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    Vladimir Putin says Biden ‘radically different’ after impulsive Trump

    The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has said US-Russia relations are at their lowest point in years, in an interview before his meeting with the US president, Joe Biden, next week.Putin and Biden will meet in Geneva on Wednesday. The White House has said Biden will bring up ransomware attacks emanating from Russia, Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine, the jailing of dissidents and other issues that have irritated the relationship.“We have a bilateral relationship that has deteriorated to its lowest point in recent years,” Putin said, according to an NBC translation of excerpts of an interview broadcast on Friday.Putin characterised the former US president Donald Trump as “an extraordinary individual, talented individual”, but impulsive, and said Biden, as a career politician, was “radically different” from the “colourful” Trump.“It is my great hope that, yes, there are some advantages, some disadvantages, but there will not be any impulse-based movements on behalf of the sitting US president,” he said, according to a translation by NBC News.Putin has openly admitted that in the 2016 vote he supported Trump, who voiced admiration for the Russian leader and notoriously at their first summit appeared to accept his denials of election interference.Biden, at the start of an eight-day visit to Europe this week, said: “We’re not seeking conflict with Russia.“We want a stable and predictable relationship … but I’ve been clear: the United States will respond in a robust and meaningful way if the Russian government engages in harmful activities.”Putin was asked about several Russian dissidents whose deaths have been blamed on Moscow, including the ex-KGB spy Alexander Litvinenko who was poisoned in 2006. Putin dismissed the question and said some of those responsible for the deaths had gone to prison.Asked about Biden calling him a killer in an interview in March, Putin said he had heard dozens of such accusations. “This is not something I worry about in the least,” Putin said, dismissing it as part of “macho behaviour” common in Hollywood.Such discourse “is part of US political culture where it’s considered normal. By the way, not here, it is not considered normal here,” he said.On the issue of recent ransomware attacks that the United States has traced to Russia, Putin denied any knowledge of the hackings and called on Biden to reach an agreement with him on cyberspace, NBC News said.Putin also dismissed a report in the Washington Post this week that Russia was preparing to supply Iran with an advanced satellite that would enable it to track potential military targets across the Middle East. “It’s just fake news. At the very least I don’t know anything about this kind of thing,” Putin said, according to NBC News. “It’s just nonsense, garbage.” More

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    Watchdog investigates seizure of Democrats’ phone data by Trump DoJ

    The US justice department’s internal watchdog launched an investigation on Friday after revelations that former president Donald Trump’s administration secretly seized phone data from at least two House Democrats as part of an aggressive leaks inquiry related to the Russia investigation into Trump’s conduct.Democrats in Congress called the seizures a “shocking” abuse of power, while the White House labeled the revelations “appalling”.The announcement by the DoJ inspector general, Michael Horowitz, came shortly after the deputy attorney general, Lisa Monaco, made the request on Friday morning.Horowitz said he would examine whether the data turned over by Apple followed department policy and “whether any such uses, or the investigations, were based upon improper considerations”.It was revealed late on Thursday that the US justice department under Trump had taken data from the accounts of at least two members of the House of Representatives intelligence committee in 2018 as part of an aggressive crackdown on leaks related to the Russia investigation and other national security matters, according to a committee official and two people familiar with the investigation.Prosecutors from the previous president’s DoJ subpoenaed Apple for the data, according to the people, who were granted anonymity to discuss the secret seizures first reported by the New York Times.The records of at least 12 people connected to the intelligence panel were eventually shared, including the chairman, Adam Schiff, who was then the top Democrat on the committee.The California Democratic congressman Eric Swalwell was the second member, according to spokeswoman Natalie Edelstein. The records of aides, former aides and family members were also siezed, including one who was a minor, according to the committee official.Apple informed the committee last month that their records had been shared, but did not give extensive detail. The committee is aware, though, that metadata from the accounts was turned over, the official said.The records do not contain any other content from the devices, like photos, messages or emails, one of the other people said. The third person said that Apple complied with the subpoena, providing the information to the DoJ, and did not immediately notify the members of Congress or the committee about the disclosure.While the justice department routinely conducts investigations of leaked information, including classified intelligence, opening such an investigation into members of Congress is extraordinarily rare.Schiff tweeted: “Trump repeatedly demanded the DoJ go after his political enemies. It’s clear his demands didn’t fall on deaf ears. This baseless investigation, while now closed, is yet another example of Trump’s corrupt weaponization of justice. And how much he imperiled our democracy.”Trump repeatedly demanded the DOJ go after his political enemies.It’s clear his demands didn’t fall on deaf ears. This baseless investigation, while now closed, is yet another example of Trump’s corrupt weaponization of justice.And how much he imperiled our democracy.— Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff) June 11, 2021
    The disclosures, as first reported by the New York Times, raise questions about what the department’s justification was for spying on another branch of government and whether it was done for political reasons.The Trump administration’s attempt to secretly gain access to data of individual members of Congress and others connected to the panel came as the president was fuming publicly and privately over investigations – in Congress and by the special counsel Robert Mueller – into his campaign’s ties to Russia. Trump called the probes a “witch-hunt”, regularly criticized Schiff and other Democrats on Twitter and repeatedly dismissed as “fake news” leaks he found personally harmful to his agenda. As the investigations swirled around him, he demanded loyalty from a justice department he often regarded as his personal law firm.The House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, said in a statement that “these actions appear to be yet another egregious assault on our democracy” waged by the former president.“The news about the politicization of the Trump administration justice department is harrowing,” she said.Schiff, now the panel’s chair, also confirmed in a statement on Thursday evening that the DoJ had informed the committee in May that the investigation was closed. Still, he said: “I believe more answers are needed, which is why I believe the inspector general should investigate this and other cases that suggest the weaponization of law enforcement by a corrupt president.”The justice department told the intelligence panel then that the matter had not transferred to any other entity or investigative body, the committee official said, and the department confirmed that to the committee again on Thursday.The panel has continued to seek additional information, but the department has not been forthcoming in a timely manner, including on questions such as whether the investigation was properly predicated and whether it only targeted Democrats, the committee official said.It is unclear why Trump’s justice department would have targeted a minor as part of the investigation. Another Democrat on the intelligence panel, the Illinois representative Mike Quigley, said he did not find it even “remotely surprising” that Trump went after committee members’ records during the Russia investigation.“From my first days as part of the Russia investigation, I expected that eventually, someone would attempt this – I just wasn’t sure if it would be a hostile government or my own,” Quigley said.And the Florida congresswoman Val Demings, an impeachment manager in Trump’s first Senate trial, and who is now challenging Republican Florida Senator Marco Rubio for his seat, tweeted: “It is outrageous but not surprising. We have a former president with no regard for the rule of law or for those who enforce the laws.” More

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    The Guardian view on an Atlantic charter: new rules for new threats | Editorial

    Before the second world war, states acted as they wished in international affairs, limited only by their resources and power. These circumstances began to change in August 1941, before America joined the allied cause. On a battleship off the coast of Newfoundland, the US president Franklin Roosevelt and the British prime minister Winston Churchill issued the Atlantic charter at a time when Nazi Germany appeared to be decisively winning the European war. A few months later, America, Britain, the Soviet Union and 23 other governments declared in the name of “United Nations” an intention to regulate the postwar world based on three revolutionary principles: free trade, non-aggression and democracy.Eighty years later, Joe Biden and Boris Johnson have signed a new Atlantic charter, to reflect a world of different threats and one in which the UK is a much diminished power. Mr Biden looks out and sees an increasingly dangerous world. In some ways the vista resembles the 1930s – with populists, nationalists and demagogues on the rise, European powers divided, and democracy vulnerable to foreign manipulation. There’s no mention of China in the 604-word charter, but it is the undeclared target of many of the policies regarding debt transparency, freedom of navigation and protecting the west’s “innovative edge”.There is much to agree with in the text, especially the focus on the climate crisis and promoting sustainable global development. It also calls for both countries to adhere to “the rules-based international order”, a welcome snub to the Trumpian idea that this was a threat to US power. However, the 2021 text is a pale imitation of its 1941 forerunner. There’s nothing remotely as bold as a new international law on governing relations between states.The original document’s genius was the realisation that the time to think and plan is not at the end of a crisis, but as it unfolds. For the past 15 months, Covid-19 shut down large swathes of the planet amid what was initially a chaotic me-first approach. The pandemic has accelerated trends already in progress and will usher in a new geopolitical era. As the grip of the pathogen loosens, the world will need new principles to address the deeper issues that led to a decline in international cooperation, creeping illiberalism, and a shift in the balance of power away from democracies.Mr Biden is looking for allies in his mission to ensure that the world remains conducive to a liberal, democratic way of life. Mr Johnson is looking for a role for Britain outside of the EU, and London almost always dances to Washington’s tune. But Mr Johnson’s inability to stick to the Northern Ireland protocol of the Brexit deal he negotiated saw the US issue a reprimand this week. Washington bluntly told Mr Johnson to come to a “negotiated settlement” with Brussels and accept, if needed, “unpopular compromises” – even if that means London temporarily aligning with EU rules on agriculture and slowing progress on a future UK-US trade deal. Mr Biden understands that allies will not begin to forge a better future by falling out with one another.Nations need international agreements to promote and protect their own interests. Cooperation between states requires rules. Attempts to abandon the idea of international restraint and go it alone usually end badly. There’s nothing in the new charter that other members of the G7, or the EU, could not sign up to. The world does not govern itself, and leading powers cannot abdicate their role in shaping international institutions – and mobilising others to defend them. If the world’s democracies were to turn away, then either others would step in or the world risks a descent into chaos as it did in the 1930s. More

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    A Modi-fied India Has Weakened on the World Stage

    Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, has completed seven years in office. At the same time, his autocratic leadership has brought the simmering discontent in the foreign policy establishment out in the open. Some members of the Forum of Foreign Ambassadors of India signed an open letter slamming critics of Modi’s foreign policy. On May 31, the government notified the Central Civil Services (Pension) Amendment Rules, 2020, to further muzzle dissent by retired bureaucrats.

    Although rare, such vocal disagreements are not new in India. However, with its economy in shambles and a spate of downgrades by reputed international agencies on democratic values, human development, press freedom and hunger index, the foreign affairs discord will further diminish its global stature.

    India Is Slowly Evolving Into a Market Economy

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    Over the decades, India has seen several significant changes in the way it looks at the world. It went from the idealistic Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s to a close relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Now, India has cozied up to the United States to form the Quad, a strategic partnership to counter China that also includes Japan and Australia. India also flirted with BRICS nations for a brief while to form a coalition of developing countries — Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa — which seems to be dying a quiet death.

    All along, India has prided itself in maintaining strategic autonomy. Modi’s megalomania made him believe that he would suddenly catapult India to global power status. Unfortunately, his terms in office have left a muddled mess in its wake.

    Strong Start

    In today’s world of modern warfare and geopolitics, which includes nuclear-armed neighbors in Pakistan and China, Modi’s early years saw inane chatter about “Akhanda Bharat,” the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) term for undivided India. This idea seeks to regain ancient India’s lost glory by spreading Hinduism’s influence across South Asia. Barring such misplaced euphoria, Modi rode the wave of international goodwill to regularize the border with Bangladesh.

    In western Asia, the Middle East was warming up to Indian influence. Progress was made on a deal to develop Iran’s strategic Chabahar port, which would facilitate overland access to Afghanistan. In 2017, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel. India has also improved its relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Yet since the 2017 Doklam standoff on the India-China border that Modi’s team handled well, Beijing has succeeded in building more infrastructure in the region than New Delhi. Though it could also be considered a strategic tie. Despite US objections, the decades-old India-Russia defense partnership evolved from New Delhi being a technology buyer to the recipient of technology transfer and, finally, a defense research and development partner — an evolution that has continued under Modi.

    Embed from Getty Images

    India’s perpetual see-saw with Pakistan has continued throughout Modi’s tenure. His initial outreach by inviting then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his inauguration in 2014 and a surprise stopover in Lahore a year later quickly fizzled out. In 2016, Pakistan-based militants carried out terrorist attacks near the town of Uri in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In response, India conducted “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC), which separates the disputed Kashmir region. In 2019, Pakistani militants attacked Indian soldiers in Kashmir. For the first time since 1971, India entered Pakistani airspace to bomb locations that New Delhi claimed to be terrorist training camps.

    The situation between India and Pakistan did not change much. Tensions between the two countries persist. But Modi was reelected in 2019 on the promise of this altered equation of India swiftly and boldly following up on terrorist attacks by Pakistan-based militants.

    The reality was much more nuanced. Despite Indian claims and Pakistani counterclaims, international observers concluded that the two cross-border raids by India were not particularly effective. By blocking access to bombed sites, Pakistan’s side of the story seemed flimsy. However, Islamabad’s downing of an Indian fighter jet in February 2019 and capturing an Indian pilot, who was returned a few days later, appeared to expose holes in India’s defense preparedness. Nonetheless, Modi managed to isolate Pakistan globally and, in 2018, have it included in the gray list of the Financial Action Task Force, the global agency tracking terror financing.

    India’s relations with the West did not improve much. In Europe, other than the Rafale warplanes agreement in 2016, the Modi government was unable to make progress on the stalled trade deal with the EU. To be fair, Brussels was busy rebuilding after the Great Recession and the chaos caused by Brexit. Across the Atlantic, there was optimism in the air. During his final term, US President Barack Obama reluctantly embraced Modi. Later, the bonhomie between Donald Trump and Modi could not prevent a trade war.

    However, India-US defense and strategic cooperation strengthened as Modi built on the hard work of his predecessors, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh. The rising threat of China also played its part in developing this relationship. The 2015 agreement between Obama and Modi on nuclear liability issues was followed by a bilateral Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement in 2016 and a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement in 2018. The Quad seems to be a natural extension of this closer US-India partnership, India’s Act East policy and the Asian pivot of the United States.

    What Changed?

    After a reasonably strong start, Modi’s India has found itself in a muddle. India’s foreign policy failures closely follow the country’s economic decline since 2017-18 and steadily rising majoritarianism. Trump’s erratic, isolationist policies and India’s widening geopolitical deficit vis-à-vis China played a role, but most of Modi’s wounds are self-inflicted.

    For his narrow domestic agenda and to pass the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), Modi selectively gave a pathway to citizenship to non-Muslims from the neighboring countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Because it excluded Muslims, even persecuted ones, from these countries, the CAA was criticized and deemed discriminatory.

    In doing so, Modi alienated Bangladesh, which is rapidly modernizing and leaving India behind on most human development and economic indicators. Bangladesh swiftly showed India its place through a diplomatic snub and demonstrated its desire to walk into China’s open arms. Sustained diplomacy over the past year, combined with Modi’s recent trip to Bangladesh and India’s donation of COVID-19 vaccines, repaired some of the damage. While cooling down the CAA rhetoric might help, India’s weakened economy could still push Bangladesh closer to China.

    Embed from Getty Images

    Under the Trump administration, the US held a tough stance against Pakistan over what it called “Islamabad’s failure to take action against militant groups.” Aid from Saudi Arabia also dried up due to strained relations between Riyadh and Islamabad. As a result, Pakistan is beholden to China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through Gilgit and Baltistan, a disputed region that both India and Pakistan claim sovereignty over, has cemented China’s grip on Pakistan. New Delhi has not approached the recent ceasefire agreement with Islamabad and the resumption of peace talks from a position of strength. Rather, it is a tacit admission by both weakened parties that peace is mutually beneficial.

    Relationships with the Arab world and Israel remain strong, but Modi has lost the plot with Iran and is losing some ground with Russia. Beijing recently signed a 25-year strategic deal with Tehran and, with its economic clout, is pulling the Kremlin into its sphere of influence. In the pre-Modi era, as a rising economic power, India managed to carve out exceptions for itself to bypass US sanctions against Iran and Russia. Throughout Modi terms in office, China has steadily widened the economic and geopolitical gap with India. New Delhi’s growing weakness vis-a-vis Beijing has resulted in India kowtowing to the US and losing its strategic autonomy.

    Britain’s need for trade partners following its departure from the European Union might lead to a favorable India-UK deal. But a free trade agreement between India and the EU has not seen any significant movement under Modi. US President Joe Biden does not seem to be in any rush to end the trade war his predecessor began with India.

    For all the buzz surrounding The Quad, India is the junior partner that has little to offer to others in terms of economic benefits. New Delhi will enhance its strategic and military cooperation with other like-minded democracies, but it is unlikely to intervene if there is a full-scale confrontation between India and China. Unless the Indian economy becomes efficient and tightly integrates itself with Quad countries, its usefulness to other partners will be limited to its size and strategic location.

    In the Cold War, the US aligned with autocrats and religious fundamentalists, most notably in China and Pakistan, to defeat the Soviet Union. In the new brewing cold war between Washington and Beijing, Quad countries will pay lip service to building democratic institutional capacity in India. However, if push comes to shove, they will partner with an authoritarian India to counter China, which will serve their narrow self-interests.

    India-China Relations

    Modi’s biggest foreign policy failure is India’s frayed relationship with China. His misplaced overconfidence forced him to reject conventional wisdom and embark on a charm offensive with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Modi ignored the Doklam warning and kept expecting Xi to treat India as an equal, despite the crumbling Indian economy. Meanwhile, China had already started reducing New Delhi’s sphere of influence through its outreach to India’s neighbors and offers of economic and strategic partnerships. In 2019, Modi scrapped Article 370 of the Indian Constitution to downgrade the state of Jammu and Kashmir to a union territory status. His deputy, Amit Shah, made unrealistic claims about taking back the China-controlled Aksai Chin. In response, Xi directly occupied Indian territory in Ladakh for almost a year.

    China’s strength and India’s decline are best captured through the different ways the countries approach bonds. China is selling its government bonds internationally at a negative interest rate despite a raging pandemic, ongoing border clashes with India and a 300% debt-to-GDP ratio. Indian bond investors are demanding higher yields even though India’s debt-to-DGP ratio is below 100%.

    With a sizable military and tactical superiority, India was unlikely to lose territory to China. However, through emergency weapons purchases during the Doklam standoff, India paid dearly for Modi and Shah’s hubris and prioritizing domestic politics over national interest.

    Weakened on the World Stage

    Through his speeches, photo-ops with world leaders and tweets, Modi keeps peddling lies and projecting strength to voters. While India’s financial health has deteriorated significantly, the BJP has raised — through anonymous electoral bonds — millions in political donations that fuel Modi’s formidable propaganda machine.

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    The world knows that India is run by a narcissist who has built a false domestic narrative of the country’s global standing to keep winning elections. The West will keep hoping that India gets its act together economically and stops destroying independent institutions so that it becomes a democratic counterweight to China. But that is a battle only Indian voters can lead.

    As India warms up to the Quad, where does it go from here? As a new cold war brews, lessons from the past are informative. While the US used China and Pakistan to dismantle the Soviet Union, China cleverly used its leverage to strengthen its economy and authoritarian communist rule. Meanwhile, Pakistan indulged its military and majoritarian religious leadership to destroy itself from within.

    With his dismantling of democratic institutions and promotion of religious bigotry, Modi has left Indian foreign policy in doldrums. If voters want it to become a vibrant, democratic counterweight to China and a global player that does justice to its potential, India will have to find a leader who understands that issues like a strong economy, independent judiciary and social stability cannot be divorced from its foreign policy but are integral to it.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Does the World Need to Contain China?

    The rise of China has revived the rhetoric of Cold War-era containment to depict competition between dominant powers, although the state of international relations is fundamentally different. Containment strategy toward China featured prominently in former US President Donald Trump’s policy, and many believe that strategic competition will continue to define the relationship under the Biden administration but in a different form. However, the necessity to contain China is a contested idea both on economic and ethical levels.

    In the first place, it should be understood that the world “includes many different groups with varying degrees of dependence from China,” says Domingo Sugranyes, director of a seminar on ethics and technology at Pablo VI Foundation. Therefore, he adds, “the need for containment will be seen differently if you are looking at textile supply chains, workers’ rights in [Xinjiang], data privacy rules, markets for European cars.”

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    Oscar Ugarteche, a Peruvian professor of economics, believes the emergence of a new superpower competing with other Western countries may be “positive, particularly for the Global South.” That said, we are undeniably witnessing “the emergence of a new distribution of power in which relative weights are shifting away from the United States and its allies, although the absolute political and economic power of these nations is and will remain considerable,” he mentions.

    Some, such as researcher Valerio Bruno, see the rise of China not only in the economic and military domains, but also as an ideological confrontation — “between two Weltanschauungen” — that determines whether the future world order will be defined by liberal or authoritarian ideas. Proponents of a containment policy believe that China does not offer a realistic alternative to the liberal order and that it should be obliged to comply with those rules. How? According to economist Etienne Perrot, it could be through “multilateral agreements and targeted alliances” designed to bring European powers more firmly into the containment effort in the economic and technological domains.

    Embed from Getty Images

    In contrast, some observers question the necessity of containment. Kara Tan Bhala, president and founder of Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics, argues that “a deliberate policy of containing another country, and thereby not allowing many to achieve their human potential” may not be morally justified. States should “respect the diversity of systems … while encouraging each other to become ‘better socialists’ and ‘better capitalists’ serving humanity,” says Christoph Stuckelberger, a professor of ethics. On the economic front, Ugarteche says, “the technological competition between the USA and China is positive for all of us as it speeds up innovation and reduces costs and consumer prices.”

    At first glance, the Cold War rhetoric of containment refers to a bipolar world, which is not (yet) the case. Multipolarity seems to be the best guarantee to avoid the world sliding into bipolarity, with a risk of falling once again into a Thucydides’ Trap. In this perspective, the swift assertion of the European Union as a global, active player is urgently needed to leverage a new negotiated equilibrium anchored in a minimal level of mutual commitment on most urgent global challenges. In that sense, the notion of containment may be reformulated in terms of the world’s self-containment, especially, as Edward Dommen says, when we look “at the way the world economy abuses the planet.”

    By Virgile Perret and Paul Dembinski

    Author’s note: From Virus to Vitamin invites experts to comment on issues relevant to finance and the economy in relation to society, ethics and the environment. Below, you will find views from a variety of perspectives, practical experiences and academic disciplines. The topic of this discussion is: Does the world need to contain China and, if so, how?

    “… multilateral agreements and targeted alliances…”

    “Yes. China, by virtue of its human capacities, its natural resources and its organization, is today the dominant power (in terms of purchasing power parity). Opposite, the United States retains a monetary and military advantage, which China seeks to steal from them. Knowing that “power corrupts” (Lord Acton) and that “only power stops power” (Montesquieu), how to contain China without submitting to the USA? Through multilateral agreements and targeted alliances against MNCs [multinational companies] who, in the global market, behave like privateers in the service of their country of origin, sometimes even like pirates without faith or law.”

    Etienne Perrot — Jesuit, economist and editorial board member of the Choisir magazine (Geneva) and adviser to the journal Etudes (Paris)

    “… China does not export its politics.”

    “Is it the world or is it the West? Did the world need to contain Great Britain or Spain or the US in its time? What we are facing is a new superpower emerging that will compete with other Western countries and the result should be positive, particularly for the Global South. “The more, the merrier.” The technological competition between the USA and China is positive for all of us as it speeds up innovation and reduces costs and consumer prices. All else is irrelevant. China does not export its politics.”

    Oscar Ugarteche — visiting professor of economics at various universities

    “…negotiate with a clear understanding of issues at stake…”

    “The ‘world’ is no geopolitical actor; it includes many different groups with varying degrees of dependence from China. The need for containment will be seen differently if you are looking at textile supply chains, workers’ rights in [Xinjiang], data privacy rules, markets for European cars and machinery, monetary balances, Taiwan security and microprocessor supplies, loans to Africa and Latin America, or rare earth resources. … If the question refers to containment from the ‘West’ or, more precisely, the European Union, then the answer is no. We should negotiate with a clear understanding of issues at stake, as in the case of the proposed comprehensive agreement on investment. Above all, we should learn more facts about the incoming largest economic power.”

    Domingo Sugranyes — director of a seminar on ethics and technology at Pablo VI Foundation, past executive vice-chairman of MAPFRE international insurance group

    “One world — diverse systems”

    “How should the role of China be in the world? Three options: 1) China is disconnected from the world, sealed off, as it was to some extent 1949-1979, based on self-reliance and autonomous development; 2) China is fully integrated in the globalized world and follows the Western model of so-called capitalism and democracy as many powers in the West hoped that China, with its Open Door Policy since 1979, would develop; and 3) China is integrated in the world, but with its ‘Chinese characteristics’ of ‘third way’ combining planned and market economy, socialist one-party system with elements of consultative participatory processes and controlled civil society. The ethics of international relations needs to respect the diversity of systems as in option 3, while encouraging each other to become ‘better socialists’ and ‘better capitalists’ serving humanity.

    Christoph Stuckelberger — professor of ethics, founder and president of Globethics.net foundation in Geneva, visiting professor in Nigeria, China, Russia and the UK

    “…we are witnessing the emergence of a new distribution of power…”

    “The danger of conflict arises when there is no longer a consensus regarding the real power situation of the major parties — in this case, Russia as well as China and the United States. Conflict can become real when the parties, acting on significantly different subjective visions of the objective situation, come into collision. The purpose of conflict will be to demonstrate what the real power relationships have become and to establish some new consensus. Avoidance of conflict requires peaceful development of such a consensus, for which prerequisites will be acceptance by previously dominant countries that we are witnessing the emergence of a new distribution of power in which relative weights are shifting away from the United States and its allies, although the absolute political and economic power of these nations is and will remain considerable.”

    Andrew Cornford — counselor at Observatoire de la Finance, past staff member of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), with special responsibility for financial regulation and international trade in financial services

    “…foster friendly and mutually fruitful relations…”

    “Does the world need to contain China? The USA? Itself? To contain oneself is always good advice, and if we look at the way the world economy abuses the planet, the world ought indeed to contain itself. However, to struggle to contain another party normally provokes a hostile reaction, and things go from bad to worse. Better to converse with it and thus to foster friendly and mutually fruitful relations. Trade is a form of that kind of conversation. As Adam Smith said, “It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society … universal opulence.”

    Edward Dommen — specialist in economic ethics, former university professor and researcher at UNCTAD and president of Geneva’s Ecumenical Workshop in Theology.

    “…climate change will do more to change China…”

    “Containing China may be too big a task, and not all the world necessarily agrees on this goal. Indeed, it’s questionable if a deliberate policy of containing another country, and thereby not allowing many to achieve their human potential, is morally justified. Certainly, we should robustly oppose her monstrous conduct in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong and counter the Chinese Communist Party’s unacceptable behavior, for example, in trade and IP [intellectual property] in a targeted manner. But the demographics of an aging and gender skewed population, and the devastating effects of climate change will do more to change China than any containment strategy. One final thought: Should the world have contained the US when it destroyed indigenous peoples or practiced slavery?

    Kara Tan Bhala — president and founder of Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics

    “…two comprehensively different conceptions of the world…”

    “As Xi Jinping continues to steer the Middle Kingdom out of its historical isolation, avoiding challenging the United States for the position of world leader will be difficult, given China’s demographics and economic status. These two Weltanschauungen, two comprehensively different conceptions of the world, sooner or later will present the international community with a choice. Xi is well aware that the Biden administration can finally change course for the US and its allies, forging a united and progressive front after years of populist, nativist and authoritarian politics. Perhaps this element can help understand Xi’s assertiveness at the last World Economic Forum better than the recent economic successes. After all, political and civil rights are China’s Achilles’ heel.”

    Valerio Bruno — researcher in politics and senior research fellow at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR).

    “…obliging China to follow the rules…”

    “Present international relations cannot be correctly interpreted in the Cold War terms. The current confrontation between the United States and China is not Cold War 2.0 — it has a different nature. A historicist attempts to adapt the strategy of containment to post-Cold War realities are doomed to failure. The heterogeneous world is not able to be either an opponent or a proponent of the People’s Republic of China; only the consolidated West can be such an actor. China is a revisionist power. [It] criticizes the liberal world order but does not offer a realistic alternative. The most effective way to minimize Beijing’s destructive influence is to improve a rule-based order, and therefore a liberal order, by obliging China to follow those rules.

    Yuriy Temirov — associate professor, dean of the Faculty of History and International Relations at Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University in Ukraine

    *[A version of this article was originally published by From Virus to Vitamin and Agefi.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Oregon house expels Republican who helped far-right rioters enter capitol

    A Republican politician who on Thursday became the first representative ever expelled from the Oregon state house said the people he covertly let into the state capitol in December were “mostly blue-haired old ladies”.In fact they were far-right agitators, among them members of Patriot Prayer, a far-right group often involved in street violence, and people toting guns and Confederate flags and wearing militia regalia. Some attacked law enforcement officers with bear spray. Outside, reporters were assaulted and doors broken. Police struggled to force the rioters back.Widely seen CCTV footage from 21 December, when the state legislature was in special session and closed to the public, showed Republican Mike Nearman opening a door for agitators there to protest against coronavirus-related public health measures.In January, the Oregon house speaker, Tina Kotek, called for Nearman’s resignation, for putting “every person in the capitol in serious danger”.Referring to the 6 January riot in Washington DC by supporters of Donald Trump, she added: “As we tragically saw … during the insurrection at the United States Capitol, the consequences [in Oregon] could have been much worse.”Representatives of both parties called for Nearman to quit. Then, this month, new video surfaced in which Nearman described how the covert entry would work – and how he would deny knowledge if confronted.“We’re talking about setting up Operation Hall Pass,” he said, “which I don’t know anything about and if you accuse me of knowing something about, I’ll deny it. But there would be some person’s cellphone.”Nearman then gave out his number, claiming “that was just random numbers that I screened up. That’s not anybody’s actual cellphone. And if you say ‘I am at the west entrance’ during a session in [a] text to that number there, that somebody might exit that door while you’re standing there.“But I don’t know anything about that, I don’t have anything to do with that, and if I did, I wouldn’t say that I did. But anyway, the number that I didn’t say was [the number first mentioned]. So don’t text that number. But a number like that. Make sure you say what exit you’re at too.”In an interview on rightwing radio, Nearman said he had been speaking to the Oregon Citizens Lobby, which he said was “mostly blue-haired old ladies” but which local media called “right-leaning”.Nearman claimed to have been being “flippant” as he described his scheme, but also said he didn’t agree with closing the capitol and was willing to pay the price for his actions.That price includes charges of official misconduct and criminal trespass on which Nearman was arraigned in May, the same month he told conservative radio he had “a really bad case of Covid and I’m kind of on the mend a little bit”. Another hearing is scheduled.On Thursday, Nearman was ejected from the state House by a vote of 59-1. His seat will probably remain empty until the end of the session, later this month. More

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    How much trouble is Rudy Giuliani in? Politics Weekly Extra

    As an investigation and lawsuit hang over the former New York mayor and lawyer to Donald Trump, Jonathan Freedland finds out about the man from biographer Andrew Kirtzman

    How to listen to podcasts: everything you need to know

    In April, the apartment of Donald Trump’s lawyer Rudy Giuliani was searched as part of an investigation into his dealings with Ukraine. He’s also facing a lawsuit over claims of pushing baseless conspiracy theories about the 2020 election, but denies any wrongdoing in either case.The Giuliani name is rarely out of the spotlight. Now his son Andrew has announced he will run for governor of New York, the state where his father was once hailed as ‘America’s mayor’ in New York City after handling the tragedy of 9/11.Jonathan Freedland speaks to biographer Andrew Kirtzman, who is currently writing his second book on Giuliani, about his eventful career and life to find out where he goes from here. Send us your questions and feedback to podcasts@theguardian.com Help support the Guardian by going to gu.com/supportpodcasts More