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      Status Anxiety Is Blowing Wind Into Trump’s Sails

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      What is the role of status discontent in the emergence of right-wing populism? If it does play a key role, does it matter more where someone stands at any given moment or whether someone is moving up the ladder or down?In the struggle for status, Michael Bang Petersen, a political scientist at Aarhus University, Denmark and the lead author of “Beyond Populism: The Psychology of Status-Seeking and Extreme Political Discontent,” argues thatEducation has emerged as a clear cleavage in addition to more traditional indicators of social class. The highly educated fare better in a more globalized world that puts a premium on human capital. Since the 1980s the highly educated left in the U.S. and elsewhere have been forging alliances with minority groups (e.g., racial, ethnic and sexual minorities), who also have been increasing their status in society. This, in turn, pushes those with lower education or those who feel challenged by the new emerging groups towards the right.It is hardly a secret that the white working class has struggled in recent decades — and clearly many factors play a role — but what happens to those without the skills and abilities needed to move up the education ladder to a position of prestige in an increasingly competitive world?Petersen’s answer: They have become populism’s frontline troops.Over the past six decades, according to Petersen, there has been a realignment of the parties in respect to their position as pro-establishment or anti-establishment: “In the 1960s and 1970s the left was associated with an anti-systemic stance but this position is now more aligned with the right-wing.”Those trapped in a downward spiral undergo a devastating experience.Lea Hartwich, a social psychologist at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies at Osnabrueck University in Germany wrote in an email:Those falling behind face a serious threat to their self-worth and well-being: Not only are the societal markers of personal worth and status becoming unattainable but, according to the dominant cultural narrative of individual responsibility, this is supposedly the result of their own lack of hard work or merit.Instead of focusing on the economic system and its elites, Hartwich continued,Right-wing populists usually identify what they call liberal elites in culture, politics and the media as the “enemies of the people.” Combined with the rejection of marginalized groups like immigrants, this creates targets to blame for dissatisfaction with one’s personal situation or the state of society as a whole while leaving a highly unequal economic system intact. Right-wing populists’ focus on the so-called culture wars, the narrative that one’s culture is under attack from liberal elites, is very effective because culture can be an important source of identity and self-worth for people. It is also effective in organizing political conflicts along cultural, rather than economic lines.In a January 2021 paper — “Neoliberalism can reduce well-being by promoting a sense of social disconnection, competition, and loneliness” — Hartwich, Julia C. Becker, also of Osnabrueck, and S. Alexander Haslam of Queensland University found that “exposure to neoliberal ideology,” which they describe as the belief that “economies and societies should be organized along the principles of the free market,” results in “loneliness and, through this, decreases well-being. We found that exposure to neoliberal ideology increased loneliness and decreased well-being by reducing people’s sense of connection to others and by increasing perceptions of being in competition with others.”Diana Mutz, a political scientist at the University of Pennsylvania, described the political consequences of white status decline in her 2018 paper, “Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote.”“Candidate preferences in 2016 reflected increasing anxiety among high-status groups,” Mutz wrote. “Both growing domestic racial diversity and globalization contributed to a sense that white Americans are under siege by these engines of change.”Mutz found that:Change in financial well-being had little impact on candidate preference. Instead, changing preferences were related to changes in the party’s positions on issues related to American global dominance and the rise of a majority-minority America: issues that threaten white Americans’ sense of dominant group status.In fact, status decline and economic decline, which have fueled the increasing conservatism of the Republican Party, are closely linked both psychologically and politically.Gordon Hanson, a professor of urban policy at Harvard and the author of “Economic and Political Consequences of Trade-Induced Manufacturing Decline,” emailed me that before the 2016 election, the assumption was that “the political consequences of regionally concentrated manufacturing job loss” would be that “left-leaning politicians” would be “the primary beneficiaries.” Trump’s victory “dramatically altered our thinking on the matter.”Instead, Hanson continued, “large scale job loss led to greater tribalism (as represented by the populist nationalism of Trump and his acolytes) rather than greater support for redistribution (as represented by your run-of-the-mill Democrat).” There was, in fact, “precedence for this outcome,” he wrote, citing a 2013 paper, “Political Extremism in the 1920s and 1930s: Do German Lessons Generalize?” by Alan de Bromhead, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H. O’Rourke, economists at Queen’s University Belfast, Berkeley and N.Y.U. Abu Dhabi.The three economists wrote:Consistent with German experience, we find a link between right-wing political extremism and economic conditions, as captured by the change in G.D.P. Importantly, however, what mattered for right-wing anti-system party support was not just deterioration in economic conditions lasting a year or two, but economic conditions over the longer run.Many of the U.S. counties that moved toward Trump in 2016 and 2020 experienced long-run adverse economic conditions that began with the 2000 entry of China into the World Trade Organization, setbacks that continue to plague those regions decades later.Hanson and his co-authors, David Autor and David Dorn, economists at M.I.T. and the University of Zurich, found in their October 2021 paper “On the Persistence of the China Shock” thatLocal labor markets more exposed to import competition from China suffered larger declines in manufacturing jobs, employment-population ratios, and personal income per capita. These effects persist for nearly two decades beyond the intensification of the trade shock after 2001, and almost a decade beyond the shock reaching peak intensity.They go on:Even using higher-end estimates of the consumer benefits of rising trade with China, a substantial fraction of commuting zones appears to have suffered absolute declines in average real incomes.In their oft-cited 2020 paper, “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure,” Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Kaveh Majlesi, an economist at Monash University, found that in majority white regions, adverse economic developments resulting from trade imports produced a sharp shift to the right.Autor and his co-authors describe “an ideological realignment in trade-exposed local labor markets that commences prior to the divisive 2016 U.S. presidential election.” More specifically, “trade-impacted commuting zones or districts saw an increasing market share for the Fox News Channel, stronger ideological polarization in campaign contributions and a relative rise in the likelihood of electing a Republican to Congress.”Counties with a majority white population “became more likely to elect a G.O.P. conservative, while trade-exposed counties with an initial majority-minority population became more likely to elect a liberal Democrat,” Autor and his colleagues write.They continue:In presidential elections, counties with greater trade exposure shifted toward the Republican candidate. These results broadly support an emerging political economy literature that connects adverse economic shocks to sharp ideological realignments that cleave along racial and ethnic lines and induce discrete shifts in political preferences and economic policy.The trade-induced shift to the right has deeper roots dating back to at least the early 1990s.In “Local Economic and Political Effects of Trade Deals: Evidence from NAFTA,” Jiwon Choi and Ilyana Kuziemko, both of Princeton, Ebonya Washington of Yale and Gavin Wright of Stanford make the case that the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993 played a crucial role in pushing working class whites out of the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party:We demonstrate that counties whose 1990 employment depended on industries vulnerable to NAFTA suffered large and persistent employment losses relative to other counties. These losses begin in the mid-1990s and are only modestly offset by transfer programs. While exposed counties historically voted Democratic, in the mid-1990s they turn away from the party of the president (Bill Clinton) who ushered in the agreement and by 2000 vote majority Republican in House elections.The trade agreement with Mexico and Canada “led to lasting, negative effects on Democratic identification among regions and demographic groups that were once loyal to the party,” Choi and her co-authors write.Before enactment, the Republican share of the vote in NAFTA-exposed counties was 38 percent, well below the national average, but “by 1998, these once-solidly Democratic counties voted as or more Republican in House elections as the rest of the country,” according to Choi and her colleagues.Before NAFTA, the authors write, Democratic Party support for protectionist policies had been the glue binding millions of white working-class voters to the party, overcoming the appeal of the Republican Party on racial and cultural issues. Democratic support for the free trade agreement effectively broke that bond: “For many white Democrats in the 1980s, economic issues such as trade policy were key to their party loyalty because on social issues such as guns, affirmative action and abortion they sided with the G.O.P.”The consequences of trade shocks have been devastating both to whole regions and to the individuals living in them.Katheryn Russ — co-author along with Katherine Eriksson and Minfei Xu, economists at the University of California-Davis, Jay C. Shambaugh, an economist at George Washington University of the 2020 paper “Trade Shocks and the Shifting Landscape of U.S. Manufacturing” — wrote in an email that trade induced economic downturns “affect entire communities, as places with the lowest fractions of high-school or college-educated workers are finding themselves falling with increasing persistence into the set of counties with the highest unemployment rates.”Even worse, these counties “do not bounce back out with the same frequency that counties with the highest fraction of high-school and college-educated workers do. So we aren’t just talking about a phenomenon that may influence the self-perceived status of individual workers, but of entire communities.”Russ cited a separate 2017 study, “Trade Shocks and the Provision of Local Public Goods” by Leo Feler and Mine Z. Senses, economists at U.C.LA. and Johns Hopkins, which finds that “increased competition from Chinese imports negatively affects local finances and the provision of public services across US localities.”Specifically, “a $1,000 increase in Chinese imports per worker results in a relative decline in per capita expenditures on public welfare, 7.7 percent, on public transport, 2.4 percent, on public housing, 6.8 percent, and on public education, 0.9 percent.”These shortfalls emerge just as demand increases, Feler and Senses write: “The demand for local public goods such as education, public safety, and public welfare is increasing more in trade-affected localities when resources for these services are declining or remaining constant.”For example,Public safety expenditures remain constant at a time when local poverty and unemployment rates are rising, resulting in higher property crime rates by 3.5 percent. Similarly, a relative decline in education spending coincides with an increase in the demand for education as students respond to a deterioration in employment prospects for low-skilled workers by remaining in school longer.As if that were not enough,In localities that are more exposed to trade shocks, we also document an increase in the share of poor and low-income households, which tend to rely more on government services such as public housing and public transportation, both of which experience spending cuts.Eroded social standing, the loss of quality jobs, falling income and cultural marginalization have turned non-college white Americans into an ideal recruiting pool for Donald Trump — and stimulated the adoption of more authoritarian, anti-immigrant and anti-democratic policies.Rui Costa Lopes, a research fellow at the University of Lisbon, emailed in response to my inquiry about the roots of right-wing populism: “As we’re talking more about those who suffer from relative deprivation, status insecurity or powerlessness, then we’re talking more about the phenomenon of ‘politics of resentment’ and there is a link between those types of resentment and adhesion to right populist movements.”Lopes continued: “Recent research shows that the link between relative deprivation, status insecurity or powerlessness and political populist ideas (such as Euroscepticism) occurs through cultural (anti-immigrant) and political (anti-establishment) blame attributions.”“The promise of economic well-being achieved through meritocratic means lies at the very heart of Western liberal economies,” write three authors — Elena Cristina Mitrea of the University of Sibiu in Romania, Monika Mühlböck and Julia Warmuth, of the University of Vienna — in “Extreme Pessimists? Expected Socioeconomic Downward Mobility and the Political Attitudes of Young Adults.” In reality, “the experience of upward mobility has become less common, while the fear of downward mobility is no longer confined to the lower bound of the social strata, but pervades the whole society.”Status anxiety has become a driving force, Mitrea and her colleagues note: “It is not so much current economic standing, but rather anxiety concerning future socioeconomic decline and déclassement, that influences electoral behavior.”“Socially disadvantaged and economically insecure citizens are more susceptible to the appeals of the radical right,” Mitrea, Mühlböck and Warmuth observe, citing data showing “that far-right parties were able to increase their vote share by 30 percent in the aftermath of financial crises.Economic insecurity translates into support for the far-right through feelings of relative deprivation, which arise from negative comparisons drawn between actual economic well-being and one’s expectations or a social reference group. Coping with such feelings increases the likelihood of rejecting political elites and nurturing anti-foreign sentiments.The concentration of despair in the United States among low-income whites without college degrees compared with their Black and Hispanic counterparts is striking.Carol Graham, a Brookings senior fellow, and Sergio Pinto, a doctoral candidate at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, document this divide in “The Geography of Desperation in America: Labor Force Participation, Mobility Trends, Place, and Well-being,” a paper presented at a 2019 conference sponsored by the Boston Federal Reserve:Poor blacks are by far the most optimistic group compared to poor whites: they are 0.9 points higher on the 0-10 scale (0.43 standard deviations). Poor blacks are also 14 percentage points (0.28 standard deviations) less likely to report stress the previous day, half as likely as poor whites to report stress in the previous day, while poor Hispanics fall somewhere in the middle.Graham and Pinto measured poll respondents’ sense of purpose, sense of community and their financial and social well-being and found “that blacks and Hispanics typically score higher than whites,” noting that “these findings highlight the remarkable levels of resilience among blacks living in precarious circumstances compared to their white counterparts.”Graham and Pinto write:The deepest desperation is among cohorts in the white working class who previously had privileged access to jobs (and places) that guaranteed stable, middle-class lives. Rather ironically, African Americans and Hispanics — the cohorts that historically faced high levels of discrimination — retain higher levels of well-being, especially hope for the future.The data suggest that a large segment of the white, non-college population lives day-by-day in a cauldron of dissatisfaction, a phenomenon that stands apart from the American tradition.This discontent drew many disaffected Americans to Donald Trump, and Trump’s defeat in 2020 has produced millions of still more disaffected voters who support his claim that the election was stolen.Michael Bang Petersen puts it this way:We know that humans essentially have two routes to acquire status: prestige and dominance. Prestige is earned respect from having skills that are useful to others. Dominance is status gained from intimidation and fear. Individuals who are high in the pursuit of dominance play a central role in political destabilization. They are more likely to commit political violence, to engage in hateful online interactions and to be motivated to share misinformation.That this is dangerous does not need repeating.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

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      Facing Tough Election, Orban Turns to Putin for Support

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      The Hungarian leader made his name by defying Moscow. But he has increasingly turned toward Russia in an effort to secure the natural gas he needs to keep energy prices low and voters happy.BUDAPEST — Facing a tough election in two months, Hungary’s far-right populist prime minister, Viktor Orban, last week opened the centerpiece of a new state-funded museum district celebrating his country’s role as an anchor of European culture and identity.A shrine in the newly opened “House of Music” honors Hungarian champions of democracy routed by Austrian and Russian troops in 1848, anti-communist rebels crushed by Soviet soldiers in 1956 and, on a happier note, Hungary’s successful defiance of Moscow in 1989, when Mr. Orban made his name by demanding that 80,000 Soviet troops go home.On Tuesday, just days after the museum opening, a celebration of the national pride that Mr. Orban has long used to rev up his voters, the Hungarian prime minister swerved in the opposite direction to shore up another vital if contradictory pillar of his support — Russia.Meeting in Moscow with President Vladimir V. Putin, he signaled sympathy for Russia in its standoff with the West over Ukraine, and pleaded for more deliveries of the natural gas he needs to keep energy prices low and voters happy.Mr. Orban has long been seen as a political chameleon — and reviled by foes as a brazen opportunist — but he is now pushing his shape-shifting talents to a new level. He has broken ranks not only with Hungary’s allies over Ukraine but also with his country’s own long history of wariness toward Russia as he seeks to reconcile economic populism with the nationalism that underpins his political brand.Hungary, according to the European Union’s statistical agency, has the lowest electricity prices and third lowest gas prices for consumers in the 27-member European bloc. While prices elsewhere have doubled or tripled over the past year, Hungary has kept them steady, a feat that Mr. Orban’s governing Fidesz party is hoping will help it defeat an unusually united opposition in elections on April 3.A basilica in Budapest last September. A recent poll found that Hungary views Russia and China as more important strategic partners than the United States.Akos Stiller for The New York TimesAnalysts question whether Hungary can keep prices low for consumers indefinitely without crippling the finances of a huge state-owned electricity provider. But Mr. Orban has turned to Moscow to help convince voters he has their economic interests in hand.Hungary has sided unequivocally with Mr. Putin as fellow members of the European Union and NATO have voiced growing alarm over what they see as Russian bullying of Ukraine, on whose borders Moscow has massed more than 100,000 troops.Speaking on Hungarian radio Friday, Mr. Orban brushed off criticism of his cozying up to the Kremlin, saying that Hungary wanted to act as an “icebreaker” by pursuing a policy that he acknowledged “deviates entirely from most E.U. and NATO ally countries.”Understand Russia’s Relationship With the WestThe tension between the regions is growing and Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly willing to take geopolitical risks and assert his demands.Competing for Influence: For months, the threat of confrontation has been growing in a stretch of Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Threat of Invasion: As the Russian military builds its presence near Ukraine, Western nations are seeking to avert a worsening of the situation.Energy Politics: Europe is a huge customer of Russia’s fossil fuels. The rising tensions in Ukraine are driving fears of a midwinter cutoff.Migrant Crisis: As people gathered on the eastern border of the European Union, Russia’s uneasy alliance with Belarus triggered additional friction.Militarizing Society: With a “youth army” and initiatives promoting patriotism, the Russian government is pushing the idea that a fight might be coming.At a news conference Tuesday in the Kremlin with Mr. Putin, Mr. Orban left no doubt about the main reason for this deviation.“If we have Russian gas, we can provide a cheap supply of it to Hungarian households. If there is no Russian gas then we cannot do this,” he explained.Peter Kreko, the director of Political Capital in Budapest, said cheap energy was one of Fidesz’s main selling points to voters. “The party says that while people in the rest of Europe are freezing or becoming impoverished because of energy prices, Hungary has no problems.”Mr. Orban’s Moscow trip, he said, could therefore be a “big win — so long as the war does not escalate in Ukraine.” But if Russia invades, he added, Mr. Orban, who described his trip to Mr. Putin as a “mission of peace,” will be “in serious trouble internationally and also domestically. His whole narrative crumbles.”At a joint news conference with Mr. Orban in Moscow on Tuesday, Mr. Putin effectively endorsed the Hungarian leader.Pool photo by Yuri KochetkovMr. Orban is not the first Hungarian leader to go cap in hand to Moscow in pursuit of energy. But when a predecessor did so in 2007 and reached a gas deal with Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled energy behemoth, Mr. Orban lambasted the arrangement as evidence his country was slipping back into Moscow’s orbit.Since then, however, Mr. Orban has dropped the anti-Moscow sentiments that catapulted him to prominence in 1989, and instead developed a form of far-right populism more focused on stoking contemporary cultural wars by targeting the European Union as a menacing threat to Hungarian sovereignty and values.Nationalist leaders in other European countries like Poland share Mr. Orban’s hostility toward Brussels but reject his outreach to Mr. Putin, a rift that has hobbled a yearslong effort by Europe’s far right to form a united front.“We had a bad relationship with the Soviet Union for many reasons that I do not need to list here,” Mr. Orban told radio listeners on Friday. “But that era is over, and now we are trying to have a system of relations with this new Russia that is different from what we had with the Soviet Union.”Mr. Putin has returned the favor.After blasting NATO for “ignoring” Russia’s security concerns as Mr. Orban stood at his side in the Kremlin, the Russian president effectively endorsed the Hungarian leader.“As we usually say when our partners are having elections, we will work with any elected leader,” Mr. Putin said, adding: “But I must note that you have done so much in your work on the Russian track in both the interest of Hungary and Russia. I hope our cooperation will continue.”A station for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, owned by the Russian energy company Gazprom, in Lumbin, Germany. Around 80 percent of the gas used in Hungary is imported from Gazprom.Sean Gallup/Getty ImagesMore important, he offered Mr. Orban a helping hand with energy, noting that underground storage facilities for gas in Europe are just 40 percent full and “our European partners in Europe will probably face problems next year.” But Hungary, Mr. Putin promised, “will have no problems because we will coordinate additional volumes.”Around 80 percent of the gas used in Hungary is imported from Gazprom, more than double the European Union’s average level of Russian imports. Then there is nuclear energy. The biggest producer of electricity in Hungary is the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, a Soviet-designed facility whose expansion Mr. Orban also discussed with Mr. Putin. It generates around half of Hungary’s electricity. Russia has provided loans of $10 billion to fund the plant’s expansion, a project led by Russia’s state-owned nuclear power company, Rosatom.“It should be clear for everyone that as long as this government is in power, energy prices will be reduced,” Mr. Orban’s chief of staff, Gergely Gulyas, declared last year.Hungary’s dependence on Russia for energy helps explain why, when the Biden administration announced this week that it would send more American troops to the region, Hungary said it didn’t need them. Poland and Romania welcomed the American offer.Hungary has a long history of animosity toward Russia, but this has faded as media outlets controlled by Mr. Orban and his supporters have praised Mr. Putin and steadily eroded trust in the Western alliance.Mr. Putin on TV during his meeting with Mr. Orban in Moscow on Tuesday. Hungary’s long history of animosity toward Russia has faded in recent years.Sergey Ponomarev for The New York TimesA survey of public opinion across East and Central Europe last year by Globsec, a research group in Slovakia, found that Hungary, alone among countries in the region, views Russia and China as more important strategic partners than the United States.Some analysts believe Mr. Putin’s pledges of support for Hungary in Moscow were largely symbolic and won’t help Mr. Orban keep utility prices in check.“The era of cheap Russian gas has ended,” said Attila Weinhardt, an energy analyst at Portfolio, an online financial journal. The government’s hope that it can keep fixed energy prices for households, he said, is probably unsustainable.Mr. Orban’s Moscow visit secured no written commitment of additional supplies and mostly just reaffirmed a 15-year deal signed last September. That deal, which advanced Russian efforts to reduce gas deliveries to Europe through Ukraine by using alternative pipelines, was condemned by Ukraine as a “purely political, economically unreasonable decision.”Mr. Orban’s foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, responded that Hungary was not playing politics but simply securing its own economic and security interests. “You cannot heat homes with political statements,” he said.Valerie Hopkins More

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      En Latinoamérica, la izquierda asciende

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      Los candidatos con plataformas izquierdistas han logrado victorias en una región con dificultades económicas y una desigualdad que va en aumento.RÍO DE JANEIRO — En las últimas semanas de 2021, Chile y Honduras votaron con determinación por presidentes de izquierda para reemplazar a líderes de derecha, con lo que se extendió un cambio significativo que lleva varios años ocurriendo en toda América Latina.Este año, los políticos de izquierda son los favoritos para ganar las elecciones presidenciales en Colombia y Brasil, sustituyendo a los presidentes en funciones de derecha, lo que pondría a la izquierda y a la centroizquierda en el poder en las seis economías más grandes de una región que se extiende desde Tijuana hasta Tierra del Fuego.El sufrimiento económico, el aumento de la desigualdad, el ferviente descontento con los gobernantes y la mala gestión de la pandemia de COVID-19 han impulsado un movimiento pendular que se distancia de los líderes de centroderecha y de derecha que dominaban hace unos años.La izquierda ha prometido una distribución más equitativa de la riqueza, mejores servicios públicos y redes de seguridad social ampliadas. Pero los nuevos líderes de la región se enfrentan a graves limitaciones económicas y a una oposición legislativa que podría restringir sus ambiciones, así como a unos votantes intranquilos que se han mostrado dispuestos a castigar a quien no cumpla lo prometido.Los avances de la izquierda podrían impulsar a China y socavar a Estados Unidos mientras compiten por la influencia regional, dicen los analistas, al presentarse una nueva cosecha de líderes latinoamericanos desesperados por lograr el desarrollo económico y con más apertura hacia la estrategia global de Pekín de ofrecer préstamos e inversiones en infraestructuras. El cambio también podría dificultar que Estados Unidos siga aislando a los regímenes autoritarios de izquierda en Venezuela, Nicaragua y Cuba.Con el aumento de la inflación y el estancamiento de las economías, los nuevos líderes de América Latina tendrán dificultades para lograr un cambio real en los problemas profundos, dijo Pedro Mendes Loureiro, profesor de estudios latinoamericanos en la Universidad de Cambridge. Hasta cierto punto, dijo, los votantes están “eligiendo a la izquierda simplemente porque en este momento es la oposición”.Los niveles de pobreza se encuentran en el nivel más alto de los últimos 20 años en una región en la que un efímero auge de las materias primas permitió a millones de personas ascender a la clase media tras el cambio de siglo. Varios países se enfrentan ahora a un desempleo de dos dígitos, y más del 50 por ciento de los trabajadores de la región están empleados en el sector informal.Los escándalos de corrupción, el deterioro de la infraestructura y la ausencia crónica de fondos en los sistemas de salud y educación han erosionado la confianza en el gobierno y las instituciones públicas.Personas sin hogar en fila para recibir el almuerzo de los voluntarios en São Paulo en agosto. “El tema ahora es la frustración, el sistema de clases, la estratificación”, dijo un analista.Mauricio Lima para The New York TimesA diferencia de lo que ocurrió a principios de la década de 2000, cuando los izquierdistas ganaron presidencias decisivas en América Latina, los nuevos gobernantes tienen que hacer frente a la deuda, a presupuestos magros, a escaso acceso al crédito y, en muchos casos, a una oposición vociferante.Eric Hershberg, director del Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Latinos de la American University, dijo que la racha ganadora de la izquierda nace de un sentimiento generalizado de indignación.“En realidad se trata de los sectores de la clase media baja y de la clase trabajadora que dicen: ‘treinta años de democracia y todavía tenemos que ir en un autobús decrépito durante dos horas para llegar a un centro de salud malo’”, dijo Hershberg. Citó la frustración, la ira y “una sensación generalizada de que las élites se han enriquecido, han sido corruptas, no han actuado en favor del interés público”.La COVID-19 asoló América Latina y devastó economías que ya eran precarias, pero la inclinación política de la región comenzó antes de la pandemia.Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, exlíder de izquierda de Brasil, tiene una ventaja considerable sobre Bolsonaro en un cara a cara, según una encuesta reciente.Mauro Pimentel/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesEl primer hito fue la elección en México de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, que ganó la presidencia con un resultado arrollador en julio de 2018. Durante su discurso de la noche electoral, declaró: “El Estado dejará de ser un comité al servicio de una minoría y representará a todos los mexicanos, a ricos y pobres”.Al año siguiente, los votantes de Panamá y Guatemala eligieron gobiernos de centroizquierda, y el movimiento peronista de izquierda de Argentina tuvo un sorprendente regreso a pesar del legado de corrupción y mala gestión económica de sus líderes. Con la promesa de “construir la Argentina que nos merecemos”, Alberto Fernández, profesor universitario, celebró su triunfo frente a un presidente conservador que buscaba la reelección.En 2020, Luis Arce se impuso a sus rivales conservadores para convertirse en presidente de Bolivia. Se comprometió a ampliar el legado del exlíder Evo Morales, un socialista cuya destitución el año anterior dejó brevemente a la nación en manos de una presidenta de derecha.En abril del año pasado, Pedro Castillo, un maestro de escuela de provincia, sorprendió a la clase política peruana al derrotar por un estrecho margen a la candidata derechista a la presidencia, Keiko Fujimori. Castillo, un recién llegado a la política, arremetió contra las élites y presentó la historia de su vida —un educador que trabajó en una escuela rural sin agua corriente ni sistema de alcantarillado— como una encarnación de los defectos de la clase gobernante.En Honduras, Xiomara Castro, una candidata de plataforma socialista que propuso el establecimiento de un sistema de renta básica universal para las familias pobres, venció con facilidad en noviembre a un rival conservador para convertirse en presidenta electa.Xiomara Castro, que ganó las elecciones en Honduras, ha propuesto un sistema de renta básica universal para las familias pobres.Daniele Volpe para The New York TimesLa victoria más reciente de la izquierda se produjo el mes pasado en Chile, donde Gabriel Boric, un antiguo activista estudiantil de 35 años, venció a un rival de extrema derecha con la promesa de aumentar los impuestos a los ricos para ofrecer pensiones más generosas y ampliar enormemente los servicios sociales.La tendencia no ha sido universal. En los últimos tres años, los votantes de El Salvador, Uruguay y Ecuador han desplazado a sus gobiernos hacia la derecha. Y en México y Argentina, el año pasado, los partidos de centroizquierda perdieron terreno en las elecciones legislativas, socavando a sus presidentes.Pero en general, Evan Ellis, profesor de estudios latinoamericanos en el Colegio de Guerra del Ejército de Estados Unidos, dijo no recordar una América Latina “tan dominada por una combinación de izquierdistas y líderes populistas antiestadounidenses”.“En toda la región, los gobiernos de izquierda estarán particularmente dispuestos a trabajar con los chinos en contratos de gobierno a gobierno”, dijo, y posiblemente “con respecto a la colaboración en materia de seguridad, así como a la colaboración tecnológica”.Jennifer Pribble, profesora de ciencias políticas de la Universidad de Richmond que estudia América Latina, dijo que el brutal número de víctimas de la pandemia en la región hizo que las iniciativas de izquierda, como las transferencias de efectivo y la atención universal a la salud, fueran cada vez más populares.“Los votantes latinoamericanos tienen ahora un sentido más agudo de lo que el Estado puede hacer y de la importancia de que el Estado participe en un esfuerzo redistributivo y en la prestación de servicios públicos”, dijo. “Eso condiciona estas elecciones, y está claro que la izquierda puede hablar más directamente de eso que la derecha”.Gabriel Boric, quien fuera activista estudiantil, ha prometido una amplia expansión de los servicios sociales en Chile.Marcelo Hernandez/Getty ImagesEn Colombia, donde las elecciones presidenciales se celebrarán en mayo, Gustavo Petro, exalcalde izquierdista de Bogotá que perteneció a un grupo guerrillero urbano, ha mantenido una ventaja constante en las encuestas.Sergio Guzmán, director de la consultora Colombia Risk Analysis, dijo que las aspiraciones presidenciales de Petro se hicieron viables después de que la mayoría de los combatientes de las FARC, un grupo guerrillero marxista, dejaron las armas como parte de un acuerdo de paz alcanzado en 2016. El conflicto había dominado durante mucho tiempo la política colombiana, pero ya no.“El tema ahora es la frustración, el sistema de clases, la estratificación, los que tienen y los que no tienen”.Justo antes de Navidad, Sonia Sierra, de 50 años, se encontraba fuera de la pequeña cafetería que regenta en el principal parque urbano de Bogotá. Sus ingresos se habían desplomado, dijo, primero en medio de la pandemia y luego cuando una comunidad desplazada por la violencia se trasladó al parque.Sierra dijo que estaba muy endeudada después de que su marido fuera hospitalizado con covid. Las finanzas son tan ajustadas que hace poco despidió a su única empleada, una joven venezolana que solo ganaba 7,50 dólares al día.“Tanto trabajar y no tengo nada”, dijo Sierra, cantando un verso de una canción popular en la época navideña en Colombia. “No estoy llorando, pero sí, me da sentimiento”.En Recife, Brasil, se complementan los ingresos recogiendo mariscos.Mauricio Lima para The New York TimesEn el vecino Brasil, el aumento de la pobreza, la inflación y una respuesta fallida a la pandemia han convertido al presidente Jair Bolsonaro, el titular de extrema derecha, en un candidato débil de cara a la votación programada para octubre.El expresidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, un izquierdista que gobernó Brasil de 2003 a 2010, una época de notable prosperidad, ha conseguido una ventaja de 30 puntos porcentuales sobre Bolsonaro en un cara a cara, según una encuesta reciente.Maurício Pimenta da Silva, de 31 años, subgerente de una tienda de suministros agrícolas en la región de São Lourenço, en el estado de Río de Janeiro, dijo que se arrepentía de haber votado por Bolsonaro en 2018 y que ahora tiene la intención de apoyar a Da Silva.“Pensé que Bolsonaro mejoraría nuestra vida en algunos aspectos, pero no lo hizo”, dijo Da Silva, un padre de cuatro hijos que no tiene relación con el expresidente. “Todo es tan caro en los supermercados, especialmente la carne”, agregó, lo que lo llevó a tomar un segundo empleo.Con los votantes enfrentados a tanta agitación, los candidatos moderados están ganando poca influencia, lamentó Simone Tebet, una senadora de centroderecha en Brasil que planea presentarse a la presidencia este año.“Si miramos a Brasil y a América Latina, estamos viviendo un ciclo de extremos relativamente aterrador”, dijo. “El radicalismo y el populismo se han impuesto”.Ernesto Londoño More

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      Leftists Are Ascendant in Latin America as Key Elections Loom

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      Growing inequality and sputtering economies have helped fuel a wave of leftist victories that may soon extend to Brazil and Colombia.RIO DE JANEIRO — In the final weeks of 2021, Chile and Honduras voted decisively for leftist presidents to replace leaders on the right, extending a significant, multiyear shift across Latin America.This year, leftist politicians are the favorites to win presidential elections in Colombia and Brazil, taking over from right-wing incumbents, which would put the left and center-left in power in the six largest economies in the region, stretching from Tijuana to Tierra del Fuego.Economic suffering, widening inequality, fervent anti-incumbent sentiment and mismanagement of Covid-19 have all fueled a pendulum swing away from the center-right and right-wing leaders who were dominant a few years ago.The left has promised more equitable distribution of wealth, better public services and vastly expanded social safety nets. But the region’s new leaders face serious economic constraints and legislative opposition that could restrict their ambitions, and restive voters who have been willing to punish whoever fails to deliver.The left’s gains could buoy China and undermine the United States as they compete for regional influence, analysts say, with a new crop of Latin American leaders who are desperate for economic development and more open to Beijing’s global strategy of offering loans and infrastructure investment. The change could also make it harder for the United States to continue isolating authoritarian leftist regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba.With rising inflation and stagnant economies, Latin America’s new leaders will find it hard to deliver real change on profound problems, said Pedro Mendes Loureiro, a professor of Latin American studies at the University of Cambridge. To some extent, he said, voters are “electing the left simply because it is the opposition at the moment.”Poverty is at a 20-year high in a region where a short-lived commodities boom had enabled millions to ascend into the middle class after the turn of the century. Several nations now face double-digit unemployment, and more than 50 percent of workers in the region are employed in the informal sector.Corruption scandals, dilapidated infrastructure and chronically underfunded health and education systems have eroded faith in leaders and public institutions.Homeless people lining up to receive lunch from volunteers in São Paulo in August. “The issue now is the frustration, the class system, the stratification,” one analyst said.Mauricio Lima for The New York TimesUnlike the early 2000s, when leftists won critical presidencies in Latin America, the new officeholders are saddled by debt, lean budgets, scant access to credit and in many cases, vociferous opposition.Eric Hershberg, the director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, said the left’s winning streak is born out of widespread indignation.“This is really about lower-middle-class and working-class sectors saying, ‘Thirty years into democracy, and we still have to ride a decrepit bus for two hours to get to a bad health clinic,’” Mr. Hershberg said. He cited frustration, anger and “a generalized sense that elites have enriched themselves, been corrupt, have not been operating in the public interest.”Covid has ravaged Latin America and devastated economies that were already precarious, but the region’s political tilt started before the pandemic.Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s leftist ex-leader, has a sizable advantage over Mr. Bolsonaro in a head-to-head matchup, according to a recent poll.Mauro Pimentel/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesThe first milestone was the election in Mexico of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who won the presidency by a landslide in July 2018. He declared during his election night address: “The state will cease being a committee at the service of a minority and it will represent all Mexicans, poor and rich.”The next year, voters in Panama and Guatemala elected left-of-center governments, and Argentina’s Peronist movement made a stunning comeback despite its leaders’ legacy of corruption and economic mismanagement. President Alberto Fernández, a university professor, celebrated his triumph over a conservative incumbent by promising “to build the Argentina we deserve.”In 2020, Luis Arce trounced conservative rivals to become president of Bolivia. He vowed to build on the legacy of the former leader Evo Morales, a socialist whose ouster the year before had briefly left the nation in the hands of a right-wing president.Last April, Pedro Castillo, a provincial schoolteacher, shocked Peru’s political establishment by narrowly defeating the right-wing candidate Keiko Fujimori for the presidency. Mr. Castillo, a political newcomer, railed against elites and presented his life story — an educator who worked in a rural school without running water or a sewage system — as an embodiment of their failings.In Honduras, Xiomara Castro, a socialist who proposed a system of universal basic income for poor families, handily beat a conservative rival in November to become president-elect.Xiomara Castro, who won election in Honduras, has proposed a system of universal basic income for poor families.Daniele Volpe for The New York TimesThe most recent win for the left came last month in Chile, where Gabriel Boric, a 35-year-old former student activist, beat a far-right rival by promising to raise taxes on the rich in order to offer more generous pensions and vastly expand social services.The trend has not been universal. In the past three years, voters in El Salvador, Uruguay and Ecuador have moved their governments rightward. And in Mexico and Argentina last year, left-of-center parties lost ground in legislative elections, undercutting their presidents.But on the whole, Evan Ellis, a professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College, said that in his memory there had never been a Latin America “as dominated by a combination of leftists and anti-U. S. populist leaders.”“Across the region, leftist governments will be particularly willing to work with the Chinese on government-to-government contracts,” he said, and possibly “with respect to security collaboration as well as technology collaboration.”Jennifer Pribble, a political science professor at the University of Richmond who studies Latin America, said the brutal toll of the pandemic in the region made leftist initiatives such as cash transfers and universal health care increasingly popular.“Latin American voters now have a keener sense of what the state can do and of the importance of the state engaging in a redistributive effort and in providing public services,” she said. “That shapes these elections, and clearly the left can speak more directly to that than the right.”Gabriel Boric, a former student activist, has promised a vast expansion of social services in Chile. Marcelo Hernandez/Getty ImagesIn Colombia, where a presidential election is set for May, Gustavo Petro, a leftist former mayor of Bogotá who once belonged to an urban guerrilla group, has held a consistent lead in polls.Sergio Guzmán, the director of Colombia Risk Analysis, a consulting firm, said Mr. Petro’s presidential aspirations became viable after most fighters from the FARC, a Marxist guerrilla group, laid down their weapons as part of a peace deal struck in 2016. The conflict long dominated Colombian politics, but no more.“The issue now is the frustration, the class system, the stratification, the haves and have-nots,” he said.Just before Christmas, Sonia Sierra, 50, stood outside the small coffee shop she runs in Bogotá’s main urban park. Her earnings had plummeted, she said, first amid the pandemic, and then when a community displaced by violence moved into the park.Ms. Sierra said she was deep in debt after her husband was hospitalized with Covid. Finances are so tight, she recently let go her only employee, a young woman from Venezuela who earned just $7.50 a day.“So much work and nothing to show for it,” Ms. Sierra she said, singing a verse from a song popular at Christmastime in Colombia. “I’m not crying, but yes, it hurts.”In Recife, Brazil, supplementing income by harvesting shellfish.Mauricio Lima for The New York TimesIn neighboring Brazil, rising poverty, inflation and a bungled response to the pandemic have made President Jair Bolsonaro, the far-right incumbent, an underdog in the vote set for October.Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leftist firebrand who governed Brazil from 2003 to 2010, an era of remarkable prosperity, has built a 30 percentage point advantage over Mr. Bolsonaro in a head-to-head matchup, according to a recent poll.Maurício Pimenta da Silva, 31, an assistant manager at a farming supplies store in the São Lourenço region of Rio de Janeiro state, said that he regretted voting for Mr. Bolsonaro in 2018, and that he intended to support Mr. da Silva.“I thought Bolsonaro would improve our life in some aspects, but he didn’t,” said Mr. Pimenta, a father of four who is no relation to the former president. “Everything is so expensive in the supermarkets, especially meat,” he added, prompting him to take a second job.With voters facing so much upheaval, moderate candidates are gaining little traction, lamented Simone Tebet, a center-right senator in Brazil who plans to run for president.“If you look at Brazil and Latin America, we are living in a relatively frightening cycle of extremes,” she said. “Radicalism and populism have taken over.”Ernesto Londoño and Flávia Milhorance reported from Rio de Janeiro. Julie Turkewitz reported from Bogotá. More

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      La inflación pone en aprietos a los líderes populistas de derecha

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      Los líderes de Turquía, Hungría y Brasil enfrentan problemas generados por el aumento global de precios antes de los comicios nacionales.Para todos aquellos que serían un desafío para Jair Bolsonaro en la próxima elección presidencial, incluida la prensa, el Supremo Tribunal Federal y los liberales, el aguerrido líder de derecha tiene una respuesta: “Solo Dios me saca de aquí”.Pero Bolsonaro podría perder el poder debido a una dificultad inesperada y para la cual su manual político no tiene una respuesta fácil: la inflación.En Brasil, un país con antecedentes relativamente recientes de episodios inflacionarios desastrosos, los precios suben a los niveles más altos de las últimas dos décadas. La moneda ha ido perdiendo su valor constantemente, al depreciarse alrededor del 10 por ciento contra el dólar solo en los últimos seis meses. Y su economía, la mayor de América Latina, volvió a entrar en recesión en el tercer trimestre del año.Eso ha inquietado a personas como Lucia Regina da Silva, una asistente de enfermería retirada de 65 años de edad que solía apoyar a Bolsonaro. Ha visto cómo en el último año los precios al alza han erosionado el poder de compra de su humilde pensión mensual.“Yo creía que este gobierno mejoraría nuestra vida”, dijo Da Silva en una mañana reciente, mientras empujaba un carrito de supermercado casi vacío —algunas verduras y artículos de uso personal era todo lo que le alcanzaba— por los pasillos de Campeão, una cadena de supermercados económicos de Río de Janeiro. “Pero esto fue un error”.Bolsonaro forma parte de una generación de populistas de derecha que, en la última década y media han ascendido al poder en democracias como Turquía, Brasil y Hungría y cuyos mandatos han coincidido, al menos en principio, con periodos de sólido desempeño económico en sus países. Han permanecido en el poder azuzando las pasiones nacionalistas y causando profundas divisiones en el electorado con temas culturales candentes. En el camino se han apropiado de los medios y amedrentan a sus oponentes.Ahora estos líderes autoritarios —entre ellos Bolsonaro, el primer ministro de Hungría Viktor Orban y el presidente de Turquía Recep Tayyip Erdogan— batallan con el alza de los precios y enfrentan elecciones nacionales en los próximos dos años. La inflación, un peligro nuevo e inesperado, amenaza con organizar y animar a la oposición política en los países de estos tres líderes de un modo que pocos habrían predicho hace unos meses.En Hungría, donde los precios al consumidor aumentan a la mayor velocidad desde 2007, los sondeos sugieren que Orban enfrentará su elección más dura el próximo año, cuando el costo de vida y los bajos salarios serán las principales preocupaciones para los votantes.En Hungría, las encuestas sugieren que el primer ministro Viktor Orban se enfrentará a las elecciones más difíciles de su historia el próximo año, pues el costo de la vida y los bajos salarios se convierten en las principales preocupaciones.Foto de consorcio por John ThysLos votantes en la cercana República Checa —que ha enfrentado una inflación creciente y elevados costos de energía—acaban de sacar del poder por un estrecho margen a Andrej Babis, el primer ministro multimillonario populista y de derecha del país.La situación de Bolsonaro, cuyo gobierno ha sido muy afectado por la gestión de la crisis de covid, se ha tambaleado y las encuestas lo muestran muy por detrás de quien probablemente sea su contendiente en 2022, el expresidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.En preparación, Bolsonaro ha empezado a poner los cimientos para disputar los resultados de la votación del año entrante, que los sondeos sugieren que perdería si se realizara hoy. “Quiero decirles a aquellos que quieren lograr que en Brasil no me elijan, que solo Dios me quitará”, le dijo a una multitud entusiasta en Sao Paulo en septiembre.Pero Da Silva ya ha incorporado la crisis económica a su incipiente campaña. “El gobierno de Bolsonaro es responsable de la inflación”, dijo en una entrevista. “La inflación está fuera de control”.La situación es más seria en Turquía, donde las políticas económicas poco ortodoxas del presidente Erdogan han desatado una crisis monetaria total. El valor de la lira se colapsó aproximadamente 45 por ciento este año. Y los precios aumentan a una tasa oficial de más de 20 por ciento anual, una cantidad que los cálculos extraoficiales ubican en un porcentaje mayor.Los países con líderes derechistas no son los únicos que se tambalean por la inflación. En Estados Unidos los precios aumentan a la mayor velocidad registrada desde 1982. Y los populistas de izquierda, como los que gobiernan en Argentina, también compiten contra feroces corrientes inflacionarias, que los tienen a la defensiva.El repunte representa una ruptura repentina con la tendencia de crecimiento lento e inflación moderada que dominó la economía mundial durante aproximadamente una docena de años antes del impacto de la pandemia. Ese telón de fondo de bajo crecimiento permitió a los poderosos bancos centrales de Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y el Reino Unido mantener bajas las tasas de interés. Y esas decisiones tuvieron grandes implicaciones para los países más pobres de todo el mundo.Eso se debe a que las políticas de bajo interés formuladas por los bancos centrales, entre ellos la Reserva Federal, reducen los retornos que los inversionistas en los países ricos pueden conseguir al comprar bonos del gobierno en sus países de origen, lo que los impulsa a emprender inversiones más arriesgadas en mercados emergentes que prometen mayores retornos.Los economistas dicen que el flujo de dinero hacia los países en desarrollo podría haber sido un elemento poco apreciado del éxito del que han gozado los líderes populistas de derecha en años recientes, pues les brindó un viento económico favorable que coincidió con sus mandatos.Turquía, que en 2009 sufrió una aguda recesión, pudo recuperarse de una manera relativamente rápida gracias a un auge de préstamos de inversionistas extranjeros que le dieron un gran impulso al crecimiento. La elección de Bolsonaro en 2018 coincidió con un renovado impulso para disminuir las tasas de interés de la Reserva Federal, lo que llevó a los inversionistas estadounidenses a comprar más deuda de mercados emergentes y ayudar a levantar el real.“Desde la recesión financiera global, el ambiente macroeconómico global fue una bendición para los autoritarios”, dijo Daron Acemoglu, profesor de economía en el Instituto Massachusetts de Tecnología que ha estudiado el deterioro de las democracias. “Básicamente, con tasas de interés muy bajas, hizo que muchos países que ya tenían o democracias débiles o semi autoritarismos, o francos autoritarismos, siguieran siendo atractivos para el capital extranjero”.Pero cuando la economía global empezó a recuperarse de la pandemia este año, una combinación de perturbaciones en la cadena de suministro, la impresión de moneda de los bancos centrales y el gasto público dirigido a aprovechar la recuperación dieron lugar a un alto incremento en los precios de todo el mundo. Esto hizo que los líderes de muchos países en desarrollo ajustaran sus políticas y que los inversionistas globales repensaran sus inversiones en esos mercados.Claudia Calich, líder de deuda en mercados emergentes en M&G Investments en Londres, ha invertido en bonos gubernamentales turcos, con denominación en liras, durante años. Pero, según Calich, el aumento en la presión pública que Erdogan ejerció este año en el banco central para recortar las tasas de interés ocasionó que el fondo se deshiciera de toda su inversión.En Turquía, liderada por el presidente Recep Tayyip Erdogan, el valor de la lira ha perdido alrededor del 45 por ciento este año y los precios aumentan a una tasa oficial de más del 20 por ciento anual.Burhan Ozbilici/Associated Press“Tan pronto como empezamos a ver este año que los cambios iban en la dirección equivocada, es decir hacia una mayor reducción de tasas, entonces nos empezó a preocupar la moneda”, dijo Calich. “Esta ha sido, hasta ahora, la respuesta equivocada en materia de políticas. Y sí, hemos estado muy contentos de salirnos de esa posición”.Hay pocas opciones políticamente aceptables para los países de mercados emergentes que se enfrentan a un repunte inflacionario y al debilitamiento de las monedas. Pero por varias razones, el aumento inflacionario es un terreno político especialmente complicado para populistas como los señores Orban, Erdogan y Bolsonaro, quienes se enfrentan a elecciones en 2022 o 2023.Su enfoque personalista de la política —y el hecho de que todos llevan años en el poder— dificulta que intenten evadir la culpa por las condiciones económicas. Al mismo tiempo, su tipo de populismo, que enfatiza las rivalidades nacionalistas y en el pasado ha dado resultados, puede parecer fuera de la realidad para los ciudadanos cuyo nivel de vida se desploma rápidamente.El remedio tradicional para la inflación requeriría una combinación de tasas de interés más elevadas por parte del banco central y menor gasto público. Pero ambas medidas podrían afectar el crecimiento económico y el empleo, al menos el corto plazo, lo que podría empeorar las perspectivas de reelección.En Turquía, Erdogan —que ha adoptado un estilo de liderazgo cada vez más autoritario desde que sobrevivió a un intento de golpe en 2016— ha descartado una respuesta convencional. En semanas recientes, el Banco Central de la República de Turquía, que Erdogan básicamente controla personalmente, ha recortado las tasas de interés repetidamente.La mayoría de los observadores consideran que Erdogan ha empeorado una situación de por sí difícil, pues la perspectiva de más recortes a las tasas de interés y el declive monetario ha hecho que los inversionistas extranjeros retiren su dinero de Turquía.Al mismo tiempo, los vientos políticos también parecen soplar en contra de Erdogan. La situación económica que cada vez está peor ha motivado algunas protestas callejeras dispersas. Los políticos de oposición piden unas elecciones anticipadas para lidiar con la crisis mientras insisten en criticar a Erdogan por lo que dicen que ha sido una gestión económica desastrosa.Orban y Bolsonaro, quienes alguna vez se perfilaron como conservadores al formular los presupuestos, han abandonado sus posiciones anteriores. En cambio, están impulsando un aumento a corto plazo del gasto gubernamental para proporcionar una entrada de efectivo a los votantes antes de las elecciones del próximo año. Sin embargo, no está claro que este enfoque ayude, ya que es probable que empeore las presiones inflacionarias.Una tarde reciente, sentado en una banca de un mercado local de productores en Budapest, Marton Varjai, de 68 años, se reía del cheque por aproximadamente 250 dólares que Orban le había enviado hace poco como parte de un pago que el gobierno autorizó para todos los pensionados, que representan un 20 por ciento de la población.Varjai cobra una pensión mensual de aproximadamente 358 dólares, de los cuales destina el 85 por ciento al pago de medicinas y servicios. “El resto es lo que tengo para vivir”, dijo y añadió que le preocupaba que le alcanzara para llegar a fin de mes.Estos sentimientos se están convirtiendo en un foco cada vez más importante para los votantes húngaros. Un estudio reciente de Policy Solutions, un grupo progresista de expertos en Budapest, encontró que los húngaros están más preocupados por el costo de la vida y los bajos salarios.“Si estos temas dominan las campañas, no será bueno para Fidesz”, dijo Andras Biro-Nagy, director de Policy Solutions, en referencia al partido oficialista de Orban.Matt Phillips cubre mercados financieros. Antes de integrarse a The New York Times en 2018, fue editor jefe de Vice Money e integrante fundador del personal en Quartz, el sitio de negocios y economía. Pasó siete años en The Wall Street, donde cubría mercados bursátiles y de bonos. @MatthewPhillipsCarlotta Gall es la jefa del buró de Istanbul y cubre Turquía. Previamente ha reportado sobre los efectos de la Primavera Árabe desde Túnez, de los Balcanes durante la guerra en Kosovo y Serbia y ha cubierto Afganistán y Pakistán. @carlottagall • Facebook More

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      Inflationary Wave Changes Political Terrain for Right-Wing Populists

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      The leaders of Turkey, Hungary and Brazil are all grappling with problems posed by the global rise in prices ahead of national elections.To all those who would pose a challenge to Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil’s coming presidential election, including the press, the Supreme Court and liberals, the embattled right-wing leader has an answer: “Only God removes me.”But Mr. Bolsonaro might be unseated by an unexpected problem that his political playbook has no easy answer for: inflation.Prices are climbing faster than they have in almost two decades in Brazil, a country with a relatively recent history of disastrous inflationary episodes. The currency has steadily declined in value, losing roughly 10 percent against the dollar in the last six months alone. And the economy, Latin America’s largest, slipped back into recession in the third quarter.That has upset people like Lucia Regina da Silva. A 65-year-old retired nursing assistant and former Bolsonaro supporter, she has watched over the last year as surging prices have eroded the purchasing power of her modest monthly pension.“I believed this government would improve our lives,” said Ms. da Silva on a recent morning as she pushed a mostly empty shopping cart — a few vegetables and some personal products were all she could afford — through the aisles of Campeão, a cheap supermarket chain in Rio de Janeiro. “But that was flawed.”Mr. Bolsonaro is among a generation of right-wing populists who, in the past decade and a half, have risen to power in democracies like Turkey, Brazil and Hungary, and whose reigns have coincided, at least at first, with periods of solid economic performance in those countries. They have remained in power by stoking nationalist passions and driving deep wedges into the electorate with hot-button cultural issues. Along the way, they have co-opted the news media and cowed opponents.Now these strongmen — including Mr. Bolsonaro, Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey — are grappling with rising prices, even as they face national elections within the next two years. A new and unexpected peril, inflation is threatening to organize and animate political opposition in the countries of these three leaders in a way few would have predicted just a few months ago.In Hungary, where consumer prices are rising at their fastest pace since 2007, polls suggest that Mr. Orban will face his toughest election ever next year, as the cost of living and low wages become top concerns for voters.In Hungary, polls suggest that Prime Minister Viktor Orban will face his toughest election ever next year as the cost of living and low wages become top concerns.Pool photo by John ThysVoters in the nearby Czech Republic — which has faced rising inflation and soaring energy costs — just ousted Andrej Babis, the country’s billionaire right-wing populist prime minister, by a narrow margin.Mr. Bolsonaro’s standing, already damaged by his administration’s management of the Covid crisis, has tumbled, with polls showing him badly trailing his likely 2022 opponent, former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.In anticipation, Mr. Bolsonaro has begun laying the groundwork to dispute the results of next year’s vote, which the polls suggest he would lose badly if it were held today. “I want to tell those who want to make me unelectable in Brazil, only God removes me,” he told a cheering crowd in São Paulo in September.But Mr. da Silva has already incorporated the economic crisis into his recent campaign. “The Bolsonaro government is responsible for inflation,” he said in an interview. “Inflation is out of control.”The situation is most dire in Turkey, where the unorthodox economic policies of President Erdogan have set off a full-on currency crisis. The value of the lira has collapsed roughly 45 percent this year. And prices are now rising at an official rate of more than 20 percent annually, with some unofficial estimates even higher.Countries with right-wing populist leaders aren’t the only ones reeling from inflation. In the United States, prices are rising at their fastest rate since 1982. And left-leaning populists, such as those in power in Argentina, are also contending with fierce inflationary currents, which have put them on the defensive.The upsurge represents a sudden break from the trend of sluggish growth and tepid inflation that dominated the global economy for roughly a dozen years before the pandemic hit. That low-growth backdrop allowed powerful central banks in the United States, the European Union and Britain to keep interest rates low. And those decisions had large implications for poorer countries around the world.That’s because the low-rate policies made by central banks such as the Federal Reserve reduce the returns investors in wealthy nations can make by buying safe government bonds in their home countries, pushing them into riskier investments in emerging markets that promise higher returns.Economists say that flow of money toward developing nations might have been an underappreciated element of the success right-wing populist leaders have enjoyed in recent years, as it provided a steadily favorable economic tailwind that coincided with their time in power.Turkey, which suffered a sharp recession in 2009, was able to rebound relatively quickly thanks to a surge of borrowing from foreign investors that supercharged growth. Mr. Bolsonaro’s election in 2018 coincided with a fresh push to lower interest rates from the Federal Reserve, which prompted U.S. investors to buy more emerging market debt and helped prop up the real.“Since the global financial recession, the global macroeconomic environment was a godsend to authoritarians,” said Daron Acemoglu, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has studied the deterioration of democracies. “Essentially, with very low interest rates, it made many countries that had either weak democracies or semi-authoritarianism, or sometimes fully fledged authoritarianism, still attractive to foreign capital.”But as the global economy began to heal from the pandemic this year, a combination of supply chain disruptions, central bank money-printing and government spending aimed at juicing the recovery ignited a sharp rise in prices around the world. That prompted leaders in many developing countries to tweak their policies — and global investors to rethink their investments in those markets.Claudia Calich, the head of emerging market debt at M&G Investments in London, has invested in Turkish government bonds, denominated in lira, for years. But, Ms. Calich said, the increasing public pressure that Mr. Erdogan was putting on the country’s central bank to cut interest rates this year led the fund to sell its entire position.In Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the value of the lira has lost about 45 percent this year, and prices are rising at an official rate of more than 20 percent annually.Burhan Ozbilici/Associated Press“As soon as we started seeing the changes this year going in the wrong direction, namely for further rate reductions, then we started getting worried about the currency,” Ms. Calich said. “That has been, so far, the wrong policy response. And yeah, we’ve been very happy to have exited that position.”There are few politically palatable options for emerging market countries dealing with an inflationary upsurge and weakening currencies. But for a number of reasons, the inflationary rise is especially tricky political terrain for populists like Messrs. Orban, Erdogan and Bolsonaro, who all face elections in 2022 or 2023.Their personalized approach to politics — and the fact that they have all been in office for years — makes it difficult for them to sidestep blame for the condition of the economy. At the same time, their brand of populism, which emphasizes nationalist rivalries and has been effective in the past, can seem out of touch to citizens whose standards of living are swiftly plummeting.The traditional remedy for inflation would call for some combination of higher interest rates from the central bank and skimpier government spending. But both moves would probably hurt economic growth and employment, at least in the short term, potentially worsening prospects of re-election.In Turkey, Mr. Erdogan — who has adopted an increasingly authoritarian leadership style since surviving a coup attempt in 2016 — has ruled out such a conventional response. In recent weeks, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, essentially under Mr. Erdogan’s personal control, has repeatedly cut interest rates.Most observers think Mr. Erdogan has made a difficult situation much worse, with the prospect of more interest rate cuts and currency declines driving foreign investors to pull their money from Turkey.At the same time, the political winds also seem to be blowing against Mr. Erdogan. The worsening economic situation has prompted scattered street protests. Opposition politicians are calling for snap elections to deal with the crisis, while hammering Mr. Erdogan for what they call his disastrous management of the economy.Mr. Orban and Mr. Bolsonaro, both of whom once fashioned themselves as conservative budgeteers, have abandoned their previous positions. Instead, they are pushing a short-term surge of spending to provide an influx of cash to voters ahead of next year’s elections. It’s unclear that such an approach will help, however, as it is likely to make inflationary pressures worse.Sitting on a bench at a local farmers market in Budapest on a recent afternoon, Marton Varjai, 68, laughed at the $250 check Mr. Orban recently sent him, part of a payout his government authorized to all pensioners, who amount to roughly 20 percent of the population.Mr. Varjai earns a monthly pension of about $358, of which 85 percent goes to covering medicine and utilities. “The rest is what I have to live off,” he said, adding that he was concerned about his ability to make ends meet.Such sentiments are becoming an increasing focus for Hungarian voters. A recent study by Policy Solutions, a progressive think tank in Budapest, found that Hungarians are most concerned with the cost of living and low wages.“If these issues dominate the campaign, it’s not good for Fidesz,” said Andras Biro-Nagy, director of Policy Solutions, referring to Mr. Orban’s ruling party. More

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      Macron and Scholz Meet and Call for More ‘European Sovereignty’

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      The new German chancellor made his first foreign stop in Paris, where the two leaders discussed a more independent, bolder Europe.PARIS — On the face of it, President Emmanuel Macron, a showman, and Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a study in reserve, would not be natural companions. But the world has changed, and for France and Germany the imperative of building what they call a “sovereign Europe” has become overwhelming.So Mr. Scholz, who took over from Angela Merkel on Wednesday, chose France as his first foreign destination, not only because that tends to be what newly installed German chancellors do, but also because, as he said standing beside Mr. Macron in Paris on Friday, “We want to reinforce Europe, work together for European sovereignty.”The two men, who first met in Hamburg, Germany, in 2014, held a working lunch at the presidential palace that reflected “the essential need to meet quickly,” as Mr. Scholz put it afterward at a 20-minute news conference. “Our first exchanges demonstrated a solid convergence of views,” Mr. Macron said.Their tone was serious but convivial, with Mr. Macron referring repeatedly to “dear Olaf” and using the less formal “tu,” rather than “vous,” when addressing the chancellor. At the end of the news conference they fist-bumped — a far cry from the image of President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl holding hands on the battlefield of Verdun in 1984, but a Covid-era indication of friendship.Mr. Scholz’s embrace of “European sovereignty” was surely music to Mr. Macron’s ears, as the French president prepares to take over the rotating six-month presidency of the European Union on Jan. 1. The bloc faces an immediate crisis as Russia builds up troops on the Ukrainian border and the pandemic refuses to wane.Asked about the Russian buildup, Mr. Scholz said, “It is clear to all of us that there is no alternative to de-escalation.” Mr. Macron, who seemed skeptical of any imminent Russian threat, said, “We must avoid all useless tension.”Mr. Macron’s vision for a Europe of “power,” backed by real European military and technological capacity, tends toward the grandiose. Mr. Scholz may not like that style — his German government coalition prefers the more prosaic “enhancing European capacity to act” — but the general goal is intensely shared, perhaps more so than in the later Merkel years or at any time since the Cold War.The distance from shared goals to shared action in the European Union is always great because 27 countries have to be aligned. Still, the trauma of Covid-19 and its accompanying economic challenges have brought urgency, as has a sense of European vulnerability in a more unstable world where American leadership is no longer assured.Demonstrations in Frankfurt last week after Germany imposed new Covid regulations.Kai Pfaffenbach/Reuters“I’m more optimistic than I was with Ms. Merkel toward the end,” said Wolfgang Ischinger, a veteran German diplomat. “We have a window of opportunity.”That window may be narrow. Any joint Franco-German plans could be rudely interrupted in April if Mr. Macron is defeated in the French presidential election. He is the favorite, but if France lurched toward the ascendant nationalist hard right, all bets would be off.A German priority in the coming months will be to avoid that outcome, making accommodating gestures toward Mr. Macron more likely.France and Germany have always been the motor of European integration; when they stall, so does the whole project. Although the need to confront the pandemic brought budgetary breakthroughs, Europe has found itself in the shadow of Brexit and internal division while China rose and the United States turned its attention elsewhere.The 177-page coalition agreement of Mr. Scholz’s three-party government alludes to ultimate evolution toward a “federal European state.” Mr. Macron, with the election in mind, has not gone that far — the French attachment to the nation is fierce — but the mere German mention of a United States of Europe suggests new boldness and revived ambition.Still, there are differences. Where Mr. Macron speaks of European “strategic autonomy,” Mr. Scholz prefers “strategic sovereignty.” The difference is not small.“Germans do not want strategic autonomy if that means independence from the United States,” said Cathryn Clüver, the director of the German Council on Foreign Relations.The French president offered some de rigueur praise of NATO when laying out his European presidency program on Thursday. He said it had proved its “usefulness.” But he broadly views European independence as an emancipation from the United States.Germany, intensely attached for historical reasons to the American anchor of European security, is wary of any strategic distancing from Washington. This view is broadly shared in several European Union states, including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, especially at a time when Russian troops are massed on the Ukrainian border.All this complicates both the meaning and the attainability of whatever European sovereignty may be.A Christmas market in Paris last week as virus cases were rising in Europe.Ian Langsdon/EPA, via ShutterstockFrance and Germany share the view that they preserved a multilateral global system based on the rule of law and Western values while the United States, under former President Donald J. Trump, embraced nationalism and disparaged Europe.Understand Germany’s New GovernmentCard 1 of 6The post-Merkel era begins. More

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      Bloodied Venezuelan Opposition Returns to Elections for First Time in Years

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      UPATA, Venezuela — His opposition to Venezuela’s authoritarian leader had left him bloodied by government thugs, forced him into hiding in a foreign embassy and pushed him into a nearly two-year exile in Italy, where he sold bread in a train station as he thought of home.Américo De Grazia’s political defiance had also cost him his marriage and his savings. And yet here he was, back in his hometown in southeastern Venezuela, sweating through his shirt sleeves on stage — one of thousands of opposition candidates running in an election this Sunday that they are almost certain to lose.“We are in a time of turbulence,” Mr. De Grazia, 61, told voters as drums beat behind him, “and that demands we fight.”The political parties who oppose Venezuelan’s autocratic leader, Nicolás Maduro, have for years refused to participate in elections, arguing that to do so would legitimize a man who has spent nearly a decade jailing enemies, detaining journalists, co-opting political parties and banning key opposition figures from office, all as the country has fallen into an economic and humanitarian crisis.But on Sunday, the opposition will make a return to the ballot box, putting up candidates in gubernatorial and mayoral races across the country, an about-face they say is meant to rally a disillusioned electorate ahead of a future presidential vote, which should legally take place in 2024.Supporters of Mr. De Grazia cheering during a speech.Mr. De Grazia’s political defiance cost him his marriage and his savings. The conditions — while nominally better than in past years, according to the nonpartisan Venezuelan Electoral Observatory — are far from freely democratic, and the shift is a gamble for the opposition.Mr. Maduro, who faces both economic sanctions and an investigation in the International Criminal Court, is hungry for democratic legitimacy, and he is likely to use the election to push the United States and the European Union to ease their positions against him.Supporters of Ángel Marcano, the candidate for the ruling party, gathering for a rally in downtown Ciudad Bolívar.A warehouse with the former President Hugo Chavez’s likeness emblazoned on the front.But the shift is also a sign of just how desperate many Venezuelans are for anything that looks like a shot at change. And Mr. De Grazia’s fight to become governor of one of the country’s largest states is emblematic of that desperation.“This election is not free, not fair, not transparent, nothing like that,” he said over lunch one day after a campaign rally where he handed out tiny pieces of paper bearing his name, face and personal phone number — homespun campaigning in difficult times. But, “to beat this regime you have to confront it.”Bolívar, a sprawling state in Venezuela’s southeast, is home to steel and aluminum plants and large deposits of gold, diamonds and coltan. Despite these resources, its people have suffered greatly amid the country’s economic decline. Ninety-five percent of the nation now lives in poverty, according to the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello in Caracas.In Bolívar, families line up daily outside food kitchens, and children die regularly of treatable and preventable conditions — malaria, hydrocephalus, malnutrition — because their parents cannot afford medication.A couple making a pot of soup that will feed over a dozen children in their community in the state of Bolivar.Roxana Sánchez, 20, with her son, Anthony, 7 months, who a doctor in Bolivar diagnosed with severe malnutrition, with the boy weighing little more than his birthweight.In interviews in six municipalities across the state, many people said that an influx of dollars that began two years ago, after Mr. Maduro’s decision to relax economic regulations that had once defined his government, had percolated little beyond the richest families.Mr. De Grazia is the son of Italian immigrants who started a string of bakeries in Bolívar in the 1950s. The original shop, Panadería Central, is still open across the street from the home where Mr. De Grazia lives with his mother, who runs the bakery.He entered politics at 14, and eventually became a vocal critic of the governments of Hugo Chávez and his successor, Mr. Maduro, who held themselves up as champions of a socialist revolution.Mr. De Grazia’s career has often focused on workers’ rights and corruption in the mining industry. He was a congressman for a decade, and said that he had been beaten up at least four times in the National Assembly. In the last instance, the results of which were caught on camera in 2017, men wearing ski masks left him bleeding on the legislature’s patio.In 2019, he supported a decision by the head of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, to declare himself interim president, a move backed by the United States and dozens of other countries.Afterward, Mr. Maduro’s government issued capture orders for Mr. De Grazia and many other opposition figures, forcing him to flee. He went first to the Italian Embassy, where he lived for seven months, and then to Italy, where he worked in a bakery run by one of his seven children.It was around that time that his wife issued an ultimatum: Leave politics or we split. They split. “She could no longer take that life,” he said. “This is part of the price.”Supporters of Mr. De Grazia in El Palmar, Venezuela.A boy resting on his grandmother’s shoulders during an assembly in support of Mr. De Grazia in Upata, Venezuela.But in Italy, Mr. De Grazia became increasingly convinced that the opposition coalition he once backed had no plan to move beyond a stalemate. He said that electoral abstention had left the coalition disconnected from voters and almost weaponless in the fight for fairer election conditions in 2024.In February, he announced that he would participate in this year’s vote. He left the coalition, and was booted from the party he joined at 14, called Causa R. In April he declared his candidacy for governor.Several months later, much of the coalition that had rejected him declared that they, too, would participate in the vote. Among the candidates running this year is David Uzcátegui, of Miranda State, who called abstention “an error.”“The vote is an instrument you can fight with,” he said.Mr. De Grazia and many other opposition candidates have limited chances of winning. In a report ahead of the vote, the Venezuelan Electoral Observatory said that while the government had allowed a broader spectrum of participation in this election than in past years, it continued to “restrict full freedom to exercise suffrage” in myriad ways, among them the illegal use of public funds to campaign for the ruling party.Hundreds of political prisoners remain locked up, while many voters fear they will lose benefits if they don’t cast a ballot in favor of Maduro-backed candidates.Takeaways From the 2021 ElectionsCard 1 of 5A G.O.P. pathway in Virginia. More