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    Who Are the Men Hoping to Succeed Angela Merkel?

    The decision of who will follow Angela Merkel to become Germany’s next chancellor is still up in the air. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party conference to elect a new leader has been postponed until January next year.

    Merkel’s approval ratings have skyrocketed during the pandemic. Recent polls show that 72% of Germans are either satisfied or very satisfied with her performance. The last time Merkel enjoyed such high popularity was in January 2015, shortly before the refugee crisis, which saw her approval ratings plummet. The refugee crisis divided German society and eroded trust in democratic institutions and the political class. Recovery from this, at least during Merkel’s tenure, appeared unlikely. But it seems another crisis was needed to reignite the love between the German public and the chancellor, a relationship that is entering its 16th — and final — year. 

    The Downward Spiral of Angela Merkel’s CDU

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    Since Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer announced her resignation as party leader in February this year, three potential successors have been waiting in the wings. They will find it hard to live up to Merkel’s qualities that endeared her not only to the German, but also the global, public. Merkel’s unagitated, unpretentious and clear-headed governing style that proved particularly effective during the pandemic threatens to overshadow the three men itching to succeed her.

    Friedrich Merz: Merkel’s Antithesis

    Leading the polls among the three candidates is Friedrich Merz, a lawyer and former supervisory board chairman of the asset managing firm Blackrock. He comes from the economically liberal and conservative wing of the CDU, endorsing less state regulation of the economy. In 2000, before Merkel ousted him as CDU whip in Germany’s parliament, the Bundestag, Merz demanded a so-called “German leading culture” as a counterweight to the model of multiculturalism. Even today, he proposes cuts to social benefits for immigrants. Furthermore, he set off controversial intra-party debates during CDU regional conferences in 2018 by questioning the individual right to asylum. 

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    His appeal: Despite losing to Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer in his first attempt to become the CDU leader in 2018, Merz is a popular figure among party members and has a devout group of supporters. He is a good speaker and can draw large crowds. Merz comes across as authentic and a straight talker. Furthermore, he embodies the times of the 1990s and the early 2000s, when the world seemed less complicated. That could give him an advantage, especially among older male voters.

    His Achilles heel: Merz is an old foe of Angela Merkel and hasn’t occupied political office for almost 18 years. Hence, he cannot count on much support among senior party figures in the CDU, which is vital to securing the leadership. He recently underlined his intra-party role as a divisive lone warrior by stating that the cancellation of the conference on December 4 was the latest part of a concerted effort to prevent him from becoming party leader.

    How he has fared during the pandemic: Without a government position and after catching COVID-19 in March, Merz struggled to get much public attention during the first few months of the pandemic. That has not changed despite his attempts to initiate a debate about the post-coronavirus economic recovery. Only his recent accusations around the delay of the party conference caught attention, probably not to his advantage.

    Armin Laschet: Merkel’s Man

    Merz’s closest rival, Armin Laschet, is the minister president of Germany’s most populous state of North-Rhine Westphalia. He represents a continuation of Merkel’s policies and is known for defending her controversial stance on refugees and migration policy. Concerning national issues, Laschet tends to strike a moderate rather than conservative tone. Nonetheless, he has shown to be capable of appealing to the conservative wing of the party by buckling down on crime in his home state.

    His appeal: Laschet is a candidate for cosmopolitan, left-leaning swing voters. Also, he has an ace up his sleeve: Laschet has teamed up with Health Minister Jens Spahn, whose conservative profile appeals to voters in rural Germany. This double ticket, which speaks to a broad voter base, and the support of the largest and influential CDU state association from North-Rhine Westphalia, make him a favorite to win the leadership.

    His Achilles heel: Laschet’s attributes of being a unifier and striking moderate tones has its flipside. He is not a charismatic leader who can capture people’s hearts, which might be a disadvantage in the final weeks of the leadership race. 

    How he has fared during the pandemic: As head of a state government, the COVID-19 crisis was a chance for Laschet to get an advantage over his competitors. He failed to seize it. In his attempt to take a more light-hearted approach to the virus, Laschet exuded nervousness. It came across as a desperate attempt to distinguish himself from his adversary, the Bavarian Minister President Markus Söder, who implemented more rigorous measures to fight the pandemic. But with time, as people become weary of constraints, his strategy might come to fruition.

    Norbert Röttgen: Merkel’s Smartest

    Norbert Röttgen, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Bundestag, represents the left-wing of the CDU. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, he instigated the phasing out of Germany’s nuclear power as federal environment minister. He also favors a yet unprecedented coalition between the CDU and the Greens on a national level. Regarding foreign policy, he demands a more decisive and self-assured role for Germany in international affairs.

    His appeal: As a former member of Merkel’s cabinet, Röttgen was referred to as “Muttis Klügster” — Mother’s Smartest. His strength is a profound knowledge of policy, coupled with rhetorical skills that allow him to come across thoughtful and precise.

    His Achilles heel: Röttgen has no noteworthy supporter group within the party and is having trouble distinguishing himself from the other two candidates. On the one hand, his policies resemble Laschet’s too closely while also not appealing to conservative party members. He is the clear outsider in the race.

    How he has fared during the pandemic: Not very well. Without inhabiting any political office, Röttgen was hardly visible during the pandemic.

    What About Markus Söder?

    Regardless of how the leadership race unfolds, Markus Söder, the party leader of the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), is touted as Germany’s next chancellor. Most Germans would prefer him over the three candidates running for the CDU’s party leadership. According to opinion polls, 37% of the German electorate would choose Söder as chancellor over potential competitors from the Greens and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Despite being the second choice among CDU members after Friedrich Merz, 53% of the membership regards Markus Söder as the candidate with the highest chances of winning a general election. 

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    Söder’s rising popularity is nothing short of unexpected. In his younger years, Söder came across as an overambitious agitator and a vain self-promoter. But he has masterfully used the COVID-19 crisis as a stage to demonstrate a statesmanlike demeanor with a supposedly firm grip on things. Remarkably, above-average coronavirus case numbers and failures in Bavarian testing centers have not affected his high approval ratings. But Söder himself has remained tight-lipped about his ambitions. When asked whether he rules out running for chancellor, he typically replies with the phrase, “My place is in Bavaria.” Until now, this non-committal strategy has proved to be shrewd. While the three candidates might wear themselves out in petty skirmishes, he can enhance his idealized self-image of the caring and resolute Bavarian chief minister.

    Nevertheless, his opportunity to run for chancellor is dependent on the outcome of the leadership race. An equally ambitious fighter, Friedrich Merz would hardly give the chancellorship a miss if elected party leader. Only a victory for Laschet or a surprise candidacy of his running mate, Jens Spahn, would open a clear window of opportunity for Söder.

    The delay of the party conference has added a new dimension to the race. It has given candidates in public offices like Laschet and Söder more time and opportunity to shine. In contrast, other candidates, particularly Friedrich Merz, are scrambling for the limelight. That has led to resentment as Merz sees the delayed party conference as a plot to thwart his chances. He might have a case.

    The longer Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer remains party leader, the more she can pull strings toward a more favorable outcome. It is an open secret that she, as well as Angela Merkel, would prefer Laschet over Merz. Also, Kramp-Karrenbauer warned against possible surprise candidacies to avoid a “ruinous competition.” Rumors suggest that Jens Spahn, who is increasingly popular among CDU members as well as voters, could enter the race.

    As the infighting in the party commences, the CDU should not forget why the leadership race is taking in the first place. The CDU is at a crossroads and under severe pressure from the right. As the pandemic continues to create problems for Angela Merkel’s government, her party has to decide whether it wants to win back conservative voters from the far-right Alternative for Germany party or stay on a liberal course set by Merkel.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Muslims Will Not Kill God for Marianne

    Two conflicting narratives have been clashing anew in extremely heated debates amid what we may call “a new cartoon crisis.” On one side, there is a sizable portion of orthodox Muslims with a strong aniconism tradition and who perceive the representation of sacred characters as unpardonable blasphemy. On the other are defenders of secularism who consider freedom of expression a holy human right. The world is witnessing the confrontation of two epistemologically divergent civilizations: a humanist one that killed God and put the human at its center, and a metaphysical one ready to die and kill for its deity and sacrosanct icons.

    Is Peace Religious or Secular?

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    “Islam is a religion that is in crisis,” stated French President Emmanuel Macron, as he unveiled his plan to defend French secularism against Islamic extremism in early October. This prompted a backlash from Muslim communities around the world. The events escalated further amidst the beheading of a French teacher who shared with his class derogatory caricatures featuring Prophet Muhammad. In an act of defiance, Macron insisted the French will make no concessions and would “not cease drawing caricatures” as Paris displayed gigantic reproductions of the cartoons in question on government buildings.

    Post-Truth Era

    The current situation is a classic case of a post-truth-era dilemma. Each camp firmly believes it is the keeper of a universal, irrefutable truth, while in reality it lives inside its own ideological bubble and refuses to accept that there are other truths out there and probably a transcendental one that is beyond all opposing paradigms.

    Post-truth — which was named the Word of the Year in 2016 by the Oxford Dictionary in the midst of the divisions caused by Brexit and the election of Donald Trump — is a philosophical concept that signals a context where shared rational facts are replaced by subjective and emotional beliefs that shape public opinion. French humanism is rooted in centuries of reforms ending in a rupture between the state and the church. Muslim societies lived a completely different historical reality, where metaphysics are central and populations still romanticize the theological concept of the umma (global Muslim community).

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    In an ideal world, both “truths” would be able to coexist peacefully. Nevertheless, France never overcame its colonial mindset with its good old “civilizing mission.” Macron arrogantly insinuates that it is the white man’s burden to modernize and secularize a Muslim world “in crisis.” Acts of terror committed by Muslims are indubitably repugnant and humanly unacceptable, but so is radical secularization and the extremist modernization dogma that blindly attempts to assimilate citizens into the fifth republic’s grinding machine.

    Defenders of the French perspective would say: Why don’t followers of other religions get angry when we draw Jesus or Moses? This is a shallow and simplistic comparison that does not take into consideration the cultural and anthropological particularity of the Muslim community, nor the sanguinary colonial encounter it had with France just decades back in Africa. It also characterizes the obstinate myopia with which the country of Marianne continues to deal with its almost 6 million Muslims.

    Maybe the most revealing inconsistency in the French discourse can be summed up in a saying repeated by those who call to boycott French products: “Insulting a black person is racism, insulting a Jew is anti-Semitism, insulting a woman is sexism, but insulting a Muslim is freedom of expression.”  

    Both Sides Demonize the Other

    Of course, not all French people are rigid defenders of the values of the republic. Many philosophers, artists and journalists came out to condemn the French president’s provocations. However, as in many post-truth dichotomies, both antagonists compete to demonize the other, which fuels further hate and animosity. Moreover, instead of fighting violent extremism, it can do just the opposite, such as with the previous Danish cartoon controversy of 2005 and the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015. Meanwhile, Muslims are flooding the internet with hashtags and memes against Macron, while countries like Kuwait removed French products from its shelves and the Turkish president even questioned the mental health of his counterpart in Paris.

    To answer Macron’s statement, we can regrettably say that France is a country in crisis because of its failure to address systemic racism against Muslims and its refusal to embrace cultural plurality and hybridity. In the French context, Edward Said’s “clash of ignorance” can no longer be used as an excuse to hide the clash of truths between radical secularism and Muslims refusing to kill God for Marianne.

    *[An earlier version of this article was published by Raseef22.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Can Zelensky Win Ukraine’s War on Corruption?

    While the Ukrainian military continues to fight Russian-backed separatists in the east, it was the country’s bitter war on corruption that has exploded back into the spotlight last week. The decision by Ukraine’s constitutional court to strike down elements of anti-corruption legislation has brought protesters to the streets of Kyiv, with President Volodymyr Zelensky calling for an immediate legal response to nullify the court’s decision. Members of the court have framed their initial ruling and continued resistance as an attempt to maintain judicial independence and protect individuals, but the president and other public figures accuse the court of protecting the judges’ personal wealth and that of their political backers.

    Can Volodymyr Zelensky Bring Peace to Eastern Ukraine?

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    This particular challenge is yet another inflection point in a long-running battle between potential reformers and the entrenched networks of privilege and wealth that have dominated Ukraine’s political and economic apparatus since independence in 1991. Setbacks are common, and progress is slow for any country when it comes to combating corruption, but the magnitude of the current scandal means that Ukraine is at a new crisis point. A weak or ineffective response could potentially bury the already-faltering reformist agenda of Zelensky’s cabinet. Alternatively, this could be the moment when a corrupt institution overplays its hand in a way that serves to reinvigorate and rearm the Ukrainian anti-corruption project.

    Corruption in Context

    Scholars of corruption are quick to point out the lack of any final answers or even definitions of terms when it comes to diagnosing corruption. Corruption is present in all countries to some extent, but it manifests in Ukraine as a systemic rather than episodic issue. To take one of many definitions, systemic corruption means “interdependence on deviate behavior in public and/or private sector institutions.” Individual action is informed by the so-called sucker mentality — the knowledge that you would lose out personally if you do not engage in corrupt acts like everyone else.

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    Additionally, the opportunity costs of engaging in corrupt actions make devious behavior acceptable and highly profitable. We are not talking about one or two “bad eggs,” but a ready-made template for those who want to take advantage of others. The case involving Ukraine’s constitutional court stems from the interplay of the country’s legislative, executive and judiciary branches that, despite their relatively recent creation, all exist within a specific post-Soviet context.

    Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidential campaign was successful because it ran essentially on a one-issue platform — addressing corruption. This aim was rendered more plausible by Zelensky’s outsider status. The electorate was suffering from a lack of forward movement after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, with progress stalled by the political and economic immediacy of the anti-terrorist operations against Russian-backed separatists. Zelensky came to power on the promise to end the conflict in the east and wage a war on corruption.

    As an executive, Zelensky is still more or less understood to be “personally incorruptible,” and his position allows him a large measure of power to highlight corruption and work with MPs on financial crime legislation. His Servant of the People party initially dominated the poles, winning the country’s first-ever single-party majority in the Ukrainian parliament. As a result, the president was able to pass legislation aimed at clearing up a number of high-risk sectors like banking and security services.

    The creation of the high anti-corruption court and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) were viewed as significant steps, while the upcoming land reform process represents another big step in upgrading the country’s rich agriculture system. That being said, MPs are by necessity often connected to the country’s oligarchs who want to ensure that their interests are not harmed. The constitutional court’s surprise ruling was made on the basis of a complaint by MPs associated with the millionaire personal friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Viktor Medvechuk; the same group of MPs is also working with those loyal to the infamous oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky to challenge the land reform package.

    On October 27, the constitutional court ruled that the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) no longer had the authority to require officials to submit electronic asset declarations. It also struck down the law that makes false declarations a criminal offense, calling it “excessive punishment.” In the words of Oleksandr Novikov, the head of the NACP, “The court has canceled all anti-corruption tools developed since Ukraine became independent.”

    Several of the judges themselves are currently under investigation for making false declarations, which could mean jail time if the ruling is declared null and void. This is in keeping with the traditional alliance between the judiciary and the legislative branch, with judges able to protect the rights of oligarchs and MPs from legal challenges.

    Betrayed Promise

    Both the war on corruption and with the separatists can be understood within a geopolitical context, meaning that both wars overlap and intersect. Much like the conflict in Donbas, the anti-corruption drive symbolizes turning away from Soviet and Russian influence in Ukraine in hope of enjoying the benefits of membership within the Euro-Atlantic community. The Revolution of Dignity was sparked by what many viewed as a move by then-president Viktor Yanukovych to take part in a corrupt transaction offered by Russia that would keep Ukraine from moving closer to the EU.

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    Corruption is articulated publicly as a Russian practice that has no place in Ukraine’s transition toward Western practices, and it appears that pro-Russian legislators and oligarch-backers have put up the most opposition to Zelensky’s reforms. But while it is dangerous to assume that oligarchs are necessarily in cahoots with Russian interests, the Ukrainian public has an understandably long and difficult relationship with anti-corruption rhetoric.

    The average Ukrainian is extremely skeptical of the authorities, and many of the people the author knows personally who initially voted for Zelensky always qualified their choice with, “But I doubt anything will change.” Approval ratings have plummeted for the Zelensky administration despite his personal appeal, and his Servant of the People party was hammered in local elections last week. The pressure to deliver has never been higher.

    Coverage of President Zelensky’s effectiveness as a reformer tends to revolve around the narrative of an actor discovering that the business of governance is actually quite difficult. While it is an evocative hook that references his rise to fame, all of Ukraine’s elected leaders have displayed a marked inability to move beyond rhetoric to achieve measurable gains. What makes Zelensky’s presidency so interesting is that his first year in office has shown noticeable improvements in terms of concrete legislation.

    The space for corrupt activity has been shrunk, but the reshuffling of the cabinet and mixed messaging about going after high-profile individuals means that the administration is perceived as sliding back on its aims. According to Chatham House’s Orysia Lutsevych, “This is a Rubicon for Zelensky.”

    Zelensky’s Rubicon

    In the immediate aftermath of the court’s decision, Zelensky introduced a draft law to reverse the ruling and remove the mandate from its current members. The legislation is aimed at restoring the public’s faith in the court as a legitimate organ of government, but the court’s judges and opposition parties have been quick to brand the legislation as an attempt by the executive office to gain control of the independent judiciary. The head of the constitutional court, Oleksandr Tupytsky, labeled the move a “constitutional coup.”

    It is true that the president has no technical power to disband the court, and opposition parties like Holos have been content to merely call for the resignation of the judges, a move that Tupytsky has ruled out. But with four of its 15 judges already under investigation for breach of the declaration law, the optics are not in the court’s favor.

    This particular crisis serves as the perfect example for the question of anti-corruption initiatives, namely: Can or should a country fight corruption from the top down? Given the power of MPs within the legislature covering for corrupt judges or prosecutors, a Chatham House report from 2018 states that “The process of cleaning up institutions must start at the top.” Reform efforts such as the creation of the NABU or the push to mandate the disclosure of property and financial assets for public servants have increased the pressure on those with something to hide.

    However, the consolidation of anti-corruption rhetoric under Zelensky has made his administration vulnerable both to opportunistic opposition parties and their oligarch backers, as well as jeopardizing the democratizing push that catapulted Zelensky into office. A strong showing from a single party can only take the movement so far, and, as the Atlantic Council’s Adrian Karatnycky points out, the “remedy is not unilateral action by the president and his majority in the Rada. What is needed is a national consensus with the support of the pro-Western opposition.” This struggle takes place amidst increasing pressure from Kolomoisky to stop land reform as well as reclaim his PrivatBank that was nationalized in 2016 under President Petro Poroshenko.

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    Ukraine’s former economy minister, Tymofiy Mylovanov, is more sanguine about Zelensky’s options for weathering the storm. “If the law goes through, Zelensky comes out a victor, recaptures control of the parliament, and demonstrates in the public eye that he is trying to fulfill his promises of getting rid of the corrupt elites and making Ukraine prosperous,” he said. But “if the law gets stuck, it is parliament that is to blame.”

    The question remains about how effectively Zelensky can cooperate with a parliament that would presumably continue to hemorrhage allies, meaning that his party can only hope that the constitutional crisis is resolved in a way that allows the president to achieve a public victory. Whether understood as a self-perpetuating environment or simply as actions of malicious or greedy individuals, corruption flourishes when allowed to become the status quo. The battle for the constitutional court and, by extension, the legitimacy of much of Zelensky’s anti-corruption legacy will be fought with all sides utilizing the public rhetoric of upholding the laws of Ukraine.

    For Volodymyr Zelensky, the judges know that “only a weak president and a weak state are a guarantee of preserving their corrupt lifestyle.” The fear now is that executive attempts to strengthen the state will simply erode support from other stakeholders while failing to disincentivize corrupt behavior.

    Progress is understandably relative, and the power of corrupt networks has had over three decades to grow and evolve. The rhetoric of war, whether on corruption or separatism, would seem to promise glory and immediacy of a result that can only lead to disappointment for a weary public. Ukraine has yet to win its war on corruption, and it seems to be put in an untenable geopolitical position by a hostile government in Moscow. That being said, Russia lost its battle with corruption a long time ago. Ukraine has taken a different path, and it remains to be seen whether it will succeed.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Emmanuel Macron Defends His Crusade

    Throughout the month of October, French President Emmanuel Macron projected himself into the global news cycle as the leader of a new crusade launched ostensibly to bring Islam into conformity with French Enlightenment ideals. In reality, his campaign is aimed at bolstering his chances of winning a second term in the 2022 presidential election.

    Is Peace Religious or Secular?

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    The Muslim world’s reaction to Macron’s crusade has been one of stunned bewilderment. In an interview with Al Jazeera on Saturday, the president offered no apologies and instead sought to explain his motives: “I understand the sentiments being expressed and I respect them. But you must understand my role right now, it’s to do two things: to promote calm and also to protect these rights.”

    Here is today’s 3D definition:

    Promote calm:

    Engage in any action — however ill-conceived, unjust or destructive — that affords peace of mind to a politician worried about his diminishing chances of winning the next election.

    Contextual Note

    Can President Macron be serious when he says that his actions and discourse have served to promote calm? Has the world or France itself become calmer since his speech at the beginning of October, when he declared that Islam was in crisis globally? Can he be unaware that when a Western leader announces what Al Jazeera describes as “his plan ‘to reform Islam’ in order to make it more compatible with his country’s republican values,” some may interpret that as a sign of aggression against their culture by a European who appears to have retained a neocolonial mindset?

    Does Macron believe that by providing a supplementary motive to unhinged individuals driven by fanaticism and ready to engage in murderous violence against his own people he is promoting calm and protecting rights? President Donald Trump might claim the same thing when he encourages white supremacists and the police to attack protesters in the name of “retribution.” The only logical perspective that could lead to calm in the struggle he describes would be total victory. In other words, crushing and humiliating the other side. But even that would be a failed plan. Humiliation brings short-term peace but sets the stage for major revolt as soon as the winner’s grip begins to loosen.

    Macron proudly announces: “I will always defend in my country the freedom to speak, to write, to think, to draw.” The only threat to that freedom can come from institutions with the power to repress it, not from individuals who react irrationally to what some people write, think and draw. Macron’s language is fundamentally dishonest. The controversy that has been going on for over a decade is not about the right to speak, think and draw. It concerns the possible social consequences of publishing, disseminating and amplifying messages that some may interpret as an expression of hateful and discriminatory intimidation. 

    Embed from Getty Images

    Jules Ferry, the virulently anticlerical father of laïcité, created France’s modern public education system. As minister of education in 1883, he instructed teachers to speak “with the greatest reserve, whenever you risk even brushing against a religious sentiment of which you are not the judge.” He insisted that if “a single honest man may take offense at what you are going to say … abstain from saying it.” Macron has a different reading of laïcité. In fact, the controversy turns around a bigger problem at the core of today’s civilization: the role of the media. In its quest to increase its audience, the media routinely amplifies every difference of opinion or quarrel that it presents as a cause to be defended, on one side or the other. In such circumstances, every word and gesture may be perceived as a provocation of the other side. 

    By way of contrast, in a society that encourages healthy dialogue and debate, friction and tension will inevitably exist, but they contribute to building a culture of tolerance and open exchange. Social dialogue can have its ugly moments, as parties directly challenge each other. But respectful dialogue creates networks of understanding rather than pockets of conflict. As soon as debates are turned into defending “a cause,” dialogue disappears.

    Causes kill debate by invoking a higher principle that often exists only in the purveyor’s mind. Emmanuel Macron’s formulation of the idea of freedom is far more absolute than its actual practice in France, where restrictions on freedom of speech, including libel and hate speech, incitement to violence and insulting public servants, exist and are enforced. Jules Ferry would have expected his teachers to reflect on whether the Charlie Hebdo cartoons fell into any of those categories.

    French political culture has traditionally reserved a special status for satire. Its preservation ensures that the people may criticize the government and institutions of authority. The government is free to counter with its own arguments but runs the risk of being held to account if it goes too far in restricting citizens’ rights. The cartoons in question had nothing to do with the questioning of national authorities. They were much closer to nationalistic propaganda.

    The controversy over the cartoons appears to cross an invisible borderline between satire and gratuitous and xenophobic insult. There is no readily identifiable borderline but a culture that pretends to be as rational as France’s vaunted Enlightenment culture claims to be should acknowledge the reality of the borderline. Even in his attempt at an apology in the Al Jazeera interview, Macron clearly refuses to do so.

    It is a well-known fact that politicians distort everything to attain their ends. It is part of their job profile. Macron distorts even the idea of distorting. He complains about “distortions” that led people “to believe that the caricatures were a creation of the French state.” That is clearly a distortion on his part. No serious voice has made that claim. He then generously notes that “in the world there are people who distort Islam and in the name of this religion that they claim to defend, they kill, they slaughter.” That may be true, but the effect of his speeches has been to distort the nature what he calls the “global crisis” of Islam.

    Al Jazeera’s senior political analyst, Marwan Bishara, sagely and humbly expresses the wish that Macron “should begin to improve the atmosphere between France, Europe, and the Muslim world.” Bishara nevertheless implies that is unlikely. On this occasion, he doesn’t mention the reason why, which he is well aware of. There will be a new presidential election in 18 months.

    Historical Note

    Samuel Paty, the assassinated teacher at the heart of all this, undoubtedly believed that the Charlie Hebdo cartoons, originally published in 2015, belonged to history and could be treated as artifacts of the past when he presented them in a civics class. After all, political cartoons published in newspapers are essentially ephemera. They quickly disappear from everyone’s cultural memory. The Greeks understand that since their word for newspaper is εφημερίδα — ephemerida. 

    If Paty believed that the cartoons belonged only to the past, he was wrong. Because of the media’s and politicians’ obsession with causes and the fact that the Charlie Hebdo murder trial was currently underway, the issues around the cartoons were very much alive. 

    In the late 20th century, Ireland endured a prolonged conflict between Protestants and Catholics marked by terrorism. The IRA was better organized and better equipped than any of today’s loose Muslim extremist networks. We might wonder today whether it would have made any sense for Protestant cartoonists to publish cartoons of the pope as a terrorist? (They obviously could not have taken Jesus as their target because both of the warring religions were Christian). 

    The answer is simple. It didn’t happen. Everyone understood the conflict had nothing to do with religion and everything to do with communities and conflicting loyalties. This is perfectly illustrated in a joke from that time: It’s night and a man is walking on the streets of Belfast. Suddenly a shadowy figure leaps out and thrusts him against a wall in a dark alley. He feels a gun pressed up against his skull. A voice shouts, “What religion are you?” He thinks: “If I say Catholic and he’s Protestant, he’ll kill me. If I say Protestant and he’s Catholic, I’m dead.” Thinking quickly, he said, “I’m Jewish.” He then heard the voice blurt out, “I must be the luckiest Palestinian in Ulster.”

    Now that is meaningful and effective satire. Though troubling, it can elicit a laugh from people of any religion. 

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    A Counterweight to Authoritarianism, People Power Is on the Rise

    Despite all the obstacles, Americans are voting in huge numbers prior to Election Day. With a week to go, nearly 70 million voters have sent in their ballots or stood on line for early voting. The pandemic hasn’t prevented them from exercising their constitutional right. Nor have various Republican Party schemes to suppress the vote. Some patriotic citizens have waited all day at polling places just to make sure that their voices are heard.

    Americans are not alone. In Belarus and Bolivia, Poland and Thailand, Chile and Nigeria, people are pushing back against autocrats and coups and police violence. Indeed, 2020 may well go down in history alongside 1989 and 1968 as a pinnacle of people power.

    Some pundits, however, remain skeptical that people power can turn the authoritarian tide that has swept Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro and Narendra Modi into office. “People power, which democratized countries from South Korea and Poland in the 1980s to Georgia and Ukraine in the 2000s and Tunisia in 2010, has been on a losing streak,” writes Jackson Diehl this week in The Washington Post. “That’s true even though mass protests proliferated in countries around the world last year and have continued in a few places during 2020 despite the pandemic.”

    Diehl can point to a number of cases to prove his point. Despite massive popular resistance, many autocrats haven’t budged. Vladimir Putin remains in charge in Russia, despite several waves of protest. Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to have only consolidated his power in Turkey. And who expected Bashar al-Assad to still be in power in Syria after the Arab Spring, a punishing civil war and widespread international condemnation?

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    Even where protests have been successful, for instance most recently in Mali, it was the military, not democrats, who took over from a corrupt and unpopular leader. Rather than slink out of their palaces or send in the tanks for a final stand by, autocrats have deployed more sophisticated strategies to counter popular protests. They’re more likely to wait out the storm. They use less overtly violent means or deploy their violence in more targeted ways to suppress civil society. Also, they’ve been able to count on friends in high places, notably Donald Trump, who wishes that he could rule forever.

    Pundits tend to overstate the power of the status quo. Autocrats may have the full panoply of state power at their disposal, but they also tend to dismiss challenges to their authority until it’s too late. As Americans await the verdict on Trump’s presidency, they can take heart that the tide may be turning for people power all over the world.

    Overturning Coups: Bolivia and Thailand

    One year ago, Bolivia held an election that the Organization of American States (OAS) called into question. The apparent winner was Evo Morales, who had led the small South American nation for nearly 14 years. The OAS, however, identified tampering in at least 38,000 ballots. Morales won by 35,000 votes. Pressured by the Bolivian military, Morales stepped down and then fled the country. A right-wing government took over and set about suppressing Morales’ Movement for Socialism (MAS) party. It looked, for all the world, like a coup.

    The OAS report set into motion this chain of events. Subsequent analysis, however, demonstrated that the OAS judgment was flawed and that there were no statistical anomalies in the vote. Granted, there were other problems with the election, but they could have been investigated without calling into question the entire enterprise.

    It’s also true that Morales himself possesses an autocratic streak. He held a referendum to overturn the presidential term limit and then ignored the result to run again. He came under criticism from environmentalists, feminists, and his former supporters. But Morales was a shrewd leader whose policies raised the standard of living for the country’s poorest inhabitants, particularly those from indigenous communities.

    Embed from Getty Images

    These policies have enduring popularity in the country. With Morales out of the political equation, Bolivians made their preferences clear in an election earlier this month. Luis Arce, the new leader of MAS, received 55% of the vote in a seven-way race, a sufficient margin to avoid a run-off. The leader of last year’s protest movement against Morales received a mere 14%. MAS also captured majorities in both houses of congress. An extraordinary 88% of Bolivian voters participated in the election. The victory of MAS is a reminder that the obituaries for Latin America’s “pink tide” have been a tad premature.

    The Bolivians are not the only ones intent on overturning the results of a coup. In Thailand, crowds of protesters have taken to the streets to protest what The Atlantic calls the “world’s last military dictatorship.” In the past, Thailand has been nearly torn apart by a battle between the red shirts (populists) and the yellow shirts (royalists). This time around, students and leftists from the reds have united with some middle-class yellows against a common enemy: the military. Even members of the police have been seen flashing the three-finger salute of the protesters, which they’ve borrowed from “The Hunger Games.”

    The protesters want the junta’s figurehead, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, to step down. They want to revise the military-crafted constitution. And they want reforms in the monarchy that stands behind the political leadership. Anger at the royals has been rising since the new king took over in 2016, particularly since he spends much of his time with his entourage in a hotel in Bavaria.

    It’s not easy to outmaneuver the Thai military. The country has had more coups in the modern era than any other country: 13 successful ones and nine that have failed. But this is the first time in a long time that the country seems unified in its opposition to the powers that be.

    Finally, the prospects for democracy in Mali received a recent boost as the military junta that took over in August orchestrated a transition to more or less civilian rule over the last month. The new government includes the former foreign minister, Moctar Ouane, as prime minister and several positions for the Tuaregs, who’d previously tilted toward separatism. Military men still occupy some key positions in the new government, but West African governments were sufficiently satisfied with this progress to lift the economic sanctions imposed after the coup. National elections are to take place in 18 months.

    Standing Up the Autocrats: Belarus and Poland 

    Protesters in Belarus want Alexander Lukashenko to leave office. Lukashenko refuses to go, so the protesters are refusing to go as well. Mass protests have continued on the streets of Minsk and other Belarusian cities ever since Lukashenko declared himself the winner of the presidential election in August. The last European dictator has done his best to suppress the resistance. The authorities detained at least 20,000 people and beat many of those in custody.

    This Sunday, nearly three months after the election, 100,000 again showed up in Minsk to give punch to an ultimatum issued by exiled opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya: Lukashenko either steps down or will face a nationwide work stoppage. Lukashenko didn’t step down. So, people walked out. The strikes began on Monday, with workers refusing to show up at enterprises and students boycotting classes. Shops closed down, their owners creating human chains in Minsk. Even retirees joined in.

    Notably, the protest movement in Belarus is directed by women. Slawomir Sierakowski describes one telling incident in The New York Review of Books:

    “After receiving reports of an illegal assembly, a riot squad is dispatched to disperse it. But when they get there, it turns out to comprise three elderly ladies sitting on a bench, each holding piece of paper: the first sheet is white, the second red, the third white again — the colors of the pro-democracy movement’s flag. Sheepishly, these masked commandos with no identification numbers herd the women into a car and carry them off to jail.
    How many sweet old ladies can a regime lock up without looking ridiculous?” 

    Women are rising up in neighboring Poland as well, fed up the overtly patriarchal leadership of the ruling Law and Justice Party. The right-wing government has recently made abortion near-to-impossible in the country, and protesters have taken to the streets. In fact, they’ve been blockading city centers.

    It’s not just women. Farmers and miners have also joined the protests. As one miner’s union put it, “a state that assumes the role of ultimate arbiter of people’s consciences is heading in the direction of a totalitarian state.”

    Strengthening the Rule of Law: Chile and Nigeria

    Chile has been a democracy for three decades. But it has still abided by a constitution written during the Pinochet dictatorship. That, finally, will change, thanks to a protest movement sparked by a subway fare increase. Beginning last year, students led the demonstrations against that latest austerity measure from the government. Resistance took its toll: Around 36 people have died at the hands of the militarized police. But protests continued despite COVID-19.

    What started as anger over a few pesos has culminated in more profound political change. This week, Chileans went to the polls in a referendum on the constitution, with 78% voting in favor of a new constitution. In April, another election will determine the delegates for the constitutional convention. In 2022, Chileans will approve or reject the new constitution.

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    The protests were motivated by the economic inequality of Chilean society. A new constitution could potentially facilitate greater government involvement in the economy. But that kind of shift away from the neoliberal strictures of the Pinochet era will require accompanying institutional reforms throughout the Chilean system. A new generation of Chileans who have seen their actions on the streets translate into constitutional change will be empowered to stay engaged to make those changes happen.

    In Nigeria, meanwhile, the recent protests have focused on an epidemic of police killings. But the protests have led to more violence, with the police responsible for a dozen killings in Lagos last week, which only generated more protest and more violence. Activists throughout Africa — in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and elsewhere — have been inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement to challenge police brutality in their own countries. Accountable governments, transparent institutions, respect for the rule of law: These are all democratic preconditions. Without them, the elections that outsiders focus on as the litmus test of democracy are considerably less meaningful.

    The Future of People Power

    People power has caught governments by surprise in the past. That surprise factor has largely disappeared. Lukashenko knows what a color revolution looks like and how best to head it off. The government in Poland contains some veterans of the Solidarity movement, and they know from the inside how to deal with street protests. The Thai military has played the coup card enough times to know how to avert a popular takeover at the last moment.

    But in this cat-and-mouse world, people power is evolving as well. New technologies provide new powers of persuasion and organizing. Greater connectivity provides greater real-time scrutiny of government actions. Threats like climate change provide new urgency. Sure, authoritarians can wait out the storm. But the people can do the same.

    Here in the United States, periodic demonstrations have done little to push the Trump administration toward needed reforms. Nor have they led to his removal from office. Trump delights in ignoring and disparaging his critics. He rarely listens even to his advisers. But the four years are up on Tuesday. The American people will have a chance to speak. And this time the whole world is listening and watching. Judging from the president’s approval ratings overseas, they too are dreaming of regime change.

    *[This article was originally published by Foreign Policy in Focus.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Is Peace Religious or Secular?

    Reporting on yesterday’ horrendous knife attack in Nice’s cathedral, Al Jazeera defined the context: “The incident comes amid growing tensions between France and the Muslim world over French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent speech wherein he said Islam was in ‘crisis’, and amid renewed public support in France for the right to show cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.”

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    Earlier this week, Fair Observer’s founder, CEO and editor-in-chief, Atul Singh, teaming up with the great and respected scholar Ishtiaq Ahmed, published an article with the title, “Macron Claims Islam Is in ‘Crisis.’ Erdogan Disagrees.” Citing the public quarrel that recently broke out between the French and Turkish presidents, the authors review various moments of violence in the political history of Muslim expansion in Asia.

    France finds itself undergoing a historical psychodrama with existential implications. At the beginning of October, Macron asserted that “Islam is a religion that is in crisis,” accusing it of the anti-republican crime of “separatism.” Commentators avoided noticing that this was a clever ploy on Macron’s part to distract attention from the fact that France and Europe have been in an existential crisis for some time. Pointing to someone else’s crisis is an efficient way of hiding one’s own.

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    Above all, Macron wants to convince voters in France that he, far better than the nationalist Marine Le Pen, has the stature to confront the consequences of Islam’s global crisis. The president has built a fragile center-right power base, and his main challengers in the 2022 election are on the right and the extreme right. He must at all costs occupy some of their terrain. The Muslim threat is the hot-button issue that has the most immediate impact.

    Shortly after President Macron’s denunciation of the global crisis of Islam, the gruesome killing and beheading of Samuel Paty took place. The history teacher’s 18-year-old assassin, born in Chechnya, had been educated in French public schools from the age of 6. Paty’s crime had been to show his class the controversial Charlie Hebdo cartoons ridiculing Islam in a lesson about freedom of speech. Macron has since made a point of defending the “liberty of blasphemy” as a basic right, protesting that he would not “renounce the caricatures,” which for some may sound as if he is endorsing their content.

    The article by Ahmed and Singh builds up to a fundamental question: “Does Islam lead to violence and terrorism?” After noting that “[m]any Islamic scholars and political analysts argue in the negative,” the authors boldly announce their “contrarian view that Islam can only be a religion of peace after it conquers the world and establishes a supremacy of sharia.”

    Here is today’s 3D definition:

    Religion of peace:

    Every religion at its spiritual core, just as every religion as soon as it is appropriated or overtaken by political forces becomes a religion of war

    Contextual Note

    Throughout mankind’s history, there have been so many sects, cults, churches and spiritual philosophies that generalizing about religion itself can only be a futile exercise. Generalizing about any single religion, especially one shared by more than a billion people and that has lasted over a thousand years, is equally fraught with ambiguity. Attributing to a religion the ambition of conquering the world begs so many questions of history, economy, political organization and culture that no discussion, however rational, can hope to produce an acceptable general conclusion.

    St. Augustine observed that if fire is used to produce warmth, we see it as good and peaceful, but if used to burn and destroy, it appears aggressive and evil. The same is true of any religion. History offers examples of both the good and evil uses of religion. Searching the sacred texts of any religion will provide examples of exhortations that may at times suggest aggressive inclinations and at others, peace and harmony.

    It is not the task of a Devil’s Dictionary’s to defend any particular religion or religion in general, but rather to recognize those occasions when even secular thought — and more particularly political thought — hides the fact that it has its own dogmas, often as categoric and absolute as the most puritanical religion.

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    Most media commentators have refused to notice what is obvious about the situation in France. Laicité in the hands of French politicians has become a surrogate religion. It has produced a belief system with doctrines increasingly formulated as dogmas. Political scientist Olivier Roy wonders whether Macron isn’t seeking to abolish the separation of church and state, the foundation of laïcité, by focusing only on Islam. Macron’s stance implies that “the simple fact of placing God above men is a declaration of separatism.” Laïcité risks becoming a religion of war, not peace.

    Emulating the Catholic Church, Macron’s government turned Paty into a republican saint and martyr when it instantly conferred upon him the Légion d’honneur. In the days following his killing, some had proposed to have him interred at the Pantheon, to be entombed with the “gods” of the republic. In contrast, the Vatican requires an elaborate procedure, the passage of time and the intervention of the devil’s advocate before canonizing its saints and martyrs.

    One prominent voice in French politics has suggested a subtle but necessary distinction that Macron’s government and the media prefer to avoid. Jean-Luc Mélanchon, the head of the party La France Insoumise, has consistently militated in the past for severe punitive measures directed not at “Islam in crisis,” “radical Islam” or even fundamentalism, but at the actors of “political Islam,” a term Roy defines as “the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology.” For this crime, Macron’s minister of education calls Mélanchon a treasonous “Islamo-gauchiste.”

    Historical note

    Though the characterization of Islam by Ishtiaq Ahmed and Atul Singh appears abusive in its generality, there is a very real sense in which is true. All systems of thought that claim to be universal are tempted by despotism. If we define secular peace as a state of shared understanding and harmonious interaction across an entire population, we must recognize that it implies some degree of submission and conformity to an order, usually a political order. It’s a question of degree and the means of enforcement available. France’s Reign of Terror was conceived by secular rationalists. Throughout history, submission and conformity have been achieved through fear and intimidation, conquest and slaughter.

    Both Christianity and Islam claim to be universal. In the history of both religions, we have seen examples that tended toward two extremes: the generous belief that the religion is accessible to all people and the insistence that all people in a specific region embrace it. The determining factor has always been the political climate and social traditions within which the universality of the religion and its moral system have been applied or imposed.

    The same is true of secular religions such as French republicanism and American exceptionalism. These non-religious cults play a determining role in the nations’ foreign policy. The US and France have each created a political religion that they believe is not only proper to their nation, but represents a universal model that other nations should emulate. In both cases, the separation of church and state plays an important role, clearing the way for universal adherence to the declared values of the republic and the civic religion.

    Embed from Getty Images

    Some point out that Islam differs from Christianity, whose founder insisted on rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar’s but not what is God’s. They may argue that Islam has never taken the trouble to distinguish between religious and political authority and has, throughout history, consistently invited confusion between the two. But in the Muslim world, the tradition of Sufism dates back to the early Umayyad period. Though it never had any pretension of becoming dominant, its historical reality demonstrates the awareness of a radical distinction between the spiritual (faith) and the worldly (politics).

    In short, religions play the role that history allows them to play. They also influence the politics we in the West, somewhat presumptuously, consider to be the unique basis of history. Moral philosophy always accompanies religion and can at times play a dominant role. But more often, political forces associated with religion manage to push it aside or mold it into something new. Whether any dominant religion becomes a religion of war or peace lies in the eyes of the beholder at a specific moment of history.

    *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    What WhatsApp Conversations Reveal About the Far Right’s Ideology

    Forum for Democracy (FvD) is a political party on the rise in the Netherlands. Thierry Baudet, FvD’s conservative revolutionary leader, positions himself and his party as right-wing and as an acceptable ideological alternative to all other Dutch parties. All media controversies about his radical-right ideology are labeled by Baudet as the work of opponents trying to frame him and the party in a negative way. A careful analysis of WhatsApp messages shared between the youth divisions of the party, however, shows a different reality, namely that mass media reporting helps shape a metapolitical discourse without deradicalizing the core ideology. 

    Intimate Conversations

    Thierry Baudet likes to use controversy to normalize his ideology. This strategy can be seen in his victory speech following the 2019 election and his review of Michel Houellebecq’s book “Sérotonine” for American Affairs. The two interventions were in essence about what he calls the decline of the boreal (or “Northern”) civilization and what Baudet sees as the devastating impact of the party cartel in particular and the individualization and atomization of society since 18th-century Enlightenment in general.

    Such discourse is emblematic of Baudet’s ideological position. He regularly echoes anti-Enlightenment, conservative revolutionary and new right thinkers such as Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye. All the classic tropes from these thinkers are present in his discourse: the decline of the nation, the demographic question, the loss of identity, traditional family and gender roles, and the devastating impact of globalization, liberalism and the French Revolution. And, as with any new right leader, he also loudly stresses the need for a national and civilizational rebirth. 

    Most notable, however, is that both his victory speech and his review became the object of intense media scrutiny. In Baudet’s victory speech, the use of the word “boreal” was read as an indication of his radical-right stance. In his review, it was the use of the word “suicide” in relation to abortion and his suggestion that women entering the workplace causes the decline of society that affirmed this profile. But despite all the classic ingredients of generic fascism being on full display, the Dutch media centered around some emblematic features without discussing the ideology that gives meaning to those excerpts.

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    This allowed Baudet to claim that the media was taking his words out of context and that it avoided the real debate on the issues that he was proposing. He constructed, as usual, the idea of an unfair witch hunt by fully exploiting the multilayered meanings attached to his words.

    In light of this public debate, the discussions in the party WhatsApp groups are revealing. WhatsApp groups have become important tools for political parties and for populists in particular. The groups are used to share political messages among young FvD militants and even to suggest a direct line between Baudet and his sympathizers. The closed spaces of those groups not only enable so-called echo chambers, but they also facilitate more intimate conversations among party members and sympathizers as well as functioning as a teaching environment for new recruits.

    As a result of the more informal and private nature of such groups, participants tend to lower their guard. Those conversations, when made public, can become highly explosive scandals. The FvD experienced this first-hand in April this year when a group of young party militants leaked a series of racist, radical-right memes and posts that were posted on the party’s official WhatsApp groups. They did this after their concerns remained unanswered by the leaders of the youth division and the party elite.

    The whistleblowers categorized the communication in those groups as “expressions that correspond to authoritarian, fascist and/or National Socialist ideas, including anti-Semitism, homophobia and racist imperialism.” In short, the posts showed the integration of the members in the global new right culture. The media backlash was substantial, but the party, even though it called the discourse “disgusting,” refused to apologize. 

    Surveillance Culture

    This summer, the Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant asked this author to analyze another 900 WhatsApp messages of the FvD’s youth divisions. Those new chats were collected after the media storm caused by the first leak and illustrate the impact of earlier leaks. Concretely, we see how members of the WhatsApp group act as if they are being watched by mainstream media like de Volkskrant or the NRC. 

    Moderators help members to imagine surveillance and to self-surveil. Party member Iem Al Biyati, for instance, explains how members should interact in the WhatsApp group: “Place yourself in the position of a journalist before you post edgy memes. You know very well how everything can be framed, so don’t open up that space.” In the literature, this is called imagined surveillance: moderators imagine “the scrutiny that could take place … and may engender future risks” for the party and act accordingly. As a result, a culture of (self-)surveillance is installed within the group chat. Not only the moderators but also regular members intervene when somebody posts something that can create bad optics.

    Why is this important? The interventions and the non-interventions of moderators and members help us understand what the party and its members understand as acceptable discourse within both the party itself and society at large. It also allows us to understand the reception and appropriation of the discourse of the party elite by the militants and staffers. This is especially relevant when the party elite regularly claims to be misunderstood by the (left-wing) mass media and academia. And, lastly and maybe most importantly in the context of this article, it allows us to assess the impact of mass media hype on the discourse among party members.

    Moderation policies in the WhatsApp group affect those topics that can connect the party to national socialism, Nazism and, in particular, anti-Semitism. Explicit anti-Semitism, explicit racism or incitement to violence are (sometimes) moderated. Any association with those topics has the potential to destroy the metapolitical construction of the party and push it out of the Overton window. Despite this surveillance culture, we see that members are still very explicit in their aversion toward LGBTQ+ people, migrants and migration, and the left. The analysis that Dutch identity has been emptied and is now filled with “transgenderism” in an attempt to destroy the nation passes without moderation. The framing of criminals as mainly “non-boreals” is not moderated, indicating that the controversy the media has created around Baudet’s use of the term didn’t succeed in harming the party. 

    A similar pattern is visible after mainstream media claimed that Baudet questioned the role of working women, as well as the availability of euthanasia and abortion in his review of Houellebecq’s book. Baudet himself claimed that his words were taken out of context, but in the WhatsApp group, the members, including the moderators, were enthusiastic, responding with “It was about time,” “nice!,” “he is just a great thinker, who thinks things through and puts them up for debate. Very well done! Proud of Cherry.” These takes were not only similar to what the mainstream media read in Baudet’s interventions, but in many cases, this back-facing discourse was far more radical than what Baudet explicitly stated or what the media made of it. Mainstream media reporting didn’t have an impact on the reception of Baudet’s words among peers.

    Triggering Outsiders

    Already in the 1990s, J.B. Thompson stressed that the study of ideology should not only look at the original text, but also at the transmission, construction, reception and appropriation of ideological discourse. From the FvD’s WhatsApp messages, we see how the party’s ideology is shaped in the interaction between the members of the WhatsApp group, the official party discourse and mass media reporting. 

    The moderation policies in the WhatsApp groups are partially informed by previous media attention. An earlier WhatsApp scandal created a surveillance culture that steers the militants away from damaging scandals. But this surveillance culture is rarely legitimized in terms of the party and its ideology. The need for self-surveillance is advocated to avoid what the journalists, in the words of another moderator, can use it to “frame” the party. 

    The imagined surveillance does not seem to affect the uptake of Baudet’s discourse by the militants and staffers in the WhatsApp groups. Mass media hypes that avoid tackling the larger ideology of the party contribute to the metapolitical character of the discourse. They help to establish a radical discourse that avoids explicit connotations with neo-Nazism, anti-Semitism and fascism. At the same time, we see that mass media reporting hardly affects the ideological core conviction of its members. With the exception of explicit or so-called “ironic” racism, anti-Semitism and references to Nazism, militants and moderators in the Young Forum for Democracy WhatsApp groups amplify Baudet’s discourse even when they think that they are being watched.

    The word “boreal” has been used in over 100 WhatsApp messages. Baudet clearly has succeeded in introducing the term and establishing a strategic ambivalence concerning its meaning. The militants clearly understand the strategic potential of the ambivalent meaning, which now functions as an identity emblem in the group. It is clear that when media hypes fail to sketch the bigger ideological picture, the words and sentences that are extrapolated from of Thierry Baudet’s discourse become badges of honor because they have succeeded in triggering the outsiders without causing bad optics. 

    *[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Anti-Semitism Is Resurfacing Again in Germany

    In October 2019, a right-wing terrorist attack on a synagogue in Halle an der Saale led to two fatalities and reminded the German public of rising anti-Jewish violence and right-wing extremism. In the aftermath of the attack, Chancellor Angela Merkel called for more protection for Jewish people. Sadly, statements like these expose the fact that the political sphere in Germany has been underestimating the growing threat against Jewish life. 

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    Roman Yossel Remis was leading the prayers at the synagogue on the day of the attack and stated, “Today I experienced what it means to be Jewish, to be a Jew in 2019.” According to the journalist and author Richard Chaim Schneider, the attack in Halle showed that “Anti-Semitism has long since returned to the center of society. No, not arrived, because it never left: it simply crawled out of its holes again.”

    Jewish Voters Want to Know

    The Halle terrorist attack was the point of culmination and a gruesome expression of overriding societal developments concerning anti-Semitism in Germany. According to the latest report on anti-Semitism from Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, “Anti-Jewish sentiment can be found in all extremist areas of Germany but is particularly prevalent in the right-wing spectrum.” Corresponding anti-Semitic attitudes also circulate among conspiracy theorists, in Islamism and, to a lesser extent, in left-wing extremism. Recent statistics undermine these worrying developments: Anti-Semitic violence doubled between 2017 and 2019, and 85% of the 73 anti-Semitic acts of violence in 2019 were motivated by right-wing extremism. 

    The return of anti-Semitism into the mainstream of German society highlights the question of where political parties stand in respect to its manifestations. The question also weighs heavily on those affected, namely Jewish people living in Germany. Linda Rachel Sabiers, a German author and columnist of Jewish descent, tried to describe the psychology of Jewish voters. According to Sabiers, many hinge their voting decisions on two key questions. Which party does the most against anti-Semitism and how to “vote Jewish.”

    These were the questions she had to face up to herself: “If one wants to vote Jewish … one can perhaps weigh up which party actively opposes anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. The search for a political home that offers both has made many Jews unhappy. … For years, I asked myself similar questions when voting, and at times — because of the anti-Semitism that flared … — I felt so cornered that between the ages of 18 and 34, I had no normal relationship to voting.” Following Sabiers’ opinion that this pattern of thought seems to be widespread among Jewish voters, a closer look at Germany’s political parties is of interest. Where do the main German parties stand in regard to anti-Semitism?

    Alternative for Germany (AfD) 

    Despite leading representatives of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) stressing the party’s pro-Israel and pro-Jewish stance, statements by members repeatedly trigger allegations of anti-Semitism. Even the existing faction, Jews in the AfD, which the AfD often refers to as evidence for the party’s pro-Jewish viewpoints, cannot gloss over anti-Semitic tendencies in the party ranks. The Central Council of Jews in Germany criticized the AfD’s pro-Jewish image by stating that the “AfD is a danger for Jewish life in Germany [and] a racist and anti-Semitic party.”

    This warning comes against the backdrop of numerous problematic incidents of anti-Semitism within the AfD. One accusation was brought against Wolfgang Gedeon, an MP for the AfD in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, according to whom the view that the blame for the Second World War lies with the Nazis is “a version dictated by Zionism.”

    Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) 

    After the lessons of the Nazi past and the resulting anti-Semitic fundamental consensus in the German public, anti-Jewish references ceased to play a role in the programmatic orientation of the center-right CDU/CSU. Nevertheless, the reproaches of anti-Semitism occurred regularly. Most prominently, Martin Hohmann, a former CDU MP, stated in 2003 that the claim of collective guilt against Germans during the Nazi period should also apply to Jewish people. The CDU/CSU subsequently excluded Hohmann from the fraction and party. Hohmann joined the AfD. 

    Liberal Democrats (FDP)

    After the foundation of the FDP in the 1950s, national liberal tendencies were dominant. The party included people who had held high positions in the Nazi regime. From the late 1960s onward, the FDP departed from its national liberal imprint toward a center to center-right party.

    But in 2002, the infamous Möllemann scandal awoke ghosts of the past. Jürgen Möllemann, a former MP in the national parliament, the Bundestag, was accused of stirring up anti-Semitic attitudes in society by claiming that the Israeli prime minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, had to bear the blame for the escalation of the Middle East conflict. He also branded German-Jewish television journalist, Michel Friedman, to be his political propagandist. The FDP refrained from taking decisive action against Möllemann. Since then, no incidents of equal gravity occurred.

    The Greens 

    The center-left Green Party, which defines itself as a political force oriented toward human rights and the environment, publicly condemns anti-Semitism. Correspondingly, issues with anti-Semitism remained the exception. Still, debates about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulted in internal party disputes about potential anti-Semitic remarks and connotations. One major incident took place in 2002, when Jamal Karsli, an MP in the North Rhine-Westphalian state parliament, criticized the Israeli armed forces for applying Nazi methods in the conflict. In reaction to accusations of using anti-Semitic rhetoric, Karsli left the party and joined the FDP.

    Die Linke (The Left)

    A minority of The Left party harbors a pronounced hostility toward Israel that bubbles up regularly. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether anti-imperialism, anti-Semitism or a mixture of both lies at the forefront of this hostility. Anti-Israel positions in the left-wing of the party usually aim at Israeli state policies toward Palestine. By often alluding to a “David versus Goliath” narrative, Israel supposedly acts as an imperial, ruthless power.

    Among several problematic intraparty incidents was the invitation of two controversial publicists and Israel critics, Max Blumenthal and David Sheen, to a discussion on the topic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by two MPs from The Left. Gregor Gysi, former party whip in the Bundestag, disapproved of the invitation and decided to call off the meeting.

    Social Democratic Party (SPD)

    The center-left SPD has been steadfast in its committed stand against anti-Semitism. André Levi Israel Ufferfilge, a researcher in Jewish Studies at Münster University, wrote in 2009: “In my opinion, the SPD seems to have a good standing with many Jews. … It is very welcome that the SPD has a working group for Jewish Social Democrats and that Judaism is considered part of the roots of social democracy in the SPD’s latest party manifesto.”

    Although anti-Semitic incidents are just as rare as with the Greens, the party has not been untouched by accusations. In 2018, Ulrich Mäurer, an SPD senator from Bremen, falsely claimed that the Israeli army is “executing dozens of Palestinians at the border fence.” In response to fierce criticism from outside and within the party, Mäurer apologized for his “unfortunate choice of words.”

    Germany’s Parties Need to Act on Anti-Semitism

    All parties in the German Bundestag show sensitivity toward the issue of anti-Semitism and are quick in denouncing it. Still, some, particularly the AfD, either display more frequent or singular prominent allegations of anti-Semitism, like the Möllemann scandal in the FDP, that persist in the public memory. Thanks to fewer major allegations, Jewish voters lean toward parties closer to the center, like the SPD and the Greens.

    Nevertheless, none of the parties have been unblemished by accusations of anti-Israel or anti-Semitic rhetoric. These controversial incidents often give rise to exhaustive debates among the German public about the thin line between justifiable criticism of Israeli politics and anti-Semitism. Due to the public attention and the recent increase in anti-Semitic violence, these intra-party incidents weigh heavily on the minds of Jewish people and voters, and hence deserve scrutiny.

    Jewish voters in Germany seem to make their voting decision dependent on the parties’ attitudes toward anti-Semitism. That highlights their vulnerability in society, which originates in Germany’s history and the persecution of Jews during the Nazi period. This vulnerability has reemerged due to soaring anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. The growing concerns of Jewish people is a call to action for Germany’s political parties. Evaluating their own and other parties’ activities against anti-Semitism more thoroughly should be a small building block of a bigger picture, namely protecting Jewish life in Germany.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More