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      Beirushima: What Lebanon Needs to Survive

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      It will be a while until we know what or who triggered the explosion destroyed the Beirut port and, with it, half of the Lebanese capital, on August 4. What we know for sure is who the ultimate culprits are, and, unfortunately, none of them are included among those under house arrest or currently being interrogated: the corrupt political mafia that has controlled and exploited the lives of ordinary Lebanese for many years. Each one of those in power, directly or indirectly, has contributed to the blast that not only killed at least 200 people and wounded more than 6,000, but also destroyed Lebanon’s desperately needed economic lifeline, turning the country into a beggar state that must survive on external charity.

      The fact that the petition launched on the eve of President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Beirut calling for Lebanon to return to the French mandate gathered 50,000 signatures in the first 24 hours is representative of the hopelessness that has pervaded this small, but historically proud, creative and industrious nation. The fact that regional and international scavengers have come closer, circling the Lebanese wagon, seeking to complete their meal, is testimony to the dangers that lie ahead as Lebanon must try to protect the last remaining elements of its sovereignty against another assault.

      This assault will further compound the UN Security Council ruling that overruled Lebanon’s parliament in the case of Rafiq Hariri, the former prime minister assassinated in 2005 — a process that has lost both its respect and even its entertainment value.

      Last Line of Defense

      But that is a discussion for another day when the delayed ruling is announced. For now, in the midst of one of the most destructive episodes in the country’s recent history, the Lebanese people find themselves faced with not only the greatest challenge to their survival as a nation but also the loss of what they fought hard to defend in the face of foreign usurpation: their ability to continue as a creative nation of free thinkers and artists and, above all, as partakers of a free political process that is the envy of all those subjugated to dictatorships in the region.

      Just two days apart, 75 years ago, in Hiroshima, Japan, another proud and industrious people were smitten by unprecedented magnitude. While the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and then Nagasaki were a deliberate act of premeditated evil, the jury is still out on Lebanon’s Beirushima. The jury is also still out on whether the Lebanese will follow the footsteps of their predecessors to rebuild their country into a vibrant and transparent economic regional player, but without surrendering the strength that first liberated most of their land and now continues to protect its territorial integrity — the last line of defense for what remains of Lebanon as a nation.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Beyond that imperative, nothing must be held sacred if reform is to be the true way forward. Losing that imperative is what many of the country’s regional enemies will seek to force upon Lebanon, exploiting the opportunities this very dark hour provides them. This will indeed prove to be a challenge that requires strong leadership that must protect Lebanon from foreign intervention.

      As shock turned into more street anger, Lebanon’s fragmented society has forgotten its religious and sectarian divides and united against a common internal enemy: the corrupt political system that has abused its democratic process and misruled Lebanon for far too long. This display of national unity is the silver lining that will hopefully ultimately save Lebanon.

      The entire political system must be overhauled if Lebanon is to survive as a nation. And the onus of leading the way lies with the people and not the leadership. Lebanese politicians have proven themselves to be one of the most corrupt political elite in the region, owning or being involved in everything ranging from garbage collection to power generation to banks that lend money to the government at exorbitant rates. The structure has created a ruling class with everything to lose and nothing to gain from economic reform. These are not the people trustworthy of leading the transformation the country so desperately needs.

      Pulling the Trigger

      On top of everything else, its ailing economy is loaded with more than 1.5 million refugees, the result of Israeli occupation, the Syrian Civil War and many regional conflicts that Lebanon is made to pay the price for. It is, therefore, not surprising that highly explosive ammonia nitrate abandoned at the port of Beirut for six years would be allowed to lie hidden and become a powder keg waiting for something or someone to trigger what Brian Castner, the lead weapons investigator for Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Team, called “the biggest explosion in an urban area in decades” that made 300,000 people homeless.

      In a country where economic indicators have lost their meaning, where law and order are decided by a judicial mafia, where the role of both political business leadership has lost its demarcations and where a foreign president is popularly welcomed where a native is banished, it is clearly a time to fold and start all over again. And only the street, now prompted and indeed strengthened by a massive explosion, can lead the way. Whether the blast that devastated the nation’s capital has also wiped away the corruption that brought Lebanon to its feet, only time will tell. For if it hasn’t, nothing ever will, and the noble, generous and hardworking Lebanese will become a nation that once was.

      This is, of course, assuming it was something, not someone, who pulled the trigger. Should it, in the end, become evident that the explosion was another act of premeditated evil, then all bets are off. Our worst fears will become true, and Lebanon, and the entire region, will go up in flames. Let us hope Donald Trump was once again wrong when he suggested the blast had been an attack, and let us hope that foreign election campaigns have not been the reason Beirut blew up, with the potential to take with it the rest of what’s remaining of our region.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The NY Times and Elon Musk Deal With Bolivia

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      Maria Silvia Trigo and Anatoly Kurmanaev have penned an article for The New York Times that describes the dramatic protests in Bolivia against the interim government. As so often in NYT articles, the content reveals more about the newspaper itself than about the topic it analyzes.

      Treating the current instability in Bolivia with the perspective acquired 10 months after the ouster of Evo Morales, the former president, should have provided a perfect opportunity to review the complex drama surrounding that coup. Instead, the authors chose to describe the dramatic events unfolding today as a simple contest between two opposing groups. The article reports on the roadblocks organized by anti-government protesters that have paralyzed several cities in Bolivia. It cites two motives behind the protests: “to challenge the delay of general elections and rebuke the government’s poor response to the coronavirus pandemic.”

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      The authors have reduced an existential geopolitical drama to little more than a vigorous election campaign between two sides with contrary views of the best way of governing. They do take the trouble to mention, in a single sentence, the crucial spark that set off the crisis: “Mr. Morales, Bolivia’s first Indigenous president, was ousted from power in November after a fraught bid for a fourth term.”

      Here is today’s 3D definition:

      Fraught:

      A convenient adjective to describe a situation characterized by factors that cause anxiety and stress leading to suffering while creating the impression that the reasons for the anxiety are inexplicable, there being no identifiable party responsible for either the stress or the suffering, which also may simply be imaginary

      Contextual Note

      The New York Times has an excellent reason for avoiding to delve into the complex facts behind Morales’ “fraught bid for a fourth term.” The Times itself not only misreported those facts at the time of Morales’ ouster, but the journal actively contributed to justifying a right-wing, anti-indigenous coup led by a fanatically evangelical Christian faction that the US government and its media supported under manifestly false pretenses.

      The authors are skilled in The Times’ art of crafting reporting to get a political message across while hiding their own allegiances from view. In the sentence cited above — “Mr. Morales…. was ousted from power” — the authors deftly use the passive construction to exclude any reference to how the ousting took place, by whom and with what objective. It was just something that happened, possibly on its own. The ouster was successful and now belongs to history. The passive mood removes any consideration of accountability.

      In an earlier article published in June revealing the uncomfortable truth that the pretext for removing Morales was flawed, the authors also demonstrated their talent at carefully designing their wording to remove the question of agency: “Mr. Morales’s downfall paved the way to a staunchly right-wing caretaker government, led by Jeanine Añez, which has not yet fulfilled its mandate to oversee swift new elections.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      Calling it “Mr. Morales’s downfall” implies that, like Humpty Dumpty, the president teetered and fell off the wall. Nobody pushed him. The metaphor “paved the way” implies that the Anez government simply wandered innocently into a situation of Morales’ making and profited from it. Continuing to call it a “caretaker government” denies what most observers had noticed at least since January: that “the right-wing former senator entered the presidential palace claiming a much bigger mandate,” as Angus McNelly put it.

      Finally, adding “yet” to the observation that the Anez government has not “fulfilled its mandate” fails to recognize the increasingly evident fact that it has no intention to keep its promise. The very idea of a “mandate” also obscures the more egregious fact that nobody actually issued a mandate. Back in the thick of events in November 2019, Kurmanaev, quoting Javier Corrales of Amherst College, described the position of the Anez faction: “Without a popular mandate, they are pushing forward some of the most objectionable aspects of their agenda.”

      Then there’s the question of possible US involvement, which The New York Times famously dislikes mentioning whenever left-wing governments fall. In the June article, the authors offered a single hint at the US State Department’s likely involvement in the coup. “The United States State Department quickly reacted to the O.A.S. [Organization of American States] statement, accusing electoral officials of trying to ‘subvert Bolivia’s democracy,’” they wrote.

      This leaves the impression that the US was nothing more than a neutral observer of the events that played out and that its only interest in the affair is safeguarding democracy. The same article highlighted the flawed accusations of electoral fraud that led to Morales’ ouster — accusations put forward by the OAS, which is largely obedient to the US. Clearly, with hindsight, the US was quite content to see Bolivian democracy not only subverted but canceled.

      The article concludes with the now traditional “false balance” or “bothsidesism” characteristic of NYT journalism. Referring to the strategic implications around the current protests and their possible political consequences, the authors quote Filipe Carvalho, a Washington-based analyst. “Both sides are playing the pandemic for electoral gain, adding a new level of tensions,” he said. This leads the journalists to the melancholy conclusion: “Whoever wins will take control of a highly divided country in deep recession and few options to restart economic growth.”

      Historical Note

      Anatoly Kurmanaev’s article on December 5, 2019, began with this sentence: “An independent international audit of Bolivia’s disputed election concluded that former President Evo Morales’s officials resorted to lies, manipulation and forgery to ensure his victory.”

      On June 7 of this year, Kurmanaev and Maria Silvia Trigo provided an update with this explanation: “A close look at Bolivian election data suggests an initial analysis by the O.A.S. that raised questions of vote-rigging — and helped force out a president — was flawed.” Instead of pointing to politically interested deceit, they attributed everything to the fault of undue haste. Quoting Calla Hummel, a Bolivia observer at the University of Miami, they write, “The issue with the O.A.S. report is that they did it very quickly.”

      As The Times reporters consistently skirted around the facts concerning Morales’ ouster, two other reporters, Vijay Prashad and Alejandro Bejarano, writing for Salon, have provided a more complete historical background. They have updated the history with a revealing story about how American interests have been involved in the Bolivian economy well before the dramatic events of 2019.

      The authors call Morales’ ouster “the lithium coup.” In July, Elon Musk stepped up to the public witness box with a tweet that inadvertently provided evidence of the economic and political intrigue underlying Bolivia’s drama. The billionaire entrepreneur began by advising the American people against the evils of too much generosity. “Another government stimulus package is not in the best interests of the people imo,” Musk opined on Twitter. This provoked the following response from a user called Armani: “You know what wasnt in the best interest of people? the U.S. government organizing a coup against Evo Morales in Bolivia so you could obtain the lithium there.”

      Instead of denying any connection with the coup, Musk defiantly tweeted: “We will coup whoever we want. Deal with it.” Apparently realizing that this might be interpreted as a confession of collusion, he later deleted the tweet.

      This battle of tweets could be dismissed as just another example of Musk’s Trump-like irresponsible addiction to Twitter. It doesn’t prove Tesla’s CEO had any hand in or knowledge of the events that led to the coup in Bolivia, though the lithium factor and Musk’s initiatives in South America would seem to point in that direction.

      But Musk’s formulation of his message is revealing. He claims “we” have the right to foment coups. He begins by claiming to speak in the name of the “interests of the [American] people.” But the “we” he identifies with is not the people. It’s US imperial power, a force that for more than a century has intervened against “whoever we want” as it has both successfully and unsuccessfully sought to overthrow any government guilty of showing a preference for the interest of its people to the detriment of American businesses.

      On the day following Musk’s original tweet advising against a stimulus package following the economic downturn in the US, The New York Times’ Maureen Dowd published an interview with him in which she affirmed that “he also really does want to save the world and make products that bring joy.” In the end, that’s how The Times has treated all the coups of the past. The rest of the world simply has to learn to “deal with it.”

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      With the BRI, China Still Has a Long Road Ahead

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      To determine whether China can deliver a better Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), we must first ask whether Beijing is first of all capable of delivering a better BRI? Accusations of practicing debt-trap diplomacy and new forms of colonialism have had some impact on Beijing’s thinking, resulting in its pivot in 2018 to commit to a new, greener BRI, but the foundation of its “grand plan” for implementing the BRI basically remains similar to when it started in 2013.

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      President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CCP) have put some good-looking window dressing on the basic package, but so far, many BRI host country governments would say not all that much has changed since 2018, when Xi announced a pivot. Beijing is very good at saying one thing and doing another, as numerous governments around the world have learned. As a result, BRI host nations will inevitably believe that Beijing has had a real change of heart when they see it.

      Deaf Ear

      Part of Beijing’s problem is that it does not appear to be attuned to what the world is thinking. Perhaps it does not care. Reading Chinese media reports on the subject leaves one with the impression that the world is in unison and harmony with Beijing, its vision for the world and its performance thus far with the BRI. For example, according to  the CCP’s primary media outlet, the China Daily, a 2018 survey of 8,500 people in 17 BRI countries determined that “more than 70% agreed with the concepts of the “Chinese Dream,” the Belt and Road and “a community with a shared future for mankind.” But even this Chinese government-sponsored survey admitted that 64% of respondents believed that the BRI will confront many difficulties and challenges in the future.

      That concern was echoed by a 2019 survey by Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, which polled more than 1,000 respondents in the government sector, the business community, civil society, academia and the media from across all 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It found that fewer than 10% of respondents viewed China as “a benign and benevolent power,” 64% had little or no confidence that Beijing’s revised approach to the BRI will result in a fairer deal for their respective countries, and nearly 50% responded that they believed that Beijing possessed an intent to turn Southeast Asia into its own sphere of influence. That does not sound like a particularly inspiring foundation from which to try to turn things around.

      Beijing knows it has a long road ahead. To its credit, it has issued regulations intended to better monitor the conduct of state-owned enterprises and private Chinese businesses, mandating that they should pay more attention to environmental, social, integrity, financial and other risk factors. If a particular host nation’s laws are weak, these entities have been advised to ensure compliance with Chinese law, international treaties and conventions, and industry best practices. Reporting requirements, capital controls, and the regulation of overseas finance and investment have been tightened, which has contributed to the notable decline in new Chinese overseas loans and investments since 2017.

      Outside the Norm

      That said, Beijing has generally been reluctant to apply its laws to the activities of its entities overseas. In fact, State Council guidance requiring extensive disclosure of contracts for major construction projects expressly exempts overseas investment and foreign aid projects. Laws criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials have never been enforced. Although Chinese courts have heard cases related specifically to the BRI, unless a project contract contains explicit obligations for which performance is sought, enforcement of Chinese laws for overseas actions almost never occurs. Beijing appears to be banking on the fact that a great many of the BRI’s host governments have worse transparency and corruption ratings than China, which presumably makes their willingness to pursue Chinese entities engaged in corruption less likely in the first place.

      As long as Beijing continues to insist that only Chinese entities will provide financing for BRI projects, there is no way for external organizations to monitor transparency, corruption or adherence to international standards. That will, by itself, ensure that tension remains between Beijing, BRI host nations and the West, and signals to the world that Beijing is not in fact serious about reforming fundamental aspects of the initiative. Greater emphasis can be placed on taking some care not to blatantly violate national laws and international norms, allowing Beijing to proclaim that progress is being made, but that will continue to be on a relative scale.

      If practices were previously wholly outside the norm of internationally acceptable behavior but they are improved, they can remain outside the norm of acceptable behavior even though they have improved. More than minor tweaks are required to demonstrate that a true pivot has occurred. Beijing certainly has the ability to implement meaningful wholesale change to the BRI if it chooses to, but it has yet to do so. Based on its prior history of performance regarding its flagship initiative, such changes stand little chance of being implemented.

      *[Daniel Wagner is the author of “The Chinese Vortex: The Belt and Road Initiative and its Impact on the World.”]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Russia Has Planted Seeds of the EU’s Demise in the Balkans

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      Earlier this year, Kosovo elected Albin Kurti as prime minister. Progressive, pro-American, pro-justice and anti-corruption, Kurti was precisely the kind of politician Americans would ordinarily wish to see in power in the region. And yet the US has orchestrated what Kurti has called “a parliamentary coup d’etat” to replace him with Avdullah Hoti, who, as soon as he was installed, reversed the measures Kurti had taken to promote reciprocal sovereign relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

      Emerging out of the protests in Kosovo against the failures by the EU and the UN to address the massive corruption and pro-Serbian bias undermining peace negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, Kurti had staunchly refused American requests that Kosovo remove the import tariffs it had imposed on Serbia’s goods for its refusal to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. But if Kurti wanted to garner the same respect for Kosovo that Serbia was getting from the West, and the Trump administration in particular, his recalcitrance soon proved costly.

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      Congressional Republicans, with Trump’s blessing, threatened Kosovo with the loss of $49 million in US support, along with US peacekeepers still deployed in the country. And so, after less than two months in power, Kurti was labeled anti-American and swiftly ousted in a vote of no confidence. Unsurprisingly, Hoti, as Kosovo’s new prime minister, made immediate concessions to Serbia under the guise of aiding peace negotiations.

      Ad Hoc Border Redrawing

      A few weeks ago, an ad hoc White House summit between Serbia and Kosovo intended to promote the idea of land swaps within the region was abruptly canceled after a special prosecutor in The Hague hijacked the US plan with a surprising move by indicting, on June 24, Kosovo’s president, Hashim Thaci, for war crimes in the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office even before the pre-trial judge’s confirmation of the charges. This indictment may or may not prove legitimate according to due process, but it did achieve the immediate result of removing the one remaining obstacle to a rushed peace treaty from which Kosovo was unlikely to benefit.

      Thaci’s role as president is largely ceremonial, but his early leadership of Kosovo’s liberation from Serbia and his standing as one of the country’s most prominent politicians of the last 20 years would have made him a formidable peace negotiator.  

      Embed from Getty Images

      The conspicuous timing of this indictment, then, was entirely to the advantage of Serbia and, by extension, Russia. The peace negotiations will go on with Kosovo’s delegation being limited to Hoti, a bit player likely to agree to whatever is put on the table. Serbia, on the other hand, is led by a rising authoritarian, Aleksandar Vucic, whose party has just won a parliamentary majority in an election the integrity of which has been broadly questioned by the country’s opposition.

      Serbia’s minister of information in the late 1990s, Vucic, is credited with banning foreign media and any criticism of the government. Equally sacrosanct is his relationship with Russia. Vucic recently hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Belgrade, gifting him, perhaps symbolically, with yet another puppy. In return for this kind of clearly demonstrated loyalty, Putin has been good to Serbia, delivering anti-aircraft weapons but also actively arming Bosnian Serb police and training paramilitary units to strengthen the voices of separatists in the region.

      Putin has similarly turned Milorad Dodik, the current representative of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (Bosnia) tripartite presidency, into a political puppet. Emboldened by Trump’s deference to Putin, Dodik has undermined all of Bosnia’s efforts to join the NATO alliance. He has even promised to Bosnian Serbs that he would break up Bosnia and annex nearly half of its land to Serbia, which Serbia — along with Bosnian Serbs — has already ethnically cleansed of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) during the 1990s genocide. Dodik’s continued destabilization of his own country reflects the extent to which Putin dominates the region. To bolster Dodik’s power, in April of this year, Putin stunned Bosnia and Herzegovina’s government by sending Russia’s military units into the country, uninvited.

      If it was not already clear enough, it is now: Putin has successfully enlisted Donald Trump as a pawn in Russia’s long-term geopolitical game in Europe. And with an unfettered Russia free to make such moves as Putin chooses, we may soon be witnessing another round of serious bloodshed in the Balkans. The threat has not gone unnoticed.

      European Concerns

      Europe saw Thaci’s indictment as an opening to inject itself into the peace talks between Kosovo and Serbia. Only a day later, the president of the European Council met with Kosovo’s prime minister; the “1st physical visit since coronavirus” by the president of the European Commission was also with Hoti. Having now been summoned by the EU and perhaps overwhelmed by the pressure brought to bear by his western neighbors, Hoti agreed to participate in new Europe-led peace talks with Vucic that would take the place of that canceled White House summit. 

      The EU was rightly concerned with the direction of the peace talks led by Trump’s envoy, Richard Grenell, and the consequent violence that might have ensued had the peace agreement legitimized the idea of land swaps, as Trump’s former national security adviser, John Bolton, has now confirmed were being discussed. As far as Bolton is concerned, “This happens in history, that’s just something you have to live with.”

      But Europe is far less indifferent to the kind of bloodshed such land swaps might trigger in the Balkans. The EU, after all, now includes Croatia, a country bordering Serbia, which, if drawn into a conflict, would undermine the long-term viability of the already weakened transnational organization. In short, a peace treaty endorsing the land swaps would open a Pandora’s Box of tensions reigniting Serbs’ old claims over territories in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and beyond. Violence of this kind in the Balkans will assure Putin’s ultimate goal of destabilizing Europe. Once again, Russia will have a point of reentry into Eastern Europe, through its own backdoor — the Balkans.

      Under the malign neglect of Trump’s presidency, Vladimir Putin has crafted for himself a unique window of opportunity within which to instigate violence in the Balkans, capitalizing on likely Serb secession from the handful of nations born out of the fall of Yugoslavia. Serbs in Montenegro, Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in Kosovo have long hoped to join into a Greater Serbia, an ethnically cleansed and imagined nation void of religious diversity. It was this same Serb ambition of ethnic purity that led to several wars and the unforgettable genocide against Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s.

      The Bells of Hate

      Today, the bells of hate chime more widely yet, drawing upon white supremacy throughout the West. Aided by Russia and a half-witting Trump, an authoritarian-led Serbia is entirely capable of initiating bloodshed as relentlessly and dangerously as it did in the 1990s — perhaps even more so.

      Setting aside Trump’s own race and religion-based sympathies for Serbian nationalism, American national interests in no way align with Serbia’s agenda of redrawing borders in the Balkans. But with Putin pushing for it, Trump has been in a hurry to help out however he can. And why wouldn’t he be, just ahead of a November election in which his Russian friend may once more be able to play a critical role?

      So while Europe and the US continue to trip over each other, this is the perfect opportunity for Putin to legitimize the idea of redrawn borders. Serbia and Kosovo are one thing, after all, but validating the concept for implementation elsewhere? This would really be something, taking geopolitics back to a mode in which military conquest and ethnic cleansing, rather than aspirations to democracy, human rights and social justice, are what shape the fortunes of nations.

      Putin is a long-term strategist who, while no one was watching, has actively planted the seeds of the EU’s demise in the Balkans. And make no mistake: Neither a canceled meeting in the White House nor another summit hosted by Europeans this summer is going to stop him. In the wake of Richard Grenell’s White House summit debacle and the EU leaders’ evident panic for what comes next, the only thing meaningfully standing in Putin’s way is the tiny NATO-protected country of Montenegro. Last year, Russian military intelligence agents were convicted for their role in a 2016 coup d’état aimed at thwarting Montenegro’s attempt to join NATO. Though the attempt failed, Putin didn’t stop there.  

      In 2018, only three days after the infamous off-the-record meeting between Trump and Putin in Helsinki that shocked the world, President Trump stunned us all yet again when he proclaimed that NATO’s insistence on protecting this newly admitted member, Montenegro, would trigger a war of global proportions. Few were inclined to take this seriously at the time, but watching Trump’s hastened interest in appeasing Russia with the peace treaty between Kosovo and Serbia, America’s indifference toward the rise of Putin’s control over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the recently announced costly withdrawal of American troops from Germany in the midst of America’s own national crisis shines a light not only on Washington’s shifting alliances but also new dangers on the horizon.

      While the US president insists on enabling serious mischief in the Balkans, Europe can only watch in fear, too weak to stop what may be coming next. Bearing in mind the fact that it was Franz Ferdinand’s assassination by a secret Serb military organization that triggered the First World War, we would do well right now not to look the other way.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Houthi Rebels Gain Momentum in Yemen

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      Early on July 13, the Houthi rebels launched their second coordinated attack on Saudi Arabia in 20 days. The Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted and destroyed four ballistic missiles and six explosive drones that had been launched from the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital Sanaa. While the Saudis did not inform the location of the missile and drone attacks, a Houthi military spokesperson stated they were directed at “military aircraft, pilot accommodation and Patriot systems in Khamis Mushait, and other military targets at Abha, Jizan and Najran airports” and destroyed a number of those targets. He added that “the giant oil facility in the Jizan industrial zone” was also targeted, and that the “strike was accurate.” Additionally, the rebels claimed to have killed and injured dozens of Saudi military officers. 

      The new coordinated attack, which followed the airstrikes against targets that included the Saudi defense and intelligence headquarters and King Salman air base on June 23, aiming for military sites and equipment with the addition of an oil facility, shows that the Houthis are stepping up their offensives against the Saudi-led coalition. The rebels claimed the attack was a retaliation against Saudi aggression, the latest of which was an airstrike on the Hajjah governorate that killed seven children and two women on July 12.

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      Although the Saudi airstrike indeed provoked Houthi retaliation, another large-scale attack of that sort was already expected, and more are likely to come. With these two attacks, the Houthis have gained momentum based on their alleged ability to hit targets with high precision deep within Saudi Arabia, namely in Riyadh, and strike multiple targets in different cities at the same time. The Iran-backed group likely intends to push the Saudi-led coalition to approach ceasefire talks more seriously and consider concessions that the Saudis have so far deemed unnegotiable, such as the lifting of the sea, land and air blockade of Yemen.

      The Push for Marib City

      Tied to the Houthis’ intention to force the Saudi-led coalition to agree to better terms for a ceasefire is the rebels’ continuing push to capture Marib city, the Yemeni government’s last stronghold in the north of the country. On June 29, Houthis and pro-government fighters clashed in the Hashia district of Marib province, and on July 1, the Saudi-led coalition carried out airstrikes on the governorate, which is mostly controlled by the Houthis, except for parts that include its capital of the same name. Following the initial session (on July 7) of the trial of Houthi leaders accused of orchestrating the takeover of the Yemeni government, the Iran-backed group launched a ballistic missile that reportedly landed in a civilian area of Marib city on July 8, followed by another strike on July 14.

      The Saudis have been wanting to withdraw from the Yemeni conflict for quite some time now. But they cannot allow a complete Houthi takeover of the northwest and, without Saudi presence, possibly even further, as this would give the rebels more bargaining power ahead of eventual direct negotiations. After Houthi forces captured the city of al-Hazm, in al-Jawf province, in March, the rebels gained access to a pathway through the al-Ruwaik desert where they would be able to send fighters directly to Marib and/or carry out additional airstrikes on the city.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Considering the danger of that threat, army troops announced in late June that they had surrounded al-Hazm, and on July 15, the coalition allegedly carried out air raids on the city that killed several civilians, increasing pressure as it is aware of the strategic importance of the city in a potential Houthi takeover of Marib.

      It is highly unlikely that either of the two warring parties will achieve a complete military victory in Yemen. The Houthis will likely continue with their escalation approach hoping to capture Marib city so that they can increase their leverage ahead of eventual direct negotiations with the Saudi-led coalition, which are being pursued by the UN envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths. The coalition, in turn, will likely continue striking Houthi-controlled areas responding to the rebels’ attacks and keep on defending its last stronghold in the north, but, at some point, it will need to address ceasefire talks for the sake of the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

      Should the coalition decide to wait and see if the tables are turned in the conflict, in which at the moment Houthi forces enjoy the upper hand militarily, and continue to refuse to grant Houthis legitimacy, the Saudi-backed government might be perceived by the international community as one of the pieces hindering a successful political process in Yemen. That is not to say that the Houthis are facilitating the process, but the Yemeni government has more to lose in terms of legitimacy simply because it is the governing entity recognized worldwide.

      Endless fighting, with constant accusations of violations of international humanitarian law against the Saudi-led coalition, which currently amount to over 500 since 2015 according to the UK government, could eventually wear out the support for the government and its international legitimacy — the only thing knowingly corrupt President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi still holds onto — might start to fade.

      Undivided Attention

      In the south, the latest developments involving the Abu Dhabi-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) may affect the landscape of the war. The STC has been involved in on-and-off fights with the Saudi-led coalition for control of the south even after the power-sharing Riyadh Agreement the two parties signed in November 2019 and the announcement of a ceasefire in June. On July 26, however, the STC and the Yemeni government agreed on another attempt for the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement following a Saudi proposal to “accelerate” its fulfillment. 

      According to Yemeni media, the new deal brings similar points, such as the appointment of a governor and security director for Aden and the formation of a new cabinet with equal representation from both the north and the south, with new conditions, like the return of the governor of Socotra to the island and the revocation by the STC of its declaration of self-rule.

      The alleged adaptation of the Riyadh Agreement, the materialization of which is still to be seen, and the consequent reduction of tensions between the two parties would ultimately damage Houthi plans, since the Iran-backed group was likely taking advantage of the fragmented attention given by the coalition to the fight against the STC in the south and the Houthis themselves in the north. The question that remains is whether the now undivided coalition’s attention to the fight against the Houthis in the north, provided the new conditions with the STC bring stability to the south, will enable it to turn the table in the conflict.

      Looking ahead, there is a big chance the Houthis will continue to pressure the coalition, especially with offensives in and around Marib city and potentially in Saudi Arabia. Previous experiences show Houthi attacks are likely to continue even after the reported understanding between the coalition and the STC based on the fact that the June 23, Houthi-coordinated attacks on Saudi Arabia came a day after the coalition and the STC had announced a ceasefire. Meanwhile, if focused on the fight against the Houthis, the coalition might be able to respond to attacks with more vigor and prevent the rebels from increasing their leverage ahead of eventual direct negotiations.

      *[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Was the First Gulf War the Last Triumph of Multilateralism?

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      This week marks the 30th anniversary of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Desperate to pay off his nation’s seemingly insurmountable debt, acquired as a result of his invasion of and the futile 8-year war with Iran that had just ended, Saddam Hussein saw oil-rich Kuwait as the solution. Iraq had never recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty, claiming it had been hived off by the British during its occupation of Iraq in the early 20th century. Moreover, as he and many Iraqis asserted, it really was Iraq’s “19th province.”

      The World Without American Leadership

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      Saddam deployed Iraqi troops to the border in July of 1990, prompting concern among neighboring Arab countries and the United States. In a much-reported meeting with then-US Ambassador April Glaspie late in July, he was asked about his intentions. Glaspie took pains to explain that the US had “no opinion” on Arab-Arab disputes, further expressing the US hope that the Iraqi-Kuwait border question might be resolved soon and without the use of force. (Egypt has been trying to mediate the dispute.) Saddam interpreted her response as an American green light to invade, as egregious a misinterpretation of a diplomatic communication as there ever was.

      A Multilateral Approach

      Within hours of the August 2 invasion, the UN Security Council convened and ordered Iraq’s immediate withdrawal. It was ignored by Saddam, as were multiple subsequent UNSC resolutions. Saddam did not believe that the US or any other nation would take action to defend the small patch of desert at the end of the Persian Gulf, despite its outsize oil wealth and massive reserves.

      He was wrong. Under the leadership of President George H. W. Bush and his able secretary of state, James Baker, the US organized a 34-nation coalition, including many Arab states and NATO allies. Armed with a UNSC resolution authorizing “all necessary means” if Saddam did not withdraw his forces by the January 15 deadline, the US and other coalition forces began assembling in Saudi Arabia, which many feared would be the next target of Saddam’s ambitions. Facing more than 650,000 troops and a massive US, British and French air assault, Iraqi forces were driven out of Kuwait. The three-day campaign cost coalition forces some 300 deaths, including 146 Americans. Iraqi casualties were never officially ascertained, but estimates range from 20,000 to 26,000 killed and 75,000 injured. Over 1,000 Kuwaitis also died, mostly civilians.

      The Kuwait incursion proved even more humiliating and costly than Iraq’s ill-fated invasion of Iran. Numerous and increasingly costly sanctions (including on critical oil exports), intrusive UN weapons inspectors and expansive no-fly zones in the country’s north and south decisively placed Iraq in pariah-nation status in the world. Ultimately, it set the stage for the American invasion and occupation of Iraq and Saddam’s removal in 2003.

      Leadership When It Counted

      The First Gulf War marked a significant achievement for American diplomacy, one that would be difficult to replicate today. Though Saddam remained unmoved by American warnings and UNSC resolutions and sanctions, the international community proceeded deliberately but measuredly before employing force. The UNSC’s approval of Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force, obtained 12 affirmative votes, including from four of the five permanent members (China abstained) and only two negatives (Cuba and Yemen).

      Deft diplomacy on the part of Bush and Baker attracted 33 other nations to the coalition that expelled Saddam’s forces. Secretary of Baker met on several occasions with Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, to resolve the crisis. This was a marked contrast to George W. Bush’s approach to, and eventual invasion of, Iraq in 2003, which failed to secure UNSC approval and incurred considerable worldwide condemnation.

      Importantly, despite a virtually open road to Baghdad and against the urgings of some in the US at the time, in 1991 President Bush withdrew all US forces from Iraq and did not seek to remove Saddam. This proved to be critical in maintaining the unprecedented coalition he had organized to address a Middle East crisis. Bush Sr. was able to capitalize on that achievement by assembling world leaders in Spain later that fall for the Madrid Conference, which brought together many of the same Arab countries from the coalition, plus Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and co-sponsor the Soviet Union to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conference became a stepping stone for increased action on the part of many Arab countries, the Palestinians and Israel, and the progress that followed.

      The Era of Great Power Rivalry

      The First Gulf War itself and what followed demonstrated what principled, deft and concerted diplomacy on the part of the US can achieve. Clearly, the task remains significantly short of its ultimate goal. But the hope of that seems all the more distant as the US under President Donald Trump eschews the Bush/Baker approach to multilateral diplomacy in favor of narrow, one-sided bilateral diplomacy. The latter has proven to be a contributing factor in the region’s — and perhaps the world’s — decided move toward “great power” competition.

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      Nations as diverse as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others now vie for increased influence and even dominance in the Middle East and elsewhere. Never a partisan in great power competition, the US now stands strangely quiet on the sidelines as these nations attempt to carve out spheres of influence, from the Crimea and Ukraine, to South and Central Asia, the Far East and the Middle East. For some of the peoples of the Middle East — Syria, Yemen and Libya — this has meant misery and devastation, and for the rest of the region, instability, uncertainty and fear. US-led multilateralism at a time when it stood unparalleled in military, political and economic power in the world helped address a genuine Middle East crisis 30 years ago. In that sense, America’s and the world’s actions in Iraq may very well have been the mythical “good” war in the Middle East, as much an oxymoron as that may sound.

      In an era of great-power maneuvering, it would be inconceivable to imagine now a similar response in the event of another crisis between nations of the region, say Iran and Saudi Arabia. With rival major powers choosing sides, one could more easily envision competing alliances being drawn up, culminating in the sort of conflict the world saw in Europe in World War I.

      Great-power competition seldom, if ever, leads to stability or peace. World War I amply proved that. The example of the First Gulf War, however, proved that multilateralism, especially when led by a powerful but principled nation, can diffuse escalating tensions, avert greater disaster and provide at least the prospect and a framework for peace and stability.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Beijing’s BRI Hubris Comes at a Price

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      Despite more than 3,000 years of Chinese history, many of the world’s countries had little to no direct experience with China or Chinese investment prior to the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). There was a presumption on the part of many governments that international best practices were well established and that China would be in compliance with those standards as it rolled out the initiative. As they now know, that often turned out not to be the case, but the fact that the Chinese business model is a mix of public and private sector participation, rules and regulations that are not necessarily logical or coherent and are often misunderstood has complicated matters.

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      For all concerned, the BRI has in many ways been a leap in the dark, since such an ambitious undertaking had never before been attempted. The Chinese government, and many of the nation’s companies active in the initiative, were, and remain, on a learning curve. The enforceability of Chinese regulations on private sector Chinese companies operating overseas can be inconsistent, and Chinese-built infrastructure has, at times, been found to be substandard. Regulations governing the practices of Chinese firms are frequently revised, leaving many organizations scrambling to keep up in the public and private sectors. It then takes a while for new guidelines to translate into practice abroad.

      BRI Financing

      BRI financing is highly dependent on loans from the China Development Bank, China Export-Import Bank and other state-owned commercial banks. China’s foreign exchange reserves are important sources of capital for these institutions. Although Beijing maintains the world’s largest aggregation of foreign currency, its foreign reserves have declined in recent years, which, when combined with its dramatically slowing economy, raises questions about the sustainability of BRI financing in the medium term.

      Under the presumption that foreign capital and support from multilateral financial institutions will be required to sustain BRI projects in the future, China’s Ministry of Finance established the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Financing with eight multilateral development banks and financial institutions. The center is expected to enhance the project financing process through a combination of better information sharing, improved project preparation and capacity building. The ministry has also developed the Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries (DSF) of the BRI, collaborating with its counterparts from 28 partner countries. China’s DSF is virtually identical to the World Bank-International Monetary Fund DSF, which governs lending operations for the multilateral institutions and many bilateral lenders. That should increase its prospects for success.

      China’s effort is a significant step forward in guarding against the debt challenges associated with the BRI. Debt sustainability can only grow in importance for Beijing. As the BRI progresses, China will have no choice but to take steps to improve reporting transparency vis-à-vis financing, transaction structures and debt repayment. As for host governments that have become saddled with tens of billions of dollars of debt as a result of debt-trap diplomacy, their concerns have been widely shared with Beijing. Many of these nations have already become more discriminating BRI consumers. Although the trail of debt-related issues will certainly not diminish going forward, they will hopefully become less severe in time.

      The Chinese government has sought to integrate the BRI with its green growth agenda in an attempt to address criticism of its continued reliance on coal power and the lack of environmental oversight on Chinese infrastructure projects. Although Beijing has made great strides toward improving environmental and resource productivity, greater efficiency gains are vital to achieving a shift toward low-carbon, resource-efficient, competitive economies. Future progress will largely depend on the country’s capacity to integrate environmental aspects into the decision-making process for all its domestic and foreign policies to ensure that industrial and environmental policy objectives and measures are well aligned and mutually supportive.

      Reputational Risk

      At ongoing risk also is China’s reputation. The blowback it has experienced as a result of its rollout of the BRI from countries around the world has been unprecedented. The same may be said about its trade practices with the US and its response to COVID-19. Many of the world’s governments and people have simply lost confidence in Beijing, to the extent that they had confidence to begin with. The ball is squarely in Beijing’s court to raise the level of confidence the world may have in the future regarding what it says versus what it actually does. There is no better proving ground on that score than the BRI.

      A combination of hubris, a bulldozer approach to getting things done and a complete lack of sensitivity had worked well for the Communist Party of China at home for 70 years, and Beijing apparently believed that doing the same would work well overseas. While some aspects of Beijing’s original approach ended up yielding some positive results, President Xi Jinping’s move toward “BRI lite” in 2018 had to be taken with a grain of salt. He deserves credit for acknowledging some of the initiative’s pitfalls, but the Chinese government’s pivot must ultimately be considered too little and too late.

      If it wanted to more fully acknowledge the error of its ways, it would have offered to renegotiate every BRI contract that was clearly skewed in its favor rather than waiting to be asked to do so, award debt forgiveness on a broader basis and stop in its tracks any project under construction that is inconsistent with best environmental practices. That is clearly not going to happen.

      *[Daniel Wagner is the author of “The Chinese Vortex: The Belt and Road Initiative and its Impact on the World.”]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Annexation or No Annexation, Little Will Change in Israel-GCC Relations

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      It is important to question how the proposed Israeli annexation of 30% to 40% of the West Bank could impact Tel Aviv’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Although it is impossible to safely predict how regional dynamics would change if the annexation goes ahead, there are three main reasons why the move would probably neither elicit a discernible reaction from most Arab Gulf sheikdoms nor irreparably damage Israel’s existing partnerships with GCC members.

      First, most regimes in the Arabian Peninsula do not perceive Israel as a grave strategic threat, nor do most in the GCC view standing up for the Palestinian cause as a high-ranking priority, especially compared to dealing with the perceived Turkish and Iranian threats. Second, throughout the 20th century, Israel has developed extensive relations with some states in the GCC. Such engagement and cooperation spread across numerous domains such as intelligence, security and economic cooperation. Third, the question of Palestinian statehood is generally linked to either pan-Arabism or Islamism, and most Arab Gulf regimes seek to limit the power of such ideologies in their own countries.

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      Furthermore, while officials in the GCC have issued public statements warning Israel to not to go ahead with the planned annexation of the West Bank, such rhetoric is mainly intended for domestic and regional consumption and does not directly reflect the warming relations between Israel and the Gulf capitals. 

      Strategic Relations

      Foreign ministers and Gulf officials have publicly condemned the move, arguing that “annexation will certainly and immediately upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and with UAE.” Moreover, Bahraini minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, expressed that the “Israeli plan threatens international peace and security and endangers the region,” while both Kuwait’s ambassador to the United Nations and Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued similar statements condemning annexation. 

      Doha would likely react negatively to annexation based on the close relationships developed with Hamas and a litany of Islamist movements across the region since the 1990s. However, Qatar has had to go to pains to cement its close relations with the Trump administration amid the past three years of being subjected to a blockade by its neighbors. Thus, officials in Doha would likely have to be cautious about taking any steps vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine that could trigger a negative response from the most pro-Israel leader who has ever occupied the Oval Office.

      Embed from Getty Images

      At the same time, examining the strategic relations between Israel and the GCC member states allows one to understand the potential repercussions of annexation. Accordingly, Israel’s economic, security and intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE are likely to withstand annexation. This is mainly due to most Arab Gulf states’ tactical acceptance of Israel’s military and technological predominance in the region, especially when viewed in terms of the perceived Iranian threat, Turkish “neo-Ottomanism” and Washington’s waning military commitment to the region. Notwithstanding Qatar and Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman all formed durable ties in the realms of security, intelligence, and economics. In the domains of security and intelligence, the common enemy — Turkey — and the threat of Iranian hegemony cohere Israel with the UAE, Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

      Israel and Arab Gulf states’ clandestine diplomatic engagement began decades ago and surfaced into overtly public relations. Consequently, the move toward normalization of ties has shuttered away the long-standing Arab demand that Israel withdraw from lands captured in 1967 as a precondition for acceptance of Israel.

      Omani-Israeli relations are largely predicated on clandestine diplomacy and are historically orchestrated by the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency. To be sure, Mossad officers have routinely traveled to Muscat to consult with Omani officials regarding Iran and other shared regional concerns. Oman’s willingness to work with Tel Aviv is based on a historic pattern of bilateral economic and political ties. It follows that Oman will not disrupt ties with the Jewish state but rather continue its historical role as a diplomatic mediator — a position Muscat is likely to attempt to embrace in the short term in the event of annexation.

      Durable Ties

      Moreover, Israel established durable intelligence and security ties with other GCC members. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) caused a bit of a surprise in the regional when he declared that “there are a lot of interests we [Saudi Arabia] share with Israel and if there is peace, there would be a lot of interest between Israel and the GCC.” Further, GCC support for Israel was expressed during the 2019 Warsaw Mideast Summit, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE’s chief diplomats all defending Israel’s right to exist and alluding that the perceived Iranian threat overshadowed the question of Palestinian statehood. That same year, MBS declared that “the Palestinians need to accept [Trump’s] proposal or stop complaining.”

      Although, as noted, Tel Aviv’s intelligence and security relations with GCC member states are predicated on sharing information regarding Tehran and terrorism, many Arab Gulf monarchies are acquiring signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities from the Israeli defense sector. As an anonymous European intelligence official told The Washington Post, “The tools you need to combat terrorism are the same ones you need to suppress dissent.”

      To be sure, the Israeli defense sector has sold GCC member-states SIGINT collection methods and eavesdropping capabilities to monitor internal dissent and entrench the power of the central authority. For example, Israel sold Saudi Arabia over $250 million worth of electronic and signals intelligence eavesdropping equipment in 2018, while Tel Aviv sold the Iron Dome advance air defense system to the kingdom a short time earlier. In 2016, Israel sold more than $1 billion to Arabian Peninsula sheikdoms, with most of the weapons directed to the Emiratis and Saudis, although the majority of such deals are kept secret.

      The defense and intelligence relationships are again important given the convergence of interests around the Iranian threat, Ankara’s ambitious and Muslim Brotherhood-friendly foreign policy, along with the relative decline of Washington’s regional influence. For many Gulf monarchies, Israel represents a strategic partner that can effectively contribute to regional and global efforts to counter Iranian conduct in the wider Arab/Islamic world, provide intelligence information and collection capabilities to counterterrorism operations, and eavesdrop on domestic detractors while also gradually embracing the regional security role previously commanded by Washington.

      Domestic perceptions triggered by annexation among the GCC population are likely to dilute the strength of public diplomacy between the Gulf monarchies and Tel Aviv in the short term, despite Riyadh and Abu Dhabi often viewing Hamas with trepidation given the group’s Islamist ideology and its relations with Turkey, Qatar and Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are worried about Islamist movements and affiliated political power as a challenge to authority, yet they are equally concerned about domestic perceptions of annexation given the overtly public relations between the two monarchies and Tel Aviv.

      In sum, the annexation process is unlikely to rupture Tel Aviv’s relations with GCC members. Israel is united with the Arabian monarchies by the common perception of the Iranian threat, while the Israeli defense and intelligence establishment provides an abundance of weaponry, intelligence information and collection capabilities to Gulf partners. Moreover, while annexation will stir internal opposition in the region, the GCC member states are only likely to publicly condemn the policy while continuing with diplomatic engagement, trade, intelligence sharing and defense acquisitions.*[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More