More stories

  • in

    Pro-Beijing Clubs Will Help Pick Hong Kong's Next Leader

    Beijing is making it nearly impossible for the pro-democracy camp to win city elections. One tool: “grass roots” groups loyal to the government.HONG KONG — The Sea Bear Swimming Club, in the northeastern outskirts of Hong Kong, is a humble organization. It trains children for local competitions and offers free lessons to older adults. Its Facebook page, with just 151 followers, features photos of grinning students in swim caps and the occasional cat meme.But in the coming weeks, the group will take on a new responsibility: helping to choose the city’s next leaders.The club is one of about 400 so-called grass-roots associations recently tapped by the government to play a key role in the city’s elections after Beijing overhauled the system in March to ensure that only “patriots” could run the territory. The groups have been appointed to vote next month for the city’s Election Committee, a 1,500-member body that will then pick the city’s leader, known as the chief executive, and many legislators from a slate approved by Beijing.The government says it is giving more voice to ordinary Hong Kong residents. But the groups also share an important characteristic: demonstrated support for Beijing and the Hong Kong government.Besides Sea Bear, other groups entrusted with this responsibility include The Family, a community organization that cheered on the police during the antigovernment protests that rocked the city in 2019. There is the Bright and Elite Youth Association, a group of young professionals from Hong Kong and mainland China that held an event attended by an official from the Central Liaison Office, Beijing’s top arm in Hong Kong.A group that hosts dance recitals, according to its Facebook page, organized a performance celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party together with Hong Kong’s biggest pro-Beijing political party — which has also co-hosted swimming lessons with Sea Bear. Also onboard are the Kam Tin Table Tennis Association and the Chinese Arts Papercutting Association, according to a recently released roster of voters.Pro-Bejing supporters campaigning in Hong Kong in March for the new election system, which drastically reduces the public’s ability to vote and increases the number of pro-Beijing lawmakers making decisions for the city.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesSeveral groups defended their right to participate in the election process.“We may seem like small potatoes, but when you put all these small organizations together, isn’t this the grass roots?” said Wan Ying-bo, a coach at Sea Bear, when reached by phone.But to critics, the problem is not that these groups now get a say; the problem is who does not.The election changes all but eliminated the voice of pro-democracy blocs in the Election Committee, which had already been hobbled by Beijing’s far-reaching national security law. Opposition lawmakers have been arrested. Churches, labor unions and arts groups have disbanded, citing fear of arrest. Pro-democracy politicians who would have held seats on the Election Committee as low-level elected officials called district councilors have resigned in droves in the face of various threats.The overhaul has also vastly reduced the public vote. Previously, about 240,000 voters — already a mere fraction of the city’s 7.5 million residents — could choose Election Committee members through a mix of individual ballots and ones cast by groups. Now, the number has been cut to below 8,000, as most individual votes have been eliminated.Election results have consistently shown that more residents favor the pro-democracy camp. But countering that was precisely the point, said Ivan Choy, a political scientist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.Pro-China lawmakers raised their hands in favor of the bill amending electoral laws at the Legislative Council in Hong Kong in May.Vincent Yu/Associated Press“It is quite clear that the Beijing authorities want to make sure that they can predict and even control the election outcome,” he said. “They want those organizations who are loyal.”The Chinese Communist Party has long relied on trade unions and community organizations to build its base in Hong Kong. The central government helps fund the city’s pro-Beijing parties, which partner with business tycoons to sponsor social welfare groups or even establish new ones, scholars have shown. Now, some of these groups are being recruited for a more overtly political function.Hong Kong’s election system was never truly democratic, with just a portion of the legislature elected by popular vote. The chief executive has always been chosen by the Election Committee, which was already stacked with pro-government figures before the overhaul. Calls for genuine universal suffrage have long been at the heart of protests.Despite the constraints, the opposition over the years managed to win many of the popularly elected seats, giving it a small but influential voice on the Election Committee. Now, Beijing’s electoral changes have stamped out that limited power, in part by reconfiguring the committee to tie it even more closely to the authorities.Within that reconfiguration, the addition of the grass-roots groups is relatively minor. They will be allowed to choose 60 of the 1,500 Election Committee members. By contrast, nearly 200 members will be chosen by elite members of the Chinese legislature or another advisory body to Beijing.Pro-democracy supporters celebrating the results of the election in Hong Kong in November 2019. Despite the constraints, the opposition over the years has managed to win many of the popularly elected seats.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesThe grass-roots associations have attracted particular attention because of their claim to represent a more democratic impulse. Pro-democracy residents have alternately ridiculed or fumed at the groups. One headline in a local newspaper, quoting experts, called some of the groups’ selection “comical.”.css-1xzcza9{list-style-type:disc;padding-inline-start:1em;}.css-3btd0c{font-family:nyt-franklin,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:1rem;line-height:1.375rem;color:#333;margin-bottom:0.78125rem;}@media (min-width:740px){.css-3btd0c{font-size:1.0625rem;line-height:1.5rem;margin-bottom:0.9375rem;}}.css-3btd0c strong{font-weight:600;}.css-3btd0c em{font-style:italic;}.css-w739ur{margin:0 auto 5px;font-family:nyt-franklin,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-weight:700;font-size:1.125rem;line-height:1.3125rem;color:#121212;}#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-w739ur{font-family:nyt-cheltenham,georgia,’times new roman’,times,serif;font-weight:700;font-size:1.375rem;line-height:1.625rem;}@media (min-width:740px){#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-w739ur{font-size:1.6875rem;line-height:1.875rem;}}@media (min-width:740px){.css-w739ur{font-size:1.25rem;line-height:1.4375rem;}}.css-9s9ecg{margin-bottom:15px;}.css-uf1ume{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-box-pack:justify;-webkit-justify-content:space-between;-ms-flex-pack:justify;justify-content:space-between;}.css-wxi1cx{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-flex-direction:column;-ms-flex-direction:column;flex-direction:column;-webkit-align-self:flex-end;-ms-flex-item-align:end;align-self:flex-end;}.css-12vbvwq{background-color:white;border:1px solid #e2e2e2;width:calc(100% – 40px);max-width:600px;margin:1.5rem auto 1.9rem;padding:15px;box-sizing:border-box;}@media (min-width:740px){.css-12vbvwq{padding:20px;width:100%;}}.css-12vbvwq:focus{outline:1px solid #e2e2e2;}#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-12vbvwq{border:none;padding:10px 0 0;border-top:2px solid #121212;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-rdoyk0{-webkit-transform:rotate(0deg);-ms-transform:rotate(0deg);transform:rotate(0deg);}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-eb027h{max-height:300px;overflow:hidden;-webkit-transition:none;transition:none;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-5gimkt:after{content:’See more’;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-6mllg9{opacity:1;}.css-qjk116{margin:0 auto;overflow:hidden;}.css-qjk116 strong{font-weight:700;}.css-qjk116 em{font-style:italic;}.css-qjk116 a{color:#326891;-webkit-text-decoration:underline;text-decoration:underline;text-underline-offset:1px;-webkit-text-decoration-thickness:1px;text-decoration-thickness:1px;-webkit-text-decoration-color:#326891;text-decoration-color:#326891;}.css-qjk116 a:visited{color:#326891;-webkit-text-decoration-color:#326891;text-decoration-color:#326891;}.css-qjk116 a:hover{-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;}When The New York Times sent a message to a WhatsApp number listed on the dance recital group’s Facebook page seeking an interview, the person on the other end immediately responded “SORRY,” then blocked further messages. A staff member for The Family, reached by phone, said the group performed community service and had more than 700 members, but directed further questions to the group’s president, a man she identified only by his surname, Lam. But Mr. Lam said: “Too many media inquiries. I don’t want to talk to reporters.”Calls or emails to at least 20 more organizations went unanswered.Dozens of the groups on the roster shared addresses, down to the room number. The Sea Bear Swimming Club, for example, was listed at the same address as a Sea Bear Squash Club. When a reporter called a number listed online for the squash club, Mr. Wan, the swimming coach, picked up. He said the organizations were separate, though he did not explain.Hong Kong’s election system was never truly democratic, with just a portion of the legislature elected by popular vote.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesAt least four groups — including the Bright and Elite Youth Association, the group of young professionals — were housed in the same unit of a mixed-use building in the Wan Chai neighborhood, according to the government’s list and the building’s directory. A man who answered the door of the unit when Times reporters visited said no one there was authorized to speak to the news media. In the room behind him, dozens of alternating Hong Kong and Chinese flags were strung up on the walls.There is no indication that the groups do not actually exist or do not perform the work they say they do. In the hallway outside the groups’ office in Wan Chai, stacks of cardboard boxes were labeled indicating they contained dozens of soup packets for distribution to families.Still, the links between many of these grass-roots groups and the establishment are evident. In some cases, the groups are founded and headed by politicians from pro-Beijing parties, and their activities align with the central government’s objectives.Bright and Elite, for example, hosts cultural and educational exchanges with the mainland. Another group on the grass-roots roster, Action of Voice, is led by Frankie Ngan Man-Yu, a leader of the pro-Beijing party Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong. His group, he said, visits middle schools in Hong Kong to conduct patriotic education.“These are apples and oranges. One person can, of course, be part of many groups,” Mr. Ngan said when asked about his dual memberships. “So there is no reason for you to put all these things together.” More

  • in

    Qin Gang, China’s new ambassador to US, strikes conciliatory note

    ChinaQin Gang, China’s new ambassador to US, strikes conciliatory noteFirst Washington press conference stresses “mutual exploration, understanding and adaptation” Vincent Ni China affairs correspondentThu 29 Jul 2021 09.06 EDTFirst published on Thu 29 Jul 2021 08.53 EDTChina’s new envoy to the US, Qin Gang, struck a conciliatory tone in his debut press conference upon arrival in Washington DC on Wednesday.China’s US ambassador pick shines light on debate over ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacyRead more“I believe that the door of China-US relations, which is already open, cannot be closed,” Qin said, adding he would “endeavour to bring [bilateral] relations back on track, turning the way for the two countries to get along with each other … from a possibility into a reality.“China and the United States are entering a new round of mutual exploration, understanding and adaptation, trying to find a way to get along with each other in the new era,” Qin said, signalling Beijing’s thinking on the current state of the relationship, and invoking memories of the former US national security adviser Henry Kissinger’s trailblazing cold war-era visit to Beijing.Cold war or uneasy peace: does defining US-China competition matter?Read moreQin is one of Xi Jinping’s most trusted senior diplomats. In recent years, the 55-year-old has been seen accompanying the Chinese president on his overseas trips and meetings with foreign leaders.A former news assistant at United Press International’s bureau in Beijing, Qin became a diplomat in 1992 and has served in various capacities at the Chinese embassy in London three times throughout his career.Qin’s appointment to Washington comes at a time when the US foreign policy establishment is in the midst of a fundamental rethink of its ties with Beijing. The bilateral relationship is at its lowest ebb since its establishment in 1979.Like his predecessor Donald Trump, Joe Biden has pledged to deal with China “from a position of strength” in what he calls “the biggest geopolitical test” of this century. On Monday, the Chinese vice-foreign minister Xie Feng accused the US of treating the country as an “imaginary enemy” in a message to the visiting US deputy secretary of state, Wendy Sherman.Since Qin’s appointment, observers of Chinese diplomacy have been debating whether he will bring Beijing’s controversial “wolf warrior” style to its most consequential diplomatic posting. His predecessor, Cui Tiankai, an old-school Chinese diplomat, has largely distanced himself from rancorous rhetoric against his host country.After serving as Chinese Ambassador to the US for over 8 years, I will be leaving my post and returning to China this week. It’s an honor of a lifetime to represent my country in the US. I want to thank everyone who has supported my performance of duties over the years.— Cui Tiankai (@AmbCuiTiankai) June 22, 2021
    Yet, as a former foreign ministry spokesperson, Qin is known for his uncompromising handling of foreign media and defending China’s image.In 2009, he chided a BBC journalist when answering a question about China’s “Green Dam” internet filtering system. “Do you know what this software is about?” he asked the reporter. “Do you have kids?” he continued. The exchange won him praise in a Chinese-language article in 2010.US accused of ‘demonising’ China as high-level talks begin in TianjinRead moreIn explaining his understanding of Chinese diplomacy, Qin said in 2013 that China’s diplomacy cannot simply be evaluated in terms of “soft” and “hard”. “The fundamental starting point for our diplomatic work is how to better safeguard national interests as well as world peace and development,” he said.“Diplomacy is complex and systematic work. It can be hard with some softness, or soft with some hardness. It can also be both hard and soft. As time and situation change, the two may transform into each other.”Before his ambassadorship to the US, Qin served as China’s vice-minister of foreign affairs from 2018, and before that the ministry protocol department’s director general from 2014.In 2015, he accompanied Xi on his visit to the US. Qin struck an impression as one who is “willing to ruffle feathers without hesitation when he felt it was necessary”, according to Ryan Hass, former China director at the US national security council under Obama, during Xi’s visit.“Qin Gang was very attentive to how his leader would be portrayed and the image that his leader’s public appearances would send,” Hass told the New York Times. “This was particularly the case around President Xi’s state visit to the White House.”TopicsChinaAsia PacificUS foreign policyWashington DCUS politicsReuse this content More

  • in

    China retaliates with sanctions on former commerce secretary Wilbur Ross

    US newsChina retaliates with sanctions on former commerce secretary Wilbur RossThe ‘counter-sanctions’ are in response to Washington’s actions and are the first under China’s new anti-foreign sanction law Vincent Ni, China affairs correspondentFri 23 Jul 2021 15.54 EDTLast modified on Fri 23 Jul 2021 16.03 EDTBarely 48 hours before the arrival in China of one of Biden’s most-trusted diplomats, Beijing has announced its decision to impose counter-sanctions on seven American citizens and entities, including former commerce secretary Wilbur Ross, in retaliation against Washington’s earlier sanctions on Chinese officials over Hong Kong crackdowns.The Biden administration announced sanctions on seven Chinese officials on 16 July and warned US businesses of the “growing risks” posed by Beijing and Hong Kong.It is not the first time Washington and Beijing have imposed mutual sanctions, but the latest round marks the first time China has done so using its new anti-foreign sanction law, which was passed in June.Others affected in Beijing’s “reciprocal counter-sanctions” are the current or former heads of a range of US organisations, including the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International Republican Institute, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the Washington-based Hong Kong Democracy Council.Low-key US-China meeting will address high tensions in relationshipRead moreIn response to Beijing’s counter sanctions, one of the affected US citizens, HRW’s China director Sophie Richardson tweeted, sarcastically: “thanks, for the extra motivation!” She added in another tweet, in reply to Jo Smith Finley, a British Xinjiang expert who was sanctioned by Beijing in March: “Seriously: so much work to do! And this ain’t about us.”Since the enactment of the anti-foreign sanctions law last month, Beijing’s decision to impose counter-sanctions has been expected, but the timing of it is indicative of the deteriorating US-China relations. It also comes just less than 48 hours before US deputy secretary of state Wendy Sherman’s China visit on Sunday.“Washington has reiterated that Sherman’s visit and talk with the Chinese side will be from ‘a position of strength’, but Beijing may want to remind [the Biden administration] that they are equals,” said Ma Ji, a senior CV Starr lecturer at Peking University’s school of transnational law.Ma added: “Of course, none of those targeted are in Biden’s inner circle, which means that Beijing still wants to continue the conversation with Washington. But by issuing this list shortly before Sherman’s visit, Beijing clearly intends to reduce her expectations.”TopicsUS newsChinaUS politicsForeign policyBeijingnewsReuse this content More

  • in

    What is the state of US-China relations? Politics Weekly Extra

    It’s been 50 years this month since Henry Kissinger, the then national security advisor, made a secret trip to the People’s Republic of China. Joan E Greve talks to the Guardian’s China affairs correspondent, Vincent Ni, to find out how the current diplomatic relationship compares with 1971

    How to listen to podcasts: everything you need to know

    When president Nixon visited China in 1972 – following the secret trip that Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor, took there in 1971 – it marked a turning point in the cold war and 20th-century history. But a lot has changed since the 1970s, such as China now having one of the largest economies in the world, data security concerns and, of course, Covid-19. So how have US-China relations changed in the 50 years since Kissinger’s visit in 1971? In this week’s episode, the Guardian’s China affairs correspondent, Vincent Ni, shares his thoughts. Send us your questions and feedback to podcasts@theguardian.com Help support the Guardian by going to gu.com/supportpodcasts Archive: NBC News, the Obama Whitehouse, Richard Nixon Foundation, Hindustan Times More

  • in

    How China’s Growing Dominance Will Impact Sino-Gulf Relations

    The COVID-19 pandemic has sent shockwaves through energy markets. Since March 2020, lockdowns around the world have led adults to work remotely and children to learn virtually. Last year, according to estimates, global energy demand and investment fell by 5% and 18%, respectively.

    Yet as restrictions ease and economies pick up pace, the sense of normality that many hope for is one of the few luxuries energy producers cannot afford. In the race to comply with mounting political pressure to reduce carbon emissions while simultaneously securing their energy futures, the Sino-Gulf alliance may become the new center of gravity for global energy markets.

    Young People Are the Key to Reconciling China and Hong Kong

    READ MORE

    The pandemic has undoubtedly cast a dark shadow on energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently revealed that energy demand will not return to pre-pandemic levels until 2023 in its most optimistic outlook or 2025 in the case of a delayed economic recovery. However, a return to pre-COVID demand does not necessitate a return to pre-crisis growth. Predicted growth in demand between 2019 and 2030 is estimated at 4% in the delayed recovery case, compared to 12% in a COVID-free world.

    Nevertheless, the pandemic has also highlighted the importance of a reliable and accessible electricity supply. The IEA predicts that the electricity sector, whose demand outpaces other fuels, will support economic recovery and account for 21% of global final energy consumption by 2030. This push for electricity is widely driven by the various global emission reduction targets, increased use of electric vehicles and heat sources in advanced economies, and greater consumption from emerging markets.

    Leader of the Pack

    Of the countries driving this growth, China is leading the pack and is predicted to be the main driver of energy demand over the next decade. Following his call for an “energy revolution,” President Xi Jinping has sought to reposition China as a key player in global energy markets. While the Chinese are currently the world’s biggest consumers and producers of coal-fired electricity, Xi’s pledge to make China carbon neutral by 2060 means that energy demands are increasingly being met via renewables.

    .custom-post-from {float:right; margin: 0 10px 10px; max-width: 50%; width: 100%; text-align: center; background: #000000; color: #ffffff; padding: 15px 0 30px; }
    .custom-post-from img { max-width: 85% !important; margin: 15px auto; filter: brightness(0) invert(1); }
    .custom-post-from .cpf-h4 { font-size: 18px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
    .custom-post-from .cpf-h5 { font-size: 14px; letter-spacing: 1px; line-height: 22px; margin-bottom: 15px; }
    .custom-post-from input[type=”email”] { font-size: 14px; color: #000 !important; width: 240px; margin: auto; height: 30px; box-shadow:none; border: none; padding: 0 10px; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-pen-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: center right 14px; background-size:14px;}
    .custom-post-from input[type=”submit”] { font-weight: normal; margin: 15px auto; height: 30px; box-shadow: none; border: none; padding: 0 10px 0 35px; background-color: #1878f3; color: #ffffff; border-radius: 4px; display: inline-block; background-image: url(“https://www.fairobserver.com/wp-content/plugins/moosend_form/cpf-email-icon.svg”); background-repeat: no-repeat; background-position: 14px center; background-size: 14px; }

    .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox { width: 90%; margin: auto; position: relative; display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;}
    .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label { text-align: left; display: block; padding-left: 32px; margin-bottom: 0; cursor: pointer; font-size: 11px; line-height: 18px;
    -webkit-user-select: none;
    -moz-user-select: none;
    -ms-user-select: none;
    user-select: none;
    order: 1;
    color: #ffffff;
    font-weight: normal;}
    .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox label a { color: #ffffff; text-decoration: underline; }
    .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input { position: absolute; opacity: 0; cursor: pointer; height: 100%; width: 24%; left: 0;
    right: 0; margin: 0; z-index: 3; order: 2;}
    .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:before { content: “f0c8”; font-family: Font Awesome 5 Free; color: #eee; font-size: 24px; position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0; line-height: 28px; color: #ffffff; width: 20px; height: 20px; margin-top: 5px; z-index: 2; }
    .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:before { content: “f14a”; font-weight: 600; color: #2196F3; }
    .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input:checked ~ label:after { content: “”; }
    .custom-post-from .cpf-checkbox input ~ label:after { position: absolute; left: 2px; width: 18px; height: 18px; margin-top: 10px; background: #ffffff; top: 10px; margin: auto; z-index: 1; }
    .custom-post-from .error{ display: block; color: #ff6461; order: 3 !important;}

    China is predicted to account for 40% of global renewable expansion, leading in the realm of nuclear power, biofuel production and will account for almost half of globally distributed photovoltaic power. In addition to this, Chinese demand is also predicted to account for 40% of global electricity sector growth by 2030, up from 28%. It was as a consequence of East Asia’s growing appetite for clean energy that, in 2016, global electricity investment outpaced that of oil and gas for the first time in history.

    However, as with everything, there will be winners and losers. While electricity is on the up, sluggish global oil demand has led to falling oil prices. With demand predicted to plummet in the 2030s, there is a growing urgency for Gulf Arab states to diversify as oil becomes more of a burden than a blessing. Yet, in their hurry to claim their stake in the new energy world order, Gulf countries may begin to look east rather than west for a friend to rely on.

    China and the Gulf

    Sino-Gulf relations are not a new occurrence. As the world’s largest importer of oil and natural gas, these two commodities dominate Chinese trade relations and have been the basis of the Saudi-led Gulf alliance. The Gulf Cooperation Council supplies over 30% of China’s oil imports, with Saudi Arabia topping the list, accounting for over 16% of the oil import total. Nevertheless, in a world that is increasingly turning its back on oil, GCC states and China may increasingly look to each other to secure their respective energy futures.

    From the establishment of the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in 2004 to the China–GCC Strategic Dialogue in 2010, Sino-Gulf relations have grown from strength to strength. As such, it was hardly supplying when China gave the GCC a starring role in its Belt and Road Initiative. Announced in 2013, this global infrastructure project that seeks to boost physical connectivity, financial integration, trade and economic growth has become the core pillar of China’s increasingly active foreign policy approach under Xi.

    During the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the CASCF in 2014, Xi spoke about the Gulf Arab states as “natural cooperative partners in jointly building” the BRI. This set the stage for a flood of multi-billion-dollar investments and agreements between China and the Gulf states, advancing the Belt and Road Initiative in the Arabian Peninsula and deepening economic ties.

    Chinese investment activity in the Gulf has followed the “1+2+3” Sino-Arab cooperation framework. This features energy cooperation as its central axis, investment and infrastructure, and accelerating breakthroughs in three high-tech sectors, namely aviation satellite, nuclear energy and new energy. However, there is no doubt that the BRI aims primarily to strengthen this central pillar of energy cooperation. Aptly described as “oil roads,” the initiative will enable China to establish the necessary infrastructure, transport and refinery facilities needed to secure its energy future and keep GCC coffers full.

    These ambitious plans will be of greater significance in the years to come. Despite the economic and energy market turmoil triggered by the pandemic, Sino-Gulf relations show no signs of slowing. Rather, the pandemic may have made way for a greater mutual dependence between China and the Gulf states. This is particularly true for the GCC, whose economic wellbeing depends heavily on the revival of global oil markets. China may prove to be the answer to Gulf ministers’ prayers, stimulating growth by providing a guaranteed revenue stream for the region’s main export, no doubt stabilizing GCC economies.

    Embed from Getty Images

    Beyond the energy sector, however, the two regions offer a wealth of investment opportunities that will likely deepen relations, particularly as the GCC economies realize their various diversification plans. The synergies between the GCC’s various “vision” agendas and China’s BRI are extensive, thus acting as a major point of collaboration. The two are already in the final stages of concluding the long-awaited China–GCC free trade agreement, a move that would no doubt propel economic cooperation and open the doors to a vast array of trading opportunities. Saudi Arabia has already taken active steps to consolidate this BRI-vision cooperation by signing various agreements and memorandums of understanding with China. Riyadh has since considered the BRI to be “one of the main pillars of the Saudi Vision 2030,” consequently making China “among the Kingdom’s biggest economic partners.” 

    Closer Partners

    It is thus clear that, willingly or unwillingly, recent global events have further pushed China and GCC into each other’s arms. Sino-Gulf relations can be expected to gain serious traction in the next few years, especially in the realm of energy cooperation, which is likely to continue to spearhead this strategic alliance as a sector of great mutual importance. Meanwhile, as China seeks to entrench itself in the Gulf, it may find itself caught in the middle of the regional power struggles that threaten stability, namely the Iran-Saudi rivalry. President Xi, however, shows no intent of mixing business with politics, as seen in his recent regional tour, which saw him visit both Saudi Arabia and Iran among others.

    Nevertheless, if China wishes to grow its presence in the Gulf, ensuring regional peace will undoubtedly become a priority for Beijing. Chinese neutrality may be exactly what is needed to defuse regional tensions and maintain a level of accord that keeps the feud below boiling point. Yet despite Sino-Gulf relations taking center stage in the near future, China will not be replacing the United States as the dominant foreign power in the Middle East any time soon. Beijing’s focus on economic rather than political matters makes China, to use the words of Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, “not necessarily a better friend, but a less complicated friend.”

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

  • in

    US image rebounds while ‘unfavourable’ views of China remain, global survey finds

    A new survey has found that since Joe Biden came to power, positive views of the United States have rebounded across 17 advanced economies in North America, Europe and Asia Pacific. Most continue to see China in an unfavourable light.“Confidence in the US president has shot up precipitously since Joe Biden took office, while confidence in President Xi Jinping remains unchanged and near historic lows,” the survey, conducted by the US-based Pew research centre, found. The survey was conducted between 1 February and 26 May this year across 17 advanced economies as a part of Pew’s 2021 Global Attitudes survey wave. There were 18,850 respondents.Last year the survey found that negative views of both the US and China had reached historic highs in many countries.The pro-America opinion is the highest in South Korea, where 77% have positive views of the country, while around two-thirds or more in the US, Italy, Japan, France and the UK say the same. In every place except New Zealand, around half or more had a favourable opinion of the US.Only two countries – Greece and Singapore – have a more positive view of China compared with last year. Three-quarters or more in Japan (88%), Sweden (80%), Australia (78%), South Korea (77%) and the US (76%) have negative views of China. “In many places, these unfavourable views are at or near historic highs, though they are largely unchanged since last year,” the authors wrote.The large majority of respondents also said that China “does not respect personal freedoms of its people”. In 15 of 17 publics, eight-in-10 have this impression. “This sense is also at or nearly historic highs in nearly every place surveyed, having risen significantly in countries like Italy, South Korea, Greece, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom since 2018,” Pew found.On US-China leadership, when the question was asked last year, few respondents had confidence in either Xi or then-President Donald Trump to do the right thing when it came to world affairs. It found that across much of western Europe, more had confidence in Xi than Trump.Half or more people in almost every place surveyed say it is “more important for their nation to have strong economic ties with the US than with China”. The views were different in Singapore (33%) and New Zealand (45%).But the feelings towards China are not all negative. When it comes to the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, China scored higher than the US. A median of 49% respondents among the 17 publics surveyed say that China has done “a good job” in handling the coronavirus outbreak, whereas a median of 37% regard the US’s response positively. More