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    Does Italy’s Center-Right Coalition Have a Political Future?

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    According to polling from July, the Italian far right — or the destra sovranista (sovereign right), as it prefers to be labeled — would account for at least 40% of electoral preferences. The broader center-right coalition would attract around 48%, with Matteo Salvini’s League taking 20,5%, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI) 20,1 % and Forza Italia 7,6%.

    A scenario where two far-right parties with similar levels of popular support, many overlapping features and comparable political programs are contending to win most votes represents a unique case in Europe and, perhaps, at the global level. In addition, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the League supports the current government led by Prime Minister Mario Draghi while the Brothers of Italy is the only opposition party. In light of the center-right coalition’s leadership contest and the general election that is scheduled to take place in early 2023, which factors may ultimately give either party the upper hand?

    The Italian Far Right’s Long-Term Investment

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    When it comes to the neck-and-neck race for the center-right leadership between Meloni and Salvini, four factors will influence the dynamics of the competition. Former prime minister and founder of Forza Italia Silvio Berlusconi has recently floated the idea of a “partito unico,” a single party that would unite all the members of the center-right coalition. However, the proposal has left Giorgia Meloni indifferent, while Matteo Salvini seems more cautious, leaving a door open for the possibility of a “federation” of the Italian center right.

    The possibility of a federation between the League and Forza Italia could help Salvini retain the de facto leadership of the coalition and eventually contest the premiership from its platform. The Brothers of Italy may also benefit from an exodus of frustrated politicians and MPs from Forza Italia willing to join Meloni’s party.

    A second element that could heavily influence the leadership race and the 2023 election is the possible dissolution of the Five Star Movement (M5S). M5S is currently undergoing a deep leadership crisis as a result of disagreements between the movement’s founder Beppe Grillo and former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. It is plausible that in case of splintering of the Five Star Movement and the creation of Conte’s own party, at least a part of M5S supports may opt to move to factions belonging to the center-right coalition.

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    Another important factor comes in the guise of CasaPound, one of the Italian extreme right’s most active movements. The group did not miss the chance to portray the much discussed taking the knee by the Italian team at the recent European Football Championships as a disgrace, vandalizing street art murals inviting Italian players to join the Black Lives Matter movement into a fascist “Resta in piedi Italia!” — “Stay up, Italy!” — with the image of an Italian football player from the 1930s doing in the Roman salute.

    In fact, the League and the Brothers of Italy, which are both mainstream parties supported by millions of Italian citizens, attract a complex galaxy of political and social movements belonging to the extreme right and espousing clear neo-fascist ideology. These actors aren’t represented in the Italian parliament and mostly function in the dark, Forza Nuova and CasaPound among them. The “sovereign right,” while undoubtedly interested in the more moderate votes, is at the same time trying to affirm its strong sympathies for extreme-right movements in order to keep, or eventually gain, the votes of members of these fascist and neo-fascist organizations.

    Lastly, a key factor will be the success of the national recovery strategy. In fact, with the decision to support Draghi’s executive last February, Salvini has undoubtedly opted to tie the League’s electoral support to the success of Italy’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR). The PNRR is set at €222 billion ($263 billion) and is based mostly on the NextGenerationEU (a joint recovery plan worth €750 billion) with the addition of an extra budget deficit — €30 billion from a budgetary fiscal deviation defined by Draghi as “good debt.”

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    On the contrary, the Brothers of Italy, by refusing to support the current government, is betting against the success of the PNRR and on the inability of the Draghi cabinet to efficiently handle both the continuing COVID-19 crisis and post-pandemic recovery. If the PNRR fails, FdI will inevitably deploy its arsenal of political rhetoric and narratives against the Draghi executive and the parties supporting it, including the League.  

    The competition for what used to be a moderate center-right coalition under Silvio Berlusconi’s leadership but now increasingly resembles a fully-fledged radical-right faction will have a crucial impact on Italian politics tout court for years to come. The League and the Brothers of Italy will undoubtedly keep moving on the same far-right platform and within the same coalition, aware that breaking it up will not be a smart decision.

    Within those boundaries, however, strong competition is already taking place. On one side is the chameleon-like opportunism of Matteo Salvini, with his League party strongly rooted in the north and the northeast of Italy. On the other, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers is collecting dividends from the years in opposition and the refusal of any political compromise.  

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The Italian Far Right’s Long-Term Investment

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      When the government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte was unable to find eleven lawmakers willing to join its ranks in the house of representatives in order to keep his ruling majority, President Sergio Mattarella decided to offer the former president of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, the possibility to try to form a new governo tecnico. Italy’s last technical government was led by Mario Monti between 2011 and 2012. A third Conte cabinet did not materialize because of the opposition by Matteo Renzi, the leader of Italia Viva, a party currently polling at 2%.

      The Italian Job: Can Mario Draghi Master It?

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      All political parties in the Italian parliament supported Draghi’s appointment except one: Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy). Even the Euroskeptic and anti-immigration populist-radical Lega (League) agreed to support Draghi, with its leader Matteo Salvini affirming, “I rather prefer to play the game and manage 209 billions of euros than not,” referring to the Italian share of the Next Generation EU plan agreed in July last year.

      Next Generation EU

      Next Generation EU, a €750-billion ($904-billlion) stimulus package designed to boost post-pandemic recovery, will be the largest ever financed by the European Union. Taken together with the EU’s long-term budget, overall recovery funding stands at a total of €1.8 trillion, aimed at rebuilding, “a greener, more digital and more resilient Europe.”

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      The complex intergovernmental dynamics that have led to the agreement behind Next Generation EU are well known. What began with the initial opposition by the so-called “Frugal Four”  — Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden — to the French-German initiative in May 2020 ended in an impasse provoked in late November by Hungary and Poland’s veto of the EU budget. Warsaw and Budapest were concerned about the Rule of Law Mechanism attached to the stimulus that would make it easier for Brussels to sanction violations of democratic principles by withdrawing aid.

      Of the €750 billion, about two-thirds would be non-repayable grants financed by joint borrowing, and one-third will consist in loans. With the aim to help less wealthy countries, Italy and Spain will get the biggest chunk, €209 billion and €140 billion respectively, with France “only” allocated €40 billion. Next Generation EU has been hailed by many as the “new Marshall Plan” that helped lift Europe out of the ruin of the Second World War. However, its practical implementation is revealing to be more complicated than earlier expected.

      For instance, the Spanish government led by Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has already officially declared it will not seek €70 billion in loans, in a move similar to the one announced by Portugal’s Prime Minister Antonio Costa. In Italy, the recent political crisis erupted when Matteo Renzi quit the government over an objection to Conte’s plans for how to spend EU recovery money. In particular, Renzi, once an enfant prodige of Italian and European politics, was critical of the highly technocratic governance that the Conte cabinet was originally seeking to adopt vis-à-vis the stimulus package, including a task force composed of more than 300 experts. Conte, whose popularity has increased over the course of the pandemic, in order to avoid possible vetoes, had previously defended the move by highlighting that it was required by the EU.

      Grand Strategy

      With the Italian government desperately trying to avoid a return to the ballot box during a pandemic, which has already killed nearly 100,000 Italians so far, and an executive struggling to produce a consistent dossier on how to allocate the money from the EU recovery plan, the move by Giorgia Meloni to not lend support to the new government might appear pointless. In fact, Meloni was the only Italian political leader who called for new elections. According to polls, an election now would give to the Italian populist radical-right parties a landslide victory, with Salvini’s League and Meloni’s Brothers of Italy potentially garnering 40% of the votes.

      However, the Brothers of Italy, which in the last year has moved from 10,7% to the current 17%-18%, could vastly benefit from this “isolating abstention.” By simply waiting for the end of the honeymoon between Draghi’s technocratic executive and Italian political parties, the Brothers of Italy could easily build narratives based around blaming the incapacity of the current executive to efficiently utilize the EU funds; denouncing a technocratic agenda dictated by the European “bureaucrats” in Brussels or by “foreign” policymakers in Berlin and Paris; and by criticizing the opportunistic and inconsistent attitudes of other Italian parties, including the League.

      What is certain is that a highly deteriorated and inflamed post-pandemic landscape could provide a perfect context for the Brothers of Italy to gain support by reverting to social policies that à la Orban or à la Kaczyński, focusing on the pillar of “traditional” family. The Brothers of Italy was formed in late 2012 following the open disagreement with the center-right People of Freedom party launched by Silvio Berlusconi, and since then, Miloni has been clearly outlining social and family policies she wants to adopt in Italy. Those policies are based on the principles of conservativism and nationalism, and on intelligent, soft Euroskepticism in the name of sovereignty.

      The policies are the focus of a grand strategy to increase birth rates and protect the traditional family, with generous incentives for both parents and children alongside investment in social housing. It is important to note here that, differently from the League’s economic policies, based on a syncretic and opportunistic mix of both neoliberal and autarchic worldviews protecting small and medium enterprises, the Brothers of Italy has a clear and organic economic vision. As Mitchell Orenstein, among others, has brilliantly demonstrated in the case of Hungary and Poland, these types of policies can be particularly effective in buying many voters into the nationalist right’s vision of a social state. Could this be the case in post-pandemic Italy?

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Is China the New Champion of Globalization?

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      On January 25, addressing a virtual World Economic Forum, China’s President Xi Jinping not only strongly advocated for a multilateral approach to the COVID-19 pandemic but insisted on the virtues and systemic benefits of free trade and globalization. Jeopardizing those elements may introduce conflict into the international system, Xi warned, clearly referring to, although not mentioning, the United States. This is not the first time Xi has credited himself as the “champion of globalization,” in particular when attending meetings in Davos. In 2017, in the early days of Donald Trump’s presidency, with the long shadow of barriers to trade and isolationist policies just starting to appear on the horizon, China’s president made important remarks encouraging free trade and opening up the markets.

      However, with Trump out and Joe Biden now in the Oval Office, there seems little to suggest any substantial change in US policy, at least in the foreseeable future. If the US isn’t particularly eager to work with China toward free trade and multilateral cooperation, the European Union, and Germany in particular, quickly opted for a completely different approach, signing a key investment deal with Beijing at the end of last year. The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) will grant a greater level of market access for investors than ever before, including new important market openings.

      Forecasting the US-China Relationship

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      Washington did not miss the opportunity to express its concerns about a deal that suddenly and unexpectedly sidelined the United States at a moment when, after four years of relative anarchy and opportunism, restarting transatlantic relations should be a priority. Writing in the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman recently pointed out how little sense it makes to rely on a US security guarantee in Europe while undermining its security policy in the Pacific, considering how much Europe has benefitted from the fact that for the past 70 years, the world’s most powerful nation has been a liberal democracy. Germany, in fact, was able over the last decades to exercise a sui generis role of Zivilmacht (civilian power) by framing its national interest in geoeconomic terms, encouraging German exports worldwide while outsourcing its defense to the reassuring presence of US troops.

      To better understand Xi’s quasi-imperial stance at the World Economic Forum, it has to be placed not only against the backdrop of the recent investment deals with the European Union or with the 15 countries of the Asia-Pacific region, but on the big news that China is on course to overtake the US as the world’s biggest economy by 2028, five years ahead of earlier predictions, mainly due to the asymmetric impact of COVID-19. While it is clear that China has successfully contained the Sars-Cov-2 outbreak and the Chinese economy is now recovering at a higher speed than other countries, it is also true that a lack of transparency and delays in sharing information with the international community about the virus have contributed to an acceleration of the pandemic at a global level.

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      Nonetheless, in the current debate over shaping more efficient emergency policies, China is still emerging as the model to follow and imitate, despite being unpopular. There is little doubt that in the “social imaginary” of liberal societies, as reports from Europe and the US suggest, authoritarian regimes are seen by many as more efficient and better prepared to deal with crises than democracies. Yet we must not forget that this efficiency comes at the inevitable cost of political and civil rights.

      Xi Jinping is well aware that the Biden administration can finally change course for the US and its allies, forging a united and progressive front after years of populist, nativist and authoritarian politics. Perhaps this element can help understand Xi’s assertiveness at the World Economic Forum better than the recent economic successes. After all, political and civil rights are China’s Achilles’ heel. Criticism of the Communist Party, let alone advocating for basic human rights such as freedom of speech or the rule of law, inexorably leads to repression that falls with equal severity on the rich metropolis of Hong Kong and the poor areas of Xinjiang, sweeping up ordinary citizens and billionaires alike, from Joshua Wong to Jack Ma.

      Can China credibly profess the virtues of globalization to achieve harmony and balance in an international system if it doesn’t adhere to international law? Can Beijing speak of cooperation to solve global problems when it has withheld vital information about the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic? As Xi Jinping continues to steer the Middle Kingdom out of its historical isolation, avoiding challenging the United States for the position of world leader will be difficult, given China’s demographics and economic status. Will these two Weltanschauungen, two comprehensively different conceptions of the world, sooner or later present the international community with a choice?

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      How Do You Tell an Authoritarian From a Fascist These Days?

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      Recent developments in global politics, such as Donald Trump’s reelection campaign or the rise of illiberal democracies across Central and Eastern Europe, have arguably led to a misinterpretation of what many refer to as a “return of fascism.” Although authoritarian populism shares numerous similarities with fascism, these two ideologies differ markedly, both in terms of their ideological nature and of their danger, as well as the very real challenges that they pose to liberal democracies in the 21st century.

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      The term “fascism” is a complex ideological label that has found historical prominence in both 20th century Italy and in Nazi Germany between the two world wars. The concept is currently applied broadly in academic literature to identify radical-right political parties, right-wing authoritarian (or military) regimes or even movements sympathetic to fascism. However, the term is more properly used when referring to the ideology that was promoted and implemented by Benito Mussolini in Italy in the interwar period.

      Fascism Versus Authoritarianism

      Historically, fascism derives its roots from nationalism, totalitarianism and the myth of violence. Firstly, through the advent of nationalism, fascism does not only try to achieve ethnic homogeneity of the members of the community but also introduces the concept of national superiority over other peoples and nations.

      Secondly, to comprehend totalitarianism, it is necessary to keep in mind the impact of the Great War and the depersonalization of the individual. For fascism, an individual is a “tool” used to pursue the interests of the state, which coincide directly with the interests of the fascist party. However, fascism is not limited solely to obedience, as has been shown, among others, by Hannah Arendt. It claims legitimacy by obtaining the consent of the masses and, to accomplish this, fascism as an ideology is mobilized and tends to encompass all sectors of society. As the self-styled Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile remarked, “for fascism everything is in the state and nothing is outside the state, in this sense the state is totalitarian.”

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      Finally, the myth of violence is one of the most important tenets of fascism. Enemies are everywhere, and fascism must assert itself through violence (extreme, if necessary). This pattern inevitably undermines any forms of pluralism. For this reason, for fascist ideologues, this eventual clash is inevitable, and, eventually, all the principles of both liberal democracy and representative institutions fall.

      In defining authoritarian populism, we can refer to the “fourth wave” in the radical-right literature as outlined by Cas Mudde. Mudde argues that there are three core patterns that make up this ideology, comprising nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Firstly, nativism refers to the “membership” of the nation, which is determined by ethnic terms. This notion is also related to the exclusionary pattern of radical-right parties that tend to argue that multiculturalism should be considered as a threat to the national heritage and cultural traditions. Consequently, the state should impede access to those immigrants who differ from the majoritarian ethnic group; or, alternatively, immigrants should entirely adopt the national culture and fully assimilate.

      Secondly, authoritarianism refers to what extent a society should be strictly controlled by the state in order to maintain security and order within the borders of the country. This pattern is linked to the strong emphasis on law and order which “is directed not only against external threats (immigrants and asylum seekers) and criminal elements, but also against its critics and political opponents.” Finally, the notion of populism refers to the well-known definition of conflict within current societies, between the people (represented by the radical right) and the elite (mainstream politicians and the political establishment).  

      The Cult of the Leader

      It is clear from the above analysis that fascism and authoritarian populism are different, ideologically speaking. Nonetheless, there are two elements that are significantly comparable in both ideologies. The first is the cult of the leader, or fanatism. The fascist leader isn’t just someone to obey or support, but also serves as an image in which the electorate can feel represented. This image is one that is omnipotent and omniscient. For example, Mussolini was portrayed as a hero in all fields — “a hard worker, an athlete, an airplane pilot” and so on — in order to create a cult of personality.

      A similar cult of personality was also portrayed in Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, via the Führerprinzip — the leader principle. In this regard, US Present Donald Trump also (indirectly) reminds us of this type of leader. Trump often boasts of his “unlimited” knowledge and unprecedented achievement in various fields, from science and defense to economics and race relations.  

      Trump also speaks through his body. For example, after the first presidential debate against former Vice-President Joe Biden, President Trump was diagnosed with COVID-19. Once recovered, he staged a dramatic return to the White House to demonstrate strength in having defeated the virus and being immune from it. A not too dissimilar scene also played out in Brazil, with President Jair Bolsonaro also contracting COVID-19 but dismissing it as nothing more than an ordinary bout of flu.

      In both fascism and authoritarian populist ideologies, the leader is presented as an invincible figure that most of the times is described (most often by the state propaganda machine) as the savior of the homeland from ruin. So, Mussolini should have restored the ancient splendor of the Roman Empire, while Trump was supposed to “Make America Great Again.”

      Creation of the Enemy

      The second analogy is the creation of an enemy. Recalling how fascism was founded on the myth of violence, conflict does not take place only on ethnic or religious, but also on political grounds. Thus, anybody who represents a danger to the stability of the fascist authority in the country should be eliminated (for the good of the nation itself).

      As the Soviet author Vassily Grossman explains in his famous 1970 novel “Everything Flows,” the “scalpel is the great theorist, the philosophical leader of the twentieth century.” With this image, Grossman exemplifies how totalitarianism (including fascism) envisaged a certain political project — founded on purely abstract ideological principles applied in the real world — and everything that is not included in this project must be eliminated and overthrown.

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      Fascism does not foresee discussions or compromises with the other side. In this same regard, even authoritarian populism does not offer dialogue to the opposition, since its raison d’être is to interpret society as a Manichean conflict between “the pure people versus the corrupt elite,” which does not include dialogue between these “two homogeneous and antagonistic groups.”

      For example, during his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump declared several times that he would have Hillary Clinton jailed and later accusing former President Barack Obama of “some terrible things” that “should never be allowed to happen in our country again.” This is an example of how Trump, an authoritarian populist leader, identifies the political counterpart as an enemy, thereby leaving no space for discussion or disagreements. Scholars such as Matthew Feldman, the director of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, have even recently remarked about the fascist ideological nature of President Trump. Recent events in the United States, such as yesterday’s storming of the US Capitol in Washington, DC, by pro-Trump rioters hoping to overturn the election result, give rise to fears about a neo-fascist wave.

      Ideological Differences

      Although fascism and authoritarian populism share two important ideological features, it might be easy to forget that fascism was, on the one hand, a conservative militia with the goal of subduing communist mass strikes of workers and peasants. On the other hand, it was born as a revolutionary movement. Indeed, the main historical goal of fascism was to overthrow the modern state “with its connotations of industrialism, individualism and bourgeois values.”

      Put simply, the project of fascism was to reject liberal democracy, political pluralism and the market economy. Authoritarian populism’s aim is not to overthrow the democratic regime — instead, it is a part of the democratic system. Even though authoritarian populist leaders can achieve political power in government, they are not immune from the overall democratic process, especially when they lose power. President Trump’s loss in the 2020 US election, despite his claims of voter fraud, demonstrates this fact.

      The year 2020 will surely be remembered for the significant impact that COVID-19 has had on globalized societies. During the first wave of the pandemic, national governments called for nationwide solidarity, and many succeeded in achieving it. At the same time, the past year may have ushered in authoritarian populism as the new zeitgeist of the next decade: The long-term impact of COVID-19 may benefit radical-right parties as the second wave of the pandemic wave has caused an even longer period of economic and social deprivations.

      Authoritarian populism may play a legitimatizing role in democratic regimes, and it is important to note that this ideology has become increasingly mainstreamed and normalized. While authoritarian populists should not be defined as fascists if they do not abolish democratic institutions, this normalization process represents the main threat to liberal societies across the globe in the 21st century.

      In contrast to neo-fascist movements, which are significantly opposed to democracy, the leaders of authoritarian populist movements are allowed to participate in the democratic game, to fuel protests politics among citizens and to capitalize on these in order to achieve power. Donald Trump’s insistence that the election was stolen from him to spur his supporters to disrupt the certification of Joe Biden’s victory has left four dead. As the world watched an “insurrection incited by the president” at the heart of the world’s oldest democracy, it is clear that the line between fascism and authoritarian populism is becoming increasingly blurred.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      What the US Election Means for the Liberal World Order

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      In 1992, Francis Fukuyama published his controversial best-seller, “The End of History and the Last Man,” arguing that liberal democracy is the final form of government for all nations. Almost three decades later, G. John Ikenberry, one of the most influential theorists of liberal internationalism today, in “A World Safe for Democracy” suggests that the liberal world order, if reformed and reimagined, remains possibly the best “international space” for democracies to flourish and prosper. After all, reasons Ikenberry, what do its illiberal challengers like China or Russia have to offer?

      Apart from outside challengers, the liberal international order’s project is threatened from the inside as well. In fact, both populist parties and technocracies in a variety of forms and shapes represent a growing threat not only to the rule of law, party politics and parliamentary democracy, but to the international order tout court. Ikenberry considers the COVID-19 pandemic as the moment possibly marking the end of the liberal world order, specifically the spring of 2020, “when the United States and its allies, facing the gravest public health threat and economic catastrophe of the postwar era, could not even agree on a simple communiqué of common cause.”

      360˚ Context: The 2020 US Election Explained

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      However, Ikenberry admits that “the chaos of the coronavirus pandemic engulfing the world these days is only exposing and accelerating what was already happening for years.” As the COVID-19 pandemic risks to mark the end of the world liberal order, will the upcoming US election represent the last call for the existing system or what still remains of it?

      A Brief History of the Liberal World Order

      The liberal world order was forged in the aftermath of the Second World War upon a set of principles governing the international system. Based on the leadership of the United States and exerted through five core institutions — the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and NATO — with all its limits and weaknesses, granted economic development and security to a significant part of the world during the Cold War. Free market societies, supported by strong welfare policies, produced a long-term yet fragile balance between instances of economic competition, social inclusion and cohesion.

      The dynamic worked well until the 1980s, when the foresightedness of preserving such a fragile balance gradually vanished. Liberal premises (equality of opportunities) and liberal promises (a more equal, peaceful and wealthy world) have been subverted by neoliberal politics and economic ideological positions, regressive and anti-progressivist in nature.

      Today, a neoliberal world order has almost replaced the liberal one, bringing with it the opening of the markets through economic privatization, financialization and deregulation that results in national governments unable to shield citizens from social inequality deriving from unregulated globalization. Neoliberal politics and technocracies, often by taking advantage of emergencies and crises, have produced financial bubbles and rising economic inequality. This has taken place in light of an abstract intellectual orthodoxy, often reduced in opening international markets even if detrimental to social order, as argued, among others, by Joseph Stiglitz.

      These days, the majority of the mass media points to radical-right populism and nationalism as the main threat to liberal democracy and its “international space.” In fact, the mainstreaming of the radical right has become an international phenomenon, with radical-right and nationalist parties experiencing growing electoral support among the middle classes globally. Yet Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini, Marine Le Pen & Co are not the only threat: A new balance between state sovereignty and the coordinative action of international institutions is paramount to saving the international liberal order.

      If we want liberal democracies to escape a Scylla and Charybdis’ kind of dilemma, such as having to choose between the trivialization of politics proposed by populists or the gray hyper-complexity of technocratic governance, it is key to point out elements of convergence, different from the status quo and envisioning a general interest — not the sum of particular interests — to change non-cooperative behavior.

      Everything’s Not Lost

      From abandoning the World Health Organization (WHO) in the middle of a global pandemic to the signing of the Abraham Accords and openly flirting with right-wing extremists and white supremacists like the Proud Boys or QAnon adherents, President Donald Trump’s radical and populist rule has given up on multilateralism for a chaotic and opportunistic unilateralism. Trump has galvanized radical and far-right nationalist and populist parties worldwide, while his administration’s lack of interest in multilateral governance, in times of increasingly global nature of the issues policymakers are called to deal with, has implied both the weakening of the international order and the risk of handing it over to authoritarian challengers.

      Paradoxically, some of those challengers, particularly China, have now even recognized that international institutions and organizations such as the WHO, with all their shortcomings, do have a comparative advantage in confronting global trends such as pandemics, climate change or large-scale migration.

      However, on the other side of the Atlantic, old historic allies, in particular Germany, have not given up on the possibility to resume multilateralism with the US, as recently argued, among others, by Max Bergmann on Social Europe and Peter Wittig in Foreign Affairs. While the Trump administration jeopardized decades of liberal international order, transatlantic relations and multilateralism, Germany kept fighting to keep it alive. Germany’s Zivilmacht — civilian power, to use Hanns Maull’s formulation — even if often expressed internationally in geoeconomic terms, with key business partnerships established with China or Russia, has never allowed business interests to undermine its regional and international commitments.

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      Chancellor Angela Merkel has demonstrated leadership in the recent poisoning of Alexei Navalny, Russia’s key opposition figure, or when forced to act unilaterally during the 2015 refugee crisis, providing leadership by example to reluctant EU member states despite being heavily criticized at home, or in the case of the €750-billion ($821-billion) EU recovery fund, produced in close partnership with France. These crises made Angela Merkel the most trusted leader worldwide (and, for the time being, without a political heir), holding that spot since 2017, when Trump succeeded Barack Obama as US president, according to PEW research surveys. This trust was even more confirmed during the COVID-19 pandemic, with Germany’s leadership considered most favorably in relation to the US, France, China, UK and Russia.

      As we await the 2020 US presidential election, we should not forget one lesson: In a globalized world, crises can be unique occasions to rediscover the mistreated virtues of multilateralism and collective decision-making. A victory for Donald Trump next week would translate into a coup de grace for the liberal world order, as countries as Germany will not be able to take on America’s role as global leader, in particular if other European Union member states are neither able nor willing to join their efforts.

      If Joe Biden enters the Oval Office next January, there is a chance for the liberal system to survive, but it would require both bold vision and reforms, as suggested by Ikenberry. However, if globalization keeps increasing financialization and deregulation, only a simulacrum of the liberal world order will remain.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More