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      Pakistan’s New “Geoeconomics” Lawfare

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      Of late, statements from the highest level in Pakistan’s government have urged the global community to build a relationship with the country centered around “geoeconomic security.”  The new policy posture is aimed at the Biden administration, but it appears in equal proportion in Pakistan’s recent diplomatic overtures to other countries.

      In the past, Pakistan’s global pitch was peppered with terms such as “geostrategic pivot” — an umbrella concept for military and security nuances — to emphasize its indispensability in South Asia. This predisposition informed the overall trajectory of the US–Pakistan relationship since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, as well as the burgeoning China–Pakistan bonhomie that has manifested through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

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      Pakistan’s sojourn from “geostrategy” to “geoeconomics” is led by the country’s national security adviser, Moeed Yusuf. In his speech at the Wilson Center in January, Yusuf reminded the United States that it would be engaging with a “very different Pakistan” that is now focused on the “economic security paradigm.” He said Pakistan should be seen beyond the Afghanistan “prism” as an economic partner. He also cautioned against viewing Pakistan from a “third country lens and keeping India at the center of all conversations.”

      Similar sentiments were echoed later during the launch of a report titled, “Pak-Americana — Ushering in a New Era of Pakistan–U.S. Relations,” published by Tabadlab, an Islamabad-based think tank. The speakers at the event unerringly ground the future of US–Pakistan relations in economic terms. This paradigm shift was also mentioned by Prime Minister Imran Khan during his recent trip to Sri Lanka, which he invited to join the CPEC.

      Interestingly, Pakistan’s new pitch has also gone in lockstep with recent international publications. For example, writing for the Atlantic Council, Shamila Chaudhary and Vali Nasr have argued that Pakistan’s strategic calculus has changed over the years and US policy toward the country should be informed by considerations of a broad-based economic partnership.

      The Driver

      The underlying driver behind these new policy utterances could be the attempted pushback against entrenched perceptions in US policy circles where Pakistan has been viewed with suspicion. In the best of times, Pakistan has been seen as a security hedge for protecting US regional interests. Since 9/11, the US–Pakistan relationship has been largely about the South Asian nation conducting counterterrorism operations and supporting US military action in Afghanistan. Lately, Pakistan has been trying to put an end to the 20-year-long war in Afghanistan to help the US extricate itself from the Afghan imbroglio.

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      It is therefore no surprise that Islamabad’s geoeconomic messaging attempts to clear the air about the misconception that Pakistan’s relationship with China is a bar to broader US–Pakistan cooperation. The thrust is to decouple Pakistan’s relationship with China and to showcase it as a “neutral” partner of the US.

      What possibly ungirds Pakistan’s embrace of geoeconomics? After all, this would be a major breakaway from entrenched patterns of the past. Pakistan is perceived to firmly reside in the Chinese camp, which explains former US Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells’ animus toward the CPEC, which she vehemently criticized for its “predatory loans” and “lack of transparency.”

      Despite China and Pakistan embarking on the ambitious CPEC some seven years ago, the Pakistani economy remains its Achilles’ heel. A quick economic turnaround does not seem to be on the horizon with the country on the Financial Action Task Force’s gray list since June 2018. With peace in Afghanistan also a distant prospect, Pakistan’s strategic choices made over the years seem to have outlived their utility.

      It is perhaps in this context that Pakistan has realized that stale policy positions need to be discarded. A realization seems to have crept in that if Pakistan is to resurrect its economy and, concomitantly, enhance its global stature, it would have to appear “sexy” and offer the world something more than its geostrategic location.

      Giving It Some Thought

      If this policy direction is meaningfully implemented, it augurs well for Pakistan’s future. However, to convince the world to view it from a new lens, the country will need to give a concrete direction to this new strand of thought. 

      First, Pakistan will have to provide an equal opportunity level playing field to all countries looking to develop a broader economic relationship with it. This will mean undoing the perception of elusiveness surrounding CPEC and the “guilt-by-association” blemish on Pakistan that is largely the result of the broader US–China power rivalry. It would be equally important for Pakistan to balance things out vis-à-vis China, which now has deeply entrenched strategic and economic interests in Pakistan. 

      Second, Pakistan’s India-centric lens that has only blurred its policy vision will need to change. This will require Pakistan to delink its relationship with the US and other countries from India, in the same vein that those countries have delinked their India relationship from their relationship with Pakistan. The increasing coziness between the US and India is a reality that Pakistan cannot wish away. Despite the animosity with India, Pakistan must never close the door for dialogue because a sustainable geoeconomic integration will eventually require an India–Pakistan thaw. The recent announcement by top military officials of India and Pakistan to strictly observe all agreements and the ceasefire along the Line of Control — the frontier that separates Indian-controlled and Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir — is a much-needed respite.

      Faced with some cold, hard facts, Pakistan seems to be undergoing a policy catharsis. Instead of getting sucked into global and regional power rivalries, it has wisely extended an olive branch to the US and the world at large. It is too early in the day to know how Pakistan’s new strategic posture will interact with political developments in South Asia. However, for its geoeconomics foray to be truly protean in nature, Pakistan’s best bet is to become a regional bridge of connectivity that is firmly hinged on transnational economic pursuits, instead of being tethered to stale hyperbolic policy postures that have led the country nowhere.   

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      What an Afghan Peace Deal Could Look Like

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      In a recent interview with the BBC, President Ashraf Ghani insisted that the condition for peace in Afghanistan depends on the condition of the war. First, according to him, Afghan security forces need international support due to intensifying violence by armed groups, including the Taliban. Second, without addressing Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, the situation with the conflict will not change. “My message is those who provide sanctuaries to the Taliban should be talked very straight,” he said. “There’s so many fears of collapse into civil war.”

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      His message is for the Biden administration to have serious talks with officials in Pakistan, the Taliban’s main supporter. Ghani added that the only way he would leave the office to compromise for peace is via an election, while the Taliban does not yet recognize elections as a legitimate political mechanism. The Taliban want Ghani to resign and for Afghanistan’s political system to change back to their Islamic emirate of the 1990s or something similar to it.

      The Doha Deal

      Since the first round of the intra-Afghan peace talks in September 2020, violence in Afghanistan has intensified, while the negotiations resumed just last week after a six-month delay. The Doha deal, signed by the Taliban and the Trump administration early last year in Qatar, has failed to stop the violence in the country. Shortly after his inauguration in January 2021, US President Joe Biden launched a review of the Doha deal to determine whether the Taliban have upheld their commitments to cut ties with other militant groups and engage in meaningful peace talks with the Afghan government.

      Pakistan has urged the Biden administration to “persevere” with the Doha agreement and not attempt to amend it. The deal gave the Taliban the upper hand and undermined the Afghan government. The agreement excluded the Afghan government and allowed the Taliban to gain legitimacy, while also mandating that US and NATO troops leave the country within 14 months if militants uphold their end of the bargain. For Pakistan, while this is a step in the “right direction” for peace talks, as per Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, it also enhanced the Taliban’s position and made regime change in Kabul a real possibility.  

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      Although the war has a complicated domestic dimension, it is effectively a proxy conflict that Pakistan has waged against the Afghan government amidst perceived Indian influence in Afghanistan. From Pakistan’s point of view, Afghanistan has changed into an Indian playground and the Taliban are the only force that can secure Pakistani interests. As a result, the Afghan peace process also has a complicated regional dimension.  

      At the same time, the Taliban’s ideological system has proved to be inflexible for a democratic process that upholds citizens’ rights, leading to concerns about the Taliban seeking to build a new regime based on discrimination. Considering the strategic nature of proxy war, the history of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Taliban’s ideology, the following four scenarios are conceivable if the Biden administration underestimates the situation.

      Scenario 1: A Civil War Without the Government

      The Taliban insurgency has reduced the government’s territorial control, limiting it to urban cities and district centers. This has increased the likelihood of Taliban attacks on large cities.

      In the first scenario, the Taliban would seek to conquer and control through violence, leading to the collapse of the government and a descent into all-out civil war. In such a situation, the ground is prepared for mass atrocities due to ethnic tension, poverty and the presence of other militias, such as the Islamic State-Khorasan, an affiliate of ISIS. Just imagine the war affecting cities like the capital Kabul with millions of people. Political crises are rife in Afghanistan, which would be exacerbated by the early withdrawal of NATO forces. Therefore, the pullout of foreign troops according to the Doha agreement’s timetable is a cause for alarm. Under the deal, all US and NATO troops are scheduled to leave the country by May 1.

      This scenario is more likely to happen if the government is dismantled in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement between the Afghan officials and the Taliban. There are growing calls for Ghani to step down to pave the way for an interim government that includes the Taliban. However, an interim administration without the presence of a peace deal — one that includes mechanisms to ensure it is upheld — is risky. Such a scenario makes it hard to keep the Afghan security forces united if another round of violence erupts under an interim administration. This would be especially the case if the international community does not have a strategy for securing such a fragile peace arrangement.

      Scenario 2: A Civil War Despite the Government

      Another danger is that the withdrawal of US and NATO forces will take place without a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In this scenario, the government would not completely collapse if it mobilizes anti-Taliban forces and receives foreign support, but violence would spread from rural areas to populated cities.

      As a result, government officials would retreat to an area outside Kabul and continue their fight against militants as long as they have international recognition and receive support from foreign powers — possibly India, Russia and Iran. This situation is similar to what President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government faced in the 1990s amidst an insurgency by Taliban militants. That administration withdrew from Kabul but continued its role in the conflict and retained international backing.

      In the second scenario, the war takes on a local context, with violence in pockets around the country. In order to survive, the government would ally with local forces. The government would not have the ability to mount a viable challenge against the Taliban and other armed groups, and its role would largely be reduced to a symbolic one. At the same time, it would be extremely hard for the Taliban to conquer the whole country. Anti-Taliban forces — from the constituency of the old Northern Alliance — would still fight them.

      Scenario 3: Parallel Balance With the Government

      In the third scenario, the Taliban challenge the government through greater territorial control and contestation, but the government would not completely collapse. Instead, it would retain control of large cities and many other areas.

      An example of a parallel balance is Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the Shia organization has both political and military wings. In practice, however, the Taliban have already achieved this by controlling 75 of 405 districts in Afghanistan and contested another 189. As soon as a ceasefire is reached, as per this scenario, the political landscape of some districts under Taliban control and others under government authority would be officially recognized.

      Interestingly, both the government and the Taliban are not in favor of such a situation. The Taliban want complete control of Afghanistan, while the government wants the Taliban to be integrated into the current political system. Under this scenario, international assistance to the Afghan government could continue, but without Pakistan’s cooperation, nothing would change and the Taliban would push on with their insurgency. This scenario is likely if the US and other NATO members continue their support for the government.  

      Scenario 4: Maximum Balance From Within, But Without the Government

      In the final scenario, military and political pressure is exerted on the government to accept a fragile peace agreement that meets the Taliban’s demands. The Taliban impose their type of political system, which gives them religious legitimacy and allows them to influence other political and social forces. A peace deal under the Taliban’s terms would enable them to eventually take over — or have the upper hand in — the legislature and the judiciary system. Besides, the Taliban are estimated to have tens of thousands of fighters and, under such a peace deal, they would either join the security forces or remain armed as parallel forces ready to take action, if necessary.

      This scenario may seem like a soft conquest, but it could easily turn violent. The international community’s departure from Afghanistan and the unrealistic optimism about the Taliban’s ideological position and proxy relations may contribute to such a situation. Pakistan supports this version of a peace agreement to place the Taliban in Afghanistan’s polity to have a dominating position. This scenario is not acceptable for many people in Afghanistan and could create a fragile situation that would likely lead to violence at some point.

      Moving Forward for a Durable Peace

      A durable peace arrangement is only likely when both sides consider several key factors. These include what a possible peace agreement would look like, its implementation, what the future political system would involve and how citizens’ rights are ensured.

      First, there is a need to put pressure on Pakistan to take action against Taliban sanctuaries inside that country. At the very least, Pakistan must ensure there is a reduction in violence and that the Taliban are flexible when it negotiates with the Afghan government. Otherwise, it is hard to imagine a sustainable peace in the context of a proxy war. At the same time, Afghanistan should be neutral when it comes to regional politics, and its future should not depend on the rivalry between India and Pakistan.

      Second, a power-sharing process with the Taliban should be based on transparency. A peace agreement must be mutually agreed and include multiple stages of implementation and international monitoring. However, a power-sharing arrangement should be part of the peace agreement, not the other way around. The implementation of power-sharing before a peace agreement is highly risky and could lead to the collapse of the political order.

      Third, citizens’ and women’s rights and democratic legitimacy should be the basis of the future political system. Otherwise, in a country as diverse as Afghanistan, sustainable peace is not possible.

      Fourth, a political system that focuses on the separation of powers is necessary. Ensuring that political power is not concentrated in one party’s hands, such as the Taliban’s, would protect Afghanistan from the misuse of power.

      Therefore, to ensure peace in Afghanistan and the responsible withdrawal of foreign troops, it is crucial for the Biden administration to consider the implication of the war’s proxy dynamics on peacemaking efforts. When it comes to the domestic context, without considering the country’s sociopolitical diversity and citizens’ rights, it would be extremely hard to think about lasting peace.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Why Are India’s Farmers Protesting?

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      Indian farmers have lately made international headlines. Popstar Rihanna, actor Susan Sarandon and activist Greta Thunberg have taken up their cause. Ozy, a glitzy Silicon Valley publication posed a provocative question: “Will the World Step In?”

      The story playing out in international media appears to be a simple one. Indian farmers are the noble David standing up to an evil Goliath-like government beholden to greedy billionaires. In an era of increasing inequality and decreasing social mobility, this narrative resonates. The fact that elite journalists in New Delhi or New York see the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a Hindu fascist party adds to its appeal.

      Publications such as Ozy convey that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has brought in agricultural reforms solely to benefit large corporations. As per this narrative, the government is in thrall to big business and against poor farmers. Is this narrative true, or is there something more complicated going on?

      The Burden of History

      Ever since the British Raj, Indian farmers have led tough lives. The colonial power imposed extortionate taxes on farmers, taking away at least 45% of harvests, often confiscating the whole yield. British imperialists took Niccolo Machiavelli’s advice to heart and patronized a new feudal class of landlords to act as their middlemen. They did the dirty work of squeezing farmers, enabling them to escape much of the blame. The British also created an extractive colonial bureaucracy to suck wealth out from India. Few realize that the primary job of the now-glamorous district collector — an elite civil servant who does the job elected mayors do in western democracies — was to collect taxes from poor Indian farmers.

      Writing in The World Financial Review last year, Kalim Siddiqui explained in some detail why famine stalked British India. Great Britain industrialized and became a great power partly through ruthless exploitation of farmers in what are now India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which then comprised British India. As a result, millions died of starvation, and those who survived the famines suffered constant malnourishment.

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      The first priority for independent India was feeding its people. Indian farmers were dirt poor with no access to credit, reliable irrigation or modern agricultural tools and farming methods. They were often in the clutches of predatory moneylenders. Yet farmers had experience of mass movements. Mahatma Gandhi led his first satyagraha in Champaran against exploitation by British landlords, mobilizing thousands of poor farmers. In India’s new democracy, farmers might have been poor but, for the first time in centuries, they wielded real political power.

      That power has carried over to today. Even as India has urbanized, farmers disproportionately decide elections. A staggering 83.5% of seats in the Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of Parliament, still primarily comprise rural areas. The political power of farmers has given them many benefits. Since 1947, governments have formulated multiple economic policies to overcome India’s colonial-era rural poverty. India abolished zamindari, an indigenous form of landlordship, immediately after independence. It overturned centuries of tradition by abolishing income tax for farmers. A key purpose of the 1969 bank nationalization was to provide cash-starved farmers access to credit.

      The Green Revolution

      In the 1960s, India launched its famous Green Revolution, which subsidized farmers in India’s northwest region, comprising the states of Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh. This part of the country is a flat fertile plain irrigated by Himalayan snow-fed perennial rivers and with relatively large landholdings. Inspired by the American agronomist Norman Borlaug, India’s government encouraged farmers in this region to grow high-yield varieties of wheat, rice and cotton. It also gave farmers massive subsidies for fertilizers, seeds and equipment, investing large sums of capital to build dams and a network of canals and giving farmers access to easy credit. As a result, the farmers of landholding communities in northwest India became the most prosperous in the country.

      The Green Revolution ended India’s ship-to-mouth existence. India’s population had exploded after independence in 1947. In a poor country, agriculture was inefficient and rain-fed. A bad monsoon meant poor harvests. Demand would outstrip supply and the specter of famine was never far off. Until production took off in India, the US supplied grains to Indian masses under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, commonly known as PL–480 or Food for Peace. Lyndon B. Johnson limited even critical famine aid to India, demanding the country implement agricultural reforms and temper criticism of US intervention in Vietnam. The Green Revolution provided India with food security after two centuries of rapacious British rule.

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      Yet like any policy, the Green Revolution had unintended consequences. In 2009, Daniel Zwerdling chronicled how this fabled revolution was “heading for collapse.” With an emphasis on high-yield varieties, the traditional mix of crops grown in the region for centuries has been abandoned. Yields increased dramatically but only through an insatiable thirst for water. Groundwater levels have fallen by 75%-85% over the decade. In Punjab and Haryana, farmers are boring deeper and deeper for water. In 2018, 61% of wells were dug deeper than 10 meters. In a land crisscrossed by rivers fed by Himalayan snow, such water levels mark historic lows. India might have achieved food security at the cost of water security.

      Parts of India are not just running out of water. The soil itself is turning toxic. Intense use of fertilizers and pesticides over decades has pumped harmful chemicals into the soil. More than 10 years ago, astute journalists like Daniel Pepper were reporting on villagers who spoke about rising cases of cancer, renal failure, stillborn babies and birth defects. These health problems have increased since. Researchers attribute these conditions to the “overuse and misuse of pesticides and herbicides.” As Pepper reported in 2008, Punjab comprised 1.5% of India’s area but accounted for nearly 20% of the country’s pesticide consumption. Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh suffer similarly high soil pollution and consequent health problems.

      Another consequence of the Green Revolution has been the overproduction of cereals. So much wheat and rice are produced that a storage crisis has ensued. India now lacks the capacity to store grains, with millions of tons are stockpiled in poor conditions. In particular, India lacks cold storage facilities for fruits and vegetables because of restrictions on farmers, the stranglehold of Agricultural Produce Market Committees (APMCs) and a lack of incentives for the private sector to invest in the rural economy.

      A Soviet Procurement System

      After independence, India opted for the Soviet economic model. Five-year plans set out ambitious targets for a command-and-control economy. The so-called quota-permit-license raj emerged, with bureaucrats dictating “which company would produce what, but also the amount of production, as well as the price of commodities.” Agriculture was no different. In a top-down, command-and-control system, the government set targets that farmers had to meet.

      In an indigenous twist to the Soviet system, India created the institution of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee. Thousands of APMCs were to run local agricultural markets, known as mandis. Farmers could only sell to APMC-controlled mandis and only at fixed prices. Unlike their American or European counterparts, Indian farmers could not sell wheat or rice on the open market. This prohibition had two reasons. First, APMCs allowed the government to control both production and price in its planned economy model. Second, APMCs were meant to protect farmers from the vagaries of the free market and save them from exploitation.

      Over time, APMCs become the new oppressors. Local politicians and special interest groups came to control APMCs. Since they were the only buyers by law, APMC mandis began to set ceilings on what farmers received for their produce, offering precipitously low prices. Commission agents started taking greater cuts. APMCs delayed payments to farmers, forcing them to borrow from “[commission agents], local money lenders and savings for their daily expenses.” In addition, APMCs rarely gave receipts to farmers. This meant that they were denied the option of applying to banks for much cheaper credit. Instead, they were pushed into India’s infamous informal economy and became prey to exploitative lending. Tragically, inevitable and unbearable debt burdens have led to thousands of farmer suicides.

      Apart from the APMCs, the government instituted a minimum price support mechanism as part of its planned economy model. New Delhi wanted high and stable production of key crops. Farmers wanted, and still want, stable income. In a pure market system, too much production leads to falling prices. This is not ideal for farmers. Therefore, they are careful to avoid overproduction. So, India’s economic planners instituted a system that provided a floor below which prices would not fall, encouraging farmers to grow crops deemed essential for food security and economic interests.

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      Over time, powerful lobbies in northwestern India, the heartland of the Green Revolution, pressured the government to put the minimum support price well above the price the market would have otherwise set. What began as limited support to ensure price and production stability eventually morphed into a substantial taxpayer-funded direct subsidy.

      Support prices differed widely from one state to another. At the same time, restrictive laws compelled farmers to sell to designated APMCs within their districts. Crossing state and even district boundaries to get a better price for their produce was illegal and could land farmers in jail. For instance, Punjab’s support prices have been higher than those in Bihar. Therefore, Bihari farmers have been illegally selling paddy to markets in Punjab at a price lower than the minimum support price but higher than what they would get back home. A flourishing black market and widespread corruption emerged as a result.

      New Agricultural Reforms

      In December 2019, the parliamentary standing committee on agriculture published a major report. It concluded that APMC markets were not working in the interest of farmers. Instead, they were reducing competition, causing cartelization of traders and unduly deducting money due to farmers through market fees and commission charges. Corruption and malpractices in APMCs were rife. The committee observed that “there [was] urgent need for radical reform” and asked the government to inform parliament “about steps taken in this direction within three months.” It is noteworthy that the opposition and farmers’ unions agreed with the committee’s observations.

      Last year, the government finally instituted long overdue agricultural reforms. Several economists and policy wonks welcomed them, arguing that these reforms would “unshackle farmers from the restrictive marketing regime that has managed the marketing of agriculture produce for decades.” In their view, these reforms promised “to bring the entire world of farming technology, post-harvest management and marketing channels at the doorstep of the farmer.”

      The reforms have three key aspects. First, farmers will be able to sell their produce to anyone, including agricultural businesses, supermarket chains, online grocers or, as before, APMC mandis. The key difference from the status quo is that farmers are no longer required to sell only to APMC mandis. A Bihari farmer would now have the legal right to sell in Punjab and vice versa without fear of arrest.

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      Second, the reforms have created a framework for agricultural commercial agreements. When farmers engage directly with processors, agri-business firms and large retailers, their counterparties will have to guarantee a price and make timely payments. Third, regulations on farm produce have been simplified and eased. The command-and-control system that determined the crops or quantities farmers would grow is being dismantled. Only in extraordinary circumstances such as war, famine, a natural calamity or an extraordinary price rise will the government have the right to direct production of cereals, pulses, oilseeds, edible oils, onions, potatoes or any other crops.

      In 2020, agricultural reforms became inevitable because of the COVID-19 pandemic. A nationwide lockdown caused a massive migration of urban workers back to their villages. This increased pressure on already scarce land — something needed to be done. Restrictive laws on sale, pricing and storage of produce had to go. Therefore, after two decades of endless discussion, reforms finally transpired. They seek to increase investment in agriculture, boost farmer incomes and create a national agricultural market to emerge for the first time since India’s independence.

      Who Is Protesting and Why?

      From the outset, the reforms have proved controversial. In September, the BBC wondered whether they were a “death warrant” for farmers. Some farmers worry whether the reforms might lead to the end of wholesale markets and guaranteed prices. Currently, the government offers a minimum support price that acts as a safety net for farmers. Even though the government has promised to retain such a price, farmers fear its withdrawal over time.

      There is an added fear that big private players will offer good money to farmers in the beginning, kill off their competition and then pay little for agricultural produce. Farmers might go from the local monopsonies of the APMCs to the national oligopoly of Amazon-like behemoths. It is important to remember that the government offers price support only for the staple crops of the Green Revolution. Other crops do not qualify, nor do fruits and vegetables.

      Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming number of protesters are farmers from India’s northwest, the region that has benefited most from the old system. In particular, they belong to Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, the birthplace of the Green Revolution. In 2018-19, APMCs procured 73% and 80% of the total wheat production in Punjab and Haryana respectively at a minimum support price. This was higher than the market price, but a hefty chunk of the support price ends up in the hands of middlemen through various fees and charges. Unknown to most, price support does not necessarily mean income support in the current system.

      Farmers in the Himalayas, the Nilgiris or most other parts of India never benefited from the status quo. As a result, farmers in 25 of India’s 28 states and all eight union territories have not taken to the streets. The Shetkari Sanghatana, a Maharashtra-based farmers’ union founded by the economist-turned-farmer leader Sharad Joshi, and other unions support the government’s agricultural reforms.

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      The late Joshi was convinced that “the root cause of farmers’ problems lay in their limited access to the market.” As per this farmer leader, open and competitive markets, instead of a top-down command-and-control agricultural economy, served farmer interests better. Joshi opposed the APMCs, and his organization naturally supports recent reforms. In fact, it wants to go much further. It wants the government to remove the ban on the export of onions and threatened to pelt BJP MPs with onion bulbs if the government fails to do so.

      Journalists unfamiliar with rural India, including those working for the market-friendly Financial Times, have failed to capture this nuance. Not all farmers are protesting. Protests are largely confined to Punjab, Haryana and Jat strongholds in western Uttar Pradesh. This northwest region around Delhi comprises less than 8% of the Indian population. It elects 38 out of 543 MPs in the Lok Sabha, but its proximity to the capital gives it disproportionate power. Home to the Green Revolution, it has benefited from massive government spending for decades.

      As per the managing editor of the Financial Express, farming households in Punjab get an average of $2,385 per year in fertilizer and electricity subsidies alone. Irrigation subsidies account for another $190 per year. Households in Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh benefit from other subsidies as well. To put these figures into context, in 2019, GDP per capita in India was less than $2,100, with most farmers earning a much lower figure.

      Many of those protesting are large farmers from northwestern India. Some of their family members are part of the Indian diaspora in Australia, Canada, the UK, the US and elsewhere. Some of them continue to be absentee landlords. They have petitioned their representatives to raise the issue with the Indian government, organized demonstrations and raised the matter with the press. As a result, a narrative has emerged in the English-speaking press that is not entirely unbiased.

      On January 26, India’s Republic Day, protesting farmers marched through New Delhi. Some attacked the police, destroyed public property and flew flags on the Mughal-built Red Fort from where prime ministers address the nation. This caused outrage and weakened the movement. However, Rakesh Tikait, a farmer leader, rallied his protesters with an emotive appeal. He broke down in tears and threatened to hang himself if the BJP government did not repeal its reforms. Tikait is the son of the late farmer leader Mahendra Singh Tikait who took over the nation’s capital with nearly 500,000 farmers in 1988. Per the Indian press, Rakesh Tikait is a former policeman with assets worth 80 crore rupees ($11 million), a significant sum for a farmer in India.

      It is clear that the likes of Tikait are not poor, helpless farmers crushed by debt, contemplating suicide. They form part of the almost feudal elite that has dominated the APMCs and the rural economy for decades. Many media outlets fail to realize that such farmers have enjoyed price support, subsidies on agricultural inputs, free electricity, waived water charges, cheap credit from the state-led banking sector and no tax on farm income. They are the winners of the old system and are desperate not to lose what they have.

      Small farmers in northwestern India have joined large farmers too. They fear the unknown. Since British rule, agrarian distress has been persistent in India. Well-meaning measures like APMCs have backfired. The Indian countryside faces the unique challenge of extreme overpopulation. Low productivity, fragmented landholdings, lack of storage infrastructure, high indebtedness, strangulating red tape and entrenched corruption have held rural India back and caused simmering discontent. Leaders like Tikait are tapping into this discontent much like Donald Trump harnessed the rage of those left behind.

      What Lies Ahead?

      The government has clearly been shaken by the duration and intensity of the protests. Sustained negative media coverage in the West has rattled New Delhi. For decades, the West in general and the US in particular criticized India’s agricultural subsidies. At the World Trade Organization (WTO), the US consistently argued that Indian subsidies distort trade. The WTO has been a hostile place for India. Over the last three years, Canada raised 65 questions against India’s farm policies. Australia has complained against India’s sugar subsidies. Yet reform has led to brickbats, not plaudits, in Western capitals.

      In fact, contrary to many press reports, the government has behaved with remarkable restraint. It did not act against protesters even when they blocked highways and hindered railway traffic. Swarajya, a center-right publication, called for the government to “demonstrate it [meant] business when it comes to law and order.” Yet it did nothing. When British coal miners challenged Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s authority, she used mounted police to crack down on them.

      Embed from Getty Images

      In contrast, the Modi government has been rather conciliatory, engaging in 11 rounds of talks with protesters. The government offered key concessions and proposed amendments to its reforms. In the final round, the government even offered to suspend the implementation of its reforms for 18 months. Protest leaders rejected this offer and demanded nothing less than a complete repeal of all reforms. No government was likely to accept such an intemperate demand, especially one that was reelected with a thumping majority in 2019.

      The Economist, a longtime critic of Modi and the BJP, takes the view that “agronomists and economists are in nearly uniform agreement” with India’s agricultural reforms. It attributes protests to the “trust deficit” of the BJP government. The publication sees large-scale cold storage as the most obvious benefit of the reforms. Such storage would involve removing limits on stockpiling commodities for future sale. Farmers fear that this could give large companies too much power and undue advantage. They could buy large quantities of produce from farmers within a few days of harvest, hoard this produce and sell it when the price was high.

      Such fears of change are only natural. No entrenched system changes without upheaval even when the status quo is untenable. The Indian agricultural system no longer works, economically, environmentally or ethically. Agriculture needs investment. Neither the government nor the farmers have the ability to provide this investment. In the post-1991 world, India’s private sector has been a success. It is the only player in the Indian economy with the ability to invest in the villages. Hence, Modi has called for a greater role for the private sector in an unexpectedly candid parliamentary speech.

      Despite the current sound and fury, India’s farmer protests will simmer down. Like the Green Revolution, India’s agricultural reforms will have intended and unintended consequences, both positive and negative. 

      Finally, it may be prudent to think about agriculture in the global context. Most countries subsidize agriculture in one way or another for reasons ranging from food security to cultural preservation. The country of Jean Jacques Rousseau has championed the Common Agricultural Policy. Even the free-market US is generous with its farm subsidies. If either France or the United States were to implement agricultural reforms, demonstrations would ensue, legislators would face pressure from electors and sections of the media would accuse them of one sin or another. India is doing something that both the EU and the US may need — but have not yet dared — to do.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 125 Shares119 Views

      in World Politics

      Can India and Nepal Find a Path to Peaceful Coexistence?

      by

      When Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla arrived in Kathmandu in late November, he did something that would have seemed impossible just a few months earlier. After landing at Tribhuvan International Airport, instead of continuing to inflame rhetoric over the bitter territorial dispute that had engulfed the two neighbors, he spoke in Nepali about cooperation and connectivity between the two nations. His visit, and the manner of his address, was in sharp contrast to the acidic barbs that had been thrown between the two nations just a few months ago.

      Following Shringla’s trip came the news that Nepal’s foreign minister, Pradeep Gyawali, would make an official visit to New Delhi in December. While this trip was delayed, Gyawali later headed to New Delhi on a three-day state visit in mid-January. Gyawali’s trip, alongside rumors of a potential future trip by Nepali Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli, was to be another significant step in the resetting of ties that had been all but severed over the Lipulekh territorial dispute.

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      Yet hopes for a resumption of strong bilateral relations were severely disrupted when on 21st December when Oli abruptly dissolved parliament, citing a need to seek a fresh mandate amidst rumored upcoming vote of no confidence. In the days that have followed Oli’s highly controversial decision, political attention has been focused solely on who will be taking over the office after Nepal’s new elections to be held in April and May this year. This new political crisis has thrown plans to resolve India and Nepal’s border disputes into disarray.

      Self-Destructive Cycle

      Earlier this year, Lipulekh, a territory situated between the western border of Nepal and the Indian state of Uttarakhand that both India and Nepal claim as their own, became the center of a furious territorial row. After information came to light that a new road through the disputed territory had been inaugurated by India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, Nepal rushed to publish a new state map with Lipulekh and other contested territories firmly inside its borders. A diplomatic standoff ensued. As the media provided daily blow-by-blow updates of the dispute, Indo-Nepal relations lay in tatters. This was only the most recent incident of a series of rows between the two neighboring countries.

      Back in late 2015, a few months after it was rocked by a devastating earthquake and after years of negotiations following the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Nepal promulgated a new constitution. Yet instead of offering congratulations, India promptly blockaded the border for 135 days. In the eyes of many Nepalis, India highjacked an internal crisis and leveraged it for its own ends. Many Madhesi political parties that supported the blockade and now saw it spiral from a debate over citizenship concerns into an acrimonious debate about Indian influence in Nepal had to face the wrath of a public angry at their role in the blockade and the violation of the country’s sovereignty. 

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      The border blockade, deployed to pressure Nepal — already engulfed in violent anti-constitution protests — into making changes to the legislation that India deemed beneficial, halted Nepal’s access to vital goods, medicine and fuel. Even if New Delhi squarely denies its involvement, in the eyes of Nepali people, it is culpable. The blockade had a catastrophic effect on a country that was still struggling with the aftermath of the earthquake. As transport ground to a halt and hospitals were left unable to treat patients, anger on the streets of Kathmandu was palpable. Relations between the two sides seemed to have broken down irreparably.

      Yet just a few months after the blockade was eventually lifted, tensions calmed and, before long, relations returned to normal. This is the self-destructive cycle of Indo-Nepal relations: Just at the point when their relations seem in tatters, normalcy is quietly restored. These spats are as infuriating as they are detrimental. They are often damaging and often result from an incredibly poor foreign policy on both sides. Unfortunately, these political disputes come with a heavy price. For example, the 2015 border blockade exacted a hefty humanitarian cost by leaving millions of Nepalis without access to medicine, food or shelter. These disputes are more than diplomatic squabbles. Instead, they have highly damaging, and occasionally deadly, consequences, with little to no gain.

      Lipulekh is no exception. Now, following the two visits of Harsh Vardhan Shirngla and Pradeep Gyawali, relations were said to be almost back to normal. This appears to be yet another spat that disrupted India-Nepal relations for a few months, only to later burn out. In this case, a return to normalcy means a return to periodic disputes and reconciliation. But why do these spats take place in the first place?

      Foundations for a Positive Relationship

      At first glance, there appears to be little indication as to why relations between the two sides so frequently deteriorate. After all, they have much in common. It would not be untoward to say that neither Nepal nor India could be theoretically closer to any other country than each other. They share an unbroken open border both through the Terai lowlands in the south and in the hills to Nepal’s east and west. The two countries are linked by railheads, highways and a multitude of official and unofficial border crossings and trading posts, not to mention a new cross-border oil pipeline. So important is this connectivity that almost all of Nepal’s foreign imports and exports travel over the Indian border. In comparison, its northern Chinese border lies underutilized and poorly connected.

      It’s not just about physical connections. A wealth of bilateral development projects exists, as do deep military ties. Nepal’s rivers are the source of India’s largest basin systems, and Nepal and India have joint ownership over key dams, such as the huge Kosi barrage. The 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship ensures not just unhindered border access to both sides but also extraordinary close civil and political relations. Millions of Nepalis travel to India for education or work, while around 1 million Indians work in Nepal. 

      They share an immense number of socio-cultural linkages too. A large number of Nepalis understand Hindi, whereas the Nepali language is spoken by approximately 3 million Indians in states such as West Bengal, Sikkim and Assam. Strong religious links exist, with Indian Pandits serving as chief priests in Nepal’s Pashupatinath temple, and each day pilgrims from India throng to Nepal’s Hindu temples and to Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha.

      India played a vital role in Nepal’s own political history, with a myriad of exile political groups, including the Nepali Congress, being founded in Varanasi, Calcutta and Darjeeling between the 1920s and 1940s in order to oppose autocratic Rana rule, while many Quit India activists wanted by the Indian Imperial Police often sought sanctity inside Nepal’s borders. Given these factors, despite years of understanding and mutual cooperation, why do both sides fail to build a strong collaborative partnership?

      A Fractious Relationship

      While looking at a list of similarities, the two sides may be natural allies, yet such bonhomie is compromised by geopolitics. A quick glance at a map shows that Nepal is utterly surrounded by India, falling right in New Delhi’s line of vision, firmly inside its sphere of influence. Moreover, given Nepal’s sensitive Himalayan border with China, India sees it as natural, self-evident even, that it would have a say in the country’s foreign and domestic policy. Given the open border between the two sides, many in New Delhi perceive Nepal’s northern border to be India’s frontier. In other words, whatever happens in Nepal echoes in India.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The familiarity between the two sides leads many in India’s political parties, from the Indian National Congress to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to believe they have the right to influence Nepal’s affairs, almost as if it were any other Indian state. Looking over Nepal’s recent history, India has always been the key external actor. India sees the events surrounding the fall of the Ranas and Nepal’s brief return to democracy in 1950 as something it can take credit for, as it can for the people’s movement in 1990 and the signing of the CPA in 2006. It isn’t just political movements where India feels its influence has been positive. It looks at the numerous hospitals, roads and hydropower plants it built in Nepal and feels a paternalistic sense of achievement. But this exercise of influence causes many issues. At times, this line of thinking borders on India believing that it understands Nepal’s best interests better than Nepal itself, which New Delhi sees as its smaller brother. This is considered highly condescending and patronizing in Nepal. 

      The methods through which India exerts its influence are also controversial, often clumsy and far from covert. In recent years, New Delhi has hidden its self-interest in an altruistic narrative about its concern for Madhesi groups, since 2007 portraying itself as their protector. While successive Nepali governments have indeed repeatedly failed to live up to responsibilities to Madhesi concerns over citizenship and the lack of equitable representation, given India’s own poor record of looking after its own minorities, it seems dubious that any action to protect Nepal’s Madhesi is taken purely out of a rights-based concern.

      This becomes particularly clear given India didn’t raise concerns about the treatment of the Madhesi prior to 2007, as a powerful Madhesi political block that India sought to influence was yet to emerge. India’s defense of Madhesis is politically expedient and explains why New Delhi hasn’t equally taken action to protect the more marginalized parts of Nepalese society. This absence of political benefit explains why India has yet to expend any political capital on Tharu land rights or the welfare of Lepchas or Chepangs. 

      Uncomfortable Truths

      India’s involvement in Nepal is also reflective of the sentiment that India has a right to interfere in Nepal’s affairs. This viewpoint is shared by a large sector of civil society and is widespread in the Indian media. As a result of decades-old comments by Sardar Patel, India’s first deputy prime minister, about the desire to incorporate Nepal and to annex Sikkim, many in India still tend to see the lines that delineate Nepal’s sovereignty as blurred. This belief is rooted so deeply that it has a particular hold on the media and among politicians.

      Occasionally, such sentiments are also fueled by Nepal itself. While numerous Madhesi politicians have openly courted New Delhi, mainstream politicians too have looked to India to influence domestic events in their own favor. The current prime minister, K. P. Oli, who in the last few years has been seen as an ardent nationalist strongly opposed to Indian interference, had very close relations with New Delhi during the negotiations of the 1996 Mahakali treaty. The Maoists and the monarchy have also been known to look to India for support, either tacit or explicit, during the 1996-2006 insurgency.

      However, being reminded of these uncomfortable truths doesn’t always sit well. Many in Nepal look on in anger at the talking heads proclaiming the right to meddle in its affairs, concerned that their own independence is not being respected. Any nuance or subtlety is lost, and debates that are better suited to calmer settings are being played out in the heated environs of the Indian media. This inflames sentient in Nepal, and soon, politicians are provoked into rash statements — and the two sides are at loggerheads again. 

      Embed from Getty Images

      Moreover, it appears that many in India are walking around unaware of the offense and anger they are creating. There is seemingly a lack of understanding in these circles that such actions toward Nepal, far from being seen as paternalistic benevolence, are highly unwelcome meddling. It is hard to believe that, had New Delhi anticipated the anger the border blockade would unleash, it would have undertaken such actions. Not only did Nepal not back down and make the changes to the constitution demanded by New Delhi — albeit some smaller less consequential changes were conceded — India’s public image in Nepal was shattered. A huge amount of political will had been spent, and New Delhi had little to show for it.

      Another example of this lack of self-awareness relates to the Lipulekh case, where Nepal’s decision to repeat its claim of ownership was written off by prominent Indian officials not as legitimate actions taken by a state, but rather as Nepal acting at the behest of China. Nepal is acutely aware of the massive power instability between itself and India, and as such, these comments were taken incredibly badly and only inflamed public sentiment. These recent spats have been further complicated by the arrival of the new narrative that Nepal is “pivoting to China,” clearly a sensitive point for India. This sensitivity is particularly acute when the Himalayas are involved; few in New Delhi have forgotten the humiliation India suffered here at the hands of China in 1962. 

      Admittedly Nepal itself has not helped matters. While accepting Chinese development aid, many politicians have signaled to New Delhi that its influence in Nepal is no more. Moreover, many Nepali politicians have become adept at placing blame on India at a time they themselves are facing accountability for malpractice or poor governance. The nationalist card is not only popular in Kathmandu, but it is also expedient at a time of political crisis. Anger against India is the political well that never runs dry. It is perhaps no surprise that relations between the two sides have broken down a number of times.

      Competing domestic factions within India that make a unified foreign policy harder to develop and implement further complicate relations. While the Communist Party of India and some in the Congress may be more favorable to Nepal, influential members of the BJP take a more combative approach.   

      Both sides need to be careful when it comes to border disputes. India has well over seven decades worth of militarized border disputes with Pakistan and China that have derailed chances of reconciliation. Recent clashes between the Indian and the Chinese army in Ladakh and the disputes in Arunachal Pradesh show how tense these stand-offs can become and how the inability to solve lingering issues will remain a bottleneck for the development of robust bilateral relations. Nepal and India need to calmly negotiate a fair and acceptable settlement for Lipulekh and the adjacent areas if there is to be any chance of long-term stability.

      The Fallout

      This damaging cycle of Indo-Nepal relations is hugely detrimental to both sides. Instead of stable long-term bilateral partnerships, the two countries are locked into a pattern of disputes. While relations never fail entirely — there is too much at stake and the two sides are too interconnected to risk any serious rupture — this is simply not good enough for two neighboring countries, let alone those that share an open border.

      The millions of people who live along and depend on the India-Nepal border do not have the luxury of breaking relations even temporarily over differences in political opinion. They are reliant on leaders in both countries to keep a working relationship on track and ensure they do not unjustly suffer as a result of political failures. The fact that relations will never break irreparably is of is small comfort to those paying the price for this fractious relationship. Without proper management, the livelihoods of those who coexist along the border are at stake. Just take the example of the hundreds of Nepalis stranded on the border due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, with no provision of food, water or shelter, and little information on what quarantine procedures await them if they were able to cross; thousands of Indian workers have also been unable to return home.

      Embed from Getty Images

      This diabolical situation was entirely avoidable had the two countries engaged in a systematic collaborative dialogue. This isn’t the only example of poor co-operation leaving citizens in the lurch. During the border blockade, the failure to secure a political solution to the constitutional protests saw local traders and residents take matters into their own hands. After suffering for months from a lack of trade, people were forced to dismantle the barriers themselves so that business and daily life could return to normal.

      For this damaging cycle to end, New Delhi needs to understand that all its actions will be under the microscope in Kathmandu. Hesitant citizens will be wary of any visit by Indian officials and be keenly aware of the potential to get a raw deal or be strong-armed into agreeing to something undesirable. Indian diplomats in Nepal need to tread carefully and be aware that they are viewed with skepticism, and that there will be little tolerance for blunders or poorly worded remarks that highlight the power imbalance between the two sides.

      Sensitivity and nuance, never a strong point for New Delhi, will go a long way. In Nepal, politicians seeking victory in the spring elections must also resist playing the highly damaging nationalist card and ramping up anti-India sentiment on their path to power. India is too easy a target for politicians not to swipe at for political gain, and such comments may well derail reconcilement. After all, as those in Singha Durbar know only too well, nationalism is never more politically expedient than in an election campaign.

      Hopes for a resumption of good relations were somewhat dashed after the fallout from Gyawali’s trip. While the trip was by no means a failure, it wasn’t a success either. No breakthrough was reached on border disputes or on the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines. Worst of all, despite Nepal spending three days trying to secure an audience with Narendra Modi, Gyawali flew back to Kathmandu amidst allegations of being “snubbed” by the Indian prime minister.

      The trip was supposed to be a step in the right direction. Had Gyawali been able to repeat Shringla’s success, there was a chance that perhaps India and Nepal could finally break the cycle of dispute that has plagued relations for decades. It appears that a resetting of ties will have to wait yet again.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 88 Shares179 Views

      in World Politics

      Sovereign Wealth Funds Bet Big on India

      by

      Since the outbreak of COVID-19, bad news has dogged India on the economic front. By the end of the 2020-21 financial year, which begins on April 1 and ends on March 31, the country’s GDP is estimated to shrink by 7.7%, the biggest contraction since 1952. In the first quarter of the 2020-21 financial year, the economy contracted by a historic 23.9%.

      To put things in perspective, India has suffered its first contraction since the 1979-80 financial year. Then, India’s GDP shrunk by 5.2% because of a double whammy. First, the 1979 Iranian Revolution led to a doubling of crude oil prices, hurting an energy importer like India. Second, a severe drought led to crop failure, falling incomes and declining demand. The 2020-21 recession is worse than that of 1979-1980. In fact, India’s contraction is the second-worst in Asia after the Philippines, whose economy has contracted by 8.5%-9.5%.

      Green Shoots of Recovery

      In 2021, better news has trickled in. India’s manufacturing sector is rebounding. The Nikkei Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index, compiled by IHS Markit, rose to 56.4 in December 2020, up from 56.3 in the previous month. Any figure over 50 signals growth, and manufacturing has now been increasing for five months. More importantly, India’s agricultural sector is expanding strongly. In fact, it grew even during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

      Deloitte estimates that “India may have turned toward the road to recovery.” It bases its judgment on recent high-frequency data. India has been fortunate to have lower infection and fatality rates than countries like the US or the UK. It has also launched the world’s biggest coronavirus vaccine drive. This should improve consumer and business confidence and boost economic recovery.

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      The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is predicting a return to growth in 2021 as are investment banks and large funds. The Indian government is bullishly claiming that India can achieve double-digit growth through increased digital services and the expansion of its manufacturing base. This would be driven by growing demand in the rural sector, the youth and India’s aspirational middle class.

      Even if the government claims might be optimistic, many companies and investors have bought into the India growth story. In particular, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have been betting on India. In 2020, they invested a record $14.8 billion in the country. In the same period, they invested only $4.5 billion in China, meaning that SWF investment in India is three times that of China. What is going on?

      Dark Clouds in Sunny Skies

      To understand why SWFs are turning to India, we have to understand their incentives. These funds do not answer to investors who crave quarterly or yearly or even five-year returns. As custodians of a nation’s wealth, SWFs are long-term investors. In their view, India is operating from a lower base than China. So, India’s growth prospects are higher than China’s as it plays catch-up. 

      Furthermore, unlike venture capital or private equity players, SWFs place a high premium on the long cycle factors like political stability, social cohesion and geopolitical importance. As a robust democracy with many decades of experience in the peaceful transfer of power, India is increasingly attractive in a volatile, complex and ambiguous world. China’s actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang have shaken up many SWFs that are choosing to park their money in India.

      There is another reason for SWFs to invest in India. They agree with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, who praised India for taking “very decisive action, very decisive steps to deal with the pandemic and to deal with [its] economic consequences.” Like her, they are impressed by New Delhi’s appetite for structural reforms and the surprising competence India’s much-maligned government has demonstrated during the pandemic.

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      On December 31, India’s health ministry revealed that the country’s COVID-19 recovery rate was an astonishing 96.04%. This is one of the highest recovery rates in the world. Despite the economic contraction, the government has fed hundreds of millions, brought in much-needed economic reforms and kept the budget deficit down to reasonable levels. At a time when countries have sunk into unsustainable debt traps, India presents a relatively better investment opportunity for SWFs with strong prospects of sustainable, long-term growth.

      There are two dark clouds threatening this sunny economic scenario. First, India faces the twin external threat of China and Pakistan. Both these nuclear powers make territorial claims against India. They have been ratcheting up rhetoric, and tensions are running high. Even at the height of a bitterly cold winter, Indian and Chinese troops have clashed yet again on the border. Once the Himalayan snows start melting in late spring and early summer, troops could start clashing and a military conflict might ensue. This would inflict a tremendous economic setback in the short run. If India is able to defend its territory, then its economy would benefit in the long term. However, there is no guarantee how such a conflict might play out, and this remains a great risk to the economy.

      Second, India faces the threat of domestic unrest. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has had to deal with numerous protests since its reelection in 2019. The Citizenship Amendment Act triggered protests in many cities across the country. They died down as the pandemic spread. Currently, farmer protests are rocking New Delhi on Republic Day. In a country as large and diverse as India, threats of more protests and unrest are never far away. As long as the government can contain protests, they remain immaterial. However, a breakdown in social cohesion would damage India’s growth story.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      A History of Indian Conservatism

      by

      At the time of independence from British rule in 1947, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, adopted a mode of governance that came to be known as Nehruvian socialism. State control of industrial production and government interference in all spheres of life came to define this era and, indeed, the entire Indian political and intellectual landscape. Social mobility became virtually impossible without having the right connections or lineage, while a lumbering, deeply corrupt bureaucracy — the so-called “License Raj” — further handicapped the fledgling economy. Nehru’s descendants, including his daughter Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi, both of whom served as prime ministers, further reinforced the socialist legacy.

      The economic climate changed somewhat during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s tenure, when his finance minister, Manmohan Singh, carried out a series of long-overdue structural reforms in 1991 to spur economic growth by liberalizing Indian markets.

      India’s League of Internationalists

      READ MORE

      A notable holdout to the near-total Nehruvian consensus was the Swatantra Party, committed to equality of opportunity of all people “without distinction of religion, caste, occupation, or political affiliation.” Created in 1959 by C. Rajagopalachari as an alternative to Nehru’s increasingly socialist and statist outlook, the party envisioned that progress, welfare and happiness of the people could be achieved by giving maximum freedom to individuals with minimum state intervention. Perceived to be on the economic right of the Indian political spectrum, Swatantra was not based on a purely religious understanding of Indic culture, unlike the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Jana Sangh.

      Jaitirth “Jerry” Rao, a former Citigroup honcho, MPhasis CEO and presently chairman of the Value Budget Housing Corporation, in his 2019 book, “The Indian Conservative: A History of Indian Right-Wing Thought,” explores the philosophical roots of modern Indian conservatism in five domains: economic, cultural, social, political and aesthetic. The book clearly and concisely conveys the intellectual underpinnings of conservative thought based on indigenous traditions and culture. True conservatives advocate for evolution and not revolution, and the idea that conservative thinking is static, frozen and fixated on a Utopian golden past is a caricature designed by detractors, according to Rao.

      In this guest edition of The Interview, Vikram Zutshi talks to Jaitirth Rao about what it means to be an Indian conservative today, about the history of right-wing thought, and the conflicts in Kashmir and with China.

      The text was lightly edited for clarity.

      Vikram Zutshi: What is your personal understanding of conservatism? Can you give us a timeline of conservative thought in the Indian context?

      Jerry Rao: Conservatism is more a way of looking at the world than a philosophy. In politics, conservatives support gradual, peaceful, constitutional change where care is taken not to abandon the good things inherited from our ancestors. In aesthetics, conservatives have a love for old established traditions in music, dance, drama, painting, literature and, above all, in town-planning and architecture. A conservative will always oppose the Corbusier school of town-planning and architecture.

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      In economic affairs, conservatives support market-based systems not because they are efficient, which they might very well be. Conservatives support markets because they are time-honored, organic, voluntary institutions evolved by human beings and are predicated on peaceful intercourse, negotiations, bargains and consensus.

      Markets have a positive moral dimension as far as conservatives are concerned. Symmetrically, conservatives opposed central planning in economics as it concentrates power and reduces citizens to serfs. Conservatives believe in a minimalist state which is strong. They do not believe in anarchic libertarianism. Conservatives believe in cultural cohesion in societies. We believe that the culture we have inherited from our ancestors, while always in need of modest change, is nevertheless a precious legacy which we need to preserve and hand on to our descendants intact or in an enhanced way. It is not to be abruptly jettisoned.

      The same spirit pervades apropos of the environment. Our forests, water bodies and landscapes are sacred trusts given to us, which we need to pass on as trustees rather than as short-term owners. Conservatives are usually positive toward religion, which is seen as an important cultural inheritance —  conservatives are very fond of religious music, liturgy, chanting, painting, architecture, sculpture, dance and ritual — and also as being a very successful part of the moral cement that a society needs.

      The roots of Indian conservatism go back to the Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata and the Tirukkural. Modern Indian political conservatism has had two fathers: Ram Mohan Roy and Bankim Chandra Chatterjee. The intellectual descendants include Rajagopalachari, Minoo Masani on one side, and Deen Dayal on the other. In economics, the tradition of Naoroji and Dutt has been carried forward by Shenoy all the way down to contemporary market-friendly economists. In aesthetics, the traditions of Bharata Muni, Sarangadeva, Abhinavagupta and Appayya Dikshitar have been carried forward by Ananda Coomaraswamy all the way down to the present efflorescence.

      Zutshi: To what degree does the current government in India embody conservative ideals?Rao: The present government of India, in political terms, is the very embodiment of conservatism. The Constitution of India represents a gradual constitutional change over the Government of India Act of 1935, which represented gradual constitutional change over previous acts like the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the Minto-Morley Reforms, the Indian Councils Act, the Queen’s Proclamation, The EI Company Charter Acts, the Pitt India act and the Regulating Act. We have retained the same constitution for 70 years, unlike Latin American countries which jettison constitutions quite quickly.

      Changes to our constitution have been done through a complex amendment process and has been subject to judicial review. While conservatives are not happy with all the changes, we must perforce be happy with the gradual, peaceful, constitutional nature of the changes. No revolutionary changes here.

      Now, coming to the current political dispensation, which has been in power for six years, we can state that it is more conservative in character than the previous dispensation. It is not as market-friendly as some conservatives may desire. But it is more market-friendly than the government of the previous 10 years. It is also more scrupulous about constitutional propriety — no outrageous acts like retrospective legislation. In its emphasis on subjects like yoga and Sanskrit, it certainly supports a cultural continuity so dear to conservatives. Its focus on the Ganga River and on solar power demonstrates a sense of trusteeship about the environment.  

      Principally, the government needs to be more market-friendly and it needs to dismantle large parts of the intrusive administrative state which it has inherited. It needs to hasten slowly in this area. I cannot think of any serious blunders.

      Zutshi: At what juncture did your political philosophy begin to crystallize? To what extent does Indian conservatism resemble its American and British counterparts?Rao: This took some time to grow. Reading a biography of Edmund Burke in 1975 may have been when it started. It has taken years, even decades to crystallize. There is an amazing synchronicity between the ideas of the Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata, the ideas of the Tirukkural, the ideas embedded in the Apastamba Sutra of the Yajur Veda and the ideas of Edmund Burke, Benjamin Disraeli and Roger Scruton. In modern times, great Indian conservatives like Ram Mohan, Bhandarkar, Bankim, Rajaji and Masani acknowledged their debts both to the classical Indian texts and to Burke. 

      Zutshi: There is much noise in the Indian media about the silencing and incarceration of dissenters. Many activists and academics have been locked up without due process, for example, Varavara Rao, Sudha Bharadwaj, Hany Babu and others. Do you think such draconian measures are justified?

      Rao: The Indian state and republic have been under attack. The previous prime minister, Manmohan Singh, emphatically stated that Maoists were India’s greatest security threat. So there is a continuity between governments in the threat perception. We are dealing with people who wanted to destroy bourgeois democracy from within. In recent times, the alliance between Maoists and jihadists who are bent on an Islamic reconquest of India has led to considerable concern and alarm. Those who supply the ideological basis for violence against the republic, those who shelter the extremists, those who help the extremists acquire arms and those who create a penumbra of respectability around people who violently murder Indian police personnel and ordinary citizens, have much to answer for.

      These ideologies have until now taken advantage of the soft Indian state. They have been foolish. The Indian Republic has contained Naga, Kashmiri and Khalistani separatists and the bomb-throwers and murderers of Naxalbari. Sooner or later, the velvet glove was bound to get a little loose. That is what has happened.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Zutshi: What is China’s long-term agenda with regards to India? What are we to make of the ongoing aggression between the two powers? Can India afford another war at this point? If not, what are its remaining options?

      Rao: In my opinion, China’s leaders see India as an irrelevant pinprick. They see America as their natural rival. Having said this, the Chinese do have a desire to break up India and they will try their best to do so. There is no “aggression between the two powers.” There is only Chinese aggression and aggressiveness. I don’t know what we can make of it, except to assume that their expansionist and irredentist stance is not likely to abate. In strictly economic cost-benefit terms, we cannot afford it. But if the other option is servitude and disintegration, they do not leave us with much choice but to resist irrespective of the economic calculus.

      Truman articulated the doctrine of “containment” apropos of the Soviet Union. A global coalition along those lines is the answer. We do not have the choice of being non-aligned now. The Soviet Union was far from us and did not attempt to encroach on us or weaken us. China is our neighbor and seems to have decided that we are like Poland of the 1930s. We might need to demonstrate that we are closer to the weak and inefficient Russia which suffered much but still did halt the efficient German juggernaut in the 1940s.

      Zutshi: Finally, do you agree with the abrogation of article 370 in Kashmir? More importantly, is the lockdown and curtailment of civil liberties justified?

      Rao: Yes. It was a serious anomaly. It was detrimental to Kashmiri women, religious minorities like the Hindus and the Buddhists, Dalits, refugees and so on. It was allowing for the retention of a space for Islamist groups like the ISIS to infiltrate; 370 had to go.

      Noisy sections of the valley’s population took the public and publicized position that a self-proclaimed ISIS terrorist was a hero and a martyr. The previous local government either could not or chose not to do anything. When such things happen, any organized state worth its name has to take drastic intrusive action. Let us not forget that Lincoln suspended habeas corpus during the American Civil War and Pitt suspended habeas corpus during the Napoleonic Wars.

      Zutshi: What will it take to bring Kashmir back to normal again, or is that just a pipe dream?

      Rao: The Kashmiri Sunni leadership has to realize that if they do not change, in 40 years, they will resemble the Naga Muivarh faction leaders seeking medical treatment in Delhi and talking gibberish. The rank-and-file Kashmiri Muslims need to realize that they have been fed ridiculous propaganda. Joining Pakistan means joining a failed state that is a bit of an international joke. Given the years and decades of educational damage and brainwashing that has happened, this is not going to be an easy task for the Indian state to accomplish. But slowly, inevitably, inexorably, it will get done.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Was It Wise for India to Reject the RCEP?

      by

      Last month, 15 Asia-Pacific countries formed the world’s largest trading bloc. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is China’s response to the US jettisoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) under President Donald Trump. The deal excludes both India and the US. Though the RCEP is not as comprehensive as the TPP and does not cut tariffs to the same degree, its members comprise a third of the world’s population and of the global GDP. Given international attention on Xinjiang and Hong Kong, pulling off the RCEP is a major feather in China’s cap.

      Is India Missing the Boat?

      Many blame India for not joining the RCEP, suggesting it is missing out on access to a big market. Indian policymakers take a different view. They realize that countries like South Korea, Vietnam and China have terrific manufacturing capabilities. Opening markets to their goods could damage India’s industry. India could risk that blow if it could sell services to manufacturing powerhouses and earn a net benefit in the process. However, the RCEP focuses on goods, not services, giving India little incentive to sign on.

      In the past, free trade agreements with Asian economies have yielded limited benefits in terms of economic growth, increased investment or geopolitical heft. Instead, they have led to a surge of cheap imports that have decimated India’s inefficient domestic industry. India’s goal is to make its industry more efficient instead of deindustrializing prematurely.

      In Asia, a New Kid on the Trade Bloc

      READ MORE

      While many experts and much of the media predict doom and gloom in a post-RCEP world, both foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) are flooding into India. The country received a record-high FDI of $35.37 billion in the first five months of India’s fiscal year starting on April 1. The November FPI of $8.5 billion exceeds FPI inflows of the past two years combined. Clearly, investors envisage a different reality than the pessimists.

      The pessimistic outlook on India in the post-RCEP world comes from the fact that India missed the free-trade boat earlier and stagnated in the 1970s. Starting in 1969, India lurched to hard-line socialism under Indira Gandhi, the daughter of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. She began by nationalizing 14 of the largest private banks in the country. After her reelection in 1971, Gandhi nationalized the coal, steel, copper, refining, cotton textiles and insurance industries.

      Apart from going on a nationalization spree, Gandhi gave unbridled power to bureaucrats, who strangled businesses with red tape. She championed public sector behemoths that turned out to be corrupt, inefficient and uncompetitive. Arguably, she did more to destroy private industry than 190 years of British rule.

      Silver Linings to Staying Out

      There are key differences between the 1970s and today. Indian conglomerates such as Reliance Industries and Adani Enterprises have their flaws, but they are not as inefficient as the public sector. In the services sector, India has managed to provide for American and even European markets. Doing business is much easier than in the 1970s because the political elite and the colonial bureaucracy are not as capricious, arbitrary and toxic to private enterprise. So, staying out of RCEP is unlikely to lead to a 1970s-style stagnation.

      There is another tiny little matter. Many economists are blinded by the dogma of free trade. As one of the authors has argued in the past, trade invariably produces winners and losers. Recent press reports reveal that Hershey used financial instruments called futures to squeeze cocoa farmers in West Africa. This is part of a centuries-long pattern. Trade has not necessarily proven to be good to countries exporting commodities from Ghana to Bolivia. On the other hand, countries such as South Korea, Vietnam and, above all, China, that have industrialized, developed technologies and moved up the value chain have done quite well out of trade.

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      The US itself became a major industrial power through a policy of protectionism. Alexander Hamilton took the view that economic independence was as essential as political independence. The US Congress’s first piece of legislation was the Tariff Act of July 4, 1789, which protected American infant industries from ruinous British competition. Many others, including East Asian tigers, emulated American industrial policy.

      There is a strong argument to be made that India’s economic failure came not from protectionism but socialism. By giving colonial bureaucrats the commanding heights of the economy, Nehru and his daughter cut India off at its knees. Economic liberalization in 1991 unleashed growth, but competition from East Asia prematurely deindustrialized India, robbing it of productivity growth. 

      Badly burnt, Indian policymakers are trying something different. Like South Korea in the past, India is favoring its own version of chaebols. The country is embarking on an indigenous form of protectionism, so the RCEP is not on the cards. Furthermore, thanks to fear of both China and Pakistan, India has thrown in its lot with the US. Just as the country once traded preferentially with the Soviet Union, India now aims to do so with its new ally. Already, India exports services and people to the US and gets revenue and capital in return.

      The RCEP, as it stands, has little upside for India. Besides, some of its members like China and Australia have increasingly fraught relations with each other. Key details of the RCEP are yet to be worked out, and reality might turn out to be very different from the hype. Doomsayers damning India might not quite be right. Staying out of the RCEP could well turn out to be wise.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      India’s League of Internationalists

      by

      Shivshankar Menon, India’s famous former national security adviser, has stirred much controversy recently. His recent article for Foreign Affairs, titled “League of Nationalists,” argues that India’s illiberal drift and new transactional foreign policy has weakened relations with the US. Coming at a time when relations between India and the US have grown closer than ever, Menon’s comments are troubling and untrue.

      India-US Relationship Is Now Official

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      Menon’s case has been helped by others expressing misgivings about India. Analyst Ashley Tellis has said that the West will be a less willing partner if India becomes illiberal. Writer William Dalrymple, an Indophile who has made the country his home, is “imagining a future where [he] might not die” in India. Rising illiberalism makes him uncomfortable. Thanks to a colonial hangover, thin-skinned Indians have been rattled by what Tellis and Dalrymple have to say. These Indians are still fixated on the West’s views of their nation. In turn, many in the West take a great interest in India.

      Mistaken Assumptions

      There is a good reason for this interest. In 1947, independent India began as an internationalist power. Jawaharlal Nehru, its first prime minister, was a Fabian socialist. Along with Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Indonesia’s Sukarno, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito, he started the Non-Aligned Movement. It was a group of newly independent nations that rejected the two power blocs led by the US and the Soviet Union. To this day, this movement retains an element of romance, and many intellectuals view it through rose-tinted lenses.

      After seven decades, India is finally moving away from Nehru’s legacy. This is causing heartburn among many, both at home and abroad. Yet Nehruvian internationalism runs deep. Until 2014, his dynasty was in power. It shaped the country’s institutions and patronized its intellectuals. Its legacy still runs strong. Many anglicized Indians see themselves as members of a global leftist movement. They view the Labour Party in the UK and the Democratic Party in the US as natural allies. This metropolitan elite venerates the BBC, The Washington Post and The New York Times. Since Indians now comprise a significant percentage of their readership, these publications offer much advice to India. So do friends of the country like Tellis and Dalrymple.

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      The fundamental argument internationalists make about the dangerous drift of India is based on two assumptions: first, that illiberalism is on the rise in India and, second, that the West must act to stem the tide. Both assumptions are questionable. While US President Donald Trump wins votes from working-class men, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s most loyal supporters are rural women. There may be illiberal aspects to the current government, but the reality is more nuanced than the simplistic liberal-illiberal juxtaposition at which many hastily arrive.

      Furthermore, the idea that the West can stem illiberalism in India lacks historical and political understanding. For the last 500 years, the Western record has not been reassuring. Genocide in the Americas, the colonization of India, the scramble for Africa, the Opium Wars against China and the divvying up of the Middle East reveal a hegemonic bent of mind. In more recent years, the 1953 coup in Iran, the Vietnam War and the 2003 Iraq War reveal that the West may pay lip service to liberal causes, but it functions as per the blood-and-iron laws of realpolitik.

      Anglicized Indians often forget that the West favored Pakistan over India for decades. The former was a military dictatorship and the latter was a democracy, but such inconvenient details did not matter. Indeed, the West favored China over India once Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger decided to seduce Zhongnanhai from the arms of the Kremlin. Thanks to the past patronage of the West, India faces a formidable threat on its border by two hostile nuclear powers.

      Getting Key Facts Wrong

      India’s internationalists fail to pay adequate attention to this threat. To be fair, Menon admits that in “many ways US-India relations are in better shape than ever.” The US has overtaken China to become India’s largest trading partner. In 2019, India-China trade declined to $84 billion while India-US trade grew to $143 billion. The US and India are cooperating on defense and security as well. Yet all is not well because the US and India are “now conceiving of the relationship in transactional, rather than principled, terms.” Given the history of US-India relations, where interests have always trumped principles, this is a rather naive assertion.

      Menon also paints a rather simplistic picture of India for his American friends. He claims that “India has excluded Muslim immigrants from the path to citizenship.” Menon is wrong. A cold read of India’s 2019 citizenship legislation reveals that India expedites the path to citizenship for non-Muslims. It does not bar Muslims from getting citizenship. The act was brought in because of persistent persecution and ethnic cleansing of non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. On September 27, the Associated Press reported how the last embattled Sikhs and Hindus fled Afghanistan after threats from a local Islamic State affiliate. These refugees have arrived in India and have a path to citizenship thanks to the 2019 legislation.

      Similarly, Menon makes another glib allegation. He critiques the Modi administration for limiting “the autonomy of the Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir region.” He forgets that this former princely state comprised of Buddhist Ladakh, Hindu Jammu and Muslim Kashmir. For years, Ladakhis suffered discrimination from Kashmiris and did not want to be under their yoke. Ladakhi autonomy does not seem to be of concern to Menon. He would be well advised to read an article this author co-wrote with Fair Observer’s editor-in-chief Atul Singh on Kashmir that examines the tortured history of the conflict and its geopolitical complexity. The thorny issue of Kashmir is a little more complicated than Menon’s disingenuous throwaway line would have us believe.

      Power, Not Principles         

      Menon’s glibness raises a key question: Is he genuinely standing up for liberal principles or is there more than meets the eye? Menon’s grandfather served Nehru as India’s first foreign secretary, and his father was the ambassador to Yugoslavia. Menon himself is a blue-blooded member of the Indian establishment that was dethroned in 2014. Modi’s victory meant that Menon had to leave his colonial bungalow in Lutyens’ Delhi and play bridge with other out-of-work patricians instead.

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      One line in particular has angered many, including those who do not have much admiration for Modi: “Uninterested in human rights and democracy, Trump has given the Modi government a free pass on its controversial domestic agenda.” The idea that Trump or any other American president should have the right to give a free pass to a government that won a thumping parliamentary majority at home is neocolonial and deeply problematic.

      Menon notes how it has been left to Democrats like Pramila Jayapal of Washington state and Ro Khanna of California to express “public disquiet” over Modi’s domestic policies. The idea that Democrats should intervene for liberalism in India is similarly flawed and problematic. Menon, Jayapal and Khanna come from the upper caste anglicized Indian elite that has been defenestrated. There is a sneaking suspicion that it is not liberal values but loss of power that drives them. 

      Menon’s grandfather was an internationalist who loyally served Nehru. Ironically, Menon is attempting to enlist American support in stark contrast to his grandfather who opposed the US and wooed the USSR. More importantly, the former diplomat’s diatribes reflect the beliefs of a significant section of India’s bureaucratic firmament that views the world differently from its own citizenry. For them, India’s politicians are a bunch of uncouth upstarts. They are untrained in grand vision, strategic perspective and humanitarian ideals. In 2007, India’s ambassador to the US at the time called Indian MPs “headless chickens” with “vegetable brains” for opposing some clauses of the India-US nuclear deal.

      This blue-blooded elite league of internationalists disdains India’s democratically-elected politicians. They take the view that these politicians should focus on fighting elections and leave matters of state policy to elite bureaucrats. They resent their loss of control over foreign policy and national security under Modi. This league of internationalists, whose children study at Harvard and Yale, want to take back control from the league of nationalists who speak languages like Gujarati, Hindi and Tamil.

      Nehruvian Princelings Have Failed India

      Menon and his ilk take their cue from Nehru. India’s first prime minister fervently believed in international anticolonial cooperation. He despised the military, distrusted the intelligence community and, as a good Brahmin and a committed socialist, looked down on business and entrepreneurship. Nehru molded the nation in his image. He imposed Soviet-style planning through a colonial bureaucracy. The result was the infamous Hindu rate of growth.

      Unlike other leaders who fought for India’s independence such as Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Patel and Maulana Azad, Nehru promoted his family and established a dynasty. Inner party democracy went out of the window. Social mobility vanished. His daughter Indira Gandhi brought in the idea of a “committed bureaucracy.” In the words of Sir Mark Tully, the legendary former BBC South Asia bureau chief, this ushered in an era of the neta-babu raj — domination by a politician-bureaucrat nexus — which kept “India in slow motion.” Menon’s father loyally served Indira Gandhi and was part of this nexus.

      Rajiv Gandhi, Indira’s son and Nehru’s grandson, was not as dictatorial as his mother but not quite democratic either. David Goodall, the then-British high commissioner to New Delhi, observed that Rajiv’s cabinet was like an “oriental court” where he was “king among courtiers.” Menon was a favored page boy in this court. After all, he came from good stock. He was a third-generation Nehru family loyalist. The patrician elite Menon belongs to merrily forgets that India was neither liberal nor democratic when they were in charge.

      In the heydays of the Nehru family, India huffed and puffed as a socialist economy. Victory in the 1971 India-Pakistan War was squandered by poor diplomacy in the 1972 Shimla Agreement. India’s anglicized diplomats snatched defeat from the jaws of victory much to the chagrin of the Indian military. These diplomats also shied away from formulating a clear policy on Tibet or Afghanistan. They threw open Indian markets to Chinese goods, getting little in return.

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      These heaven-born officials failed to safeguard the rights of Tamils in Sri Lanka or champion the rights of minorities in Pakistan or highlight ethnic cleansing of the Hindu Pandits in the Kashmir Valley. They also took their eyes off Nepal. As a result, Chinese-backed communists took over the country.

      In 2008, India’s financial capital Mumbai was attacked by Pakistani terrorists. Hundreds were killed or maimed. Menon was foreign secretary then. Bomb blasts in major cities had already been a regular occurrence. Yet Menon and his underlings failed to mount a vigorous diplomatic effort against Pakistan for using terror as an instrument of state policy. Worse, the establishment Menon belonged to kept arguing for an “uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue” with Pakistan. Menon’s strategy led India nowhere, yet he rose to be national security adviser.

      Dancing in the Shadows

      Today, Menon is dancing in the shadows. His patrons have lost two consecutive elections. Under Modi, Ajit Doval is now national security adviser. He is a former intelligence operative who argues for a muscular foreign policy. Unlike Menon, Doval believes in punishing Pakistan for terrorism through military strikes. He has thrown Menon’s Pakistan policy into the same dustbin where he has deposited Menon’s China policy. This makes Menon and his ilk uncomfortable.

      The likes of Menon, who have run India’s foreign and security policy for decades, have been Nehruvian pacifists and internationalists. They decreed that India occupy the commanding heights of international morality. Some aspects of this policy were commendable, such as India’s support for independence of colonized nations and its sustained opposition to apartheid in South Africa. However, this policy largely failed to further India’s national interests in terms of boosting economic growth or achieving national security.

      Today, this policy has lost credibility for another reason. Like all elites, the Nehruvian one became corrupted by power. Over time, it earned notoriety for nepotism. Menon became foreign secretary by superseding 14 officers senior to him. There is a possibility that he was indeed so brilliant that he deserved to jump the queue. However, the fact that Menon came from a family of Nehru dynasty loyalists might have helped his meteoric ascent.

      There is another tiny little matter. ShivshankarMenon was national security adviser to a government that noted journalist Chaitanya Kalbag damned as “the most corrupt in [India’s] history.” When princelings damn peasants for being unprincipled and transactional, they could do well to remember Bob Dylan’s words that “The Times They Are a-Changin’.”

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More