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    12 Years After Mumbai, the Fight Against Terrorism Continues

    The 12th anniversary of the November 26, 2008, Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks in Mumbai is an apt occasion to evaluate not only India’s struggle against terrorism but also how other major countries have dealt with this menace.

    Nine gunmen traveled from Karachi to Mumbai by boat to unleash mayhem over the course of three days. They attacked multiple locations, killing 164 people and wounding more than 300. Iconic locations such as the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel next to the Gateway of India, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (earlier known as Victoria Terminus) and the Leopold Cafe were hit. The attacks paralyzed the city, triggered mass panic and caused the collapse of India’s booming stock market.

    Cat-and-Mouse Game

    India absorbed the monstrous nature of the Mumbai attacks and resumed direct political dialogue with Pakistan in July 2009. India even agreed to make a major political concession: It delinked the dialogue from the issue of terrorism in the hope that the two countries could have a free, frank and uninterrupted conversation. Pakistan treated this as a political victory at India’s expense. Instead of initiating a process of normalizing ties with India, Pakistan continued with its policy of supporting jihadi groups dedicated to launching terror attacks in neighboring countries.

    India’s policy was based on the assumption that Pakistan would realize the internal cost of nurturing jihadi groups on its soil. Like Frankenstein, terrorists have turned on Pakistan itself. In 2013, an explosion killed at least 45 people in a Shia district of Karachi, and the 2014 Peshawar school massacre led to 150 deaths, of which at least 134 were students. These are just two of the many such incidents that have been taking place in Pakistan over the past decade.

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    Yet Pakistani support for terror as an instrument of state policy has continued. India has thus reverted to its position of putting terrorism at the center of any India-Pakistan dialogue. Pakistan refuses to accept India’s position. Instead, it wants dialogue on Kashmir and uses terror as a tactic to wage war against India for this territory.

    Pakistan-sponsored attacks against India have continued unabated. Most recently, on November 20, four suspected terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammad, a jihadist group headquartered in Pakistan, waged a three-hour-long gun battle with the police on the Jammu-Srinagar national highway. They had entered India to disrupt local elections in Kashmir. Reportedly, they were planning a spectacular attack to commemorate the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

    India-Pakistan relations continue to be in a stalemate on the issue of terrorism. In a cat-and-mouse game, Pakistan promotes terrorist attacks while India prevents them. Since 2019, one thing has changed. After the 2019 Pulwama attack that killed 40 paramilitary personnel, India conducted airstrikes on Pakistani territory. For the first time since the 1971 war, India crossed the line of control, the de facto India-Pakistan border in Jammu and Kashmir. The airstrikes demonstrated that India is no longer deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear capability. If Pakistan instigates a major terrorist attack on Indian soil, New Delhi has shown to be willing to take limited military action in retaliation.

    An Increasingly Extremist Society

    Even as Pakistan continues to promote terrorism across the border, its society has become increasingly extremist. In 2012, the German news agency Deutsche Welle analyzed the rise in extremism in Pakistani society. Many see cultural plurality as un-Islamic. Arabization is on the rise. Numerous jihadist and terrorist organizations operate freely in the country. This trend taking place in a nuclear state is and should be a matter of great international concern.

    Pakistan now exports terror not only to India and Afghanistan, but also to other countries. As per the European Foundation for South Asian Studies, there is an “unholy alliance” between Pakistan’s army and terrorism. Islamic extremists from Pakistan or of Pakistani origin have been involved in many terrorist attacks in other countries. In September, the main suspect for a knife attack outside the former Paris offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo was of Pakistani origin.

    Most recently, street protests have erupted in Pakistan against French President Emmanuel Macron after he claimed that Islam is in crisis following the beheading of schoolteacher Samuel Paty, killed by a Chechen refugee disgruntled over Paty’s discussion of the controversial Charlie Hebdo cartoons during a civic education class. Protesters burned a defaced image of Macron and the French flag outside the French consulate in Karachi. Many sought the expulsion of the French ambassador and demanded that Pakistan break off diplomatic ties with France.

    Pakistan has taken great umbrage at Macron’s actions to curb Islamic extremism. Pakistani leaders object to France’s insistence that Muslim leaders agree to a “charter of republican values,” reject political Islam and foreign interference. Shireen Mazari, Pakistan’s human rights minister, tweeted: “Macron is doing to Muslims what the Nazis did to the Jews — Muslim children will get ID numbers (other children won’t) just as Jews were forced to wear the yellow star on their clothing for identification.” After French protestations, she withdrew her comments, but the damage was done.

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    In October, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global terror financing watchdog, put Pakistan on its grey list for its failure to “effectively crackdown on means of financing terror activities.” The FATF found “strategic deficiencies in [Pakistan’s] regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.”

    To improve its international image, Pakistan has taken some judicial action against the masterminds of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Hafiz Saeed, one of the founders of Lashkar-e-Taiba and the leader of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, two notorious jihadist organizations, has been convicted on charges of terror financing. As Pakistan’s leading English newspaper Dawn observed, the conviction came “as Pakistan tries to avoid punitive blacklisting” by FATF. Given Pakistan’s incestuous relationship with the likes of Saeed, he might get off lightly after an appeal once Pakistan has escaped censure from the FATF.

    The big international concern is that the Pakistani establishment continues to aid and abet terrorism. There has been no fundamental change in either policy or actions. In fact, Islamabad’s ratcheting up of its rhetoric on Macron is alarming because it is accompanied by “rising religious intolerance at home.”

    Nelson’s Eye

    Despite the fact that six Americans were killed in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the US has been relatively soft on Pakistan. For decades, Islamabad was a Cold War ally. The US and Saudi Arabia funded the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet Union through Pakistan. These led to close ties between the American and Pakistani establishments. Of late, these ties have been weakening and Washington has been inching closer to New Delhi.

    In the most recent joint statement, India and the US have called “for concerted action against all terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.” They have also asked “Pakistan to take immediate, sustained and irreversible action to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks, and to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators and planners of all such attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai, Uri, and Pathankot.”

    While this statement might give diplomatic satisfaction to India, it is important to remember that Saeed was able to freely address public rallies in Pakistan despite the US putting a bounty of $10 million on his head. The US could not, or did not, put Pakistan on the mat for failure to act against the Haqqani Network, responsible for inflicting casualties on US soldiers in Afghanistan.

    The US has imposed the most draconian sanctions on Iran and has not spared a powerful nuclear state like Russia. Yet it has hesitated to impose serious sanctions on Pakistan, giving, unconvincingly, its nuclear status as one of the excuses. The limited military and economic sanctions the US has imposed on Pakistan are neutralized by Islamabad’s ever-increasing economic and military links with China. In any case, despite the FATF proceedings against Pakistan, the country has obtained yet another bailout from the International Monetary Fund.

    The US has turned Nelson’s eye on Pakistan’s promotion of terror because it needs the country’s assistance to retreat from Afghanistan. The war on terror has not quite succeeded. Like the UK and the Soviet Union, the US is worn out after nearly two decades on the ground in Afghanistan. It needs to save face and avoid the impression of total defeat. It is willing to negotiate with the Taliban even as the armed group continues to commit horrific acts of terror against innocent Afghans. A report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction showed a 50% increase in attacks over the past three months alone, with the UN estimating that some 6,000 civilians have died in the violence in the first nine months of 2020.

    India’s Unique Vulnerability to Terror

    As the US makes peace with the Taliban, India’s problems with Pakistan-sponsored terror are likely to grow. Even Russia has opened a “channel to the Taliban,” a historic sworn enemy. The Taliban leadership is demonstrating diplomatic savvy by negotiating their way back to power. This leadership might appear relatively urbane, but the Taliban rank and file continue to be fanatics. They now believe they have defeated two superpowers thanks to their faith in Islam.

    Once the Taliban win power, they will impose their obscurantist ideology. This will embolden extremists in Pakistan. Lest we forget, an Indian plane hijacked by terrorists landed in Kandahar in 1999. India released terrorists to bring back hostages. One of the terrorists was Masood Azhar. He went on to start Jaish-e-Muhammad, responsible for the deaths of hundreds over the years. Azhar is to India what Osama bin Laden was to the US. He got his initial training in Afghanistan, and many more like him are likely to receive similar training once the Taliban are firmly back in the saddle.

    While the Taliban might not engage in direct terrorism against the US, India would be fair game. Pakistan would promote Taliban efforts, and China would ignore, if not abet, them. For a decade, China opposed resolutions in the United Nations Security Council to designate Azhar as an international terrorist, leading Michael Kugelman, a noted South Asia analyst, to call him “China’s favorite terrorist.” China has become a loyal ally of Pakistan and lauds Islamabad’s fight against international terrorism even as its junior ally stays deafeningly silent on the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. As India and China clash, an increase in terror attacks on Indian soil would serve Chinese interests. Pakistan and the Taliban are likely to oblige.

    Attacks across Europe and elsewhere demonstrate that India is not alone in facing the scourge of terrorism. As we mark the 12th anniversary of the Mumbai attacks, India’s 1996 proposal for a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism is more relevant than ever. The world needs to increase security, boost peace and safeguard the lives of innocents.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Can the Afghans Work Toward a Lasting Peace Deal?

    Afghanistan is at a critical stage in its decades-long conflict. A combination of factors has led to a deterioration of the country’s security. These include political corruption, dysfunctional institutions, patron-clientelism and social instability. Violence has intensified in recent years, causing numerous causalities of civilians and troops. 

    Can the Taliban and the Afghan Government Make Peace?

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    Washington has been a key supporter of the Afghan political system ever since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001, when NATO invaded Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks in the US. Since then, the US has sought to strike a deal with the Taliban, who have led an insurgency against NATO and Afghan security forces.

    Making Peace

    The US-Taliban peace deal — which the Afghan government is not a party to — was struck on February 29. If successful, it could help bring an end to the longest war in US history. The deal, which was signed in Doha after mediation by the Qataris, was the result of months of talks between Taliban officials and Zalmay Khalilzad, the US special envoy to Afghanistan. The agreement aims to pave the way for the end of US military involvement in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country if the Taliban uphold their side of the deal.

    The accord has been met with opposition due to continued attacks by Taliban militants against Afghan forces and civilians. On March 10, the Taliban and the government in Kabul were due to enter intra-Afghan peace talks for a separate agreement. However, an attack on a hospital maternity ward in May, which caused the death of mothers, midwives and newborns, threw the idea of peace in Afghanistan up in the air. As a result, the government resumed offensive operations against Taliban militants soon after the attacks. Afghan officials have since confirmed that peace talks are set to begin in September.

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    “This is cradle-to-grave terrorism,” says columnist Max Boot in an op-ed for The Washington Post, referring to the attack on the hospital. Nonetheless, US officials, including President Donald Trump, have stressed their desire for Afghans to take charge of their own security rather than relying on US and NATO forces. The US insists on intra-Afghan negotiations and is in a hurry for there to be a political settlement between the government and the Taliban.

    Based on its continued stance, there is no doubt that the Trump administration is committed to the Doha deal and its withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, whatever the circumstances or consequences. This makes it more unclear what the US-Taliban agreement could lead to and, more importantly, how much influence the Taliban would have on Afghan politics and society as a result.

    Ending Decades of Conflict in Afghanistan

    Ever since the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghans have witnessed violence. Many young people are fed up with warlords who have destroyed the country and profited from its misery. Yet there is optimism that a political solution will emerge from the Doha agreement. This could have a lasting and positive impact if certain conditions are addressed.

    In this context, a number of local, regional and global factors are crucially significant to bring an end to the longstanding conflict and ensure a durable political settlement in Afghanistan.

    First, Afghans need to work on a local and national consensus. In a divided and diverse country like Afghanistan, the people must build strong social networks that include all factions and ethnic groups. They must work on a general consensus pertaining to a power-sharing structure.

    That said, the power distribution should be based on citizenship, not ethnic and religious lines. In the long term, stability and development are likely to be ensured if power-sharing is based on Afghan citizenship. Aside from this, the government needs to support such community networks, strengthen key institutions, continue to empower Afghan security forces and clamp down on widespread corruption.

    Second, under the auspices of the United Nations, a shura (council) should be created that consists of all sociopolitical elites, including political, tribal and community leaders, to lead the Afghan peace process. This shura needs to negotiate a ceasefire as a first step. Holding direct talks between rival groups is the second step. This would involve the government, the Taliban and former mujahideen commanders.

    To carry out the talks, the shura needs to form an inclusive and consultative negotiating team from all ethnic and political groups to be able to address the deeper grievances in the country. These issues should be aired by the people and addressed under Afghan legal frameworks and the rule of law.

    The shura needs to help all opposition groups resolve their differences and conflicts through dialogue. For a peace agreement to succeed, the Afghan government, the Taliban, all Afghan leaders, ambassadors of regional states, representatives of major Muslim countries and members of NATO must be a party to the deal. These stakeholders would need to guarantee that they would abide by any conditions in the settlement, and regional states would have to agree to end all meddling in Afghan affairs.

    Third, there is a need for economic and political pressure at a regional level. Considerable pressure should be imposed on influential states like Pakistan and Iran. These two countries are considered to be the root of the problem in Afghanistan and have been accused of harboring and supporting insurgents. Hence, it is necessary that Islamabad and Tehran assure the Afghan government that they will not provide safe havens for terrorists and that anyone doing so will be brought to justice.

    It is also vital that Pakistan and Iran own up to their covert interventions in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Both of these nations should be transparent about such operations with the Afghan government and external stakeholders. Furthermore, regional states must recognize the political independence, territorial integrity and the rights of Afghan people to self-determination in their choice of political system.

    The assurances and regional consensus also need to be based on a commitment by the Afghans. In other words, in order to ensure an end to meddling in Afghan affairs, the government in Kabul must remain impartial when it comes to the political situation of other regional states.

    In addition, Kabul needs to assure regional states — Iran and Pakistan, particular — that their legitimate interests in Afghanistan will not be harmed. The Afghans must pledge to be active partners in trade, transit and energy resources. This would be a gamechanger for the region. There would be a shift away from the destructive intervention of neighboring states toward regional connectivity and an economy-focused approach that would benefit all nearby nations.

    Fourth, once a peace deal is reached, the international community could transform a treaty into a sustainable settlement through political and economic assistance. With this in mind, once a peace agreement is ratified, Kabul should engage with the US, the European Union, the World Bank and other international partners to design and implement nuanced development programs that could lead Afghanistan toward greater physical and economic stability. This would create job opportunities for all civilians and even militants, who would, presumably, put down their guns.

    In the first phase after a peace deal is enforced, a clear future plan needs to be implemented so members of opposition groups can be appointed in official positions. In this regard, the rights and obligations of the political forces of militant groups would be on the same footing as other Afghan citizens in a democratic and fair manner. The aim would be to reintegrate opposition groups and to encourage dialogue to prevent future conflict. Furthermore, the international community, alongside the shura, should persuade all parties — including the Taliban’s political wing — to participate in free and fair elections.

    If Peace Isn’t Possible?

    These measures would strengthen and consolidate the peace process to ensure that weapons are put down and stay down. A failure to address these conditions could lead to an intensified proxy war. As a result, non-state actors like the Taliban would step up with their insurgency, leading to an escalation of violence. This would not only bury any possible political settlement, but it would also derail global security.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Can the Taliban and the Afghan Government Make Peace?

    Having harbored al-Qaeda militants, the Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 was toppled by the US following the 9/11 attacks in the US. In 2003, the Taliban reorganized and began their insurgency against the Afghan government and NATO forces. Since then, despite national and international efforts to negotiate a peace settlement, the insurgency has continued. As a result, Afghanistan has faced years of instability and violence.

    In late 2018, Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed by Washington as the US special envoy to Afghanistan in a bid to strike a deal with the Taliban, which was signed on February 29, 2020, in Qatar. Under this agreement, peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban should have started at the beginning of March.

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    Yet after months of political wrangling, the negotiations will begin in September, according to Afghan officials. The US-Taliban deal states that prisoners on both sides should be released before the intra-Afghan peace talks commence, including 5,000 for the Taliban and 1,000 for the Afghan government. This has proved to be a contentious issue.

    The Afghan peace talks are to start soon, but one thing is clear: The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan cannot be easily reconciled with the government’s Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Hence, with a number of sticking points, including a permanent ceasefire or a significant reduction in violence, peace talks will be extremely strenuous.

    Both sides have been at a stalemate. The main reasons for this are conflicting positions between the Taliban and the government. The Afghan government has taken an intransigent view regarding the republic system. It has called it a “red line” that cannot be negotiated, though it has made some concessions since the US-Taliban peace talks began. The Taliban have always focused on reinstating an Islamic emirate, often vaguely calling it an “Islamic system” that should be harmonious with Afghan cultural values.

    In particular, there are three main areas of contention for both parties.

    The Constitution

    First, the negotiations could focus on either the revocation or amendment of the Afghan Constitution, which conflicts with the Taliban’s goal of an Islamic emirate. While the current constitution guarantees equal rights for all Afghan males and females, the Taliban sternly deny gender equality as well as other basic human rights.

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    This is why, in their Moscow statement of February 2019, the Taliban called Afghanistan’s current constitutional law un-Islamic, urging for a new constitution based on “Islamic tenets.” The existing constitution of Afghanistan is believed to be one of the most liberal Islamic constitutions in the region, and the Taliban want to Islamize it based on their extreme interpretation of Islam.

    By Islamization, the Taliban would likely centralize power in the hands of one man — the group’s leader — who would have ultimate control as the head of state. He would handpick members of an Islamic council that would serve as the legislative body. The constitution of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which was drafted in three days in 1998 by 500 clerics, is a case in point of what governance by the Taliban looks like.

    Elections

    Second, according to Article 61 of the current constitution, the president can only be elected by the people. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, a staunch supporter of the existing political system, has repeatedly said that the government will decisively defend the constitution based on the “republic system.”

    In this system, the head of state and other elected bodies are elected directly by the people. Article 4 of the constitution explicitly says that national “sovereignty in Afghanistan shall belong to the nation, manifested directly and through its elected representatives.” Afghanistan has held elections as a feature of democracy since the fall of the Taliban, including four presidential and three parliamentary elections. 

    In contrast, in the Taliban system based on sharia law, legitimacy comes from the decision of an exclusive, small group of religious elites. That is why the Taliban have continuously opposed elections in Afghanistan. Taliban militants have repeatedly carried out attacks around election time, including in 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019. The aims of such assaults were to disrupt the elections, undermine the government and, ultimately, to taint the legitimacy of the outcome of these votes.

    More importantly, democratic decision-making is an alien concept to the Taliban as a movement. For instance, the founder of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omar, declared himself as the leader in 1994. Similarly, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor and Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the successors to Omar, were both appointed by members of the supreme council.

    Many Taliban members have also expressly rejected elections as a means of choosing a government. In 2018, a senior member of Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s leadership council, flatly rejected elections. Referring to the shura, he said that the leadership of a government should be selected by a supreme council because “elections are not according” to sharia law. Likewise, Jalaluddin Shinwari, the former deputy minister of justice under the Taliban regime of the 1990s, said in 2019 that the “Taliban will not accept elections.” The group has asked the US to return power to them and to accept the Taliban’s emirate.

    However, aside from the theological argument of opposing elections, the Taliban’s biggest fear in this process stems from the uncertain outcome of allowing the people to choose. The Taliban’s odds of winning and eventually returning to power are extremely slim. Therefore, the group is likely to make every effort in the Afghan peace talks to win power as long as they do not involve elections.

    Human Rights

    Third, human rights are of the utmost importance when examining the Taliban. Respect and the protection of individual rights supported by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are fundamental elements of a democratic system. Article 7 of the current Afghan Constitution assures respect for human rights. Likewise, Article 22 guarantees equal rights for all Afghans before the law, irrespective of their gender, ethnicity or religion.

    Conversely, the Taliban are strongly opposed to respecting such universally accepted values and rights. They have never shown flexibility to accept a democratic and republican state, which values human rights. Rather, the Taliban have steadfastly reiterated their intent to reinstall an Islamic emirate that will respect human rights under their model of an “Islamic framework.” As per the Taliban‘s ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam, this would be incompatible with a democratic state’s human rights values.  

    To cite just a few examples, the Taliban have been notorious for their hostility and discriminatory policies toward ethnic and religious minorities and women. When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, they committed massacres against Hazaras in Mazari Sharif and Bamyan, slaughtering hundreds of civilians, including women and children. This attitude remains unchanged. 

    Similarly, under Taliban rule, Sikh minorities in Afghanistan were required to hang a yellow cloth on their rooftops and, in particular, Sikh women had to wear yellow cloths in public to identify themselves. Likewise, when they captured Kabul in 1996, the Taliban forbade girls and women from attending school and going to work, except in rare cases as medical staff with strict conditions. 

    Finally, the Taliban’s Dastur (draft constitution) stipulates that the amir al-mumineen, an Arabic term that means commander of the faithful, “must be a male Muslim follower of the Hanafi Islamic jurisprudence” — referring to a Sunni Muslim school of thought. The Taliban originally reserved this title for Mullah Omar.

    Though the matter of Dastur seems to be missing from the current discourse of the movement, the patriarchal nature of the Taliban still holds true, not only for the head of the state but also for other key positions. By only allowing a man to hold the role of head of state, the Taliban’s system of governance discriminates against women and members of other faiths — including Muslims of different Islamic sects — both of which are conflict with basic principles of human rights.  

    Despite claims by the Taliban and speculation by some researchers, the group’s general values have not changed. For example, in Taliban-controlled areas of today, women who wish to work or get an education are forced to do so under stringent conditions. In reality, this deprives women of the right to education and work as they are likely to be reluctant to attend a school or get a job.  

    Will the Afghan Peace Talks Work?

    The evidence so far suggests that both the Taliban and the Afghan government have shown some flexibility in agreeing to talks. Yet the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remain incompatible. Both forms of governance negate each other. Unless the two sides accept considerable concessions in their positions, the possibility of reconciliation appears slim. This is particularly applicable to the Taliban.

    If the Taliban wish to smoothly reintegrate into society, they will have to adapt their policy about the governance system to a society that is very different from what they saw in the late 1990s. If they do not give in to the will of the new Afghan society of today, the group will face the resistance of Afghans who have sacrificed a lot over the last 19 years. Moreover, the chance of overthrowing the Western-backed Afghan government — if that is still the Taliban’s goal — seems far less than possible. 

    As a nation marred by violent conflict for decades, Afghanistan is highly dependent on international aid and assistance. Therefore, as the intra-Afghan talks begin, the Taliban have no option but to change their restrictive position with regard to holding free and fair elections and upholding human rights and other critical issues protected by the current constitution.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Will the US-Taliban Deal Bring Peace to Afghanistan?

    After a week-long reduction in violence to test the Taliban’s ability to control their fighters on the ground in Afghanistan, the US and the Taliban signed their long-awaited peace agreement on February 29 in Qatar’s capital, Doha. The deal, officially titled the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, was signed by the US envoy, Zalmay […] More

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    Is Afghanistan Ready to Negotiate With the Taliban?

    After more than a year of negotiations between US and Taliban representatives in Qatar, talks have now reached a critical point. The two sides are reportedly close to signing an agreement that will pave the way for intra-Afghan dialogue and the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. However, it is not yet clear who will […] More