters of Chileans supported the protesters, with 87% backing the demand for constitutional reform. Camila Meza, a 28-year-old publicist living in Santiago, agrees with the need for a new constitution: “The need for a new constitution is paramount. One that allows for a more efficient response to issues of citizen interest, such as education and guaranteed health care.”

      A government directly addressing public needs amidst protest is not a given. But there should be optimism for a better, more stable Chile. It is important for the country to push forward with the drafting of a new constitution. Otherwise, the capacity for further violence and unrest will remain. The late Chilean poet Nicanor Parra said it best: “There are two pieces of bread. You eat two. I eat none. Average consumption: one bread per person.” 

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More