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      Meet the People Working on Getting Us to Hate Each Other Less

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      Affective polarization — “a poisonous cocktail of othering, aversion and moralization” — has prompted an explosion of research as the threat to democratic norms and procedures mount.Intensely felt divisions over race, ethnicity and culture have become more deeply entrenched in the American political system, reflected in part in the election denialism found in roughly a third of the electorate and in state legislative initiatives giving politicians the power to overturn election results.Many researchers have begun to focus on this question: Is there a causal relationship between the intensification of hostility between Democrats and Republicans and the deterioration of support for democratic standards?“Growing affective polarization and negative partisanship,” Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, political scientists at Georgia State University and Koç University-Istanbul, write in a 2019 essay, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies,”contribute to a perception among citizens that the opposing party and their policies pose a threat to the nation or an individual’s way of life. Most dangerously for democracy, these perceptions of threat open the door to undemocratic behavior by an incumbent and his/her supporters to stay in power, or by opponents to remove the incumbent from power.What is affective polarization? In 2016, Lilliana Mason, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins, wrote that when a voter’s “partisan social identity” merges with his or her racial, religious, sexual and cultural identities, “these various identities work together to drive an emotional type of polarization that cannot be explained by parties or issues alone.”Mason argues that “threats to a party’s status tend to drive anger, while reassurances drive enthusiasm” so thata party loss generates very negative, particularly angry, emotional reactions. This anger is driven not simply by dissatisfaction with potential policy consequences, but by a much deeper, more primal psychological reaction to group threat. Partisans are angered by a party loss because it makes them, as individuals, feel like losers too.One optimistic proposal to reduce partisan animosity is to focus public attention on the commonality of Democratic and Republican voters in their shared identity as Americans. Matthew Levendusky, a political scientist at the University of Pennsylvania, has written extensively on this subject, including in his 2018 paper “Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?” and in his soon-to-be-published book, “Our Common Bonds: Using What Americans Share to Help Bridge the Partisan Divide.”“I show,” Levendusky contends in his 2018 paper, “that when subjects’ sense of American national identity is heightened, they come to see members of the opposing party as fellow Americans rather than rival partisans. As a result, they like the opposing party more, thereby reducing affective polarization.”There are serious problems, however, with a depolarization strategy based on American identity, problems that go to the heart of the relentless power of issues of race, ethnicity and immigration­ to splinter the electorate.In their December 2022 paper, “ ‘American’ Is the Eye of the Beholder: American Identity, Racial Sorting, and Affective Polarization among White Americans,” Ryan Dawkins and Abigail Hanson write thatWhite Democrats and White Republicans have systematically different ideas about what attributes are essential to being a member of the national community. Second, the association between partisanship and these competing conceptions of American identity among White Americans has gotten stronger during the Trump era, largely because of Democrats adopting a more racially inclusive conception of American identity. Lastly, appeals to American identity only dampen out-partisan animosity when the demographic composition of the opposing party matches their racialized conception of American identity. When there is a mismatch between people’s racialized conception of American identity and the composition of the opposition party, American identity is associated with higher levels of partisan hostility.Dawkins and Hanson acknowledge that “national identity is perhaps the only superordinate identity that holds the promise of uniting partisans and closing the social distance between White Democrats and White Republicans,” but, they continue,If conceptions of national identity itself become the subject of the very sorting process that is driving affective polarization, then it can no longer serve as a unifying identity that binds the entire country together. In fact, frames that highlight the association of American identity to historic norms of whiteness can ultimately divide the country further, especially as the United States transitions into a majority-minority country. Indeed, continued demographic change will likely make the schism between White Democrats and White Republicans wider before things have any hope to improve.I asked Levendusky about the Dawkins-Hanson paper. He replied by email that he was now “convinced that there is no simple path from animosity (or affective polarization) to far downstream outcomes (albeit important ones)” — adding that “there’s a long way from ‘I dislike members of the other party’ to ‘I will vote for a candidate who broke democratic norms rather than a candidate from the other party’ and the process is likely complex and subtle.”In an August 2022 paper, “Does Affective Polarization Undermine Democratic Norms or Accountability? Maybe Not,” David E. Broockman, a political scientist at Berkeley, Joshua L. Kalla, a political scientist at Yale, and Sean J. Westwood, a political scientist at Dartmouth, pointedly reject the claim made by a number of scholars “that if citizens were less affectively polarized, they would be less likely to endorse norm violations, overlook copartisan politicians’ shortcomings, oppose compromise, adopt their party’s views, or misperceive economic conditions. A large, influential literature speculates as such.”Instead, Broockman, Kalla and Westwood contend, their own studies “find no evidence that these changes in affective polarization influence a broad range of political behaviors — only interpersonal attitudes. Our results suggest caution about the widespread assumption that reducing affective polarization would meaningfully bolster democratic norms or accountability.”Broockman and his co-authors measured the effect of reducing affective polarization on five domains: “electoral accountability, adopting one’s party’s policy positions, support for legislative bipartisanship, support for democratic norms, and perceptions of objective conditions.”“Our results,” they write, “run contrary to the literature’s widespread speculation: in these political domains, our estimates of the causal effects of reducing affective polarization are consistently null.”In an email, Westwood argued that the whole endeavor “to fix anti-democratic attitudes by changing levels of partisan animosity sounds promising, but it is like trying to heal a broken bone in a gangrenous leg when the real problem is the car accident that caused both injuries in the first place.”Westwood’s point is well-taken. In a country marked by battles over sex, race, religion, gender, regional disparities in economic growth, traditionalist-vs-postmaterialist values and, broadly, inequality, it is difficult to see how relatively short, survey based experiments could produce a significant, long-term dent in partisan hostility.Jan G. Voelkel, a sociologist at Stanford, and eight of his colleagues, report similar results in their October 2022 article “Interventions Reducing Affective Polarization Do Not Necessarily Improve Anti-democratic Attitudes.” “Scholars and practitioners alike,” they write, “have invested great effort in developing depolarization interventions that reduce affective polarization. Critically, however, it remains unclear whether these interventions reduce anti-democratic attitudes, or only change sentiments toward outpartisans.”Why?Because much prior work has focused on treating affective polarization itself, and assumed that these interventions would in turn improve downstream outcomes that pose consequential threats to democracy. Although this assumption may seem reasonable, there is little evidence evaluating its implications for the benefits of depolarization interventions.In “Megastudy Identifying Successful Interventions to Strengthen Americans’ Democratic Attitudes,” a separate analysis of 32,059 American voters “testing 25 interventions designed to reduce anti-democratic attitudes and partisan animosity,” however, Voelkel and many of his co-authors, Michael N. Stagnaro, James Chu, Sophia Pink, Joseph S. Mernyk, Chrystal Redekopp, Matthew Cashman, James N. Druckman, David G. Rand and Robb Willer significantly amended their earlier findings.In an email, Willer explained what was going on:One of the key findings of this new study is that we found some overlap between the interventions that reduced affective polarization and the interventions that reduced one specific anti-democratic attitude: support for undemocratic candidates. Specifically, we found that several of the interventions that were most effective in reducing American partisans’ dislike of rival partisans also made them more likely to say that they would not vote for a candidate from their party who engaged in one of several anti-democratic actions, such as not acknowledging the results of a lost election or removing polling stations from areas that benefit the rival party.Voelkel and his co-authors found that two interventions were the most effective.The first is known as the “Braley intervention” for Alia Braley, a political scientist at Berkeley and the lead author of “The Subversion Dilemma: Why Voters Who Cherish Democracy Participate in Democratic Backsliding.” In the Braley intervention, participants are “asked what people from the other party believe when it comes to actions that undermine how democracy works (e.g., using violence to block laws, reducing the number of polling stations to help the other party, or not accepting the results of elections if they lose).” They are then given “the correct answer” and “the answers make clear the other party does not support actions that undermine democracy.”The second “top-performing intervention” was to give participants “a video showing vivid imagery of societal instability and violence following democratic collapse in several countries, before concluding with imagery of the Jan. 6 U.S. Capitol attack.”“To our knowledge,” Willer wrote in his email, “this is the first evidence that the same stimuli could both reduce affective polarization and improve some aspect of Americans’ democratic attitudes, and it suggests these two factors may be causally linked, more than prior work — including our own — would suggest.”Kalla disputed the conclusions Willer drew from the megastudy:The most successful interventions in the megastudy for reducing anti-democratic views were interventions that directly targeted those anti-democratic views. For example, Braley et al.’s successful intervention was able to reduce anti-democratic views by correcting misperceptions about the other party’s willingness to subvert democracy.This intervention, Kalla continued,was not about affective polarization. What this suggests is that for practitioners interested in reducing anti-democratic attitudes, they should use interventions that directly speak to and target those anti-democratic views. As our work finds and Voelkel et al. replicates, obliquely attempting to reduce anti-democratic views through the causal pathway of affective polarization does not appear to be a successful strategy.I sent Kalla’s critique to Willer, who replied:I agree with Josh’s point that the most effective interventions for reducing support for undemocratic practices and candidates were interventions that were pretty clearly crafted with the primary goal in mind of targeting democratic attitudes. And while we find some relationships here that suggest there is a path to reducing support for undemocratic candidates via reducing affective polarization, the larger point that most interventions reducing affective polarization do not affect anti-democratic attitudes still stands, and our evidence continues to contradict the widespread popular assumption that affective polarization and anti-democratic attitudes are closely linked. We continue to find evidence in this newest study against that idea.One scholar, Herbert P. Kitschelt, a political scientist at Duke, contended that too much of the debate over affective polarization and democratic backsliding has been restricted to the analysis of competing psychological pressures, when in fact the scope in much larger. “The United States,” Kitschelt wrote in an email,has experienced a “black swan” confluence, interaction and mutual reinforcement of general factors that affect all advanced knowledge societies with specific historical and institutional factors unique to the U.S. that have created a poisonous concoction threatening U.S. democracy more so than that of any other Western society. Taken together, these conditions have created the scenario in which affective polarization thrives.Like most of the developed world, the United States is undergoing three disruptive transformations compounded by three additional historical factors specific to the United States, Kitschelt suggests. These transformations, he wrote, are:“The postindustrial change of the occupational structure expanding higher education and the income and status educational dividend, together with a transformation of gender and family relations, dismantling the paternalist family and improving the bargaining power of women, making less educated people — and especially males — the more likely socio-economic and cultural losers of the process.”“The expansion of education goes together with a secularization of society that has undercut the ideological foundations of paternalism, but created fierce resistance in certain quarters.”“The sociocultural and economic divisions furthermore correlate with residential patterns in which the growing higher educated, younger, secular and more gender-egalitarian share of the population lives in metropolitan and suburban areas, while the declining, less educated, older, more religious and more paternalists share of the population lives in exurbia or the countryside.”The three factors unique to this country, in his view, are:“The legacy of enslavement and racial oppression in the United States in which — following W.E.B. DuBois — the white lower class of less skilled laborers derived a ‘quasi-wage’ satisfaction from racist subordination of the minority, the satisfaction of enjoying a higher rank in society than African Americans.”“The vibrancy of evangelical ‘born again’ Christianity, sharply separated from the old European moderate, cerebral mainline Protestantism. The former attracts support over-proportionally among less educated people, and strictly segregates churches by race, thereby making it possible to convert white Evangelical churches into platforms of white racism. They have become political transmission belts of right-wing populism in the United States, with 80 percent of those whites who consider themselves ‘born again’ voting for the Trump presidential candidacy.”“The institutional particularities of the U.S. voting system that tends to divide populations into two rival parties, the first-past-the-post electoral system for the U.S. legislature and the directly elected presidency. While received wisdom has claimed that it moderates divisions, under conditions of mutually reinforcing economic, social, and cultural divides, it is likely to have the opposite effect. The most important additional upshot of this system is the overrepresentation of the countryside (i.e. the areas where the social, economic, and cultural losers of knowledge society tend to be located) in the legislative process and presidential elections/Electoral College.”Kitschelt argues that in order to understand affective polarization it is necessary to go “beyond the myopic and US-centric narrow vision field of American political psychologists.” The incentives “for politicians to prime this polarization and stoke the divides, including fanning the flames of affective polarization, can be understood only against the backdrop of these underlying socio-economic and cultural legacies and processes.”Kitschelt is not alone in this view. He pointed to a 2020 book, “American Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective,” by Noam Gidron, James Adams and Will Horne, political scientists at Harvard, the University of California-Davis and Georgia State University, in which they make a case thatAmericans’ dislike of partisan opponents has increased more rapidly than in most other Western publics. We show that affective polarization is more intense when unemployment and inequality are high, when political elites clash over cultural issues such as immigration and national identity and in countries with majoritarian electoral institutions.Writing just before the 2020 election, Gidron, Adams and Horne point out that theissue of cultural disagreements appears highly pertinent in light of the ongoing nationwide protests in support of racial justice and the Black Lives Matter movement which has sparked a wider cultural debate over questions relating to race, police funding and broader questions over interpretations of America’s history. In a July 4th speech delivered at Mt. Rushmore, President Trump starkly framed these types of “culture war” debates as a defining political and social divide in America, asserting “our nation is witnessing a merciless campaign to wipe out our history, defame our heroes, erase our values and indoctrinate our children.”The study of affective polarization sheds light on how vicious American politics has become, and on how this viciousness has enabled Trump and those Republicans who have followed his lead, while hurting Democrats whose policy and legislative initiatives have been obstructed as much as they have succeeded.Richard Pildes, a professor of constitutional law at N.Y.U., addressed this point when he delivered the following remarks from his paper “Political Fragmentation in Democracies of the West” in 2021 at a legal colloquium in New York:There is little question that recent decades have seen a dramatic decline in the effectiveness of government, whether measured in the number of important bills Congress is able to enact, the proportion of all issues people identity as most important that Congress manages to address, or the number of enacted bills that update old policies enacted many decades earlier. Social scientists now write books with titles like Can America Govern Itself? Longitudinal data confirm the obvious, which is the more polarized Congress is, the less it enacts significant legislation; in the ten most polarized congressional terms, a bit more than 10.6 significant laws were enacted, while in the ten least polarized terms, that number goes up 60 percent, to around 16 significant enactments per term. The inability of democratic governments to deliver on the issues their populations care most about poses serious risks.What are the chances of reversing this trend?The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

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      Is Brazil’s Alexandre de Moraes Actually Good for Democracy?

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      Alexandre de Moraes, a Brazilian Supreme Court justice, was crucial to Brazil’s transfer of power. But his aggressive tactics are prompting debate: Can one go too far to fight the far right?When Brazil’s highway police began holding up buses full of voters on Election Day, he ordered them to stop.When right-wing voices spread the baseless claim that Brazil’s election was stolen, he ordered them banned from social media.And when thousands of right-wing protesters stormed Brazil’s halls of power this month, he ordered the officials who had been responsible for securing the buildings arrested.Alexandre de Moraes, a Brazilian Supreme Court justice, has taken up the mantle of Brazil’s lead defender of democracy. Using a broad interpretation of the court’s powers, he has pushed to investigate and prosecute, as well as to silence on social media, anyone he deems a menace to Brazil’s institutions.As a result, in the face of antidemocratic attacks from Brazil’s former far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, and his supporters, Mr. de Moraes cleared the way for the transfer of power. To many on Brazil’s left, that made him the man who saved Brazil’s young democracy.Yet to many others in Brazil, he is threatening it. Mr. de Moraes’s aggressive approach and expanding authority have made him one of the nation’s most powerful people, and also put him at the center of a complicated debate in Brazil over how far is too far to fight the far right.Damage to the Supreme Court caused by right-wing protesters. Mr. de Moraes ordered the officials who had been responsible for securing the buildings arrested.Victor Moriyama for The New York TimesHe has jailed people without trial for posting threats on social media; helped sentence a sitting congressman to nearly nine years in prison for threatening the court; ordered raids on businessmen with little evidence of wrongdoing; suspended an elected governor from his job; and unilaterally blocked dozens of accounts and thousands of posts on social media, with virtually no transparency or room for appeal.In the hunt for justice after the riot this month, he has become further emboldened. His orders to ban prominent voices online have proliferated, and now he has the man accused of fanning Brazil’s extremist flames, Mr. Bolsonaro, in his cross hairs. Last week, Mr. de Moraes included Mr. Bolsonaro in a federal investigation of the riot, which he is overseeing, suggesting that the former president inspired the violence.His moves fit into a broader trend of Brazil’s Supreme Court increasing its power — and taking what critics have called a more repressive turn in the process.Many legal and political analysts are now sparring over Mr. de Moraes’s long-term impact. Some argue that his actions are necessary, extraordinary measures in the face of an extraordinary threat. Others say that, acting under the banner of safeguarding democracy, he is instead harming the nation’s balance of power.“We cannot disrespect democracy in order to protect it,” said Irapuã Santana, a lawyer and legal columnist for O Globo, one of Brazil’s biggest newspapers.Understand the Riots in Brazil’s CapitalThousands of rioters supporting Jair Bolsonaro, the far-right former president of Brazil,  stormed the nation’s Congress, Supreme Court and presidential offices on Jan. 8.Anatomy of a Mass Attack: After Mr. Bolsonaro lost the presidential election in October, many believed that the threat of violence from his supporters would recede. Here is what went wrong.The Investigations: Authorities face several major questions as they piece together how rioters briefly seized the seats of Brazil’s government.Digital Playbook: Misinformation researchers are studying how the internet was used ahead of the riots in Brazil. Many are drawing a comparison to the Jan. 6 attack.The Role of the Police: Their early inaction in the riot shows how security forces can help empower violence and deepen the threat to democracy.Mr. Santana voted in October for Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the new leftist president, but said he worried that many in Brazil were cheering on Mr. de Moraes without considering the potential consequences. “Today he’s doing it against our enemy. Tomorrow he’s doing it against our friend — or against us,” he said. “It’s a dangerous precedent.”Milly Lacombe, a left-wing commentator, said such concerns missed a bigger danger, evidenced by the riots and a foiled bomb plot to disrupt Mr. Lula’s inauguration. She argued, in her column on the Brazilian news site UOL, that the far right posed grave perils to Brazil’s democracy, which should overshadow concerns about free speech or judicial overreach.“Under the threat of a Nazi-fascist-inspired insurrection, is it worth temporarily suppressing individual freedoms in the name of collective freedom?” she wrote. “I would say yes.”Brazil’s former far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, center, has long accused Mr. de Moraes of overstepping his authority and had tried to impeach him.Dado Galdieri for The New York TimesThe dispute has illustrated a larger global debate not only on judicial power but also about how to handle misinformation online without silencing dissenting voices..css-1v2n82w{max-width:600px;width:calc(100% – 40px);margin-top:20px;margin-bottom:25px;height:auto;margin-left:auto;margin-right:auto;font-family:nyt-franklin;color:var(–color-content-secondary,#363636);}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-1v2n82w{margin-left:20px;margin-right:20px;}}@media only screen and (min-width:1024px){.css-1v2n82w{width:600px;}}.css-161d8zr{width:40px;margin-bottom:18px;text-align:left;margin-left:0;color:var(–color-content-primary,#121212);border:1px solid var(–color-content-primary,#121212);}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-161d8zr{width:30px;margin-bottom:15px;}}.css-tjtq43{line-height:25px;}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-tjtq43{line-height:24px;}}.css-x1k33h{font-family:nyt-cheltenham;font-size:19px;font-weight:700;line-height:25px;}.css-1hvpcve{font-size:17px;font-weight:300;line-height:25px;}.css-1hvpcve em{font-style:italic;}.css-1hvpcve strong{font-weight:bold;}.css-1hvpcve a{font-weight:500;color:var(–color-content-secondary,#363636);}.css-1c013uz{margin-top:18px;margin-bottom:22px;}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-1c013uz{font-size:14px;margin-top:15px;margin-bottom:20px;}}.css-1c013uz a{color:var(–color-signal-editorial,#326891);-webkit-text-decoration:underline;text-decoration:underline;font-weight:500;font-size:16px;}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-1c013uz a{font-size:13px;}}.css-1c013uz a:hover{-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;}What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.Learn more about our process.Twitter’s owner, Elon Musk, weighed in that Mr. de Moraes’s moves were “extremely concerning.” Glenn Greenwald, an American journalist who has lived in Brazil for years and has become a critic of certain social-media rules, debated a Brazilian sociologist this week about Mr. de Moraes’s actions. And Brazilian officials have suggested that they would consider new laws to address what can be said online.Mr. de Moraes has declined requests for an interview for more than a year. The Supreme Court, in a statement, said that Mr. de Moraes’s investigations and many of his orders have been endorsed by the full court and “are absolutely constitutional.”In the hours after the riot, Mr. de Moraes suspended the governor of the district responsible for security for the protest that turned violent and then ordered the arrests of two district security officials. Still, there is little support in the Supreme Court for arresting Mr. Bolsonaro because of a lack of evidence, as well as fears that it would prompt unrest, according to a senior court official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss private conversations.Multiple Supreme Court justices instead prefer to try to convict Mr. Bolsonaro for abusing his power through the country’s election agency, making him ineligible to run for office for eight years, the official said.Mr. Bolsonaro, who has been in Florida since Dec. 30, has long accused Mr. de Moraes of overstepping his authority and has tried to impeach him. Mr. Bolsonaro’s lawyer said he had always respected democracy and repudiated the riots.Mr. de Moraes, 54, spent decades as a public prosecutor, private lawyer and constitutional law professor.He was appointed to the Supreme Court in 2017, a move denounced by the left because he was aligned with center-right parties.Mr. de Moraes with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva last month.Andre Borges/EPA, via ShutterstockIn 2019, the Supreme Court’s chief justice issued a one-page order authorizing the court to open its own investigations instead of waiting for law enforcement. For the court — which, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, handles tens of thousands of cases a year, including certain criminal cases — it was a drastic expansion of authority.The chief justice tapped Mr. de Moraes to run the first inquiry: an investigation into “fake news.” Mr. de Moraes’s first move was to order a magazine to retract an article that had linked the chief justice to a corruption investigation. (He later rescinded the order when the magazine produced evidence.)Mr. de Moraes then shifted his focus to online disinformation, primarily from Mr. Bolsonaro’s supporters. That gave him an outsize role in Brazilian politics that grew further this year when, by chance, his rotation as Brazil’s election chief coincided with the vote.In that job, Mr. de Moraes became Brazilian democracy’s chief guardian — and attack dog. Ahead of the vote, he cut a deal with the military to run additional tests on voting machines. On Election Day, he ordered the federal highway police to explain why officers were stopping buses full of voters. And on election night, he arranged for government leaders to announce the winner jointly, a show of unity against any attempt to hold onto power.In the middle of that group of leaders was Mr. de Moraes himself. He delivered a forceful speech about the value of democracy, drawing chants of “Xandão,” or “Big Alex” in Portuguese. “I hope from the election onward,” he said, “the attacks on the electoral system will finally stop.”They did not. Right-wing protesters demonstrated outside military bases, calling on the military to overturn the vote. In response, Mr. de Moraes ordered tech companies to ban more accounts, according to a senior lawyer at one major tech firm, who spoke on the condition of anonymity out of fear of angering Mr. de Moraes.Supporters of Mr. Bolsonaro protesting in front of army headquarters in São Paulo to call for military intervention after the election in November.Victor Moriyama for The New York TimesAmong the accounts Mr. de Moraes ordered taken down are those of at least five members of Congress, a billionaire businessman and more than a dozen prominent right-wing pundits, including one of Brazil’s most popular podcast hosts.Mr. de Moraes’s orders to remove accounts do not specify why, according to the lawyer and a copy of one order obtained by The New York Times. Visits to banned accounts on Twitter yield a blank page and a blunt message: The “account has been withheld in Brazil in response to a legal demand.” And account owners are simply told they are banned because of a court order and should consider contacting a lawyer.The lawyer said that his tech firm appealed some orders it viewed as overly broad, but that Mr. de Moraes denied them. Appeals to the full bench of judges have also been denied or ignored, this person said.Multiple social networks declined to comment on the record for this article. Mr. de Moraes is a potential threat to their business in Brazil. Last year, he briefly banned Telegram in the country after it did not respond to his orders. There were talks recently among some justices about the need to bring Mr. de Moraes’s investigations to an end, according to the court official, but after the Jan. 8 riot, those talks ceased. The riot has increased support for Mr. de Moraes among his peers, according to the official.Beatriz Rey, a political scientist at the State University of Rio de Janeiro, said Mr. de Moraes’s approach, though not ideal, is necessary because other branches of the government, especially Congress, have skirted their duties.“You shouldn’t have one justice fighting threats to democracy over and over again,” she said. “But the problem is the system itself is malfunctioning right now.”André Spigariol More

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      Será que Alexandre de Moraes é realmente bom para a democracia?

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      Alexandre de Moraes, Ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal, foi crucial para a transição de poder no Brasil. Mas suas táticas agressivas estão provocando um debate: É possível ir longe demais para combater a extrema-direita?Quando a Polícia Rodoviária Federal começou a impedir a passagem de ônibus cheios de eleitores no dia da eleição, ele ordenou que parassem.Quando vozes da direita espalharam a alegação infundada de que a eleição no Brasil foi roubada, ele ordenou que fossem banidas das redes sociais.E quando milhares de manifestantes da direita invadiram as sedes dos três poderes neste mês, ele ordenou que autoridades responsáveis pela segurança fossem presas.Alexandre de Moraes, Ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal, assumiu o papel de principal defensor da democracia brasileira. Usando uma interpretação ampla dos poderes do Tribunal, Moraes impulsionou investigações e processos, bem como o silenciamento nas redes sociais, de qualquer pessoa considerada por ele uma ameaça às instituições brasileiras.Como resultado, diante dos ataques antidemocráticos do ex-presidente de extrema direita do Brasil, Jair Bolsonaro, e de seus apoiadores, Moraes abriu caminho para a transição de poder. Para muitos da esquerda brasileira, isso fez dele o homem que salvou a jovem democracia brasileira.No entanto, para muitos outros no Brasil, ele a ameaça. A abordagem agressiva e a expansão da autoridade de Moraes fizeram dele uma das pessoas mais poderosas do país, e também o colocaram no centro de um debate complicado no Brasil sobre até que ponto se pode ir para lutar contra a extrema-direita.Danos causados ao Supremo Tribunal Federal por manifestantes da direita. Alexandre de Moraes ordenou a prisão de autoridades responsáveis pela segurança.Victor Moriyama for The New York TimesAlexandre de Moraes já ordenou prisões sem julgamento por ameaças postadas em redes sociais; liderou o voto que sentenciou um deputado federal a quase nove anos de prisão por ameaçar o Tribunal; ordenou busca e apreensão contra empresários com poucas evidências de irregularidades; suspendeu um governador eleito de seu cargo; e bloqueou monocraticamente dezenas de contas e milhares de publicações nas redes sociais, praticamente sem transparência ou espaço para recurso.Na sua caça em nome da justiça após o tumulto deste mês, Moraes se tornou mais audacioso. Suas ordens para banir vozes influentes online se proliferaram, e, agora, ele colocou o homem acusado de atiçar as chamas extremistas do Brasil, Bolsonaro, sob sua mira. Na semana passada, Moraes incluiu o ex-presidente na investigação federal do tumulto, da qual é o relator, sugerindo que o ex-presidente tenha inspirado a violência.Suas ações se encaixam em uma tendência mais ampla da Suprema Corte brasileira de aumentar o próprio poder — tomando o que os críticos chamam de um rumo mais repressivo no processo.Vários juristas e analistas políticos agora discutem que impacto Moraes terá a longo prazo. Alguns argumentam que as suas ações são medidas extraordinárias, mas necessárias diante de uma ameaça extraordinária. Outros dizem que, agindo sob a bandeira da salvaguarda da democracia, Moraes está, em vez disso, prejudicando o equilíbrio de poder no país.“Não podemos desrespeitar a democracia para protegê-la”, disse Irapuã Santana, advogado e colunista jurídico do jornal O Globo, um dos maiores do Brasil.Santana votou em Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, o novo presidente da esquerda, em outubro, mas disse temer que muitos no Brasil estejam apoiando Moraes sem considerar as possíveis consequências. “Hoje ele está fazendo isso contra o nosso ‘inimigo’. Amanhã ele está fazendo isso contra o nosso amigo — ou contra nós”, disse. “É um precedente perigoso.”Milly Lacombe, uma comentarista da esquerda, disse que tais preocupações ignoram um perigo maior, evidenciado pelos tumultos e um complô frustrado de atentado à bomba para perturbar a posse de Lula. Ela argumentou, em sua coluna no site de notícias UOL, que a extrema direita apresenta graves perigos para a democracia brasileira, o que deve ofuscar as preocupações com liberdade de expressão ou excesso judicial.“Sob ameaça de uma insurreição de inspiração nazi-fascista vale suprimir temporariamente liberdades individuais em nome da liberdade coletiva?” escreveu. “Eu diria que sim.”O ex-presidente de direita, Jair Bolsonaro, há muito tempo acusa Alexandre de Moraes de exceder sua autoridade e tentou um impeachment contra o Ministro.Dado Galdieri for The New York TimesA disputa ilustra um debate global mais amplo, não apenas sobre o poder do Judiciário, mas também sobre como lidar com a desinformação nas redes sem silenciar vozes dissidentes.O proprietário do Twitter, Elon Musk, ponderou que os movimentos de Moraes foram “extremamente preocupantes.” Glenn Greenwald, um jornalista americano que vive no Brasil há anos e crítico de certas regras das redes sociais, participou de um debate nesta semana com um sociólogo brasileiro sobre as ações de Moraes. E as autoridades brasileiras sugeriram que poderiam considerar novas leis para determinar o que pode ser dito nas redes.Alexandre de Moraes tem recusado pedidos de entrevista há mais de um ano. O Supremo Tribunal Federal, em nota, disse que as investigações de Moraes e muitas de suas ordens foram endossadas por toda a Corte e “são absolutamente constitucionais.”Nas horas seguintes ao tumulto em Brasília, Moraes afastou o governador do Distrito Federal, responsável pela segurança do protesto que se tornou violento, e depois ordenou a prisão de dois agentes de segurança do Distrito Federal.Ainda assim, há pouco apoio no Supremo Tribunal Federal para prender Bolsonaro, devido à insuficiência das provas e temores de que uma prisão provocaria novos conflitos. De acordo com um alto funcionário do Supremo Tribunal Federal que falou sob condição de anonimato para discutir conversas privadas, diversos ministros da corte preferem tentar condenar Bolsonaro por abuso de poder no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, o que o tornaria inelegível por oito anos.Bolsonaro, que está na Flórida desde 30 de dezembro, há muito tempo acusa Moraes de exceder sua autoridade e tentou um impeachment contra o Ministro. O advogado de Bolsonaro disse que ele sempre respeitou a democracia e repudiou os tumultos.Moraes, de 54 anos, tem décadas de atuação como promotor público, advogado e professor de Direito Constitucional.O Ministro foi nomeado para o Supremo Tribunal Federal em 2017, uma medida condenada pela esquerda porque ele estava alinhado com partidos da centro-direita.Alexandre de Moraes com o Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva no mês passado.Andre Borges/EPA, via ShutterstockEm 2019, o então presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal emitiu uma portaria de uma página autorizando a Corte a instaurar seus próprios inquéritos ao invés de aguardar outras autoridades. Para o Tribunal — que, ao contrário da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos, processa dezenas de milhares de casos por ano, incluindo certos casos criminais — essa foi uma expansão drástica de sua jurisdição.O presidente da Corte designou Moraes para iniciar o primeiro inquérito: uma investigação sobre “fake news”. O primeiro passo de Moraes foi ordenar a uma revista que retirasse do ar uma reportagem que ligava o presidente da Corte a uma investigação sobre corrupção. (Ordem que revogou quando a revista mostrou provas.)Moraes então mudou o foco das investigações para a desinformação nas redes, principalmente vinda dos apoiadores de Jair Bolsonaro, o que deu a ele um enorme papel na política brasileira. Papel que cresceu ainda mais este ano, quando, por acaso, seu revezamento como presidente do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral coincidiu com a eleição.Nessa função, Alexandre de Moraes se tornou o maior guardião — e cão de guarda — da democracia brasileira. Antes da eleição, Moraes fez um acordo com os militares para realizar testes adicionais em urnas eletrônicas. No dia da eleição, ordenou que a Polícia Rodoviária Federal explicasse por que os policiais estavam parando ônibus cheios de eleitores. E, na noite da eleição, Moraes convidou os líderes da República para que anunciassem o vencedor em conjunto, uma demonstração de unidade contra qualquer tentativa de perpetuação no poder.No meio desse grupo de líderes estava o próprio Alexandre de Moraes. O Ministro fez um discurso contundente sobre o valor da democracia, provocando cantos de “Xandão”.“Espero que, a partir dessa eleição”, disse, “finalmente cessem as agressões ao sistema eleitoral.”Elas não cessaram. Manifestantes da direita protestaram em frente aos quartéis, pedindo aos militares que revogassem a eleição. Em resposta, Moraes ordenou que empresas de tecnologia suspendessem mais contas, de acordo com um advogado sênior de uma grande empresa de tecnologia, que falou sob condição de anonimato por medo de irritar o Ministro.Apoiadores de Jair Bolsonaro protestam em frente ao quartel do Exército em São Paulo para pedir intervenção militar após eleições em novembro.Victor Moriyama for The New York TimesEntre as contas que Moraes ordenou que fossem retiradas estão as de pelo menos cinco parlamentares federais, um empresário bilionário e mais de uma dezena de influenciadores da direita, incluindo um dos apresentadores de podcast mais populares do país.As ordens de Moraes para remover contas não especificam o motivo, de acordo com o advogado e uma cópia de uma ordem obtida pelo New York Times. Acessos a contas proibidas no Twitter levam a uma página em branco e uma mensagem contundente: “a conta foi retida no Brasil em resposta a uma exigência legal.” Os donos das contas são simplesmente informados de que estão suspensas devido a uma ordem judicial e que devem considerar entrar em contato com um advogado.O advogado disse que sua empresa de tecnologia entrou com recursos contra ordens que considera excessivamente amplas, mas eles foram negados por Moraes. Os recursos ao Plenário do STF também foram negados ou ignorados, disse.Procuradas pela reportagem, várias redes sociais se recusaram a comentar o assunto publicamente. Moraes é uma potencial ameaça para os seus negócios no Brasil. No ano passado, Moraes baniu brevemente o Telegram no país após a empresa não cumprir suas ordens.Recentemente houve conversas entre alguns ministros do STF sobre a necessidade de pôr fim aos inquéritos de Moraes, de acordo com a fonte do tribunal, mas após o tumulto de 8 de janeiro, esses comentários cessaram. O tumulto aumentou o apoio a Moraes entre seus pares, de acordo com o alto funcionário da Corte.Beatriz Rey, cientista política da Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, disse que a abordagem de Moraes, embora não ideal, se faz necessária porque outros poderes do governo, especialmente o Legislativo, não cumpriram seu dever.“Você não deveria ter um Ministro combatendo ameaças à democracia repetidas vezes,” disse. “Mas o problema é que o próprio sistema está funcionando mal neste momento.”André Spigariol More

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      ‘You Don’t Negotiate With These Kinds of People’

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      Over the past eight years, the Republican Party has been transformed from a generally staid institution representing the allure of low taxes, conservative social cultural policies and laissez-faire capitalism into a party of blatant chaos and disruption.The shift has been evident in many ways — at the presidential level, as the party nominated Donald Trump not once but twice and has been offered the chance to do so a third time; in Trump’s — and Trump’s allies’ — attempt to overturn the 2020 election results; in his spearheading of the Jan. 6 assault on the Capitol; and most recently in the brutal series of votes from Jan. 3 to Jan. 7 in the House of Representatives, where 20 hard-right members held Kevin McCarthy hostage until he cried uncle and was finally elected speaker.What drives the members of the Freedom Caucus, who have wielded the threat of dysfunction to gain a level of control within the House far in excess of their numbers? How has this group moved from the margins to the center of power in less than a decade?Since its founding in 2015, this cadre has acquired a well-earned reputation for using high-risk tactics to bring down two House speakers, John Boehner and Paul Ryan. During the five-day struggle over McCarthy’s potential speakership, similar pressure tactics wrested crucial agenda-setting authority from the Republican leadership in the House.“You don’t negotiate with these kinds of people,” Representative Mike Rogers, Republican of Alabama and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, declared as the saga unfolded. “These are legislative terrorists.”“We have grifters in our midst,” Representative Dan Crenshaw, Republican of Texas, told the Texas Liberty Alliance PAC.One of the key factors underlying the extremism among Republicans in the House and their election denialism — which has confounded American politics since it erupted in 2020 — is racial tension, not always explicit but nonetheless omnipresent, captured in part by the growing belief that white Americans will soon be in the minority.As Jack Balkin of Yale Law School noted, “The defenders of the old order have every incentive to resist the emergence of a new regime until the bitter end.”In his paper “Public Opinion Roots of Election Denialism,” published on Jan. 6, the second anniversary of the storming of the Capitol, Charles Stewart III, a political scientist at M.I.T., argues that “among Republicans, conspiracism has a potent effect on embracing election denialism, followed by racial resentment.”According to Stewart’s calculations, “a Republican at the 10th percentile of the conspiracism scale has a 55.7 percent probability of embracing election denialism, compared to a Republican at the 90th percentile, at 86.6 percent, over 30 points higher. A Republican at the 10th percentile on the racial resentment scale has a 59.4 percent probability of embracing denialism, compared to 83.2 percent for a Republican at the 90th percentile on the same scale.”In other words, the two most powerful factors driving Republicans who continue to believe that Trump actually won the 2020 election are receptivity to conspiracy thinking and racial resentment.“The most confirmed Republican denialists,” Stewart writes, “believe that large malevolent forces are at work in world events, racial minorities are given too much deference in society and America’s destiny is a Christian one.”Along parallel lines, Neil Siegel, a law professor at Duke, argues in his 2021 article “The Trump Presidency, Racial Realignment and the Future of Constitutional Norms,” that Donald Trump “is more of an effect than a cause of larger racial and cultural changes in American society that are causing Republican voters and politicians to perceive an existential threat to their continued political and cultural power — and, relatedly, to deny the legitimacy of their political opponents.”In this climate, Siegel continues, “It is very unlikely that Republican politicians will respect constitutional norms when they deem so much to be at stake in each election and significant governmental decision.”These developments draw attention to some of the psychological factors driving politics and partisan competition.In a 2020 paper, “Dark Necessities? Candidates’ Aversive Personality Traits and Negative Campaigning in the 2018 American Midterms,” Alessandro Nai and Jürgen Maier, political scientists at the University of Amsterdam and the University of Koblenz-Landau in Germany, argue that the role of subclinical “psychopathy” is significant in the behavior of a growing number of elected officials:Psychopaths usually show “a cognitive bias towards perceiving hostile intent from others” and are impulsive, prone to callous social attitudes, and show a strong proclivity for interpersonal antagonism. Individuals high in psychopathy do not possess the ability to recognize or accept the existence of antisocial behaviors, and thus should be expected to more naturally adopt a more confrontational, antagonistic and aggressive style of political competition. Individuals high in psychopathy have been shown to have more successful trajectories in politics. They are furthermore often portrayed as risk-oriented agents. In this sense, we could expect individuals that score high in psychopathy to make a particularly strong use of attacks, regardless of the risk of backlash effects.Narcissism, Nai and Maier continue,has been shown to predict more successful political trajectories, also due to the prevalence of social dominance intrinsic in the trait. Narcissism is, furthermore, linked to overconfidence and deceit and hyper competitiveness, which could explain why narcissists are more likely to engage in angry/aggressive behaviors and general incivility in their workplace. Narcissism is furthermore linked to reckless behavior and risk-taking and thus individuals high in this trait are expected to disregard the risk of backlash effects.Nai and Maier also refer to a character trait they consider politically relevant, Machiavellianism, which they describe as havingan aggressive and malicious side. People high in Machiavellianism are “characterized by cynical and misanthropic beliefs, callousness, a striving for argentic goals (i.e., money, power, and status), and the use of calculating and cunning manipulation tactics,” and in general tend to display a malevolent behavior intended to “seek control over others.”In an email, Nai argued that structural and ideological shifts have opened the door to “a greater tolerance and preference for political aggressiveness.” First, there is the rise of populism, which “strongly relies on a very aggressive stance against established elites, with a more aggressive style and rhetoric.”“Populists,” Nai added, “are very peculiar political animals, happy to engage in more aggressive rhetoric to push the boundaries of normality. This helps them getting under the spotlight, and explains why they seem to have a much greater visibility (and perhaps power) than they numerically should.”Second, Nai contended thata case can be made that contemporary politics is the realm of politicians with a harsh and uncompromising personality (callousness, narcissism, and even Machiavellianism). Trump, Bolsonaro, Duterte, all share a rather “nasty” character, which seems indicative of a contemporary preference for uncompromising and aggressive leaders. Such political aggressiveness (populism, negativity, incivility, dark personality) is perfectly in character for a political system characterized with high polarization and extreme dislike for political opponents.Other scholars emphasize the importance of partisan polarization, anti-elitism and the rise of social media in creating a political environment in which extremists can thrive.“There are likely a few factors at play here,” Jay Van Bavel, a professor of psychology and neural science at N.Y.U., wrote by email. “The first is that ideologically extreme people tend to be more dogmatic — especially people who are on the far right.”He cited a 2021 national survey that he and Elizabeth Harris, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, conducted that “found that conservatism and ideological extremity both contributed to an unwillingness to compromise.”The members of the Freedom Caucus, Van Bavel noted,tend to be ideologically extreme conservatives which makes them very good candidates for this type of rigid and extreme thinking. We also found that politically extreme individuals were more likely to have a sense of belief superiority. These traits help explain why this group is very unwilling to cooperate or strike a political compromise.Three years ago, I wrote a column for The Times about a segment of the electorate — and a faction of elected officials — driven by “a need for chaos,” based on the work of Michael Bang Petersen and Mathias Osmundsen, political scientists at Aarhus University in Denmark, and Kevin Arceneaux, a political scientist at Sciences Po in Paris. Since then, the three, joined by Timothy B. Gravelle, Jason Reifler and Thomas J. Scotto, have updated their work in a 2021 paper, “Some People Just Want to Watch the World Burn: The Prevalence, Psychology and Politics of the ‘Need for Chaos.’”In their new paper, they argue:Some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society, while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individuals to “want to watch the world burn.”The distinction between those seeking chaos to fulfill destructive impulses and those seeking chaos in order to rebuild the system is crucial, according to the authors:The finding that thwarted status-desires drive a Need for Chaos, which then activates support for political protest and violence, suggests that a Need for Chaos may be a key driver of societal change, both currently and historically. While some simply want to “watch the world burn,” others want to the see a new world rebuilt from the ashes.There are, the authors continue,both nihilists and those who have a purpose. Nonetheless, owing to the destructive force of a high Need for Chaos, one of the key challenges of contemporary societies is indeed to meet, recognize and, to the extent possible, alleviate the frustrations of these individuals. The alternative is a trail of nihilistic destruction.In a more recent paper, published last year, “The ‘Need for Chaos’ and Motivations to Share Hostile Political Rumors,” Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux found that the need for chaos “is significantly higher among participants who readily take risks to obtain status and among participants who feel lonely.” At the extreme, the need surpasses partisanship: “For chaos-seekers, political sympathies toward political parties appear to matter little for sharing decisions; instead, what matters is that rumors can be used as an instrument to mobilize against the entire political establishment.”The authors found that “the need for chaos is most strongly associated with worries about losing one’s own position in the social hierarchy and — to a lesser, but still significant extent — the perception that one is personally being kept back from climbing the social status ladder,” noting that “white men react more aggressively than any other group to perceived status challenges.”Van Bavel wrote by email that instead of focusing on a need for chaos, he believes “it might be simpler to assume that they are simply indifferent to chaos in the service of dogmatism. You see some of this on the far left — but we found that it simply doesn’t reach the same extremes as the far right.”Van Bavel pointed to the structural aspects of the contemporary political system that reward the adoption of extreme stances:In the immediate political context, where there is extremely high polarization driven by partisan animosity, there are strong social media incentives to take extreme stances, and an unwillingness for moderate Republicans to break ranks and strike a compromise with Democrats. In this context, the Freedom Caucus can get away with dogmatic behavior without many serious consequences. Indeed, it might even benefit their national profile, election prospects, and fund-raising success.Along similar lines, Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist at N.Y.U., stressedthe rapid change in audience and incentives that social media has engineered for congresspeople. The case of Ted Cruz, caught checking his mentions as he sat down from giving a speech on the Senate floor, is illustrative. Why is he making himself so responsive to strangers on Twitter, rather than to his constituents, or to his colleagues in the Senate?Haidt wrote by email that he agrees with Yuval Levin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, that:Social media has contributed to the conversion of our major institutions from formative (they shape character) to performative (they are platforms on which influencers can perform to please and grow their audiences). When we add in the “primary problem” — that few congressional races are competitive, so all that matters is the primary, which gives outsized influence to politically extreme voters — we have both a road into Congress for social media influencers and the ultimate platform for their performances.Plus, Haidt added:The influence economy may give them financial and career independence; once they are famous, they don’t need to please their party’s leadership. They’ll have opportunities for money and further influence even if they leave Congress.Leanne ten Brinke, a professor of psychology at the University of British Columbia, wrote by email:My research on power and politics focuses on the role of psychopathic personality traits, which is characterized by callousness, manipulation/coercion, impulsivity, and a desire for dominance. When people think of psychopathy they often think of criminals or serial killers, but these traits exist on a continuum, so people can be “high” in these traits without meeting any kind of clinical cutoff, and it will impact the way they move through the world. People with high levels of these traits tend to gravitate toward powerful roles in society to fulfill that desire for dominance and to bully others when in these roles.Brinke noted that she has “no data on the personalities of those in the House Freedom Caucus,” but in “previous research we actually found that U.S. senators who display behaviors consistent with psychopathy were more likely to get elected (they are great competitors!) but are less likely to garner co-sponsors on their bills (they are terrible cooperators!).” In addition, Brinke continued, “they enjoy having power over others, but don’t use it to make legislative progress. They tend to be more self-interested than other-interested.”In a separate 2020 paper, “Light and Dark Trait Subtypes of Human Personality,” by Craig S. Neumann, Scott Barry Kaufman, David Bryce Yaden, Elizabeth Hyde, Eli Tsukayama and Brinke, the authors find:The light subtype evidenced affiliative interpersonal functioning and greater trust in others, as well as higher life satisfaction and positive self-image. The dark subtype reflected interpersonal dominance, competitiveness, and aggression. In both general population samples, the dark trait subtype was the least prevalent. However, in a third sample of U.S. senators (N =143), based on observational data, the dark subtype was most prevalent and associated with longer tenure in political office, though less legislative success.In a separate 2019 paper, “The Light vs. Dark Triad of Personality: Contrasting Two Very Different Profiles of Human Nature,” Kaufman, Yaden, Hyde and Tsukayama wrote that dark personalities are “not associated with exclusively adverse and transgressive psychosocial outcomes” and may, instead, “be considered adaptive.”Those with the more forbidding personal characteristics “showed positive correlations with a variety of variables that could facilitate one’s more agentic-related goals” and they “positively correlated with utilitarian moral judgment and creativity, bravery, and leadership, as well as assertiveness, in addition to motives for power, achievement, and self-enhancement.”In contrast, more sunny and cooperative dispositions were “correlated with greater ‘reaction formation,’ which consisted of the following items: ‘If someone mugged me and stole my money, I’d rather he be helped than punished’ and ‘I often find myself being very nice to people who by all rights I should be angry at.’ While having such ‘lovingkindness’ even for one’s enemies is conducive to one’s own well-being, these attitudes” could potentially make these people “more open to exploitation and emotional manipulation.”In March 2022, Richard Pildes, a law professor at N.Y.U., warned in “Political Fragmentation in Democracies of the West”:The decline of effective government throughout most Western democracies poses one of the greatest challenges democracy currently confronts. The importance of effective government receives too little attention in democratic and legal theory, yet the inability to deliver effective government can lead citizens to alienation, distrust, and withdrawal from participation, and worse, to endorse authoritarian leaders who promise to cut through the dysfunctions of democratic governments.For the Republican Party, the empowerment of the Freedom Caucus will face its first major test of viability this month. According to Janet Yellen, secretary of the Treasury, the United States will hit the $31.4 trillion statutory debt limit on Jan. 19. The Treasury, she continued, would then be forced to adopt stringent cash-management procedures that could put off default until June.At the moment, House Republicans, under pressure from the Freedom Caucus, are demanding that legislation raising the debt ceiling be accompanied by sharp spending cuts. That puts them at loggerheads with the Biden administration and many members of the Senate Democratic majority, raising the possibility of a government shutdown.In other words, the takeover of the Republican Party by politicians either participating in or acceding to tribalism and chaos has the clear potential in coming weeks to put the entire nation at risk.Looking past the debt ceiling to the 2024 elections, Richard L. Hasen, a law professor at U.C.L.A., writes in the April 2022 Harvard Law Review:The United States faces a serious risk that the 2024 presidential election, and other future U.S. elections, will not be conducted fairly and that the candidates taking office will not reflect the free choices made by eligible voters under previously announced election rules. The potential mechanisms by which election losers may be declared election winners are: (1) usurpation of voter choices for president by state legislatures purporting to exercise constitutional authority, possibly with the blessing of a partisan Supreme Court and the acquiescence of Republicans in Congress; (2) fraudulent or suppressive election administration or vote counting by law- or norm-breaking election officials; and (3) violent or disruptive private action that prevents voting, interferes with the counting of votes, or interrupts the assumption of power by the actual winning candidate.What, one has to ask, does this constant brinkmanship and playing to the gallery do to democracy generally?The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

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      Your Wednesday Briefing: China’s Dual Crises

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      Last year, China’s economy had one of its worst performances in decades. Its population is also shrinking.Together with Japan and South Korea, China has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world.Qilai Shen for The New York TimesChina’s twin crisesAt the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, China sought to reassure the world that its economy was back on track. A delegation told world leaders that business could return to normal now that the country has relaxed its “zero Covid” policy.But China’s projected resilience does not align with two major revelations about its long-term health and stability.Yesterday, China revealed that its economy had just had one of its worst performances since 1976, the year Mao Zedong died. Its economy grew by just 3 percent, far short of its 5.5 percent target.Perhaps more consequential, China also revealed that its population had shrunk last year for the first time since the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s failed economic experiment.In the population data, experts see major implications for China, its economy and the world. Births in China have fallen for years, and officials have fought to reverse the trend. They have loosened the one-child policy and offered incentives to encourage families to have children. Those policies did not work. Now, some experts think the decline may be irreversible.A shrinking Chinese population means that the country will face labor shortages in the absence of enough people of working age to fuel its growth. By 2035, 400 million people in China are expected to be over 60, nearly a third of its population. That will have major implications for the global economy; the country has been the engine of world growth for decades.Context: The problem is not limited to China. Many developed countries are aging, and toward the middle of this century, deaths will start to exceed births worldwide. The shift is already starting to transform societies. In East Asia, people are working well into their 70s, and in France, an effort to raise the retirement age from 62 to 64 is expected to expose older workers to hiring discrimination.Opinion: China’s population decline creates two major economic challenges, writes Paul Krugman. The state pension system will struggle to handle the unbalanced ratio of older adults to the working population. And the decline may harm China’s overall productivity.Olena Zelenska pressed leaders at Davos to support Ukraine.Gian Ehrenzeller/EPA, via ShutterstockThe Ukraine war dominates at DavosThe war in Ukraine is taking center stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, as Ukraine pushes for more aid and advanced weapons from the West.Olena Zelenska, Ukraine’s first lady, is there in person. Yesterday, she called on world leaders and others at the forum to use their influence to help Ukraine. She also outlined the 10-point peace plan that her husband, President Volodymyr Zelensky, announced last fall, which includes Russia’s complete withdrawal.Pressure is now growing on Germany to export its main battle tank to Ukraine, or allow other countries to do so. Poland and Finland are waiting for Germany’s approval to send the German tanks, which could help Ukraine better defend itself against Russian aerial attacks and take the initiative along the front line in the east.The State of the WarDnipro: A Russian strike on an apartment complex in the central Ukrainian city was one of the deadliest for civilians away from the front line since the war began. The attack prompted renewed calls for Moscow to be charged with war crimes.Western Military Aid: Britain indicated that it would give battle tanks to Ukrainian forces to help prepare them for anticipated Russian assaults this spring, adding to the growing list of powerful Western weapons being sent Ukraine’s way that were once seen as too provocative.Soledar: The Russian military and the Wagner Group, a private mercenary group, contradicted each other publicly about who should get credit for capturing the eastern town. Ukraine’s military, meanwhile, has rejected Russia’s claim of victory, saying its troops are still fighting there.What’s next: The dispute over German-made tanks should be resolved by the end of the week. Vocal U.S. support could help sway Germany. Yesterday, a senior NATO official said that Britain’s recent announcement that it would send 14 tanks to Ukraine was making Germany’s reluctance untenable.Context: Ukraine and its allies are growing more worried that there is only a short window to prepare for a possible Russian offensive in the spring.Elsewhere: The Australian Open banned Belarusian and Russian flags yesterday. It has allowed tennis players from those countries to compete, but not as representatives of their country.Brayan Apaza, 15, is the youngest person who was killed in the protests.Federico Rios Escobar for The New York Times.A referendum on Peru’s democracyProtests in rural Peru that began more than a month ago over the ouster of the former president, Pedro Castillo, have grown in size and in the scope of demonstrators’ demands.The unrest is now far broader than anger over who is running the country. Instead, it represents a profound frustration with the country’s young democracy, which demonstrators say has deepened the country’s vast inequalities.At first, protesters mainly sought timely new elections or Castillo’s reinstatement. But now at least 50 people have died, and protesters are demanding a new constitution and even, as one sign put it, “to refound a new nation.”“This democracy is no longer a democracy,” they chant as they block streets.Background: Peru returned to democracy just two decades ago, after the authoritarian rule of Alberto Fujimori. The current system, based on a Fujimori-era Constitution, is rife with corruption, impunity and mismanagement.Context: The crisis reflects an erosion of trust in democracies across Latin America, fueled by states that “violate citizens’ rights, fail to provide security and quality public services and are captured by powerful interests,” according to The Journal of Democracy. Just 21 percent of Peruvians are satisfied with their democracy, according to one study. Only Haiti fares worse in Latin America.THE LATEST NEWSAsia PacificMursal Nabizada was one of a few female legislators who stayed in Afghanistan after the Taliban seized power. Wakil Kohsar/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesA former Afghan lawmaker was fatally shot at her home in Kabul. No one has been arrested, and it was unclear whether it was a politically motivated murder or a family conflict.New Zealand is facing an egg shortage. One reason is a decade-old disagreement about how to farm poultry.Vietnam’s president resigned yesterday after he was found responsible for a series of corruption scandals, The Associated Press reports.Around the WorldArmed insurgents kidnapped 50 women in Burkina Faso, which has been battling a jihadist insurgency since 2015.Britain’s government blocked a new Scottish law that made it easier for people to legally change their gender.Experts think European inflation has probably peaked, after an unusually warm winter drove down gas prices.Science TimesSome 130,000 babies get infected with H.I.V. each year in sub-Saharan Africa.Malin Fezehai for The New York TimesEfforts to treat adults for H.I.V. have been a major success across sub-Saharan Africa. But many infections in children are undetected and untreated.Dolphins can shout underwater. But a new study suggests that underwater noise made by humans could make it harder for them to communicate and work together.The rate of big scientific breakthroughs may have fallen since 1945. Analysts say that today’s discoveries are more incremental.A Morning ReadPrincess Martha Louise of Norway stepped away from her royal duties last year to focus on her alternative medicine business.Lise AserudThe British aren’t the only ones with royal drama. Thailand, Norway, Denmark and Spain have zany monarchies, too.ARTS AND IDEAS“The Reading Party,” painted in 1735 by Jean-François de Troy, was sold for $3.6 million last month. Christie’sTough times for the old mastersThe art market, like pretty much everything else in our culture, has become all about the here and now. European paintings from before 1850 were once a bedrock of the market. But now, works by the old masters make up just 4 percent of sales at Sotheby’s and Christie’s.Instead, buyers increasingly want works by living artists. Last year, Sotheby’s, Christie’s and Phillips offered works by a record 670 “NextGen” artists, who are under 45. A January report found that their art grossed more than $300 million. Experts say that younger collectors often regard art from the distant past as remote and irrelevant, and contemporary art reflects the fast-forward cultural preoccupations of our society. There may also be a financial incentive: Works by younger, Instagram-lauded artists are routinely “flipped” at auction for many multiples of their original gallery prices.Related: A new book, “The Status Revolution,” argues that class signifiers have flipped. The lowbrow has supplanted luxury as a sign of prestige.PLAY, WATCH, EATWhat to CookArmando Rafael for The New York Times. Food Stylist: Simon Andrews. Prop Stylist: Paige Hicks.Instant pistachio pudding mix is the secret to this moist Bundt cake.How to NegotiateThere is an art to asking for a raise.HealthIs it bad to drink coffee on an empty stomach?FashionHere’s how to choose the perfect work T-shirt.Now Time to PlayPlay the Mini Crossword, and a clue: Whole bunch (four letters).Here are the Wordle and the Spelling Bee.You can find all our puzzles here.That’s it for today’s briefing. See you next time. — AmeliaP.S. Adrienne Carter, who has led our newsroom in Asia since 2019, will be the next Europe editor. Congratulations, Adrienne!“The Daily” is on China’s “zero Covid” pivot.We’d like your feedback! Please email thoughts and suggestions to briefing@nytimes.com. More

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      Así comenzó el ataque en Brasilia

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      Mientras el autobús se dirigía desde el corazón agrícola de Brasil a la capital, Andrea Barth sacó su teléfono para preguntar a sus compañeros de viaje, uno por uno, qué pensaban hacer cuando llegaran.“Derrocar a los ladrones”, respondió un hombre.“Sacar al ‘Nueve Dedos’“, dijo otro, en referencia al presidente de izquierda de Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, quien hace décadas perdió parte de un dedo en un accidente de trabajo sucedido en una fábrica.Mientras los pasajeros describían sus planes de violencia, más de cien autobuses llenos de simpatizantes de Jair Bolsonaro, el expresidente de extrema derecha, también descendían en Brasilia, la capital.Video posted on social media shows dozens of supporters of Jair Bolsonaro arriving in Brasília by bus.Jakelyne Loiola, via TwitterUn día después, el 8 de enero, una turba pro-Bolsonaro desató un caos que conmocionó al país y que dio la vuelta al mundo. Los agitadores invadieron y saquearon el Congreso, el Supremo Tribunal Federal y el palacio de gobierno del país, con la intención, según muchos de ellos, de incitar a los líderes militares a derrocar a Lula, quien había asumido el cargo una semana antes.El ataque caótico tuvo un parecido inquietante con el asalto al Capitolio de Estados Unidos el 6 de enero de 2021: cientos de manifestantes de derecha, alegando que una elección estuvo amañada, entraron a los pasillos del poder.Ambos episodios impactaron a dos de las democracias más grandes del mundo, y casi dos años después del ataque de Estados Unidos, el asalto del domingo de hace un par de semanas mostró que el extremismo de extrema derecha, inspirado por líderes antidemocráticos e impulsado por teorías de la conspiración, sigue siendo una grave amenaza.Lula y las autoridades judiciales actuaron con rapidez para recuperar el control y detuvieron a más de 1150 alborotadores, desalojaron los campamentos donde se refugiaron, buscaron a sus financiadores y organizadores y, el viernes de la semana pasada, abrieron una investigación sobre cómo Bolsonaro pudo haberlos inspirado.The New York Times habló con las autoridades, servidores públicos, testigos y participantes en las protestas y revisó decenas de videos y cientos de publicaciones en las redes sociales para reconstruir lo sucedido. El resultado de la investigación muestra que una turba superó con rapidez y sin esfuerzo a la policía.También muestra que algunos agentes de la policía no solo no actuaron contra los alborotadores, sino que parecían simpatizar con ellos, ya que se dedicaron a tomar fotos mientras la turba destruía el Congreso. Un hombre que fue a ver qué estaba pasando dijo que la policía simplemente le indicó que se dirigiera a los disturbios.El desequilibrio entre los manifestantes y la policía sigue siendo uno de los puntos centrales de la investigación de las autoridades y las entrevistas con los agentes de seguridad han generado acusaciones de negligencia grave e incluso de complicidad activa en el caos. Tras los disturbios, las autoridades federales suspendieron al gobernador responsable de la protección de los edificios públicos y detuvieron a dos altos funcionarios de seguridad que trabajaban para él. More

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      How a Mob Tried to Oust Brazil’s Lula

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      As the bus made its way from Brazil’s agricultural heartland to the capital, Andrea Barth pulled out her phone to ask fellow passengers, one by one, what they intended to do once they arrived.“Overthrow the thieves,” one man replied.“Take out ‘Nine-Finger,’” said another, referring to Brazil’s leftist president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who lost part of a finger decades ago in a factory accident.“You might escape a lightning strike,” another man said, as if confronting Mr. Lula himself. “But you won’t escape me.”As the passengers described their plans for violence, more than a hundred other buses bulging with supporters of Jair Bolsonaro, the far-right former president, were also descending on Brasília, the capital.Video posted on social media shows dozens of Bolsonaro supporters arriving in Brasília by bus.Jakelyne Loiola, via TwitterA day later, on Jan. 8, a pro-Bolsonaro mob unleashed mayhem that shocked the country and was broadcast around the world. Rioters invaded and ransacked Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court and presidential offices, intending, many of them said, to spur military leaders to topple Mr. Lula, who had taken office just a week earlier.The chaotic attack bore an unsettling resemblance to the Jan. 6, 2021 storming of the U.S. Capitol: Hundreds of right-wing protesters, claiming an election was rigged, stomping through the halls of power.Each episode rattled one of the world’s largest democracies, and almost two years to the day after the U.S. attack, last Sunday’s assault showed that far-right extremism, inspired by antidemocratic leaders and fed by conspiracy theories, remains a grave threat.Mr. Lula and judicial authorities have moved swiftly to reassert control, arresting more than 1,150 rioters, clearing the encampments that gave them refuge and searching for their funders and organizers.But questions continue to swirl about how a relatively small band of unarmed protesters, who had largely publicized their plans, were able so easily to storm the country’s most important government buildings.The New York Times spoke with law enforcement, government officials, eyewitnesses and protesters, and reviewed dozens of videos and hundreds of social media posts to piece together what happened. The reporting shows that a mob, led by what appeared to be a relatively small group of extremists bent on destruction, swiftly and effortlessly overwhelmed a drastically outnumbered police presence.It also shows that some officers not only failed to take any action against rioters, but, in at least one case, waved a spectator toward Congress.The imbalance between protesters and the police remains a central focus of the authorities’ investigation, and interviews with security officials yielded accusations of gross negligence and even active complicity in the mayhem. After the riot, federal authorities suspended the governor responsible for protecting the buildings and ordered the arrest of two top security officials who worked for him. More

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      Brazil’s Protests Resemble the US Capitol Attack on Jan. 6

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      Supporters of U.S. President Donald J. Trump gathered outside the Capitol in Washington on Jan. 6, 2021.Leah Millis/ReutersSupporters of Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro outside Brazil’s National Congress in Brasília on January 8, 2023.Adriano Machado/ReutersA defeated president claims, falsely, that an election was rigged. After months of baseless claims of fraud, an angry mob of his supporters storms Congress. They overwhelm police and vandalize the seat of national government, threatening the country’s democratic institutions.Similarities between Sunday’s mob violence in Brazil and the attack on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, are self-evident: Jair Bolsonaro, the right-wing former president of Brazil, had for months sought to undermine the results of an election that he lost, in much the same manner that Donald J. Trump did after his defeat in the 2020 presidential election. Trump allies who had helped spread falsehoods about the 2020 election have turned to sowing doubt in the results of Brazil’s presidential election in October.Those efforts by Mr. Bolsonaro and his allies have now culminated in an attempt — however implausible — to overturn the results of Brazil’s election and restore the former president to power. In much the same manner as Jan. 6, the mob that descended on the Brazilian capital overpowered police at the perimeter of the building that houses Congress and swept into the halls of power — breaking windows, taking valuable items and posing for photos in abandoned legislative chambers.A Trump supporter inside the office of Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the House, on Jan. 6, 2021.Saul Loeb/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesSupporters of Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro rifle through papers on a desk in the Planalto Palace in Brasília on Sunday.Eraldo Peres/Associated PressThe two attacks do not align completely. The Jan. 6 mob was trying to stop the official certification of the results of the 2020 election, a final, ceremonial step taken before the new president, Joseph R. Biden Jr., was inaugurated on Jan. 20.But Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the new president of Brazil, was sworn into office more than a week ago. The results of the presidential election have been certified by the country’s electoral court, not its legislature. There was no official proceeding to disrupt on Sunday, and the Brazilian Congress was not in session.The mob violence on Jan. 6, 2021, “went right to the heart of the changing government,” and the attack in Brazil is not “as heavily weighted with that kind of symbolism,” said Carl Tobias, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Richmond.Pro-Trump protesters storming the Capitol in 2021.Will Oliver/EPA, via ShutterstockPro-Bolsonaro protesters storming the Planalto Presidential Palace in Brasília in 2023.Sergio Lima/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesAnd Mr. Bolsonaro, who has had strong ties with Mr. Trump throughout their years in office, was nowhere near the capital, having taken up residence in Orlando, Fla., about 150 miles from Mr. Trump’s estate at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach.Nevertheless, the riot in Brasília drew widespread condemnation, including from U.S. lawmakers, with many Democrats drawing comparisons between it and the storming of the U.S. Capitol.“Democracies of the world must act fast to make clear there will be no support for right-wing insurrectionists storming the Brazilian Congress,” Representative Jamie Raskin wrote on Twitter. “These fascists modeling themselves after Trump’s Jan. 6 rioters must end up in the same place: prison.”The Capitol Rotunda after a pro-Trump mob stormed the building on Jan. 6.Win Mcnamee/Getty ImagesThe National Congress building in Brasília after pro-Bolsonaro protesters stormed the building on Sunday.Eraldo Peres/Associated PressRepresentative George Santos, a Republican from New York under criminal investigation by Brazilian authorities, appeared to be one of the first elected officials from his party to condemn the mob violence in a post on Twitter on Sunday, but he did not draw a connection to Jan. 6.Many of the lawmakers who condemned the violence had lived through the attack on the Capitol that occurred just over two years ago. Mr. Raskin was the lead impeachment manager in Mr. Trump’s second impeachment trial over his role in inciting the mob.In a final echo of the Jan. 6 attack on Sunday, hours after the riot in Brazil began, Mr. Bolsonaro posted a message on social media calling for peace, much the way Mr. Trump did. Authorities had already announced they had the situation under control. More