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ChinaBiden tells Xi US and China must not ‘veer into conflict’ in first call for monthsWhite House says leaders agree to engage ‘openly and straightforwardly’ amid US frustration at lack of progress in advancing countries’ relations Helen Davidson and agencies@ More
The ObserverChinaJonathan Mirsky obituaryJournalist and historian of China who went from admiring the regime to being one of its sternest critics Jonathan SteeleThu 9 Sep 2021 12.15 EDTLast modified on Thu 9 Sep 2021 12.17 EDTJonathan Mirsky, who has died aged 88, was a prominent American historian of China who switched to journalism and won the international reporter of the year title in the 1989 British Press Awards for his coverage in the Observer of the Tiananmen uprising.Getting the story had been a bloody experience. Armed Chinese police gave him a severe beating when they discovered he was a journalist. He was lucky to be rescued by a colleague from the Financial Times who led him away, his left arm fractured and three teeth knocked out.Mirsky’s career encapsulated the shifts in the way the western left viewed China, from the first decades of communist rule to Beijing’s move to capitalism while still under single-party control.He began as an early and prominent academic critic of the US’s role in the Vietnam war, starring in numerous protest marches and campus teach-ins. Opposing the US strategy of isolating China in the years before Nixon and Kissinger’s 1972 visit to Mao Zedong in Beijing, Mirsky supported the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, a group of radical US academics who criticised the senior faculty elite of US Asian studies for their silence on the immorality of the war.He had his first direct encounter with Maoism on an extraordinary boat trip led by Earle Reynolds, a Quaker peace activist. In 1969 Reynolds took Mirsky and four other Americans on his ketch, Phoenix, heading for Shanghai. It was meant as a goodwill gesture in the hope of starting a dialogue between Americans and Chinese officials. When they were stopped by a Chinese naval vessel 20 miles from the coast and ordered to leave, Mirsky – according to his account to friends – thought: “OK. In that case I’ll swim to China.” He jumped into the sea. The Chinese vessel hurriedly pulled away, and the Phoenix sailed back to Japan.Mirsky was never a “110 percenter” like some western admirers of Maoism but he was prepared to be impressed on his first foray to China in April 1972. With a dozen other young China scholars he spent six weeks travelling around the country with official guides. As he recalled in a book of essays by alumni of King’s College, Cambridge, he had gone “convinced that the Maoist revolution and even the Cultural, which was still going on, were good for China”. After only a few days he became convinced something bad was happening that their hosts were covering up. Many colleagues on the trip resented his growing scepticism. Some years later Mirsky met one of the guides again and complained about his deception. The guide replied: “We wanted to put rings in your noses and you helped us put them there.”Over the next four and a half decades Mirsky was to develop into one of China’s sternest and most knowledgable critics, a trajectory that he described as “From a Mao fan to a counter-revolutionary” in his contribution to the book My First Trip to China: Scholars, Diplomats, and Journalists Reflect on Their First Encounters with China (2012). He regularly lambasted western leaders for downplaying human rights violations for the sake of trade.In typically colourful language in a 2014 article for the New York Review of Books, he deplored the lack of political and social progress. “I may have been inadvertently right in May 1989 [just after Tiananmen] when I said China would ‘never be the same again’. It is sleeker, richer, internationally more reckless, more corrupt – and its leaders are ever more terrified … I am reminded of the old street sweeper in 1990 at a corner in Beijing. She was shovelling donkey dung into a pail. I asked her if she thought things had changed for the better. She replied, ‘This city is like donkey dung. Clean and smooth on the outside, but inside it’s still shit.’”Mirsky was born in New York to Reba Paeff, a children’s author and harpsichord player, and Alfred Mirsky, a pioneer in molecular biology. Educated first at Ethical Culture Fieldston school in the city, he went on to obtain a BA in history at Columbia University. He spent a year at King’s, Cambridge, in 1954, during which he met an American woman who had been a missionary in China and who urged him to study Mandarin. Three years of language study in the US followed before Mirsky, with his first wife, Betsy, also a Mandarin student, went to Taiwan to run a language school for four years.Back in the US he was awarded a PhD in Chinese history at the University of Pennsylvania in 1966. He and Betsy divorced in 1963 and he married Rhona Pearson, a British neurobiologist, with whom he moved to Dartmouth College, in New Hampshire, in 1966. There he became co-director of the East Asia Language and Area Studies Center. However, he was refused tenure, in part because of his anti-Vietnam protest activity, and in 1975 he and Rhona moved to London.Mirsky was attracted to journalism and became the Observer’s China correspondent, based in London but frequently travelling to the country. His critical views of communist rule were strengthened when he made the first of six visits to Tibet for the paper. He decided the fault was not just communism but racist imperialism by Han Chinese towards ethnic minorities. Later he visited the exiled Dalai Lama in north India, who became a close friend. They shared the same sense of humour, and Mirsky was delighted to receive a long message from the Dalai Lama a few weeks before he died.During a trip to China in 1991 Mirsky was asked by the foreign ministry to leave the country and told he would never again receive a visa. In 1993 he moved to Hong Kong to become East Asia correspondent of the (London) Times until he resigned in 1998 in protest at its owner, Rupert Murdoch’s, accommodating line on China. Back in London, Mirsky wrote dozens of book reviews, mainly for the New York Review of Books. They were always erudite and colourful, and are admired today by scholars of China for their astute observation.For at least a quarter of a century Mirsky loved to hold court with friends over lunch at the same table at Fortnum and Mason’s in Piccadilly, usually enhanced by at least one Jewish and one off-colour joke. In the words of a close friend, Michael Yahuda, a former professor at the London School of Economics, “Jonathan was a master of anecdotes and he was never shy of embellishing them in favour of a good story. Above all, he enjoyed friendships and a good meal. Life with him was never dull.”He and Rhona divorced in 1986. While in Hong Kong, a decade later Mirsky married Deborah Glass, an Australian specialist in financial regulation who became deputy chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission when they moved to London. In 2014 they separated and Deborah returned to Australia.He is survived by his sister Reba. TopicsChinaHistory booksNewspapers & magazinesUS politicsThe ObserverobituariesReuse this content More
There is growing anti-China sentiment in South Korea, particularly among young voters. Conservative politicians are eager to turn the antipathy into a presidential election issue.SEOUL — The list of election issues set to define South Korea’s presidential race next year is long. The runaway housing prices, the pandemic, North Korea and gender inequality are a start. But an unlikely addition has also emerged in recent weeks: China.South Korea’s decision to let the American military deploy a powerful antimissile radar system on its soil in 2017 has been the subject of frequent criticism from China. And last month, a presidential hopeful, Yoon Seok-youl, told the country to stop complaining, unless it wanted to remove its own radar systems near the Korean Peninsula.Political elites here are usually careful not to antagonize China, the country’s largest trading partner. But Mr. Yoon’s blunt rhetoric reflected a new phenomenon: a growing antipathy toward Beijing among South Koreans, particularly young voters whom conservative politicians are eager to win over.Anti-Chinese sentiment has grown so much this year that China has replaced Japan — the former colonial ruler — as the country regarded most unfavorably in South Korea, according to a joint survey by the polling company Hankook Research and the Korean newsmagazine SisaIN. In the same survey, South Koreans said they favored the United States over China six to one.Over 58 percent of the 1,000 respondents called China “close to evil” while only 4.5 percent said that it was “close to good.”Yoon Seok-youl, a conservative politician, on television during a press conference in Seoul in June. He has been openly critical of China.Ahn Young-Joon/Associated PressNegative views of China have deepened in other advanced countries as well, but among the 14 nations surveyed last year by Pew Research Center, South Korea was the only one in which younger people held more unfavorable views toward China than previous generations.“Until now, hating Japan was such a part of Korean national identity that we have a common saying: You know you are a real Korean when you feel hateful toward Japan for no particular reason,” said Jeong Han-wool, a chief analyst at Hankook Research. “In our survey, people in their 40s and older still disliked Japan more than China. But those in their 20s and 30s, the generation who will lead South Korea in the coming decades, tipped the scale against China.”South Korea elects its next president in March, and observers are watching closely to see how younger people vote on the country’s policy toward Beijing.Conservatives in South Korea have called anything less than full-throated support of the alliance with Washington “pro-North Korean” and “pro-Chinese.” Progressives usually support reconciliation with North Korea and calls for diplomatic “autonomy” between the United States and China. Younger South Koreans have traditionally voted progressive, but millennials are breaking that pattern, and possibly turning into swing voters.An American military vehicle that was part of an antimissile radar system arriving in Seongju, South Korea, in 2017. China railed against South Korea over the deployment of the system.Reuters“We feel frustrated when we see our government act spineless while Beijing behaves like a bully,” said Chang Jae-min, a 29-year-old voter in Seoul. “But we also don’t want too much tension with China or North Korea.”For decades, South Korea has benefited from a military alliance with the United States while cultivating trade ties with China to fuel economic growth. But that balance has become increasingly difficult to maintain as relations between Washington and Beijing deteriorate.President Moon Jae-in’s conservative rivals, like Mr. Yoon, have complained that South Korea’s ambiguous policy on the United States and China made the country the “weakest link” in the American-led coalition of democracies working to confront Chinese aggression.“We cannot remain ambiguous,” Mr. Yoon told JoongAng Ilbo, a South Korean daily, last month during an interview in which he made his critical remarks about China.The conservative opposition has long accused Mr. Moon of being “pro-China.” His government has maintained that South Korea — like other American allies, including those in Europe — should avoid alienating either power. While South Koreans overwhelmingly support the alliance with Washington, the country’s trade with China is almost as big as its trade with the United States, Japan and the European Union combined.Chinese tourists in a shopping district in Seoul last year.Jean Chung for The New York Times“We cannot pick sides,” Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong has said.Yet when Mr. Moon met with President Biden in Washington in May, the two leaders emphasized the importance of preserving “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” and vowed to make their alliance “a linchpin for the regional and global order.” Many analysts saw the statement as a sign that South Korea was aligning itself more closely with Washington at the risk of irritating China, which has called Taiwan a red line.The main conservative opposition, the People Power Party, has already begun harnessing young voters’ anti-China sentiment to secure electoral wins.In April, young voters helped deliver landslide victories for the party in the mayoral races in South Korea’s two largest cities. Last month, the party’s young leader, Lee Jun-seok, 36, said his fellow South Korean millennials would fight against Chinese “cruelty” in places like Hong Kong and Xinjiang, where China has been accused of genocide.Older Koreans, while often anti-Communist, tend to respect Chinese culture, which influenced the Korean Peninsula for millenniums. They have also looked upon the country as a benign giant whose rapid economic growth was a boon for South Korean exporters. Younger South Koreans tend not to share that perspective.President Moon Jae-in of South Korea with President Biden during a press conference at the White House in May.Stefani Reynolds for The New York TimesMost of them grew up proud of their homegrown economic and cultural successes. And as China’s foreign policy became more assertive under President Xi Jinping, they began to see the country’s authoritarianism as a threat to free society. They have also been critical of China’s handling of the coronavirus, its expansionism in the South China Sea and fine-dust pollution from China that regularly blankets Seoul.“They have grown up in a liberal environment the earlier generations built through sweat and blood, so they hold an inherent antipathy toward illiberal countries,” said Ahn Byong-jin, a political scientist at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. “They root for politicians who criticize China.”Nowhere has South Korea’s dilemma between Washington and Beijing been magnified more dramatically than over the deployment of the American antimissile radar, known as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD.When South Korean officials agreed to the deployment, they called it a necessity in defending against North Korea. China saw it as part of a continuing threat from the United States military presence in the region, and retaliated by curbing tourism to South Korea and boycotting the country’s cars, smartphones, shopping malls and TV shows.South Korean students demonstrated in support of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, outside the Chinese Embassy in Seoul, in 2019.Ed Jones/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesHa Nam-suk, a professor of Chinese politics and economy at the University of Seoul, has monitored how deepening animosity toward Beijing has played out on and off campuses in recent years, as cash-starved South Korean universities began accepting more Chinese students.South Korean and Chinese students clashed over whether to support young pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, he said. They have also gotten into spats online over K-pop and kimchi. In March, many young South Koreans forced a TV station to cancel a drama series after it showed an ancient Korean king dining on Chinese dumplings.“As they watched what China did in places like Hong Kong,” Mr. Ha said, “Koreans began asking themselves what it would be like to live under a greater sphere of Chinese influence.” More
The landslide victory of pro-democracy politicians in local elections in 2019 was a stunning rebuke of Beijing. Now, fear of retaliation has driven them to quit.HONG KONG — When Hong Kong’s pro-democracy politicians won a resounding victory in local council elections in 2019, they inspired hopes of democratic change. Now, fears of arrest have driven most of them to quit, laying bare that dream’s dramatic collapse.The opposition had swept nearly 90 percent of the 452 seats in Hong Kong’s district councils, riding on widespread antigovernment sentiment that had turned into months of protests. Though the polls were for the lowest rung of elected office, they were regarded as an informal referendum that showed the public’s support for the pro-democracy camp. The victory dealt a stinging defeat to Beijing and raised the opposition’s expectations that even greater electoral successes were within reach.But in less than two years, Beijing has struck back, demolishing those gains as part of a broader security crackdown that has drastically raised the risk of political dissent.More than half of the council members from the pro-democracy camp, over 250 of them, have quit in recent weeks to avoid being ensnared in Beijing’s campaign. Those who remain are worried about being arrested.A line at a polling station during the district council election in Hong Kong in November 2019, during which pro-democracy candidates won a large majority of the seats.Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times“Before, we had a lot of hope and anticipation. Now, it feels like our hands and feet are tied,” said Zoe Chow, an elected district official who had represented the working-class neighborhood of Sham Shui Po since 2015 before resigning in July. “We have to think very hard about what to do next because it feels as though everything we do is considered wrong.”By targeting opposition figures in local councils, the authorities are effectively burying the last vestige of democracy in Hong Kong. Dozens of politicians are in jail and facing potential life sentences on national security charges. Apple Daily, a major pro-democracy newspaper, has been forced to close after the arrest of its founder and top editors. Hong Kong’s largest teachers union and the Civil Human Rights Front, which organized large protest marches, both said in recent days that they would disband. Beijing has rewritten the rules for future elections to bar candidates it deems disloyal.The district councilors said they were alarmed by the government’s plans to impose a new loyalty oath on them and reports that perceived violations could leave them imprisoned, barred from politics or bankrupted.District councilors are not usually in the political limelight. They handle unglamorous tasks such as dealing with pest infestations, overflowing trash and illegal parking. They help residents with everyday problems such as the payment of bills or economic aid.Roy Tam, right, a district councilor, boarding a prison van in Hong Kong in March after being charged under the national security law.Jerome Favre/EPA, via ShutterstockBut in 2019, when the city was consumed with antigovernment protests, the councils took on outsize political importance. Many first-time candidates campaigned on issues raised by the protesters, even though the councils have little say on questions of police accountability or universal suffrage.After the opposition swept up the bulk of the seats, Beijing ordered, as part of a sweeping national security law, that anyone who assumed public office must swear allegiance to the Hong Kong government and its laws. The new condition was widely seen as paving the way to disqualifying the government’s critics.“It was only when so many radicals got on to the district councils through the 2019 election did the problems arise,” according to Lau Siu-kai, a senior adviser to Beijing on Hong Kong affairs.Beijing has said only patriots are allowed to run the city. It has applied vague definitions to what it means to break an oath of loyalty to the government. Last year, it ordered the ouster of four opposition leaders in Hong Kong from the city’s legislature for expressing support for U.S. sanctions against Hong Kong’s officials. The remainder of the pro-democracy camp in the legislature then resigned in protest.Volunteers campaigning for a candidate for the district council elections in November 2019. District councilors, who usually handle daily tasks, took on outsize political importance during the antigovernment protests.Chris Mcgrath/Getty ImagesThe government has not told the district councilors what consequences they may face for breaching the oath, or even when they are supposed to take it. But the city’s pro-Beijing news outlets carried reports warning that district councilors found infringing the oath could be forced to repay two years of salary and expenses. They also cited officials as warning that district councilors who had displayed protest slogans in their offices could be targeted.Michael Mo, a district councilor in the satellite town of Tuen Mun, said he quit to avoid the oath and the risk of being accused of disloyalty. He said he believed that such an allegation could later become the grounds for a national security investigation; in July, he fled to London.“It’s scary,” he said. “It’s like they’re trying to make a trap for you.”The exodus also follows months of tensions with city officials and pro-Beijing politicians. Many democrats wanted to use their platforms as district councilors to pressure the government on political issues. When they raised complaints about police conduct, for instance, local officials would sometimes cancel meetings or walk out.A government billboard earlier this year, after Beijing announced that only patriots were allowed to run the city.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesSome pro-government district council members have criticized the opposition representatives’ approach as unproductive.Lam Kong-kwan, one of two establishment representatives on the Sha Tin district council, pointed to a statement opposing the national security law that was approved last year by the 17 district councils controlled by the pro-democracy camp, calling it a distraction.“They always say they are reflecting the will of the people. But what does the will of the people even mean?” Mr. Lam added. “The people aren’t telling you to oppose the government or oppose central authorities.”But many pro-democracy district council members say the government is unwilling to work with opposition politicians even on public service improvement projects.Paul Zimmerman, a pro-democracy representative who did not step down, said the Home Affairs Department has not allowed him to approve agendas for committee meetings of the Southern District Council, even though he is now the most senior officer after a wave of resignations.A pro-democracy district councilor and his team distributing face masks and cleaning products at a housing estate in Hong Kong last year during the pandemic.Isaac Lawrence/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesThat will hold up plans for projects like a pedestrian bridge over a bay in the district, he said. He called it part of a campaign “to disempower the district councils.”The government has acknowledged that the resignations have crippled some district councils but said it did not plan to hold elections to fill the empty seats before next July.In Sham Shui Po, a district in the northwest corner of the Kowloon peninsula known for its walk-up tenement buildings, street vendors and old temples, older residents have long relied on council members to navigate the complexities of applying for government benefits and services.Yeung Yuk, a pro-democracy politician, resigned as one of its district councilors in July but said he would continue to help residents on a voluntary basis until the end of this month. His name is still visible on a sign outside his office on the ground floor of a high-rise in the Hoi Lai public housing complex, but a sheet of paper was taped over the Chinese characters for his former title, “councilor.”In Sham Shui Po, older residents have long relied on council members to navigate the complexities of applying for government benefits and services.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesAs he worked from his desk on a recent weekday, a steady stream of residents dropped by the office. Some wanted to buy cockroach poison. Others wanted to watch the television. Stacked on the tables were boxes of masks, bags of rice and bottles of tea. A poster on the wall showed the 25 council members from the district, with the photos of 20 crossed out.“I don’t want to leave them, and they don’t want to me to leave,” Mr. Yeung said, adding that he would find a part-time job in social work to support his family. Mr. Yeung, 36, was covering the rent of the office space out of pocket and with donations from residents. He planned to close the office at the end of August.Ngan Siu, a 71-year-old retiree, said she often sought Mr. Yeung’s help when she received government notices she did not understand. He had helped her register for her Covid-19 vaccine appointment and to receive a $640 spending voucher.“The government keeps telling us to go online, but how?” Ms. Siu asked. “If he didn’t help me, where else would I go?” More
OpinionRaceThe Guardian view on anti-Chinese suspicion: target espionage, not ethnicitiesEditorialClose attention to Chinese spying and influence operations is important. It cannot justify racial profiling and the promotion of distrust Tue 10 Aug 2021 14.13 EDTLast modified on Tue 10 Aug 2021 14.26 EDTPoliticians and academics in the US have begun to talk of Researching While Chinese American, in a deliberate echo of the phrase Driving While Black. There is a long, ignoble history of failed espionage cases against such scientists. But the Trump administration stepped things up when it launched the China Initiative, vowing to aggressively pursue the theft of trade secrets and identify researchers who had helped to transfer technology to Beijing.Though one man was jailed after pleading guilty to making false statements to federal authorities this spring, its first trial has rightly faltered. Anming Hu’s prosecution for fraud, over claims he hid ties to China, ended in a hung jury and a mistrial. One juror later declared that the FBI owed him an apology, after agents admitted they had falsely accused the former University of Tennessee researcher of being a spy. Yet to the shock of academics, Asian American advocacy groups and others, prosecutors plan to retry the Chinese-born Canadian citizen.The concerns go beyond the treatment of Professor Hu to the broader strategy, and the general suspicion it evinces of those of Chinese ethnicity in science and technology, by singling out one country’s espionage. Though other cases have been dropped, 90 members of Congress have now urged the department of justice to end what they believe is the racial profiling of individuals of Asian descent. While cases like this are most alarming to academics, business people and others who fear that their lives could be similarly upended, they send a broader message that at best some citizens are not seen as quite as American as others, and at worst, that they are viewed as enemies within. A similar signal is clear when analysts, politicians and others of Chinese birth or descent in western countries face a greater level of scrutiny for their actions or statements, with insinuations or outright accusations that they may be working for another country’s interests.As political competition intensifies, and concern grows about China’s behaviour internationally, such suspicion is likely to grow. It is important to be alert and thorough in assessing the risks posed by Chinese espionage or its covert influence operations. But stereotyping of and animosity towards those with Chinese heritage is both wrong and counterproductive. The suspicion is all the more painful at a time when those of east and south-east Asian descent have faced soaring abuse and violence sparked by the pandemic. The US has seen a spate of horrifying attacks; in the UK, it is estimated that communities have experienced a three-fold increase in hate crimes.In the UK, Chinese agents have reportedly been applying for visas under the scheme for Hong Kong’s British National (Overseas) passport holders, designed to aid those fleeing Beijing’s crackdown. Vigilance is essential, and will help to protect those who are genuinely escaping the repression. But necessary care in processing cases should not be used to justify bureaucratic delays which risk their ability to leave Hong Kong.Still less should such concerns fuel wider suspicion. It goes without saying that discrimination is intrinsically wrong. It can hit those who have left China for their opposition to the leadership. It also risks bolstering Beijing’s claim that the world is not critical of the leadership’s abuses, but hostile to the Chinese people. That is not in anyone’s interests.TopicsRaceOpinionChinaAsia PacificUS politicsDonald TrumpeditorialsReuse this content More
OpinionCoronavirusThe Guardian view on post-Covid recovery: powered by the state not the marketEditorialThe Thatcherite wing of the Conservative party desires a restoration of ideas whose time has come and gone Mon 9 Aug 2021 14.02 EDTLast modified on Mon 9 Aug 2021 15.35 EDTThe Conservative party hooked British capitalism to the state’s life support system for the past 18 months. So it takes chutzpah to think, as business secretary Kwasi Kwarteng does, of putting the free market at the heart of a post-Covid recovery. Yet lengthening NHS waiting lists, hiking consumer energy bills and welfare cuts when poverty is rising all betray a mindset that regards the re-legitimation of state intervention as threatening a way of life rather than securing it.What the Thatcherite wing of the Conservative party desires is a restoration. For them this is an opportunity to go back to 1979 and use tried-and-tested ways to stabilise prices, crush labour and discipline poorer nations. These rightwingers yearn for higher interest rates, to prioritise financial returns on assets and the use of creditor power to squeeze the global south.Such ideologues are likely, in part, to be disappointed. The US president, Joe Biden, does not see the world their way, saying this April that “trickle-down economics”, associated with Ronald Reagan, didn’t work. The president aims to show that the state can do good, and the early results are promising. His Covid-related aid boost will push the share of Americans in poverty to the lowest level on record. Mr Biden’s treasury secretary, Janet Yellen, professes a “free market” scepticism. She has promoted the social benefits of running the economy “hot” by maximising the use of all available resources. Her inspiration is the economist Arthur Okun, who in 1973 argued that governments increasing employment would foster “a process of ladder climbing” in the job market that would reduce inequality and stimulate productivity growth. Ms Yellen has stuck to this playbook in office.Perhaps the greatest pushback against the return of laissez-faire dominance in economics comes from China. Beijing has surpassed the US in some key technologies. Mr Biden’s economic team is blunt about needing to use the state for more “targeted efforts to try to build domestic industrial strength … when we’re dealing with competitors like China that are not operating on market-based terms”.The state is, clearly, not powerless against global capital. During Covid it paid for millions of workers without breaking a sweat. Contrary to conventional thinking there was no threat from rising deficits to interest rates. Thatcherism was defined by Nigel Lawson as “increasing freedom for markets to work within a framework of firm monetary and fiscal discipline”. This saw the state put in service of business interests rather than mediating between labour and capital. It also left Britain woefully unprepared, and ill-equipped, for the pandemic. A Thatcherite approach will not produce a fairer distribution of growth. It will militate against support during downturns and plans to “level up” the regions. Ministers ought to outline a new role for the state rather than relying on failed ideas about what the market can do.TopicsCoronavirusOpinionConservativesMargaret ThatcherEconomicsJoe BidenUS politicsRonald ReaganeditorialsReuse this content More
Beijing is making it nearly impossible for the pro-democracy camp to win city elections. One tool: “grass roots” groups loyal to the government.HONG KONG — The Sea Bear Swimming Club, in the northeastern outskirts of Hong Kong, is a humble organization. It trains children for local competitions and offers free lessons to older adults. Its Facebook page, with just 151 followers, features photos of grinning students in swim caps and the occasional cat meme.But in the coming weeks, the group will take on a new responsibility: helping to choose the city’s next leaders.The club is one of about 400 so-called grass-roots associations recently tapped by the government to play a key role in the city’s elections after Beijing overhauled the system in March to ensure that only “patriots” could run the territory. The groups have been appointed to vote next month for the city’s Election Committee, a 1,500-member body that will then pick the city’s leader, known as the chief executive, and many legislators from a slate approved by Beijing.The government says it is giving more voice to ordinary Hong Kong residents. But the groups also share an important characteristic: demonstrated support for Beijing and the Hong Kong government.Besides Sea Bear, other groups entrusted with this responsibility include The Family, a community organization that cheered on the police during the antigovernment protests that rocked the city in 2019. There is the Bright and Elite Youth Association, a group of young professionals from Hong Kong and mainland China that held an event attended by an official from the Central Liaison Office, Beijing’s top arm in Hong Kong.A group that hosts dance recitals, according to its Facebook page, organized a performance celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party together with Hong Kong’s biggest pro-Beijing political party — which has also co-hosted swimming lessons with Sea Bear. Also onboard are the Kam Tin Table Tennis Association and the Chinese Arts Papercutting Association, according to a recently released roster of voters.Pro-Bejing supporters campaigning in Hong Kong in March for the new election system, which drastically reduces the public’s ability to vote and increases the number of pro-Beijing lawmakers making decisions for the city.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesSeveral groups defended their right to participate in the election process.“We may seem like small potatoes, but when you put all these small organizations together, isn’t this the grass roots?” said Wan Ying-bo, a coach at Sea Bear, when reached by phone.But to critics, the problem is not that these groups now get a say; the problem is who does not.The election changes all but eliminated the voice of pro-democracy blocs in the Election Committee, which had already been hobbled by Beijing’s far-reaching national security law. Opposition lawmakers have been arrested. Churches, labor unions and arts groups have disbanded, citing fear of arrest. Pro-democracy politicians who would have held seats on the Election Committee as low-level elected officials called district councilors have resigned in droves in the face of various threats.The overhaul has also vastly reduced the public vote. Previously, about 240,000 voters — already a mere fraction of the city’s 7.5 million residents — could choose Election Committee members through a mix of individual ballots and ones cast by groups. Now, the number has been cut to below 8,000, as most individual votes have been eliminated.Election results have consistently shown that more residents favor the pro-democracy camp. But countering that was precisely the point, said Ivan Choy, a political scientist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.Pro-China lawmakers raised their hands in favor of the bill amending electoral laws at the Legislative Council in Hong Kong in May.Vincent Yu/Associated Press“It is quite clear that the Beijing authorities want to make sure that they can predict and even control the election outcome,” he said. “They want those organizations who are loyal.”The Chinese Communist Party has long relied on trade unions and community organizations to build its base in Hong Kong. The central government helps fund the city’s pro-Beijing parties, which partner with business tycoons to sponsor social welfare groups or even establish new ones, scholars have shown. Now, some of these groups are being recruited for a more overtly political function.Hong Kong’s election system was never truly democratic, with just a portion of the legislature elected by popular vote. The chief executive has always been chosen by the Election Committee, which was already stacked with pro-government figures before the overhaul. Calls for genuine universal suffrage have long been at the heart of protests.Despite the constraints, the opposition over the years managed to win many of the popularly elected seats, giving it a small but influential voice on the Election Committee. Now, Beijing’s electoral changes have stamped out that limited power, in part by reconfiguring the committee to tie it even more closely to the authorities.Within that reconfiguration, the addition of the grass-roots groups is relatively minor. They will be allowed to choose 60 of the 1,500 Election Committee members. By contrast, nearly 200 members will be chosen by elite members of the Chinese legislature or another advisory body to Beijing.Pro-democracy supporters celebrating the results of the election in Hong Kong in November 2019. Despite the constraints, the opposition over the years has managed to win many of the popularly elected seats.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesThe grass-roots associations have attracted particular attention because of their claim to represent a more democratic impulse. Pro-democracy residents have alternately ridiculed or fumed at the groups. One headline in a local newspaper, quoting experts, called some of the groups’ selection “comical.”.css-1xzcza9{list-style-type:disc;padding-inline-start:1em;}.css-3btd0c{font-family:nyt-franklin,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:1rem;line-height:1.375rem;color:#333;margin-bottom:0.78125rem;}@media (min-width:740px){.css-3btd0c{font-size:1.0625rem;line-height:1.5rem;margin-bottom:0.9375rem;}}.css-3btd0c strong{font-weight:600;}.css-3btd0c em{font-style:italic;}.css-w739ur{margin:0 auto 5px;font-family:nyt-franklin,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-weight:700;font-size:1.125rem;line-height:1.3125rem;color:#121212;}#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-w739ur{font-family:nyt-cheltenham,georgia,’times new roman’,times,serif;font-weight:700;font-size:1.375rem;line-height:1.625rem;}@media (min-width:740px){#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-w739ur{font-size:1.6875rem;line-height:1.875rem;}}@media (min-width:740px){.css-w739ur{font-size:1.25rem;line-height:1.4375rem;}}.css-9s9ecg{margin-bottom:15px;}.css-uf1ume{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-box-pack:justify;-webkit-justify-content:space-between;-ms-flex-pack:justify;justify-content:space-between;}.css-wxi1cx{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-flex-direction:column;-ms-flex-direction:column;flex-direction:column;-webkit-align-self:flex-end;-ms-flex-item-align:end;align-self:flex-end;}.css-12vbvwq{background-color:white;border:1px solid #e2e2e2;width:calc(100% – 40px);max-width:600px;margin:1.5rem auto 1.9rem;padding:15px;box-sizing:border-box;}@media (min-width:740px){.css-12vbvwq{padding:20px;width:100%;}}.css-12vbvwq:focus{outline:1px solid #e2e2e2;}#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-12vbvwq{border:none;padding:10px 0 0;border-top:2px solid #121212;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-rdoyk0{-webkit-transform:rotate(0deg);-ms-transform:rotate(0deg);transform:rotate(0deg);}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-eb027h{max-height:300px;overflow:hidden;-webkit-transition:none;transition:none;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-5gimkt:after{content:’See more’;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-6mllg9{opacity:1;}.css-qjk116{margin:0 auto;overflow:hidden;}.css-qjk116 strong{font-weight:700;}.css-qjk116 em{font-style:italic;}.css-qjk116 a{color:#326891;-webkit-text-decoration:underline;text-decoration:underline;text-underline-offset:1px;-webkit-text-decoration-thickness:1px;text-decoration-thickness:1px;-webkit-text-decoration-color:#326891;text-decoration-color:#326891;}.css-qjk116 a:visited{color:#326891;-webkit-text-decoration-color:#326891;text-decoration-color:#326891;}.css-qjk116 a:hover{-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;}When The New York Times sent a message to a WhatsApp number listed on the dance recital group’s Facebook page seeking an interview, the person on the other end immediately responded “SORRY,” then blocked further messages. A staff member for The Family, reached by phone, said the group performed community service and had more than 700 members, but directed further questions to the group’s president, a man she identified only by his surname, Lam. But Mr. Lam said: “Too many media inquiries. I don’t want to talk to reporters.”Calls or emails to at least 20 more organizations went unanswered.Dozens of the groups on the roster shared addresses, down to the room number. The Sea Bear Swimming Club, for example, was listed at the same address as a Sea Bear Squash Club. When a reporter called a number listed online for the squash club, Mr. Wan, the swimming coach, picked up. He said the organizations were separate, though he did not explain.Hong Kong’s election system was never truly democratic, with just a portion of the legislature elected by popular vote.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesAt least four groups — including the Bright and Elite Youth Association, the group of young professionals — were housed in the same unit of a mixed-use building in the Wan Chai neighborhood, according to the government’s list and the building’s directory. A man who answered the door of the unit when Times reporters visited said no one there was authorized to speak to the news media. In the room behind him, dozens of alternating Hong Kong and Chinese flags were strung up on the walls.There is no indication that the groups do not actually exist or do not perform the work they say they do. In the hallway outside the groups’ office in Wan Chai, stacks of cardboard boxes were labeled indicating they contained dozens of soup packets for distribution to families.Still, the links between many of these grass-roots groups and the establishment are evident. In some cases, the groups are founded and headed by politicians from pro-Beijing parties, and their activities align with the central government’s objectives.Bright and Elite, for example, hosts cultural and educational exchanges with the mainland. Another group on the grass-roots roster, Action of Voice, is led by Frankie Ngan Man-Yu, a leader of the pro-Beijing party Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong. His group, he said, visits middle schools in Hong Kong to conduct patriotic education.“These are apples and oranges. One person can, of course, be part of many groups,” Mr. Ngan said when asked about his dual memberships. “So there is no reason for you to put all these things together.” More
ChinaQin Gang, China’s new ambassador to US, strikes conciliatory noteFirst Washington press conference stresses “mutual exploration, understanding and adaptation” Vincent Ni China affairs correspondentThu 29 Jul 2021 09.06 EDTFirst published on Thu 29 Jul 2021 08.53 EDTChina’s new envoy to the US, Qin Gang, struck a conciliatory tone in his debut press conference upon arrival in Washington DC on Wednesday.China’s US ambassador pick shines light on debate over ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacyRead more“I believe that the door of China-US relations, which is already open, cannot be closed,” Qin said, adding he would “endeavour to bring [bilateral] relations back on track, turning the way for the two countries to get along with each other … from a possibility into a reality.“China and the United States are entering a new round of mutual exploration, understanding and adaptation, trying to find a way to get along with each other in the new era,” Qin said, signalling Beijing’s thinking on the current state of the relationship, and invoking memories of the former US national security adviser Henry Kissinger’s trailblazing cold war-era visit to Beijing.Cold war or uneasy peace: does defining US-China competition matter?Read moreQin is one of Xi Jinping’s most trusted senior diplomats. In recent years, the 55-year-old has been seen accompanying the Chinese president on his overseas trips and meetings with foreign leaders.A former news assistant at United Press International’s bureau in Beijing, Qin became a diplomat in 1992 and has served in various capacities at the Chinese embassy in London three times throughout his career.Qin’s appointment to Washington comes at a time when the US foreign policy establishment is in the midst of a fundamental rethink of its ties with Beijing. The bilateral relationship is at its lowest ebb since its establishment in 1979.Like his predecessor Donald Trump, Joe Biden has pledged to deal with China “from a position of strength” in what he calls “the biggest geopolitical test” of this century. On Monday, the Chinese vice-foreign minister Xie Feng accused the US of treating the country as an “imaginary enemy” in a message to the visiting US deputy secretary of state, Wendy Sherman.Since Qin’s appointment, observers of Chinese diplomacy have been debating whether he will bring Beijing’s controversial “wolf warrior” style to its most consequential diplomatic posting. His predecessor, Cui Tiankai, an old-school Chinese diplomat, has largely distanced himself from rancorous rhetoric against his host country.After serving as Chinese Ambassador to the US for over 8 years, I will be leaving my post and returning to China this week. It’s an honor of a lifetime to represent my country in the US. I want to thank everyone who has supported my performance of duties over the years.— Cui Tiankai (@AmbCuiTiankai) June 22, 2021
Yet, as a former foreign ministry spokesperson, Qin is known for his uncompromising handling of foreign media and defending China’s image.In 2009, he chided a BBC journalist when answering a question about China’s “Green Dam” internet filtering system. “Do you know what this software is about?” he asked the reporter. “Do you have kids?” he continued. The exchange won him praise in a Chinese-language article in 2010.US accused of ‘demonising’ China as high-level talks begin in TianjinRead moreIn explaining his understanding of Chinese diplomacy, Qin said in 2013 that China’s diplomacy cannot simply be evaluated in terms of “soft” and “hard”. “The fundamental starting point for our diplomatic work is how to better safeguard national interests as well as world peace and development,” he said.“Diplomacy is complex and systematic work. It can be hard with some softness, or soft with some hardness. It can also be both hard and soft. As time and situation change, the two may transform into each other.”Before his ambassadorship to the US, Qin served as China’s vice-minister of foreign affairs from 2018, and before that the ministry protocol department’s director general from 2014.In 2015, he accompanied Xi on his visit to the US. Qin struck an impression as one who is “willing to ruffle feathers without hesitation when he felt it was necessary”, according to Ryan Hass, former China director at the US national security council under Obama, during Xi’s visit.“Qin Gang was very attentive to how his leader would be portrayed and the image that his leader’s public appearances would send,” Hass told the New York Times. “This was particularly the case around President Xi’s state visit to the White House.”TopicsChinaAsia PacificUS foreign policyWashington DCUS politicsReuse this content More
